

AJS

CUR-HS467-7-KP16

American

Social

Anthropology

Volume 99 Number 4

January 1994

Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes—Stryker

Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment—Savelsberg

Legalization of the Workplace—Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, and Scott

Early Parental Work, Family Social Capital, Childhood Outcomes—Parcel and Menaghan

Intergenerational Support in Taiwan—Lee, Parish, and Willis

Educational Continuation by College Graduates—Stolzenberg

REVIEW ESSAY

Gagnon on Posner

The University of Chicago Press

MARTA TIENDA, Editor

IVAN ERMAKOFF, ROGER V GOULD, MARTIN RIESEBRODT, ROBERT J SAMPSON, and KAZUO YAMAGUCHI, Associate Editors

MARY C BRINTON, Associate Editor, Book Review

DAVID LINDSTROM, Assistant Book Review Editor

MARY BLAIR-LOY, GRACE KAO, CHAN-UNG PARK, and ALFORD A YOUNG, JR, Book Review Editorial Board

SUSAN ALLAN, Managing Editor

LAUREN FORD-TAGGART and CLAIR JAMES, Editorial Assistants

Consulting Editors PAUL D ALLISON • PETER BEARMAN • ROBERT J BURSİK, JR • GLENN R CARROLL • JOHN CASTERLINE • MARK CHAVES • KAREN COOK • NANCY DAVIS • NANCY DENTON • LAUREN EDELMAN • ROBERT R FAULKNER • SCOTT FELD • CLAUDE FISCHER • ROBERTO FRANZOSI • NOAH FRIEDKIN • MARK GRANOVETTER • LARRY GRIFFIN • DOUGLAS HECKATHORN • BARBARA HEYNS • FRED KNISS • GARY LAFREE • MARGARET MOONEY MARINI • J MILLER MCPHERSON • JAMES MONTGOMERY • DANIEL MONTI • JOEL PODOLNY • DUDLEY POSTON • CHARLES RAGIN • CECILIA RIDGEWAY • JOACHIM SINGELMANN • MATTHEW C SNIPP • GILLIAN STEVENS

International Consulting Editors JEAN-FRANCOIS AMADIEU (France) • NORMAN BRAUN (Switzerland) • ANDREAS DIEKMANN (Switzerland) • ULF HANNERZ (Sweden) • PETER HEDSTROM (Sweden) • JOHANNES HUININK (Germany) • NOAH LEWIN-EPSTEIN (Israel) • TOM A B SNIJDERS (The Netherlands) • HAYA STIER (Israel) • THOMAS VOSS (Germany) • JEROEN WEESIE (The Netherlands)

Editorial Board ANDREW D ABBOTT • WILLIAM G AXINN • GARY S BECKER • CHARLES E BIDWELL • DONALD J BOGUE • TERRY N CLARK • JAMES S COLEMAN • JOHN L COMAROFF • WENDY GRISWOLD • PHILIP M HAUSER • EVELYN KITAGAWA • EDWARD O LAUMANN • DONALD N LEVINE • DOUGLAS S MASSEY • WILLIAM L PARISH • MOISHE POSTONE • EDWARD SHILS • GEORGE P STEINMETZ • ROSS M STOLZENBERG • FRED L STRODTBECK • GERALD D SUTTLES • LINDA J WAITE • WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (ISSN 0002-9602) is published bimonthly in July, September, November, January, March, and May by The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division 5720 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, Illinois 60637 Subscription rates, U S A institutions, 1 year \$87 00, individuals, 1 year \$39 00 Student subscription rate, USA 1 year \$27 00 (photocopy of valid student ID must accompany subscription) ASA and BSA members, 1 year \$34 00 All other countries add \$9 00 for each year's subscription to cover postage Canadian subscribers add 7% GST Subscription agent for Japan Kinokuniya Company, Ltd Single copy rates institutions \$13 35, individuals \$6 25 Volumes 1-90 available from Schmidt Periodicals GmbH, Dettendorf, D-8201 Bad Feilnbach 2, Germany All volumes are available from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, and Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546 Subscriptions are payable in advance Subscriptions will be entered to start with the first issue to be published after receipt of order **Postmaster** Send address changes to *American Journal of Sociology*, The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P O Box 37005, Chicago, Illinois 60637

ADVERTISING space in THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY is available, as is rental of its subscriber list For information and rates, please contact the advertising sales staff, The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, 5720 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637 Advertising and list rental is limited to material of scholarly interest to our subscribers

Copying beyond Fair Use The code on the first page of an article in this journal indicates the copyright owner's consent that copies of the article may be made beyond those permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the U S Copyright Law provided that copies are made only for personal or internal use or for the personal or internal use of specific clients and provided that the copier pay the stated per-copy fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc Operations Center, 27 Congress St, Salem, Massachusetts 01970 *To request permission for other kinds of copying*, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale, kindly write to Permissions Department, The University of Chicago Press, 5801 S Ellis Ave, Chicago, Illinois 60637 *If no code appears* on the first page of an article, permission to reprint may be obtained only from the author

Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Illinois, and at additional mailing offices

© 1994 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39 48-1984 (∞)

AJS

can Journal of Sociology

Volume 99 No 4 January 1994

CONTENTS

- 847 Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes Some Implications
for Social Conflict, Order, and Change
ROBIN STRYKER

- 911 Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment
JOACHIM J SAVELSBERG

- 944 The Legalization of the Workplace
JOHN R SUTTON, FRANK DOBBIN, JOHN W MEYER, AND W
RICHARD SCOTT

- 972 Early Parental Work, Family Social Capital, and Early Childhood
Outcomes
TOBY L PARCEL AND ELIZABETH G MENAGHAN

- 1010 Sons, Daughters, and Intergenerational Support in Taiwan
YEAN-JU LEE, WILLIAM L PARISH, AND ROBERT J WILLIS

- 1042 Educational Continuation by College Graduates
ROSS M STOLZENBERG


Review Essay

- 1078 The Dismal Science and Sex
JOHN GAGNON

Book Reviews

- 1083 *Identity and Control A Structural Theory of Social Action* by
Harrison C White
PETER ABELL

- 1085 *Structural Holes The Social Structure of Competition* by Ronald
S Burt
MARK SHANLEY



- 1087 *Rational Choice Theory Advocacy and Critique*, edited by James S Coleman and Thomas J Fararo
VICTOR NEE
- 1090 *Institutions and Social Conflict* by Jack Knight
SATOSHI KANAZAWA
- 1092 *Inequality Reexamined* by Amartya Sen
STEIN RINGEN
- 1093 *Property, Bureaucracy, and Culture Middle-Class Formation in Contemporary Britain* by Mike Savage, James Barlow, Peter Dickens, and Tony Fielding
ALAN DAHL
- 1095 *Time, Labor, and Social Domination A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* by Moishe Postone
BOB JESSOP
- 1097 *The New Social Economy Reworking the Division of Labor* by Andrew Sayer and Richard Walker
VICKI SMITH
- 1099 *Farewell to the Self-Employed Deconstructing a Socioeconomic and Legal Solipsism* by Marc Linder
KEVIN HENSON
- 1101 *Down on Their Luck A Study of Homeless Street People* by David A Snow and Leon Anderson
PETER H ROSSI
- 1103 *Talking Politics* by William A Gamson
ROBERT D BENFORD
- 1105 *Linking Citizens to Government Interest Group Politics at Common Cause* by Lawrence S Rothenberg
ANNE COSTAIN
- 1107 *Through Jaundiced Eyes How the Media View Organized Labor* by William J Puette
WILLIAM DIFAZIO
- 1109 *Visions of a New Industrial Order Social Science and Labor Theory in America's Progressive Era* by Clarence E Wunderlin, Jr
GRETCHEN RITTER
- 1110 *Health Politics Interests and Institutions in Western Europe* by Ellen M Immergut
TED MARMOR

K-P-16

150

Am 35

- 1112 *All God's Mistakes Genetic Counseling in a Pediatric Hospital*
by Charles L Bosk
CAROL A HEIMER
- 1114 *The Social Cage Human Nature and the Evolution of Society* by
Alexandra Maryanski and Jonathan H Turner
J RICHARD UDRY
- 1116 *Mother-Infant Bonding A Scientific Fiction* by Diane E Eyer
KRISTIN K BARKER
- 1118 *The "Girl Question" in Education Vocational Education for
Young Women in the Progressive Era* by Jane Bernard Powers
REGINA WERUM
- 1120 *The Evolution of Women's Asylums since 1500 From Refuges for
Ex-Prostitutes to Shelters for Battered Women* by Sherrill Cohen
CRAIG MCEWEN
- 1122 *The Japanese Woman Traditional Image and Changing Reality*
by Sumiko Iwao
GLENDA S ROBERTS
- 1124 *Domestic Allegories of Political Desire The Black Heroine's Text
at the Turn of the Century* by Claudia Tate
• KATHRYN RAGSDALE
- 1125 *Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America* by James Davison
Hunter
LESTER R KURTZ
- 1128 *A Bridging of Faiths Religion and Politics in a New England
City* by N J Demerath III and Rhys H Williams
HOWARD M BAHR
- 1130 *The Churching of America, 1776-1990 Winners and Losers in
Our Religious Economy* by Roger Finke and Rodney Stark
KENT REDDING
- 1132 *The Church, Society and Hegemony A Critical Sociology of Reli-
gion in Latin America* by Carlos Alberto Torres
SAMUEL SILVA-GOTAY
- 1134 *Armenian-Americans From Being to Feeling Armenian* by Anny
Bakalian
JEAN BACON
- 1136 *Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in Israeli Society* by Eliezer Ben-
Raphael and Stephen Sharot
MERVIN F VERBIT
-

- 1138 *Low Living and High Thinking at Modern Times, New York* by
Roger Wunderlich
E BURKE ROCHFORD, JR
- 1139 *America's Utopian Experiments Communal Havens from Long-
Wave Crises* by Brian J L Berry
FRED KNISS
- 1142 *Debt Cycles in the World Economy Foreign Loans, Financial
Crises, and Debt Settlements, 1820-1990* by Christian Suter
HERMAN M SCHWARTZ
- 1143 *Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity* by Liah Greenfeld
JUAN DIEZ MEDRANO
- 1145 *Policing and Punishment in China From Patriarchy to "the Peo-
ple"* by Michael R Dutton
ARIF DIRLIK
- 1147 *Lessons of Struggle South African Internal Opposition, 1960-
1990* by Anthony W Marx
ALDON MORRIS
- 1150 **Book Notes**

IN THIS ISSUE

ROBIN STRYKER is associate professor of sociology at the University of Iowa. Her research focuses on the politics of policy-making. She currently is building on her comparative-historical investigations of social science expertise in labor-management relations and antitrust law to examine the politics of science in equal employment opportunity and environmental law.

JOACHIM J. SAVELSBERG is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota. He received his degrees in his native Germany and held fellowships at Johns Hopkins University and Harvard University before moving to the United States in 1989. His current research is on criminological knowledge construction and on crime and social control in the East European transformation.

JOHN R. SUTTON is associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Most of his work is focused on law, deviance, and organizations. In addition to the research reported here on workplace governance in the United States, he is conducting a comparative study of the interrelationships among imprisonment, mental health policies, and the politics of social welfare in post-World War II Western democracies.


FRANK DOBBIN is assistant professor of sociology at Princeton University. He studies public policy and management practice and is continuing to explore the changes that equal opportunity law has wrought in personnel management.

JOHN W. MEYER is professor of sociology at Stanford University. He is involved in research on the institutional determinants of organizational structure and in projects on world institutional arrangements and their impact on national societies, particularly in educational and scientific areas.

W. RICHARD SCOTT is professor of sociology, with courtesy appointments in the schools of business, education, and medicine, at Stanford University. He is the founding director of the Center for Organizations Research at Stanford.

TOBY L. PARCEL is professor of sociology and associate dean, College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, at Ohio State University. Her current research investigates the effects of parental working conditions on children's cognitive and social outcomes and the role of job benefits in reducing work-family time conflict in union and nonunion households.

ELIZABETH G. MENAGHAN is professor of sociology and adjunct professor in the Center for Human Resources Research at Ohio State University. Her current research is concerned with understanding the contributions of parental occupational and economic conditions to their children's cognitive achievements and emotional well-being and with tracing the effects of early and current family conditions on children's likelihood of engaging in high-risk behaviors.



YEAN-JU LEE received her Ph D in 1990 from the Department of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin—Madison. She is now a fellow at the East-West Center. Her areas of interest include aging, gender stratification, family, and population studies. Recently, she has been investigating how rapid economic growth affects gender and generational relationships in East Asia.

WILLIAM L. PARISH is professor of sociology at the University of Chicago. His current research includes studies of aging in Taiwan and family and work organization in rural China.

ROBERT J. WILLIS is professor of education and public policy at the University of Chicago and director of the Economics Research Center at NORC. He is an economist with interests in labor economics, economic demography, and the economics of education. Currently, his research focuses on intergenerational relations in developing countries and issues concerning marriage, divorce, and out-of-wedlock childbearing in the United States.

ROSS M. STOLZENBERG is professor of sociology at the University of Chicago. His current substantive research examines employment (retirement, effects of English language fluency on earnings), professional education, and the effects of values on the transition to adulthood. His methodological work focuses on selectivity bias in regression analysis.

JOHN H. GAGNON is professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. At the present time he is completing the analysis, with E. O. Laumann, R. T. Michael, and S. Michaels, of a national survey of sexual behavior. In addition he is pursuing his interest in the material origins of the self in the 19th century.

Erratum

In September 1993 (99:2) we printed a book review of Richard Jessor et al.'s *Beyond Adolescence*. We were surprised and disappointed to discover that this review had already appeared, in an expanded form and with an accompanying response from the authors, in another publication. Because the publication of this piece led us to inadvertently act in contradiction to our own editorial policy (see Editor's Note, below), we will supply a new, previously unpublished critique of this book in a future edition of the *Journal*.

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR'S NOTE

Having completed my first year as book review editor, I would like to take the opportunity to communicate some thoughts and observations to *AJS* readers. It strikes me that writing a book review is an odd job—and I mean this in all senses of the term. It is odd because it is something we ask scholars to do in their “spare” time. But it is odd in another way as well. Writing a book review is both a privilege (after all, we chose *you*!) as well as a duty to the discipline.

This dual nature makes the book review editor's task rather delicate. We expect reviews to summarize and constructively critique books and to suggest the audience for whom the book is likely to have the most appeal. When reviews fall short of these expectations it can be awkward because, unlike the major articles that appear in *AJS*, book reviews have been solicited. After asking a reviewer to spend time reading and thinking about a book, we do not wish to dismiss his or her labors. But because not all reviews we receive are equally well argued and well written, we do take the prerogative of editing and we may occasionally ask a reviewer to rewrite parts of the review. I see this as essential for two reasons. First, the standards of *AJS* are extraordinarily high, and as the journal's caretakers, the editorial board must see to it that the entire journal reflects these standards. Second, and perhaps even more important in the long run, reviews that are poorly written, very short on content, or unnecessarily acerbic do a disservice to the book's author and to the discipline. If a book offers so little that it does not merit a review, a reviewer should by all means call us to discuss this. We occasionally do commit an error in judgment, and feedback from the reviewer is very welcome in such cases. (We even make an effort to reward such behavior by sending a much better book the next time around.)

In sum, then, I ask reviewers to understand that we are continually making efforts to maintain the quality of the book reviews that appear in *AJS*, and it is toward this end that we will occasionally suggest ways of rewriting a review to improve its contribution to the discipline.

This also seems the appropriate place to remind book reviewers, authors, and readers alike that it is this *Journal's* policy to publish only original materials—and this standard applies to reviews as well as articles. If we invite you to review and you have already reviewed this book elsewhere—or plan to do so in the future—we must be informed of this fact. It is important to remember that, if critiques are to serve the discipline well, each review should represent an individual appraisal, no reviewer should use multiple publication sites to air his or her negative *or* positive views of a work. Instead, the collective goal of review publications is to provide multiple perspectives on books, so that the acumen of a variety of readers may offer insights into the material being critiqued.

Finally, timeliness matters. As book authors we all want our work to be as widely discussed as possible, and this is greatly facilitated by prompt reviews. Unfortunately, *AJS* must sometimes cancel a review if we have made repeated unsuccessful attempts to reach a reviewer whose piece is 6 months overdue. In such cases we try very hard to reassign

the book, but this obviously puts us behind our desired schedule. If reviewers know they are going to be late and discuss this with us, we are generally quite flexible. But we do need to know when to expect the review.

I also want to mention that in this issue of *AJS* we are introducing an addition to the book review section, "Book Notes." From time to time we accumulate a number of edited books that are valuable to the discipline but would be very difficult for a reviewer to adequately summarize and critique. This new section will briefly introduce such books. *AJS* will also continue to review a small number of edited volumes that are highly integrated and thus "reviewable."

Many thanks to all of our reviewers past and current. We continue to welcome suggestions of books to review and of potential reviewers, and we value highly the participation of the many members of our discipline.

MARY C. BRINTON

Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes: Some Implications for Social Conflict, Order, and Change¹

Robin Stryker

University of Iowa

Current scholarship on how science affects law's legitimacy in advanced capitalist democracies yields inconsistent predictions and findings. This article resolves inconsistencies and provides new insights by constructing a general framework relating law's legitimacy to the mix of legal and scientific rationalities in law. Consistent with dualistic visions of structure as both rules/schemas and resources, the theory specifies *how* competing legal and scientific rule/resource sets shape action and produce order and change through conflict in and over legal institutions. The theory's guiding orientations illuminate legitimacy processes, order, and change in other institutions including the economy, the polity, and education.

- Complementary issues of producing social order and social change are central to sociology. From the classics to today (e.g., Weber 1947, Walker et al. 1991), from micro and macro vantage points (e.g., Della Fave 1986, Gamson 1975), and from perspectives as diverse as functionalism and neo-Marxism (e.g., Parsons 1951, Habermas 1975), sociologists have presumed that *in some way*, legitimacy processes are important to maintaining social order and to mobilizing discontent. Legitimacy processes have provided causes, consequences, and assumptions for theory and research across such diverse areas as complex organizations (Meyer and

¹ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the meetings of the Law and Society Association, Philadelphia, May 28–31, 1992, and at "The Future of Sociological Theory," at the Southern Sociological Association, Atlanta, April 1991. I thank Art Stinchcombe, Larry Hazelrigg, Henry Walker, Charles Mueller, Scott Eliason, Sheldon Stryker, Judith Howard, Cecilia Ridgeway, Edward Lawler, and members of Iowa Workshop on Theoretical Analysis, and the *AJS* reviewers for helpful comments on previous drafts. Martha Shockey assisted in locating useful documents. A grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-9209777) helped support work undertaken to revise the paper during 1992–93. Correspondence may be directed to Robin Stryker, Department of Sociology, University of Iowa, 140 Seashore Hall, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.

Rowan 1977, Hannan and Freeman 1987), stratification and work (Della Fave 1986, Halaby 1986, Burowoy 1979), political sociology (e g , Lehman 1987, Campbell 1987, Offe 1975a), legal sociology (e g , Tyler 1990, Edelman 1992, Friedman 1981), sociology of the professions (Larson 1977, Abbott 1988), the sociology of macro-social change (e g , Gurr and Goldstone 1991), and the sociology of small groups (e g , Ridgeway, Diekema, and Johnson 1992, Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch 1986) Today, legitimacy remains "an exceedingly complex concept" (Dornbusch and Scott 1975, p 37), and work on legitimacy is marked by dissension (e g , Della Fave 1986, Walker et al 1986) Yet assertions that legitimacy processes play a major role in producing order and change are well founded

This article develops the centrality of legitimacy processes by proposing a theory that explains how introducing science into law affects the legitimacy of law Focusing on the relations among law, science, and legitimacy in legal institutions is promising for several reasons First, law's incorporation of scientific-technical expertise has been an important transformation accompanying the development of Western welfare states (Therborn 1978, Stryker 1989) Although some scholars presume that scientific-technical rationality legitimates law (see Stryker 1990c), others presume the opposite (e g , Nelkin 1984) The proposed theory resolves inconsistent predictions and findings in earlier scholarship by embracing a dualistic concept of structure as both rules/schemas and resources (e g , Sewell 1992) The theory exploits the rule/resource duality to show that law and science simultaneously provide alternative rules of the game and resources for action in Western welfare states The theory analytically separates three distinct mechanisms (constitutive, instrumental, and normative), which link introduction of science into law, to law's legitimacy It then deduces the separate consequences of each mechanism for legitimacy processes, including mobilization and conflict over legal acts, authorities, and institutions Last, it shows *conditions under which* and the *groups for whom* the three mechanisms *reinforce*, or conversely, *undercut*, each other in legitimating or delegitimizing law By resolving inconsistencies in earlier scholarship, the theory helps us understand legal order and change

Second, law is a central tool of politics and administration in the U S welfare state (e g , Brand 1988, pp 1-33, Breyer 1982) Law figures prominently, though not as dominantly, in European and Scandinavian polities (e g , Rehbinder and Stewart 1988, Kelman 1981, Vogel 1986, Baldwin and McCrudden 1987) Political systems in capitalist democracies are legitimated in part by collective orientation to the rule of law (e g , Weber 1947, pp 328-30, Friedman 1981, pp 4-5, 23-24) Im-

proved comprehension of what legitimates or delegitimates law thus helps us understand political order and change more generally

Third, just as law is part of the polity, so legal institutions exist within a larger social and economic environment. Weber viewed both formal-rational law and technical-rational science as parts of the overarching rationalization taking place in modern capitalist societies (e.g., Weber 1946, pp. 140–41, 150–55, 196–98, 214–15, 1947, pp. 131, 160–63, 186–202, 275, 328–41). Formal-legal rationality spilled over to help promote bureaucracy in the workplace (e.g., Halaby 1986, Meyer and Rowan 1977). Similarly, the rise of science and technology in society spills over to provide rules of the game for law and government (see, e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977, Offe 1975*b*, Therborn 1978). Given the tendency of action-orienting rules to diffuse across institutional arenas (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977), a theory exploring how alternative sets of rules affect legitimacy has ramifications beyond the legal system. Hypotheses in the theory presented are *specific* to variation in law's legitimacy and to further implications for the polity that stem from this. But the theory's guiding orientations to legitimacy processes are *more generally applicable* to many areas of sociology, including politics and policy-making, complex organizations, the sociology of education, stratification, and work, the sociology of science, and small-group dynamics.

Fourth, my proposed theory specifies for *one* set of institutions how social structures as both rules and resources shape action through legitimacy processes not only to reproduce but also to transform themselves. Demonstrating the usefulness of concepts requires us to lay out their explanatory implications systematically. By providing explicit, logical links between concepts, assumptions, and hypotheses, the proposed theory shows, for one institutional arena (law) and one social process (legitimacy), precisely how a dualistic concept of structure such as that proposed by Sewell (1992) can help us understand order and change.

I EXPANSION OF SCIENCE IN LAW LEGITIMATION OR DELEGITIMATION?

Neo-Marxists such as Habermas (1970, pp. 57–122, 1975, pp. 36–37) led the way for those who presume that reliance on scientific-technical rationality helps legitimate government and law. For Habermas and others (e.g., Larson 1977, pp. 137–45, Dickson 1984), scientific-technical expertise helps legitimate administrative decisions and institutions because administrative reliance on science converts political issues into technical ones removed from popular control. Issues then can be resolved in an apparently neutral way by experts who use the seemingly objective

criteria of scientific analysis. Contradictions between increasingly socialized production and the private appropriation of surplus are masked, as are contradictions between the egalitarianism of democracy and the megalitarianism of capitalism. Administrative use of science legitimates both the content and the nondemocratic form of decisions and institutions.

Similarly, various non-Marxist scholars suggest that science often functions to eliminate popular participation in administration, an exclusion that depoliticizes legal decisions and institutions (Yeager 1990, pp. 34–35, Eisner 1991). Eisner (1991, pp. 7–8) argues that decision makers often appeal to professionalism, including scientific-technical expertise, *because* they anticipate legitimating effects. Such appeals are “a common component of strategies designed to divert political opposition and insulate public policies from future assaults. [They are] attempts to limit the vulnerability of policy to future political conflicts.” Where Habermas, Eisner, and others focus explicitly on legitimacy, approaches that advance the theme of science as a resource for state effectiveness implicitly suggest that science can function to legitimate state action.

Offe (1975b), Therborn (1978), and Skocpol (1985, Skocpol and Finegold 1982) stress the connection between science and effectiveness. Offe and Therborn show how purposive, cause-and-effect rationality is better suited to producing effects on social life than is formal-legal rationality, while Skocpol suggests that the capacity and autonomy of government interventions can be increased by reliance on scientific-technical expertise.

State capacity refers to government's ability to meet goals notwithstanding adverse “socio-economic circumstances” or “over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups” (Skocpol 1985, p. 9). State autonomy refers to the formulation and pursuit of “goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society” (ibid.). From this perspective, science can increase the capacity of legal authorities to meet institutional goals whether these goals are given from without or actively constructed from within. Authorities such as commissions, agency administrators, and judges will seek scientific-technical expertise because it helps them construct and interpret goals from the often vague, conflicting, or ambiguous directives in statutes, in common law, and in legislative and executive branch statements (Stryker 1990a). Legal authorities also seek scientific-technical expertise to increase their ability to evaluate effects of their decisions, to better judge arguments made by affected parties, and to maneuver around pressures from groups and institutions in their environment (Eisner 1991, Gross 1981, pp. 265–67, Stryker 1989, 1990a, 1990c, Melnick 1983).

If science increases administrative capacity and autonomy, and if ca-

capacity and autonomy entail managing and defusing external pressures, we move back to the possibility that science legitimates legal acts and the institutions that produce them. Elsewhere (Stryker 1989, 1990a), I have shown how the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) lost law enforcement capacity when Congress abolished its in-house economic research unit in 1940. Gross (1981, p. 265) in turn argues that by removing in-house social scientists from the agency, Congress helped produce a post-World War II "widespread skepticism concerning the administrative expertise of the Board—a skepticism which challenges the legitimacy of the NLRB." Conversely, Eisner (1991, pp. 154–74) shows that by expanding its reliance on economic analysis, the 1970s Federal Trade Commission improved its performance. This helped it respond to criticism and relegitimize itself in the eyes of Congress, consumer activists, and the American Bar Association. In these empirical cases, legitimacy required capacity for effective performance. As predicted by Offe, Thernborn, and Skocpol, science increased that capacity.

Directly opposed to theory and research suggesting a legitimization function for science is scholarship showing that administrative reliance on science delegitimizes legal acts and institutions. There is ample evidence that legal authorities adopt scientific-technical expertise with the intention of increasing their legitimacy (see, e.g., Rosenbaum 1991, Melnick 1983, Eisner 1991, Stryker 1990c). But empirical work also shows that, no matter what proponents of increased reliance on science intend, under some conditions scientific-technical rationality *increases* politicization and *delegitimizes* processes and outcomes of welfare state legal institutions (Stryker 1989, 1990c, Campbell 1987, Nelkin 1984, pp. 16–17). For example, elsewhere (Stryker 1990c) I have shown how social science reasoning and research increased the politicization of pre-World War II NLRB decisions and decision making. Campbell (1987) documents how Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) technical analysts, who felt their policy criteria were being ignored in the 1960s and early 1970s, actively worked to undermine public support of the AEC and its decisions.

Nelkin (1984, pp. 9–22) does not dispute that science can depoliticize, but argues that this is the exception not the rule. For Nelkin (1984) and others (e.g., Stryker 1990c, Crandall and Lave 1981, Dietz and Rycroft 1987), scientific knowledge and experts do not mask values involved in policy and legal disputes. Instead, they are resources for all sides in such disputes and are mobilized on behalf of alternative and conflicting values. Scientific uncertainty exacerbates the tendency of technical issues to become political rather than vice versa. This further politicizes already-controversial ground.

Nelkin's (1984) picture of scientists intensifying preexisting administrative conflicts provides a mirror image to Habermas's (1970, 1975) view

of the depoliticizing effects of administrative reliance on science.² In addition, the latter view presumes that decision making by experts deflects popular attention away from the content of decisions by removing decisions from democratic control so that they seem a natural and inevitable outgrowth of applying objective scientific "laws" (Habermas 1970, 1975, Larson 1977). In contrast, for Nelkin (1984), Campbell (1987), and Stryker (1990*a*, 1990*c*), scientific expertise focuses controversy squarely on the content of decisions. Scientists exacerbate prior politicization and create new conflicts.

Inconsistent predictions and findings in earlier scholarship clearly warrant resolution, especially given the centrality of legitimacy processes and the pervasiveness of scientific-technical rationality in the legal system (e.g., Stryker 1990*c*, Monahan and Walker 1990, Savelsberg 1992). In the United States and elsewhere, in diverse areas of law, social and natural scientists commonly serve on advisory panels and provide consulting relevant to government regulation. In staff or administrative positions, they conduct fact-finding and research, evaluate and design policy options and participate in agency rule making and rule enforcement. In court-enforced law, scientists testify as expert witnesses to help resolve factual issues. They also help attorneys write briefs providing appellate courts with scientific theories and data to help resolve issues of law (e.g., Saks 1990, Stryker 1990*b*).

The remainder of this article resolves inconsistencies in earlier scholarship on law, science, and legitimacy, and provides insight into legitimacy processes more generally. The starting point for these goals is the duality of structures, including law and science, as rules/schema and as resources. Section II explicitly defines legitimacy and develops some general assumptions about legitimacy processes, so that these may be applied to the problem of law, science, and legitimacy. Because applying these assumptions requires understanding the role played by science in law, Section II develops the concept of technocratization to capture how law incorporates scientific-technical reasoning, experts, and institutional forms. Formal-legal and scientific-technical rationalities then are presented as alternative rule-resource sets for law in Western welfare states.

Section III presents a theory, built on definitions in Section II, that explains how incorporating science into law (i.e., technocratization) affects law's legitimacy. In accord with the rule/resource duality, Section III resolves inconsistencies in earlier work by first analytically separating three mechanisms that link technocratization to law's legitimacy, second,

² Neo-Marxist views of science as legitimation do not require that it depoliticize or suspend *all* conflicts. Rather, science masks the *class* content of state action for subordinate classes and groups, which suppresses manifest class conflict from mobilization from below (Stryker 1990*c*).

deducing the consequences of each mechanism for legitimacy processes, including mobilization and conflict over legal acts, authorities, and institutions, and third, showing the conditions under which and groups for whom the three mechanisms reinforce, or conversely, undercut, each other in legitimating or delegitimizing law. The posited mechanisms, which explain how technocratization affects law's legitimacy, are (1) a *constitutive mechanism*, which operates through an orientation to alternative rules of the game provided by the introduction of science into law, (2) an *instrumental mechanism*, which operates through the increased orientation to legal outcomes—and to rules as resources for outcomes—that science produces, and (3) a *normative mechanism*, which operates through the increased orientation to a rule of effectiveness that science produces. By separating diverse mechanisms linking science to law's legitimacy, and by specifying, for each mechanism, what is being legitimated or delegitimated, for whom, how, and under what conditions, the proposed theory helps rationalize past predictions and findings. It shows where and why approaches by Habermas, Nelkin, and others were correct or incorrect.

The proposed theory does more than resolve extant theoretical inconsistencies. Enhanced specificity and precision improve our ability to understand and predict legitimacy processes in concrete settings. Because all three mechanisms linking the presence of science in law to law's legitimacy operate simultaneously in real world contexts, analyzing the relationship between technocratization and legitimacy for such contexts requires that the combined import of all mechanisms be assessed. *The theory in Section III shows what factors must be known to assess this combined import and to predict how science will affect law's legitimacy in real-world settings.* Section III also provides a small amount of illustrative empirical evidence consistent with major assumptions and hypotheses in the theory. Illustrative evidence is provided to support the theory's empirical relevance, so as to encourage research designed to directly test it. Evidence presented here is suggestive only, because a direct test requires isolating the operation of each mechanism from the operation of the *other* mechanisms linking technocratization and legitimacy and from the effects of factors other than technocratization that also influence law's legitimacy. In addition, a direct test must isolate effects of legitimacy itself from the confounding effects of other factors, which, like legitimacy, affect approval of law, behavioral consent to law, and mobilization and conflict over law.

Section IV returns to more general implications of the theory. These apply not only to legitimating law and the polity but also to legitimating, for example, social inequality and mobility, organizational decision making and rewards, and status and authority in small groups. In fact, more

general implications apply to stability or transformation of any set of institutions and processes. Section IV ends by showing how the theory helps illuminate central sociological issues of order and change.

Finally, a word must be said about the theory construction and about presentation of the theory in Sections II and III. Major concepts are defined explicitly, underlying assumptions are stated explicitly, and deductive reasoning is employed to create a logical chain of hypotheses or predictions. The argument is presented discursively rather than symbolically or mathematically. But the text makes clear how each new hypothesis results from deductive logic applied to basic assumptions or to basic assumptions in conjunction with previously deduced hypotheses. Inductive elements also are present in the discursive argument. Induction is confined to taking aspects of real-life contexts and conceptualizing them more abstractly in ways relevant to deducing additional predictions. The final result is the series of logically interrelated hypotheses in Section III. An overview of the full set of hypotheses is offered in tables 1–4. Discussion of how these hypotheses resolve prior theoretical disputes occurs at the end of subsections A–D of Section III. Implications for conflict, order, and change in legal institutions are discussed in Section III E, as are the factors which must be known to assess how science affects law's legitimacy in real-world settings. In theory development, explicit exposition of key terms and assumptions and a clear, replicable logic for moving from hypothesis to hypothesis helps promote theoretical critique and empirical test, while showing how legitimacy processes triggered by introducing science into law are relevant to order and change more generally.

The theory's large number of hypotheses although demonstrating the usefulness of its basic assumptions, does add complexity, as do its analytic separation and subsequent recombination of diverse legitimacy mechanisms. But the complexity is needed to resolve earlier inconsistencies and bring disparate work into one theoretical framework. *Underlying the surface complexity is a simple theoretical core: the rule/resource duality of structures, including law and science, and the constitutive, instrumental, and normative mechanisms that explain how introducing the rule/resource set of science into law affects law's legitimacy.* From this core comes the set of factors needed to assess how science affects law's legitimacy in real-life settings. Also from this core come the theory's implications for the stabilization and transformation of legal institutions and for order and change more generally.

II CENTRAL CONCEPTS

A theory showing how the technocratization of law affects law's legitimacy must begin by defining the theory's central concepts. Both causal

and outcome factors in the theory rest on a dualistic concept of structure as rules and as resources

A The Rule/Resource Duality

Sewell (1992), drawing on work of Giddens and Bourdieu, promotes a concept of structure as both rules or schema (Sewell prefers the term *schema*) and as resources. Schemas or rules are, according to Giddens, "generalizable procedures applied to the enactment/reproduction of social life" (quoted by Sewell 1992, p. 8). These can be more or less formal and can elicit more or less explicit cognitive awareness from actors. Sewell stresses the informal and not always fully conscious nature of schema as action-orienting assumptions, as found, for example, in rules of democracy, etiquette, or gender. Rules/schema can be generalized, "that is, transposed or extended" from one situation or institutional arena to others (Sewell 1992, p. 8). They are reproduced over time to the extent that they are validated by resources—human attributes and nonhuman objects that "can be used to enhance or maintain power" (p. 9). Sewell argues that resources are both causes and effects of rules. As effects, resources reinforce and empower rules. As causes, resources instill and justify rules. Given Sewell's definitions, it follows that when people use rules to enhance or maintain power, rules provide, activate, and even become resources.

On the one hand, structures, that is, "sets of schemas and resources [which] mutually imply and sustain each other over time" (Sewell 1992, p. 13) may reproduce themselves. On the other hand, structures as rules and resources can also generate their own transformation. They do so in important part because there are multiple sets of rules and resources across various institutional arenas and because rules are transposable from one arena to another. A logical extension of Sewell's argument is that extending rule sets to arenas in which they previously were absent will create new rules and also new resources for the recipient institutional sphere. The new rule/resource set then will shape action by providing new opportunities and constraints. Transposability is one reason for what Sewell terms intersecting or overlapping structures, that is, the likely existence within any given institutional sphere of multiple, available rule/resource sets to shape action. Transposability also enables resources to undercut as well as to sustain rules.

Examining the relationship among law, science, and legitimacy provides an opportunity to show more precisely how the transposability of rules, resources provided by rules, and the existence of multiple and intersecting rule/resource sets can transform structures. It also allows in-depth examination of how structural transformation promoted by com-

peting rule/resource sets can contribute to social order as well as to social change. In fact, legitimacy processes provide a central means through which rule/resource sets shape action through cognitive, normative, and instrumental mechanisms.

B Legitimacy

Earlier disparate implicit and explicit definitions of legitimacy contain three major themes: legitimacy as *attitudinal approval* of rules (e.g., Della Fave 1986), as *behavioral consent* to rules (e.g., Przeworski 1980), and as *cognitive orientation* to binding rules (e.g., Walker et al. 1991). Implicit in each definition is a different explanation for legitimacy. *Normative mechanisms* are favored by those viewing legitimacy as attitudinal approval. *Instrumental mechanisms* predominate in accounts of legitimacy as behavioral consent. *Constitutive mechanisms* are highlighted by those who define legitimacy as cognitive orientation to binding rules. The proposed theory draws on all three approaches to capture how the rule/resource sets provided by law and science intersect to affect law's legitimacy.

In the attitudinal approval approach to legitimacy, attachment, loyalty, allegiance, and a "favorable affective orientation" to the political and legal system are synonymous with legitimacy (Tyler 1990, p. 28). People who regard acts, authorities, and institutions as legitimate offer what they see as good reasons for them and for obedience to them (Della Fave 1986, Easton 1958). The process producing legitimacy is normative in that people internalize rules of the game. They comply with adverse directives and voluntarily support inequalities that disfavor them (Della Fave 1986, Tyler 1990, pp. 24–26). Belief in law's rightness causes people to perceive an obligation to obey and ultimately to act on that perception (see Tyler 1990, pp. 25–26). Internalized obligation to bring one's behavior into line with political or legal rules signals legitimacy at the individual level (e.g., Tyler 1990). Aggregation of individual support produces the collective approval constituting legitimacy of the political or legal system itself (e.g., Lehman 1987, Lipset and Schneider 1983).

In the behavioral consent approach to legitimacy, consent is signaled by behavior within the parameters of institutions to which consent is given (see Przeworski 1980, p. 33). Consent may involve active participation, passive acquiescence, or even sullen obedience (cf., e.g., Habermas 1970, 1975, with Przeworski 1980). Predominant, though not sole motivation for consent is instrumental in that consent provides material resources. Cooperating with capitalists produces monetary payoffs for workers (Przeworski 1980, Habermas 1975). Government redistributive and regulatory programs make concessions to subordinate classes and

groups (see Wright 1978) Rules such as juridical equality "must be reinforced by the material outcomes of governmental measures and policies" (Offe 1975a, p 252, see also Friedman 1981) Individual workers/citizens consent as does a working class or mass public (Przeworski 1980, Habermas 1975)

The cognitive orientation approach to legitimacy distinguishes between the concept of validity, the "collective orientation to a binding rule," and the concept of propriety, "an individual's approval of the rule" (Thomas, Walker, and Zelditch 1986, p 378) Validity presumes neither normative consensus nor a uniformity of belief among individuals It requires only that there be "a known institutionalized order within the collective" (Thomas et al 1986, p 380) Whether or not an individual positively evaluates a set of rules, he or she knows these rules are binding They define, guide, and interpret action, bestowing legitimacy on actors and action taken according to the rules (Walker et al 1991) As in approaches stressing approval, actors conform to valid rules in the absence of threats of force and even if conformity hurts their material interests But validity implies only the recognition of rules, not approval of those rules The "constitutive" effect of a valid rule is that actors conform to it because they recognize it as binding, even (and perhaps especially) if they do not personally support it (Walker et al 1991, pp 6, 22 n 5) Valid rules are part of a "meaningful and natural order" defining "*the way things are*" (Walker et al 1991, pp 21, 6, emphasis in original)

Separating recognition of binding rules from their approval is important because it suggests how cognitive awareness of a set of institutionalized rules can reproduce these rules by causing behavioral consent and attitudinal approval Existence of valid rules logically presupposes that people presume peers and authority figures will behave according to, and in support of, those rules (Walker et al 1991) Peer support feeds back to reinforce a person's orientation to the rules, as does that person's expectation that sanctions can be applied effectively and with peer support (Walker et al 1986, Walker et al 1991) Empirical findings suggest that increased collective orientation to rules lessens the mobilization of collective action against rules that are detrimental to actors' material interests (Walker et al 1991) Conversely, if peers or authority figures do not play by and support the rules, collective orientation to those rules should weaken and diminished behavioral consent should follow

The existence of valid rules does not imply that people have internalized them But a series of experiments supports the notion that, over time, collective orientation to rules will produce approval of rules by many persons in the collective (Thomas et al 1986, Walker et al 1991) Thomas et al (1986) also suggest that, over time, norm-oriented behavior prompts people to bring beliefs into line with action Similarly, Della

Fave (1986) argues that equity norms and also self-evaluations that support an inegalitarian order are formed when people must participate in asymmetric exchanges within everyday formal and informal settings. Because peer approval of rules promotes individual approval (Walker et al 1986), collective orientation to rules also will produce individual approval when people infer others' approval from anticipating others' behavior according to rules.

As shown below in more detail, introducing science into law provides alternative possible sets of action-orienting rules for those inside and outside legal institutions. Alternative orienting rules in turn provide alternative resources for action. Drawing on the cognitive orientation approach provides the definition of legitimacy most helpful to exploring how legitimacy processes link such alternative rule/resource sets to social conflict, order, and change. Thus, *legitimacy is collective recognition of, and orientation to, institutionalized and binding rules of the game*. A legal act's legitimacy is based on orientation to rules that produced it. The legitimacy of a legal authority or institution is based on orientation to rules according to which it operates. Distinct from the concept's purely collective referent, legitimacy processes focus on individuals as well as on the noninstitutional (e.g., crowds, interest groups, classes) and institutional (e.g., businesses and nonprofit corporations, state agencies, unions, lobbies, social movement organizations, etc.) collective actors that make up larger social units. This highlights how collective orientation to a particular rule set is affected by possible conflicting orientations among individuals and institutions within that larger collectivity.

The discussion in Section III treats individual and collective attitudinal approval and behavioral consent as consequences of legitimacy. *Behavioral consent is compliance with current law and the absence of participation in political mobilization to change legal decisions and decision-making procedures*. Consent is a broader concept than is compliance. Lack of consent may be expressed through participation in mobilization to change law coupled with either compliance or noncompliance. Building on all prior approaches to legitimacy, Section III assumes that legitimacy itself is produced in part through constitutive, in part through normative, and in part through instrumental mechanisms. All mechanisms operate through the individual actor, tying her in various ways to networks of interaction and to the multiple and overlapping sets of rules and resources that constitute social structures. By definition, the constitutive element—recognition of "*the way things are*" (Walker et al 1991, p. 6)—helps produce legitimacy. Here, existence of institutionalized rules is crucial. But the binding character of rules is enhanced when people internalize rules' appropriateness (normative), when they are provided with resources and positive outcomes by rule applications (instrumental),

and when they evaluate expected costs of rule breaking to be high relative to expected benefits (instrumental) (see, e g , Tyler 1990, Friedman 1981, Thomas et al 1986, Walker et al 1991)

C Science and Alternative Sources of Legitimacy in Law

Understanding how the foregoing applies to the problem of law, science, and legitimacy requires conceptualizing the role played by science in law Earlier (Stryker 1989, 1990*b*), I coined the term *technocratization* to capture a complex, multidimensional process by which legal reasoning and institutions incorporate scientific-technical reasoning and institutional forms Any area of substantive law provides a framework of rules that can be interpreted, applied, and even created by scientists using general cause-effect relations rather than by lawyers using their own typical expertise *Technocratization moves law toward "exclusive use of causal reasoning by scientific experts to make and administer" legal decisions and institutions* (Stryker 1989, p 342)³ To whatever degree and in whatever ways it occurs, technocratization implies at least partially substituting scientific reasoning and experts for legal reasoning and experts⁴

Once technocratization is underway, multiple rule/resource sets become available to orient, interpret, and enable action within legal institutions Formal-legal and scientific-technical rationalities now provide alternative and competing rules of the legal game and resources for legal

³ Cause-and-effect reasoning and scientific expertise are separable elements of the global concept of technocratization, which presumes a positive, though not perfect, correlation between them Cause-and-effect reasoning is conducive to scientific expertise but does not require it For example, NLRB decisions today are effects oriented but often do not verify behavioral assumptions with scientific analysis (Stryker 1989) Savelsberg's (1992) study of sentencing guidelines shows how scientific expertise at times supports formal-legal methods of reasoning My earlier work (Stryker 1990*b*) supports a global concept of technocratization but predicts under what conditions and to what degree judges and lawyers will promote scientific analysis and, conversely, scientists will promote formal-legal analysis Absent empirical research examining correlations among *all* elements of technocratization, the global concept is retained to capture a complex process But distinctions among elements of technocratization and conditions under which particular elements may not "hang together" empirically are kept in mind for hypothesis formation

⁴ Some argue that welfare state law extends civil and political rights to rights of social citizenship (e g , Friedman 1981) Because technocratization applies cause-and-effect logic to facts of specific cases, completing it would nullify universal individual rights and the legal rule orientation of formal-rational states Broekman (1988, p 79) suggests that welfare states combine justice ideals with economic facts Scientists often do develop data to pursue social rights (e g , Stryker 1989, 1990*a*), but the concept of technocratization is not logically wedded to achieving any specific substantive purpose or even to achieving rights in general

action. Alternative and competing rules of the game also provide alternative and competing possible sources of legitimacy for legal acts, authorities, and institutions. When science is introduced into law, actors inside and outside legal institutions may orient themselves and their behavior to either formal-legal or scientific-technical rationality. Because rules provide resources, actors can mobilize both rationalities in attempts to reproduce or transform legal acts, authorities, and institutions.⁵

Law enforcement that is based on formal-legal rationality is rule oriented in the bureaucratic sense. Its source of legitimacy is impartial manipulation and application of legal rules according to defined (and presumably litigant neutral) techniques by experts trained in legal analysis. Projected effects of rules are not relevant.

The source of legitimacy for law enforcement based on scientific-technical rationality also entails a set of institutionalized procedures: the application of cause-effect analysis by relevant scientific and technical experts. Projected effects are central to scientific-technical reasoning in law, but the reasoning is presumed neutral, given the goals to be attained. Achieving *particular* outcomes does not enter into the scientific-technical game. But, because the technocrat is purposive rather than formal-rational, the norm of effectiveness becomes a source of legitimacy in technocratic reasoning and institutions. *Effectiveness*—attaining given goals—*becomes part of the institutionalized rule set*.

Further specifying legal and scientific rationalities enables better appreciation of them as alternative and competing rule/resource sets and sources of legitimacy. In common law settings such as the United States,⁶

⁵ This view of formal-legal and scientific-technical rationalities as competing sources of legitimacy, with actors oriented primarily to one or the other, is an analytic consequence of my earlier definitions and assumptions. If legitimacy is collective orientation to *the* rules of the game, if legal and scientific rationalities are alternative rule sets that cannot be followed simultaneously on a global level, and if technocratization substitutes one rule set for the other, it follows that the two possible rule sets and legitimacy sources compete. This is consistent with this article's underlying conflict orientation to legitimacy processes. Below, I develop the assumption of competing legitimacy sources and I show why it is likely to be theoretically fruitful and empirically reasonable. I discuss the rule orientations of groups inside and outside the legal system and also consider how, in some situations, divergent rules lead to the same outcomes.

⁶ Distinctions between cause-and-effect reasoning apply to Continental (code law) and common (case law) systems, but rule application varies across the two systems (Stryker 1990b, Ewing 1987). Indicators for both rationalities thus must be tailored to each system. Here, discussion is confined to common law contexts. Among these also, variations in legal reasoning and institutions exist, e.g., in the degree to which formal-legal institutions are adversarial (e.g., Vogel 1986). Still, the ideal-typical contrast between legal and scientific rationality is useful. Real life settings have elements of both.

legal reasoning involves interpreting, applying, and creating adjudicative and administrative rules pursuant to common or statutory law. Legal experts apply rules by, for example, distinguishing cases, relying on precedent, and interpreting statutes based on legislative history. In adjudicative rule creation and application, rules appear as “holdings” on, or in the context of, specific facts. Holdings are applied to the parties in that case and also become precedent to be applied in like cases. These, however, may also be distinguished based on their own facts. The process involves “reasoning by analogy” (Easterbrook 1984, p. 7). Judges extract what they deem pertinent from earlier opinions and determine whether the current case resembles or diverges from those cases. On the one hand, judges systematize adjudicative rules as they progressively refine them by abstracting relevant features of new fact situations. On the other hand, outside observers can systematize existing rules into a hierarchy in which more general rules logically encompass narrower ones (see Stryker 1990*b*). The calculability achieved ought not be exaggerated given ample room left for judicial discretion. Still, adjudicative and administrative rule making result in rule systems elaborated according to defined techniques of legal reasoning.⁷

In common law contexts, the institutional dimension of formal-legal rationality includes formalized settings in which procedures and roles are highly choreographed, adversarial, and minimally flexible, the hierarchical structure is well defined, and legal training is needed to occupy authoritative positions, for example, counsel or judge. In the United States, adjudicative rule making by federal courts or administrative agencies best conforms to this. Attorneys, witnesses, and judges all have assigned parts to play. Constitutional rights and rules of evidence limit evidence gathering and decision making. Rules of evidence are designed to produce impartial and “legally accurate” verdicts, but legal accuracy does not guarantee factual truth (Tanford 1990). Rather, judges and juries get evidence from witnesses who are not always reliable. Rules of evidence may exclude factually relevant information.⁸ Yet courts “reach legally binding decisions even if the evidence is weak, contradictory or

⁷ Adjudicative rule making under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169) provides a good example of this decision-making logic. For examples of rule development under the LMRA, see Stryker (1990*b*). For discussion of legal reasoning in Anglo-American systems, see Levi (1949), Llewellyn (1989), Eisenberg (1988). In these systems, even highly codified areas of law retain common law techniques, such as reliance on precedent and reasoning by analogy for interpreting and applying statutes.

⁸ Hawkins (1984, pp. 188–89) shows how field officers enforcing British antipollution laws are frustrated by inadmissibility in court of information that is factually accurate and relevant. See also Chesler, Sanders, and Kalmuss (1988) for how legal procedures constrain norms of scientific accuracy.

confusing Trials are concerned with whether the parties can satisfy the rules of a closed system" (Tanford 1990, p. 163) Decision makers are subject to appeal to a higher authority, for example, from a federal agency to the appropriate federal court of appeals (see Carp and Stidham 1991, pp. 41–44) Administrative rule making, also, is governed by formalized procedures including notice to and comment by parties who will be affected by proposed rules (e.g., Breyer 1982, pp. 345–50) Agency-promulgated administrative rules usually are subject to appeal through a hierarchy of legal authority ⁹

Scientific-technical rationality provides an alternative possible set of rules and source of legitimacy for law enforcement Technocratization involves importing this rule set, developed in technocratic policy interventions, into law (Stryker 1989, 1990b) Technocratic interventions use social and natural science to manipulate the economy Law fixes who is responsible for the interventions, but interventions involve making policy rather than substantive legal rules ¹⁰ Scientific calculation of general, often probabilistic, cause-and-effect relations is the central means for making policy, which may shift frequently in response to readings of scientific variables Factual truth of cause-and-effect links, rather than legal accuracy, is the aim ¹¹ Policy shifts occur at the discretion of experts in whom policy-making responsibility is vested ¹²

Typical technocratic institutional forms are the committee and the ad hoc commission They are more informal and less hierarchical than are courts or administrative agencies Commission experts may not always

⁹ Administrative rule-making procedures in the United States are laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., 701 et seq.) and its judicial interpretations The APA fills gaps in each agency's organic statute (Shapiro 1986) Thus, each agency has a different legal basis, as may different programs within an agency If an agency's organic statute has standards for judicial review, these override the APA

¹⁰ Terms used here to distinguish technocratic and legal interventions must not be confused with equivalent terms used as legal terms of art within statutes such as the APA "Law," "policy," "substantive rule," and "interpretive rule" all have specific legal meanings under the APA

¹¹ Because political values enter decisions about what should be produced, technocratic decisions are not "neutral" But objective truth seeking is the norm for scientifically analyzing cause and effect Policy goals must come from outside both formal-legal and scientific-technical rationalities (see Weber 1946, pp. 144–52)

¹² The Federal Reserve Board's use of cause-and-effect principles from economics to set monetary policy is a good example of technocratic reasoning When the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) alters the money supply by changing the discount rate, it responds to such indicators as the inflation rate, and it aims to produce such effects as lowered inflation Law fixes FOMC jurisdiction to guide the money supply, provided only that the agency consider cause and effect (Stryker 1990b) Like its legal counterpart, technocratic rationality is an ideal-type Decision makers employing it may employ other logics (e.g., legal or political) as well

agree, they may be chosen to represent different views. But instead of using adversarial procedures, technocratic institutions try to achieve consensus by structuring informal, flexible deliberations among equals. Most important, experts occupying authoritative positions are economic, social, and natural scientists.¹³

Elsewhere (Stryker 1990*b*), I have described in detail how scientific-technical elements transform the creation, interpretation, and application of legal rules. When legal rules classify according to cause and effect, when the rationale for rules is based on causal analysis using scientific concepts, theories, or research, and when the source of policy goals to be implemented by a legal rule is found in scientific theories, models, or studies, then scientific-technical elements have entered legal reasoning and substituted for alternative formal-legal methods of making and applying rules. Scientific-technical elements also function as evidence. When theoretical or empirical science enters a legal record as data to prove or disprove legal claims, when it is reiterated by reviewing appellate courts, and when it appears as "legislative fact" to alert appellate judges to scientific data of which they may take judicial notice, scientific-technical elements have entered legal reasoning. In trials, replacing legal accuracy—the satisfaction of legal rules that may require excluding relevant facts while incorporating facts that are unreliable—by factual truth seeking also signals technocratization.¹⁴

Scientists themselves are expert witnesses in court-administered law and are staff members of administrative and adjudicative rule-making agencies. Institutional elements of technocratization include the numbers of scientists participating in legal acts and institutions, the scope of scientists' role in these acts and institutions, the extent of reliance on scientists in any given institutional role and for any given legal act, the authority and prestige of scientists relative to attorneys within legal institutions, and the degree of formality, adversariness, and hierarchy in the procedures by which scientists contribute to law. I define technocratization of law as greater the broader the scope of scientists' role in law administration, the more legal authorities and acts rely on scientists, the greater the

¹³ The Federal Reserve Board, e.g., allocates prestigious staff positions to economists (Greider 1987, pp. 72–73). Professional backgrounds of the organization's Board of Governors (who serve on the FOMC) are in financial economics or banking.

¹⁴ Elsewhere (Stryker 1990*b*), I have given examples and detail on both scientific-technical and strictly formal-legal alternatives. Short of fully substituting for legislative intent, one way science becomes the source of statutory goals is when its concepts and theories are "read into" Congress's intent. For how price theory and welfare economics shape antitrust goals, see, e.g., Posner (1976). See Shapiro (1986, pp. 107–8) for how the Supreme Court has used pluralist theory to construct goals of the APA. See Easterbrook (1984, pp. 55–56) for how economic theories of politics inform Supreme Court interpretation of regulatory law.

authority and prestige of scientists in legal institutions, and the more informal, nonhierarchical, and cooperative the procedures by which scientists contribute to law enforcement. Technocratization of law is greater too, the less scientists' contributions to law enforcement are subject to judicial review.

In sum, scientific-technical elements whose presence constitutes technocratization provide an alternative to formal-legal rationality as rules orienting legal action and as a legitimacy source for law. Scientific-technical rationality in law then must also provide an alternative source of approval and consent to law. Because law in existing welfare states involves some combination of formal-legal and scientific-technical elements, each potential source of legitimacy to some degree will be institutionalized and binding. Yet, as I will demonstrate in Section III, each to some degree will also jeopardize the other.

One final issue must be addressed before developing hypotheses about law, science, and legitimacy. By definition, science provides an alternative possible legitimacy source for law by providing new rules for legal action. In Western welfare states, the diffusion of rule sets between institutional arenas and the consequent new source of law's legitimacy brought by science is reinforced by the legitimacy and approval that scientists, their procedures, and institutions enjoy in society (see, e.g., National Science Board 1989, p. 16). Despite controversies over science (e.g., Nelkin 1984), large majorities of Americans believe that science and scientists improve the quality of life. The scientific community ranks high in public confidence (National Science Board 1989, pp. 171-73, 295, 395-96). Theoretically, in spite of differences between them, both modern law and science contribute to global rationalization of culture and society (e.g., Weber 1946, 1947). Welfare state interventionism and technocratic policy-making also are part of this (e.g., Therborn 1978). Overarching rationalization makes it likely that the various distinct rule/resource sets that contribute to that rationalization will diffuse or transpire across institutional arenas. For law, such diffusion results precisely in the multiple and intersecting rule/resource sets provided by formal-legal and scientific-technical rationality.

Because people do value science and what science produces, and because association with desired values and outcomes reinforces the binding character of rules, scientific-technical rules compete with formal-legal rules as the source of law's legitimacy. Section III's hypotheses are confined to Western welfare states, in which global rationalization is well advanced. Even here, science is not monolithic. Scientists do not all agree on methods and findings. Section IV considers how scientific disagreements affect legitimacy, given the rule/resource duality and implications of alternative rule sets developed below.

III TECHNOCRATIZATION AND LAW'S LEGITIMACY

This section presents a theory explaining how introducing science into law affects law's legitimacy. The theory builds on the previously discussed rule/resource duality, definitions of legitimacy and technocratization, and general orientations to legitimacy processes to distinguish three separate mechanisms linking technocratization to law's legitimacy. Each mechanism—constitutive, instrumental, and normative—is presented, and its consequences are deduced for legitimacy processes, including mobilization and conflict over legal acts, authorities, and institutions. Analytically separating the mechanisms shows through which mechanism or mechanisms, under what conditions, for whom, and why various earlier approaches were correct and incorrect.

Exploring the mechanisms' joint operation shows conditions under which, and groups for whom, these various mechanisms reinforce or undercut each other in legitimating and delegitimizing law. It also shows what factors must be known to assess the combined import of all mechanisms in real-world settings.

A Consequences through the Constitutive Mechanism

Section II showed that constitutive mechanisms produce legitimacy through cognitive orientation to institutionalized, binding rules. But bringing science into law provides multiple rule sets that can orient those inside and outside legal institutions. Once an alternative rule set becomes readily recognizable and available, collective recognition of, and orientation to, any particular rule set becomes more problematic. When there is a readily available alternative, neither scientific-technical nor formal-legal rules can constitute a "natural order" that represents the way things are. For those inside and outside legal institutions, there now are "objectively possible alternatives" to orient and interpret legal acts, authorities, and institutions (Walker et al., 1991, p. 21). Thus, when scientific-technical rules diffuse into law, constitutive processes should weaken *both* formal-legal and scientific-technical rules as sources of law's legitimacy. This discussion suggests the following constitutive mechanism linking legitimacy and technocratization:

CONSTITUTIVE MECHANISM —*By providing legal acts, authorities and institutions with alternative and competing sources of legitimacy, the introduction of scientific-technical reasoning, experts and institutional forms into law delegitimizes (decreases the legitimacy of) legal acts, authorities and institutions. But the delegitimizing effect is not linear. I suggest a logarithmic functional form.*

Table 1 presents this proposition as the basic assumption of the consti-

TABLE 1
HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF TECHNOCRATIZATION THROUGH CONSTITUTIVE MECHANISM

Hypothesis	Technocratization of Legal Act, Authority, Institution	Legitimacy, Approval, Consent to Legal Act, Authority, Institution	For Which Actors	Constraint or Condition
1	Increases	Approval, consent decrease	External, internal individual actors, external institutional actors and collectivities	Diminishing returns in reduced approval, consent as prior level of technocratization rises
2	Stable	Legitimacy, approval, consent, decrease	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities affected by legal act, institution who are more aware of alternative rationalities (vs those who are less aware)	None
3	Stable	Legitimacy, approval, consent, decrease	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities who have experience with legal institutions (vs those without experience)	None
4	Stable	Legitimacy, approval, compliance with legal acts decrease	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities	When collective legal authority engages in public (externally visible) conflict over which alternative rationality for act should be authoritative (vs collective authority does not engage in public conflict)
5	Legal authority resists technocratization	Legitimacy, approval decrease	Internal scientific-technical experts	None
6	Scientists offer scientific reasoning, expertise for specific legal act and legal authority rejects this scientific reasoning, expertise	Legitimacy, approval of act, authority decrease	Internal scientific-technical experts	None

7	Increase in degree to which legal authorities promote technocratization	Legitimacy, approval decrease	Internal lawyers	Smaller inverse relationship as level of technocratization increases across legal areas, institutions
8	Scientific-technical reasoning, experts, institutional forms introduced into legal institutions	Opportunities for conflict increase, likelihood of conflict increases	Within legal institutions	None
9	Legal institutions employ scientific-technical experts (vs institutions that do not employ such experts)	Internal conflict more likely, internal conflict increases	Within legal institutions	None
10	Legal institutions organize functional units by expertise (vs institutions that do not organize units by expertise)	Internal conflict more likely, internal conflict increases, conflict intensity over alternative rationalities increases	Within legal institutions	None
11	Intensity of internal conflict over alternative rationalities increases	Rate of exit from legal institution increases, approval decreases, more widespread disapproval, increased likelihood that internal actors mobilize external actors to pressure legal authority	Internal staff of legal institution	None
12	Intensity of internal conflict over alternative rationalities stable	Rate of exit from legal institution greater	Internal staff members oriented to rationality not favored by legal authority (vs internal staff members oriented to rationality favored by legal authority)	None

NOTE ---All effects are based on the assumption that introducing scientific-technical reasoning, experts, and institutional forms (technocratization) into law delegitimizes legal acts, authorities, and institutions by giving them alternative and competing sources of legitimacy. Delegitimizing effects of increased technocratization diminish as earlier levels of technocratization rise

tutive mechanism¹⁵ Because competing sources of legitimacy already have been manifest at lower levels, the delegitimizing effect of additional increments of science should diminish, once science already is present in law to some degree The logarithmic form allows for such diminishing returns

Many hypotheses can be deduced by combining this assumption with other discussion in this article, including its previous examination of how legitimacy promotes approval and consent Table 1 lists hypothesized effects through the constitutive mechanism To prevent ambiguity, hypotheses are explicit about what is being legitimated (given legal acts, authorities, institutions) and for whom (e g , collectivities and their individual members inside legal institutions, collectivities and their individual or institutional members outside legal institutions) If table 1, column 2 does not indicate specific objects of legitimacy, approval, and consent, then hypotheses pertain to all objects If columns 1 and 2 do not indicate specific aspects of technocratization (scientific-technical reasoning, experts, or institutional forms) or sites of technocratization (legal acts, authorities or institutions), then hypotheses pertain to all possible aspects and sites *Legal institutions are defined broadly to include, in addition to courts and prosecuting agencies, the whole range of regulatory, redistributive, and distributive agencies, provided only that statutorily mandated agency responsibilities are met primarily through law enforcement* The broad definition is appropriate given that, according to the theory, processes stemming from diffusion of science into law should be applicable to all institutional subtypes subsumed under the label "legal institutions," as long as institutional responsibilities are met primarily through law enforcement In general, theoretical propositions which are relatively abstract, general, and consistent in terminology help reveal the theory's logic and extend its applicability as far as is consistent with its content Yet the theory also attends to concrete historical and legal context This is so because (1) real-world contexts provide a basis for abstract concepts used in propositions, tying theory construction to the social world and subjecting hypothesized relationships to contextual constraints and conditions, and (2) operationalizing such concepts as favorable and unfavorable outcomes to test the hypotheses in which these concepts appear depends on concrete context (see discussion in Sec III B below)

The text in column 3 of table 1 shows for which actors a hypothesized relationship holds Where hypotheses are offered for collectivities, such collectivities are composed either of individual actors or of institutional

¹⁵ Empirical tests of constitutive, instrumental, and normative mechanisms are not meant to be precluded by presenting them as assumptions from which further hypotheses are deduced

actors, but not of both at the same time. The text in column 4 either further specifies the functional form for a hypothesized relationship between technocratization and legitimacy or specifies conditions under which the relationship holds.

For example, hypothesis 1 indicates that, as technocratization of legal acts, authorities, or institutions increases, approval and consent to them decreases through the constitutive mechanism. Diminishing returns in reduced approval and consent are expected as the previous level of technocratization rises. Hypothesis 1 applies to both individual actors internal to (inside) legal institutions and individual actors external to (outside) those institutions. Among external actors, hypothesis 1 applies to individuals, institutions, and to the larger collectivities that contain them. In contrast, hypotheses 2 and 3 apply to external actors only and are not subject to constraints or conditions. They indicate that, at any given level of technocratization, legitimacy, approval, and consent will be lower through the constitutive mechanism for actors who are more aware of alternative rationalities compared with those who are less aware, legitimacy, approval, and consent also will be lower for actors who have had experience with legal institutions compared with those who have not. Hypothesis 1 results from logically combining the constitutive mechanism with legitimacy's presumed effects on approval and consent. Hypotheses 2 and 3 result from deducing how varying awareness of alternative rationalities will affect the constitutive mechanism. (At the limit, if there is no awareness at all of alternative and competing rationalities, there is no effect on legitimacy through the constitutive mechanism.) More experience with legal institutions is presumed to increase awareness.

Hypothesis 4 results from varying external actors' awareness of alternate sources of legitimacy. In the United States, the Supreme Court and other appellate courts are collective bodies. Many law enforcement agencies also are headed by a commission or a board, rather than by a single administrator. All adjudicative and administrative rule-making institutions must make written, public statements justifying decisions (e.g., Breyer 1982, Shapiro 1986). Appellate judges can provide written dissents to majority decisions. Collective legal authorities provide opportunities for internal conflict involving alternative rationalities, thus they increase the external awareness of alternatives. Externally visible conflict inside a collective authority also may cause external actors to presume weaker or less probable sanctions for failures to comply.

Again in the United States, agency and court-enforced civil law often makes use of cease-and-desist orders. Affected parties have rights of appeal from trial courts and from agency administrative and adjudicative rulings. Or, if federal agencies' adjudicative orders are not obeyed, agencies can petition federal appellate courts to enforce them. *In the United*

States then, reduced compliance encompasses both refusals to obey administrative and adjudicative rulings in the absence of any further enforcement and enforcement-delaying tactics including filing an appeal and forcing an agency to petition for court enforcement by refusing to comply or to comply fully with an agency-issued order

Hypotheses 5–12 show effects of the constitutive mechanism on legitimacy processes among actors internal to legal institutions. Recall that alternative rule sets are alternative sources of legitimacy. Lawyers and scientists who work for legal institutions are oriented toward a particular legitimacy source through professional training and socialization (see, e.g., Katzmman 1980, Stryker 1990a, 1990b). In part, such training instructs on the way things are, which becomes part of professional identity. Cognitive orientation usually is reinforced by the normative process of internalizing professional norms and values (Katzmann 1980, Stryker 1989, 1990b, Chesler et al. 1988, Heinz and Laumann 1982, pp. 160–65). Under some conditions, attorneys' interest in winning cases and in appearing professionally competent will cause them to accept or even promote scientific-technical expertise in law, especially when science is subordinate to legal expertise (Stryker 1990b). Conversely, scientists working in legal institutions must adjust to their overarching legal framework. Within that framework, the degree to which scientists promote technocratization depends on factors that include their professional commitment, their commitment to their employing legal institution's goals, their career expectations and opportunities, and the degree to which their top administrators support technocratization (Stryker 1990b). However, especially at the beginning of tenure in legal institutions, professional training and socialization probably incline *both* lawyers and scientists to orient themselves to formal-legal rationality or to increases in scientific-technical rationality, respectively, as the major source of law's legitimacy. If this is so, hypotheses 5–7 follow.

Hypothesis 7 has the noted constraint because winning also is part of the rule set that orients lawyers in an adversary system. In legal areas and institutions in which technocratization already is high, scientific-technical rationality probably helps lawyers win and be defined as successful attorneys. As technocratization increases across institutions, then, the inverse relationship between, for example, legal authorities' promotion of technocratization and staff lawyers' approval of those authorities will decrease.

By creating and making manifest alternative sources of legitimacy in law, technocratization paves the way for political mobilization based on these alternatives (see Walker et al. 1991, Stryker 1989). Scientific-technical rules compete with legal rules as a basis for mobilizing by legal authorities, lawyers, and scientists in legal institutions and by those affected by law who wish to defend it or change it.

Hypotheses 8–12 trace implications of the constitutive mechanism for conflict inside legal institutions. They also trace further effects of internal conflict on approval and consent. For these hypotheses and others, *conflict intensity is the degree of “energy expenditure” and “involvement” in the conflict of the parties to the conflict* (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 211). The more involved participants are in a conflict and the more important it is to them, the more intense the conflict. *Conflict (not conflict intensity) increases when it becomes more frequent, more widespread (general), or both*.

Hypotheses 8–9 suggest increased internal conflict through alternative and competing rule sets and sources of legitimacy provided for legal acts, authorities, and institutions. Hypothesis 10 follows from considering how variation in the institutional context affects operation of the constitutive mechanism. Legal institutions that organize staff into units defined by type of expertise ensure that alternative sources of legitimacy are recognized, and these institutions increase the salience of orientation to a given source. Unit tasks are constituted according to competing rule sets, and interaction among these units and with legal authorities is based on these rule sets. Thus, institutions that create such units for lawyers and scientists should have more general, frequent, and participant-involving internal recognition of, orientation to, and action based on competing rule sets than do institutions in which lawyers and scientists work together in units organized by law enforcement task.

Hypothesis 11 follows because intense internal conflict heightens non-participants’ awareness of competing rules and sources of legitimacy. Given legitimacy’s effects on approval and consent, intense internal conflict may lead to what might loosely be termed internal “legitimation crisis.” That is, in the more precise terms of the theory, intense internal conflict may lead to generalized internal disapproval of, or at least absence of support for, the institution’s decisions. Absence of collective approval may lead individual employees to various types of behavioral nonconsent. It may lead them to exit legal institutions, to try to undermine legal authorities from within, or to encourage mobilization to change law enforcement from the outside. Hypothesis 12 follows because reductions in legitimacy in response to intense internal conflict should be greater for those whose professional identities are oriented to rules not in favor with authorities.

In short, delegitimation through the constitutive mechanism that links legitimacy to technocratization can lead to internal politicization and “legitimation crisis” even in the absence of preexisting conflicts over legal goals. Internal conflict is implicit in the existence of alternative rules and sources of legitimacy for legal acts, authorities, and institutions. Latent conflicts become manifest in part because lawyers and scientists

who implement the law are trained and socialized to promote the rules that best define their professional identity and that they believe are right or appropriate

With respect to prior inconsistencies, the constitutive mechanism supports Habermas and Larson in emphasizing how form can overshadow content in legitimacy processes. But because the constitutive mechanism fails to produce legitimacy when there are competing rules for action, this mechanism stabilizes law by legitimating and depoliticizing only when science so pervades law that it alone provides rules of the game for legal action. Outside this extreme condition, the mechanism works contrary to Habermas's and Larson's presumptions: it delegitimizes and politicizes. Results conform to Nelkin's view, but are not produced by the focus on content that Nelkin and others highlight. Instead, by analytically isolating the constitutive mechanism, the proposed theory shows how focus on form or procedures alone promotes conflict and possible legal transformation. Because form and content come together in real-world settings, the next step must be to examine the instrumental mechanism linking technocratization and legitimacy. Exploring how internal legitimacy processes affect external legitimacy through joint effects of both constitutive and instrumental mechanisms follows.

B Consequences through the Instrumental Mechanism

Alternative and competing rule sets provide alternative and competing resources, a condition that exacerbates tendencies toward politicization. Technocratization of law is likely to create conflict for instrumental as well as constitutive reasons, because lawyers and scientists not only constitute professional identities according to competing rules, they also promote rules that increase their prestige, authority, and autonomy (Katzmann 1980, Stryker 1989, 1990b).¹⁶ Manifest conflicts emerge too because rules become resources for goal-directed action by actors inside and outside legal institutions (Nelkin 1984, Stewart 1983).

Law becomes involved in economic and social conflicts in Western welfare states because private parties invoke civil law to resolve their disputes (e.g., Silberman 1985, Player 1988). State actors use civil and criminal law to regulate potentially conflictual social relations (e.g., Yeager 1990, Eisner 1991).¹⁷ Conflicts over economic and social goals are

¹⁶ Assuming that lawyers and scientists seek prestige and authority does not imply that scientists will always promote technocratization or that lawyers will always resist it (see Sec. III-A above). Elsewhere (Stryker 1990b), I have specified conditions under which, and the degree to which, lawyers and scientists promote or resist the expansion of science in law.

¹⁷ Excepting apolitical "industrialism" accounts, otherwise-diverse approaches argue

imported into law as conflicts over legal goals. Stewart (1983, p. 1537), for example, charts the appearance in U.S. law of "several competing understandings of the ends of government: the protection of entitlements, the promotion of production and the nurturance of non-commodity values." Given that issues addressed are conflictual, with costs and benefits arrayed differently for various affected individuals and groups (see Wilson 1980), the legal system cannot resolve conflicts among legal goals quickly or easily. Legal and scientific-technical reasoning cannot themselves adjudicate which goals are most desirable (Weber 1946, pp. 144–52). But they do provide alternative methods of "constructing"—identifying or making explicit—goals in common and statutory law (see n. 14 above and Stryker 1990b). Such alternative methods enable alternative goal-directed actions. Or, alternative and competing goals may remain implicit in the different outcomes promoted by legal as opposed to scientific-technical rationality. In either case, substituting one for the other rule set usually leads to different outcomes, with a different cost-benefit array for affected parties (Simon 1983, Stryker 1990a).

Considering competing policy goals is not built into scientific-technical rationality. But any rationality explicitly focused on achieving goals encourages those inside and outside legal institutions to reflect on outcomes. Scientific-technical rules not only provide resources in goal disputes, but also bring forth previously unasked questions about how favorable are the outcomes received by various individual, group, and institutional actors under different legal goals. Science also highlights the procedure-outcome relationship. An adversarial system makes conflict over technocratization inevitable once the instrumental aspect of law and of alternative rule sets in law is stressed.

Substituting purposive for purely formal reasoning in fact intensifies this instrumental aspect of legitimacy processes—the power of positive outcomes to enhance the binding character of rules. By definition, technocratization imports orientation to outcomes into the set of institutionalized rules of the legal game. As scientific-technical rules enter law, law's legitimacy, as well as consequent approval and consent, become contingent to some extent on legal outcomes. This discussion suggests the following instrumental mechanism linking legitimacy and technocratization.

that (re)distribution and regulation shape latent and manifest conflicts (see, e.g., Pempel and Williamson 1989, Korpi 1989, Stryker 1992a). These conflicts may be more or less well managed depending on institutional context, but they are endemic to Western welfare states.

INSTRUMENTAL MECHANISM — *By increasing orientation to outcomes as a source of legitimacy, the introduction of scientific-technical reasoning, experts, and institutional forms into law legitimates (increases the legitimacy of) legal acts, authorities, and institutions for those who receive favorable legal outcomes and delegitimates (decreases the legitimacy of) legal acts, authorities, and institutions for those who receive unfavorable legal outcomes. But these effects are not linear. I suggest a logarithmic functional form for both legitimating and delegitimizing effects.*

Table 2 presents this proposition as the basic assumption of the instrumental mechanism. Where technocratization is high already, the addition of more science is not likely to appreciably increase orientation to outcomes. Instead, increments of science in law should have their greatest instrumental effects where law's scientific-technical component was previously nonexistent or low. Through the instrumental mechanism then, technocratization should be legitimating (for those who receive favorable outcomes) and delegitimizing (for those who receive unfavorable outcomes) at a decreasing rate, as previous technocratization rises.¹⁸ The logarithmic form allows for this.

Table 2 presents four hypotheses that result from logically combining the instrumental mechanism with the presumed effects of legitimacy on approval and consent. Hypotheses 13 and 14 focus on approval of legal acts, authorities, and institutions, hypothesis 15 focuses on approval of technocratization. The instrumental mechanism linking technocratization to law's legitimacy relies only on enhanced focus on outcomes brought about by technocratization. If outcomes are poor, and attention is on them, delegitimation is presumed to result even if scientific rationality did not directly contribute to unfavorable outcomes. But, where approval of science in law is at issue, people are presumed to evaluate science's contribution to outcomes. Hypothesis 16 is a logical extension of the instrumental mechanism. It suggests that whether legitimacy in a given collectivity increases or decreases through the instrumental mechanism in response to increased technocratization depends on the relative number of actors in the collectivity who experience favorable and unfavorable outcomes.

Legal outcomes result from adjudication or from administrative actions, including, for example, setting general rules, standards, or rates, or individualized screening of products (see Breyer [1982] and Mitnick

¹⁸ These presumed decreasing rates as technocratization rises do not preclude the instrumental mechanism from importance when the level of technocratization is high. Sec. III C suggests that when technocratization (and so focus on outcomes) is high, the instrumental mechanism will eclipse the constitutive mechanism. Outcomes will be more central than competing sources for law's legitimacy.

TABLE 2

HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF TECHNOCRATIZATION THROUGH INSTRUMENTAL MECHANISM

Hypothesis	Technocratization of Legal Act, Authority, Institution	Legitimacy, Approval, Consent to Legal Act, Authority, Institution	For Which Actors	Constraint or Condition
13	Increases	Approval, consent increase	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities receiving favorable outcomes	Diminishing returns of approval, consent as prior level of technocratization rises
14	Increases	Approval, consent decrease	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities receiving unfavorable outcomes	Diminishing returns of approval, consent as prior level of technocratization rises
15	Stable	Legitimacy, approval of <i>technocratization</i> of legal act, authority, institution higher (vs lower)	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities receiving favorable outcomes through technocratization (vs actors receiving unfavorable outcomes through technocratization)	None
16	Increases	Legitimacy, approval, consent increase or decrease or remain stable	Collectivity of individual actors, collectivity of institutional actors	Depending upon the relative number of individual (or, where relevant, institutional) actors in collectivity receiving favorable and unfavorable legal outcomes, and subject to diminishing returns as prior level of technocratization rises

NOTE —All effects are based on the assumption that, by increasing orientation to outcomes as a source of legitimacy, introducing scientific-technical reasoning, experts, and institutional forms (technocratization) into law legitimates legal acts, authorities, and institutions for actors receiving favorable legal outcomes and delegitimizes those same objects for actors receiving unfavorable legal outcomes. Legitimizing and delegitimizing effects of increased technocratization diminish as earlier levels of technocratization rise.

[1980] for detailed specification of these and other types) Outcomes apply directly to a given individual or institutional actor or to a group (legal class) of such actors But, like Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of statutes, outcomes have effects far beyond those to whom they directly apply It is impossible to specify completely what constitutes a favorable or unfavorable legal outcome and for whom it does without knowing real-world context What outcomes are in an actor's interest and which interest or interests among enhancing material well-being, prestige, authority, autonomy, or self-esteem are paramount cannot be defined independently of the social and legal context in which actors, interests, and objectively possible alternative outcomes are embedded (see Moe 1987, Stryker 1990*b*, 1990*c*)

For example, in sentencing in a capital case, the autonomy/liberty interest is most central Life in prison is a favorable outcome for the convicted criminal if death is the only alternative For business owners affected by a new pollution-control standard, economic costs and authority over technological decisions are likely to be central interests At the time a decision on the final standard is reached, a less, rather than more, stringent standard can be a favorable outcome if there is no realistic chance of defeating the regulation altogether

In general, for purposes of empirically testing hypotheses resting on the instrumental mechanism, the analyst must establish what are more or less favorable outcomes for affected actors at any time by (1) specifying the range of possible legal outcomes, (2) assessing the possible gains and losses in the actors' economic well-being, prestige, authority, autonomy, and self-esteem, and (3) establishing which of those gains and losses are made important by the legal context ¹⁹ Assessing favorable and unfavorable outcomes thus requires knowledge of legal procedures, legal goals, and the history of legal acts and their effects in areas in which the analyst works It cannot be accomplished without an empirical context to which propositions are applied

By focusing on alternative and competing rationalities as resources for outcomes, the workings of the instrumental mechanism deviate from Habermas's view of legitimacy processes but conform to views presented

¹⁹ This approach further specifies approaches that analyze objective costs and benefits of state action (Wilson 1980, Sanders 1981, Stryker 1989, 1992*b*) It resembles approaches focusing on subjective outcomes which stress how social context shapes preferences and perceptions But the approach differs from subjective approaches by proposing that context shapes objective interests and outcomes and that objective outcomes have causal import Where the same actors repeatedly are affected by a legal institution's acts, as in any area of regulatory law, what may matter more than any given outcome is the entire history or trend of outcomes which relevant institution(s) have produced within a given period of time (see Stryker 1989*b*)

by Nelkin Understanding how rules provide resources contributing to politicization and conflict requires examining constitutive and instrumental mechanisms in tandem

C Consequences through Constitutive and Instrumental Mechanisms Jointly

Table 3 presents hypotheses deduced by considering prior assumptions and hypotheses based on both constitutive and instrumental mechanisms Hypotheses 17 and 18 suggest how instrumental processes may *intensify* operation of constitutive processes of delegitimation Note that in hypothesis 18 higher technocratization also means greater orientation to outcomes through the instrumental mechanism²⁰ Hypothesis 18 (as is the case for hypotheses 22, 23, 25, and 26) is subject to the constraint that the relative number of actors receiving favorable and unfavorable outcomes remains constant Hypotheses 19–20 show how instrumental concerns may intensify technocratization's previously discussed constitutive tendency to lead to political mobilization and conflict internal to legal institutions

In table 1, hypothesis 11 showed how internal conflict may lead actors within legal institutions to recruit external allies Even without such active, intentional recruitment, internal "legitimation crises" may spur external mobilization of collective action In table 3, hypotheses 21–29 trace the dialectic of internal and external legitimacy processes stemming from joint operation of the constitutive and instrumental mechanisms

From the constitutive mechanism, the recognition of competing legitimacy sources lessens legitimacy of legal acts, authorities, and institutions for external actors affected by law From the instrumental mechanism, enhanced focus on outcomes brought by technocratization delegitimizes law for external actors who receive unfavorable legal outcomes From both mechanisms, conflict involving competing rule sets enhances awareness of those rule sets, of outcomes, and of the links between rules and outcomes External knowledge of internal conflict around or involving

²⁰ Table 3, hypothesis 18, does not conflict with the previously presumed decreasing rate of delegitimation through the constitutive mechanism as the level of technocratization rises The decreasing rate holds because at higher levels of technocratization, more actors, relative to the total population, previously have been aware of alternative sources of legitimacy Here, I argue that more delegitimation would occur at the higher level of technocratization, *if*, in two systems equal in relative number of actors receiving favorable and unfavorable outcomes but different in level of technocratization, the *same numbers* of additional actors receiving favorable and unfavorable outcomes relative to the total population receiving favorable and unfavorable outcomes *became aware of alternative sources of legitimacy* This follows from an increased orientation to outcomes as technocratization rises

TABLE 3
HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF TECHNOCRATIZATION THROUGH CONSTITUTIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL MECHANISMS COMBINED

Hypothesis	Technocratization of Legal Act, Authority, Institution	Legitimacy, Approval, Consent to Legal Act, Authority, Institution	For Which Actors	Constraint or Condition
17	Stable	Decrease in legitimacy, approval in response to recognition of alternative rationalities greater	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities receiving unfavorable outcomes (vs actors receiving favorable outcomes)	None
18	Higher (vs lower)	Legitimacy declines at faster rate in response to increased number of individual (or where relevant, institutional) actors who recognize alternative rationalities	Collectivity of individuals external to legal institution, collectivity of institutions external to legal institution	Assuming relative number of external individual (or, where relevant, institutional) actors receiving favorable and unfavorable legal outcomes remains constant
19	Stable	Conflict around alternative rationalities greater	Within legal institutions	When use of alternative rationalities promotes alternative outcomes in earlier, independent goal conflict (vs use of alternative rationalities does not promote alternative outcomes)
20	Stable	Conflict intensity around alternative rationalities increases	Within legal institutions	When internal actors promote alternative rationalities to achieve earlier, independent notions of correct legal outcomes (vs other reasons)

21	Stable	Likelihood of recognizing, orienting to alternative rationalities increases in response to increased within legal institution conflict intensity around or involving alternative rationalities Approval, consent decrease in response to increased within legal institution conflict intensity around or involving alternative rationalities	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities	None
22	Stable	Approval, consent decrease in response to increased within legal institution conflict intensity around or involving alternative rationalities	Collectivity of individuals external to legal institution, collectivity of institutions external to legal institution	Assuming relative number of external individual (or, where relevant, institutional) actors receiving favorable and unfavorable legal outcomes remains constant
23	Stable	Likelihood of mobilizing collective action against legal act, authority, institution increases in response to increased within legal institution conflict intensity around or involving alternative rationalities	External individual and institutional actors	Assuming relative number of external individual (or, where relevant, institutional) actors receiving favorable and unfavorable legal outcomes remains constant
24	Stable	Likelihood of awareness of legal outcomes and of alternative possible rationalities for legal act, authority, institution increases in response to increased frequency, generality of external mobilization of collective action against legal act, authority, institution	External individual and institutional actors who are non-participants in collective action against legal act, authority, institution	None

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Hypothesis	Technocratization of Legal Act, Authority, Institution	Legitimacy, Approval, Consent to Legal Act, Authority, Institution	For Which Actors	Constraint or Condition
25	Stable	Increased rates of decline in legitimacy, approval, compliance in response to increased within legal institution conflict intensity around or involving alternative rationalities	Collectivity of individuals external to legal institutions, collectivity of institutions external to legal institution	As external mobilization of collective action against legal act, authority, institution increases and assuming that the relative number of external individual (or, where relevant, institutional) actors receiving favorable and unfavorable legal outcomes remains constant
26	Increasing in legal institution, substantive legal area in which specialized legal institution works	Increased rates of decline in legitimacy, approval in response to external mobilization of collective action against legal act, authority, institution	Collectivity of individuals external to legal institutions, collectivity of institutions external to legal institution	Assuming relative number of external individual (or, where relevant, institutional) actors receiving favorable and unfavorable legal outcomes remains constant
27	Stable	Increased within legal institution intensity and generality of preexisting conflicts around or involving alternative rationalities in response to external mobilization of collective action involving alternative rationalities and against legal act, authority, institution	Within legal institutions	None

28	Stable	Greater decrease in approval of legal act in response to externally visible conflict, within a collective legal authority, over which of alternative rationalities for act should be authoritative	External individual and institutional actors who are adversely affected by legal act (vs actors not adversely affected)	None
29	Stable	Likelihood of compliance, degree of compliance with adverse legal act decreases	External individual and institutional actors who are adversely affected by legal act	When use of alternative rationalities would result in different outcomes and collective legal authority engages in externally visible conflict about which of the alternative rationalities should be authoritative (vs when either—or both—of these two conditions is not met)

NOTE —All effects are based on assumptions noted for both table 1 and table 2

competing sources of legitimacy and of an absence of internal approval for legal acts, authorities, and institutions provides an opportunity for external actors to mobilize protests against legal acts, authorities, and institutions. External knowledge of internal conflict also provides added resources to external actors who wish to engage in collective action to change legal acts, authorities, and institutions. Hypotheses 21–23 superimpose these constitutive and instrumental processes to show that the more intense is internal conflict involving alternative rule sets, the more likely it inadvertently spills over to the external arena, where it erodes external approval and promotes external collective action. Legitimacy processes thus can help produce initial external acts of political mobilization and conflict over legal acts, authorities, and institutions.²¹

Such external collective action against legal acts, authorities, and institutions may be more or less frequent and more or less general in the population. It may involve more or less institutionalized legal and political means or forms. It may involve existing organizations and networks or it may create new ones. *The external mobilization of collective action is defined as increasing when it is more frequent and/or more general (widespread)*. Once some external actors are actively engaged in mobilizing collective action against a legal act, authority, or institution, they may provoke what can loosely be termed a more generalized external legitimation crisis of that act, authority, or institution. In the more precise terms of the theory, over time, the initial mobilization by some external actors may spur more generalized delegitimation as well as public disapproval or at least absence of support for law. It may also activate more widespread mobilization of institutionalized and/or noninstitutionalized means to change law and even a failure to comply with law. This is because the initial mobilization (1) heightens nonparticipants' awareness of competing rule sets and sources of legitimacy, (2) draws nonparticipants' attention to legal outcomes and the links between procedures and outcomes, and (3) provides normative support for additional resistance. In addition to such factors endogenous to legitimacy processes stemming from technocratization, government response to the initial mobilization is important for the generalization of reduced behavioral consent. Section II above noted that cost-benefit evaluations of rule breaking can enhance

²¹ Viewing collective action as partly endogenous to legitimacy processes stemming from technocratization does not preclude the importance of other factors. Such other factors affecting collective action include government repression and mobilization-relevant resources other than legitimacy. These are discussed in the last part of Sec III B above and in Sec III C below. Future theory and research should explore the intersection of legitimacy processes outlined here with theories of collective action.

the binding character of rules when expected costs of noncompliance are high relative to expected benefits. If government response to initial mobilization and noncompliance is conciliatory rather than repressive, this lessens perceived costs of mobilization and noncompliance while raising the perceived likelihood of benefits for those not yet mobilized.

Based on constitutive and instrumental mechanisms, hypotheses 24–26 present a dynamic of generalization for an “external legitimacy crisis.” Hypothesis 24 shows why external mobilization of collective action may spread to previously nonparticipating external actors. Hypothesis 25 suggests escalation of external legitimacy problems in response to a conjunction of internal and external legitimacy problems. Hypothesis 26 assumes that the increased orientation to outcomes brought by technocratization through the instrumental mechanism also raises the import of outcomes. Thus, assuming that the relative number of actors receiving favorable and unfavorable outcomes remains constant, a collectivity should experience greater decline in legitimacy of its legal institutions in response to external mobilization against these institutions where they are highly technocratic.

In general, and requiring the constraint in hypotheses 18, 22, 23, 25–26 the existence of multiple mechanisms linking technocratization to law’s legitimacy leaves the chance that, under some conditions, the mechanisms work at cross-purposes rather than reinforce each other. Constitutive and instrumental mechanisms do work at cross-purposes for actors receiving favorable outcomes. This is illustrated by the effect of external political mobilization on legitimacy for these actors.

By increasing awareness of alternative rule sets—the constitutive mechanism—external mobilization of collective action against legal acts, authorities, and institutions decreases legitimacy for all external actors. By increasing awareness of outcomes—the instrumental mechanism—such external mobilization increases legitimacy for *external actors receiving favorable outcomes*. Evaluating the combined effect of external political mobilization on legitimacy at varying levels of technocratization, *for external actors receiving favorable outcomes*, requires examining which mechanism—constitutive or instrumental—is stronger.

At low levels of technocratization, where law has a perceptible but small scientific component, the constitutive mechanism may outweigh the instrumental such that, even for actors receiving favorable outcomes, the combined effect of external mobilization of collective action through the two mechanisms is delegitimizing. But if technocratization is high, orientation to outcomes may be so strong that the instrumental outweighs the constitutive. Then, external mobilization would decrease legitimacy and approval of legal acts, authorities, and institutions for those receiving

unfavorable outcomes, but increase legitimacy and approval for those receiving favorable outcomes *This would set up a mostly instrumental dynamic of conflict over legal acts, authorities, and institutions, in which external actors who mobilize collective action to defend and stabilize the legal authority and institution square off against those who mobilize collective action to attack and transform the authority and institution* Alternative rule sets in law are likely to be mobilized as group resources in any such conflict. Once such conflict is ongoing, defenders of legal authorities and institutions may not wait for detractors to protest new legal acts. Instead, they may anticipate such protest and weigh in with their support before the next protest round occurs.

Hypothesis 27 proposes that external legitimacy problems “feed back” to heighten internal problems in a negative dynamic of internal and external conflict over both alternative rule sets and the outcomes (or legal content) to which they become linked. Hypotheses 28–29 presume a collective legal authority, so that conflict internal to the authority can occur and also can be externally known. Hypothesis 28 rests on the assumption that, for external actors adversely affected by the authority’s acts, the instrumental mechanism will intensify the negative constitutive effects, proposed in hypothesis 4 of table 1, of externally known disagreements within a legal authority. More, when externally known disagreements exist, such external actors adversely affected by law should be more likely to perceive the possibility and feasibility of mobilizing collective action against unfavorable acts—and also of using rules strategically as resources to do so. This is especially the case if it is clear that a different rule would have produced a different outcome. External actors who mobilize to transform law may presume some support for their efforts within the conflict-ridden legal authority, they also may perceive weaker or less likely sanctions for delays or reductions in compliance. This leads directly to hypothesis 29 in table 3, which proposes conditions for reduced compliance to legal acts among external actors adversely affected by those acts.

Joint workings of the constitutive and instrumental mechanisms deviate from Habermas’s views, but are consistent with the politicization and conflict predicted by Nelkin. Hypotheses stemming from these mechanisms specify more precisely than does any previous scholarship how, why, and under what conditions dynamics of mobilization and counter-mobilization emerge oriented to and empowered by alternative sources of legitimacy. The mechanisms also enable some predictions about who will defend scientific-technical rules or formal-legal rules and their associated legal outcomes and under what conditions these defenses might occur. My discussion of how predicted dynamics relate to order and change will continue after I present the normative mechanism.

D Consequences through the Normative Mechanism

Evaluating science's overall effects on law's legitimacy in real-world contexts requires isolating a final mechanism that links technocratization and legitimacy. Distributive, redistributive, and regulatory laws intervene in economic and social relationships to produce effects: examples include attempts to end racial discrimination in employment or to promote industrial peace. In the United States, explicit or implicit cause-and-effect assumptions about social life guide the writing and interpreting of such "interventionist" statutes (Stryker 1990a).

Legal authorities have an interest in meeting goals they are charged to implement because their authority and prestige depend upon it. Because science is oriented toward effects, judges and administrators charged with implementing interventionist law often will use science to increase effectiveness, that is, to actually attain legal goals (Eisner 1991, Stryker 1990a). They will be more inclined to do so when lack of effectiveness is a political issue, assuming they perceive that science enhances effectiveness. As scientific certainty increases, the perception that relying on science will enhance effectiveness is also likely to increase. Thus, legal authorities seeking effectiveness should be more inclined to rely on science the more unambiguous and certain is the relevant science and the more consensus about it there is among scientists.

In the face of scientific uncertainty, reliance on science cannot guarantee effectiveness (e.g., Tierney 1984). But it does help produce effects to a greater degree than formal-legal rationality does (e.g., Offe 1975a). Administrators of interventionist law who end or lessen reliance on science thus reduce the effectiveness of their acts and institutions. Conversely, assuming a constant degree of scientific certainty, expanded reliance on science increases effectiveness of acts, authorities, and institutions implementing interventionist law.

Science does more than augment the chances of effectiveness. Emphasizing cause-and-effect reasoning means that effectiveness increasingly is central to institutionalized rules of the legal game. Because cognitive awareness of rules affects approval of these rules, as effectiveness becomes more central to the institutionalized rules, effectiveness also is more likely to be internalized as a standard by actors inside and outside legal institutions. Whether or not the *norm of effectiveness* is fully internalized, it increasingly provides a standard that guides the behavior of actors within legal institutions, and external actors' judgments about those institutions. As science increases the orientation to effectiveness, *achieved* effectiveness enhances the binding character of law. But when actors are oriented to effectiveness and effectiveness is not achieved,

legitimacy and approval decline. This discussion suggests the following normative mechanism linking legitimacy to technocratization:

NORMATIVE MECHANISM —*By increasing orientation to effectiveness as a source of legitimacy, the introduction of scientific-technical reasoning, experts, and institutional forms into law legitimates (increases the legitimacy of) legal acts, authorities, and institutions to the extent that they are effective, that is, that they achieve given goals. Conversely, the introduction of scientific-technical reasoning, experts, and institutional forms delegitimates (decreases the legitimacy of) legal acts, authorities, and institutions to the extent that they are ineffective. But these effects are not linear. I suggest a logarithmic functional form for both legitimating and delegitimizing effects.*

Table 4 presents this proposition as the basic assumption of the normative mechanism.²² Increases in orientation to effectiveness in response to law's expanded use of science should be smaller where the previous level of science in law and its corresponding level of orientation to effectiveness already is high. Thus, as the level of technocratization rises, additional increments of science produce diminishing returns in legitimation or delegitimation through the normative mechanism, depending on whether law is effective. The logarithmic form allows for this.

The label "normative" may seem odd for a mechanism based on whether goals are achieved. But the label is apt because the mechanism operates independently of the substance of legal goals. When actors affected by law comply, they do so regardless of the content of outcomes and of any assessments about how likely noncompliance would be to provoke sanctions. Actors inside legal institutions seek effectiveness because they have internalized the norm of effectiveness and because effectiveness defines who they are and what they do. The mechanism is labeled normative and not constitutive because it does not involve recognition of two alternative sets of norms, but rather orientation to, and internalization of, a new central norm.

Table 4 presents five hypotheses based on combining the normative mechanism with my earlier discussion of legitimacy's effects on approval and consent. In hypotheses 30 and 31, reduced reliance on science by a legal institution implies reduced institutional effectiveness, assuming the

²² Because law's effectiveness is linked to the outcomes it achieves, reduced effectiveness could conceivably improve outcomes and so diminish prior reductions in legitimacy for those receiving negative outcomes. Were this to occur, it would be through the instrumental and not the normative mechanism. Section III E considers how the normative and instrumental mechanisms combine.

TABLE 4

HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF TECHNOCRATIZATION THROUGH NORMATIVE MECHANISM

Hypothesis	Technocratization of Legal Act, Authority, Institution	Legitimacy, Approval, Consent to Legal Act, Authority, Institution	For Which Actors	Constraint or Condition
30	Legal institution which previously relied heavily on scientific reasoning and experts lessens such reliance Decreases in legal act, authority, institution implementing statute	Legitimacy, approval of that institution, its acts and authority decrease Greater decline in legitimacy, approval of legal act, authority, and institution implementing statute	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities External individual and institutional actors and collectivities	Level of scientific certainty remains constant When statute explicitly intended to produce effects (vs statute not explicitly intended to produce effects), and assuming level of scientific certainty remains constant
31				stant None
32	Increases	Legitimacy, approval decrease at faster rate in response to declining effectiveness of legal act, authority, and institution	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities	
33	Stable in legal act authority, institution implementing statute	Legitimacy, approval decrease at faster rate in response to declining effectiveness of legal act, authority, institution implementing statute	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities	As degree to which statute intended to produce effects on economic, social relations increases
34	Stable	Legitimacy, approval of <i>technocratization</i> of legal act, authority, and institution decrease	External individual and institutional actors and collectivities	As effectiveness of legal act, authority, institution decline

NOTE —All effects are based on the assumption that, by increasing orientation to effectiveness as a source of legitimacy, technocratization legitimates legal acts, authorities, and institutions to the extent that they are effective and delegitimizes those same objects when they are ineffective. Legitimizing and delegitimizing effects of increased technocratization diminish as earlier levels of technocratization rise.

level of scientific certainty is held constant. In hypotheses 31 and 33, statutory intent to produce effects is presumed to heighten orientation to, and import of, effectiveness. In hypothesis 32, increases in technocratization imply increases in orientation to effectiveness through operation of the normative mechanism. The faster rates of decline in legitimacy and approval predicted in hypotheses 32 and 33 also imply that any given decline in approval or legitimacy in response to a given reduction in effectiveness will be greater under the specified conditions. Hypothesis 34 suggests that because scientific-technical logic is oriented to effectiveness, technocratization itself is delegitimated as effectiveness declines.

Workings of the normative mechanism simultaneously draw on normative accounts of legitimacy processes (e.g., Tyler 1990) and expand on insights by Therborn (1978), Offe (1975*b*), and Skocpol (1985) about how science expands state capacity. Because the normative mechanism legitimates when law is effective but delegitimizes otherwise, it provides some support for both sides in debates over law, science, and legitimacy.

When declining effectiveness prompts reduced legitimacy and approval through the normative mechanism, reduced compliance may follow, both for individual and institutional actors within the collective and for the collectivity. Compliance with legal acts and institutions is required if law is to attain given goals. That is, compliance itself is needed for law to be effective (see Tyler 1990). Here, the normative mechanism provides possibilities for negative feedback. If reduced legitimacy and approval occasioned by technocratization through the normative mechanism do lead to reduced compliance, then law's effectiveness is impaired not just by loss of science but also by reduced compliance. Decreased effectiveness through reduced compliance then may erode legitimacy and approval still further. In turn, this may further erode compliance.

When other persons and institutions approve of and comply with law, the expected cost of noncompliance for a given person or institution is greater, and the chance of perceiving noncompliance to be possible is less. Because peer compliance affects perceptions of the possibility of and the expected costs and benefits associated with noncompliance, it encourages compliance independent of approval of law (see Walker et al. 1991). This is consistent with my earlier discussion of how cost-benefit evaluations and awareness of alternatives contribute to the binding nature of rules. Thus, when peers fail to comply with legal acts at any given time, a given person or institution is less likely to comply later. Authorities can make noncompliance more costly by increasing negative sanctions, including the use of force, but they are better off with voluntary compliance (Tyler 1990). Over time, the negative feedback suggested here works to destroy such voluntary compliance.

E Law, Science, and Legitimacy Processes

Analytically separating constitutive, instrumental, and normative mechanisms has shown how approaches that suggest that science legitimates law and those that suggest that science delegitimizes law are both to some extent correct. Distinguishing the three mechanisms and deducing their effects resolves earlier theoretical inconsistencies by showing how, for whom, and under what conditions legal acts, authorities, and institutions are legitimated or delegitimated by incorporating science into law. Combining the mechanisms suggests both why and to what extent real-world legitimation processes are complex.

Introducing science into law enhances focus on law's content or outcomes (the instrumental mechanism) and on law's effectiveness (the normative mechanism) while it promotes awareness of formal-legal and scientific rationalities as alternative rule sets or forms for law (the constitutive mechanism). Where enhanced orientation to outcomes delegitimizes the law for those receiving unfavorable legal outcomes, it legitimates for those whose outcomes are favorable. Enhanced orientation to law's effectiveness, and so to the relationship between rules and results, legitimates only to the extent that given legal goals are attained. Workings of the constitutive mechanism legitimate under one condition: if scientific rationality entirely substitutes for formal-legal rationality. In this case, science legitimates because *its* rules are the *only* rules. Under conditions of competing rule sets, science delegitimizes through the constitutive mechanism.

Theories and research on state legitimacy often wish to explain or predict a "legitimacy crisis" (e.g., Lehman 1987, Habermas 1975, Offe 1975a, Wolfe 1979, Lipset and Schneider 1983, Friedrichs 1980, Miller 1992). Production of such "crises" for legal acts, authorities, and institutions through the joint operation of constitutive and instrumental mechanisms and through possibilities for negative feedback built into the normative mechanism clearly relates to questions of legal order and change. Table 1 above shows how, through constitutive mechanisms linking technocratization and legitimacy, widespread disapproval of legal decisions and decision-making procedures internal to legal institutions can occur even in the absence of preexisting goal conflicts. Table 3, based on constitutive and instrumental mechanisms jointly, shows how internal and external delegitimation, political mobilization, and conflict feed upon each other and escalate each other's frequency, generality, and intensity. This sets out conditions under which a stability-threatening crisis, in which generalized disapproval translates into substantially reduced compliance with law and noninstitutionalized means of political protest,

would be most likely to occur. In addition, the lost voluntary compliance suggested to occur through the normative mechanism, when popular orientation to effectiveness combines with legal institutions' failure to be effective, may encourage governments to increase costs of noncompliance by augmenting negative sanctions. This possibility must be taken seriously because effectiveness is difficult to achieve in welfare state law.

As suggested above, such law internalizes political conflicts so that laws "on the books" and as administered embody multiple, diverse, and often conflicting goals (e.g., Easterbrook 1984, Yeager 1990, Stryker 1990a, 1991). Environmental law embodies health and safety goals but commodity logic as well (Stewart 1983, Yeager 1990), antitrust law promotes political democracy and the preservation of competitors, in addition to market efficiency and consumer welfare (Sullivan 1977). Combining normative and instrumental mechanisms shows the problem of simultaneously increasing orientation to effectiveness and to outcomes in a framework in which it is impossible to implement all conflicting goals effectively. To the extent that goals conflict and that science promotes the implementation of some goals at the expense of others, both normative and instrumental mechanisms may be delegitimated for those who receive unfavorable outcomes.

Considering mechanisms jointly, then, on the one hand shows how incorporating science into law could produce "legitimacy crises" that transcend law to threaten political stability. Such crises would not surprise scholars who presume that the absence of legitimacy promotes the collapse of governments faced with economic or social problems (Lipset 1981, Seligson and Muller 1987), or that legitimacy crises are a central cause or component of social revolutions (e.g., Gurr and Goldstone 1991, pp. 330–31).

On the other hand, and notwithstanding such fundamental changes as abolition of legally mandated second-class citizenship for African-Americans in the United States, legal change in advanced industrial democracies has been more evolutionary than revolutionary. And, while the mobilizations and countermobilizations which led to such major changes in U.S. law as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 included use of force by state authorities and also acts of violence by societal actors, especially those defending the status quo (see e.g., Piven and Cloward 1979), substantial mobilization and conflict around legal change in the United States and other Western welfare states is nonviolent. Democratic polities of welfare states provide institutionalized political and legal rules for changing legal acts, authorities, and institutions. Individual and collective protest can and does take place through such institutionalized channels as voting, political advertising, electoral fund-raising and cam-

painging, organized interest-group lobbying, litigation, and threatened litigation. *Legally circumscribed* strikes, pickets, marches, boycotts, and rallies provide potentially more disruptive but still legally institutionalized methods of collective protest. Civil disobedience, including, for example, lunch counter sit-ins during the civil rights movement, provides a noninstitutionalized yet nonviolent means of protest. *The theory relating technocratization to legitimacy suggests that dynamics of legitimation, delegitimation, mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict are an integral part of the everyday, ordinary workings of legal institutions.* Consistent with scholarship that charts how major changes in welfare state laws and legal institutions have occurred according to institutionalized rules of representative democracy (e.g., Friedman 1981), when the dynamics of legitimation and delegitimation play themselves out through institutionalized means, they help achieve political order through legally and politically induced legal change.

This section has already suggested possibilities for negative feedback built into the normative mechanism and for a dialectic of legitimation and delegitimation built into joint workings of the constitutive and instrumental mechanisms. A similar dialectic also may occur in joint operation of the normative and instrumental mechanisms. This is so if when the orientations to effectiveness and to outcomes are intertwined, the predominant mechanism of legitimacy becomes the instrumental. Then conflict would occur between defenders and detractors of legal acts, authorities, and institutions, just as such legal and political conflicts are produced by joint workings of the constitutive and instrumental mechanisms. Again, the proposed theory is consistent with a politically threatening legitimacy crisis. But it also moves away from overemphasizing crisis to illuminate the routine and benign aspect of legitimation-delegitimation dynamics. Section IV returns to this issue when considering the theory's more general implications for order and change.

Empirical work on law and science suggests that conflict inside and outside legal institutions oriented to and enabled by competing rule/resource sets in law is very common. Such work also provides illustrative evidence in accord with major assumptions and hypotheses in the theory. For example, Chesler et al.'s (1988) study of lawyer-social scientist interaction in courtroom-litigated school desegregation cases provides evidence consistent with the operation of a constitutive mechanism that links technocratization and legitimacy. The study shows how different rule sets characterizing formal-legal and scientific-technical rationality cause attorneys and scientists to incorporate different normative stances into their differing professional identities. This makes for lawyer-scientist conflict in mobilizing expert witnesses and in preparing cases for trial. Where some lawyers felt that social science was not relevant or appro-

prate to desegregation law, some scientists expressed frustration that judges' reliance on precedent prevented them from realizing that law should change in accord with changing scientific knowledge (Chesler et al 1988, p 42, 53-54)

Many studies of U S regulatory agencies highlight the mobilization of attorneys and scientists around competing legal and scientific rationalities for agency acts and procedures (e g , Katzmann 1980, Stryker 1989, Eisner 1991, Melnick 1983, pp 277-80) Consistent with the operation of a constitutive mechanism linking technocratization and legitimacy, extant empirical work shows that conflict between attorneys and scientists inside legal institutions is created because participants are oriented to different sources of legitimacy (e g , Chesler et al 1988, Stryker 1989, 1990a) In accord with assumptions that underly the instrumental mechanism, empirical work also shows that competing rationalities often are used instrumentally by those inside and outside legal institutions to promote preferred goals (e g , Simon 1983, Melnick 1983, Eisner 1991, Nelson 1984)

Empirical work by Campbell (1987) and Stryker (1989, 1990c) illustrates the dynamics of legitimation and delegitimation predicted in tables 1-3 through the constitutive and instrumental mechanisms Specifically, it is consistent with hypotheses linking (1) reduced technical staff approval of legal acts and authorities with authorities' failure to base acts on technical advice, (2) internal legitimacy problems with competing rules for decision making, (3) conflict inside legal institutions with the external legitimacy of those institutions This work also shows how the very legitimacy problems that beset legal institutions can help maintain political stability by facilitating legal change

Campbell (1987) details the external effects of AEC technical staff disapproval of administrative decisions that ignored their advice on safety hazards in favor of promoting cost reduction in the industry By ignoring technical advice, the AEC created widespread internal disapproval of its acts among technical staff members, because it refused to base action on "their" criteria and because outcomes associated with these criteria were in jeopardy Technical staff members then actively mobilized external allies and created external legitimacy problems by leaking information to outsiders who promoted safety goals and opposed AEC policy Ultimately, legitimacy problems led to the complete dismantling and reorganization of the AEC

At the pre-World War II NLRB, conflict over competing rationalities between staff lawyers and economists converged with external, instrumentally based class conflict over agency acts, authorities, and procedures to create a more generalized absence of public approval for the agency (Stryker 1989, 1990a) Here, external spillover was inadvertent

Internal actors did not actively recruit external allies until the NLRB was already under external attack. But intense intra-NLRB conflict was externally visible, and the mobilization of collective political action by anti-NLRB employers and members of Congress capitalized on this. This external mobilization then oriented itself to legal rationality and used it instrumentally to support legal and political goals, including dismantling the agency's economic unit. Congress abolished the unit in 1940 in a rider to a supplemental appropriations bill. More broadly, the conjuncture of internal and external legitimacy problems promoted congressional action to transform the form and content of labor relations law.

The assumption that, where orientation to effectiveness and outcomes are intertwined, the instrumental mechanism linking technocratization to legitimacy will be stronger than the normative mechanism receives suggestive support from earlier empirical work. This presumption is supported by the predominantly instrumental dynamic of external mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict over the pre-World War II NLRB, notwithstanding that the NLRB achieved effectiveness in part through its reliance on science (Stryker 1989). In accord with table 2's hypotheses linking outcomes achieved through science with legitimacy and approval of technocratization through the instrumental mechanism, is the empirical finding that unions, which received favorable outcomes from the pre-World War II NLRB, supported the NLRB economic unit which promoted those outcomes (Stryker 1989). Employers' groups, receiving unfavorable outcomes, were not supportive.

Clearly, extant data loosely consistent with assumptions and hypotheses developed here cannot substitute for direct empirical examination of the theory. Using a logic of statistical or experimental control, empirical work designed to directly examine hypotheses must isolate the operation of each of the three posited mechanisms from each other and from factors—other than technocratization—which also affect law's legitimacy. Equally important, empirical tests must isolate effects of posited mechanisms that link technocratization and legitimacy from the confounding effects of other factors that also affect the approval of law, the consent to law, and the mobilization and conflict over law inside and outside legal institutions. These factors include, for example, the likelihood and severity of sanctions, including state repression (e.g., Tilly 1975, Piliavin et al. 1986). Since delegitimation reduces *voluntary* compliance, it may, when occasioned by technocratization, cause governments to raise negative sanctions. Similarly, it has been shown that legitimacy processes stemming from technocratization alter the perceived likelihood and effectiveness of sanctions. But change in sanctions also may occur independently of these processes. Other factors wholly or partially independent of legitimacy processes stemming from technocratization include distribu-

tions of mobilization-relevant resources other than legitimacy. Such resources include money, labor, technical expertise, existing organizations, and existing networks for building new organizations, gathering information, and influencing authorities (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977, Jenkins 1983). Although empirical tests remain to be done, illustrative evidence suggests they will be fruitful and that the theory can help us understand and predict legitimacy dynamics in real-world settings.

Theoretical work also remains to be done to better assess legitimacy dynamics in real-world contexts. Here, constitutive, instrumental, and normative mechanisms that link technocratization to law's legitimacy have been isolated and their separate effects deduced. Joint effects of constitutive and instrumental mechanisms have been deduced. Some possible joint effects of instrumental and normative mechanisms have also been explored. Where two mechanisms of legitimacy undercut each other, suggestions were made about which mechanism, under which conditions, was likely to be stronger. But the task of rigorously deducing joint or combined effects of all *three* mechanisms together remains. It must be done to predict how technocratization will affect legitimacy in "real life," because all three mechanisms operate simultaneously in real-world settings.²³

That work remains should not obscure current theoretical achieve-

²³ Thus, e.g., considering all three mechanisms simultaneously for external actors suggests that real-world legal authorities should promote technocratization when and if the aggregate positive impact of technocratization on legitimacy outweighs the aggregate negative impact. Assuming law is effective, positive impact occurs for all external actors through the normative mechanism. For external actors receiving favorable outcomes, additional positive impact occurs through the instrumental mechanism and intensification of the instrumental mechanism by the normative mechanism. Negative impact occurs through the constitutive mechanism for all external actors, assuming they are aware of competing rationalities for legal decision making. For external actors receiving unfavorable outcomes, negative impact occurs through the instrumental mechanism and through intensification of the constitutive mechanism by the instrumental mechanism. Future work must theoretically specify and empirically test under what conditions the sum of these positive effects outweighs the sum of the negative effects and vice versa. Clearly, this will depend both on the relative numbers of actors receiving positive and negative outcomes and on the degree to which relevant mechanisms intensify or outweigh each other. If law is ineffective, then assessing the aggregate impact of technocratization on legitimacy through all three mechanisms requires adding a negative, rather than positive, impact for all external actors through the normative mechanism. It also requires adding a negative impact through intensification of the instrumental mechanism by the normative mechanism for external actors who receive unfavorable outcomes. Theoretically specifying the combined impact of all mechanisms when law is ineffective is useful given that, as Sec. III notes, high levels of technocratization orient actors to an effectiveness which is often prevented by high levels of goal conflict internal to welfare state law. Future work also must build on the theory offered here to establish how combining all three mechanisms affects feedback between internal and external legitimacy processes.

ment The theory presented here shows through which mechanisms, how, for whom, and under what conditions earlier opposing treatments of government, science, and legitimacy offered by, on the one hand, Habermas, Larson, and others, and, on the other hand, Nelkin, Stryker, and others, are correct and incorrect By showing how science-promoted state capacity is relevant to legitimacy, the theory also incorporates insights of Skocpol, Offe, and Therborn The theory explains the empirical finding that legal authorities often increase reliance on science with the intention of increasing effectiveness, capacity and legitimacy, instead they delegitimize and politicize Unintended results occur because (1) internalized goal conflicts mean that law often is ineffective notwithstanding its reliance on science, (2) increased state reliance on science delegitimizes for all actors through the normative mechanism when law is not effective, and (3) delegitimation through the constitutive mechanism for all actors and through the instrumental mechanism for actors receiving unfavorable outcomes may outweigh legitimacy produced through the normative mechanism even when law is effective

In short, the theory explains how and why legitimization and delegitimation occur It predicts their further consequences for approval, consent, mobilization, countermobilization and conflict On the one hand, predicted dynamics of legitimization and delegitimation show conditions under which legal authorities and institutions lose autonomy through politicization of and conflict over their decision making Predicted internal institutional conflict produced solely through the constitutive mechanism shows that serious legitimacy problems can be created through the introduction of science into legal institutions even in the absence of pre-existing goal conflicts and of any focus on legal outcomes Loss of voluntary compliance through the normative mechanism and a compensating increase in negative sanctions by authorities is possible, especially if both technocratization of law and goal conflict in law are high Yet, on the other hand, the routine nature of much predicted interplay between legitimization and delegitimation shows how political stability can be promoted by delegitimation leading to institutionalized legal and political conflict and to evolutionary legal change

Last but not least, while rigorously deducing combined effects of all three legitimacy mechanisms remains to be done, *current development, as summarized in tables 1-4, makes clear the factors on which those combined effects will depend These include the current level of technocratization, the relative number of legal and scientific personnel internal to legal institutions, the level of awareness of alternative rationalities for decision making among actors inside and outside legal institutions, the relative number of external actors receiving favorable and unfavorable outcomes, the way outcomes are affected by alternative legal and scientific*

rationalities for decision making, the degree to which law enforcement has been effective in achieving legal goals, and the degree to which conflict in goals is present in law Thus, the theory specifies what must be known to evaluate how technocratization will affect legitimacy in real-world settings By specifying factors that must enter into empirical assessments in a way that resolves scholarly inconsistencies and provides an integrated, precise set of concepts, assumptions, and logically deduced hypotheses to guide future empirical work, the theory advances scholarship on law, science, and legitimacy

IV ALTERNATIVE RULE/RESOURCE SETS, ORDER, AND CHANGE

Sets of logically interrelated hypotheses in Section III are specific to explaining how technocratization of law affects law's legitimacy and to further implications for legal and political systems that flow from this But the theory is useful beyond what it offers to those interested in law, science, and legitimacy Its guiding orientations to legitimacy processes, to effects of decision-making rationalities that are both rules/schemas and resources for action, and to effects of multiple, competing rule sets guiding action are generally applicable to many areas of sociology These include politics and policy-making, complex organizations, stratification and work, small-group dynamics, sociology of science, and sociology of education Further, by specifying how science affects legitimacy of legal institutions, the theory shows for one set of institutions—legal—and one social process—legitimacy—how the rule/resource duality of structures contributes to understanding order and change

A General Implications and Applications

Delegitimation through constitutive mechanisms should apply not only when law and science compete as rationalities for decision making, but whenever multiple, competing decision-making logics are present in an institutional arena For example, the electoral and interest representation and mediation rules through which political power is exercised in representative democracy provide decision-making rules that shape policy in Western welfare states (e g , Offe 1975*b*, Bell 1985) Consistent with the proposed theory, and with evidence provided by Bell's (1985) study of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, politics as a source of rationality and legitimacy to which actors are oriented can compete with both law and science to shape state policy-making and to promote conflicts both inside and over state policy Clashing scientific and political decision-making logics are a major theme of empirical work on science and technology legislation (e g , Barke 1986) Analogous to Section III's

predictions for law and science, when science and politics provide alternative decision-making rules, instrumental and constitutive mechanisms should join to produce mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict oriented to, and enabled by, competing political and scientific rule sets

Similar implications of constitutive and instrumental mechanisms hold for the scientific community itself. Disagreement among scientists often characterizes policy disputes that draw on scientific expertise. This has effects on public approval of policy and also of science. The constitutive mechanism predicts delegitimation if there are competing methodologies or theories in which scientists are trained and socialized and around which they can mobilize. Such disagreements as those between economic structuralists and Chicago school economists in antitrust, or those between human epidemiological and animal laboratory approaches in environmental protection and occupational safety and health enhance government and public awareness of scientific uncertainty. Through the constitutive mechanism, competing scientific "schools" should reduce science's legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The legitimacy of policies based on scientific knowledge should be reduced when relevant scientific theories, methods, and findings point in different directions. As highlighted by the instrumental mechanism, rules that guide action are mobilized as resources to achieve desired outcomes. To the extent that scientists' prestige, authority, and professional identity depend on peer recognition, instrumental and constitutive mechanisms join to predict mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict among scientists over scientific form and content.

Apparently far from the realm of law and science is the social psychology of small groups. Here too the theory's basic assumptions are useful. Ridgeway et al. (1992) note the difficulties experienced by persons who, high in task ability but disadvantaged on such diffuse status characteristics as gender and race, try to act directly in small, task-oriented groups. Status-advantaged persons who also rank high in task ability elicit compliance more effectively. The authors explain this in terms of status expectations, but constitutive mechanisms of legitimacy, too, provide insight. High ability, status-disadvantaged persons are faced with ability and diffuse status as competing orientations for legitimating authority. For high ability, status-advantaged persons, ability and diffuse status are multiple but reinforcing sources of legitimate authority.

At the other end of the spectrum from small, informal groups, studies of decision making and rewards in large, formal organizations could profit from considering the implications of alternative rule/resource sets for legitimacy. For example, notwithstanding traditional models of the scholar-teacher, much current discussion both inside and outside state universities orients itself to research and teaching as alternative and com-

peting sources of institutional legitimacy and individual career rewards (see e.g., Iseminger 1993, Antczak 1993). As expected from constitutive and instrumental mechanisms, external mobilization that promotes increased emphasis on and rewards for teaching feeds back to intrauniversity disputes between factions oriented mostly to teaching and factions oriented mostly to research. The 1990s may see mutually reinforcing internal and external politicization and conflict over institutional emphases in higher education similar to dynamics predicted for law and science in legal institutions.

These examples show that separating mechanisms of legitimacy is useful beyond law and the polity, just as considering how alternative rule/resource sets shape action is useful. Constitutive legitimacy mechanisms have been isolated and supported empirically in a series of laboratory task-group experiments by Thomas et al. (1986), Walker et al. (1986), and Walker et al. (1991). The existence of separate normative and instrumental legitimacy mechanisms has been shown in survey research by Tyler (1990), who also reviews others' empirical work. Stratification and mobility may provide an especially fruitful site for further exploring the consequences of assuming that constitutive, instrumental, and normative mechanisms simultaneously produce legitimacy processes. Historically, legitimacy dynamics helped shift workplace control away from arbitrary authority toward relatively more reliance on bureaucracy (Halaby 1986). Theory and research now could inquire how current hiring and promotion procedures are affected by the interplay between two rule/resource sets: equal opportunity for disadvantaged individuals and equal results for disadvantaged groups. In public discourse, the latter rule set is increasingly labeled "diversity."

Affirmative action now is a "hot button" issue (e.g., Lipset 1992, Burstein 1993). To the extent that affirmative action is seen not as extending the ethos of merit-based equal opportunity for all, regardless of class, race, or gender, but instead as mandating equality of results for women and minority groups regardless of ability and training, alternative and competing rule/resource sets for career advancement have been created (see, e.g., Bobo and Kluegel 1993). If people are aware of these competing rules, hiring and promotion procedures and decisions should be delegitimated through the constitutive mechanism. The instrumental mechanism would presume that persons and groups mobilize alternative rules as resources to help their own career advancement. Because equality of opportunity and of results orient and empower different persons and groups, each rule/resource set provides bases for mobilization and conflict inside employing institutions and in society.²⁴ Thus, the current

²⁴ This does not imply that all women and minorities under all conditions orient

rhetoric of diversity versus merit (e.g., Brimelow and Spencer 1993) and the more general contemporary politicization of work place hiring and advancement (e.g., Lipset 1992, Gamson and Modigliani 1987, Jencks 1985) is predictable starting from the legitimacy assumptions and processes outlined in Section III

Analogous to table 1's hypotheses about lawyers' and scientists' rates of exit from legal institutions (hypotheses 11 and 12), here, employees oriented to advancement rules not followed by employers may quit in greater numbers than would those oriented to rules that employers follow. Analogous to predictions in table 1, employee resignations would rise as conflict intensity between principles of equal opportunity and equality of results increases. Worker-attachment studies argue that reduced employee turnover follows from internal labor markets and bureaucratic control (e.g., Halaby 1986). Politicization of promotion through competing rules of equal opportunity and equality of result could undercut the presumed advantage of bureaucracy.

Determining how normative mechanisms intersect with constitutive and instrumental legitimacy mechanisms in affirmative action involves first recognizing the huge normative force of merit-based equal opportunity in American life (Lipset 1992, Bobo and Kluegel 1993). In 1989, a majority of men and of women, African-Americans and whites, agreed that ability, as evidenced by test scores, rather than preferential treatment to women and minorities to make up for past discrimination, should be the main consideration for getting jobs or a college education (see data in Lipset 1992, p. 58). Additional poll data showing approval of affirmative action programs stressing opportunity for qualified minorities but disapproval of programs stressing quotas and preferential treatment is available in Kluegel and Smith (1986, pp. 201-4), Bunzel (1986), and Bobo and Kluegel (1993). Second, determining how normative legitimacy mechanisms respond to affirmative action involves considering the degree to which affirmative action programs either extend and reinforce equal opportunity or, conversely, undercut it by focusing exclusively on the

themselves to diversity or that all white males under all conditions orient themselves to equal opportunity. The theory relating technocratization to law's legitimacy considers conditions under which lawyers and scientists are more or less likely to orient themselves to legal rules as opposed to increases in scientific-technical rules as the major source of law's legitimacy. Similarly, a theory that relates affirmative action to the legitimacy of hiring and promotion decisions must consider which persons and groups, under which conditions, will be more or less likely to orient themselves to equality of opportunity and equality of results. For some women and minorities, the normative strength of equal opportunity might outweigh the instrumental advantages of orientation to diversity, especially if such women and minorities are highly qualified and so can achieve success under the equal opportunity norm.

new central norm of diversity. On the one hand, through normative mechanisms, traditional equal opportunity norms should inhibit institutionalization of affirmative action programs that are oriented exclusively to achieving diversity/equality of results. On the other hand, where affirmative action promotes diversity at the expense of equal opportunity, increasing proliferation and institutionalization of affirmative action programs should, over time, increase the normative force of diversity.

How legitimacy enters hiring and promotion is important not just because it affects whether and how mobility becomes politicized or which employees are more or less likely to quit. Legitimacy also affects how rewards are distributed. Just as law and science need not produce different results in every legal case, diversity and equal opportunity need not produce different results in every hiring and promotion decision. Hiring a highly qualified minority or female applicant promotes both diversity and equal opportunity. But just as law and science often do produce conflicting outcomes and are mobilized intentionally to do so, equal opportunity and diversity often will produce different outcomes (see, e.g., Lynch 1989, Jencks 1985). Whether hiring and promotion are governed by equal opportunity, equality of results/diversity, or some combination of the two rule sets matters because governing rules affect reward distributions across persons and groups (e.g., Jencks 1985). Governing rules also determine whether and how stratification and mobility processes are changing.

Providing examples from small groups to large-scale stratification processes is not meant to substitute for the hard work of rigorously deducing hypotheses about legitimation-delegitimation dynamics in these contexts. By using its starting assumptions to deduce a set of interrelated hypotheses for legal institutions, the theory constructed in Section III can provide a model for those interested in pursuing theoretical implications for other spheres. Such scholars can start by establishing relevant rule/resource sets for their context and research question. They also can establish which actors receive favorable and unfavorable outcomes through each rule/resource set, what normative principles are embodied in the rule/resource sets, and what new norms are introduced by institutional changes (e.g., technocratization, affirmative action) whose effects on legitimacy are explored. In short, where Section III provides a theory relating technocratization to law's legitimacy, this section suggests that by applying the starting orientations of that theory—the rule/resource duality, competing rule/resource sets shaping action, existence of constitutive, instrumental, and normative legitimacy mechanisms—we will improve our knowledge of legitimacy processes and so of social conflict, order, and change in other spheres.

B Legitimacy Processes, Order, and Change

The theory in Section III helps specify how legitimacy processes promote order and change, and so it extends and modifies prior literature linking legitimacy to social order. The theory also shows how the rule/resource duality of structures helps us understand another duality—that structures both reproduce and transform themselves. In fact, rigorously theorizing legitimacy processes leads to unanticipated insights about structural stabilization and transformation through legitimacy processes.

Whenever normative (e.g., Tyler 1990, Della Fave 1986, Lehman 1987), instrumental (Przeworski 1980), or constitutive (e.g., Walker et al. 1991), earlier treatments of legitimacy tended to equate legitimation with order and delegitimation with change or potential for change. Legitimacy crises have been seen as important because, under some conditions, they promote major social change (e.g., Wolfe 1977, pp. 322–47, Gurr and Goldstone 1991, Friedrichs 1980, Vidich 1979). The proposed theory refocuses scholarly discussion in two ways. First, it moves away from a one-to-one equation of legitimation with order and delegitimation with change. Instead, it shows how competing legitimacy sources can delegitimize, and how delegitimation can help produce order by promoting conflict and change. Second, the theory moves away from overemphasizing legitimacy crises. While highlighting conditions most likely to produce crises of legal legitimacy that threaten political stability, the theory shows how dynamics of legitimation, delegitimation, mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict can be routine, order-producing parts of how social institutions work.

According to Sewell (1992), social change occurs in significant part because there are multiple rule/resource sets across institutions and because rule/resource sets are transposable from one institutional sphere to another. The theory relating law's legitimacy to technocratization illustrates and extends this insight. In Sewell's terminology, the rule/resource sets characterizing law and science intersect in legal institutions when science is extended or transposed from its own realm into law. Structural intersection means that multiple rule/resource sets now are available within a single institution. The theory in Section III shows that change is built into the concept of multiple, transposable, and intersecting structures when transposability provides competing available rule/resource sets to orient and enable action within any given institution. By specifying the legal and scientific-technical rules that orient behavior in legal institutions, Section II shows how law and science provide such competing rule/resource sets. Through constitutive, instrumental, and normative mechanisms, introducing science into law produces the legitimation-

delegitimation dynamics developed in Section III. In turn, these dynamics specify important change-facilitating consequences of multiple, intersecting, and transposable structures.

As a dualistic concept of structure suggests, structures enable people to actively orient themselves to rules while simultaneously mobilizing rules as resources to achieve desired outcomes. If institutional context shapes action, then constitutive, instrumental, and normative legitimacy mechanisms specify how constraints and opportunities for action created by extending science into law are likely to work. Through the constitutive mechanism, competing rule sets create new cognitive possibilities and choices for action. No longer are people restricted to *the* way things are. Similarly, new resources for action are created through the instrumental mechanism. These new resources do not sustain the prior structure (i.e., the rule/resource set) but rather challenge it. New norms are created to guide action through the normative mechanism. Building on the theory of how technocratization affects legitimacy processes in legal institutions, scholars can construct theories about legitimacy processes in other spheres so as to specify additional sets of consequences for multiple, intersecting, and transposable structures. For example, Edelman (1992) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) show how formal organizations seek external legitimacy by actively building new institutional forms that essentially transpose and make use of environmentally prevailing rule sets, whether of rationalization (Meyer and Rowan) or of equal employment opportunity (Edelman).

By specifying one set of processes through which multiple, intersecting, and transposable rule/resource sets can transform structure, the proposed theory illustrates and extends Sewell's insight that a dualistic concept of structure incorporates change. But the theory also extends Sewell by showing how structural transformation produced through multiple, intersecting, and transposable rule/resource sets can reproduce social order. In so doing, it moves beyond oversimplistic equations of legitimation with order and delegitimation with change.

The theory in Section III shows how incorporating science into law can produce legitimacy crises that threaten political stability by translating widespread disapproval of law into reduced compliance, as well as into noninstitutionalized and violent collective action. While not occasioned by technocratization, the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the jury verdict acquitting police in the first Rodney King case provide a real-world reminder that when law loses legitimacy, noninstitutionalized and violent protest can follow. Current antiabortion violence provides another reminder. On the other hand, the dynamics of legitimation-delegitimation, mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict discussed in Section III may encompass neither violence nor such nonviolent, noninstitutional-

ized means of noncompliance and protest as civil disobedience. When conflict over law occurs strictly according to institutionalized legal and political rules, a legitimacy "crisis" is contained and is limited to playing itself out within rules of representative democracy. Under these conditions, the dynamics of legitimation-delegitimation, mobilization, counter-mobilization, and conflict reproduce social order through legally and politically induced legal change.

The insight of order through change has a long history within the conflict tradition in sociology (e.g., Coser 1956, Dahrendorf 1959). Rediscovering it while exploring legitimacy processes leads to questions about (1) how rule/resource sets from one institutional sphere shape legitimation and delegitimation in another and (2) under what conditions rule/resource sets in one sphere limit or exacerbate delegitimation processes in another. Future work should pursue these issues, both for their relationship with technocratization and law's legitimacy and for legitimacy processes more generally.

Similarly, future work can integrate discussion of legitimacy processes with theory and research on the formation of individual and collective identities, interests, and resources.²⁵ Walker et al. (1991), Gamson (1975), and others (e.g., Ragin, Coverman, and Hayward 1982, McCarthy and Zald 1977) show that legitimacy itself is a resource that facilitates mobilization and helps collective action achieve its goals. But other factors, including the kinds and quantities of *other* resources possessed by those mobilizing in support of or against law enforcement also affect whether such groups are successful in reproducing or transforming the status quo (e.g., Vidich 1979, p. 154, Tilly 1975, Jenkins 1983). As Section III indicated, such other resources include money, labor, technical expertise, and existing organizations and networks, including channels of access to information and of influence over authorities.

The kinds and quantities of resources possessed by aggrieved individuals and groups and by authorities also affect government sanctions. Expected sanctions in turn affect what means are chosen to express reduced consent, including whether or not reduced approval translates into reduced compliance (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1979, Gamson 1975). Expected sanctions also affect whether or not the means chosen are non-violent and whether or not they are institutionalized. As discussed in Sections II and III, people are more likely to comply with law that has lost legitimacy and approval if expected costs of noncompliance are high relative to expected benefits. Many scholars have shown that by increas-

²⁵ See Stryker (1992b, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c) for the beginnings of this work and for how the content of law shapes interests, resources, and organization, and mobilization of collective actors.

ing costs of protest, government repression affects the likelihood of active protest by those who are aggrieved (e.g., Tilly 1975, Jenkins 1983). Future analyses of constitutive, instrumental, and normative legitimacy processes can profitably be coupled with more general analyses of interest and resource formation. This should include assessing the likelihood and severity of negative government sanctions for failure to comply and how such sanctions are affected by factors both exogenous and endogenous to legitimacy processes. Just as future empirical tests of the theory should isolate effects of legitimacy from effects of other factors that shape consent, mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict, so future theory building can rigorously integrate legitimacy processes with processes of identity, interest, and resource formation.

C Summary and Conclusion

This paper has built on the rule/resource duality to provide insight into social structural transformation while simultaneously developing the centrality of legitimacy processes to social order, conflict, and change. By developing a theory showing how, for whom, and under what conditions science legitimates or delegitimizes law, the article resolves scholarly inconsistencies and integrates earlier scholarship into a more general framework.

Workings of the constitutive mechanism that links technocratization and legitimacy support Habermas and Larson in emphasizing form over content in legitimacy processes. However, in opposition to Habermas and Larson, the constitutive mechanism delegitimizes and politicizes except when science so pervades government and law that it alone provides the rules of the game for state action. Results conform to Nelkin's view, but are not produced by the focus on content that she and others highlight. Instead, the constitutive mechanism shows that legitimacy problems can be created in the absence of preexisting conflicts over legal goals and through a focus on legal procedures alone. Workings of the instrumental mechanism that links technocratization and legitimacy, and of the instrumental and constitutive mechanisms jointly, support Nelkin and others who presume that science will exacerbate politicization of and conflict over law and government. Workings of the normative mechanism incorporate insights of Offe, Therborn, and Skocpol about how science expands state capacity. Because the normative mechanism legitimates when law is effective, but delegitimizes otherwise, it provides some support for both sides in debates over law, science, and legitimacy.

Enhanced theoretical specificity helps explain and predict legitimacy processes in real-world settings. Analytically separating constitutive, instrumental, and normative legitimacy mechanisms and deducing the con-

sequences of each for approval, consent, mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict helps us understand how legal authorities produce delegitimation and politicization when they expand reliance on science with the intention of doing just the opposite. Since all three mechanisms operate at the same time in real-world settings, the theory specifies what must be known to assess the combined import of all mechanisms. It also shows conditions under which, and groups for whom, the mechanisms reinforce or undercut each other in legitimating or delegitimizing law. Illustrative evidence suggests that research designed to test the theory will be fruitful.

This article defines major concepts and states underlying assumptions explicitly. It uses deductive reasoning to construct logically interrelated propositions that are relatively abstract, general, and consistent in terminology. Yet it also attends to concrete historical and legal contexts and leaves room for induction. It does so, first, because aspects of real-world contexts provide an inductive basis for conceptualizing context more abstractly, in ways relevant to deducing additional propositions. This ties theory construction to the world and subjects hypothesized relationships to contextual constraints and conditions. It does so, second, because operationalizing such central concepts as favorable and unfavorable outcomes depends on the empirical contexts in which actors, interests, and objectively possible alternative outcomes are embedded.

Where the theory's interrelated propositions pertain to how technocratization affects law's legitimacy and to further implications for the polity that stem from this, the theory's guiding orientations to legitimacy, to effects of decision-making rationalities that are both rules of and resources for action, and to effects of multiple and competing rule sets are generally applicable across diverse areas of sociology, including stratification, complex organizations, and small-group dynamics. Similarly, the theory's guiding orientations illuminate such important current issues as affirmative action and the mission and reward structure of higher education.

By specifying how science affects legitimacy of legal institutions, the theory shows for one set of institutions—legal—and one social process—legitimacy—how the rule/resource duality of structures helps us understand order and change. While indicating how politically threatening legitimacy crises can arise in law, the theory also shows how political stability is aided by legal delegitimation that leads to politically and legally institutionalized means of mobilization, countermobilization, and conflict and to evolutionary legal change. This corrects for earlier oversimplifications that equated order with legitimation alone.

While the insight of order through conflict and change is not new, what is new is showing precisely how order results from change *through*

legitimacy processes This focuses future theory and research squarely on conditions under which expressions of nonconsent to one set of institutions are limited to socially institutionalized means by rule/resource sets in another institutional sphere In the language of conceptual debates on social structure, this article has shown how change is built into the concept of structure through legitimacy processes that are triggered by transposable and intersecting structures Now the challenge is to show, in a similarly rigorous way, how political rule/resource sets and legitimacy processes within the polity shape legitimacy processes in law and in other such structures as the economy, so as to both contain and exacerbate "legitimacy crises" in these other spheres

REFERENCES

- Abbott, Andrew 1988 *The System of Professions An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Antczak, Fred 1993 "Some Ideas toward a 'Teaching' Edge What a Teaching 'Center' Should and Shouldn't Do for the Culture of Learning at the University of Iowa " *FYI for Faculty and Staff of the University of Iowa* (March 12), pp 3, 7
- Baldwin, Robert, and Christopher McCrudden 1987 *Regulation and Public Law* London Weidenfeld & Nicolson
- Barke, Richard 1986 *Science, Technology and Public Policy* Washington, D C Congressional Quarterly
- Bell, Robert 1985 *The Culture of Policy Deliberations* New Brunswick, N J Rutgers University Press
- Bobo, Lawrence, and James R Kluegel 1993 "Opposition to Race-Targeting Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?" *American Sociological Review* 58 443-64
- Brand, Donald R 1988 *Corporatism and the Rule of Law A Study of the National Recovery Administration* Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press
- Breyer, Stephen 1982 *Regulation and Its Reform* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Brimelow, Peter, and Leslie Spencer 1993 "When Quotas Replace Merit, Everybody Suffers " *Forbes* (February 15), pp 80-102
- Broekman, Jan M 1988 "Legal Subjectivity as a Precondition for the Intertwinement of Law and the Welfare State " Pp 76-108 in *Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State*, edited by G Teubner New York Walter de Gruyter
- Bunzel, John H 1986 "Affirmative Reactions " *Public Opinion* 9 45-49
- Burowoy, Michael 1979 *Manufacturing Consent Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Burstein, Paul 1993 "Affirmative Action, Jobs and American Democracy What Has Happened to the Quest for Equal Opportunity?" *Law and Society Review* 26 901-22
- Campbell, John L 1987 "Legitimation Meltdown Weberian and Neo-Marxist Interpretations of Legitimation Crisis in Advanced Capitalist Society " *Political Power and Social Theory* 6 133-58
- Carp, Robert A , and Ronald Sudham 1991 *The Federal Courts*, 2d ed Washington, D C Congressional Quarterly
- Chesler, Mark A , Joseph Sanders, and Debra S Kalmuss 1988 *Social Science in*

- Court Mobilizing Experts in the School Desegregation Cases* Madison University of Wisconsin
- Coser, Lewis 1956 *The Functions of Social Conflict* Glencoe, Ill Free Press
- Crandall, Robert W , and Lester B Lave, eds 1981 *The Scientific Bases of Health and Safety Regulation* Washington, D C Brookings
- Dahrendorf, Ralf 1959 *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* Stanford, Calif Stanford University
- Della Fave, L Richard 1986 "Toward an Explication of the Legitimation Process " *Social Forces* 65 476-500
- Dickson, David 1984 *The New Politics of Science* New York Pantheon
- Dietz, Thomas M , and Robert W Rycroft 1987 *The Risk Professionals* New York Russell Sage
- Dornbusch, Sanford M , and W Richard Scott 1975 *Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority* San Francisco Jossey-Bass
- Easterbrook, Frank H 1984 "Forward The Court and the Economic System " *Harvard Law Review* 98 4-60
- Easton, David 1958 "The Perception of Authority and Political Change " Pp 170-96 in *Authority*, edited by C J Friedrich Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Edelman, Lauren 1992 "Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures Organization Mediation of Civil Rights Law " *American Journal of Sociology* 97 1531-76
- Eisenberg, Melvin A 1988 *The Nature of the Common Law* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Eisner, Mark Allen 1991 *Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics Institutions, Expertise and Policy Change* Chapel Hill University of North Carolina
- Ewing, Sally 1987 "Formal Justice and the Spirit of Capitalism Max Weber's Sociology of Law " *Law and Society Review* 21 487-512
- Friedman, Kathi V 1981 *Legitimation of Social Rights and the Western Welfare State A Weberian Perspective* Chapel Hill University of North Carolina
- Friedrichs, David O 1980 "The Legitimacy Crisis in the United States A Conceptual Analysis " *Social Problems* 27 540-55
- Gamson, William A 1975 *The Strategy of Social Protest* Homewood, Ill Dorsey
- Gamson, William A , and Andre Modighani 1987 "The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action " *Research in Political Sociology* 3 137-77
- Greider, William 1987 *Secrets of the Temple How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country* New York Simon & Schuster
- Gross, James A 1981 *The Reshaping of the National Labor Relations Board* Albany State University of New York Press
- Gurr, Ted Robert, and Jack A Goldstone 1991 "Comparisons and Policy Implications " Pp 324-52 in *Revolution of the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by J A Goldstone, T R Gurr, and F Moshiri Boulder, Colo Westview Press
- Habermas, Jurgen 1970 *Toward a Rational Society*, translated by J Shapiro Boston Beacon
- 1975 *Legitimation Crisis*, translated by T McCarthy Boston Beacon
- Halaby, Charles N 1986 "Worker Attachment and Workplace Authority " *American Sociological Review* 51 634-49
- Hannan, Michael T , and John Freeman 1988 "The Ecology of Organizational Mortality American Labor Unions, 1836-1985 " *American Journal of Sociology* 94 25-52
- Hawkins, Keith 1984 *Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution* Oxford Clarendon
- Heinz, John P , and Edward O Laumann 1982 *Chicago Lawyers The Social Structure of the Bar* New York and Chicago Russell Sage and the American Bar Foundation

- Iseminger, Jeff 1993 "The Labor of Learning Are Faculty Making the Grade?" *On Wisconsin The Magazine for UW-Madison Alumni and Friends* (March-April), pp 15-19, 32
- Jencks, Christopher 1985 "Affirmative Action for Blacks Past, Present, and Future" *American Behavioral Scientist* 28 731-60
- Jenkins, J Craig 1983 "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements" *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 527-53
- Katzmann, Robert 1980 *Regulatory Bureaucracy The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy* Cambridge, Mass MIT Press
- Kelman, Stephen 1981 *Regulating America, Regulating Sweden A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy* Cambridge, Mass MIT Press
- Kluegel, James R , and Eliot R Smith 1986 *Beliefs about Inequality Americans' Views of What Is and What Ought to Be* New York Aldine de Gruyter
- Korpi, Walter 1989 "Power, Politics and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship Social Rights during Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries since 1930" *American Sociological Review* 54 309-28
- Larson, Magali Sarfatti 1977 *The Rise of Professionalism* Berkeley University of California Press
- Lehman, Edward W 1987 "The Crisis of Political Legitimacy What Is It? Who's Got It? Who Needs It?" *Research in Political Sociology* 3 203-221
- Levi, Edward H 1949 *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Lipset, Seymour M 1981 *Political Man The Social Bases of Politics*, expanded ed Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
- 1992 Affirmative Action and the American Creed *Wilson Quarterly* 16 (Winter) 52-62
- Lipset, Seymour M , and William Schneider 1983 *The Confidence Gap Business, Labor and Government in the Public Mind* New York Free Press
- Llewellyn, Kurt 1989 *The Case Law System in America* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Lynch, Frederick R 1989 *Invisible Victims White Males and the Crisis of Affirmative Action* New York Greenwood Press
- Melnick, R Shep 1983 *Regulation and the Courts The Case of the Clean Air Act* Washington, D C Brookings
- Meyer, John W , and Brian Rowan 1977 "Institutionalized Organizations Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony" *American Journal of Sociology* 83 340-63
- Miller, Arthur H 1992 "In Search of Regime Legitimacy" Pp 95-122 in *Public Opinion and Political Transformations in the Gorbachev Era*, edited by A H Miller, W Reisinger, and V Heshl Boulder, Colo Westview Press
- Mitnick, Barry M 1980 *The Political Economy of Regulation Creating, Designing and Removing Regulatory Forms* New York Columbia University
- Moe, Terry 1987 "Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory The Politics of the NLRB" *Studies in American Political Development* 2 236-99
- Monahan, John, and Lorens Walker 1990 *Social Science in Law Cases and Materials*, 2d ed Mineola, N Y Foundation Press
- McCarthy, John D , and Meyer N Zald 1977 "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements A Partial Theory" *American Journal of Sociology* 82 1212-41
- National Science Board 1989 *Science and Engineering Indicators—1989* Washington, D C Government Printing Office
- Nelkin, Dorothy 1984 "Science Technology and Political Conflict Analyzing the Issues" Pp 9-26 in *Controversy Politics of Technical Decisions*, 2d ed Edited by D Nelkin, Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Offe, Claus 1975a Introduction to part 3 of *Stress and Contradiction in Modern*

- Capitalism*, edited by L. Lindberg, R. Alford, C. Crouch, and C. Offe. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
- 1975b "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation." Pp. 125–44 in *Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism*, edited by L. Lindberg, R. Alford, C. Crouch, and C. Offe. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
- Pampel, Fred, and John Williamson. 1989 *Age, Class, Politics and the Welfare State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1951 *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
- Piliavin, Irving, Rosemary Gartner, Craig Thornton, and Ross L. Matsueda. 1986 "Crime, Deterrence and Rational Choice." *American Sociological Review* 51: 101–19.
- Player, Mark A. 1988 *Employment Discrimination Law*. St. Paul, Minn.: West.
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1979 *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage.
- Posner, Richard A. 1976 *Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1980 "Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System." Pp. 21–66 in *Political Power and Social Theory*, vol. 1. Edited by M. Zeitlin. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
- Ragin, Charles C., Shelly Coverman, and Mark Hayward. 1982 "Major Labor Disputes in Britain, 1902–1938." *American Sociological Review* 47: 238–52.
- Reh binder, Eckard, and Richard Stewart. 1988 *Environmental Protection Policy*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., David Diekema, and Cathryn Johnson. 1992 "External Status, Legitimacy and Compliance in Male and Female Groups." Manuscript. Stanford University.
- Rosenbaum, Walter A. 1991 *Environmental Politics and Policy*, 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
- Saks, Michael J. 1990 "Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works." *Iowa Law Review* 75: 1011–31.
- Sanders, M. Elizabeth. 1981 *The Regulation of Natural Gas: Policy and Politics, 1938–1978*. Philadelphia: Temple University.
- Savelsberg, Jochem. 1992 "Law that Does Not Fit Society: Sentencing Guidelines as a Neo-Classical Reaction to the Dilemmas of Substantivized Law." *American Journal of Sociology* 97: 1346–81.
- Selgson, Mitchell A., and Edward W. Muller. 1987 "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978–1983." *International Studies Quarterly* 31: 301–26.
- Sewell, William H., Jr. 1992 "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation." *American Journal of Sociology* 98: 1–29.
- Shapiro, Martin. 1986 "The Supreme Court's 'Return' to Economic Regulation." *Studies in American Political Development* 1: 91–141.
- Silberman, Matthew. 1985 *The Civil Justice Process: A Sequential Model of the Mobilization of Law*. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press.
- Simon, William H. 1983 "Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System." *Yale Law Journal* 92: 1198–1269.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1985 "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research." Pp. 3–37 in *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by P. B. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer, and T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- Skocpol, Theda, and Kenneth Finegold. 1982 "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal." *Political Science Quarterly* 97: 255–78.
- Stewart, Richard. 1983 "Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-commodity Values." *Yale Law Journal* 92: 1537–90.
- Stryker, Robin. 1989 "Limits on Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of

American Journal of Sociology

- the National Labor Relations Board's Division of Economic Research " *American Sociological Review* 54 341-58
- 1990a "A Tale of Two Agencies Class, Political-Institutional and Organizational Factors Affecting State Reliance on Social Science " *Politics and Society* 18 101-41
- 1990b "Law, Science, and the Welfare State The Technocratization of Law " Paper presented at Law and Society Association, Berkeley June
- 1990c "Science, Class, and the Welfare State A Class-Centered Functional Account " *American Journal of Sociology* 96 684-726
- 1992a "Government Regulation " In *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, edited by E F Borgatta and M L Borgatta New York MacMillan
- 1992b "The Politics of Social Science in Regulatory Law " NSF Grant Proposal (#SES-9209777, August 1992-January 1994) National Science Foundation, Washington, D C
- Sullivan, Lawrence A 1977 *Handbook of the Law of Antitrust* St Paul West
- Tanford, J Alexander 1990 "The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence The Supreme Court and Psychology " *Indiana University Law Review* 66 137-73
- Therborn, Goran 1978 *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* London New Left Books
- Thomas, George M , Henry A Walker, and Morris Zelditch, Jr 1986 "Legitimacy and Collective Action " *Social Forces* 65 378-404
- Tierney, Susan Fallows 1984 "The Nuclear Waste Disposal Controversy " Pp 91-110 in *Controversy Politics of Technical Decisions*, 2d ed Edited by D Nelkin Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Tilly, Charles 1975 "Revolutions and Collective Violence " 3 483-555 in *Handbook of Political Science*, edited by F Greenstein and N Polsby Reading, Mass Addison-Wesley
- Tyler, Tom R 1990 *Why People Obey the Law* New Haven, Conn Yale University
- Vidich, Arthur J 1979 "Legitimacy, Bureaucracy and Watergate " Pp 133-58 in *Conflict and Control Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments*, edited by A Vidich and R M Glassman Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Vogel, David 1986 *National Styles of Regulation Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States* Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press
- Walker, Henry A , Larry Rogers, George M Thomas, and Morris Zelditch, Jr 1991 "Legitimizing Collective Action Theory and Experimental Results " *Research in Political Sociology* 5 1-25
- Walker, Henry A , George W Thomas, and Morris Zelditch, Jr 1986 "Legitimation, Endorsement and Stability " *Social Forces* 64 620-43
- Weber, Max 1946 *From Max Weber Essays in Sociology*, translated and edited by H H Gerth and C W Mills New York Oxford University Press
- 1947 *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* Edited by T Parsons New York Oxford University Press
- Wilson, James Q 1980 "The Politics of Regulation " Pp 357-93 in *The Politics of Regulation*, edited by J Q Wilson New York Basic
- Wolfe, Alan 1979 "The Costs of Deligitimation in Postwar America " Pp 99-131 in *Conflict and Control Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments*, edited by A J Vidich and R M Glassman Beverly Hills, Calif , and London Sage
- Wright, Erik Olin 1978 *Class, Crisis and the State* London New Left Books
- Yeager, Peter C 1990 *The Limits of Law The Public Regulation of Private Pollution* Cambridge Cambridge University

Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment¹

Joachim J Savelsberg
University of Minnesota

Recent dramatic increases of criminal punishment in the United States and very different trends in the Federal Republic of Germany suggest a critique of basic sociological theory traditions. The article confronts structural-functionalist, Marxist, and legalistic approaches with these trends and suggests an alternative and more complex theory. Utilizing an ideal-typical comparison between the two countries, this article develops a set of interrelated hypotheses on the impact of the institutionalization of (a) knowledge production in the public, political, and academic sectors and (b) political and legal decision making on (c) macro outcomes of political and legal decision making. Using the case of criminal punishment, the article suggests new themes for theory development and empirical macro-sociological research. It also contributes to the understanding of current instabilities in the political process in the United States.

The recent dramatic increase in punishment in the United States, which diverges dramatically from the experiences of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and other developed countries, presents a challenge to basic sociological theories of criminal punishment. In this article, I develop a set of hypotheses that trace this change to the institutionalization

¹ I presented earlier versions of this article at the 1992 meeting of the American Sociological Association, Pittsburgh, the Crime, Deviance, and Social Control Seminar, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin—Madison, and the History and Society Seminar, University of Minnesota. I profited from comments by Ron Aminzade, Donald Black, William Brustein, Raymond Duvall, Rosemary Gartner, Candace Kruttschnitt, Barbara Laslett, Gerald Marwell, Ross Matsueda, M. J. Maynes, Jane McLeod, Jeylan Mortimer, Robin Stryker, the *AJS* reviewers, and others who read this piece along the way (not all of whom agree with my theory). Frieder Dunkel, Christian Pfeiffer, and Peter Wetzels helped with the German data, Karl Krohn with figure 1. Pamela Feldman-Savelsberg always helps to draw ideas from our lives between societies. The research was supported by the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota. Correspondence should be sent to Joachim J. Savelsberg, Department of Sociology, 909 Social Sciences Building, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455.

of (a) knowledge construction and (b) domination, that is, institutionalized political and legal decision making. The common denominator of these hypotheses is that the development of macro outcomes of political and legal decision making cannot be explained as a direct reflection of changing social structures. I thus challenge classical and contemporary functionalist (Durkheim [1893] 1984, [1899–1900] 1983, Black 1976, 1987, 1989) and Marxist (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939, Steinert 1978) approaches. Instead, I argue that the intervening forces of knowledge and institutionalized decision making need to be taken into consideration.² I do *not* argue that structure and conflict are irrelevant. Yet, their analysis needs to be supplemented and complemented by considering the institutionalization of knowledge production and domination.³

Two sets of terminological and theoretical clarifications are warranted at the outset. First, I understand *knowledge*, as does Mannheim ([1925] 1986), in very general terms, as cognitive and normative assumptions about the world.⁴ For an example, consider peoples' assumptions about the deterrent impact of imprisonment. Knowledge in this sense is *not* based on particular methods of knowledge production, for example, on scientific rules of evidence. Knowledge instead includes beliefs based on diverse types of evidence produced in different sectors of society—in the mass media, in political debates, professional meetings, scholarly research, and the everyday world alike. I agree with Mannheim that knowledge is not disconnected from structural forces in society. Yet, I argue (a) that, whenever structural change or social conflict results in knowledge shifts, the dynamics of knowledge and the tides of beliefs and their amplitudes can only be explained if we take the institutionalization of knowledge production into account, and (b) that knowledge intervenes when social structures influence decision making.

Second, I define *domination*, following Weber (1978, p. 53), as the “probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.” I argue that the way in which domination is institutionalized has implications for how and to what degree different types of knowledge influence political and legal decision making. The

² Sutton (1987) has been at the forefront of taking institutional factors of the political system into account when explaining criminal punishment.

³ “Complemented” means that knowledge may be an independent factor (in addition to structure), “supplemented” means that structures are always mediated through knowledge (no matter how rationalized) when they influence decision making. I have written elsewhere how, on the other hand, structural forces constrain the realization of ideas during the formation and implementation of policy instruments (see, e.g., Savelsberg with contributions by Bruhl 1994, Savelsberg 1992).

⁴ For more recent sociological discussions of knowledge see, e.g., Boudon and Bourricaud (1989), Coser (1968), and Kulkick (1983).

"probability of obedience" may depend on the electorate's immediate control of individual decision makers⁵ Roth (1987) has recently coined the term "universalistic personalism" (*universalistischer Personalismus*) for such systems. In these systems, increasingly characteristic for the United States, public knowledge translates relatively easily into political and legal decision making—for example, decision making on minimum mandatory sentence laws, guilty verdicts, or sentences. In the opposite case of universalistic bureaucracies, domination is more strongly based on bureaucratized procedures. In such systems, characteristic for the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter Germany), bureaucratic rationales of political party machines or the political administration are more likely than public knowledge to influence political and legal decision making. The nation-specific institutionalization of domination thus has implications for the way in which different types of knowledge influence political and legal decision making, and, more specifically, divergent trends in criminal punishment.⁶

The hypotheses developed in this article are based on an ideal-typical comparison of the United States and Germany. These countries lend themselves to a fruitful comparison for several reasons. First, knowledge and criminal punishment within these countries show parallel trends, while the countries' rates of punishment now differ sharply. Second, while both countries are Western and industrialized, with capitalist economies and democratic governments, they differ distinctly in terms of institutionalization of domination and knowledge production in three spheres: public, political, and academic. In Germany, institutions are more strongly bureaucratized, interest mediation between private and public spheres is more neocorporate, and status groups are more secured at the cost of free competition than in the United States.⁷

I use both deductive and inductive strategies to develop a set of inter-related hypotheses. The empirical materials on which much of my argument is based are only preliminary. A systematic test of the theory would require a research program that could not be realized by an individual researcher. We need time series for structural as well as cultural vari-

⁵ More immediate control is given, e.g., in the case of self-nomination of representatives rather than nomination through party machines, individualized parliamentary decision making rather than strict faction discipline, and, for the judicial branch, the election of judges and prosecutors rather than their appointment as life-tenured civil servants.

⁶ Throughout I do not use the term "trend" in any specific technical sense, but generally, to refer to changes in the values of a temporal series of data.

⁷ Kalberg (1987) describes the relative protection of status groups in Germany as compared to the United States and the impact of this protection on the flow of information on the micro level.

ables, and they must be measured in a way that allows for their integration into comprehensive datasets.⁸ In this article I intend to demonstrate this need. I provide theoretical reasons, argue that none of the chief sociological theories satisfactorily explains macro patterns of punishment, and I provide a new theory for future testing.

BACKGROUND

Explanations and predictions of criminal punishment have long been embedded in general sociological theories, especially sociostructural and evolutionary theories of both functionalist and Marxist lineage. Such theories have been used to explain the kinds of behavior punished (Erikson 1966, Foucault 1979, Hall 1952), the sophistication of punishment (Foucault 1979), the procedures on which legal decisions are based (Foucault 1979, Nonet and Selznick 1978, Unger 1976, Weber 1978), the purposes or functions of punishment (Erikson 1966, Foucault 1979, Hall 1952, Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939), and the types of penalties applied (Durkheim 1983, Foucault 1979, Garland 1990, Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939).

Major theoretical paradigms, classical and contemporary, have also been devoted to explaining the weight of penal law in relation to other law and the amount or intensity of criminal punishment. Durkheim (1984, 1983) and Black (1976, 1987, 1989) are prominent examples. The logic and propositions of their theories are similar. Both assume a direct relation between social structure and law and punishment. While Black's theory is more differentiated than Durkheim's, both predict that society will shift over time from criminal to compensatory law and that the intensity of punishment will decline. Their predictions are framed as universal and coincide with expectations of a structural and cultural convergence of modernizing nations (Bell 1976, Inglehart 1977).

Marxist theories, in the tradition of Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939),

⁸ Such a project could not be done by an individual researcher because it would require the collection of time-series data on knowledge trends in mass media, academia, the political sector, opinion polls, interest organizations, and other sectors. All of these would have to be measured for initially two and eventually more societies. These time series would further have to be combined with time-series data on changing social structures, group conflict, policy decisions, and policy outcomes. Since the collection of time-series data on basic cultural variables, e.g., knowledge and ideology in particular policy areas, has been much neglected, future research ideally will fill gaps in the agenda. Part of the agenda, research on crime reporting in the *Washington Post*, supported by the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, and a related NSF-funded study on knowledge trends in American criminology and criminal justice sciences, is currently under way.

hold that punishment reflects the needs of the labor market (cf Greenberg 1977, Jankovic 1977) These studies demonstrate correlations between economic cycles and cycles of punishment, between unemployment rates and imprisonment rates (Inverarity and McCarthy 1988, p 265) This school concludes that the criminal justice system incarcerates fewer defendants when market demand for labor is high and supply is short

Finally, a legalistic school argues that criminal punishment simply reflects the amount and severity of crime (Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979) The ups and downs of punishment rates are seen as the result of varying rates of crime in different places and at different times

All of these theories have undergone numerous empirical tests Durkheim's evolutionary predictions and historical statements have been widely criticized (Schwartz and Miller 1965, Cartwright and Schwartz 1973, Spitzer 1974-75, Luhmann 1977) And while several of Black's hypotheses have been partly confirmed by some analyses (e g , Myers 1980, Kruttschnitt 1980-81, Hembroff 1987), they have been rejected by others (e g , Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979, Doyle and Luckenbill 1991) The latter group of authors attribute the amount of punishment (i e , the number of convictions and the severity of punishments) to the amount of crime (i e , the number of crimes and their average level of seriousness) According to yet other analyses, however, the amount of crime explains only a very small part of the variance in the amount of criminal punishment (Myers 1979-80) The ambiguities of research results in this area (Liska 1987) are due to (1) the extreme complexity of the empirical field (i e , the loosely coupled system of criminal justice [see Hagan, Hewitt, and Alwin 1979] and its political, economic, and cultural environment), (2) the difficulty of operationalizing complex and abstract macro-sociological variables, repeatedly demonstrated in recent attempts to test Black's theory of law, and (3) the validity problems of the available aggregate data, especially crime data, which have been gathered for administrative rather than for scholarly purposes Given these problems, this article follows a strategy suggested by Tilly (1984) to study and compare dramatic shifts between nations with very distinct patterns⁹

⁹ I introduce societies on the level of nation-states as units of analysis While this unit of analysis is partly constructed it is not reified Many of the spheres under consideration in this article are confined to nation-states Examples are educational systems, election systems, political parties, legal systems (including constitutions), court procedures, criminal jurisdiction, and definitions of what constitutes criminal behavior These spheres thus constitute the borders of the sociological phenomenon of the nation-state

A Recent History of Punishment Empirical Challenges

Dramatic changes in criminal punishment have occurred in the United States during the past 20 years, and considerable differences appear when we compare the United States and Germany. Incarceration rates (state and federal) in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have historically been relatively stable. The United States, during the past 65 years, experienced an increase from a rate of 79 inmates per 100,000 population ($N = 91,669$ inmates) in 1925 to one of 137 in 1939. The rate dropped to 100 in 1946, slowly increased to 121 in 1961, decreased again to 94 in 1968, then increased to 98 in 1973. Since 1973 this rate of incarceration steadily grew, in a way previously unknown, to more than 300 inmates per 100,000 population ($N = 823,414$) in 1991 (Cahalan 1986, p. 35, U.S. Department of Justice 1992a, p. 2, see fig. 1). In 1991 the United States took first rank from the world's leaders in imprisonment, the former Soviet Union and the Republic of South Africa. Including the jail population (local incarcerations), more than 1.3 million persons are now incarcerated on a given day. This increase is not compensated for by a decrease in other forms of punishment. Parole and probation also increased during this period.

Criminal punishment in Germany shows a rather different pattern of relative stability during the post-World War II period. The incarceration rate of approximately 70–80 prison inmates per 100,000 population has hardly changed from the early 1950s, after the republic's foundation, through 1968. The 1968 criminal code reform, which abolished short-term prison sentences, led to a decline of the incarceration rate, which reached a low of 54 in 1971. However, this rate soon rebounded in 1974 to a level of 59 and slowly increased from there to an extreme of 81 (1984).¹⁰ After 1984 the rate slowly and consistently declined (see fig. 1, see also Statistisches Bundesamt 1977, p. 18, 1990, p. 7).¹¹

Neither the German nor the American patterns are directly associated with changing crime rates. In Germany almost constant incarceration rates during the 1960s were accompanied by a 25% increase in crime rates (Bundeskriminalamt 1991).¹² Only during the 1970s through 1984

¹⁰ Part of this rebound may be explained by a theory that takes criminal justice resources into consideration (Pontell 1984, Sutton 1987). More prison cells became available after the abolition of short-term imprisonment for lesser crimes in 1968. Some of these cells were later used for longer terms against more serious offenders.

¹¹ However, 1991–92 was characterized by a renewed increase. It is difficult to predict how German incarceration rates will develop after 1991 given the radical structural and institutional changes brought about by unification.

¹² The crime rate increased from around 2,700 crimes per population of 100,000 (1960) to 3,588 (1968). If we consider the 1970–71 prison rate (after the abolition of short




FIG 1 —Trends of incarceration rates in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1961–92 For the United States, the incarceration rate is for prisoners sentenced to more than one year under the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities between 1961 and 1992 (see Cahalan 1986, U S Department of Justice 1990*b*, 1992*a*, figs for 1992 are estimated) The incarceration rate (*Gefangenenziffer*) in Germany is based on Statistisches Bundesamt (1977, 1991, figs for 1992 are estimated)

do we find that the increase in incarceration rates is accompanied by an increase in crime rates Yet, while incarceration rates increased by less than 50%, the increase in crime rates was considerably steeper at 75%¹³ Reported cases of violent crime almost doubled, from less than 60,000 in 1970 to almost 110,000 in the mid-1980s In subsequent years in Germany, the general crime rate stabilized, violent crime declined by 10%, while the incarceration rate declined by almost 25% during the second half of the 1980s

In the United States, rates of criminal punishment developed even more differently from rates of crime The decrease in imprisonment in the 1960s and the increase in the 1980s were opposed to the development

prison terms), the crime increase is accompanied by an almost 40% decrease in imprisonment

¹³ The crime rate increased from 3,983 crimes per 100,000 (1971) to around 7,000 (average for 1983–85) The 1988–90 average is around 7,045

of major crime indicators. The 1960s and early 1970s were characterized by a dramatic increase of index crimes (i.e., a group of crimes counted on the national level), which leveled off in the late 1970s from 3.2 million cases in 1960 to 13.2 million in 1980 (*Uniform Crime Reports [UCR]* 1986). The number of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter cases more than doubled from around 9,000 in 1960 to more than 20,000 in the peak year of 1980. During most of this period the imprisonment rate declined, with lows of 94 incarcerated per 100,000 in 1968 and 95 in 1972. Only during the last four years of this increase in index crimes (1976–80) did the imprisonment rate grow beyond the level of 1960. During the 1980s crime rates increased only slowly according to the *UCR*, while the incarceration rate doubled (*Uniform Crime Reports* 1991).

The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCS), undertaken by the Department of Justice, provides a different indicator for trends in criminal behavior. While the NCS indicates that American crime rates had stabilized during the second half of the 1970s and decreased during the 1980s, the difference between both data sources may be due to the inability of victim surveys to adequately record the crimes of aggravated assault, forcible rape, and larceny theft. If we take this survey problem into consideration, we may assume a modest increase in crime rates during this period.¹⁴ The *UCR* measurement of a moderate increase in crime rates during this period would only have to be somewhat qualified (downward) if we account for the increasing willingness of Americans to report crimes to the police.¹⁵ Despite the problems of adequate measurement of crime trends, the available evidence indicates that modest increases in crime rates during the 1980s contrast with a continuing and radical increase in the prison population by another 400,000 inmates, to over 800,000, or a rate of over 300 prisoners per population of 100,000 in 1991.

¹⁴ There is no perfect measure of crime trends. Increases in index crime rates reflect not only trends in criminal behavior but also reporting behavior. Victimization surveys, conducted since 1973 by the U.S. Department of Justice's NCS are likely to underreport certain types of crime. Further the base rates of the two data sources differ (*residential* U.S. population in the *Uniform Crime Reports* vs.—for the NCS—*households* in the United States for property crimes and the noninstitutionalized population aged 12 and over for personal crimes). According to the (probably underreported) NCS, American crime rates had already stabilized during the second half of the 1970s. They dropped during the 1980s. For example, the proportion of households experiencing a violent crime in the course of a year fell from 5.7% in the second half of the 1970s to 4.7% in the second half of the 1980s. The respective decreases for personal theft are from 15.5% to 11% and for all NCS crimes from 31% to 24.5% (U.S. Department of Justice 1992b, p. 2).

¹⁵ According to the U.S. Department of Justice (1990a, p. 5), the reporting of personal crimes to the police increased from 32% of all incidents (1973) to 37% (1989) and of household crimes from 38% (1973) to 41% (1989).

The trends in the United States and Germany suggest three conclusions

1 While we observe considerable increases in crime, and especially violent crime, in both countries, the increase in violent crime in Germany is delayed and is not as pronounced as in the United States

2 Punishment also develops differently in the United States and Germany After relatively stable patterns in both countries during the 1950s and 1960s, a recent (1973–91) dramatic increase in American criminal punishment of above 200% contrasts with continuing relative stability in Germany, where the 1991 value is almost identical with the 1973 value

3 Most important, crime and criminal punishment seem to develop causally independently of each other in each country While the relationship in the United States may be statistically inverse and thus not statistically independent (i.e., a decline in punishment while crime rises during the 1960s and a rapid increase in punishment beginning in the 1970s when crime rates had just begun to stabilize), this can hardly be interpreted as a direct causal relation

First, it would be difficult to explain theoretically the decrease in punishment during the 1960s as a rational response to rapidly increasing crime rates This does not mean that decision makers acted without any rationales The reduction of punishment may well have been a subjectively rational response to crime in the context of emerging labeling theories and community treatment ideas in combination with more relaxed attitudes toward drugs ¹⁶ The question remains why these new beliefs emerged There is little reason to believe that they emerged as a direct response to the wave of crime during this period

Second, while increasing punishment in combination with stabilizing crime rates could be perceived as a rational deterrence response, such an interpretation prompts considerable doubt First, the steepest and steadiest increase in incarceration rates began in 1980, when the crime rate had already been leveling out during the preceding four years Second, the incarceration rate increased by more than 50 inmates per 100,000 population between 1980 and 1984 without resulting in any change in the crime rate In the following five years (1984–89) the incarceration rate grew by an additional 50, again without achieving any change in crime rates Since 1989 the increase in incarceration rate has again been 50, as in the two preceding five-year periods, without changing the trend in crime rates but at considerable expense in times of a sluggish economy, declining budgets, and an eroding public infrastructure It appears that this increase in the level of punitive behavior can hardly be causally

¹⁶ Some states, in fact, paid bonuses to counties that reduced their rates of incarceration below expected levels

interpreted as a rational response to crime rates, a conclusion that is further suggested by the circumstances under which minimum mandatory sentence laws were passed—a theme I explore below. Again, I do not suggest subjectively irrational decision making. Decision makers' potential for the rationalization of decision making, even in the face of challenging evidence, is considerable. Such evidence, however, had emerged during the 1980s.

The descriptive account of crime and incarceration trends in two societies and the conclusions that follow from it thus challenge approaches that explain imprisonment rates directly through crime. While it is not inconceivable that the increase in American crime rates during the 1960s has contributed to the increase in punishment during the 1970s and 1980s, any causal relation between crime and punishment rates would not be direct but would instead be mediated in complex ways by many factors.

The data also cause problems for structural-functionalist and Marxist theories. Two central elements of theories in the Durkheim-Black tradition are questioned. (1) Both theories assume a universal model of development that is incompatible with the empirical differences found in the American-German comparison. Neither theory sufficiently incorporates country-specific differences that occur within the group of industrialized, capitalist, and democratic societies. (2) The dramatic increase in punishment in the United States during the past 20 years challenges both theories. This increase at least demonstrates a need for modifications that provide propositions for the observed trends and countertrends. Again, the data presented do not allow an outright rejection of structural-functionalist and related evolutionist arguments. If the modernization of societies continues, social control may, in the very long term, shift from punishment to compensation and restitution. Yet, the surge of American punitiveness over a period of two decades is sociologically relevant and opposed to those predictions.

The Rusche-Kirchheimer tradition is also challenged. The American development of the 1970s and 1980s contradicts previous correlations between unemployment and incarceration. The unparalleled increase in imprisonment occurred despite a relatively stable labor market. One reservation to this conclusion should be mentioned, though. While unemployment rates have been rather stable in comparison to imprisonment rates, the size of the extremely poor "imprisonable" American population (people completely detached from the labor market), has grown dramatically since 1970. That population is much smaller and considerably more stable in Germany, a fact accounted for in part by the apprenticeship system of vocational training and in part by a more highly developed welfare system. Also, most of the American "imprisonables" are African-

Americans, and the disproportionately high number of blacks among prison inmates has further increased during this period. Yet, while the increase in extreme poverty is mostly concentrated in a few large northern cities (Wilson 1991, p. 2), incarceration rates have increased steeply in most states (Cahalan 1986, p. 32).¹⁷ The latter fact again seems to point to the limits of a purely structuralist neo-Marxist explanation.

In short, structural-functionalist approaches may have explanatory power for very long-term processes of criminal punishment, legalistic, crime-centered factors may play a very indirect role in the recent American surge in imprisonment, and conflict approaches may help explain some of the American surge and international difference in imprisonment. Yet, all of these explanatory approaches are challenged by the data presented above. We need to search for other factors and for more complex approaches.

DEVELOPING NEW HYPOTHESES: KNOWLEDGE AND DOMINATION

Structural and evolutionary theories suffer from two major drawbacks. First, they do not take seriously the particular institutions of specific nation-states. Second, they do not sufficiently incorporate the complex processes of knowledge or ideology construction that intervene when sociostructural features, such as social inequality and labor-market needs, influence such concrete decisions as the passing of a determinate sentence law in the legislature or the sentencing in court.

Recent work has reminded us of the relevance of state institutions for the understanding of societal development (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985) and of the explanatory power of culture and knowledge (Swidler 1986, Tarrow 1990, Munch and Smelser 1992). Decisions are associated with and legitimized by knowledge for micro- and macro-sociological reasons. On the micro level, cognitive dissonance results when decisions are made that are contradictory to firmly held beliefs. On the macro level, the legitimacy of political and legal systems or dominant groups is endangered when their decisions regularly conflict with public beliefs. Following Mannheim's classical example (1986), students of sociolegal themes have recently rediscovered the issue of legal knowledge (one example is the 1989 meeting of the Working Group on the Legal

¹⁷ The increase between 1970 and 1984 was especially steep (around 200% or more) in a few northern states, including New York State and Illinois, and in Washington, D.C. (an indicator that might support the racial poverty hypothesis). Yet, similarly high increases are reported for almost all southern states and for several northwestern states (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and Washington). The increase for most other states was, on the average, around 100% during the same period (Cahalan 1986, p. 32).

Profession, Research Council for the Sociology of Law, ISA) More specifically, the sociology of scientific knowledge (Knorr-Cetina 1981, Lynd 1986, Zuckerman 1988) has finally been applied to criminology (Laub and Sampson 1991) Yet, none of these endeavors has so far been related to general theories of criminal punishment

As a first step in applying these recent advances in theory to the issue of criminal punishment, I propose four basic axioms or theoretical assumptions

AXIOM 1 —*The society-specific institutionalization of knowledge production causes society-specific dynamics of knowledge within different sectors of societies and distinct patterns of knowledge diffusion between sectors*

AXIOM 2 —*Changes in knowledge development influence changes in macro-outcomes of political and legal decision making*

AXIOM 3 —*The way and degree to which knowledge affects macro-outcomes of political and legal decision making depends on the country-specific institutionalization of domination, especially the degree of bureaucratization of political and legal institutions*

AXIOM 4 —*The substantive direction that change takes is a function of fundamental conflicts within social structures and between societal groups*¹⁸

As this fourth axiom indicates, I do *not* argue that social structure and the resulting conflicts between societal groups are irrelevant Instead, I argue that they are only part of the story

Social Structure and Conflict The Substance of Knowledge and Law

Knowledge concerning crime and criminal punishment is held and developed in all sectors of society—by the general public, news media, and special groups such as lawyers, politicians, and academics of different disciplines It consists of numerous, complex, and often contradictory analytical and normative assumptions concerning various aspects of society

One set of assumptions concerns the nature of offenders and the causes of crime Images of typical offenders are associated with ideas about

¹⁸ In these axioms and throughout the text I use formulations such as “A causes B,” “A influences B,” “A affects B,” “B is a function of A,” or “B depends on A” In all of these instances I mean causation as opposed to correlation I refer to a causal model according to which influences produce effects Rarely can these influences be considered sufficient conditions in the social sciences Finally, I agree with Marini and Singer (1988, p. 401) that “external influences often interact with internal processes in producing effects Moreover, mental processes are a major focus in the social sciences because they mediate most human action”

class, sex, race, and age. In addition, criminals may be imagined as free and rational actors or their behavior may be viewed as more or less determined by innate qualities, early socialization, or their place in society. Other assumptions concern the quantity and seriousness of crime in society.

Further, individuals and specialized groups hold diverse beliefs regarding the functioning and justification of different strategies with which state and society respond to crime. Some follow retributive philosophies in the tradition of Kant and Hegel, believing that evil should be responded to by evil, independent of the effects of punishment. Others, in the tradition of Bentham and Beccaria, believe in the deterrence function of punishment. If punishment is sufficiently severe and certain, they argue, crime yields more costs than benefits and becomes unlikely. Yet others favor incapacitation, the theory that separating offenders from society is a strategy to prevent crimes. A more technical and recent version of this orientation is "selective incapacitation." Its proponents believe that we can identify future recidivists and prevent crime by separating them from society for especially long periods. Finally, believers in rehabilitation suggest that crime can be prevented if offenders are cured of the traits of failed socialization or other psychological ills. And social reformers argue that improving communities and societies—for example, reducing poverty and extending legitimate opportunity—reduces crime in society. Related sets of knowledge concern the types of institutions that can best fulfill these functions—for example, prisons, mental hospitals, communities, schools, workplaces, or welfare offices.

In addition, there are assumptions about different modes of decision making, such as the effectiveness and justice of determinate versus indeterminate or discretionary sentencing schemes.

Opinions or beliefs about crime and punishment are intense, widespread, and varied (Garland 1992, pp. 215–19). Assumptions on the different dimensions outlined above are interrelated, and beliefs about crime and punishment are part of more general belief systems concerning the nature of humans and society, and the functions, capacity, and legitimacy of the state. Three belief systems are based on the distinction between formal-rational and substantive-rational orientations (Weber 1978) and socialist and conservative brands within the substantive orientation (Mannheim 1986, see table 1).¹⁹ For example, a formal-rational or libertarian belief system is rooted in Enlightenment philosophy. It entails the

¹⁹ These knowledge systems are ideal-types. For example, most conservative sets of beliefs in modern societies are mixtures of substantive-conservative and formal-rational systems. Similarly, most socialist and Social Democratic belief systems are combinations of substantive-socialist and formal-rational beliefs.

TABLE 1

IDEAL-TYPES AND CATEGORIES OF LEGAL AND RELATED KNOWLEDGE

DIMENSIONS	FORMAL-RATIONAL	SUBSTANTIVE-RATIONAL	
		Socialist	Conservative
Assumptions about Individuals	Natural condition of rational actor	Natural condition constrained by social forces	Natural condition constrained by innate qualities
The state	Autonomous, restrained	Nonautonomous, interventionist, redistributionist	Nonautonomous, interventionist, guarding privileges
Justification of domination	Legal (natural law)	Economic	Teleological-mystical
Society	Based on contract	Based on class struggle	Based on tradition and history
Methods of thought	Reason, deduction, general validity, general applicability, atomism, static thinking	Social class, generalization within class, applicability by historical stages, dynamic thinking	History, irrationality, particularity, organism, totality, dynamic thinking
Conclusions for crime, criminal law, and justice			
Offenders	Rational offenders	Socially deprived/constrained	Innately bad/constrained
Appropriate reactions	Retribution, general deterrence	Social reform, treatment	Revenge, incapacitation, correction
Legitimation	Reason and law	Extralegal reasoning, social justice	Extralegal reasoning, conservation
Institutions	Prisons	Parole, probation, welfare or community programs	Prisons, therapy
Mode of decision making	Determinate	Indeterminate	Indeterminate

idea of humans as rational actors, the state as autonomous, not interwoven with society, and restrained, not interfering in free societal exchange. Society is based on a social contract, domination on natural law, thought on reason, and the economy on free markets. The associated beliefs concerning punishment are those of rational offenders, retribution and general deterrence, prisons as adequate institutions, and determinate modes of decision making. People are justly punished for their offenses.

Further, these belief systems are not free floating, but are at least loosely tied to societal conditions. Historically, we observe simultaneous shifts of power structures, belief systems, and legal forms. They have been discussed as transformations from repressive law and conservative ideology to autonomous law and the libertarian ideology of the bourgeois democratic state, and from there to responsive law and socialist ideology (Nonet and Selznick 1978). Stryker (1989, 1990) has argued that working-class formation contributes to the emergence of technocratic law (i.e., interventionist, based on scientific expertise and associated ideologies). Elsewhere (Savelsberg 1992) I have discussed the transformation from formal-rational law to substantive-rational law as a function of changing power structures, especially as demonstrated in the organization and parliamentary representation of working classes, and changing ideologies and knowledge systems, for example, in the institutionalization of the social and economic sciences in academic and state institutions.²⁰

In sum, knowledge about crime and punishment is part of more general belief systems that are neither clear-cut nor self-contained. Instead, they are associated with forms of law and social structure (see axiom 4 above).

In the middle range of this empirical comparison, knowledge about crime and punishment in Germany was rather stable over the past 25 years. While the principles of individual guilt and retribution were maintained by German criminal law, the idea of offenders as victims of society continued to be influential among policymakers, academics, and the public. This was even true for the 1970s, when violent crime rates doubled, and for the early 1980s, when conservatism regained political power. By contrast, beliefs of many on crime and punishment in the United States have moved over the same period toward rational and biologically or psychologically determined offenders, toward strategies of general deterrence, retribution, and (selective) incapacitation, and toward determinate decision making. Americans turned toward imprisonment and capital punishment.

²⁰ Driven by socialist forces, the increasing weight of substantive rationales in law may also open avenues for conservatism, irrationality, and repression (Nonet and Selznick 1978, p. 86, Unger 1976, pp. 216–20, Weber 1978, pp. 886–87, 892–93).

Explanations for the American development are only tentative. They have been sought in the nature of crime, group interests, and racial and class struggle. For example, Stinchcombe et al. (1980) observe that punitive attitudes in America intensified following the increase in crime rates of the 1960s. Yet, cross-sectional analyses show that some groups especially threatened by crime—for example, African-Americans and women—are less punitive than other parts of the population. These authors conclude that the causal relation between exposure to crime and knowledge is uncertain. While it is possible that punitiveness in some areas (the suburbs) follows increased threats in others (inner cities), it remains questionable that the increase in neoclassical and punitive beliefs can be sufficiently explained by the crime wave of the 1960s.

Further, crime-related attitudes did not develop in isolation, but in harmony with the neoconservative movement. In the area of welfare and economics as well, responsibility for success and failure was reassigned from “society” to the “autonomous and rational individual.” General beliefs shifted, in terms of our typology, toward a combination of formal-rational and substantive-rational conservative thought.

The direction of these changes in the United States is attributed by some authors to professional group interests. For example, Cullen, Maakestad, and Cavender (1987, p. 18) interpret the neoclassical movement, the recent emphasis on formally equal justice, as a revitalization movement of the American legal profession. They suggest the profession felt threatened by increasing doubts about individualized decision making, the disparities that resulted from it, and the growing role of psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers in criminal law. Greenberg and Humphries (1980, p. 206) argue that neoclassicism was initially advanced as part of a larger radical program to transform American society, and that this program is laid out in influential reports (American Friends Service Committee 1971, Von Hirsch 1976). Yet, according to Greenberg and Humphries, libertarian intentions were absorbed by conservatism and integrated into repressive agendas. The latter point is further developed by Chambliss and Sbarbaro (1989), who explain the new criminal justice philosophies as (1) an expression of increasing resistance against the success of the civil rights movement and (2) a response to the intensifying racial conflicts of the late 1960s. Chambliss and Sbarbaro analyze presidential and congressional campaign rhetoric of the 1960s and argue that the crime issue in combination with the radicalized civil rights movement was transformed into a social order issue. The “war on crime” theme was first raised by Barry Goldwater in his 1964 presidential campaign, then promoted by a conservative alliance in Congress responding to a liberal Supreme Court and a radicalized civil rights movement.

- These studies point to possible reasons for changes in crime-and-

punishment-related knowledge in the United States. They give new weight to conflict approaches as they recognize how group interests are pursued through the redefinition of reality and the reshaping of societal knowledge. The correlation between social structure, conflict, legal forms, and knowledge found on a larger historical scale is repeated within this shorter time frame. Axiom 4 is again supported at the same time that knowledge and ideology are introduced as mediating factors. While these studies show that knowledge intervenes before structural conflicts influence new practices of punishment, the way in which knowledge intervenes is yet to be thoroughly examined. We can, so far, neither fully explain the degree of change nor the turbulent dynamics of the American development in international comparison. We need to consider the comparative dynamics of knowledge and decision making.

Knowledge Construction and Domination: The Comparative Dynamics of Knowledge and Punishment Decisions

The United States and Germany differ with regard to the institutionalization of knowledge production. This is true in each of the sectors through which knowledge concerning crime and punishment is produced and distributed. Statements on crime and punishment are published in campaign speeches and other political addresses (the polity), news media, public opinion polls, and testimony of lobby groups (the public), sociology and criminology journals, and law reviews (academia). Little is known about the dynamics of knowledge, its diffusion between these sectors, and its effects on decision making. Each of the above sectors in the United States, however, is distinct from its counterpart in Germany in terms of its internal structure, the way it generates knowledge, how it transfers and receives knowledge to and from other sectors, and in its relation to decision-making agencies. I argue that these institutional differences cause the differences in the development of beliefs and influence the impact these beliefs have on criminal punishment (see table 2).²¹

The public sector. Several institutional forces participate in the formation and measurement of public opinion in all modern Western societies.

²¹ In addition, there is variation in some institutional sector variables over time within each society. For example, the weakening of political party machines in the United States and the simultaneous enforced bureaucratization of German political parties over the past three decades has increased the institutional difference between both countries. This may explain the increasing difference in policy output observed during the past two decades. Future research should also be directed at (a) how institutional conditions, expressed, e.g., in interorganizational network structures, relate to patterns of social inequality, and (b) the interactive effects of network structures and social inequality on the flow of knowledge and political decision making.

TABLE 2

SOME IDEAL-TYPICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SYSTEMS OF INEQUALITY,
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE PUBLIC, POLITICAL,
AND ACADEMIC SPHERES, AND DOMINATION

Dimensions of Ideal-typical Comparison	United States	Federal Republic of Germany	Axioms/Hypotheses
Social structure and conflict	Relatively much social inequality, racial divide, absolute poverty, and occupational disqualification	Relatively little social inequality, racial divide, absolute poverty, and occupational disqualification	Axiom 4
Institutionalization of knowledge production			
Public sphere	Diversity of organizational interests, private mass media, and intense public opinion polling	Large neocorporate organizations, controlling important mass media, little public opinion polling	Axiom 1 and hypotheses 1-4
Political sector/government	Personalistic universalism, frequent exchange of personnel between private sector and academia, elective offices in judicial branch	Bureaucratic universalism, rare exchange of personnel between private sector and academia, civil service appointments in judicial branch	Axiom 1 and hypotheses 5-7
Academia	Tradition of pragmatism, intense competition	Historical and theoretical tradition, less competition	Axiom 1 and hypotheses 8-11
Institutionalization of domination	Personalistic universalism, frequent exchange of personnel between private sector and academia, elective offices in judicial branch	Bureaucratic universalism, rare exchange of personnel between private sector and academia, civil service appointments in judicial branch	Axioms 2 and 3 and hypotheses 12-15

mass organizations, public opinion polls, and the mass media. Public opinion as formed and expressed through these institutions presents and diffuses assumptions about crime and punishment. Each of these institutions has a specific quality in a given society, with consequences for the formation of knowledge about crime and punishment. I characterize these differences ideal-typically.

The German public is organized in large neocorporate organizations—that is, organizations with a monopoly of interest representation, compulsory membership, and involvement in the implementation of policies. American society, on the other hand, is characterized by a more pluralistic form of organization (Halliday 1989, Schmitter 1982). I expect neocorporate organization to result in relatively stable public attitudes expressed in parliamentary testimonies of public organizations on issues of crime and punishment. I also expect the strong representation of neocorporate welfare organizations to result in a more consistent presentation of welfare-oriented rationales (treatment and reform).

Closely related, the news media reflect and form public opinion. While almost all news organizations in the United States are private and controlled by market forces, major portions of the German news media (until recently all radio and television stations) are publicly organized. They are controlled by governing boards which include all major neocorporate organizations, for example, political parties, churches, unions, and employers' associations. I therefore expect knowledge expressed in the German news media to present more welfare rationales and to be characterized by more continuity than the knowledge set forth by the American media. The neocorporate arrangement of German radio and television is complemented, however, by privately owned newspapers and magazines. This dual system results in relative diversity in news and commentary, thus modifying—but not refuting—my argument.

Further, public opinion in Germany is less steadily monitored by pollsters. Therefore, the self-enforcing power of public opinion is weaker and its spread into other institutions less likely. To the degree to which public opinion is measured, I expect the monitored trends to be relatively stable and welfare oriented owing to the stronger institutionalization of welfare concerns, the impact of neocorporate organization on public opinion, and the lesser degree of social inequality.

Some evidence suggests that public knowledge about crime and punishment has indeed changed much more radically in the United States than in Germany, even when we control for increasing crime. For example, the proportion of Americans who believe that courts do not deal harshly enough with criminals has increased from 48% (April 1965) to 66% (March 1972) and again to 85% (March 1978). Ever since, this value has only rarely and slightly dropped below the 80% line (Niemi, Mueller,

Smith 1989, p. 136) Approval of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder has steadily increased from 42% (May 1966), to 53% (March 1972), to 66% (March 1978). Since 1982 this value has remained in the 70% range, with a peak of 76% in March 1985 (Niemi et al. 1989, p. 138).

In Germany punitive attitudes seem to be more consistent. They hardly change for some crimes. Four percent of the population demanded jail or prison terms for thieves in both 1970 and 1987, for tax evaders, prison was called for by 28% of the population in 1970 and 29% in 1987. Yet, punitive attitudes have changed for selected offenses: they have increased regarding domestic assault, from 2% in favor of a jail or prison term (1970) to 23% (1987), conversely, they have decreased for hashish consumption, from 14% in favor of incarceration (1970) to 8% (1987) (Reuband 1990, p. 293). The proportion of those principally favoring capital punishment has declined almost consistently from values in the 50% range throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s to the 30% range in the 1970s. This trend is accounted for in part by the emergence of new birth cohorts, but it also occurs within all cohorts and in all social classes (Reuband 1980, p. 541). Yet, in the cases of murderers to whom no mitigating circumstances apply, the percentage of those who favor capital punishment is considerably higher. During the 1960s the value varies between 65% and 71%, moves down to 53% (1973) and 44% (1974), and then goes back up to 58% in 1978 (Reuband 1980, p. 542).

The available data partly confirm theoretical expectations. Theoretical deduction and some empirical indicators suggest that the German system of public knowledge is more stable and less likely to call for severe punishment than the American system. Four hypotheses can be formulated.

HYPOTHESIS 1 —*The greater the involvement of neocorporate organizations in the production of public knowledge, the more stable that knowledge will remain over time.*

HYPOTHESIS 2 —*The less frequently the public is monitored by opinion polls, the more stable public opinion remains and the more limited the impact of public opinion will be on the development of knowledge in other sectors of society.*

HYPOTHESIS 3 —*The more intensely mass media—television, radio, newspapers, and so on—are controlled by public neocorporate organizations (as opposed to market forces) the more stable is the knowledge those media present to the public.*

HYPOTHESIS 4 —*The more that public knowledge is created by actors under the control of neocorporate welfare organizations, the more consistently that knowledge is characterized by welfare rationales.*

The political sector. Actors in the political sector are among the powerful producers and carriers of knowledge, including knowledge about

crime and punishment. Again, important institutional factors may shape the knowledge presented by these actors, and these same factors may have an effect on the way that knowledge is influenced by other sectors and the dynamics of its development. These factors may contribute to the explanation of considerable differences between the United States and Germany as well as radical shifts within the United States. The institutionalization of political and legal decision making in these countries is marked by clear—and widening—differences. Roth (1987) contrasts the U.S. political system of increasing universalistic personalism with the universalistic bureaucracies in the Federal Republic of Germany. Universalistic personalism in the American legislative system means that representatives and senators are relatively independent from their political parties, but personally accountable to their constituency. These political actors are greatly and immediately dependent on their constituency whenever an issue is highly politicized.

Representatives in the German legislature are more oriented toward party platforms and faction discipline and relatively independent from public opinion. Their nomination depends on intraparty decisions and their election depends on party membership, since voters, in practice, vote for a candidate as the member of a political party rather than for an individual with a particular voting record.

In the executive branch as well, political actors in the United States are more closely related to the public and to different sectors of society. At the same time they are less firmly integrated in the political system than their German colleagues. The administrative leadership is more strongly exposed to public opinion given the presidential election by nationwide, popular vote (as opposed to parliamentary elections of chancellors in Germany). In addition, many U.S. administrators change positions relatively frequently between the public, private, and academic sectors (Bendix [1949] 1974, for a more recent discussion, see Dye [1990, p. 175] and Roth [1987, p. 44]). Their views on policy issues are more influenced by loyalty to the current administrative leadership or to outside institutions, law firms, and academic or business institutions to which they may return than to political parties and the political bureaucracy, as in the German case.

Differences between the United States and Germany in the judicial branch resemble those in the legislative branch. While most judges and prosecutors in the United States are either elected or nominated and confirmed in political processes, those in the Federal German Republic are appointed as civil servants with tenured positions, early in their professional career, and usually according to academic achievement tests. They are more firmly embedded in the political-administrative system (Rueschemeyer 1973, Halliday 1989) than their American counterparts.

They do not depend on public approval and are therefore more independent from public opinion

In sum, U S legislators, civil servants, and criminal justice lawyers are much more exposed to shifts of public knowledge, ideology, and resulting political pressure than their German counterparts, who base their decisions on bureaucratically produced knowledge. Public knowledge is more dynamic—that is, more volatile—than bureaucratic knowledge. I expect this volatility to create much more unstable patterns of criminal justice knowledge and decision making in the American than in the German political sector.

Although much research needs to be done, preliminary empirical information supports our theoretical expectations. Beliefs in the German political system have been rather stable during the time period under consideration, despite the change from a conservative to a Social Democratic majority in 1967 and back to conservatism in 1982. In the United States, however, the instability of knowledge and the punitive tendency in the public are repeated in the political sector. Consider, for example, beliefs on crime and punishment as expressed in presidential addresses. These beliefs have changed dramatically during the period under consideration as originally documented by Chambliss and Sbarbaro (1989). Eisenhower referred to crime and delinquency problems in the context of urban problems. His purpose, he said in 1960, was to “destroy the conditions which breed crime and delinquency” (Eisenhower 1961, p. 14). During the 1960s the issue of crime became detached from concerns with social conditions. Johnson, in 1967, while continuing his war against poverty, also urged “an all out effort to combat crime” (Johnson 1968, p. 6). While Johnson still pled for parallel but institutionally distinct wars against poverty and crime, Nixon’s addresses exclusively stressed the crime issue. In 1970 Nixon argued “We have heard a great deal of overblown rhetoric during the sixties in which the word ‘war’ has perhaps too often been used—the war on poverty, the war on misery, the war on disease, the war on hunger. But if there is one area in which the term ‘war’ is appropriate it is in the fight against crime. We must declare and win the war against the criminal elements which increasingly threaten our cities, our homes, and our lives” (Nixon 1971, p. 12).

The logic of presidential addresses further changed during the following years, until Reagan, in 1985, declared “There can be no economic revival of the ghettos when the most violent ones are allowed to roam free” (Reagan 1988, p. 134). Two major changes have occurred during these 25 years. First, the concern with the social roots or causes of crime has given way to a concern with “criminal elements” and the “most violent ones.” Second, the causal chain has been reversed. The analytical logic has been turned upside down. Changing social structure is no longer

seen as a condition for the abolishment of crime. Instead, the fight against crime is regarded as a precondition for the change of social and economic deprivation ("economic revival of the ghetto"). Again, theory and preliminary data suggest a set of hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS 5 —*The more the legislative branch of government is characterized by personalistic universalism, the more likely it is that changes in public knowledge will influence changes in political knowledge*

HYPOTHESIS 6 —*The more available the executive branch is to other sectors of society through the exchange of personnel, the more likely it is that changes in other sectors will influence changes in political knowledge*

HYPOTHESIS 7 —*The more the judicial branch is characterized by personalistic universalism, the stronger the impact of changes in public knowledge will be on legal knowledge*

The academic sector —Academia has long been prominently involved in the production of knowledge on crime and punishment, especially in sociology and in the "legal realism" side of jurisprudence. In recent decades, particularly in the United States but also in Germany, criminology and criminal justice studies have become institutionalized, with their own journals and university departments.

As in other societal sectors, U.S. and German academic institutions differ, and these differences suggest that U.S. institutions experience more dynamic trends and greater impacts from other societal sectors than do institutions in Germany.²² The American academic tradition is strongly rooted in the philosophy of pragmatism (Vidich and Lyman 1985). This philosophy favors the practical orientation of academia and results in a closer adaptation to issues and perspectives put forth in the political-administrative sector. For several reasons, academic life is also more autonomous in Germany than it is in the United States. Scholars at German universities are much less exposed to competitive pressure. While both systems have tenure rules, salaries in the German system increase with age. Fringe benefits secure professors comfortably against income losses in cases of illness, injury, and retirement even on the lower ranks of the academic hierarchy. And, even though this is now changing, German academic journals have historically been less subject to anonymous reviewing procedures than American publications. The social status of German professors continues to rank among the second or third highest of all professional groups. All universities are state schools. Wages are identical at all institutions. Compared to the United States,

²² Also, this juxtaposition of two academic systems is ideal-typical.

differences in reputation between institutions are minimal. The higher competitive pressure in the United States results in academics' attempting to increase salaries, social status, and their market value by gaining outside funding from academically governed funding agencies as well as from policy-making institutions. When research is funded by political agencies, which to a large degree is the case in criminology and criminal justice studies, then it is rather likely that academically produced knowledge will follow political knowledge. This underlying resource-dependency theory has been exemplified for particular cases. State-funded research on domestic assault, for example, is more likely to deal with individual rather than sociostructural factors (Schacht and Eitzen 1990). I expect, following Mannheim's (1986) observations, that the adaptation of academic knowledge to that of powerful groups is stronger where intellectuals are less independent. This certainly appears to be the case in U.S., as opposed to German, criminological and criminal justice studies.

A special point needs to be made on jurisprudence. While the German legal profession is closely affiliated with the state (Rueschemeyer 1973), its American counterpart is relatively autonomous. For example, access to the bar in Germany is controlled by state examinations, bar association examinations provide access in the United States. Individual rights, as reflected in the U.S. Constitution, are more strongly rooted in American, than in German, jurisprudence. The same holds for the notion of individual responsibility. I therefore expect knowledge produced by U.S. jurisprudence to be more strongly associated with formal-rational law.

Again, no systematic, comparative empirical research is available. Even research on country-specific trends of knowledge is insufficient. The development of criminological knowledge, for example, has only been described impressionistically. Wheeler (1976) and Cressey (1978) both observe a trend away from research on the causes of crime and punishment and toward policy concerns, for the 1960s and early 1970s, a trend which has involved both policy-supporting and policy-critical scholars (Polk and Gibbons 1988). These authors offer insightful, but not systematically researched, information on the course of criminological knowledge production, and they speculate on the causes of this development. Laub and Sampson (1991) go further when they analyze and explain the triumph of the sociological Sutherland school over the interdisciplinary Glueck school in American criminology. They find that the emergence and development of ideas is largely unknown and conclude that this "is perhaps nowhere more true than in criminology where 'new' developments are constantly offered in what seems to be a collective amnesia about the past" (Laub and Sampson 1991, p. 1435). They argue that Sutherland's "victory" over the Glueck tradition was not due to

the validity of his theory but to institutional factors, especially the involvement of Sutherland in graduate education (p 1435) Yet, Laub and Sampson face an explanatory dilemma as they see many of the Gluecks' ideas return to prominence in criminology during the 1970s and 1980s While Laub and Sampson believe that scientific validity explains the late success of the Glueck school, their own institutional approach can be applied to explain this latest shift of the pendulum as well Possible factors influencing changing—or dynamic—beliefs include the evolving philosophies of political-administrative funding agencies and the creation of numerous departments of criminal justice with applied orientations and graduate curriculums

It appears that significant portions of the sociolegal academic sector did follow the change of knowledge in the political sector (see Sarat and Silbey 1988) Until the 1960s, the dominant social scientific approaches to crime emphasized sociostructural features, anomie, opportunities for law-abiding and law-breaking behavior, and learning conditions Only after 1970 did much-cited academic thought abandon reformist and rehabilitative ideas (Martinson 1974) and turn to neoclassical general deterrence models (Wilson 1975) and retributive or just-desert orientations (Von Hirsch 1976, 1987) In these highly influential writings, sociostructural conditions were considered irrelevant in policy terms, the rational-offender model gained ground, and a return to determinate sentencing was proclaimed

Social science on crime and punishment in Germany, on the other hand, continued the search for sociostructural conditions of crime In addition, an institution-critical approach developed that concentrated on the colonizing (Habermas 1975) effects of criminal justice institutions A rejuvenation of neoclassical ideas occurred only within a rather small group of German jurists (cf Giehring 1987, p 7) Again, theoretical considerations and empirical observations suggest several hypotheses

HYPOTHESIS 8 —To the degree that academia is rooted in the tradition of pragmatism, political-administrative knowledge will influence academic knowledge

HYPOTHESIS 9 —The more competitive the academic sector and the more dependent it is on funding and recognition from political-administrative agencies, the more it will be influenced by political knowledge

HYPOTHESIS 10 —The more academic departments are organized along the substantive lines of administrative agencies, the more academic knowledge will trail behind political knowledge

HYPOTHESIS 11 —The more the legal profession and the law are rooted in the idea of individual rights (as opposed to state intervention) the more likely it is that interventive phases will be reacted to by formal-rational movements in legal scholarship

The Interaction between Knowledge and Domination

Neither sociostructural conditions nor knowledge in the political sector and the legal profession get automatically translated into rates of punishment. Legislative decisions on minimum mandatory sentence laws, sentencing guidelines, and funding for prison construction, prosecutors' charging decisions, probation officers' sentencing recommendations, juries' verdicts, judges' sentencing, and parole boards' release decisions intervene in this translation process. Given our discussion of the interrelation between knowledge and decision making and the trends in punitive knowledge, we expect a more dynamic and more punitive trend in the United States than in Germany. This, indeed, has occurred. Developments in the United States in the past two decades are characterized by increasingly severe sentences, resulting from judges' sentencing decisions, the establishment and raising of minimum mandatory sentencing standards, and the abolition of parole by legislatures. Factors that caused the country-specific construction of political knowledge also influenced political decision making directly. Political and legal decision makers in the American system of personalistic universalism depend on their constituency. Their chances of getting reelected decrease if their criminal justice decision making systematically contradicts public attitudes. Similarly, the chances of many American prosecutors to realize their dreams of future political careers depends to a considerable degree on how they satisfy public sentiment.

Not only is there greater pressure to translate public sentiment into decision making, but the opportunity to do so is also greater in the U S legal process. At least two differences in criminal procedure need to be mentioned. First, public sentiment is directly represented in public participation on grand juries and courtroom juries, this participation is missing in German criminal procedure. Public sentiment thus enters criminal justice decision making much more directly in the United States than in Germany. Second, U S prosecutors have considerable discretion in their charging decisions while they are bound by the legality principle in Germany. This difference makes American prosecutors much more subject to the pressures of public opinion. A considerable proportion of the increase in incarceration rates may thus result from the growing inclination of prosecutors to press charges.

Four final hypotheses on the interactive effect of the dynamics of knowledge production and decision making can thus be formulated.

HYPOTHESIS 12 —If political knowledge shifts with public opinion, then the same amount of change in public knowledge leads to more dramatic shifts in the macro outcome of political and legal decision making—in this case, in incarceration rates

HYPOTHESIS 13 —*If the public is directly involved in criminal justice decision making, then changes in public knowledge translate more directly into changes in criminal justice decision making*

HYPOTHESIS 14 —*If legal decision makers have more discretion, then they are more likely to respond to changing public knowledge—and they are more likely to respond in systems where such responsiveness furthers their political opportunities*

HYPOTHESIS 15 —*The joint effect of the greater dynamics in knowledge production and in legal and political decision making is multiplicative*

CONCLUSIONS

The empirical evidence presented in this article is only illustrative. I lack precise data on the degree of changes in knowledge, the categories concerned, the causes, the carrier groups, and their effects on the macro outcomes of decision making (e.g., the prison population). Rigorous empirical research needs to be done in all of these areas. Time series of indicators for the development of knowledge in different sectors of society do not exist. Such data could be gained from content analyses of long-standing public documents, such as news media reports, annual policy statements of key policymakers and lobbying organizations, contributions on particular issues to scholarly journals, or congressional testimony. Research to establish such data sets, however, especially if conducted on an internationally comparative basis, would be costly.

Similar research should also be done for other policy areas. It would inform us about the generalizability of the hypotheses developed here. Further, more countries should be included in future comparisons. A challenge to the approach developed here, for example, may be presented by some European countries. The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, many of whose institutions resemble those of Germany much more than those of the United States, have experienced rather steep increases in rates of criminal punishment over the past 20 years. Yet, incarceration rates in these countries started off from extremely low levels (incarceration rates as low as 20 inmates per population of 100,000) and have reached, despite these increases, only about half the current level of Germany (Council of Europe 1988, p. 18). It is conceivable that the structural assimilation of these countries to other Western countries eliminated conditions for their extreme exceptionalism in criminal punishment. One example is "depillarization" in the Netherlands, that is, the loss of the traditional structuration of Dutch society along three denominational lines (Calvinist, Lutheran, Catholic) and the related loss of solidarity and informal social control. International comparisons of more

countries could thus further demonstrate the respective power and limits of the competing theoretical approaches discussed in this article

This article has produced a set of hypotheses to be tested in future research. Several preliminary empirical findings and theoretical conclusions can be summarized. The relative stability of punishment and knowledge in the Federal Republic of Germany contrasts with considerable instabilities in the United States. While further and systematic research is needed, it seems that public knowledge in Germany has been rather stable on some indicators, while, in other cases, issue-specific trends in punitive or liberal directions can be observed. In Germany, knowledge in the media, in the political sector, and in academia seems to be relatively stable as well. In addition, the degree and extent of punishment did not change considerably. The size of the prison population remained rather stable even while crime rates soared and violent crime almost doubled during the 1960s and 1970s and while administrations changed from conservative to Social Democratic and back to conservative.

The United States shows a very different pattern. Public attitudes as measured by opinion polls, media presentation, and knowledge in the political and academic sectors underwent radical changes. The search for sociostructural causes of crime was declared irrelevant by politicians and prominent scholars. Punitive attitudes peaked, and punishment increased to make the United States the world's leader in imprisonment and the only Western country that practices capital punishment. Each successive congressional session in the recent past has resulted in a more punitive criminal code. The current crime control bill alone proposes to turn 52 offenses into capital offenses.

The development of punishment is not sufficiently explained by the wave of criminal behavior during the 1960s and early to mid-1970s. This analysis indicates that changes in knowledge and ideology are necessary conditions for the increase in punishment. My analysis further indicates that neither the substance nor the dynamics of these knowledge changes can be explained by the increase in crime.

Different authors contribute conflicting accounts of the emergence of a new type of crime-and-justice-related knowledge in the United States. Disagreement centers on the time during which this knowledge emerged, the groups primarily responsible for the construction and distribution of this knowledge, and the effect of these groups on criminal justice policy and punishment. It appears plausible that the coincidence of several events caused the initial shift. (1) The politically successful civil rights movement and the liberal Supreme Court of the 1950s and 1960s sparked strong conservative opposition (see Chambliss and Sbarbaro 1989). (2)

Failures and disparities caused by the malfunctioning of the technocratized (Stryker 1989) or substantivized (Savelsberg 1992) law of the welfare-oriented era initiated neoclassical reactions within the legal profession and civil liberties groups (Greenberg and Humphries 1980) (3) The radicalized civil rights movement and subsequent racially motivated violence fueled law and order sentiments (4) The representation of African-Americans in the Democratic party moved white blue-collar workers (Reagan Democrats) toward the conservative party and thereby created conservative majorities. These majorities promoted law and order platforms, while instrumentalizing the libertarian-initiated neoclassical movement toward determinate decision making (5) The increase in crime may have supported this process but cannot by itself explain it (Stinchcombe et al 1980)

While it is plausible that a coincidence between these events and their underlying structural conflicts initiated the new type of punitive knowledge about crime and punishment, these five factors do not sufficiently explain the extreme dynamics observed in the American case. This article indicates through theoretical deduction as well as preliminary empirical evidence that purely sociostructural approaches are insufficient to explain criminal punishment. The nation-specific institutionalization of knowledge construction and domination must be taken into consideration in order to more fully explain the macro outcome of criminal punishment decisions. This institutionalization determines the degree of stability of knowledge and the diffusion of analytical and normative information between sectors. It may cause knowledge trends in different sectors to reinforce or stabilize each other. For example, we find indications for the U.S. case that public opinion polls and speeches of politicians reinforced each other once the punitive trend had gotten under way.²³ Further, political funding seems to have influenced academic knowledge, as academic knowledge further encouraged and legitimized the punitive orientation of political rhetoric and decision making.

In terms of general sociological theory, the data on imprisonment in the United States and Germany join observations in other areas to challenge unidimensional and unidirectional sociological theories. More specifically, this article argues that the explanation of macrosociological phenomena and modernization processes could be improved by taking nation-specific institutional structures of knowledge production and domination into account. Criminal punishment is but one example.

²³ It should be added that, in the opposite causal direction, punishment philosophy may also influence political outcomes. The Willie Horton case is the best-known recent example.

REFERENCES

- American Friends Service Committee 1971 *Struggle for Justice A Report on Crime and Punishment in America* New York Hill & Wang
- Bell, Daniel 1976 *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* New York Basic Books
- Bendix, Reinhard (1949) 1974 *Higher Civil Servants in American Society* Westport, Conn Greenwood Press
- Black, Donald 1976 *The Behavior of Law* Orlando, Fla Academic Press
- 1987 "Compensation and the Social Structure of Misfortune" *Law and Society Review* 21 563–84
- 1989 *Sociological Justice* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Boudon, Raymond, and François Bourricaud 1989 *A Critical Dictionary of Sociology* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Bundeskriminalamt 1991 *Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik* Wiesbaden Bundeskriminalamt
- Cahalan, Margaret Werner 1986 *Historical Correction Statistics in the United States, 1850–1984* Washington, D C Department of Justice, Department of Justice Statistics
- Cartwright, B C , and R D Schwartz 1973 "The Invocation of Legal Norms An Empirical Investigation of Durkheim and Weber" *American Sociological Review* 38 340–54
- Chambliss, William J , and Edward Sbarbaro 1989 "Criminal Law, Public Opinion, and the Political Process" Manuscript George Washington University, Washington, D C
- Coser, Lewis A 1968 "Sociology of Knowledge" Pp 428–35 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by David L Sills New York Macmillan & the Free Press
- Council of Europe 1988 *Prison Information Bulletin no 12* Strasbourg Council of Europe
- Cressey, Donald R 1978 "Criminological Theory, Social Science, and the Repression of Crime" *Criminology* 16 171–91
- Cullen, Francis T , William J Maakestaad, and Gray Cavender 1987 *Corporate Crime under Attack The Ford Pinto Case and Beyond* Cincinnati Anderson
- Doyle, Daniel P , and David F Luckenbill 1991 "Mobilizing Law in Response to Collective Problems A Test of Black's Theory of Law" *Law and Society Review* 25 103–16
- Durkheim, Émile (1893) 1984 *The Division of Labor in Society* New York Free Press
- (1899–1900) 1983 "The Evolution of Punishment" Pp 102–32 in *Durkheim and the Law*, edited by S Lukes and A Skull Oxford Martin Robertson
- Dye, Thomas R 1990 *Who Is Running America? The Bush Era* Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice Hall
- Eisenhower, Dwight D 1961 "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1960" Pp 3–17 in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* Washington, D C Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service
- Erikson, Kai T 1966 *Wayward Puritans A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* New York Wiley
- Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds 1985 *Bringing the State Back In* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Foucault, Michel 1979 *Discipline and Punish The Birth of the Prison* New York Random House
- Garland, David 1990 *Punishment and Modern Society A Study in Social Theory* Chicago University of Chicago Press

- 1992 "Punishment and Culture The Symbolic Dimensions of Criminal Justice " Pp 191–222 in *Studies in Law, Politics, and Society*, vol 11 edited by A Sarat and S S Silbey Greenwich, Conn JAI Press
- Giehring, Heinz 1987 "Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung zur Generalprävention und normative Begründung des Strafrechts " *Kriminologisches Journal* 19 2–12
- Gottfredson, Michael R , and Michael J Hindelang 1979 "A Study of 'The Behavior of Law '" *American Sociological Review* 44 3–18
- Greenberg, David F 1977 "The Dynamics of Oscillatory Punishment Processes " *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 68 643–51
- Greenberg, David F , and Drew Humphries 1980 "The Cooptation of Fixed Sentencing Reform " *Crime and Delinquency* 26 206–25
- Habermas, Jurgen 1975 *Legitimation Crisis* Boston Beacon
- Hagan, John, John D Hewitt, and Duane F Alwin 1979 "Ceremonial Justice Crime and Punishment in a Loosely Coupled System " *Social Forces* 58 506–27
- Hall, Jerome 1952 *Law, Theft, and Society* Boston Little, Brown
- Halliday, Terence C 1989 "Legal Professions and Politics Neo-Corporatist Variations on the Pluralist Theme of Liberal Democracies " Pp 375–426 in *Lawyers in Society Comparative Theories*, edited by R L Abel and P S C Lewis Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Hembroff, Larry A 1987 "The Seriousness of Acts and Social Contexts A Test of Black's Theory of the Behavior of Law " *American Journal of Sociology* 93 322–47
- Inglehart, Ronald 1977 *The Silent Revolution Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Inverarity, James, and Daniel McCarthy 1988 "Punishment and Social Structure Revisited Unemployment and Imprisonment in the United States, 1948–1984 " *Sociological Quarterly* 29 263–79
- Jankovic, Ivan 1977 "Labor Markets and Imprisonment " *Crime and Social Justice* 8 17–31
- Johnson, Lyndon B 1968 "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 10, 1967 " Pp 2–14 in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* Washington, D C Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service
- Kalberg, Stephen 1987 "West German and American Interaction Forms One Level of Structured Misunderstanding " *Theory, Culture, and Society* 4 603–18
- Knorr-Cetina, Karin 1981 *Manufacture of Knowledge An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science* Oxford Pergamon Press
- Kruttschnitt, Candace 1980–81 "Social Status and Sentences of Female Offenders " *Law and Society Review* 15 247–65
- Kuklick, Henrika 1983 "The Sociology of Knowledge Retrospect and Prospect " *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 287–310
- Laub, John H , and Robert J Sampson 1991 "The Sutherland-Glueck Debate On the Sociology of Criminological Knowledge " *American Journal of Sociology* 96 1404–40
- Liska, Alan E 1987 "A Critical Examination of Macro Perspectives on Crime Control " *Annual Review of Sociology* 13 67–88
- Luhmann, Niklas 1977 "Arbeitsteilung und Moral Durkheims Theorie " Pp 17–35 in *Über die Teilung der Sozialen Arbeit* by É Durkheim Frankfurt Suhrkamp
- Lynd, Robert S 1986 *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* Middletown, Conn Wesleyan University Press
- Mannheim, Karl (1925) 1986 *Conservatism A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge* London Routledge & Kegan Paul
- Marini, Margaret Mooney, and Burton Singer 1988 "Causality in the Social Sciences " Pp 347–409 in *Sociological Methodology*, edited by C C Clogg Washington, D C American Sociological Association

- Martinson, R 1974 "What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform " *Public Interest* 12 22-55
- Munch, Richard, and Neil J Smelser, eds 1992 *Theory of Culture* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Myers, Martha A 1979-80 "Predicting the Behavior of Law A Test of Two Models " *Law and Society Review* 14 835-57
- Niemi, Richard G , John Mueller, and Tom W Smith 1989 *Trends in Public Opinion A Compendium of Survey Data* New York Greenwood Press
- Nixon, Richard 1971 "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 22, 1970 " Pp 8-16 in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* Washington, D C Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service
- Nonet, Philippe, and Philip Selznick 1978 *Law and Society in Transition Toward Responsive Law* New York Octagon Books
- Polk, Kenneth, and Don C Gibbons 1988 "The Uses of Criminology, the Rehabilitative Ideal, and Justice " *Crime and Delinquency* 34 263-76
- Pontell, Henry N 1984 *A Capacity to Punish The Ecology of Crime and Punishment* Bloomington Indiana University Press
- Reagan, Ronald 1988 "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 23, 1985 " Pp 130-36 in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* Washington, D C Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
- Reuband, Karl-Heinz 1980 "Sanktionsverlangen in Wandel Die Einstellung zur Todesstrafe in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 1950 " *Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 32 535-58
- 1990 "Veränderungen im moralischen Urteil und Sanktionsverlangen der Bundesbürger seit 1970 " *Kriminologisches Journal* 22 284-97
- Roth, Gunther 1987 *Politische Herrschaft und Persönliche Freiheit* Heidelberger Max Weber-Vorlesungen Frankfurt Suhrkamp
- Rusche, Georg, and Otto Kirchheimer 1939 *Punishment and Social Structure* New York Columbia University Press
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich 1973 *Lawyers and Their Society* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Savelsberg, Joachim J 1992 "Law That Does Not Fit Society Sentencing Guidelines as a Neoclassical Reaction to the Dilemmas of Substantivized Law " *American Journal of Sociology* 97 1346-81
- Savelsberg, Joachim J , with contributions by Peter Bruhl 1994 *Constructing White-Collar Crime Rationalities, Communication, Power* Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press (in press)
- Sarat, Austin, and Susan Silbey "The Pull of the Policy Audience " *Law and Policy* 10 97-166
- Schacht, Steven P , and D Stanley Eitzen 1990 "Government Sponsored Research on Battered Women Redefining Structural Outcomes into Individual Problems " Paper presented at the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D C
- Schmitter, Phillippe C 1982 "Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going " Pp 259-79 in *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making*, edited by G Lembruch and P C Schmitter Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Schwartz, Richard D , and James C Miller 1965 "Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity," *American Journal of Sociology* 70 159-69
- Spitzer, Steven 1974-75 "Punishment and Social Organization A Study of Durkheim's Theory of Penal Evolution " *Law and Society Review* 9 613-37

- Statistisches Bundesamt 1977 *Rechtspflege Fachserie 10 Reihe 4 Strafvollzug* Wiesbaden Statistisches Bundesamt
- 1990 *Rechtspflege Fachserie 10 Reihe 4 Strafvollzug* Wiesbaden Statistisches Bundesamt
- Steinert, Heinz 1978 "On the Functions of Criminal Law " *Contemporary Crises* 2 167-93
- Stinchcombe, Arthur L , Rebecca Adams, Carol A Heimer, Kim Lane Scheppele, Tom W Smith, and D Garth Taylor 1980 *Crime and Punishment Changing Attitudes in America* San Francisco Jossey-Bass
- Stryker, Robin 1989 "Limits on Technocratization of the Law " *American Sociological Review* 54 341-58
- 1990 "Science, Class, and the Welfare State A Class-centered Functional Approach " *American Journal of Sociology* 95 684-726
- Sutton, John R 1987 "Doing Time Dynamics of Imprisonment in the Reformist State " *American Sociological Review* 52 612-30
- Swidler, Ann 1986 "Culture in Action " *American Sociological Review* 51 273-86
- Tarrow, Sid 1990 "Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames Materials for the Construction of Meaning " Working Papers of the History and Society Program University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
- Tilly, Charles 1984 *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* New York Russell Sage
- Unger, Roberto Mangabeira 1976 *Law in Modern Society Toward a Criticism of Social Theory* New York Free Press
- Uniform Crime Reports* 1986 Washington, D C Department of Justice
- 1991 Washington, D C Government Printing Office
- U S Department of Justice 1990a "Criminal Victimization 1989 " *Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin* Washington, D C Department of Justice
- 1990b *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics* Washington, D C Department of Justice
- 1992a "Prisoners in 1991 " *Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin* Washington, D C Department of Justice
- 1992b "Crime and the Nation's Households, 1991 " *Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin* Washington, D C Department of Justice
- Vidich, Arthur J , and S M Lyman 1985 *American Sociology Worldly Rejections of Religion and Their Directions* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Von Hirsch, Andrew 1976 *Doing Justice The Choice of Punishments* Boston Northeastern University Press
- 1987 "Structure and Rationale Minnesota's Critical Choices " Pp 84-106 in *The Sentencing Commission and Its Guidelines*, by A Von Hirsch, K A Knapp, and M Tonry Boston Northeastern University Press
- Weber, Max 1978 *Economy and Society* Berkeley University of California Press
- Wheeler, Stanton 1976 "Trends and Problems in the Sociological Study of Crime " *Social Problems* 23 525-34
- Wilson, James Q 1975 *Thinking about Crime* New York Basic Books
- Wilson, William J 1991 "Studying Inner-City Dislocations The Challenge of Public Agenda Research " *American Sociological Review* 56 1-14
- Zuckerman, Harriet 1988 "The Sociology of Science " Pp 511-74 in *Handbook of Sociology*, edited by N Smelser Newbury Park, Calif Sage

The Legalization of the Workplace¹

John R. Sutton
University of California, Santa Barbara

Frank Dobbin
Princeton University

John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott
Stanford University

This study uses longitudinal data on nearly 300 American employers over the period 1955–85 to analyze the adoption of disciplinary hearings and grievance procedures for nonunion salaried and hourly employees. Hypotheses are developed from an institutional perspective that focuses, first, on uncertainty arising from government mandates concerning equal employment opportunity and affirmative action and, second, on the role of the human relations professions in constructing employment-relations law and prescribing models of compliance. Event-history techniques are used to test these hypotheses against competing arguments concerning the internal structure and labor market position of employing organizations. Results on all outcomes strongly support the institutionalist model.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, workplace due-process mechanisms such as grievance procedures have spread beyond their traditional domain among unionized, blue-collar industrial workers and have increasingly been applied by employers to nonunion and salaried employees (Selznick 1969,

¹ The research reported here was supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-8511250, results and interpretations are solely the responsibility of the authors. We thank Keith Allum, Jessica Torres, and Roberta Stich for assistance in running the survey and coding data and Bill Bielby, Philip Selznick, Stephen Mezas, the members of the UCSB Comparative Institutions seminar, and the *AJS* reviewers for valuable comments on the manuscript. An earlier version was presented at the 1990 meetings of the American Sociological Association. Direct all correspondence to John R. Sutton, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106.

p 91, McCabe 1988, chap 2, Ewing 1989) There are a number of provocative speculations about why this has occurred The business literature treats legalization as a rational adjustment to an increasingly white-collar, highly trained labor pool The workers in this pool have valuable and portable skills, given the opportunities for horizontal mobility, they expect a sense of participation and citizenship in their work roles, and they are disinclined to tolerate traditional autocratic management regimes (see, e g , Ewing 1982) Similar arguments have been framed within a transaction-cost framework by Williamson (1985, 1986) Critical theorists such as Edwards (1979) suggest that legalization is part of a more general strategy of formalized governance designed to enhance managerial control over workers and to forestall unionization

These arguments treat legalization as a special case of bureaucratization, and in so doing, they may underestimate the significance of workplace legalization and misunderstand its origins Philip Selznick argued over 20 years ago that legalization involves an important transformation in both the role of the employee and the nature of the organization To the degree that they have formal rights to question managerial decisions, employees are not just subordinates in a hierarchical authority relationship but may become members of an association (Selznick 1969, pp 51–52, 67–68), legalization lays the groundwork for employment-qua-membership to become a “protectable status” Selznick suggested that the extension of membership not only expands organizational boundaries in a quantitative sense, but also transforms it qualitatively into an “emergent polity” (pp 26–32) In short, legalization signifies the transformation of the instrumental organization into an institution

We proceed in the spirit of Selznick’s institutional analysis, but our approach differs from his in two ways First, we focus exclusively on the causes of legalization rather than its effects The second difference concerns levels of analysis Selznick suggested that changes in the legal environment have opened the door to due-process governance, but he focused on pressures for legalization arising from within organizations Following Edelman (1990), we argue that such pressures arise primarily from the institutional environment We will develop a model that accounts for legalization in terms of a wider transformation in the relationships among the state, organizations, and individual citizens In the late 1960s and early 1970s, national and state governments in the United States became more aggressive in ensuring employee rights through equal employment opportunity legislation, affirmative action regulations, and related court decisions (see Edelman [1990] for a thorough summary) Equal employment opportunity/affirmative action (EEO/AA) law did not mandate new governance procedures, but it raised tremendous uncertainty about the

legality of traditional employment practices. Faced with an apparently hostile legal environment, employers adopted due-process governance to cool out potentially litigious employees and demonstrate good-faith compliance with government mandates (Staudohar 1981, Soutar 1981). Since 1980, federal pressure for equality in the workplace has lessened. We show that this conservative shift has slowed the pace of legalization but not reversed the general trend.

We focus our analysis on the adoption of three specific due-process policies: disciplinary hearings, grievance procedures for nonunion, exempt (salaried) employees, and grievance procedures for nonunion, non-exempt (hourly) employees. We define these policies in more detail when we describe our data. For now it is enough to note that all three policies imply some formal dispute-settlement mechanism outside the routine chain of command, but that they all represent different levels of commitment to employee rights. Disciplinary hearings allow employees to defend themselves against punitive actions initiated by management. In contrast, grievance procedures are initiated by employees, when employers institute grievance procedures, they expose themselves to a potentially unlimited range of complaints.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LEGALIZATION

To provide a foundation for our analysis of legalization, we review three lines of theorizing about different aspects of organizations and their environments. The first concerns organizations' internal structures, the second, their task environments, and the third, their institutional environments.

Arguments about the influence of internal structure appear both in Selznick's institutional study of legalization (1969) and in rational closed-system theories of organizational structure. While the two sets of arguments are motivated differently, they generate hypotheses that are remarkably similar. Selznick maintained that larger and older organizations, and those more committed to equitable, rule-bound administration, are more likely to support lawlike norms. Consequently, we expect that size, age, and bureaucratization encourage the adoption of due-process governance mechanisms.

From a rationalist perspective, legalization is a special case and an extension of bureaucratization. Like Selznick, rationalists emphasize size and prior bureaucratization as incentives to further procedural formalization. Several early cross-sectional studies found larger organizations were more likely to elaborate procedural rules (Blau and Schoenherr 1971, Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings 1969). The argument here is that formalization permits large organizations to achieve economies of scale and reduce

uncertainty. However, Edwards (1979) has contested efficiency arguments, arguing instead that personnel policies are motivated by the need for control. His research identified a cluster of personnel practices used in core firms that constitute a system of employment management he called "bureaucratic control." Under bureaucratic control, internal labor markets provide a formal mechanism for handling hiring and promotion decisions; their main effect is to motivate employees and minimize voluntary separations by promising workers regular career advancement. To Edwards, disciplinary hearings and grievance procedures further reinforce the organization's commitment to bureaucratic personnel decisions and long-term employment, thus we would expect them to appear where internal labor markets are well developed.

Open-systems rationalists treat workplace governance policies as adaptations to labor-market conditions. Economists maintain that labor turnover costs create a strong incentive for firms to implement elaborated governance mechanisms to stabilize employment (see Schlichter [1919] 1961). Williamson (1985, 1986) uses similar arguments in discussing the transaction costs associated with labor recruitment. In this view, the problem of labor turnover is exacerbated in industries where skills are not transportable between firms. Where skills are firm-specific, labor-replacement costs soar, owing to the need for specialized training (Doeringer and Piore 1971). Segmentation theorists argue that personnel practices reflect differences across industries in the social status of their respective labor pools: younger white males are more likely to be employed in core firms that offer high wages, promotion opportunities, fringe benefits, and personnel practices designed to minimize turnover; women, older workers, and minorities are disproportionately employed in peripheral firms where such incentives are lacking (Hodson 1978, Edwards 1979, Tolbert, Horan, and Beck 1980, Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). Finally, both transaction-cost and labor-segmentation theorists offer arguments about the mediating role of unions. Williamson argues that nonunionized firms are likely to adopt purely internal grievance mechanisms as functional equivalents for the mediating role of unions (1985, chap. 10), and Edwards argues that core firms adopt bureaucratic control policies with the conscious intent of forestalling unionization (1979, p. 21). Either way, we would expect legalization to be most rapid among nonunionized organizations.

We use the term "neoinstitutional theory" to distinguish our approach from those we have just reviewed. Where closed-system rationalists view legalization as arising primarily from within organizations, we argue that it is drawn from the environment. Where transaction-cost and labor-segmentation models attend to the task environment, we are concerned more with the environment's institutional aspects. The argument of neo-

institutional theory is that formal organizational structure is, in varying degrees, a symbolic phenomenon, designed to demonstrate appropriateness and rationality rather than to achieve efficiency (Meyer and Scott 1983, DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In particular, the introduction of due-process governance mechanisms dramatizes a commitment to equity and justice, independently of how those mechanisms actually function.

In more formal theoretical terms, we see two distinct, but interactive, processes driving legalization in the workplace. First, we draw on DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) argument that the state exerts "coercive" pressure on organizations to adapt their structures to institutionalized norms. There is now abundant evidence that the American state has had a powerful influence on employment-relations policy (Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 1986, Baron, Jennings, and Dobbin 1988, Dobbin 1992). Our analysis will focus on federal equal employment opportunity and affirmative action (EEO/AA) policy, as well as on key court decisions at the state level, as salient parts of the institutional environment. But legalization has not been a direct result of government mandates, and we are careful not to overestimate the state's coercive influence in this area. The federal government declared its intent to eliminate employment discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and in Executive Order (EO) 11246 (issued in 1965), which required government contractors to take "affirmative action" to assure the employment of minorities. But as Edelman (1992, pp. 1536-41) has argued in detail, the coercive power of these policies has been weakened by their ambiguity concerning standards of compliance, their emphasis on procedural remedies rather than substantive outcomes, and their lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. The law has confronted employers with broad imperatives for fairness but has raised uncertainty about the legal consequences of employers' actions. The procedural interpretation of EEO/AA mandates by courts and administrative agencies has given employers the initiative to develop their own compliance strategies and rewarded them for gestures of compliance made in good faith.

We argue that, in recent decades, due-process governance mechanisms have become institutionalized as partial solutions to problems of legal uncertainty raised by governmental antidiscrimination initiatives. Some impetus for this argument comes from Edelman's (1990) finding that adoption of grievance procedures among California employers accelerated after the passage of the 1964 act. Here we offer a more detailed specification of variation in federal pressure over time. Our reading of the policy literature and of our own data suggests that it is unlikely that the Civil Rights Act by itself influenced rates of legalization, thus 1964 may not be the appropriate take-off point. Aside from its inherent ambiguity, Title VII was impossible to implement on a broad scale because

it required individual workers to file suit before enforcement actions could be undertaken (Lempert and Sanders 1986, pp 378–79, Edelman 1992, pp 1539–40) Executive Order 11246, issued the following year, had somewhat stronger enforcement mechanisms, but enforcement was “virtually nonexistent” for some time (Edelman 1992, p 1541) By 1972, however, actions by all three branches of government had increased the potential for enforcing Title VII and EO 11246 In 1970, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the agency charged with enforcing EO 11246, issued Order 4, which required federal contractors to file workforce statistics and affirmative-action plans In 1971, the Supreme Court ruled in *Griggs v Duke Power Company* that no intent to discriminate had to be shown in suits against employers until Title VII, this position was reiterated in *Albemarle Paper Co v Moody*, decided in 1975 In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) authority to initiate suits against employers in federal court Significantly, many policies in this period markedly broadened the government’s commitment to eliminate sex discrimination (Edwards 1973, Hellam 1973) Revised Order 4, issued in 1971, required government contractors to include women as well as racial minorities in their affirmative action plans The Educational Amendments of 1972 altered the Equal Pay Act of 1963 to outlaw wage discrimination based on sex and added Title IX, prohibiting gender discrimination in education, to the Civil Rights Act These actions increased the breadth and strength of the federal EEO/AA mandate but did not reduce its diffuseness or ambiguity The enforcement climate changed again in 1980, the year Ronald Reagan was elected president, ushering in a period of probusiness, anti-civil rights enforcement policy (Days 1984, pp 313–19) Thus it seems likely that pressure for adoption declined from 1980 at least through 1985, which marks the end of our observations

Our second line of argument concerns the specific mechanisms by which due-process governance has been institutionalized as a legitimate response to the uncertainty of employment-relations law Here we argue, again following DiMaggio and Powell, that “normative” pressures for legalization are exerted through the boundary-spanning activities of personnel management professionals The general role of such professionals in diffusing models of governance has been noted for some time (e g , Vollmer and McGillivray 1960, Selznick 1969, p 91) More recently Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger (1992) have documented the prominent role played by personnel experts and labor attorneys in constructing models of compliance with legal mandates The putative role of such professionals is to package and transmit objective information to the employer about the labor market, including its legal aspects But Edelman and her colleagues show that these professionals actively interpret legal doc-

trine—typically overstating the legal threat to employers—and disseminate recipes for compliance as a means for enhancing their prestige, autonomy, and authority within organizations

Our review of the practitioner literature shows that personnel experts have prescribed due-process governance as part of their EEO/AA compliance strategies. These experts offer three arguments that are noteworthy. First, in articles, they consistently emphasize the complexity and ambiguity of EEO/AA law. Some writers attribute this ambiguity to a perceived contradiction between nondiscrimination (as mandated in Title VII) and affirmative action (e.g., Marino 1980), and others attribute it to confusing compliance requirements across different enforcement agencies and levels of government (e.g., Higgins 1976). Second, they argue in the literature that executives' uncertainty about compliance standards created a perceived need to upgrade the personnel function within their organizations (e.g., Froehlich and Hawver 1974, Giblin and Ornati 1974, Garriss and Black 1974). We cannot say whether personnel departments, in fact, became more powerful, our point here is that personnel experts sought to use the threat of EEO/AA sanctions to increase their own prestige. Third, and most important for our argument, in the professional literature procedural fairness is emphasized as an important element in an effective compliance strategy. For Gery (1977, p. 203), compliance-oriented personnel reforms must include "establishment of a grievance system . . . to assure that all employees have an opportunity to resolve complaints . . . without having to appeal to external organizations such as the EEOC." Youngblood and Tidwell (1981, p. 32) argue that, to protect themselves from claims of unjust discharge under Title VII or other legal mandates, "enlightened personnel management typically embraces a formal grievance procedure as a means to ensure fair and consistent treatment of all employees." On the basis of data from a poll of federal affirmative-action compliance officers, Marino (1980, p. 32) recommends that employers "establish a formal EEO complaint procedure within the facility" in order to demonstrate good faith and sensitivity to the problem of discrimination. The importance of due-process governance may have increased as the problems of sexual discrimination, and more specifically sexual harassment, became more salient in the 1970s (Linenberger and Keaveny 1981).

The noninstitutional model thus emphasizes the joint effects of state-induced uncertainty and expert prescriptions for governance. We offer three empirical arguments that will serve as tests. First, it seems likely that the pace of legalization has been influenced by the apparent rise and decline of government pressure for EEO/AA enforcement. Second, following several earlier studies (Dobbin et al. 1988, Edelman 1990, 1992, Dobbin et al. 1993), we suspect that an organization's proximity to the

public sphere is an important determinant of its perceived vulnerability to antidiscriminatory norms and hence its receptivity to legalistic models of governance. Third, we test whether these models of governance are adopted more readily by organizations that are directly linked to the personnel professions.

Our analysis builds on, and seeks to extend, two earlier studies of workplace legalization, both from a neoinstitutionalist perspective. Dobbin et al. (1988) used a convenience sample of 52 California employers to analyze two outcomes: the number of different grievance procedures in place in each organization and grievance-procedure complexity (measured as the average number of steps across all grievance mechanisms). In cross-sectional analyses, they found that the number of grievance procedures increased with organizational size and employees' unionization, complexity was associated only with size. It is interesting that this study found no difference between public and private employers on either outcome. Edelman's (1990) study used the same data but reported more sensitive dynamic analyses of the adoption of grievance procedures for nonunion employees. Edelman found that nonunion grievance procedures diffused more rapidly among large organizations, organizations with formalized personnel offices, and organizations that were closer to the public sphere; time-period tests showed an acceleration in adoption rates after 1964. This study goes beyond these early efforts in two ways. First, our empirical base is broader and more trustworthy: instead of using a small convenience sample, we draw on a relatively large sample of employers that is systematically stratified across several industrial sectors and regional legal environments. The second advance concerns the theoretical implications of our analysis. These studies have successfully established the plausibility of an institutional account of legalization but have not tested it against competing arguments. This study offers a more detailed institutional model and contrasts it empirically with dominant rationalist explanations focusing on the effects of organizational structure and labor-market conditions.

SAMPLE, DATA, AND ESTIMATION

The primary data for this study are drawn from a survey of 279 establishments. The sample includes public and private employers in the states of New Jersey, California, and Virginia. We stratified our sample by states to make our data collection more efficient and, on the basis of our reading of statutes, court decisions, and literature on employment relations law (e.g., Curtis, Simmons, and Armstrong 1981, Jensen 1988, Maltby 1990, p. 53, Hawkins 1988, p. 525), chose these states in order to assure variability in legal climates. California is the most progressive

state in our sample because of its unique combination of legislative and judicial activism. Like many other states, California has essentially extended federal equal employment opportunity guarantees to employees not covered by federal legislation, and California courts have been the most aggressive in the nation (with the possible exception of those in Michigan) in protecting employees from wrongful discharge. New Jersey's employment statutes are similar to California's, but the judiciary there has not been aggressively pro-employee, and Virginia is a right-to-work state with low levels of both legislative and judicial support for equal employment opportunity and employee rights. Thus we expected that California employers would be most responsive to due-process pressures and those in Virginia the least responsive, with New Jersey employers in the middle.

Within states, we chose a stratified random sample of establishments from 13 sectors of the economy. Private firms were sampled randomly within states, using the Dun and Bradstreet *Million Dollar Directory* (1985), from the following industries: publishing, chemicals, machinery, electrical manufacturing, transportation, retail trade, and banking. Hospitals were sampled from the directory of the American Hospital Association (1983). Nonprofit firms were chosen from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (1985). Official and commercial telephone directories were used to sample public agencies at the federal, state, county, and municipal levels within each state.² For most of the private firms, an estimate of the current number of employees was available from directories, and we excluded establishments with fewer than 50 employees. Size data were not available in advance for public agencies, we either queried the agencies by telephone or discarded responses from establishments that were too small.

Information was obtained through a mail questionnaire, which was typically filled out by a personnel director. The questionnaire asked a number of questions about organizational structure, demographics, employment-relations policies, and links to other organizations over the period 1955–85. On the basis of face-to-face interviews conducted in our pilot study, we are fairly confident of the information available from this source. We contacted a total of 620 organizations, and 386 questionnaires were returned. Of these, 86 were unusable because the organizations never met our minimum size criterion, which left a total of 300 valid responses. Our response rate of 48% compares favorably with those in other organizational studies. Blau et al. (1976) report a rate of 36%,

² Aldrich et al. (1988) offer thoughtful insights on the limitations of such sources as a basis for sampling organizations. They conclude in particular that these sources are likely to underrepresent newer forms of organizations.

Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985) report a rate of 35%, and Edelman's (1992) recent Gallup-conducted survey achieved 54% (for a detailed discussion of the difficulties associated with sampling organizations, see Aldrich et al [1988] and Kalleberg et al [1990])

It is important to mention a limitation in our sample that might affect the interpretation of our results. Since we sampled only organizations that were alive in 1985, we have no information about those that merged or were dissolved before that date. If the adoption of disciplinary hearings or grievance procedures is related to organizational mortality, this omission creates selection bias. We think this is unlikely because these are relatively small and peripheral changes in organizational structure, and they imply no alteration of core technologies, functions, or markets that would directly affect viability. We cannot prove this argument, however, without data on no longer existing organizations, which are practically unobtainable.

Three of the items on our questionnaire provide outcome variables for our analysis. We asked employers when, if ever, they first (1) initiated disciplinary hearings for employees, (2) initiated formal grievance procedures for nonunion, exempt (salaried) employees, and (3) initiated formal grievance procedures for nonunion, nonexempt (hourly) employees. We also asked when, if ever, they *discontinued* each of the above procedures, as it turns out, none of the employers in our sample ever revoked these, once they were put into place.³ Our pilot interviews convinced us that all of the terms used in the questionnaire, while perhaps too technical for a lay respondent, would be immediately recognized by any executive who was routinely involved in personnel matters. Special problems were raised by our queries about grievance procedures. We focused on mechanisms that had some minimal level of procedural formality, but because of the wide range of variation across firms, it was impractical to ask for detailed information over time on the structure of grievance mechanisms.⁴ Use of the word "formal" in the questionnaire items insured, at

³ This observation may raise questions about our reliance on organizational memory, since it suggests that respondents may have forgotten the existence of any policies not in force at the time of the survey. We, on the contrary, regard it as a valid finding, since respondents often reported the discontinuation of policies and practices—such as time-and-motion studies, time clocks, dress codes, suggestion boxes, and annual bonuses—that are characteristic of more traditional management regimes.

⁴ Grievance procedures vary, e.g., in the number of steps involved, whether the first step is to report the grievance to an immediate superior or to an off-line official, whether—and at what point—the employee is entitled to representation, whether his or her representative may be another employee or an outside attorney, and whether the last step involves outside arbitration. See, e.g., Dobbin et al (1988), Ewing (1989), McCabe (1988).

a minimum, that respondents would identify *written* policies. We also sought to assure that respondents did not report so-called open-door grievance policies as formal grievance procedures. Under these policies, employees are told simply to take their complaints to a supervisor. While employers often speak of these as grievance procedures and, in some cases, they are written into employee handbooks, they involve no structural changes and grant no rights to employees. To encourage fine distinctions, we included a question on open-door policies in sequence with the questions on grievance procedures.

We sought also to capture changes in covariates over the history of each organization. Thus we asked about the timing of a wide range of possible structural changes, such as the creation or dissolution of personnel offices. For continuous variables, such as the number of employees, we asked for estimates from 1955, 1965, 1975, and 1985. After coding, these data were transformed into annual observations, yielding a data set with an N of 6,701 organization/year spells. For qualitative indicators of organizational structure, it was straightforward to recode responses into time-varying categorical variables. Annual values of continuous variables were estimated using linear interpolations between reported decennial figures.⁵ We are convinced that this method yielded estimates that are as detailed as organizational memory would permit, our interpolation strategy is obviously imprecise, but unbiased. We supplemented this organization-level dataset with additional industry-level data published by the Bureau of the Census (U.S. Department of Commerce 1986) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor 1975–87). Wherever they were available in these sources, we gathered separate sets of industry-level data for each state. The data to be used here include annual indicators of wages paid to employees (by industry) and labor-force characteristics (by industry and state).

We use these data to analyze the adoption of due-process governance mechanisms within an event-history framework (Tuma 1979). Thus we focus not on the *existence* of disciplinary hearings and grievance procedures, but on their *adoption* within a given spell. The adoption of each legalization measure is an event, and the dependent variables are the

⁵ For our data on organizational size, we took special steps to capture variation that was not linear across decades. Respondents were asked whether there had been any large changes in the number of employees, if so, how many and in what years (respondents could indicate as many as four such shifts, none reported more than two). These shifts were worked into our interpolations by assuming linear change on either side of a reported rise or drop.

rates of adoption, which may vary both across organizations and over time. Adoption rates cannot be observed directly, but we can get a sense of the temporal path of the adoption process by examining hazard plots. Figures 1–3 show plots of integrated hazard functions for the adoption of disciplinary hearings and grievance procedures for nonunion, exempt and nonexempt employees. These figures show a fairly common pattern. According to our data, in 1955, 13% of employers had created disciplinary hearings, but only 4% had created grievance procedures for nonunion, exempt employees, and 5% had created grievance procedures for nonunion, nonexempt employees. By 1985, the figures were 51%, 49%, and 47%, respectively. Closer examination of these figures suggests that adoption rates may have accelerated in the early 1970s and perhaps slowed a bit after 1980. For now, we treat the adoption process as time-invariant, and specify a conventional log-linear model

$$\log r = \Phi \mathbf{x} \quad (1)$$

In this equation, r is the rate of adoption, \mathbf{x} is a vector of variables, and Φ is a vector of coefficients. Later we will offer specific hypotheses about time-period effects and offer a simple extension of this model.




FIG. 1 —Integrated hazard function: adoption of disciplinary hearings, 1955–85 (with 95% confidence intervals)




FIG 2 —Integrated hazard function adoption of grievance procedures for nonunion exempt employees, 1955–85 (with 95% confidence intervals)




FIG 3 —Integrated hazard function adoption of grievance procedures for nonunion nonexempt employees, 1955–85 (with 95% confidence intervals)

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Hypotheses and Indicators

We present hypotheses that correspond to the theoretical approaches discussed earlier, focusing first on the internal bureaucratic structure of the organizations, second, on the task environment, conceptualized here in terms of labor market structure, and third, on the institutional environment

Indicators of internal structure include organizational size, age, and the development of internal labor markets (ILMs) Size is measured as the (log) number of employees, we expect positive effects on adoption rates Age, measured in (log) years since founding, yields contrary hypotheses, while Selznick (1969) would predict that older (hence more bureaucratized and institutionalized) organizations would generate more formal procedures, Stinchcombe (1965) would expect structural innovations to appear mainly among new (hence less institutionalized and more flexible) organizations Existence of ILMs serves as an indicator of bureaucratic control mechanisms already in place It is measured using an index, ranging in value from zero to eight, that shows whether, in any given year, the employer used written job descriptions, tests for employment, promotion tests, salary classifications, performance evaluations, job ladders, centralized hiring, or centralized promotion and discharge

We use three measures of labor market structure to test the effects of the task environment First, we use a binary variable coded "1" for unionized employers and "0" for nonunionized employers to examine the role of unions as labor market mediators According to Williamson (1985) and Stinchcombe (1965), adoption of grievance procedures for non-union employees is likely to be more rapid among organizations without union contracts, disciplinary hearings may potentially appear as a *result* of unionization Second, an industry-level measure of average annual wages per employee provides a direct indicator of the cost of labor, indirectly, it represents the potential for high turnover and dependence on firm-specific skills Arguments from transaction-cost and segmentation theories would predict higher rates of legalization in industries with high average wages Third, we use the percentage of female workers, measured within industries by state, as an indicator of peripheral labor markets As segmentation theorists might expect, our early tests showed that percentage female, percentage black, and percentage older than 65 years are all highly intercorrelated, percentage female was most strongly associated with legalization, however, and is used here as a proxy for peripheralization generally The hypothesis is that industries with higher percentages of female workers are more resistant to legalization Two final comments about measurement first, the wage measure has been con-

verted to constant dollars (in units of \$1,000). Second, both industry-level variables, when coded as annual figures, showed secular increases across all industries during the 30 years covered by the study. We have detrended the data by calculating annual changes in each.

Our model of the institutional environment suggests that legalization is the emergent result of two interactive processes: diffuse coercive pressure for fair governance emanating from the state and the promotion of normative models of compliance by professional employment-relations specialists. We argue, first, that organizations' proximity to the public sphere influences their vulnerability to pressures for legalization. One hypothesis is that public agencies are more inclined to legalization than private firms. This simple dichotomy may appear tautological, suggesting only that government obeyed its own mandate, but we think the story is more complicated. We agree with Edelman (1992) that pressure for legalization has emanated primarily from the federal government and, more specifically, from particular agencies at the federal level. But the American state is remarkably fragmented and disarticulated (Skowronek 1982, Hamilton and Sutton 1989). The EEO/AA law is no more transparent to government agencies than it is to private firms; public and private employers alike have been forced to construct strategies of compliance. Our model suggests that public agencies were in a privileged position to develop persuasive compliance strategies but that their compliance was by no means automatic.⁶

We supplement this argument with two hypotheses about the state's influence on organizations in the private sector. Private firms that contract with the federal government are dependent on the state financially and fall under federal affirmative action reporting requirements, thus we expect them to be more prone to legalization than other firms. Nonprofit associations are considerably closer to the public sphere than for-profit firms because of their special legal status and public-purpose charters. Because they occupy a sectoral space "between states and markets" (Wuthnow 1991, see also DiMaggio 1986), they are also probably more exposed to institutionalizing pressures emanating from the state and thus more likely to adopt due-process governance.

⁶ If this were not the case we would expect legalization to diffuse downward, from the federal government to state and local agencies. In parallel analyses we tested for such differences; results showed no systematic patterns—if anything, local government agencies were most receptive to legalization—and models were not improved by this more complicated specification. As we would expect, legalization moved across levels of government at about the same pace (tables are available from the first author). Note also that, in these data, nonprofit associations were coded as private firms, and hospitals were coded as public or private depending on ownership status as reported by the American Hospital Association (1983).

We approach the state's role in another way by examining interstate differences in adoption rates. Early tests of interstate effects showed, as we expected, that legalization was most rapid in California, where courts have been most critical of the traditional employment-at-will doctrine, followed by New Jersey and Virginia. But by far the greatest variation is between California and the other two states, here we focus on California as a uniquely uncertain and often hostile legal environment for employers and hypothesize that employers there had higher rates of adoption. Location in the public sector, federal contractor status, nonprofit status, and location in California are all measured using binary (0,1) variables.

We offer two hypotheses concerning the influence of employment-relations professionals. It is likely that organizations that have formal personnel offices and those that retain outside labor attorneys have been more likely than others to incorporate legalistic models of governance. The presence of personnel offices and linkages to labor attorneys are both indicated by binary (0,1) variables.

The last institutional hypotheses are concerned with temporal changes in federal EEO/AA policy. We have argued that federal pressure increased after 1972 and declined after 1980. To test this argument, we estimated time-period models specified in the following way:

$$\log r_p = \Phi \mathbf{x} + \Theta_p \quad (2)$$

Here the subscript p refers to one of three periods (1955–72, 1973–79, or 1980–85). We hypothesize that the rate of adoption for disciplinary hearings and both types of grievance procedures was higher in the middle period than before or after—to state it more formally, we hypothesize that $\Theta_1 < \Theta_2 > \Theta_3$.

In what follows, we use identical modeling strategies to report results on the three legalization measures. In each case, the first step in the analysis is to test rationalist arguments concerning internal structure and labor market conditions. In the second step, we add the measured covariates from the institutionalist model. Both of these models address population heterogeneity only, as specified in equation (1). The third step is to include time-dependence terms that track salient changes in the legal environment; these models are specified in the form of equation (2). This three-step modeling procedure allows us both to assess the relative contribution of institutionalist arguments and to observe shifts in specific coefficients as we add terms to the equation. We use only those spells for which there are no missing data on any of the variables of interest (about 88% of the total sample). Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for all independent variables are reported in appendix tables A1 and A2 for both the total and reduced samples. Those figures show

TABLE 1

MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ADOPTION OF DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

VARIABLE	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
<i>N</i> employees (log)	163*	075	081	075	100	077
Age in years (log)	004	096	— 044	091	— 032	091
ILM index	131**	054	036	056	006	057
Union contract	691**	277	677**	301	625*	307
Annual change, average wages	— 262	241	— 370*	240	344	293
Annual change, percentage female	— 241	317	— 014	284	— 115	307
Public sector			1 52***	290	1 64***	279
Federal contractor			377	272	313	274
Nonprofit association			546	331	704*	336
California			328	226	404*	228
Personnel office			335	269	312	269
Labor attorney on retainer			228	277	164	281
Time-independent constant	— 4 90***	475	— 5 11***	484	— 5 70***	534
Period effect, 1973–79					1 23***	319
Period effect, 1980–85					360	365
χ^2	23 64***		55 84***		70 27***	

NOTE — *N* = 4,258 spells, 88 transitions, in model 3, the constant for 1955–72 is constrained to equal zero

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

that the pattern of variation in the original sample is closely preserved after spells with missing data have been deleted

Results

Table 1 shows results from models predicting the adoption of disciplinary hearings. Coefficients in model 1 lend initial support to three hypotheses offered by rationalist theory. As predicted, larger organizations adopted disciplinary hearings at a significantly higher rate, as did those with well-developed ILMs and those with union contracts.⁷ Coefficients for age, wage growth, and the percentage female in the industrial labor force are not significant. Note that the direction of the wage-growth effect is negative, suggesting that, on average, legalization was more rapid in

⁷ Most of our hypotheses are directional, for these we use one-tailed *z*-tests to assess significance. The exceptions are hypotheses regarding age and unionization (in the case of disciplinary hearings), to which we apply two-tailed tests.

cheaper labor markets—the very opposite of what transaction-cost theory would predict

Model 2 shows that the inclusion of institutional covariates improves the fit of the model significantly ($P < .001$), despite the fact that only one coefficient—that for public agencies—is significant. As predicted, employers in the public sector were clearly and significantly more rapid adopters. While the coefficients for the other institutional variables are in the expected direction, only that for nonprofit associations even approaches significance. There are also interesting changes in coefficients associated with the rationalist variables. The wage coefficient grows about 40%, but remains insignificant and unexpectedly negative. More interesting, the coefficients for size and ILMs drop effectively to zero when we control for institutional effects. In trying to make sense of this shift, we initially suspected that size and complexity of ILMs are related to the establishment of personnel offices in ways that might obscure their individual effects on legalization. There are no methods for measuring such indirect effects within an event-history framework (Yamaguchi 1991), as an exploratory test we estimated an equation similar to that in model 2 but omitting the personnel variable. In these results the ILM coefficient is unchanged, suggesting that the effects of ILMs and personnel offices are independent, the size coefficient increases by about 40%, but does not approach its magnitude in model 1. We conclude that size is partially important because it increases the likelihood of having a personnel office. The growth of ILMs seems unrelated either to personnel offices or disciplinary hearings.⁸

Time-period effects are included in model 3. We treat the period 1955–72 as the reference category, its coefficient is constrained to equal zero, and we omit it from the table. The period coefficient for 1973–79 is positive and significant, indicating that baseline adoption rates (net of measured covariates) went up sharply between periods. The period coefficient for 1980–85 is essentially zero, indicating that, on average, adoption rates in that period dropped back to pre-1972 levels. This supports the argument that the more activist posture of EEO/AA law after 1972

⁸ On a related point, one reviewer has questioned our use of an ILM scale as a predictor on grounds that due-process governance is, in fact, an extension of internal labor markets—thus, perhaps, producing a spurious association that might obscure important causal effects. Indeed we suspect that both ILMs and grievance procedures are responses to change in EEO/AA law, but we are also convinced that executives recognize them as clearly different kinds of compliance strategies (see, e.g., Marino 1980). As a check on our assumptions we tested a full set of models that omitted the ILM variable and compared them to the ones in tables 1–3. Results were substantively identical, thus ruling out a suppressor effect. Tables showing supplementary tests of the personnel and ILM variables are available from the first author.

encouraged legalization and that, in the more conservative political climate after 1980, adoption rates declined. Controlling for time dependence in model 3 also changes some of the observed effects of substantive variables. First, the union coefficient drops a bit in magnitude, but remains significant. Second, the positive coefficients for nonprofit associations and location in California grow sharply larger (29% and 23%, respectively) and become significant. Third, the negative sign on the wage coefficient disappears. This is not a substantively important point since the coefficient in model 3 is still insignificant, but it enhances our confidence in the realism of these models. The initial result was surely an artifact of time dependence: across all industries in our data, inflation caused real wages to fall through most of the 1970s, precisely the time when disciplinary hearings diffused most rapidly; in models lacking time-period terms, the coincidence of rapid diffusion and inflation appeared as a negative effect of wages.

Models predicting the adoption of grievance procedures for nonunion, exempt employees appear in table 2. Four of the six coefficients for rationalist variables, shown in model 1, are significant. Larger organizations and those with more complex ILMs appear as more rapid adopters. Contrary to the findings for disciplinary hearings, unionized employers were significantly less receptive to grievance procedures of this sort. Again we observe an apparent negative effect of wage growth. The variables for age and percentage female show no effects. Tests of the institutional environment, displayed in model 2, show powerful effects of state action, location in the public sector, nonprofit status, and location in California all show anticipated positive (and significant) effects, but the effect of federal contracting appears to be zero. Influence of the personnel professions is strongly supported by coefficients showing that organizations with personnel offices and those that retained labor attorneys were significantly more rapid adopters. In model 2 the ILM coefficient is cut by nearly half, and the effect of size drops away entirely. As before, our supplementary tests show that part of the shift in the size effect (about 25%) is due to inclusion of the personnel office variable. Likelihood-ratio tests show that institutional effects contribute significantly to the model.

Addition of period effects in model 3 changes the picture in interesting ways. The ILM effect drops out, and the wage effect again becomes positive, but insignificant. Other effects are consistent with model 2, indeed the coefficients for unionization, location in the public sector, and nonprofit associations grow markedly stronger. The period effects themselves are a bit different from those in table 1. Both period coefficients are significant and positive, and, while the second coefficient shows that adoption rates decelerated about 20% after 1980, the difference does not appear to be statistically significant (using 95% confidence intervals,

TABLE 2

MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ADOPTION OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES FOR NONUNION, EXEMPT EMPLOYEES

VARIABLE	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
N employees (log)	230***	074	100	075	129	079
Age in years (log)	- 112	090	- 121	094	- 110	093
ILM index	230***	049	122*	056	057	058
Union contract	-1 04**	362	-1 26***	379	-1 48***	385
Annual change, average wages	- 576**	220	- 617**	227	215	277
Annual change, percentage female	097	306	- 027	301	- 138	321
Public sector			558*	296	1 00***	310
Federal contractor			- 086	256	- 153	258
Nonprofit association			850**	292	1 19***	303
California			552**	213	672***	216
Personnel office			481*	255	428*	254
Labor attorney on retainer			843***	246	847***	245
Time-independent constant	-4 93***	446	-4 90***	451	-5 86***	512
Period effect, 1973-79					1 56***	318
Period effect, 1980-85					1 25***	330
χ^2	56 24***		90 84***		117 89***	

NOTE — N = 4,644 spells, 97 transitions, in model 3, the constant for 1955-72 is constrained to equal zero

* P < .05

** P < .01

*** P < .001

the two estimates overlap) Thus the model gives additional support to the hypothesis that changes in EEO/AA law accelerated the pace of legalization, but support for the "Reagan effect" in this case is weaker

The last set of models, showing effects on adoption rates of grievance procedures for nonunion hourly employees, is displayed in table 3 In model 1, size and ILM complexity appear to significantly encourage legalization, nonunionized organizations were significantly more rapid adopters than those with union contracts Again wage increases show a counterhypothetical negative effect, and neither age nor percentage female shows any effect at all In model 2, several of the institutional variables show significant effects Nonprofit associations and California employers had significantly higher rates of adoption, but coefficients for location in the public sector and federal contracting are insignificant Formation of a personnel office and retaining a labor attorney both accelerated adoption rates to a significant degree In this intermediate specification, the ILM and unionization coefficients retain their significance, but the effect

TABLE 3

MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ADOPTION OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES FOR NONUNION, NONEXEMPT EMPLOYEES

VARIABLE	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
<i>N</i> employees (log)	226**	074	038	078	065	082
Age in years (log)	− 061	097	− 018	102	− 007	102
ILM index	231***	050	141**	058	065	060
Union contract	− 1 01**	365	− 1 36***	380	− 1 70***	392
Annual change, average wages	− 622**	220	− 579**	233	348	281
Annual change, percentage female	− 008	304	063	311	− 090	339
Public sector			232	324	685*	340
Federal contractor			112	256	067	258
Nonprofit association			1 31***	277	1 79***	298
California			416*	223	555**	226
Personnel office			738**	266	748**	266
Labor attorney on retainer			847***	250	778***	251
Time-independent constant	− 5 19***	451	− 5 25***	493	− 6 31***	555
Period effect, 1973–79					1 76***	324
Period effect, 1980–85					1 29***	351
χ^2	52 80***		95 76***		127 24***	

NOTE —*N* = 4,683 spells, 91 transitions, in model 3, the constant for 1955–72 is constrained to equal zero

* *P* < .05

** *P* < .01

*** *P* < .001

of size drops to zero, controlling for the effect of personnel offices alone accounts for most of this shift (about 68%)

Period effects operate like those in table 2 both coefficients are significant, and a likelihood-ratio test shows that model 3 fits the data significantly better than model 2. Again, adoption accelerated most rapidly from 1973 to 1979, adoption rates during this period were significantly higher than before, but the decelerative trend after 1980 is not statistically significant. Coefficients for substantive variables are only slightly changed. As in table 2, the ILM effect drops effectively to zero. The public-sector variable nearly triples in magnitude and becomes significant. Other institutional variables—once again with the exception of federal contracting—retain their positive effects in a fully specified model.

In summary, the most emphatic result of the analysis is that, for all outcomes, state pressure—indicated by public and nonprofit status, location in California, and period-specific policy shifts—appears strongly as-

sociated with the pace of legalization. Results also show differences across the three outcomes, mainly having to do with the mechanisms through which fuzzy government positions were translated into formal governance policies. Disciplinary hearings are associated with unionization but not with links to the human relations professions. Our reading suggests that disciplinary hearings have long been a standard feature of collective-bargaining agreements, we suspect that recent organizing efforts are at least partially responsible for their continued diffusion.⁹ By contrast, both types of grievance procedures are positively associated with links to the human relations professions and negatively associated with unions. We have three speculations about why the conservative shift in the 1980s shows strong effects on the adoption of disciplinary hearings and weaker (perhaps null) effects on both types of grievance procedures. First, since disciplinary hearings are associated with unionization, the decline in adoption rates after 1980 may be a by-product of the Reagan administration's attempts to weaken organized labor. Second, our data are right censored: the third period spans a relatively short five years, and it is possible that significant declines in adoption rates for both grievance procedures would appear if our observations were extended. Third, however, it is also possible that by 1980 the due-process model of governance was so well institutionalized in the nonunion workplace that it continued to spread at a rapid rate, independent of declining federal pressure.

DISCUSSION

Much previous theory, from Selznick's to that of the modern open- and closed-system rationalists, treats workplace legalization as arising mainly within organizations in response to internal pressures or demands of the task environment. We find almost no effects that support these arguments. In fully specified models, workplace size shows no significant effects. We find some evidence that size has an indirect effect on legalization via its association with personnel offices, but it is not an efficient cause. Unionization shows mixed and ambiguous effects—disciplinary hearings may be by-products of successful organizing efforts, but nonunion grievance procedures appear most frequently in nonunion organizations, whether as a partial substitute for union governance, a strategy for forestalling unions, or both is unclear. Organizational age, the exis-

⁹ Unions have had some of their greatest successes recently in attempts to organize employees in the public sector, and we initially interpreted table 1 as suggesting that disciplinary hearings have grown mainly from public-sector unionization. We tested this interpretation by estimating a model that contained an interaction term for unionized public employees. The interaction term showed no significant effect, suggesting that the effects of sector and unionization are independent.

tence of ILMs, and the shape of external labor markets are unimportant. If the invisible hand of rationality is driving the process of legalization, we find no evidence of it.

What we do find is that the adoption of due-process governance has been influenced by governmental attention to fairness in the workplace and by the employment-relations professions. First, rates of adoption of the mechanisms we study are highly time dependent—rates went up with expanded legal and political pressure in the 1970s and show some signs of having leveled off in the 1980s. Second, proximity to the state pushes adoption rates up: public agencies and nonprofit associations were more rapid adopters of all three due-process reforms. Third, adoption rates are higher among California employers, who operate under a legislative and judicial regime that has been more assertive of employees' membership rights. Fourth, organizations that are structurally linked to the wider national environment through the professions (personnel officers and labor attorneys) are more likely to create both kinds of grievance procedures examined here.

Federal contracting, one of our more direct indicators of linkage to the state, appears entirely unrelated to legalization. This underscores our earlier point that due-process mechanisms are not a direct result of federal regulatory pressure, but rather a symbolic response to diffuse and ambiguously perceived shifts in the legal environment. Here the observed role of the human relations professions in the adoption of grievance procedures becomes theoretically important: these findings extend, and tend to confirm, arguments by Edelman et al. (1992) that personnel professionals and labor attorneys play a crucial role in constructing the legal environment and prescribing governance policies designed to mitigate its threat.

We conclude by noting some implications of our findings. We can, obviously, make no real inferences about the effect of workplace legalization for substantive employee rights. Our findings suggest that legalization is not aimed inward, toward specific employee demands or organizational requirements, but outward at the shifting concerns of regulators and courts. Thus due-process rules are vulnerable to the logic of loose coupling (Weick 1976), and it is problematic whether substantive justice on the shop floor is systematically affected by the adoption of formal procedures (Gwartney-Gibbs and Lach 1991, 1993). Nonetheless, as Edelman observes (1992, p. 1541), research on the work force has shown significant improvements in the status of minorities and women over the past few decades. Whether this is at all due to more equitable governance, or whether governance policies themselves are by-products of more fundamental changes in the normative expectations of managers, employees, and more general publics, our study can provide no evidence

Nor do we want to overestimate the degree to which legality has become a dominant model of employee relations. Our evidence suggests that concepts of employee rights, citizenship, and due process have become powerful metaphors of governance among organizations in some societal sectors. It is tempting to suggest further that legalization may combine with other incorporative programs—for lifetime employment, career-development training, and the like—to give rise to a new employment-relations regime, one that is considerably different from the Weberian bureaucratic model. Such a strong statement would be premature at this point. We are mindful that some organizations—and by no means inconsequential ones—are moving in precisely the opposite direction, toward part-time work, subcontracting, homework, and out-sourcing to foreign labor markets (Pfeffer and Baron 1988). Ironically, these moves might also be responses to threats in the legal environment, albeit responses of avoidance rather than engagement. Future research should explore whether legalistic/inclusive and discretionary/exclusive policies form empirically distinct clusters across organizations, and, if so, where each tends to be most entrenched. Much will depend, it seems, on the assertiveness of the federal government in pursuing EEO/AA goals and, perhaps, also on institutional processes affecting labor regimes at the global level.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES,
FOR TOTAL AND REDUCED SAMPLES

VARIABLE	TOTAL SAMPLE			REDUCED SAMPLE		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
N employees (log)	6,560	4.85	1.61	5,929	4.82	1.61
Age in years (log)	6,701	3.38	1.18	5,929	3.31	1.15
ILM index	6,701	2.66	2.43	5,929	2.57	2.40
Union contract	6,515	196	397	5,929	205	404
Annual change, average wages	6,701	160	458	5,929	166	454
Annual change, percentage female	6,429	434	389	5,929	440	391
Public sector	6,701	293	455	5,929	225	418
Federal contractor	6,701	280	449	5,929	312	463
Nonprofit association	6,701	102	303	5,929	115	319
California	6,701	355	478	5,929	368	482
Personnel office	6,599	466	499	5,929	449	498
Labor attorney on retainer	6,450	256	436	5,929	251	433

TABLE A2
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable	Employees	Age	ILM Index	Union Contract	Annual Average Wages	Annual Change, Percentage Female	Public Sector	Federal Contractor	Nonprofit Association	California	Personnel Office	Labor Attorney on Retainer
<i>N</i> employees (log)	191	367	211	—	031	010	147	—	036	193	107	446
Age in years (log)	193	111	091	—	007	—	050	—	142	—	099	085
ILM index	385	097	179	—	074	—	068	—	074	019	181	465
Union contract	239	141	219	—	034	—	166	—	092	—	111	194
Annual change, average wages	—	040	019	—	044	—	145	—	033	041	015	070
Annual change, percentage female	016	—	041	—	076	—	163	—	139	—	019	—
Public sector	136	188	385	052	066	—	128	—	402	—	089	130
Federal contractor	—	018	—	116	—	051	080	—	023	—	112	042
Nonprofit association	210	005	034	—	040	—	114	—	035	—	048	089
California	112	—	093	216	112	002	091	120	110	112	077	104
Personnel office	461	088	469	212	—	057	—	029	122	067	112	387
Labor attorney on retainer	327	120	393	412	—	052	073	126	062	029	112	383

NOTE.—Diagonal upper half of table shows correlations using pairwise deletion of missing data (maximum $N = 6,701$), and diagonal lower half shows correlations using listwise deletion ($N = 5,929$)

REFERENCES

- Aldrich, Howard, Arne Kalleberg, Peter Marsden, and James Cassell 1988 "In Pursuit of Evidence Sampling Procedures for Locating New Businesses " *Journal of Business Venturing* 4 367-86
- American Hospital Association 1983 *Guide to the Health Care Field* Chicago American Hospital Association
- Baron, James N , Frank R Dobbin, and P Devereux Jennings 1986 "War and Peace The Evolution of Modern Personnel Administration in U S Industry " *American Journal of Sociology* 92 350-83
- Baron, James N , P Devereux Jennings, and Frank R Dobbin 1988 "Mission Control? The Development of Personnel Systems in U S Industry " *American Sociological Review* 53 497-514
- Blau, Peter M , Cecilia McHugh Falbe, William McKinley, and Phelps K Tracy 1976 "Technology and Organization in Manufacturing " *Administrative Science Quarterly* 21 20-40
- Blau, Peter M , and Richard A Schoenherr 1971 *The Structure of Organizations* New York Basic
- Curtis, Larry A , Richard J Simmons, and Dwight L Armstrong 1981 "Judicial Protection of Employment Rights " Mimeograph University of California at Los Angeles, Institute of Industrial Relations, Center for Management Research and Education
- Days, Drew S III 1984 "Turning Back the Clock The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights " *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review* 19 309-47
- DiMaggio, Paul J 1986 *Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts Studies in Mission and Constraint* New York Oxford University Press
- DiMaggio, Paul J , and Walter W Powell 1983 "The Iron Cage Revisited Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizations " *American Sociological Review* 48 147-60
- Dobbin, Frank R 1992 "The Origins of Private Social Insurance Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 1920-1950 " *American Journal of Sociology* 97 1416-50
- Dobbin, Frank R , Lauren Edelman, John W Meyer, W Richard Scott, and Ann Swidler 1988 "The Expansion of Due Process in Organizations " Pp 71-98 in *Institutional Patterns and Organizations Culture and Environment*, edited by Lynne G Zucker Cambridge, Mass Ballinger
- Dobbin, Frank R , John R Sutton, John W Meyer, and W Richard Scott 1993 "Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal Labor Markets " *American Journal of Sociology* 99 396-427
- Doeringer, Peter B , and Michael J Piore 1971 *Internal Labor Markets and the Manpower Analysis* Lexington, Mass Heath
- Dun and Bradstreet, Inc 1985 *Million Dollar Directory* New York Dun & Bradstreet
- Edelman, Lauren B 1990 "Legal Environments and Organizational Governance The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace " *American Journal of Sociology* 95 1401-40
- 1992 "Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law " *American Journal of Sociology* 97 1531-76
- Edelman, Lauren B , Steven E Abraham, and Howard S Erlanger 1992 "Professional Construction of Law The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge " *Law and Society Review* 26 47-84
- Edwards, Harry T 1973 "Sex Discrimination under Title VII Some Unresolved Issues " *Labor Law Journal* 24 411-23
- Edwards, Richard C 1979 *Contested Terrain* New York Basic

- Encyclopedia of Associations* 1985 Detroit Gale Research
- Ewing, David W 1982 "Due Process Will Business Default?" *Harvard Business Review* 60 (6) 114-22
- 1989 *Justice on the Job Resolving Grievances in the Nonunion Workplace* Boston Harvard Business School Press
- Froehlich, Herbert P, and Dennis A Hawver 1974 "Compliance Spinoff Better Personnel Systems" *Personnel* 51 (1) 62-68
- Garris, Steve, and Ann Black 1974 "Revising Personnel Management Procedures" *Personnel* 51 (6) 50-58
- Gery, Gloria J 1977 "Equal Opportunity—Planning and Managing the Process of Change" *Personnel Journal* 56 184-203
- Giblin, Edward J, and Oscar A Ornati 1974 "A Total Approach to EEO Compliance" *Personnel* 51 (5) 32-43
- Gordon, David M, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich 1982 *Segmented Work, Divided Workers* London Cambridge University Press
- Gwartney-Gibbs, Patricia A, and Denise H Lach 1991 "Workplace Dispute Resolution and Gender Inequality" *Negotiation Journal* 7 187-200
- 1993 "Gender Differences in Grievance Processing and Its Implications for Rethinking Shopfloor Practices" Pp 299-315 in *Women Workers and the Labor Movement Forging a New Partnership*, edited by Dorothy Sue Cobble Ithaca, N Y ILR Press
- Hamilton, Gary G, and John R Sutton 1989 "The Problem of Control in the Weak State Domination in the United States, 1880-1920" *Theory and Society* 18 1-46
- Hawkins, Michael W 1988 "Employment at Will A Survey" *Labor Law Journal* 39 525-27
- Hellam, Charlotte B 1973 "Legal Tools to Fight Sex Discrimination" *Labor Law Journal* 24 803-9
- Higgins, James M 1976 "A Manager's Guide to Equal Employment Opportunity Laws" *Personnel Journal* 55 406-18
- Hodson, Randy 1978 "Labor in the Monopoly, Competitive, and State Sectors of Production" *Politics and Society* 8 429-80
- Jensen, Michael L 1988 "Developments in California Wrongful Discharge Law" *Industrial Relations Law Journal* 10 27-39
- Kalleberg, Arne L, Peter V Marsden, Howard E Aldrich, and James W Cassell 1990 "Comparing Organizational Sampling Frames" *Administrative Science Quarterly* 35 658-88
- Lempert, Richard, and Joseph Sanders 1986 *An Invitation to Law and Social Science* New York Longman
- Lincoln, James R, and Arne L Kalleberg 1985 "Work Organizations and Work-Force Commitment A Study of Plants and Employees in the United States and Japan" *American Sociological Review* 50 738-60
- Linenberger, Patricia, and Timothy J Keaveny 1981 "Sexual Harassment The Employer's Legal Obligations" *Personnel* 58 (6) 60-68
- Maltby, Lewis L 1990 "The Decline of Employment at Will—a Quantitative Analysis" *Labor Law Journal* 41 51-54
- Marino, Kenneth E 1980 "Conducting an Internal Compliance Review of Affirmative Action" *Personnel* 57 (2) 24-34
- McCabe, Douglas M 1988 *Corporate Nonunion Complaint Procedures and Systems* New York Praeger
- Meyer, John W, and W Richard Scott 1983 *Organizational Environments* Newbury Park, Calif Sage
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and James N Baron 1988 "Taking the Workers Back Out Recent Trends in the Structuring of Employment" Pp 257-303 in *Research in Organiza-*

- tional Behavior*, vol 10 Edited by Barry Staw and L L Cummings Greenwich, Conn JAI Press
- Pugh, D S , D J Hickson, and C R Hinings 1969 "An Empirical Taxonomy of Structures of Work Organizations " *Administrative Science Quarterly* 14 115-26
- Schlichter, Sumner S (1919) 1961 *Potentials of the American Economy Selected Essays of Sumner S Schlichter* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Selznick, Philip 1969 *Law, Society, and Industrial Justice* New York Russell Sage Foundation
- Skowronek, Stephen 1982 *Building a New American State The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920* New York Cambridge University Press
- Soutar, Douglas 1981 "Preempting Governmental Regulation of the Work Place through Self-Enlightened Policy Planning " *Employee Relations Law Journal* 7 67-76
- Staudohar, Paul D 1981 "Exhaustion of Remedies in Private Industry Grievance Procedures " *Employee Relations Law Journal* 7 454-65
- Stinchcombe, Arthur L 1965 "Social Structure and Organizations " Pp 142-93 in *Handbook of Organizations*, edited by James G March Chicago Rand-McNally
- Tolbert, Charles, Patrick M Horan, and E M Beck 1980 "The Structure of Economic Segmentation A Dual Economy Approach " *American Journal of Sociology* 85 1095-1116
- Tuma, Nancy B 1979 *Invoking RATE* Palo Alto, Calif DMA Corp
- U S Bureau of the Census 1986 *The National Income and Products Accounts of the U S , 1929-82* Washington, D C Government Printing Office
- U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 1975-87 *Handbook of Labor Statistics* Washington, D C Government Printing Office
- Vollmer, Howard W , and Patrick J McGillivray 1960 "Personnel Offices and the Institutionalization of Employee Rights " *Pacific Sociological Review* 3 29-34
- Weick, Karl 1976 "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems " *Administrative Science Quarterly* 21 1-19
- Williamson, Oliver E 1985 *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* New York Free Press
- 1986 *Economic Organization* New York New York University Press
- Wuthnow, Robert 1991 *Between States and Markets The Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Yamaguchi, Kazuo 1991 *Event History Analysis* Newbury Park, Calif Sage
- Youngblood, Stuart A , and Gary L Tidwell 1981 "Termination at Will Some Changes in the Wind " *Personnel* 58 (3) 22-33

Early Parental Work, Family Social Capital, and Early Childhood Outcomes¹

Toby L. Parcel and Elizabeth G. Menaghan
Ohio State University

This article evaluates the impact of parental working conditions on both a cognitive child outcome and a social one among a national sample of three- to six-year-old children with employed mothers. Current maternal working conditions (i.e., a mother's working conditions at the time of the study) affect verbal facility, but paternal work hours in the early years have significant effects on children's behavior problems. Mothers' current occupational complexity interacts with her resources and employment characteristics to influence both cognitive and social outcomes. The conclusion is that adequate parental resources contribute to the forms of family social capital useful in facilitating positive child outcomes, but that conclusions regarding negative effects of maternal work in the child's first year have been overgeneralized.

The relative risks and advantages of maternal employment for children have been examined with increasingly elaborate models for studying the multiple sources of influence on children such as parental characteristics, family configuration, and the larger community and cultural environments. Evidence has usually suggested that maternal employment has minimal positive or negative effects on children (Hoffman 1989), but concern persists. Coleman (1988, 1990) worries that maternal employment outside the home will, by weakening the social capital inherent in

¹ Earlier summaries of these findings were presented at a poster session at the 1991 meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development in April 1991 in Seattle, and at the 1991 spring meetings of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee 28 (Stratification) in June in Prague. The research reported here was supported in part by the Center for Human Resource Research and by grants R01 HD23467 and R01 HD26047 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. We thank Stacy Rogers and Laura Geschwender for research assistance. Address correspondence to Toby L. Parcel, Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1353.

the parent-child relationship that encourages children's identification with parental goals and values, hinder children's future socioeconomic attainment. He also argues that such employment decreases the total availability of social capital that inheres in the relations among neighbors, so as to reduce the collective investment in promoting children's welfare. Psychologists and policy analysts raise similar and related concerns (Belsky 1984, 1988, 1990, Belsky and Eggebeen 1991*a*, 1991*b*, Scarr 1991, Vandell and Corasaniti 1991, McCartney and Rosenthal 1991, Ferber and O'Farrell 1991).

We argue that the relationship between maternal employment and child outcomes involves several issues, each of which needs to be examined empirically. One unresolved, key issue is the timing of the effects of maternal employment on child outcomes such as cognitive ability and social adjustment. Although some psychologists focus particular attention on the first year of life as causative for subsequent child outcomes, current circumstances in children's lives are also likely to influence measurable child outcomes. It is unclear which set of influences is stronger. Also, if effects from the first year persist several years later, are they maintained when current circumstances are also considered? Similarly, are contemporaneous effects maintained when earlier circumstances are controlled? Although there are sound theoretical reasons to focus on the first year of the child's life as a critical period in the socialization process, it is not obvious that this year is more important than the second or third years. Hence, we investigate alternative operationalizations of what "early" influences on children represent.

A second issue concerns the causal agents in the complex set of processes surrounding maternal employment and child outcomes. We review arguments suggesting the relevance of several causal constructs, highlight the working conditions of both parents which, we hypothesize, affect child outcomes, and investigate the role of nonmaternal care. Implicit in many studies is the assumption that, owing to the steep rise in women's labor force participation over the past 30 years, causal mechanisms affecting child outcomes involve the employment patterns of the children's mothers. The influence of paternal employment has been relatively neglected. We therefore evaluate the influence of the working conditions of both mother and father on child outcomes because both may influence child-rearing values and behaviors. We also investigate whether it is parental working conditions during the first year or years of life or at the time of assessment that have the greater impact and examine the relative impacts of maternal and paternal working conditions. We study both cognitive outcomes and social outcomes for three- to six-year-old children with currently employed mothers.

How Important Are "Early" Influences on Child Outcomes?

Several arguments contribute to the thinking about the effect of parental employment during the period from the birth of the child through its third year (hereafter referred to as early parental employment) on later child outcomes. At the macrolevel, policy analysts such as Kamerman (1991) and Ferber and O'Farrell (1991) suggest that parental leave policies in a large number of industrialized countries encourage direct parental care of children, usually by mothers, during infancy. The rationale for these policies might be that such care is optimal for children, although parental care is also less directly costly for society. In partial contrast, it has been argued in feminist and structural analyses that the lack of widely available child care for infants is costly to women since it constrains women's work choices after motherhood and may lead to role overload (Moen 1989, Aldous and Dumon 1991). Such analyses implicitly assume that quality child care could substitute for parental care during the parents' hours of employment and that there are significant costs to women from the lack of quality child care. General views of child development stress the importance of early influences on later development, with the explicit assumption that such influences establish long-term patterns.² Coleman's (1988, 1990) notions of investment in family social capital are also tied more generally to the idea that investments at one point in time pay later dividends. We therefore evaluate whether early parental working conditions influence later developmental outcomes.

Research examining effects on children of mothers' employment during their children's first few years has obvious social policy implications. If negative effects of higher levels of maternal employment are observed, such effects could be prevented by improving the availability and quality of child care for young children or by discouraging mothers from seeking employment. Relevant social policies might include supports for extended maternal leaves, or more punitively, reductions in the supply of child care for the very young and sanctions against mothers who seek employment. Alternatively, if additional research established that higher levels of maternal employment during the children's early years had no significant negative or even positive consequences, the policy implications would differ. Under this scenario, policies promoting maternal employment

² For example, Jay Belsky has argued that maternal employment during the child's first year of life may interfere with the establishment of appropriate attachment between the mother and the child (e.g., Belsky and Rovine 1988). He infers that insecurely and securely attached infants should differ on developmental outcomes as they mature, although the evidence of difference is stronger for social outcomes (Matas, Arend, and Sroufe 1978, Lutkenhaus, Grossman, and Grossman 1985, LaFreniere and Sroufe 1985) than for cognitive outcomes (but see Vandell and Corasaniti 1991). Our analysis does not rely on the construct of attachment.

would merit support, while policies discouraging such employment would merit reconsideration. Such research can help to specify the conditions under which maternal employment may be beneficial, neutral, or detrimental.

Desai, Chase-Lansdale, and Michael (1989) argue that the effects of maternal employment in the first year on preschool cognitive outcomes vary according to child gender and the amount of income from other family members. We provide additional evidence regarding the interaction of employment effects with mothers' and children's statuses to affect both cognitive and social child outcomes. We are especially interested in whether early maternal employment interacts with current maternal working conditions in affecting these outcomes.

Parent-child relationships may change over time, in part as a function of changes in the lives of parents, particularly during early adulthood, the "floundering phase of the life course" (Namboodiri 1987). Adults in these years are apt to experience periods of unemployment or underemployment and to change employers and working conditions. Even welcome changes in working conditions, such as promotions, may require adaptations that affect familial interaction. The early adult years are also characterized by changes in family configuration, including marital dissolution or the birth of additional children. Marital separation or dissolution alters the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent and interferes with the attachment and behavioral patterns that had been established prior to separation. Studies of children who have experienced loss of paternal contact as a function of marital dissolution suggest that broken attachments may be associated with increased social maladjustment (Demo and Acock 1991, Furstenberg and Nord 1985), with possible implications for cognitive or academic difficulties (Demo and Acock 1991, Radin 1981). These changes inevitably alter the custodial parent's relationship with the child and challenge his or her resources to perform both the instrumental and affective roles that had been previously shared with a spouse. Such circumstances are unlikely to enhance the developmental chances of children, regardless of the nature of the early parental inputs. Finally, birth of additional siblings also poses adaptive challenges, even for children with normal developmental trajectories. These arguments point to conditions other than maternal employment that may affect children's behavior patterns and internal states early in life, with attendant implications for measurable child outcomes several years later.

Why Should Occupation Matter?

Following personality and social structure frameworks developed by Kohn and his colleagues (Kohn 1977, Kohn and Schooler 1982, Kohn,

Slomczynski, and Schoenbach 1986, Miller et al 1979, Schooler 1987, Kohn and Slomczynski 1990), we argue that the working conditions parents experience on the job influence their child-rearing values and provide a model of the kinds of behaviors they encourage in their children. Parents may frequently encourage the styles of behavior that are rewarded in their own lines of work. For Kohn, parental occupational complexity and opportunities for self-direction and autonomy on the job are the critical dimensions of parental working conditions that influence these child-rearing values and behaviors. Parents in high-complexity occupations place less emphasis on direct parental control, opting instead to promote children's internalization of parental norms (see Schooler [1987] for especially well-developed arguments regarding the implications of occupational complexity). When internalization is successful, children use these internal standards to monitor their own behavior, reducing the frequency of "acting-out" behavior and the necessity for parents to impose external control. Parents in high-complexity occupations appear less restrictive toward children, display greater involvement with them and greater warmth in interaction, and report less use of physical punishment (Luster, Rhoads, and Haas 1989). These parents also promote internalization of parental norms by stressing general principles of behavior that the child can use to guide his or her behavior in specific situations, including during parental absence. Conditions of work at the opposing ends of the implied continua—work that is routinized, low in autonomy, heavy in supervision, and low in substantive complexity—erode adult intellectual flexibility, thus also limiting a critical aspect of the child's intellectual environment. Studies also show a positive association between parental warmth and child cognition, owing to positive associations with children's competence and confidence (Estrada et al 1987), motivations (Radin 1971), and attitudes toward school (Steinberg, Elmen, and Mounts 1989).

Variation in parental work hours may also affect child outcomes. Psychologists are concerned with the duration of time that mothers spend with their children during infancy because mothers who return to work spend less time with their infants than mothers who remain at home. Following this argument, it is logical that, for mothers who work outside the home during their child's first years, the duration of their work effort may make a difference. Mothers who work long hours during their child's first year may be placing their children at greater risk for social maladjustment and cognitive delay than mothers who work shorter hours. Indeed, we (Parcel and Menaghan 1990) have demonstrated a nonlinear effect of contemporaneous maternal work hours on verbal facility among three- to six-year-olds, such that, compared to children of mothers who work 35–40 hours, children with mothers who typically work 21–35

hours score significantly better, and children of mothers who routinely work overtime hours score significantly worse. However, we found no statistically significant difference between children of mothers who work full time and those of mothers who work less than 21 hours. In our analysis here, we consider whether variation in the duration of maternal work hours in the child's first year or years, as opposed to the mother's either working or not working during these years, influences later child outcomes.

Parental earnings typically provide the economic foundation for family welfare. Lower levels of earnings threaten the household's material base and often cause parental distress that may hamper constructive parent-child interaction (Siegal 1984, Elder, van Nguyen, and Caspi 1985, Kessler, Turner, and House 1988, McLoyd 1989, 1990, Mirowsky and Ross 1986). This may be particularly true for offspring of young parents whose wage levels may be especially low. Increased levels of parental distress and limited material resources may hinder the child's social adjustment and limit cognitive development.

The Relative Impact of Maternal versus Paternal Characteristics

Thus far we have referred to arguments regarding the effects of *maternal* employment on children, and to literature interpreted to suggest how *parental* characteristics and work can affect children. We hypothesize that both mothers and fathers influence child outcomes. Researchers typically view relationships between *mothers* and children as critical for subsequent development because the mother is generally the child's primary caretaker during the child's first year. Such arguments support the notion that maternal characteristics and working conditions may affect child outcomes. However, other arguments suggest that fathers are also important to the child's welfare (McLanahan and Booth 1989, Radin 1981). In particular, the father's occupational conditions influence his child-rearing values, and in the absence of maternal employment, set the tone for both parents' expectations of children's behavior.

Although mothers provide more direct physical care of children than do fathers, regardless of maternal employment status, fathers who have employed wives may provide increased amounts of care compared with those in households in which only the father is employed. Under these conditions, paternal characteristics and working conditions may be all the more important. Paternal values and behavior patterns are surely involved in the child's socialization process, not only through mechanisms such as child's observation and imitation, but also through the norms and expectations that father-child interaction will convey. We expect that paternal employment will have positive effects on children,

both because it is normatively expected and because of its positive effect on the household's material base, conversely, paternal unemployment or underemployment will have adverse consequences

Additional Influences on Child Outcomes

To provide a conservative test of our arguments, we introduce additional controls. We control for the child's gender because of evidence that young boys lag behind young girls in development of verbal facility and because there is also gender differentiation in the patterns of behavior problems. Low birth weight may place children at risk for both compromised social and cognitive development. Similarly, children with health problems may not be able to take full advantage of normal social and intellectual opportunities that facilitate cognitive and social development. These children's characteristics are also associated with parental, particularly maternal, employment decisions. When studying cognition, we also control for interviewer's perception of the child's shyness at the time of the interview. Such perceptions may be an indication of the child's anxiety during cognitive testing and that could interfere with test performance.

We control for maternal cognitive skills and the level of educational attainment of each parent in order to capture elements of parental cognitive ability and approximate the level of the cognitive environment they are likely to provide for their child. Following known associations between standardized test scores and race (Gargile and Woods 1988, Zigler, Abelson, and Seitz 1973), we control for maternal race and indicators of maternal class and family background. We also control for parental ages on the assumption that older parents more effectively encourage cognitive stimulation and internalization of appropriate social standards than younger parents. We expect mothers with higher levels of self-esteem and a stronger internal locus of control have children with lower levels of behavior problems and stronger cognitive outcomes.

Our three final controls include marital status, sibling size, and home environment. We expect that being married and being stably married over time will promote positive development relative to being unmarried or being unstably married. We also expect that the presence of greater numbers of children in the family will be associated with less favorable child outcomes (see Blake [1989] on resource dilution). We also expect that stronger home environments promote stronger cognitive performance and lower levels of behavior problems (Bradley et al. 1988, Moore and Snyder 1991, Parcel and Menaghan 1993, Rogers, Parcel, and Menaghan 1991).

Figure 1 summarizes these arguments in schematic form by subsuming these characteristics under five more general constructs: parental working

Early Childhood Outcomes




FIG 1 —Schematic diagram of the effects of major constructs on child outcomes

conditions, family characteristics, parent and child characteristics, and, following the arguments above regarding the need for child care in dual earner families, characteristics of child-care environments. For ease in presentation, this figure does not show a time differentiation in relevant parental characteristics or family structure. Our specific empirical strategy, however, does invoke time-specific variables. We investigate the effects of parental working conditions at two early points in time and a later one on two child outcomes, one social and one cognitive, in the presence of numerous background controls. This strategy allows us to “cast a broad net” around the problem of early effects on later child outcomes without assuming that such effects are solely confined to one type of child outcome. It also allows us to compare the strength of any early effects with comparable effects measured at a second time point. Finally, it allows us to determine whether maternal and paternal effects are similar or different.

To pursue our emphasis on the effects of maternal working conditions,

we select a sample of children with mothers who were employed at the time of assessment. We measure variation in their working conditions, and in the working conditions of their spouses, if these mothers are married. We then follow this sample back in time to capture any variation in early maternal working conditions, allowing for the fact that some mothers were not employed during this time in their children's lives. We allow marital status to vary and we tap the variation in paternal working conditions during this same period. Our models first control for the preexisting background characteristics of mothers and children that are known to influence child outcomes and then evaluate the impact of parental working conditions early in the child's life. We also include contemporaneous parental working conditions, along with measures of temporally subsequent characteristics of family structure. Additional analyses indicate if child-care environments influence child outcomes, net of the remaining predictors.

Table 1 compares the theoretical and design features of our study (col 6, "Parcel and Menaghan, 1994") with five others that also use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) child-mother data to investigate the effects of early maternal employment on child outcomes (For a description of this study, see "Sample and Methods," below.) We see that our study is the only one to evaluate the effects of paternal working conditions on child outcomes empirically and to use a comprehensive framework to explain how variation in several parental working conditions influences child outcomes. Vandell and Ramanan's (1992) study duplicates several of our additional features including assessment of both cognitive and social outcomes, controls for children's home environments, and measurements of both early and current maternal work. However, they use a very restricted sample of children and, as do the remaining studies, fail to consider paternal work or develop a comprehensive framework regarding parental work and child outcomes. None of these studies is framed in terms of family social capital. In addition, findings among studies conflict. Baydar and Brooks-Gunn (1991) report that maternal employment in the child's first year of life negatively affects both cognitive and social outcomes, while Vandell and Ramanan (1992) report that math achievement is a positive function of early maternal employment and reading achievement is a positive function of current maternal employment. Belsky and Eggebeen (1991a) claim negative effects of early maternal employment on compliance, while Desai et al (1989) show that negative effects of early maternal employment are confined to boys who belong to families that have a high income from other family members, and Blau and Grossberg (1990) report that the net effects on verbal facility of maternal employment during the child's first three or four years are close to zero.

SAMPLE AND METHODS

Data

We use the 1986 mother and child supplements to the NLSY. In 1979, the NLSY began following approximately 12,000 youths between the ages of 14 and 21, with annual interviews concerning their educational, occupational, marital, and fertility experiences. By 1986 more than one-half of the NLSY women had become mothers, age-appropriate developmental assessments of both cognitive and social outcomes were completed on these children in 1986 and repeated in 1988 and 1990. We use data from 1986 since all children age three years and older were administered a measure of cognition used that year, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (revised) (PPVT-R). The PPVT-R has been shown to have high reliability and validity (Dunn and Dunn 1981, Baker and Mott 1989).

We use two related samples in this study. First, we select mothers whose children were three–six years old in 1986, who were employed at the time of the assessment, and whose children lived with them. In doing so we build on earlier work where we demonstrated that contemporaneous maternal working conditions influence PPVT-R scores in this age group (Parcel and Menaghan 1990). Using the same sample allows us to provide a more rigorous test of these findings by controlling for early influences and to compare the strength of the early influences with simultaneous controls for the contemporaneous effects. Truncating the sample at six years excludes older children who, in this sample, were necessarily born to very young mothers and who are therefore atypical of children of the same age. For children older than six years, the first years of their lives occurred prior to the initial NLSY interviewing year. Even with this age restriction, our sample represents children who are early or on-time births. We excluded a few additional children with extremely low birth weights (less than 1,500 grams) who might therefore be at high risk for delayed development. When more than one child per mother was in the three- to six-year-old age group, we selected the younger child to avoid overrepresenting mothers with high fertility. These criteria resulted in a sample of 768 employed mothers with young children, and it is this group for whom we study the cognitive outcome, the children's PPVT-R scores.

Our second sample is identical to the first, except that we omit the three year olds because our social outcome measure of maternal perceptions of children's behavior problems is not assessed for children younger than four years old, this resulting sample is 526 employed mothers with four- to six-year old children. All analyses use weighted data to correct for the initial oversampling of minority and low-income youth in the sampling frame. The multivariate analyses use mean substitution for missing data.

TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF DESIGNS ACROSS SEVERAL STUDIES

Study Attributes	Desai et al (1989)	Blau and Grossberg (1990)	Belsky and Eggebeen (1991a)	Baydar and Brooks-Gunn (1991)	Vandell and Ramanan (1992)	Parcel and Menaghan (1994)
Sample*	503 4-year-olds	874 3-4-year-olds	565 4-6-year-olds	572 3-4-year-olds (cognitive), 283 white 4-year-olds (social)	189 low-income second graders	768 3-6-year-olds (cognitive), 526 4-6-year-olds (social)
Both cognitive and social outcomes studied	PPVT-R only	PPVT-R only	Behavior problems only	PPVT-R and BPI	PIAT and BPI	PPVT-R and BPI

Alternative measures of "early" maternal work	Limited	Yes	Years 1-3	Years 1-3	Yes	Yes
	Continuous/ intermit- tent	Proportion and weeks worked at several points	Early only (full- time/part- time/none)	Through year 3, continuity, and intensity	Yes	Yes
Measures paternal working conditions	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
	Considers employ- ment conditions theoretically related to child outcomes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls for HOME	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

NOTE — PPVT-R = Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (revised), BPI = Behavior Problems Index, PIAT = Peabody Individual Achievement Test
 * All samples are drawn from the NLSY mother-child data

Mothers who have postponed childbearing in order to pursue further schooling or employment instead of parenthood have no opportunity to be in this sample in 1986. Of course, many of these women will eventually become mothers, but the sample mothers we study are likely to be lower in social status and in such associated characteristics as schooling level, occupational status, and mental ability. We will comment on these facts again in discussing our findings. In keeping with our arguments about how parental working conditions influence child outcomes, we select children whose mothers were employed in 1986 and use dummy variables to tap variation in maternal employment during the child's first three years. After presenting our central findings, we briefly evaluate whether key models differ, depending on whether the children's mothers were or were not employed in 1986.

Measurement of Variables

Table 2 summarizes the operationalizations of variables used in the analysis. We note additional details here.

Dependent variables —The PPVT-R measures a child's receptive or aural vocabulary of standard American English. The interviewer says a word, and the child points to one of four pictures that best matches the meaning of that word. The test becomes progressively more difficult as the child proceeds through it. The test has high split half and test-retest reliability (Dunn and Dunn 1981), high concurrent validity with broader measures such as the Stanford-Binet and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), and significant associations with standardized measures of reading comprehension, mathematics, and later school achievement (Baker and Mott 1989). Limitations of the test include the likelihood that the test underestimates verbal facility among minority children and among disadvantaged children (Lee, Brooks-Gunn, and Schnur 1988). Since minority children may approach the interviewing situation with more fear and anxiety than nonminority children, the PPVT-R was scheduled near the end of the assessment. In addition, raw scores greater than four standard deviations below the age-standardized mean were considered invalid and treated as missing. Controlling for the interviewer's assessment of the child's initial shyness and anxiety may also help mitigate this disadvantage.

Nicholas Zill and James Peterson (see Zill 1988) selected their items to tap children's behavior problems primarily from the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) developed by Achenbach and Edelbrock (1981, 1983) and derived additional items from Rutter (1970), Graham and Rutter (1968), and Kellam et al. (1975). These items represent behavior problems that are relatively common in children, for example, anxious-distractible

TABLE 2
INVENTORY OF VARIABLES

Variable	Description
PPVT-R	This represents the age-standardized score on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (rev), which taps receptive or hearing vocabulary of standard American English
Behavior Problems Index 1986	This consists of a 26-item factor-based scale tapping mothers' reports of child behavior problems, $\alpha = .88$
Hourly wages	This is the typical wage level, standardized to 1986 dollars, that each parent was paid in the child's first year of life, averaged across the first three years of life, and in 1986
Occupational complexity	This is a 19-item-based scale with an α of .94 derived from data in the <i>Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)</i> , matched to 1970 U S census detailed occupational codes (see also Parcel 1989) Items include complexity of working for people and data, measures of education and training levels required to perform work, and direction, control, and planning of activities
Usual work hours	We dummied typical hours of work, for mothers, we distinguish low part-time hours (1–20), high part-time hours (21–34), full-time hours (35–40), and overtime hours (41 or more) For fathers, we distinguish part-time hours (less than 35), full-time hours (35–40), and overtime hours (41 or more) Work hours were measured for the first year of life, averaged across the first three years of life, and in 1986
Marital status	These are dummy variables coded "1" if the mother was married in the first year of the child's life and in 1986 A set of dummies tap whether the mother was stably married in the child's first three years of life, whether she was unstably married, or whether she remained unmarried (the reference category)
Siblings	Continuous variables tap the child's number of older siblings during the first year of life and the number of younger siblings in 1986 A dummy variable taps whether additional children were born to the mother during the child's first three years of life

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Variable	Description
Home	This is a factor-based scale that measures the quality of the child's home environment in 1986 derived from a subset of items from age-appropriate scales developed by Bradley and Caldwell (1977, Bradley, Caldwell, and Elardo 1979). Separate factor analyses of items for two age groups (preschool and elementary age children) yielded three factors in common: extent of cognitive stimulation, quality of physical environment, and warmth of maternal response to the child. Scales were standardized within age groups and then combined to create a common measure of home environment, $\alpha = .71$.
Maternal race/ethnicity	These are dummy variables differentiating black, Mexican Hispanic, other Hispanic, and white.
Maternal and paternal ages and schooling	Each aspect is measured in years for child's first year of life, at the child's third year of life, and in 1986.
Maternal cognitive skills	This concept is measured by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), 1980. The AFQT sums scores on four subtests tapping arithmetic reasoning, numeric operations, word knowledge, and paragraph comprehension.
Maternal self-esteem	This is a 10-item Rosenberg self-esteem scale measured of all NLSY respondents in 1980, $\alpha = .85$.
Maternal internal locus of control	Assessed in 1979. We summed four standardized responses to items from Rotter's Locus of Control Scale. Cronbach's α is .38, as is reliability of complete Rotter scale, suggesting that items tap several dimensions of control.
Two parents at age 14	This is coded "1" if mother lived in a two-parent family at age 14.
Child's maternal grandmother's schooling	This is measured in years.
Child gender	This is coded "1" if child is a male.
Child health problems	This is coded "1" if mother reports limitation in school, sports, or play activities.
Shy/anxious	These are Z score transformations of a five-point scale in which higher values represent interviewer assessment of child as more shy/anxious at the start of the NLSY child interview.
Low birthweight	This is a dummy variable coded "1" if the child's birthweight was below 5.5 pounds.

behavior, "acting-out" or aggressive behavior, or depressed-withdrawn behavior, not serious behavioral pathologies. Items tapping both under-control and overcontrol are also included. The items have good test-retest reliability and discriminant validity. Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell (1987) argue that parental reports of children's behavior problems are consistent with the reports of other informants such as teachers and mental health professionals, thus suggesting that our measure is unlikely to deviate widely from professionals' evaluations. In addition, the mother's perceptions affect her behavior toward the child and are therefore of theoretical interest in their own right.

Parental working conditions —Parental occupational characteristics are measured at two key time points: early in the child's life and at the time of assessment in 1986.³ We use two alternative operationalizations to capture the effect of early parental working conditions: measures referring only to parental occupations during the child's first year and summary measures that capture typical parental working conditions during the child's first three years. Because we measure occupational complexity as opposed to job complexity and because occupations are aggregations of jobs that may vary in work characteristics, our measure probably contains more error than direct measures of job complexity or other associated characteristics such as Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores, schooling, and hours worked. This will potentially depress its explanatory power relative to these variables that are measured better.

We dummied typical hours of work to permit detection of nonlinear relationships between work hours and the dependent variables. Mothers with no employment during year 1 or the first three years receive missing values for all work-hours dummies for that period; if fathers are absent at any time during this interval, they receive missing values for all work-hours dummies when absent. Thus, work-hours variables capture variations in work hours among employed parents.

It is important to note that maternal resources (internal locus of control, self-esteem, and AFQT score) were measured in the initial survey years (1979 and 1980), while work and family conditions were generally measured subsequent to that time period. Thus we can be confident

³ Frank L. Mott has argued in a personal communication (1993) that most of the spouses of the mothers in the NLSY sample are the fathers of the children that we are studying. Even in the cases where these spouses are stepfathers, they still contribute to the socialization environment of the child. In those cases where the children have both biological fathers and stepfathers, the data do not permit us to ascertain the working conditions of the biological fathers, since they are not living with the mothers.

that parental working conditions are temporally subsequent to maternal resources ⁴

FINDINGS

Descriptive Findings

Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations for the variables included in the analysis. The mean of the PPVT-R score falls below national norms of 100, which is likely a function of the sample restrictions to early and on-time births. Average levels of parental occupational complexity appear unchanged over the interval. Negative levels of complexity suggest that mean complexity levels are below average across all occupations. About 67% of the mothers were employed during the child's first year, and 90% had some employment during the child's first three years. Bivariate correlations, also shown in table 3, are generally in the expected directions. Wages and occupational complexity for both parents are positively associated with PPVT-R. The scattered associations with the Behavior Problems Index (BPI) are mostly negative, that is, better parental jobs are associated with lower levels of behavior problems. In addition, maternal employment status in year 1 and in years 1–3 has near-zero associations with child outcomes.

Multivariate Models Analytic Strategy

For both cognitive and social outcomes, we estimated multivariate models including both early and current work and family conditions, as well as controls. As tables 4 and 5 show, we utilize two alternative specifications of early conditions: conditions in year 1 only (cols 1–3) and conditions during the child's first three years (cols 4–6). We also evaluate whether the effects of the mothers' current work hours, prior work histories, and background characteristics differ depending on the complexity of the mothers' current occupations. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we reestimate our models controlling for patterns of early child care. Finally, we include in our models mothers who are not currently employed in order to establish whether the effects of early work patterns differ depending on mothers' current employment status.

⁴ Because these measures were not repeated between 1980 and 1986, we cannot evaluate whether the influence of parental working conditions on child outcomes operates indirectly through changed parental internal states, or directly, as in our specifications. This is a worthy hypothesis for future research.

TABLE 3

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

Variable	Mean	SD	Correlation with PPVT-R	Correlation with BPI
PPVT-R 1986	94.66	17.29		
BPI 1986	— 80	11.47		
Maternal work characteristics, year 1				
Occupational complexity	— 4.13	9.08	11*	— 10
Wage	5.55	2.69	13*	— 08
No work hours	32	47	— 04	— 00
Work hours				
1–20	20	40	13*	— 07
21–34	24	43	— 05	06
35–40	47	50	— 09	— 00
Over 40	09	29	— 02	01
Maternal work characteristics, years 1–3				
Occupational complexity	— 4.58	8.11	17*	— 11*
Wage	5.49	2.73	16*	— 08
No work hours	10	30	01	— 03
Work hours				
1–20	14	35	03	01
21–34	33	47	— 01	04
35–40	39	49	— 02	— 05
Over 40	14	34	01	01
Maternal work characteristics, 1986				
Occupational complexity	— 5.55	11.19	14*	— 06
Wage	5.70	2.96	16*	— 11*
Work hours				
1–20	15	36	06	02
21–34	18	39	11*	— 07
35–40	56	50	— 10*	05
Over 40	11	31	— 04	— 02
Spouse work characteristics, year 1				
Occupational complexity	— 5.80	9.63	13*	— 03
Wage	8.71	4.74	20*	— 11
Work hours				
Under 35	04	20	02	12*
35–40	63	48	— 04	— 10
Over 40	32	47	04	05
Spouse work characteristics, years 1–3				
Occupational complexity	— 5.83	8.25	10*	— 04
Wage	8.88	4.56	14*	— 03
Work hours				
Under 35	07	25	— 05	22*
35–40	42	49	— 06	— 15*
Over 40	51	50	09*	03

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Variable	Mean	SD	Correlation with PPVT-R	Correlation with BPI
Spouse work characteristics, 1986				
Occupational complexity	-5.46	10.02	.05	.05
Wage	9.27	5.21	.13*	-.06
Work hours				
Under 35	.04	.21	-.08	.07
35-40	.57	.50	.11*	-.09
Over 40	.38	.49	-.08	.06
Family characteristics, year 1				
Married	.74	.44	.21*	-.03
No. of older siblings	.42	.68	-.13*	-.07
Family changes, years 1-3				
Additional children born	.19	.40	-.09*	-.00
Marriage patterns				
Unstably married	.18	.38	.04	.07
Married	.62	.49	.11*	-.04
Not married	.20	.40	-.18*	-.03
Family characteristics, 1986				
Married	.70	.46	.12*	-.08
Additional child, 4-7 years old	.27	.44	.08*	.03
No. of younger siblings	.41	.56	-.00	.04
Home	.21	.89	.35*	-.13*
Parental characteristics				
Mother				
Age, 1986	25.56	2.05	.18	-.09*
Education, 1986	12.11	1.54	.14*	-.09
Ethnicity				
Black	.18	.39	-.41*	-.06
White	.74	.44	.46*	.06
Mexican Hispanic	.05	.21	-.14*	-.03
Other Hispanic	.03	.18	-.09*	.01
Self-esteem, 1980	.56	6.35	.12*	-.13*
Internal locus of control	.28	2.33	.10*	-.19*
AFQT, 1980	67.87	18.96	.42*	-.06
Family of origin				
Two parents at age 14	.79	.40	.19*	-.01
Grandmother's education	10.86	2.60	.26*	-.03
Spouse				
Age, 1986	28.78	3.64	.03	.03
Education, 1986	12.19	1.70	.19*	-.09
Child characteristics				
Health problems	.05	.22	-.04	.08
Shy in interview	-.04	1.01	-.10*	
Low birthweight	.06	.23	-.05	.04
Male	.50	.50	-.06	-.06

NOTE.—PPVT-R = Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (rev.), BPI = Behavioral Problems Index 1986 (means and SDs are similar to those for PPVT-R). The means, SDs, and correlations with PPVT-R shown here are for a sample of $N = 768$. The correlations with BPI are for a sample of $N = 526$, as is the mean and SD. A complete table may be requested from the authors.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

TABLE 4
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR BACKGROUND, WORK, AND FAMILY VARIABLES, PPVT-R

VARIABLE	CHILD'S FIRST YEAR			YEARS 1-3		
	B	SE	sr^2	B	SE	sr^2
Early maternal work characteristics						
Occupational complexity	- 07	07	01	03	08	01
Wage	- 08	27		05	24	
No work hours	2 14	1 14		3 29	1 75	
Work hours			01			01
1-20	1 53	1 66		-2 05	1 76	
21-34	-2 66	1 55		-3 17	1 28	
35-40 ^a						
Over 40	-1 93	2 23		-1 61	1 69	
Maternal work characteristics, 1986						
Occupational complexity	00	05	02***	- 00	06	02***
Wage	54	20		34	21	
Work hours			01**			01****
1-20	1 47	1 52		2 14	1 58	
21-34	3 32	1 39		4 66	1 41	
35-40						
Over 40	-2 82	1 67		-2 84	1 70	
Early spouse work characteristics						
Occupational complexity	02	07	01**	- 02	09	00
Wage	46	17		01	17	
Work hours			00			00
Under 35	1 18	3 21		3 06	2 57	
35-40						
Over 40	1 49	1 40		2 15	1 31	

TABLE 4 (Continued)

VARIABLE	CHILD'S FIRST YEAR			YEARS 1-3		
	B	SE	sr ²	B	SE	sr ²
Spouse work characteristics, 1986						
Occupational complexity	- 07	07	01**	- 07	08	01**
Wage	- 21	15		- 08	17	
Work hours			01**			01***
Under 35	-3 33	3 01		-3 60	3 19	
35-40 ^a						
Over 40	-3 79	1 38		-4 38	1 44	
Family characteristics, year 1			01***			
Married	13	1 52				
No of older siblings	-3 10	89				
Family changes, year 1-3						
Marriage patterns						02****
Unstably married						01*
Married				-1 65	1 82	
Not married ^a				-4 19	1 86	
No of older siblings						
Additional children born				-2 85	89	
Family characteristics, 1986				-4 15	1 32	
Married	-1 46	1 30	00	44	1 45	00
No of younger siblings	-1 47	97				
Additional child, 4-7 years old				21	1 19	
Home	2 75	63	02****	2 84	63	02****
Spouse characteristics			00			00*
Age, 1986	- 23	18		- 27	18	
Education, 1986	71	42		79	42	

Maternal characteristics									
Ethnicity									
Black	-14	10	1	74	-14	90	1	72	13**** 07****
White ^a									
Mexican Hispanic	-6	83	2	52	-7	91	2	52	
Other Hispanic	-8	01	2	80	-7	55	2	80	
Age, 1986		90		31		93		30	
Education, 1986	-	43		44	-	40		43	
Self-esteem, 1980	-	04		09		01		09	
Internal locus of control, 1979	-	21		23	-	22		23	
AFQT, 1980		12		04		13		04	
Maternal family of origin									01****
Two parents at age 14	20		1	29	26		1	29	
Grandmother's education	85		22		84		22		01**
Child characteristics									
Health problems	-2	22	2	33	-2	16	2	33	
Shy in interview	-1	23		52	-1	07		52	
Low birthweight	-2	17	2	19	-2	85	2	19	
Male	-1	66	1	02	-1	43	1	01	
Constant	59	4	9	70	62	8	9	59	
R^2			36				37		
Adjusted R^2			33				34		

NOTE.—Weighted $N = 768$. Here, sr^2 refers to variance explained by respective sets of variables

^a Reference category for categorical variable

* $P < .10$, two-tailed test

** $P < .05$, two-tailed test

*** $P < .01$, two-tailed test

**** $P < .001$, two-tailed test

TABLE 5

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR BACKGROUND, WORK, AND FAMILY VARIABLES, BPI

VARIABLE	CHILD'S FIRST YEAR			YEARS 1-3		
	B	SE	sr ²	B	SE	sr ²
Early maternal work characteristics						
Occupational complexity	- 07	07	01	- 11	08	01
Wage	- 19	32		- 09	31	
No work hours	- 68	1 14		- 98	1 68	
Work hours			01			01
1-20	- 95	1 74		56	1 83	
21-34	2 22	1 59		2 19	1 29	
35-40 ^a						
Over 40	-1 31	2 26		28	1 62	
Maternal work characteristics, 1986						
Occupational complexity	01	05	00	03	05	00
Wage	- 20	21		- 12	21	
Work hours			00			00
1-20	- 53	1 50		- 51	1 52	
21-34	-1 89	1 51		-2 22	1 51	
35-40 ^a						
Over 40	-1 17	1 69		-1 11	1 68	
Early spouse work characteristics						
Occupational complexity	03	08	01	- 03	09	03***
Wage	- 28	18		- 10	16	
Work hours			01*			03*****
Under 35	7 07	3 12		10 0	2 53	
35-40 ^a						
Over 40	1 30	1 44		2 02	1 28	

Spouse work characteristics, 1986

Occupational complexity	07	07	00	06	08	00
Wage	— 01	16		— 02	17	
Work hours			00			00
Under 35	2 32	3 34		60	3 41	
35–40 ^a						
Over 40	1 39	1 44		1 28	1 41	
Family characteristics, year 1			00			
Married	— 10	1 50				
No of older siblings	— 84	97				
Family changes, years 1–3						01
Marriage patterns						01
Unstably married						
Married				3 16	1 78	
Not married ^a				2 33	1 79	
No of older siblings				— 1 14	95	
Additional children born				— 40	1 33	
Family characteristics, 1986			01	— 2 86	1 38	01*
Married	— 2 09	1 28				
No of younger siblings	1 28	98		1 56	1 16	
Additional child, 4–7 years old				— 1 72	63	01***
Home	— 1 60	63	01**			00
Spouse characteristics			00			
Age, 1986	18	18		12	17	
Education, 1986	— 16	44		02	44	
Maternal characteristics			03**			03***
Ethnicity			01*			01
Black	— 4 21	1 75		— 2 93	1 72	
White ^a						
Mexican Hispanic	— 3 37	2 48		— 2 31	2 46	
Other Hispanic	— 68	2 75		— 73	2 72	

TABLE 5 (Continued)

VARIABLE	CHILD'S FIRST YEAR			YEARS 1-3		
	B	SE	sr ²	B	SE	sr ²
Maternal characteristics (continued)						
Age, 1986	10	32		22	31	
Education, 1986	- 00	45		- 09	45	
Self-esteem, 1980	- 08	09		- 14	09	
Internal locus of control, 1979	- 60	23		- 62	23	
AFQT, 1980	- 02	04		- 02	04	
Maternal family of origin			00			00
Two parents at age 14	- 45	1 28		- 57	1 27	
Grandmother's education	00	21		- 01	21	
Child characteristics			01			01
Health problems	3 02	2 40		2 97	2 41	
Low birthweight	1 77	2 16		1 76	2 14	
Male	-1 79	1 01		-1 32	98	
Constant	2 60	10 60		-6 13	10 20	
R ²		13			15	
Adjusted R ²		05			08	

NOTE.—Weighted $N = 526$

a Reference category for categorical variable

* $P < .10$, two-tailed test** $P < .05$, two-tailed test*** $P < .01$, two-tailed test**** $P < .001$, two-tailed test

Modeling Effects on Verbal Facility

Most background and family effects are stable across both specifications of early conditions. Maternal background characteristics, including age, ethnicity, AFQT score, and grandmothers' educational attainment, have significant positive direct effects on the child's verbal facility, fathers' educational attainment also has a positive, direct effect. Having greater numbers of older siblings, as well as having a younger sibling born within three years of the target child, has a negative effect on verbal facility, having siblings born at later intervals has no significant effect. Stronger home environments also predict greater cognitive skills in children.⁵

Current work conditions generally have stronger direct effects than early conditions. For both mothers and fathers, current, routine overtime work schedules are more negative than full-time hours, for mothers, moderate part-time work (20–34 hours per week) is more positive than full-time work schedules. Higher current maternal wages have positive implications for children's PPVT-R scores, although this effect becomes insignificant ($t = 1.60$, $P < .15$) when work and family conditions during the first three years are controlled.

Fathers' early work conditions have little independent impact, except for the positive effect of fathers' wages in year 1. Variations in employed mothers' early work conditions also have no significant effects. There is a weak ($P < .10$) tendency for children whose mothers have forgone early employment to score higher on the PPVT-R, although as we note below, this effect varies, depending on the complexity of the mother's current occupation.⁶ In addition, because these models may underestimate total effects of early conditions by simultaneously considering later conditions, we also estimated models excluding current work and family conditions (equations not shown), the effects of early working conditions of mother and father are unchanged.

Interactions by current maternal occupational complexity — Following

⁵ In table 4, cols. 4–6 show a negative relationship between the mother's being stably married during the child's first three years of life and the child's PPVT-R score, while the sign of the zero-order relationship is positive. We attribute the multivariate findings to our controlling for numerous maternal background characteristics such as AFQT score, age, and ethnicity, each of which is associated with both mother's being stably married and the child's having a higher PPVT-R score. We have therefore, "explained" the stably married effect with background controls to the point that the sign of the marriage coefficient itself is reversed from the bivariate.

⁶ Even these weak direct effects may be overstated because we control for the negative effects of nonemployment on current occupational conditions. In addition, a critic may wonder whether controlling for child shyness results in "overcontrolling" for effects we expect to find. We estimated models of PPVT-R without shyness and found that there were no changes in the significance of the remaining variables.

our interest in whether maternal working conditions formed important bases for statistical interaction, we evaluated whether mothers' current occupational complexity interacted with their background characteristics (age, education, AFQT score, self-esteem, and mastery), their prior work history (employed/not employed), or their current work hours.⁷ We found significant interactive effects with maternal AFQT scores and work histories. To describe these interactions better, we solved for mean values and for plus and minus one standard deviation from the means. These results indicate that a more complex occupation in 1986 increased the positive effects of higher initial intellectual skills: unstandardized coefficients for the effects of AFQT scores are .09 for mothers with occupations low in occupational complexity, .14 for those in average occupations, and .20 for mothers in occupations high in occupational complexity. Thus, the benefits of mothers' greater cognitive skills for children's verbal facility were greater when her cognitive skills were continually practiced and reinforced on the job; mothers who had similar AFQT scores, but whose jobs were simple and repetitive, were less able to promote their children's verbal facility. The second interaction, with maternal work history, significantly qualifies the additive beneficial effect of mothers' forgoing early employment: the effect of nonemployment is *adverse* for mothers whose current occupations are high in complexity, near zero for mothers in average occupations, and beneficial only for mothers whose current occupations are low in complexity. Because complexity of early and current employment are positively correlated, any benefits of forgoing employment appear to be largely limited to mothers with poorer occupational prospects; we will return to this point in our discussion.

⁷ In addition to the tests involving maternal complexity, we used Chow tests (Cohen 1983) to assess whether the model in table 4, cols. 4–6, differed by gender, by child's age, by race, and by mother's marital status. Where indicated, we tested whether specific coefficients were significantly different between the two groups by adding specific interaction terms representing the product of independent variables and group characteristics to the pooled equation. We distinguished between male and female children, between children younger than 60 months old and older children, between white and nonwhite children, and between children of mothers who were married in 1986 and those whose mothers were not. Regarding PPVT-R, the three Chow tests by gender, age, and race were statistically significant, but the only interaction terms that retained significance in the complete equation involved the child's age. The overall negative effect of the birth of additional siblings during the first three years obtained for younger children, but not older children. Effects of fathers' 1986 working conditions also varied by the child's age: the overall negative effect of fathers' overtime work hours was significantly stronger for older children, and the effects of fathers' substantive complexity, insignificant overall, also had more positive effects for older children.

Modeling Effects on Behavior Problems

We next examine parallel models for children's behavior problems for the subset of children age four–six years in 1986. Table 5 displays the parallel additive equations with our alternative specifications of early time periods. Again, background and family effects tend to be stable across the two equations. Mothers with a stronger internal locus of control, black mothers, and those providing stronger home environments have children with fewer behavior problems. Mothers' marital history also has significant effects in the second equation: the mother's being currently married is beneficial and the mother's having had an unstable marriage during the child's first three years is inimical to child's socio-emotional outcomes. Neither spouse's current working conditions has significant additive effects, although as we note below, there are some interactive effects. Neither early maternal working conditions nor early maternal employment status has significant effects. However, for fathers, working few work hours, either in the first year or during the child's first three years, has a strong adverse impact on children.⁸

Interactive effects of occupational complexity —We evaluated whether the influence of mothers' occupational complexity on the BPI depended on mothers' background characteristics, prior work history, or current work hours. We found that occupational complexity interacted with maternal age and education. Protective effects of older maternal age and greater maternal education are greater for mothers with more complex occupations, but among mothers in occupations with below-average complexity, having a higher education and being older actually had adverse effects on children's behavior problems. These patterns suggest some negative impacts of the mothers' status incongruence or frustrated expectations on their children: children of older mothers and those with higher levels of schooling who are, nevertheless, in occupations characterized

⁸ Readers may wonder whether multicollinearity between the same variable when it is measured at different time points may interfere with including both measures in our model simultaneously. Inspection of the correlation matrices (available on request from the first author) suggests that although the relationships between such variables are positive, the correlations are not at a level that would automatically prompt such concerns (e.g., the correlation between maternal complexity in years 1–3 and in 1986 is .54). We also estimated models with variables tapping early work and family conditions, as well as variables tapping only 1986 work and family conditions (see also Rogers et al. 1991). We generally found that simultaneous inclusion of these constructs made no difference. One exception is that, in predicting PPVT-R scores, the 1986 maternal wages variable is significant and positive when early effects are uncontrolled, but misses significance when early controls are introduced. We interpret this finding as resulting from conservative estimation instead of from misspecification. The few other shifts in significance across these models can be attributed to the more conservative specification presented in the multivariate tables.

by little occupational complexity are more adversely affected than the children of their occupational peers who are younger and less educated.

Current occupational complexity also interacts with maternal work hours, decreasing the negative effects of long work hours and increasing the beneficial effects of part-time hours. Solving for high, average, and low levels of complexity at each work-hours category, and recalling that comparisons are expressed relative to effects for full-time work, it is apparent that when occupational complexity is low, overtime working hours have more adverse impacts than part-time or full-time schedules (low part-time = -0.37 , moderate part-time = -0.24 , overtime = $+0.46$), hours make less difference at average jobs, except for some benefits of moderate part-time schedules (low part-time = -0.05 , moderate part-time = -0.42 , and overtime = -0.24), and some benefits of both moderate part-time and overtime schedules appear for occupations higher in occupational complexity (low part-time = -0.73 , moderate part-time = -0.90 , overtime = -0.15).

Additional interaction —We evaluated whether the models in table 5, columns 4–6, varied by maternal race, current maternal marital status, child's age, and child's gender. Each of the four Chow tests was statistically significant. The effects of mothers' early work conditions, nonsignificant in the overall models, varied by child's age, mothers' current marital status, and child's gender. Mothers' working very few work hours during the first few years was more beneficial for children of currently unmarried mothers than for those of currently married ones. The complexity of mothers' early occupations had significantly more beneficial effects on older children. In addition, mothers who earn higher early wages report more behavior problems for boys than for girls.

The effects of paternal working conditions and family variables also vary by children's race and gender. The adverse effects of low levels of spousal hours worked during the early years were also somewhat weaker for nonwhite than for whites, for whom underemployment may be more expected, even if not desired. The weak overall negative effects of mothers' unstable marital history during the child's early years was significantly more adverse for boys than for girls; indeed, the unstandardized effects differ sharply ($B = 0.84$ [$P < .001$] for boys, but $B = -0.4$ [n.s.] for girls). Finally, mothers' sense of control, which was significant overall and in both age groups tested, was more protective for younger children.

Generalizability to Children of Mothers Not Employed in 1986

Our sample of mothers employed in 1986 is an advantaged subset of all mothers of young children in terms of personal characteristics (data not shown). Nonemployed mothers have lower levels of schooling, lower

AFQT scores, and have borne more children than employed mothers. Children of nonemployed mothers also have lower scores on the PPVT-R test than children of employed mothers. Nonemployed mothers have lower levels of internal locus of control, as assessed in 1979, than do employed mothers. Although in both groups, the proportion of mothers who are married is similar, spousal earnings are higher among the nonemployed mothers than among the employed ones. Differences on the remaining variables are negligible (see also Parcel and Menaghan 1990).

Yet some mothers who were out of the labor force in 1986 did nevertheless work when their children were young. To assess whether our findings regarding the effects of these early working conditions also apply to children whose mothers were not currently employed in 1986, we reestimated our models on the larger sample of both employed and nonemployed mothers, including using a dummy variable for current employment status and interaction terms for variations in effects by current maternal employment status. We find no significant interaction between early maternal working conditions or employment status and current employment status for either outcome, suggesting that the effects of early maternal work did not differ for mothers not currently employed.

The Role of Child Care

We have noted that the nature and quality of supplemental child-care arrangements when mothers are employed may also affect children's cognitive and social outcomes. Our prior analyses of current child-care arrangements on child outcomes, however, found no significant effects of informal or formal care, location of caregiver to child, relation of care, or ratio of caregivers to children (Parcel and Menaghan 1990). These analyses, however, did not consider child-care arrangements earlier in the children's lives. Other studies suggest that amount or location of nonmaternal care in infancy and early childhood may have lagged effects on child outcomes. For example, Mott (1991) suggests that regular out-of-home care has beneficial effects on children's cognitive skills, particularly for girls, while Belsky and Rovine (1988) find negative effects when supplemental care exceeds 20 hours a week.

To test whether such child-care experiences provide additional explanatory power and to evaluate the robustness of our results when variations in child care are controlled, we reestimated our final models with controls for care in the first year, care in the first three years, and current care. Data are based on the child's primary, nonmaternal care provider. Maternal work hours, already in the models, tapped duration of nonmaternal care. We also constructed variables tapping whether children received regular out-of-home care in the first year, in any of the first three

years, or currently, and calculated the number of years of any out-of-home care during the first three years. These were evaluated in alternative specifications. In no case did any of the early or current child-care variables make a significant contribution to equations predicting PPVT-R scores or behavior problems. Furthermore, controlling for these arrangements did not alter our other findings.

Finally, it is legitimate to ask whether our findings would change if we omitted children who were in school full-time from our sample, since we could argue that they would differ from younger children in the proportion of time spent at home and under the direction of teachers. We identified 51 children who attended school full-time and excluded them from the analyses. Most findings remain the same. However, with these 51 children excluded, we found that mothers' 1986 wages had a positive and significant effect on verbal facility. In addition, two effects on behavior problems, already significant, intensify: the adverse effect of paternal early overtime hours becomes stronger, as does the effect of being unstably married. We also find that the target child's having a closely spaced sibling has an adverse effect on behavior problems, another finding consistent with the resource dilution effects already noted.

CONCLUSIONS

As demonstrated in table 1, our investigation is the only study that evaluates the effects of paternal working conditions on child outcomes. We also, along with Vandell and Ramanan (1992), tap both social and cognitive outcomes, control for children's home environments and study both early and current maternal working conditions. We combine these advantages with the use of a larger sample, and explicitly consider how these data inform the functioning of family social capital. The Appendix compares our findings with those from the studies identified in table 1 as having some similar conceptual and design features.

Our findings suggest several conclusions. First, in contrast to Desai et al. (1989), Baydar and Brooks-Gunn (1991) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Belsky and Eggebeen (1991a), we find minimally negative effects of early maternal employment on child outcomes. The data suggest that mothers who do not work during the child's first three years may, if their occupational prospects are poor, facilitate verbal fluency in their children, however, this effect is reversed for mothers whose later occupations are high in complexity. In addition, comparable effects regarding behavior problems are not apparent. Thus, the emphasis on mothers forgoing employment to prevent children's social maladjustment (e.g., Belsky and Eggebeen 1991a) does not receive strong support. These findings suggest serious qualifications to the conclusions that maternal employment has

more positive consequences for women with fewer cognitive and material assets and is more problematic for mothers with greater assets (e.g., Desai et al. 1989). None of these studies has considered the quality of mother's experience on the job as tapped by occupational complexity. Our explicit consideration of such conditions suggests that employment has its strongest benefits for mothers with better jobs and less benign implications for mothers restricted to routine, monotonous labor at low wages.

Second, our findings suggest that it may be useful to consider fathers' work schedules when attempting to understand the effects of parental working conditions on child outcomes. Fathers' working fewer than full-time work hours during the child's first year or, on average, over the child's first three years of life, is associated with elevated behavior problems. In addition, overtime paternal hours in 1986 are associated with lower levels of verbal facility. Our data support the notion that fathers' work schedules may be important pathways through which children absorb appropriate behavioral norms and develop verbal skills that serve as the foundation for future cognitive attainment. More generally, these suggestions contribute to current thinking regarding the importance of fathers in families (Furstenberg 1988, Furstenberg and Cherlin 1991, McLanahan and Booth 1989, Radin 1981). These possibilities deserve explicit attention in future research.

How much support do our findings provide for those who worry that maternal work outside the home weakens bonds of social capital between parents and children useful in transmitting behavioral norms across generations? Support for the narrowest conceptualization of this argument is weak given the general lack of effects of maternal early working conditions on child outcomes. Clearly, heavy parental employment demands may limit social capital needed in the development of cognitive and social skills because overtime hours for mothers and fathers appear to inhibit the development of verbal facility and because the combination of overtime hours and a low-complexity occupation exacerbates behavior problems. However, our findings are incompatible with social policies that discourage maternal employment. Furthermore, our analyses of the effects of child care do not suggest that nonmaternal care has either positive or negative effects on the child outcomes we study. Thus, social trends toward increased maternal employment and increased use of nonmaternal care cannot be shown to be uniformly deleterious to child outcomes. Future research should continue to consider the relative roles of maternal employment and nonmaternal care as they influence child development.

Also deserving closer scrutiny is the notion that the sheer duration of time parents spend with children is crucial for developmental outcomes. If that were the case, we would expect that more limited work hours would be uniformly advantageous to children's development. The effects

of variations in early maternal part-time work, however, are not significant as a set in any of our models. Moderate part-time current maternal work hours are superior to fewer work hours for the cognitive outcome and nonlinear and contingent on occupational complexity for the social outcome. At the same time, the fact that an early paternal low level of work hours is associated with increases in behavior problems points to one clear negative outcome associated with fewer parental work hours. Low levels of paternal work hours likely result in frustration for both parents that may limit their abilities to set appropriate examples of self-control and to help children establish suitable standards for themselves. Despite the numerous controls we have introduced, there are probably unmeasured differences between families with and without fathers who work fewer hours. Additional research should investigate the robustness of the findings we have produced regarding the disadvantages of paternal part-time hours.

Further research should also consider the processes through which parental working conditions may influence child outcomes indirectly through children's home environments. Our findings support the notion that the social capital embedded in children's home environments will both promote verbal facility and reduce behavior problems. Because maternal working conditions influence the strength of children's home environments (Menaghan and Parcel 1991), these findings suggest that parental working conditions may have both direct and indirect effects on children, with family social capital, as represented by the home environment, playing an important role.

At a more general level, these findings caution us against making easy assumptions about what the most critical periods of children's growth are for particular outcomes. Our findings suggest that current maternal working conditions affect verbal facility but that early paternal work hours affect later levels of behavior problems. These findings reinforce the usefulness of examining the role of both parents in the socialization process, and provide useful input to policy debates. In particular, arguments regarding the importance of the child's first year of life are often associated with normative prescriptions regarding the desirability of "traditional" nuclear families and a traditional division of labor in the home. We know that such models are impossible for many families today, and that, even when possible, are inconsistent with many adult decisions regarding the allocation of time to work and family. A more useful working hypothesis is that there are probably multiple periods throughout a child's life when parental input, or social capital, is important in facilitating appropriate development. If a particular period is deficient, either in terms of parental time or the nature of the adult inputs generally, such deficiencies may be compensable, depending upon the timing, extent,

and nature of remedial intervention. Although this hypothesis may be proved false in particular circumstances, it provides a relatively parsimonious view of the socialization process. It also appears fruitful to consider viewing parental inputs in terms of averages across longer periods than some earlier researchers have advocated. Such a strategy helps us to focus on the overall, long-term environment in which the child is reared, without the distraction of short-term variations in either parental inputs or child outcomes, each of which might be inconsistent with longer term trends. Additional research that takes each of these precepts seriously promises to advance current debates about the forces shaping early childhood outcomes.

APPENDIX

Key Findings across Studies Outlined in Table 1

1 *Desai et al (1989)* —They find no adverse effects of maternal employment on PPVT-R during infancy except for boys in families with high income from other family members

2 *Blau and Grossberg (1990)* —Maternal employment during year 1 has negative effects on PPVT-R scores, but employment in second and later years has positive effects, so the net effect over the first 3–4 years is close to zero

3 *Belsky and Eggebeen (1991a)* —Children whose mothers were employed full time beginning in years 1 or 2 are less compliant than children of mothers not employed in years 1–3

4 *Baydar and Brooks-Gunn (1991)* —Maternal employment in the child's first year of life negatively affects both cognitive and social outcomes

5 *Vandell and Ramanan (1992)* —Math achievement is a positive function of early maternal employment, and reading achievement is a positive function of recent maternal employment

6 *Parcel and Menaghan (1994)* —Current maternal working conditions affect cognitive outcomes, while early paternal work hours affect social outcomes. Early maternal employment has negative effects on child cognition only for mothers with poor occupational prospects

REFERENCES

- Achenbach, Thomas S., and Craig Edelbrock. 1981. *Behavioral Problems and Competencies Reported by Parents of Normal and Disturbed Children Aged Four through Sixteen*. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, serial no 188. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1983. *Manual for the Child Behavior Checklist and Revised Child Behavior Profile*. Burlington: University of Vermont.

- Achenbach, Thomas S, Stephanie H McConaughy, and Catherine T Howell 1987 "Child/Adolescent Behavioral and Emotional Problems Implications of Cross-Informant Correlations for Situational Specificity" *Psychological Bulletin* 101 213-32
- Aldous, Joan, and Wilfried Dumon 1991 "Family Policy in the 1980s Controversy and Consensus" Pp 466-81 in *Contemporary Families Looking Forward, Looking Back*, edited by Alan Booth Minneapolis National Council on Family Relations
- Baker, P C, and F L Mott 1989 *NLSY Child Handbook 1989 A Guide and Resource Document for the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1986 Child Data* Columbus Ohio State University, Center for Human Resource Research
- Baydar, Nazli, and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn 1991 "Effects of Maternal Employment and Child-Care Arrangements on Preschoolers' Cognitive and Behavioral Outcomes Evidence from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth" *Developmental Psychology* 27 932-45
- Belsky, Jay 1984 "Two Waves of Day Care Research Developmental Effects and Conditions of Quality" Pp 1-34 in *The Child and the Day Care Setting Qualitative Variations and Development*, edited by R C Ainslie New York Praeger
- 1988 "The 'Effects' of Infant Day Care Reconsidered" *Early Childhood Research Quarterly* 3 235-72
- 1990 "Parental and Nonparental Child Care and Children's Socioemotional Development A Decade in Review" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 52 885-903
- Belsky, Jay, and David Eggebeen 1991a "Early and Extensive Maternal Employment and Young Children's Socioemotional Development Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 53 1083-1110
- 1991b "Scientific Criticism and the Study of Early and Extensive Maternal Employment" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 53 1107-10
- Belsky, Jay, and M Rovine 1988 "Nonmaternal Care in the First Year of Life and the Security of Infant-Parent Attachment" *Child Development* 59 157-67
- Blake, Judith 1989 *Family Size and Achievement* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Blau, Francine D, and Adam J Grossberg 1990 "Maternal Labor Supply and Children's Cognitive Development" NBER Working Paper no 3536 National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass
- Bradley, Robert H, and Bettye M Caldwell 1977 "Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment A Validation Study of Screening Efficiency" *American Journal of Mental Deficiency* 81 417-20
- Bradley, Robert H, Bettye M Caldwell, and R Elardo 1979 "Home Environment and Cognitive Development in the First Two Years of Life A Cross-Lagged Panel Analysis" *Developmental Psychology* 15 246-50
- Bradley, Robert H, B Caldwell, Stephen L Rock, Holly M Hamrick, and Pandia Harris 1988 "Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment Development of a Home Inventory for Use with Families Having Children 6 to 10 Years Old" *Contemporary Educational Psychology* 13 58-71
- Cohen, Ayala 1983 "Comparing Regression Coefficients across Subsamples A Study of the Statistical Test" *Sociological Methods and Research* 12 77-94
- Coleman, James S 1988 "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital" *American Journal of Sociology* 94 S95-S120
- 1990 *Foundations of Social Theory* Cambridge, Mass Belknap
- Demo, David H, and Alan C Acocck 1991 "The Impact of Divorce on Children" Pp 162-91 in *Contemporary Families Looking Forward, Looking Back*, edited by Alan Booth Minneapolis National Council on Family Relations
- Desai, Sonalde, P Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, and Robert T Michael 1989 "Mother

- or Market? Effects of Maternal Employment on the Intellectual Ability of 4-Year-Old Children " *Demography* 26 545-61
- Dunn, L , and L Dunn 1981 *PPVT-R Manual* Circle Pines, Minn American Guidance Service
- Elder, Glen H , Jr , Tri Van Nguyen, and Avshalom Caspi 1985 "Linking Family Hardship to Children's Lives " *Child Development* 56 361-75
- Estrada, P , W F Arsenio, R D Hess, and S D Holloway 1987 "Affective Quality of the Mother-Child Relationship Longitudinal Consequences for Children's School-Relevant Cognitive Functioning " *Developmental Psychology* 23 210-15
- Ferber, Marianne A , and Brigid O'Farrell, with La Rue Allen, eds 1991 *Work and Family Policies for a Changing Workforce* Washington, D C National Academy
- Furstenberg, Frank F , Jr 1988 "Good Dads, Bad Dads Two Faces of Fatherhood " Pp 193-218 in *The Changing American Family and Public Policy*, edited by Andrew J Cherlin Washington, D C Urban Institute
- Furstenberg, Frank F , Jr , and Andrew J Cherlin 1991 *Divided Families What Happens to Children When Parents Part* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Furstenberg, Frank F , Jr , and Christine Winqvist Nord 1985 "Parenting Apart Patterns of Child-Rearing after Marital Disruption " *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 47 893-944
- Gargile, S D , and J E Woods 1988 "Strengthening Black Students' Academic Preparedness for Higher Education " *Journal of Black Studies* 19 150-62
- Graham, Philip J , and Michael Rutter 1968 "The Reliability and Validity of the Psychiatric Assessment of the Child II Interview with the Parent " *British Journal of Psychiatry* 114 581-92
- Hoffman, Lois W 1989 "Effects of Maternal Employment in the Two-Parent Family " *American Psychologist* 44 283-92
- Kamerman, Sheila B 1991 "Child-Care Policies and Programs An International Overview " *Journal of Social Issues* 47 179-96
- Kellam, Shep, J D Branch, K C Agrawal, and Margaret E Ensminger 1975 *Mental Health and Going to School* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Kessler, Ronald, J B Turner, and James S House 1988 "Effects of Unemployment on Health in a Community Survey Main, Modifying, and Mediating Effects " *Journal of Social Issues* 44 69-85
- Kohn, Melvin L 1977 *Class and Conformity, A Study in Values*, 2d ed Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Kohn, Melvin L , and Carmi Schooler 1982 "Job Conditions and Personality A Longitudinal Assessment of Their Reciprocal Effects " *American Journal of Sociology* 87 1257-86
- Kohn, Melvin L , Kazimierz M Slomczynski 1990 *Social Structure and Self Direction A Comparative Analysis in the United States and Poland* Cambridge, Mass Blackwell
- Kohn, Melvin L , Kazimierz M Slomczynski, and Carrie Schoenbach 1986 "Social Stratification and the Transmission of Values in the Family A Cross-National Assessment " *Sociological Forum* 1 73-102
- LaFreniere, Peter J , and L Alan Sroufe 1985 "Profiles of Peer Competence in the Preschool Interrelations between Measure, Influence of Social Ecology, and Relation to Attachment History " *Developmental Psychology* 21 56-69
- Lee, Valerie E , J Brooks-Gunn, and Elizabeth Schnur 1988 "Does Head Start Work? A 1-Year Follow-Up Comparison of Disadvantaged Children Attending Head Start, No Preschool, and Other Preschool Programs " *Developmental Psychology* 24 210-22

- Luster, Tom, Kelly Rhoades, and Bruce Haas 1989 "The Relation between Parental Values and Parenting Behavior: A Test of the Kohn Hypothesis" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 51 139-47
- Lutkenhaus, Paul, Klaus E. Grossman, and Karin Grossman 1985 "Infant-Mother Attachment at Twelve Months and Style of Interaction with a Stranger at the Age of Three Years" *Child Development* 56 1538-42
- Matas, Leah, Richard Arend, and L. Alan Sroufe 1978 "Continuity of Adaptation in the Second Year: The Relationship between Quality of Attachment and Later Competence" *Child Development* 49 547-56
- McCartney, Kathleen, and Saul Rosenthal 1991 "Maternal Employment Should Be Studied within Social Ecologies" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 53 1103-7
- McLanahan, Sara, and Karen Booth 1989 "Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, and Politics" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 51 447-580
- McLoyd, Vonnie C. 1989 "Socialization and Development in a Changing Economy" *American Psychologist* 44 293-302
- 1990 "The Impact of Economic Hardship on Black Families and Children: Psychological Distress, Parenting, and Socioemotional Development" *Child Development* 61 311-46
- Menaghan, Elizabeth G., and Toby L. Parcel 1991 "Determining Children's Home Environments: The Impact of Maternal Characteristics and Current Occupational and Family Conditions" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 53 417-31
- Miller, Joanne, Carmi Schooler, Melvin L. Kohn, and Karen A. Miller 1979 "Women and Work: The Psychological Effects of Occupational Conditions" *American Journal of Sociology* 85 66-94
- Mirowsky, John, and Catherine E. Ross 1986 "Social Patterns of Distress" *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 23-45
- Moen, Phyllis 1989 *Working Parents*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Moore, Kristin A., and Nancy O. Snyder 1991 "Cognitive Attainment among First-born Children of Adolescent Mothers" *American Sociological Review* 56 612-24
- Mott, Frank L. 1991 "Developmental Effects of Infant Care: Mediating Role of Gender and Health" *Journal of Social Issues* 47 139-58
- Namboodiri, Krishnan 1987 "The Floundering Phase of the Life Course" Pp. 59-86 in *Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization*, vol. 7. Edited by Ronald G. Corwin. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI.
- Parcel, Toby L. 1989 "Comparable Worth, Occupational Labor Markets, and Occupational Earnings: Results from the 1980 Census" Pp. 134-52 in *Pay Equity: Empirical Inquiries*, edited by Robert Michael, Heidi Hartmann, and Brigid O'Farrell. Washington, D.C.: National Academy.
- Parcel, Toby L., and Elizabeth G. Menaghan 1990 "Maternal Working Conditions and Children's Verbal Facility: Studying the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality from Mothers to Young Children" *Social Psychology Quarterly* 53 132-47
- 1993 "Family Social Capital and Children's Behavior Problems" *Social Psychology Quarterly* 56 120-35
- Radin, Norma 1971 "Maternal Warmth, Achievement Motivation, and Cognitive Functioning in Lower-Class Pre-School Children" *Child Development* 42 1560-65
- 1981 "The Role of the Father in Cognitive, Academic, and Intellectual Development" Pp. 379-427 in *The Role of the Father in Child Development*, 2d ed. Edited by Michael E. Lamb. New York: Wiley.
- Rogers, Stacy J., Toby L. Parcel, and Elizabeth G. Menaghan 1991 "The Effects of Maternal Working Conditions and Mastery on Child Behavior Problems: Studying the Intergenerational Transmission of Social Control" *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 32 145-64
- Rutter, Michael 1970 "Sex Differences in Children's Responses to Family Stress"

Early Childhood Outcomes

- Pp 165–96 in *The Child in His Family*, edited by E J Anthony and C Koupernik
New York Wiley
- Scarr, Sandra 1991 “On Comparing Apples and Oranges and Making Inferences about Bananas ” *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 53 1099–1100
- Schooler, Carmi 1987 “Psychological Effects of Complex Environments during the Life Span A Review and Theory ” Pp 24–49 in *Cognitive Functioning and Social Structure over the Life Course*, edited by Carmi Schooler and K Warner Schaie
Norwood, N J Ablex
- Siegal, Michael 1984 “Economic Deprivation and the Quality of Parent-Child Relations A Trickle-down Framework ” *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology* 5 127–44
- Steinberg, Laurence, Julie D Elmen, and Nina S Mounts 1989 “Authoritative Parenting, Psychosocial Maturity, and Academic Success among Adolescents ” *Child Development* 60 (6) 1424–36
- Vandell, Deborah, and Mary Ann Corasaniti 1991 “Child Care and the Family Complex Contributors to Child Development ” *New Directions in Child Development* 49 23–37
- Vandell, Deborah, and Janaki Ramanan 1992 “Effects of Early and Recent Maternal Employment on Children from Low-Income Families” *Child Development* 63 938–49
- Zigler, Edward, Willa D Abelson, and Victoria Seitz 1973 “Motivational Factors in the Performance of Economically Disadvantaged Children on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test ” *Child Development* 44 294–303
- Zill, N 1988 “Behavior, Achievement, and Health Problems among Children in Stepfamilies Findings from a National Survey of Child Health ” Pp 325–68 in *The Impact of Divorce, Single Parenting and Stepparenting on Children*, edited by Mavis Hetherington and Josephine D Arasteh
Hillsdale, N J Erlbaum

Sons, Daughters, and Intergenerational Support in Taiwan¹

Yean-Ju Lee
East-West Center

William L. Parish and Robert J. Willis
University of Chicago

This study focuses on married children's financial support for their parents in Taiwan. It is often assumed that economic and social changes accompanying industrialization will drastically weaken parental power and thus reduce the support from adult children to parents. The data in this article, however, show that the vast majority of married children, both sons and daughters, provided net financial support for their parents during the previous year. The socioeconomic characteristics of the parents and children in the families where financial transfers occurred indicate that the altruism/corporate group model best portrays intergenerational transactions during the period of rapid economic growth.

During economic development, one typically expects major shifts in the patterns of assistance among family members. These shifts include a reversal in the flow of wealth between generations, a shrinking in the size and complexity of the household, a weakening of ties to kin outside the household, and an increased emphasis on the centrality of the husband-wife tie in ways that weaken old, intergenerational family obligations (e.g., Goode 1963, Shorter 1975, Parsons 1943, Caldwell 1976). Despite a broad consensus on the general direction of this change, there has been disagreement about its pace and its applicability to societies with non-Western traditions (e.g., Litwak and Kulis 1987, Martin 1990). Particularly in East Asia, strong patrilineal traditions linger and old patterns of parent-son coresidence and financial support for elderly parents

¹ The survey was supported by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and Development and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation. We are grateful to Barry Shiao-chian Fong for research assistance and to Heidi Fung and Shao-tseng Kuan for substantive suggestions. Correspondence should be addressed to Yean-Ju Lee, East-West Center, 1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96848.

continue (e.g., Morgan and Hiroshima 1983, Casterline et al. 1991). This seeming persistence of an extended family system in spite of rapid economic growth cannot be explained by bipolar models that consider only two types of societies: traditional and modern.

Concentrating on intergenerational financial support and coresidence of adult children and their parents in Taiwan, this study discusses three theoretical models of intergenerational relations—the power/bargaining, the mutual aid, and the altruism/corporate group models. We place particular emphasis on the context of rapid economic growth. Historically in Taiwan, there was a shared ideal of family continuity through the male line in which sons held a high degree of filial loyalty to their parents and, as ritualized through ancestor worship, to all preceding generations. In this ideal, parents should continue residing with married sons, and family property should be held jointly as long as possible. By examining the ways in which this ideal has been reshaped by radical economic and social change, we will provide a new assessment of differing theoretical approaches to family change.

THEORIES

Broadly, three groups of theories of the family are relevant to the issue of intergenerational support. One group emphasizes power relationships, typically associated with gender and age, that decide the winners and losers in the struggle for family resources. A second emphasizes voluntary mutual aid among family members. A third is the altruism/corporate group model in which the parents decide how to maximize the welfare of the extended family.

Power and Bargaining Model

One common argument is that, with the declining control over land, businesses, and training that accompanies economic development, parents lose their power to extract obedience and resources from children. With this loss of power, parents are unable to reverse the rising individualism that accompanies the diffusion of new values through education and the mass media (e.g., Goode 1963, Caldwell 1976, 1982, Cain 1981, Nugent 1985). In turn, this loss of control causes the direction of the flow of wealth to be reversed from its former upward direction toward mature adults to a predominantly downward direction favoring children at most ages. Parents respond by having fewer children because having children is now less profitable or more costly. In modern Western societies, where these tendencies have reached fruition, only the more affluent parents who can dangle prospective (“strategic”) property bequests as a reward

for their being more solicitous have the power to elicit children's attention and support (Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers 1985). It is also true that, in some developing countries, parents with more cattle to be inherited elicit more remittances from their children who have moved to the city (Lucas and Stark 1985). All of the above suggests a strong role for "prospective exchange" as a bargaining element in current family-assistance patterns.

There is ample anecdotal evidence of threats to patriarchal authority in Taiwan (e.g., Wolf 1968, 1975, Tang 1978, Headly 1983, Kuo 1989). Also, the rapid decline of fertility in Taiwan during the past 30 years might suggest that having children has become less "profitable" to parents. Yet the decline in birthrates was unaccompanied by an obvious change in the direction of the flow of wealth. Despite some weakening of the old patterns, most parents continue to live with adult sons and financial flows among adults continue to be overwhelmingly from the younger generation to the older (Lo 1987, Liu 1982). That these transfers continue despite rapid urbanization and a loss of parental control over jobs and resources would appear to be inexplicable by many of the simpler models of bargaining/power.

One can conceive of more subtle processes of power and bargaining, which would include bargaining, not only between parents and children, but also among siblings and between spouses about support for parents. In a broad class of family-bargaining models in economics, Chiappori (1992) shows that the distribution of family resources may be interpreted as being determined by a "sharing rule" in which the amount that each member receives is an increasing function of his or her bargaining power. Each member's bargaining power is determined by a "threat point" that depends on the minimum level of utility the member would receive if the sharing rule were not followed. In models of bargaining between spouses, threat points have been measured, for example, by the terms of proposed divorce settlements (McElroy and Horney 1981), by the spouses' earning capacities, by their nonearned incomes (Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990), or by the resources controlled by husbands and wives within their "separate spheres" (Lundberg and Pollak 1991). These models stand in contrast to conventional economic models of the household that posit a single decision maker and assume that expenditure decisions depend only on the pooled income of all household members. Empirical support for the bargaining approach is provided in a number of studies surveyed by Chiappori et al. (1993) showing that household expenditure patterns depend on the degree to which husbands or wives control household income.

In an intergenerational context, children may use financial resources to exempt themselves from coresiding with parents or other time-intensive services (e.g., Hermalin et al. 1990). Siblings with more resources may

induce less well-off siblings to accept a trade of money for time by housing a parent ² Also, a wife who works and has an income of her own may bargain with her husband over the amount of support sent to her own parent

Mutual Aid Model

An alternative explanation for the continuance of residential sharing and financial assistance among family members is mutual aid, involving voluntary quid-pro-quo exchanges. In the short term, this aid may include help with babysitting, errand running or other forms of housework, and the sharing of goods with substantial scale economies, such as housing and durable goods (washers, television sets, etc.) For example, an increasing proportion of working mothers need their parents' services, and urbanization involves a rise in housing costs. These factors may deter or slow a shift toward independent living. If the United States were the model, however, the slowing of this shift would be modest. In the United States, rising income has reduced shared housing exchanges, both because the demand for privacy rose with income and because the increased value of time caused them to buy services in the market instead of providing them through in-kind exchanges among family members (Michael, Fuchs, and Scott 1980). Somewhat different behavior may be implied when exchange involves commodities for which good market substitutes do not exist, such as visits, telephone calls, and other forms of attention from grown children in exchange for parental financial transfers. Assuming that the opportunity cost of time is greater for high-income children, Cox (1987) shows the frequency of such transfers will be inversely related to children's income but that the magnitude of the transfer will be positively related to children's income, if the demand for attention is price inelastic. The persistence of child-parent coresidence among adults in Taiwan, despite rapidly growing incomes, suggests either a uniquely high preference for family- rather than market-provided services or that something more is happening than a simple exchange of services and sharing of durables. Moreover, it seems unlikely that parental demand for attention can be a major reason for exchange in Taiwan, where the dominant direction of monetary transfers is from children to parents.

Other dimensions of mutual aid associated with long-term "prospective exchange" may be more crucial in the Taiwan context. In particular,

² Such behavior may be generated by efficiency considerations rather than bargaining power. That is, it may be more efficient for high-income siblings with relatively high-priced time to specialize in market activities and to transfer money while lower-income siblings provide services and housing for the parents.

Taiwan families may emphasize implicit insurance and loan principles. By pooling resources even among such a small group, families can significantly reduce income risks for each member by providing implicit insurance (Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981). Clearly, the insurance motive leads to a pattern of compensatory transfers in which the weakest get more, whereas, in the bargaining models that assume that threat points are positively related to a family member's relative economic strength, they would receive less (Cox 1987, Chiappori 1992). The family may also provide implicit loans to its younger members to finance their investments in education or in starting a business. To the extent that such loans are important, we hypothesize that transfers from grown children to their parents will be positively related to the child's education, when we control for the child's current and permanent income.

In order to achieve the mutual benefits available from prospective-exchange relationships, the family must address the compliance problems inherent in any loan or insurance agreement caused by the ex post incentives for one side to default. An implicit assumption of power/bargaining models is that the two generations transact resources on the basis of their own generation's interests only and that, even if desired, collaborative agreements about sharing resources over time could not be enforced in the modern world unless a bargaining chip, such as a "strategic bequest," was held in reserve. The need for such mechanisms limits the scope for mutually beneficial and credibly enforced family agreements within the power/bargaining framework, leading to potentially inefficient outcomes.

Altruism/Corporate Group Model

The altruism/corporate group model, in contrast, suggests both an effective commonality of interests between generations and an assumption that contracts can be enforced across time. Even amid rising individualism and a weakening of the extended family as a full-fledged unit of production and consumption, the two generations still preserve aspects of a corporate unit. In economics, models of altruism provide one explanation of how the family might continue as a corporate group in the modern world. Becker's (1974, 1991) model posits a family headed by an altruistic individual—for example, a patriarch or his widow—who both controls most of the family's resources and cares about the welfare of other family members as well as his or her own. Caring about each member's welfare, an altruistic head is motivated to allocate resources Pareto efficiently (i.e., so that no alternative allocation could improve the welfare of any given member without reducing the welfare of some other member). A head's decision process may be broken into two stages

wealth maximization and optimal distribution of wealth (Becker and Tomes 1979) When control of family wealth is concentrated on parents, there is little tension between these two steps Positive transfers from the head to other members help bind the family together by providing its members with incentives to behave in accord with the corporate interest ³ Variations in transfers from the altruistic head provide "automatic" insurance for family members who suffer reversals and imply that all family members will benefit from the good fortune of any given member

However, extraordinarily high rates of economic growth in Taiwan create considerable tension between the pursuit of efficiency and the distribution of welfare between parents and children For reasons of efficiency, rapid growth in the demand for skilled labor as the economy metamorphized from an agricultural laggard to a newly industrializing leader implies that an ideal strategy for families is to shift resources from the older to the younger generation to finance increased investments in human capital Partly because of these investments, per capita GNP in Taiwan increased more than fivefold between 1961 and 1986 (Deaton and Paxson 1992) This massive growth and the much higher returns to children with more education mean that most children are much wealthier than their parents (Lo 1987) The potential tension lies in how to achieve equitable distribution when parents would like to share some fruits of their investments in their children Even the most self-sacrificing parent is likely to want the direction of transfers to be reversed at later points in his or her life, in the form of old-age support, repayment of loans, or help during illness ⁴ Thus, compliance by children with parental plans is crucial for the welfare of both parents and children and for society, which would suffer from suboptimal investment by parents in children should parents think the risks of default excessive Recently, Becker (1993) has proposed a model in which even altruistic parents who are concerned about such compliance problems rear their children to feel guilt if they fail to care for their elderly parents Of course, the Chinese

³ According to Becker's "rotten kid theorem," each family member, including those who are completely selfish, are motivated to take actions that are "efficient" in the sense that they will maximize the joint wealth of the entire family even if that action would reduce the member's own income The reason is that transfers from the altruistic head compensate a family member at the margin for the costs that he or she incurs to increase the family wealth and are also sufficiently large in total to motivate each member to remain a member of the (not necessarily coresident) family Bergstrom (1989) discusses the conditions under which the rotten kid theorem holds

⁴ To discuss the direction of intergenerational transfers, one must distinguish between transfers at a given point in the life cycle and transfers that occur over the entire lifetime (see Willis 1982, 1988) Empirically, Mueller (1976) calculates that children are almost surely a net drain on parental resources in peasant societies, despite Caldwell's (1976) assumptions to the contrary

family has traditionally followed such a strategy through its emphasis on the socialization of children into the values of filial piety. Taiwan children's learning that the greatest shame of all is to abandon one's parents is reinforced by school textbooks and by society at large (Wilson 1970, 1981, Wu 1985, Lin and Fu 1990). This socialization could produce the high probabilities of compliance needed for models of family altruism and corporate group mentality to continue to function in a highly developed society.

Gender Patterns

Rapid economic growth should have an impact not only on traditional patterns of support between parents and sons but also on those between parents and daughters. Traditionally, the patrilineal ideal among Chinese families in Taiwan meant that at marriage the rights to a woman's labor and reproduction were transferred to the husband's family, with whom the new couple took up residence. Except for a dowry and occasional smaller amounts of "private money" given to the daughter at marriage, all family property passed to the sons. Among sons the division of property was largely equal, even if there was a slight cultural preference for the eldest son to be the one who provided food and housing for the parents (Sung 1981). Because of these kinds of patrilineal tendencies, of course, families had a strong incentive to invest more in their sons than in their daughters (e.g., Cohen 1976, Gallin 1966, Pasternak 1972). One might expect this strong patrilineal emphasis to weaken with development. The literature on family change in the West notes the growing centrality of the husband-wife bond as opposed to the parent-child bond and with it the growing equality between spouses (Shorter 1975, Goode 1963, Parsons 1943). Consistent with this trend, women provide much of the emotional glue that holds modern American families together, with women both maintaining contact with extended kin and caring for the family's most vulnerable members (Silverstein and Waite 1993, Brody 1985, Troll 1987, Spitze and Logan 1990, Coward and Dwyer 1990).

The evidence is mixed on whether there is a similar trend in East Asia. On the negative side, nearly all parents continue to live not with daughters but with sons (e.g., DGBAS 1987*a*, 1987*b*, Freedman, Chang, and Sun 1982, Thornton, Chang, and Sun 1984). Sons have generalized obligations to support their parents in old age. Daughters' formal obligations end at marriage, even if they give a lot before marriage (Greenhalgh 1985). Nevertheless, there is some evidence, both traditional and modern, that the division between male and female lines may not be so severe. Traditionally, despite strong patrilineal tendencies, ties to affines (female-linked kin) have also been important in Taiwan. In villages, informal

ties to affines often provided important material and spiritual benefits (Gallin 1966, Pasternak 1972, Harrell 1972, Ahern 1974, Chuang 1985). Moreover, with economic growth some people turned to a wider network of affinal kin for business efforts, political campaigning, and other kinds of assistance (Gallin 1978, Gallin and Gallin 1985). Urbanites speak anecdotally of the close emotional tie between mothers and daughters, of how much easier it is to get along with a daughter than with a daughter-in-law (the son's wife), and how daughters are more useful than sons in major illnesses or other family emergencies (e.g., Tsui 1987). Among urbanites with no parent in the home, the wife's parents are visited just as frequently as the husband's parents (Speare, Liu, and Tsay 1988, p. 179). Moreover, when women began to earn their own income through outside employment, many were freed to send money to their own parents (Tsui 1987).

These partly complementary, partly contradictory observations suggest both that relations by gender in Taiwan are in a state of flux and that we will find sharply differing patterns depending on whether a wife has her own income and whether a young couple resides in the city or countryside. By and large, we will expect a woman's pattern of relationships with her own parents to at least weakly mimic those for men and their own parents. Thus, we suggest that our hypotheses about patterns of exchange will apply most clearly for males and somewhat less clearly for females, even though they are tending in the same direction.

Hypotheses

The three models discussed above provide a framework for structuring our empirical work and interpreting the results. Broadly, the mutual aid model describes the kinds of transactions, both short-term and long-term, that make the family an important and productive social institution, while the power/bargaining and corporate group/altruism models provide alternative theories of what motivates family members to engage in transfer behavior and what limits the scope of mutually beneficial transactions among family members.

An emphasis on the power/bargaining factors suggests the following empirical hypotheses:

HYPOTHESIS 1 — *Parents with more resources (high income and undistributed property) relative to children will elicit more money and service contributions from children* (the strong bargaining hypothesis)

HYPOTHESIS 2 — *Children with more resources relative to parents and siblings will provide money in place of services* (the weak bargaining hypothesis/relative efficiency hypothesis)

HYPOTHESIS 3 — *Between spouses, a spouse with more income will*

increase resources given to his or her own parents (interspousal bargaining hypothesis)

Alternatively, assuming that the altruism/corporate group model holds and that long-term exchanges are feasible, the following two hypotheses (nos 4 and 5) emerge

HYPOTHESIS 4 — *Children who received more investment from parents (education, property) will provide more. The consequences of investment will be both relative and absolute (i.e., siblings who received more education than their siblings will give more)* (the loan hypothesis)

HYPOTHESIS 5 — *Parents with more need (fewer resources, poor health) will receive more* (the insurance hypothesis)

HYPOTHESIS 6 — *Short-term exchange within the mutual aid framework suggests that parents providing help with chores and child care will receive more resources*

METHODS

Data

Data from the 1989 Taiwan Family and Women Survey provide an island-wide representative sample of women aged 25–60 years, from which we have chosen families of currently married women.⁵ Although only women were interviewed, the same set of questions was asked about parents and parents-in-law. We restrict the analysis to currently married husbands and wives who themselves were under the age of 60 years and whose mothers were over the age of 50 years. Moreover we limit the analysis to those parents who were in Taiwan and to those observations with near-complete data on the variables of interest. Because we include only those who had at least one parent surviving, the samples of husbands and wives are not identical. With wives typically younger than their husbands, more wives have surviving parents, giving 2,231 observations for the husbands' sample and 2,662 observations for the wives' sample.⁶

⁵ For details of sampling and interview procedures of this survey, see Nei-cheng pu (1989) and NORC (1991).

⁶ Including married and unmarried, with and without living parents, the total sample size was 3,803. As to the issue of representativeness because we use interviews of children who are married, we inevitably exclude the elderly with no currently married children. Moreover, sampling parents via their children causes large families to be oversampled, with the result that the respondents here have more siblings than live in the average household (Preston 1976). One consequence is that the number of elderly living alone is understated by a few percentage points (cf. DGBAS 1987a).

Dependent Variables

Measures of mutual support include current coresidence and questions about gift giving between parents and children in the last year. After detailed questions on inheritance patterns, each respondent was asked whether there had been any other large gifts such as property or cash, whether any of these had been given in the previous year, and the approximate cash value of the previous year's gift(s). Then, to probe further, the respondent was asked, "Other than these, did your parent give other kinds of gifts last year (such as red packets, living subsidies, etc.)?"⁷ If yes, then the respondent was asked to estimate the cash value of these gifts. The two sets of cash values for gifts in the previous year were then totaled to give the sum of the downward flow from parents to child. Upward flows from child to parents were estimated by a two-part question, asking whether there had been any gifts to parents in the previous year and what the cash value of such gifts had been. The same set of questions was repeated for the husband's parents. The positive net value of these upward transfers minus the downward transfers provides the central data for the analysis below.

Explanatory Variables

There are five sets of explanatory variables related to competing models of intergenerational support (table 1). Several of the hypothesized models predict differing consequences of a couple's own *resources*. In the strong and weak versions of the bargaining model, greater couple resources will allow them to at least avoid coresidence and other time-consuming services (hypotheses 1 and 2). In the couple bargaining model (hypothesis 3), the spouse with more income provides more income to his or her parents. In the mutual aid and altruism models (hypotheses 4, 5, and 6), the couple with more income should provide more resources to parents. The logged values of the husband's and wife's average monthly earnings over the past year are included, plus additional tabulations comparing the relative income and resources of parents and children. The number of grandchildren (the couple's children) indexes local obligations that could inhibit supporting other kin.

Parents' *need* should be greater when they have lower income (measured by socioeconomic status [SES]), when only the mother or father survives, and when more siblings consumed family resources at younger ages (table 1, pt. B). Moreover, on average, parents should be more in need

⁷ It is customary to give cash in a small red packet, particularly on holiday occasions, and, to some extent, the name "red packet" is applied broadly to exchanges of cash.

TABLE 1
MEANS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF VARIABLES

	Son Sample (Husband Sample)	Daughter Sample (Wife Sample)
A Couple's resources		
Husband's income (in NT\$)*	23,292	22,218
Wife's income (in NT\$)*	6,420	6,332
No of grandchildren	2 7	2 8
B Parents' need		
Father's SES	3 8	3 9
Parents' marital status		
Both alive (%)	55 2	57 1
Only mother alive (%)	33 0	31 1
Only father alive (%)	11 8	11 8
No of brothers respondent has	2 3	2 4
No of sisters respondent has	2 4	2 4
C Parental investment		
Years of education	9 9	8 0
Years more education than siblings	1 0	-1 0
Parents' property divided		
Not yet divided (%)	44 3	43 9
Divided, no share to respondent (%)	4 2	19 5
Divided, a share to respondent (%)	21 1	3 7
No property to divide (%)	30 4	32 9
D Parents' services		
Parents help with household chores		
No (%)	86 6	96 9
Yes (%)	13 4	3 1
E Other		
Migration since age 15		
Stayed in urban area (%)	22 0	23 5
Rural to urban area (%)	34 8	34 1
Stayed in rural or moved to rural area (%)	43 1	42 4
Mother's age (in years)	65 9	64 2
Parents' living arrangement		
Living with respondent in respondent's home (%)	26 3	2 6
Living with respondent in parents' home (%)	12 9	1 3
Living alone or with spouse only (%)	20 4	22 9
Living with unmarried children (%)	7 4	13 1
Living with other married child (%)	32 9	60 1
N of observations	2,231	2,662

* For definition, see n 10 below

when they have no property to divide (table 1, pt C), when they stayed in rural areas, when they are older, and when they have unmarried children at home (table 1, pt E) Socioeconomic status is a composite measure of the father's education and his occupation during his main working years⁸ In later analysis, the consequences of sole survivorship by either the mother or father is contrasted with the situation when both spouses survive Relative ability of sons to pay because of son's urban residence and relative need because parents tended to remain behind in the village when the respondent or her husband moved to the city provides another indicator of need and payment ability If the insurance variant of the altruism model (hypothesis 5) is correct, then the coefficients between all the measures of need and giving should be large and positive

Variables used to test repayment of *parental investment* include education, relative education compared to one's siblings, and a share of parental property (table 1, pt C) "More education than one's siblings" is exact number of years of education of the husband minus the average education of all his siblings The same education gap is repeated for the wife, compared to her siblings As for property, almost one-third of all parents have none to divide Another one-fourth of parents (21% + 4%) divide the property early, particularly if they have little property and therefore need to merge their interests with their sons so as to be supported in old age (tabulations not shown) While daughters rarely share in this division (4%), sons are equally rarely left out (4%) Thus older customary practices of there being largely equal property division among sons to the exclusion of daughters continue Each of the types of property division are dummy variables, coded "0" and "1," and with "not yet" as the omitted comparison category in later equations If the fixed-loan variant of the altruism model is correct (hypothesis 4), then early parental investment in children through more education and property division should promote current assistance

If, in contrast, the power/bargaining model is correct, then parents will receive more money and services when they own property Parents can bribe children into attention with "strategic bequest" behavior, with potential property division held out as a carrot to induce coresidence and other forms of attention from children Finally, if the mutual aid model (hypothesis 6) is correct, then *parents' help with household chores* should elicit more assistance, and vice versa (pt D)

Other measures include migration and parents' ages and living arrangements Migration inhibits continued residence with parents while potentially encouraging financial assistance instead Parental age, one

⁸ To give education and occupation equal weight, both were coded on scales having a similar range (low = 1, high = 14) and then averaged

might assume, indicates need, with the eldest, frail parents requiring the most assistance.⁹ However, the *observed* age pattern is more complex. Exploratory analysis shows that initially, parents continue to have several adult children at home. Other, nonresident children send support. Over time, however, parents come to depend increasingly on a single child, usually a son. Moreover, older cohorts, from times when birthrates were high, had more children to share parental support. Thus, depending on which perspective one takes, the consequences vary. From the parents' perspective, increasing age, frailty, and financial need are associated with an increasing tendency to live with and depend on a child. But from the child's perspective, increasing parental age is associated with more available siblings to provide support and with a tendency to rely on a single sibling as the primary provider. It is the child's perspective that is captured by age, with the age tracking the curvilinear pattern (fig. 1).

Parents' living arrangement has five categories, of which "living with respondent in respondent's house" is the omitted comparison category (table 1, pt. E). Needier parents are those who live alone or only with an unmarried child, who would often be in school. Parents who live with the respondent get some assistance through in-kind support via shared living and eating arrangements that are not easily quantified, suggesting that they would be less in need of cash transfers.

In the perspective of other studies on Taiwan, the means of the explanatory variables all exhibit reasonable patterns (table 1). As one would expect when older husbands marry younger wives, the husband's parents are somewhat older (pt. E), and, accordingly, his parents are more likely to have one spouse deceased (pt. B). The husband's parents are more likely to live with the couple (pt. E) and are, therefore, more available to "help a great deal" with chores (pt. D). He shares in property divisions, she does not (pt. C). The husband received more education than his wife (pt. C). Except for these differences, husband's and wife's background characteristics are largely similar, as they should be.

RESULTS

Likelihood of Support

The findings show that financial support, including both cash and in-kind gifts, continued in an upward direction, from adult children to parents. Whether son or daughter, most married children gave financial gifts to their parents while few received gifts in return. Specifically, among those

⁹ For deceased mothers, their estimated age serves as a proxy for the age of the surviving father.




FIG 1 —Son-parent pair support

with at least one surviving parent, 79% of sons and 70% of daughters gave gifts during the previous year, while only 14% of sons and 21% of daughters received gifts from their parents (table 2). Upward and downward flows tended to be correlated—those who gave were also more likely to receive at least token amounts, and those who gave nothing were unlikely to receive gifts from parents. These results are striking both for the continuing frequency of upward flows to parents and for the extent to which the giving pattern for daughters closely parallels that for sons.

Amount of Support

The net flow of financial gifts, both downward to children and upward to parents, is perhaps best captured graphically (see fig 2). For a small minority of sons and daughters who happened to have received a one-time gift of a house, a building, land, or other goods in the year preceding our interview, the flows are enormous. We thus truncate both the left and right side of figure 2, not showing the enormous net downward flow to a small 1% or 2% minority or the substantial upward flow of the most generous 5% of sons and daughters. The unshown downward tail reaches a monthly total of \$32,000 in U.S. currency for sons and \$192,000 in U.S. currency for daughters, while the unshown upward tail reaches a

TABLE 2
EXCHANGE OF SUPPORT WITH PARENTS

	CHILD GAVE TO PARENTS		
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Son received from parents			
Yes	12*	2	14
No	67	19	86
Total	79	21	100
Daughter received from parents			
Yes	16†	5	21
No	54	25	79
Total	70	30	100

NOTE —*N* = 2,231 for sons, 2,662 for daughters

* Fig rounded to 12%—net flow in son's favor = 2.4%, in parents' favor = 8.6%, with 8% balanced

† Fig rounded to 16%—net flow in daughter's favor = 3.5%, in parents' favor = 10.4%, with 2% balanced




FIG 2 —Husband's or wife's giving to his or her parents

monthly total of \$960 in U S currency for sons and \$1,900 in U S currency for daughters

Except at the extreme tails of the giving distribution, amounts given seem in some ways modest. One-fifth to one-fourth made no net gifts (left side of fig. 2). It is not until the eighty-fifth percentile that sons reached the official per capita poverty line of \$120 in U S currency (NT\$3,150) per month. This was in a year when the average farmer earned about \$385 in U S currency (NT\$10,000) and the average manual worker earned \$770 in U S dollars (NT\$20,000) per month.¹⁰ In most societies, pension payments do not fully compensate preretirement incomes. Nevertheless, at the eighty-fifth percentile, it would take two sons to support a father-mother pair at the poverty line. Nor do the sacrifices imposed on sons to give this level of support seem enormous. Whether this support is viewed as a percentage of either the husband's income alone or as a percentage of the joint income of husband and wife, most sons gave less than 5% of their income. It is only at the eightieth percentile that the tithe for parents reached 10% of total earnings, even if at the ninety-fifth percentile the sacrifices reached a hefty one-fourth of husband's income. Thus, in contrast to high likelihood of support for parents, this modest—even parsimonious—amount given to parents seems to suggest an increasing autonomy from parents, which would be consistent with the power/bargaining model.

This judgment of parsimoniousness may be too hasty, however. Four features suggest a reevaluation. First, many parents remain young, at work, and less in need of children's resources. About one-fourth of the parents in the sample are still in their 50s, and a full half are less than 65 years old. With improving health and higher income potential, parents are less needful now than they have been in the past (again see fig. 1 on the percentage of parents at each age dependent on their children).¹¹ Second, four-fifths of the parents live with some child, usually a married son (table 1, pt. E). They thus receive extra hidden, in-kind support in housing, food, and other shared facilities. Third, parents pool contributions from multiple children. We can get a crude estimate of the pooled contribution by multiplying the husband's contribution by the total number of brothers in his family (including himself) and adding to that figure his wife's contribution to her parents multiplied by the husband's total

¹⁰ We use the symbol NT\$ for the new Taiwan dollar, with the 1988 exchange rate with \$1 in U S currency being approximately equal to \$26 in new Taiwan dollars.

¹¹ In one U S study, the proportion of private transfers to the total household income is, on average, only 1.6%, which is partly the result of only one-fifth of all households receiving a private transfer (Schoeni 1991).

number of sisters That pool varies strongly by whether the giver's (son's) income was in the top or bottom half of the income distribution and by whether the parental recipients had retired or were still working (fig 3) Parental retirement, particularly when sons had higher incomes, strongly encouraged giving (see the lines using open circle and triangle, respectively) Thus, if all sons had more modest incomes, the total amount received remained modest But if all sons had relatively high incomes and parents were retired, parents received generous contributions At the fiftieth percentile, this subgroup of parents got twice the income of someone at the official poverty line At the seventieth percentile, these parents got four times the income of someone at the official poverty line, or about the same income as a beginning secretary

The fourth feature suggesting that children's support is not modest is that at the top end of the distribution of pooled giving, the contributions begin to rise to quite substantial levels Among the top 15% of more affluent children and top 3% of poorer children, pooled monthly giving approaches \$850 in U S currency (NT\$22,050) or as much as a manual worker's average income (fig 3) All this suggests that for many parents, children's support serves an insurance function Parents get large amounts when they have special needs as they stop work

Finally, we offer four observations on women's giving (a) contrary




FIG 3 —Total giving by children

to the idea that a daughter's responsibility to her parents ends with marriage, we find that giving by daughters is common after marriage (table 2), (b) to be sure, the average giving levels are modest, serving perhaps as much a ceremonial as instrumental function (fig 2), (c) just as with sons, however, daughters' gifts rise to much higher levels among a small minority (fig 2), and (d) giving to the wife's and the husband's parents is highly correlated. When a couple gives to the parents of one, they are also very likely to give to the parents of the other (tabulation not shown).

In sum, the aggregate statistics suggest that the altruism/corporate group model is more relevant than the power/bargaining model to Taiwan's families. However, some important factors, including parental investment in children and parents' property ownership, have yet to be considered. Nor have we explored how coresidence is related to financial support or how the many potential influences on parental support act jointly with one another in a multivariate analysis.

Determinants of Coresidence

In this section and the next, we will examine coresidence and financial support separately.¹² Coresidence patterns may differ in part from financial support patterns for several reasons. Besides often implying in-kind financial support to parents, coresidence typically also implies services, emotional support, and loss of privacy. Compared to financial support, coresidence is more constrained by migration and subsequent distance and more affected by the existence of alternative house providers when there are many siblings. Coresidence can also benefit the child, when neither the parent nor the child has ample resources to live well on his or her own.

The pattern of coresidence is easily summarized (table 3). Among those with living parents, only 4% of daughters live with a parent, but a full 39% of sons do (see the last row). Among sons, four factors inhibit coresidence: (a) Son's high income reduces coresidence (row 1). This is consistent both with more affluent sons "buying" their way out of coresidence, probably sending cash instead and with poorer sons wanting to save money by sharing facilities with parents. More detailed tabulations

¹² As the later text implies, the coresidence and financial support decisions are, to some extent, joint, that is, they are partial substitutes for each other, and the choice between them is made at a single point in time. To check the consequences of this jointness, we estimated a bivariate probit model of the two decisions of coresidence and financial transfer with the error terms correlated. The results were almost identical with two separate probit analyses and the correlation, although statistically significant, was modest ($P < .15$).

TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF CORESIDENCE WITH PARENTS

	MARRIED SONS		MARRIED DAUGHTERS	
	b	SE	b	SE
Couple's resources				
1 Husband's income (logged)	— 092*	040	— 013	059
2 Wife's income (logged)	— 007	010	— 005	023
3 No of grandchildren	— 003	045	— 104	099
Parents' need				
4 Father's SES	— 024	026	190**	053
Parents' marital status				
5 Both alive				
6 Only mother alive	336**	111	1 044**	249
7 Only father alive	201	152	143	394
8 No brother			996**	360
9 No of brothers respondent has	— 399**	036	— 510**	102
10 No of sisters respondent has	014	031	— 145*	069
Parental investment				
11 Years of education	— 007	019	— 088*	044
12 Years more education than siblings	002	021	— 002	047
Parents' property divided				
13 Not yet divided				
14 Divided, no share to respondent	089	237	— 534	374
15 Divided, a share to respondent	— 011	131	713	423
16 No property to divide	— 354**	118	— 248	252
Other				
Migration since age 15				
17 Stayed in urban area				
18 Rural to urban area	— 440**	130	— 056	292
19 Stayed in rural or moved to rural area	362**	129	— 056	260
20a Mother's age (in years)	012	081	042	168
20b Mother's age ²	— 000	000	— 000	000
Intercept	— 248	2 688	— 3 275	5 528
N of observations	2,231		2,662	
Log likelihood	— 1,370		— 379	
Mean of dependent variable	39		04	

NOTE — Probit analysis of coresidence, coded 0/1

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

(unreported) show that the potential buying or “bargaining” out of coresidence occurs with both parents and siblings, for when the husband’s income is higher, some parents are more likely to live alone while other parents are more likely to live with one of the husband’s brothers ¹³ (b) If the parents have no property to divide—which is most often true of urban manual workers who only rent their home—then there is little to keep sons near home (row 16) ¹⁴ (c) With more brothers (this is less true of sisters) as alternative house sharers, it is less likely that any specific son will live with parents (rows 9–10) (d) Sons who have moved from the countryside tend to leave parents in the countryside (row 18) Conversely, major factors promoting coresidence are the widowhood of the mother (rows 6–7) and the son’s rural residence (row 19)

Given that poor sons can benefit from coresidence along with parents, the conclusions we draw here cannot be definitive. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence favors both the weak-bargaining hypothesis (with affluent sons trading cash for housing services) and a limited version of the insurance variant of the altruism/corporate group hypothesis (with sons housing widowed mothers). The high coresidence level in rural areas is consistent with models that assume the social pressures enforcing strong altruism/corporate group norms remain stronger in villages, although the much simpler explanation may have to do with near-empty family homes long vacated by the rapid flight of most family members to cities and towns.

For daughters, the list of relevant conditions is short (table 3, col. 3) (a) Coresidence is more common when they have fewer siblings, especially when there is no brother to live with the parents (rows 8–10). Without a brother, a woman’s odds of living with her parents are five times greater (about 25% vs. 5% in the raw data). (b) Daughters coreside more often when their mother has been widowed (row 6). (c) Additional education inhibits coresidence (row 11). (d) Coresidence is pro-

¹³ For example, when “parent(s) live with husband” is the comparison in a multinomial logit with the same factors as in table 3, husband’s income relates to alternative parental residence arrangements as follows: “husband lives with parents” = -443 ($P < .01$), “parents live with other married child” = 418 ($P < .01$), “parents live alone” = 398 ($P < .01$), and “parents live with unmarried child” = 149 ($P < .05$). In short, both husband’s own need and bargaining power come into play. Poorer husbands live with the parents rather than having parents live with them. Richer sons have parents who either live alone or with a married child other than themselves.

¹⁴ More detailed multinomial logit equations show that while the absence of parental property inhibits the husband’s living in his parents’ home, it does not inhibit parents’ moving in with him. Thus, the parental property effect does not prove the strong bargaining hypothesis (hypothesis 1). Even with no property to be shared, sons house parents who are in need.

moted not by parental economic need but by its opposite—daughters are more likely to live with a parent with high SES (row 4) Daughters' residential support is significant, then, not in cases of ordinary parental need, but only in those exceptional cases when there is no son to share housing with a parent or when the mother has been widowed

Determinants of Support

We examine *net* giving to parents, with children who are net recipients or nongivers and, therefore, classified as zero¹⁵ The analysis has two steps first, a probit analysis of whether there is giving (coded "1," "0") and then an ordinary least squares analysis of how much is given, with a selection factor (λ) calculated from the first step included as an independent variable (see Heckman 1980)

Couple's resources —Contrary to the strong version of the bargaining hypothesis, couples with more resources give more generously (table 4, rows 1–2) The spouses do bargain among themselves, however—among both sons and daughters, one's income has a stronger effect on giving to one's own parents than on giving to the spouse's parents Thus, although, in both equations, the husband's income is more important for giving than that of the wife, the gap is much wider for gifts to the husband's parents than for gifts to the wife's parents For example, the effect of a unit increase in the wife's income on the amount given to the husband's parents is less than one-tenth of the effect of the husband's income (.035 vs .397), whereas the ratio is approximately two-thirds for transfers to the wife's parents (.060 vs .096) As expected, more grandchildren in the home imposes local obligations that reduce the amount of giving (row 3)

Parents' need —Generally, needful parents get more support, as predicted in the insurance variant of the altruism/corporate group model Specifically, most of the six indicators of parental need—low socioeconomic status, lack of property to divide, being the sole surviving parent, a large number of children, age, and residence with unmarried children—promote sons' giving (table 4) There is an apparent exception in sons giving no more to widowed than to married parents However, this exception may be more apparent than real, since even while some support may be urgent, the total amount of support required for a single surviving parent may be less than for both parents together Another possible

¹⁵ Repeating the analysis with gross giving as the dependent variable produces almost identical results, whether or not "amount received from parents" is included as an independent variable

anomaly in daughters' failure to support their widowed fathers may reflect stronger emotional bonding to mothers

For daughters, the mixed pattern of results suggests not a generalized support role but one of emergency support for special cases. Contrary to the generalized support role, parents fail to elicit more support from daughters when the parents are poor (row 4) or living alone or with unmarried children (rows 25–26). Instead daughters provide significant support only when there is no brother (row 8)¹⁶ or the parent has moved into the daughter's home (rows 23–27). Thus, significant support is elicited only when parents with special needs have no son, which requires them, contrary to the usual cultural practice, to reside with a daughter.

Parents' investment —Consistent with the fixed-loan model of inter-generational relations, earlier parental investment promotes higher current payments. On average, children who received more education and property repay those earlier "investments" with more giving to parents (table 4, rows 11–16). Note that this higher "repayment" level is not just the result of higher current incomes, because husband's and wife's incomes are already in these equations. Moreover, with occupation in the equation as an additional proxy for permanent income, education still significantly increases giving to parents (tables not shown). All this suggests that it is not just higher current earnings or optimism about lifetime earnings that encourages a child to sacrifice for parents. Rather there is a debt, no doubt mixed with gratitude, that must be repaid.

There are no exceptions to the general debt-repayment pattern for sons. All property division promotes children's giving (rows 14–16). Obviously, sons who received a share during the property division give the largest amount. This is strong evidence of the absence of bargaining. Parents do not need to use withholding of property in a form of "strategic bequests" to induce attention from their children. Parents who have property that they could divide at some future date get not more but less support from children. Separate tabulations show that, although more muted, this pattern applies to visits as well.¹⁷ The positive relationship between education and giving also refutes the bargaining/power model, because, instead of abandoning their parents, children with more long-term earning potential do more for them.

¹⁶ With a *t* value of 1.89, the "no brother" relationship comes close to a usual .05 level of significance.

¹⁷ Dividing the sample by whether the potential male beneficiaries are multiple or single does not change these results for visits (cf. Bernheim et al. 1985). The Bernheim results are different, one suspects, because phone calls paid for by the more prosperous parent are included in the measure of frequency of contact. In Taiwan as well, phone calls are more common when the parents are prosperous.

TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF GIVING TO PARENTS AND AMOUNTS GIVEN LOGGED VALUES

	MARRIED SONS		MARRIED DAUGHTERS	
	Gave	Amount	Gave	Amount
Couple's resources				
1 Husband's income	064** (025)	397** (099)	016 (015)	096** (029)
2 Wife's income	006 (006)	035** (009)	013* (005)	060** (020)
3 No of grandchildren	- 033 (028)	- 196** (053)	- 045 (024)	- 198** (073)
Parents' need				
4 Father's SES	- 031* (016)	- 132** (044)	- 011 (021)	- 010 (022)
Parents' marital status				
5 Both alive				
6 Only mother alive	057 (072)	046 (106)	- 018 (064)	- 063 (063)
7 Only father alive	049 (097)	126 (121)	- 218** (083)	- 938** (337)
8 No brother			- 022 (141)	274 (145)
9 No of brothers respondent has	026 (022)	108** (042)	024 (021)	079* (039)
10 No of sisters respondent has	013 (020)	070** (028)	040** (017)	161** (058)
Parents' investment				
11 Years of education	015 (012)	131** (022)	036** (011)	236** (052)
12 Years more education than siblings	005 (013)	012 (015)	- 008 (012)	- 061** (017)
Parents' property divided				
13 Not yet divided				
14 Divided, no share to respondent	091 (149)	415* (202)	133 (075)	487* (199)
15 Divided, a share to respondent	332** (087)	1 270** (432)	104 (140)	271 (196)
16 No property to divide	121 (072)	435* (179)	157* (062)	599** (228)

Parents' service						
Parents help with household chores						
17	No					
18	Yes	068	(.094)	579** (137)	049 (157)	535** (164)
Other						
Migration since age 15						
19	Stayed in urban area					
20	Rural to urban area	151	(.081)	443* (212)	113 (071)	328* (167)
21	Stayed in rural or moved to rural area	- 014	(.080)	- 357** (090)	- 070 (064)	- 415** (124)
22a	Mother's age	133**	(.050)	643** (191)	036 (041)	214** (066)
22b	Mother's age ²	- 001**	(.000)	- 005** (001)	- 000 (000)	- 001** (000)
Parents' living arrangement						
23	Living with respondent in respondent's home					
24	Living with respondent in parents' home	- 037	(.100)	- 120 (133)	- 340 (271)	- 1 725** (561)
25	Living alone	177	(.092)	988** (259)	- 092 (147)	- 840** (205)
26	Living with unmarried children	332**	(.130)	1 673** (455)	- 198 (154)	- 1 372** (322)
27	Living with other married child	162*	(.081)	829** (229)	- 183 (140)	- 1 256** (294)
λ				8 46** (2 85)		6 45* (2 57)
Intercept		-4 87**	(1 66)	-22 28** (9 09)	-1 71 (1 36)	-6 06 (4 45)
N of observations		2,231		1,633	2,662	1,675
Log likelihood/ R^2		-1,261		14	-1,712	22
Mean of dependent variable		75		9 35	64	8 43

NOTE.—Analysis of giving is probit analysis, analysis of net amount given is OLS

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

Daughters, however, give not more but less when they have more education than their siblings and give, if at all, only modestly more when they have received property. However, since only about 3% of daughters fit into either of these categories, we are reluctant to flag these anomalies as major exceptions to the overall investment-repayment pattern.

Parents' service — Both sons and daughters compensate their parents for help with chores (row 18). No doubt the inverse also holds, with parents more gratefully giving assistance to children who have helped them materially.

Trade-offs — Finally, among sons, coresidence partially substitutes for financial support. Sons who coreside with parents give less than those whose parents live with another married child, unmarried children, or by themselves. The trade-offs are even more apparent in results comparing coresidence and financial support alternatives (table 5). In a multinomial logit with "no support" as the comparison, poorer sons tend toward coresidence with no explicit financial support (row 1). Richer sons send money and avoid coresidence (row 2). Doubtless, there is an element of son's need involved as well. Poorer sons need shared residential amenities. Richer sons have less need for shared amenities and more ability to send cash instead.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

This study highlights how rapid economic growth shapes patterns of adult children's support for their parents. Among the competing hypotheses about intergenerational support, the strong version of the power/bargaining hypothesis is the least supported. Contrary to the assumption that industrialization and accompanying social and economic changes rapidly weaken the power of parents to extract resources from children,

TABLE 5
SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES BY SON'S AND FATHER'S RESOURCES

SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES	SON'S INCOME		FATHER'S SES	
	b	SE	b	SE
No support				
Coresidence, no financial support	-.042	.059	-.065	.048
Financial support, no coresidence	.137*	.059	-.081*	.036
Both financial support and coresidence	.039	.056	-.081*	.040

NOTE — This table uses multinomial logit with the same list of covariates as in table 3. The dependent variable is distributed as "no support" = 14%, "coresidence, no financial support" = 9%, "financial support, no coresidence" = 49%, and "both financial support and coresidence" = 29%.

* $P < .05$

many upward flows to parents continue. Not only has the flow of resources from children to parents failed to reverse in direction, but also the parents receiving the largest flow of resources are typically not those with the greatest potential "power" over their children. True, when parents own a house, children are more likely to share that house. But contrary to purported Western patterns, parents who continue to hold property that children think they might inherit get no additional visits and not more, but less, financial support than other parents. This pattern holds in even more detailed tabulations (unreported) that compare parents of higher and lower status, with more and less property, and with many siblings or only one potentially vying for a larger inheritance (cf Bernheim et al. 1985).

Weaker versions of the bargaining hypothesis are supported, however. There are trade-offs between the loss of privacy and consumption of time that accompany coresidence and the giving of simple financial support. Although the effect of the husband's own financial need cannot be completely disentangled—poor sons benefit as well from shared housing and amenities—the bulk of the evidence suggests that there is a strong tendency for richer sons to bargain themselves out of coresidence. The richer sons are, instead, more likely to have parents living alone and receiving financial support or to have their parents living with some other, probably financially less fortunate, sibling. This cross-sectional finding is consistent with the long-term decline in coresidence. Although the vast majority of old people continue to live with at least one child, adult children now separate much more quickly from their parents and other siblings. For example, in data analyses not reported here, the percentage of couples living with the husband's parents has declined by about 30 percentage points in the past three decades. This is consistent with the American trend for increasingly affluent children to trade privacy for economized sharing of housing and amenities (see Michael et al. 1980). Thus, while virtually all parents remain supported through coresidence and financial aid, individual children increasingly bargain their way out of being the one child who provides the coresidential part of that aid, choosing instead for the parent to live nearby or with some other sibling at another location.

There is also some bargaining among spouses, with wives who earn more income providing more support to their own parents. Again, however, this is only a weak form of bargaining that is quite different from earlier assumptions that implied a quick shift in intergenerational assistance as parents lost the means to coerce payment out of children.

An almost equally cynical model of intergenerational transfers assumes that aid will continue in modern settings only on the basis of short-term,

quid pro quo exchanges (e.g., Cox 1987). The inducement to continuing support is not the "coercion" of withheld inheritances but the prospect of assistance with daily chores, child care, and other matters. Although our data confirm that there is a strong positive relationship between parents' services and children's financial support, the data also show that only a minor proportion of the parents provide services for children. Thus, short-term, quid pro quo mutual aid explains only a part of intergenerational transactions.

The altruism/corporate group model, and the long-term patterns of intergenerational loans and insurance that this model allows, is more consistent with the data. Where the economy is growing rapidly and parents' resources are meager, investing in children's human capital (particularly education) bears higher returns than investing in property. Repayment of parental investment is an important part of children's financial support. Sons and daughters who have received more education and sons who have inherited property give more to their parents, when we control for other factors, including their income. This obligation to parents is more than just a fixed loan, however. It involves open-ended obligations to support parents in need, much like an insurance policy. This aid is compensatory, with more affluent members of the corporate group transferring resources to the needier in ways that help equalize the resources among group members. Widowed mothers are housed by children. Parents get more financial assistance when they are poor, have no property, and remain alone. Additional unreported tabulations show that aid is more common when parents are ill and when the differential resources between parent and child favor the child.

These patterns question assumptions that industrialization and its accompanying cultural changes quickly erase most traditional values. Parental socialization into obligation, guilt, and gratitude via the beliefs in filial piety remains strong much longer than one might assume. Change in these beliefs may still come. With rapid growth, children have typically been more prosperous than their parents, and with very few public social welfare benefits there have been few sources of old age support other than children. This situation has continued to provide parents and the public-education system a very strong incentive for socializing children into strong obligations to their parents (see Becker 1993). Parents are becoming increasingly prosperous, however, and should the rate of future economic growth slow, the gap between children and parents' wealth would narrow. Moreover, starting with universal medical insurance, the government is gradually stepping in with public support programs. In time, then, incentives for socializing children into such strong obligations of filial piety may weaken and the overall pattern of continuing upward

support to parents reverse. But in the interim, the norms have remained much stronger and the resulting behavior much more in favor of the parents than many models would imply.

The continuing dominance of traditional values is also seen in the relationship of daughters to their parents. In some modest ways, daughters' behavior is beginning to approximate that of sons. Much like sons, daughters with more education and income are more likely to repay their parents, and daughters are more likely to help support widowed mothers and parents with no property. Nevertheless, daughters' support still remains very much supplementary. Although "ceremonial" financial support remains almost as pervasive as among sons, the average amounts are much smaller, rising to significant levels only among a small minority. Housing of parents is rare. In short, daughters respond not so much to the parents' ordinary needs as to their special ones, such as a mother's being widowed or, most distinctly, when there are no sons to provide the culturally preferred patrilineal descent line of support. Daughters, thus, remain in many ways the insurer of last resort. Again, this could change in the future. The similarity of underlying support patterns to those of sons suggests that daughters would be ready to step in. And with current Taiwan birthrates below the rate of replacement, in time, more and more parents will approach old age with only daughters to provide assistance. This is a pattern that has yet to emerge, suggesting again a greater tenacity to traditional practices than one might have expected.

In conclusion, the vast majority of adult children in Taiwan provide net financial support for their parents, and we argue that this is part of early contracts planned by the parents. During the process of rapid economic growth, parents invest in the children's human capital and the children repay it on the basis of both the amount of the parents' earlier investment in them and the parents' current needs.

REFERENCES

- Ahern, Emily M. 1974 "Affines and the Rituals of Kinship." Pp. 279-308 in *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*, edited by Arthur P. Wolf. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Becker, Gary S. 1974 "A Theory of Social Interactions." *Journal of Political Economy* 82: 1063-93.
- . 1991 *A Treatise on the Family*. Enlarged ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- . 1993 "Preference Formation within Families." Paper delivered at the American Economic Association meetings, Anaheim, Calif.
- Becker, Gary S., and Nigel Tomes. 1979 "An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility." *Journal of Political Economy* 87 (6): 1153-89.

- Bergstrom, Theodore 1989 "A Fresh Look at the Rotten-Kid Theorem—and Other Household Mysteries" *Journal of Political Economy* 97 1138–59
- Bernheim, B Douglas, Andrei Schleifer, and Lawrence H Summers 1985 "The Strategic Bequest Motive" *Journal of Political Economy* 93 (6) 1045–76
- Brody, Elaine M 1985 "Women in the Middle and Family Help to Older People" *Gerontologist* 21 470–80
- Cain, Mead 1981 "Risk and Insurance Perspectives on Fertility and Agrarian Change in India and Bangladesh" *Population and Development Review* 7 435–74
- Caldwell, John C 1976 "Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory" *Population and Development Review* 2 321–66
- 1982 *Theory of Fertility Decline* New York Academic
- Casterline, John B , et al 1991 "Differences in the Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Four Asian Countries The Interplay of Constraints and Preferences" Comparative Study of the Elderly in Asia research reports 91-10 University of Michigan, Population Studies Center
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre 1992 "'Collective' Models of Household Behavior The Sharing Rule Approach" Paper presented at the International Food Policy Research Institute–World Bank Conference on Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Policy Issues and Research Methods, Washington, D C , February
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Lawrence Haddad, John Hoddinott, and Ravi Kanbur 1993 "Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household Time to Shift the Burden of Proof" Paper presented at the American Economics Association meetings, Anaheim, Calif , January
- Chuang, Ying-chang 1985 "Family Structure and Reproductive Patterns in a Taiwanese Village" Pp 128–64 in *The Chinese Family and Its Ritual Behavior*, edited by Jih-chang Hsieh, and Ying-chang Chuang Taipei Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica
- Cohen, Myron 1976 *House United, House Divided The Chinese Family in Taiwan* New York Columbia University Press
- Coward, Raymond T , and Jeffrey W Dwyer 1990 "The Association of Gender, Sibling Network Composition, and Patterns of Parent Care by Adult Children" *Research on Aging* 12 (2) 158–81
- Cox, Donald 1987 "Motives for Private Income Transfers" *Journal of Political Economy* 95 (3) 508–46
- 1990 "Intergenerational Transfers and Liquidity Constraints" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 125 187–217
- Deaton, Angus, and Christina Paxson 1992 "Savings, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan" Paper presented at National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Aging, Cuneel Bay, U S Virgin Islands
- DGBAS (Republic of China, Hsing-cheng yuan chu-chi ch'u) 1987a *T'aiwan ti-ch'u ch'ing-shao men chi lao-jen hsien-kuang tiao-ch'a pao-kao* (Survey report on the contemporary situation of youth and the aged in the Taiwan area) Taipei Executive Yuan, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics
- 1987b *T'aiwan ti-ch'u fu-nu chieh-hun sheng-yu ch'u-yeh tiao-ch'a pao-kao* (Report on fertility and employment of married women in the Taiwan area) Taipei Executive Yuan, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics
- Freedman, Ronald, Ming-cheng Chang, and Te-hsiung Sun 1982 "Household Composition, Extended Kinship and Reproduction in Taiwan 1973–1980" *Population Studies* 36 395–411
- Gallin, Bernard 1966 *Hsin Hsing, Taiwan* Berkeley University of California Press
- 1978 "Rural to Urban Migration in Taiwan Its Impact on Chinese Family and Kinship" Pp 261–82 in *Chinese Family Law and Social Change in Historical*

- and *Comparative Perspective*, edited by David C Buxbaum Seattle University of Washington Press
- Gallin, Bernard, and Rita Gallin 1985 "Matrilateral and Affinal Relationships in Changing Chinese Society" Pp 101-16 in *The Chinese Family and Its Ritual Behavior*, edited by Jih-chang Hsieh, and Ying-chang Chuang Taipei Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica
- Goode, William J 1963 *World Revolution and Family Patterns* Glencoe, Ill Free Press
- Greenhalgh, Susan 1985 "Sexual Stratification The Other Side of 'Growth with Equity' in East Asia" *Population and Development Review* 11 265-314
- Harrell, Stevan 1972 *Ploughshare Village* Seattle University of Washington Press
- Headley, Lee A 1983 *Suicide in Asia and the Near East* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Heckman, James 1980 "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error" Pp 206-48 in *Female Labor Supply Theory and Estimation*, edited by J P Smith Santa Monica, Calif Rand Corporation
- Hermalin, Albert I, Ming-cheng Chang, Hui-sheng Lin, Mei-lin Lee, and Mary Beth Ofstedal 1990 "Patterns of Support among the Elderly in Taiwan and Their Policy Implications" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Toronto
- Kotlikoff, L J, and A Spivak 1981 "The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market" *Journal of Political Economy* 89 372-91
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J, John B Shoven, and Avia Spivak 1986 "The Effect of Annuity Insurance on Savings and Inequality" *Journal of Labor Economics* 4 S183-S207
- Kuo, Li-an 1989 "The Crises of Modern Aged Chinese From the Viewpoint of Developmental Task Theory" *Journal of Feng Chia University* no 22 39-51
- Lin, C Y C, and V R Fu 1990 "A Comparison of Child Rearing Practices among Chinese, Immigrant Chinese, and Caucasian American Parents" *Child Development* 61 429-33
- Litwak, Eugene, and Stephen Kulis 1987 "Technology, Proximity, and Measures of Kin Support" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 49 649-61
- Liu, Paul K C 1982 "Determinants of Income Inequality over the Family Development Cycle The Case of Taiwan" *Population and Development Review* 8 S53-S69
- Lo, Joan Chi-chiung 1987 "The Changing Patterns of Household Structure and Economic Status of the Elderly" Pp 375-402 in *Conference on Economic Development and Social Welfare in Taiwan* Taipei Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica
- Lucas, Robert E B, and Oded Stark 1985 "Motivations to Remit Evidence from Botswana," *Journal of Political Economy* 93 901-18
- Lundberg, Shelly, and Robert A Pollak 1991 "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market" Discussion Paper no 91-08 University of Washington, Department of Economics
- McElroy, Marjorie B, and Mary Jean Hornery 1981 "Nash-bargained Household Decisions" *International Economic Review* 22 333-49
- Martin, Linda G 1990 "Changing Intergenerational Family Relations in East Asia" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 510 102-14
- Michael, R T, V R Fuchs, and S R Scott 1980 "Changes in the Propensity to Live Alone 1950-1976" *Demography* 17 39-56
- Morgan, S Philip, and Kiyoshi Hiroshima 1983 "The Persistence of Extended Family Residence in Japan" *American Sociological Review* 48 269-81
- Mueller, Eva 1976 "The Economic Value of Children in a Peasant Society" Pp

- 98–153 in *Population and Development The Search for Selective Interventions*, edited by R G Ridker Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
- Nei-cheng pu, t'ung-chi chu, ed 1989 T'ai-wan ti-chu fu-nu sheng-huo chuang-kuang tiao-ch'a pao-kao (Report of an investigation of women's life situation in the Taiwan area) Taipei
- NORC and National Taiwan University 1991 *Taiwan Women and Family Survey Codebook* Chicago Photocopied
- Nugent, Jeffrey B 1985 "The Old-Age Security Motive for Fertility" *Population and Development Review* 11 75–97
- Parish, William L, and Robert J Willis 1992 "Daughters, Education and Family Budgets Taiwan Experiences" Paper presented at the Conference on Women's Human Capital and Development, Bellagio, Italy, May
- Parsons, Talcott 1943 "The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States" Pp 177–96 in *Essays in Sociological Theory* by T Parsons Glencoe, Ill Free Press, 1949
- Pasternak, Burton 1972 *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Preston, Samuel H 1976 "Family Sizes of Children and Family Sizes of Women" *Demography* 13 105–14
- Schoeni, Robert F 1991 "Another Leak in the Bucket? Public Transfer Income and Private Family Support" Mimeograph University of Michigan, Department of Economics
- Schultz, T Paul 1990 "Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility" *Journal of Human Resources* 25 599–634
- Shorter, Edward 1975 *The Making of the Modern Family* New York Basic
- Silverstein, Merril, and Linda J Waite 1993 "Are Blacks More Likely than Whites to Receive and Provide Social Support in Middle and Old Age? Yes, No, and Maybe So" *Journal of Gerontology Social Sciences* 48 (4) S212–S222
- Spitze, Glenna, and John Logan 1990 "Sons, Daughters, and Intergenerational Social Support" *Journal of Marriage and Family* 52 420–30
- Sung, Lung-sheng 1981 "Property and Family Division" In *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Tang, Mei-chun 1978 *Urban Chinese Families An Anthropological Field Study in Taipei City, Taiwan* Taipei National Taiwan University Press
- Thomas, Duncan 1990 "Intra-household Resource Allocation An Inferential Approach" *Journal of Human Resources* 25 635–64
- Thornton, Arland, Ming-cheng Chang, and Te-hsiung Sun 1984 "Social and Economic Change, Intergenerational Relationships, and Family Formation in Taiwan" *Demography* 21 475–99
- Troll, Lilian 1987 "Gender Differences in Cross-Generation Networks" *Sex Roles* 17 (11/12) 751–66
- Tsu, Elaine Yi-lan 1987 *Are Married Daughters 'Spilled Water'?* Taipei National University, Population Studies Center Women's Research Program
- Willis, Robert J 1982 "The Direction of Intergenerational Transfers and Demographic Transition" *Population and Development Review* 8 S207–S234
- 1988 "A Theory of the Equilibrium Interest Rate in an Overlapping Generations Model Life Cycles, Institutions, and Population Growth" In *Economic Consequences of Alternative Population Patterns*, edited by B Arthur, R Lee, and G Rodgers Oxford Oxford University Press
- Wilson, Richard W 1970 *Learning to Be Chinese The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan* Cambridge, Mass MIT Press
- 1981 "Conformity and Deviance Regarding Moral Rules in Chinese Society" Pp 117–36 in *Normal and Abnormal Behavior in Chinese Culture*, edited by Arthur Kleinman and T Y Lin Dordrecht D Reidel

Support in Taiwan

- Wolf, Margery 1968 *The House of Lim* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts
- 1972 *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press
- 1975 "Women and Suicide in China." In *Women in Chinese Society*, edited by Margery Wolf and Roxane Witke. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press
- Wu, P. 1985 "Child Training in Chinese Culture." In *Chinese Culture and Mental Health*, edited by W. S. Tseng and D. Y. H. Wu. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press

Educational Continuation by College Graduates¹

Ross M. Stolzenberg
University of Chicago

This article reconsiders the apparently paradoxical absence of background SES effects on school continuation by college graduates. The approach is distinguished by its focus on specific graduate programs, in particular MBA programs, and by a concentration on different types of attitudes that appear relevant to graduate school matriculation. The article examines the impacts of job values and directs attention to conative attitudes toward graduate school, which are inferred from prior behavior. Results are consistent with earlier findings of SES effects on total years of schooling, yet also explain the absence of parental SES effects on schooling beyond college.

I INTRODUCTION

The enduring impact of socioeconomic background on individuals' educational attainment is one of the best-established results of modern stratification research (Bidwell and Friedkin 1988, Jencks et al. 1972, Sewell, Hauser, and Featherman 1976). Substantial correlation between background SES and schooling appears to be present in all modern societies (Treiman 1977, Hope 1984), and this correlation plays a central role in virtually all major sociological explanations of intergenerationally transmitted socioeconomic inequality in industrialized nations (e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967, Illich 1983, Boudon 1974). Two basic theoretical perspec-

¹ I am very grateful to Bengt Muthén for translating path models into the LISCOMP framework, and to Bengt Muthén and Linda Muthén for supervising the work of Michael Hollis and Tammy Tam in preparing data and obtaining empirical estimates for LISCOMP analyses. Numerous people contributed many useful criticisms of earlier drafts of this article, including Bill Bielby, Arlene Leibowitz, Rob Mare, Howard Schuman, Arland Thornton, and Raymond Wong. Opinions, interpretations, and errors are mine alone. Aspects of this research were supported by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Behavior (grant P50-HD12639) and by the Graduate Management Admission Council. Address correspondence to Ross M. Stolzenberg, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637. Via e-mail: stolz@sam.spc.uchicago.edu

tives have dominated modern social stratification research on educational attainment and have been applied successfully to educational attainment through college.² The first might be called a parental resources framework, which focuses on the cost of school and the ability of high-SES parents to subsidize their children's educational expenses, thereby affecting both the probability of attending school and, for those who attend, the quality of school attended (Bowles and Gintis 1976, Boudon 1974, Illich 1983, Baird 1976, pp 33–35, National Research Council 1989, p 345, Steelman and Powell 1991). The second theoretical perspective might be called a parental socialization model (Sewell, Haller, and Portes 1969, Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf 1970, Alexander, Eckland, and Griffin 1976). This model emphasizes that children of higher SES parents tend to be socialized to want more schooling than children of lower SES parents, higher aspirations in turn increase educational persistence and total years of school completed.³ Since publication of the Wisconsin model of socioeconomic achievement (Alexander et al 1976) and its subsequent replicates and extensions, sociologists generally have come to believe that empirical evidence favors the parental socialization model as an explanation of the effect of parental SES on the total years of schooling completed by individuals.

However, it is also known that the determinants of school enrollment and academic persistence have varying effects over the course of the educational career (e.g., Alwin and Thornton 1984, Mare 1980). Thus, for example, in her classic study, Beverly Duncan (1965) focuses on effects of parental characteristics on school termination probability at specific grades, as does Mare (1980, see also Pong and Post 1990). Others have addressed the impact of parental SES on transitions from high school to college (Sewell and Hauser [1975, pp 116–17] enumerate older aspects of this literature, see also Boudon 1974, Hauser 1989, Hauser and Anderson 1989). In general, there is less research on school continuation beyond college than on educational persistence at any other educational level, and there is little detailed analysis, especially recently, of the impact of parental SES on transitions from college to postcollegiate schooling, even in those studies that do consider the subject (e.g., Berelson 1960, pp

² Hallinan (1988) nicely classifies and reviews research on quality as well as quantity of educational opportunity. My concern here is with quantity of postcollegiate schooling.

³ Comprehensive data on graduate and professional school students are not, to my knowledge, available. Berelson (1990, p 39) states that 58% of students who applied for aid through the Graduate and Professional School Financial Aid Service reported no parental financial contributions whatsoever. Reported annual parental contributions appear to be generally small in comparison with student educational debt loads, although that varies considerably by field of study.

133–35, Baird 1976, pp 32–35, for an exception—discussed below—see Mare [1980])

To the extent that empirical evidence about the determinants of school continuation beyond college does exist, it suggests that neither the parental socialization model nor the parental resources model applies very strongly, if at all. The great majority of college graduates appear to lack the level of financial dependence on their parents that would be necessary for the parental resources model to have much effect on postcollegiate school enrollment patterns (Berenson 1990). Mare's (1980) analyses of several large data sets report that socioeconomic background affects early grade progressions strongly, but has virtually no effect on educational transitions beyond college (see Pong and Post [1990] for an international extension). Parental SES apparently plays an important role in getting people to college, but the findings of Mare and others suggest that it does not have a substantial effect on the likelihood that college graduates continue their schooling. That is, the probability of entering graduate school is affected by parental socioeconomic status, but the conditional probability of entering graduate school, given that one has completed college, is not substantially affected by parental SES.⁴ Seen in contrast with the effect of parental SES on total years of schooling, the absence of these effects on school continuation beyond college remains striking.

These results are important as well as surprising, we think. Postbaccalaureate schooling profoundly affects access to some of the most powerful, prestigious, and remunerative positions in the occupational distribution (Kingston and Clawson 1985), and graduate and professional schools are critical links in the chain of institutions that transmit and codify the most complex information in modern industrial societies (Bourdieu 1977, 1984, Parsons 1964, p 342). Thus, most theories of social inequality seem to suggest stronger—not weaker—effects of background SES on transitions to the highest level of formal education than on continuation to earlier educational levels.

My main purpose here is to learn something about why the link between parental SES and school continuation virtually vanishes after college. The apparent absence of SES effects on school continuation by college graduates suggests that the path from parental SES through stu-

⁴ This finding is sometimes misunderstood to challenge the sociological commonplace that parental characteristics affect total years of school completed, or the equally venerable hypothesis that children of higher SES parents are more likely to go to graduate or professional school than children of lower SES parents. However, those who continue schooling beyond college can have higher background SES than the general population (a positive SES effect on graduate school attendance probability) without having higher background SES than the population of college graduates (a positive SES effect on the probability of transition from college to graduate school).

dent aspirations to educational continuation is attenuated or broken. But existing research does not indicate where that attenuation or break occurs. If we continue to accept the parental socialization model as fundamentally correct, then the break or attenuation in parental SES effects could occur between SES and aspirations, between aspirations and school continuation, by a weakening of both of these paths, or by the appearance of some counterbalancing negative path. My first purpose is to shed some light on where this path breaks or attenuates.

In addition, SES may show less effect on postcollegiate school continuation because of the ways in which postcollegiate schooling differs from earlier educational levels. Postcollegiate schooling is a rubric encompassing several different types of education. Graduate fields of study differ widely in content, pedagogy, financial support for students, intellectual demands, and admission requirements. Thus, "postcollegiate education" is many different types of school, and school continuation after college is a set of transitions to a variety of different competing educational programs, some of which seem more likely than others to be influenced by background SES.⁵ Important dissimilarities between different types of educational programs may be masked by lumping together transitions to business school, law school, programs in the various disciplines, and other graduate and professional programs. Therefore, it would be useful to disaggregate transitions to graduate school into transitions to one or more specific types of graduate school and to examine the effects, if any, of SES and other factors on them. A second purpose of this article is to perform this task.

I also suspect that the relationship between parental SES and school continuation beyond college may be replaced by the influence of characteristics that are directly relevant to postcollegiate school attendance but are conceptually meaningless or empirically undefined for students still in high school or grade school. These characteristics certainly include an individual's major field of study in college but may also include attitudes that are not formed before students near the end of their college years. The third purpose of this article is to define some of these characteristics conceptually, theoretically, and empirically, to examine their impact on postcollegiate school continuation, and to determine if their omission

⁵ For example, schools that tend to provide more financial support for their students would seem to insulate their students somewhat more from parental SES effects than schools that provide less support. An alternative perspective, taken up in Gary Becker's (1967) Woytinsky lectures several decades ago, suggests that if schooling is a good investment and if the economy is efficient, then students who would benefit from the investment would be able to obtain a sufficient return from it to borrow the funds necessary to pay the costs of schooling.

from previous analyses masks the effects of parental SES on educational persistence after college

In short, then, I seek to understand how certain characteristics of college graduates affect their matriculation into specific graduate programs. My approach to this problem is theoretical and empirical and begins with consideration of action and attitudes. After that, I turn to data, methods, results, and conclusions, in that order.

II ACTION AND ATTITUDES

Because graduate and professional school attendance is both an optional activity and one that requires forethought and planning, it seems the quintessence of voluntary action, and theories of action seem likely to offer some insight into its etiology. Perhaps the briefest statement of an action theory is one attributed to Pfeffer: People do what they *want* to the extent that they *can*. More elaborate formulations do not disagree, but often have focused on why different people want to do different things; these theories generally argue that the desire to take an action is governed by actors' attitudes toward the *expected consequences* of the action (Parsons 1964, pp. 4–5, Coleman 1990, Pfeffer 1985).

What consequences of postcollegiate schooling motivate college graduates to continue their formal education? Perhaps the most significant anticipated consequence of postbaccalaureate schooling is incumbency or advancement in the occupations and careers for which a program of graduate study provides training.⁶ Volumes of research in sociology, economics, and psychology have noted the impact of schooling on occupational assignment. Also, all professional schools and most discipline-oriented graduate programs correspond to particular occupations or families of occupations and prepare students for entry to or advancement in those occupations.⁷

Because occupations differ in the work, working conditions, and rewards they offer their incumbents, the appeal of a specific occupation to a particular individual depends upon the individual's work attitudes—the extent to which the individual likes or dislikes the various tasks, working conditions, rewards, or even moral values served by work in that occupation (Kalleberg 1977, Kalleberg and Loscocco 1983, Holland 1970, 1972,

⁶ This is generally true, but obviously not universally true of all people who continue school beyond college. For example, during the Vietnam War, significant numbers of men went to graduate school to avoid the draft.

⁷ At some point, graduate programs in sociology, e.g., start teaching their students how to be sociologists as well as teaching the findings of sociology. Similar transitions are made to training historians, mathematicians, and practitioners in other disciplinary fields.

Kohn and Schooler 1983, Bellah et al 1985, MacIntyre 1981) According to this reasoning, the extent to which an individual finds school continuation *in a particular field* attractive is determined by the extent to which that type of schooling appears to provide a conduit to employment in an occupation or career that is consistent with the individual's work values. Thus, action theories can be interpreted to suggest that (1) the work attitudes of college graduates affect their interest in school continuation and (2) work attitudes direct students toward postcollegiate study in particular fields rather than toward graduate study in general. Past research, conducted for the most part by psychologists, reports that work attitudes modestly affect the probability of school continuation beyond college (Astin 1978, Schein 1977, Holland 1970, 1972). But samples on which these studies are based are not representative of national populations, and we know of no research that simultaneously examines effects of both socioeconomic background and work attitudes on postcollegiate school continuation.

Social psychological attitude-behavior research is a somewhat different line of inquiry that also directs attention to attitudes as causes of behavior in general and school continuation behavior in particular. However, compared to theories of action, recent attitude-behavior studies suggest a more complex view of attitudinal effects and have found that effects of attitudes on behavior are empirically weak—or absent altogether—when these complexities are not recognized (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980, chap. 2, Schuman and Johnson 1976, McGuire 1985, Kiecolt 1988). For present purposes, this body of literature makes three key assertions.

First, social psychological studies distinguish cognitive, evaluative, and conative types of attitudes (see, e.g., Allport 1935, Rosenberg and Hovland 1960, McGuire 1985, Kiecolt 1988). Conative attitudes might also be called behavioral dispositions or behaviorally expressed attitudes. In contrast, evaluative attitudes are not necessarily reflected by behavior or behavioral tendencies. Conative attitudes have been operationalized as attitudes that are inferred from past behavior (Rosenberg and Hovland 1960), or from respondents' stated evaluations of performance of various behaviors, as distinguished from their evaluations of the consequences or goals of those behaviors (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980).⁸ I think that

⁸ In their influential work, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) eschew the term "conative," but appear to embrace the concept by distinguishing attitudes toward objects from attitudes toward behavior involving those objects. Fishbein and Ajzen also differentiate attitudes *toward* a behavior from intentions to *perform* the behavior and attitudes toward the *outcome* of that behavior. The primary conclusion of Fishbein and Ajzen is that behavioral attitudes affect *intentions* to perform that behavior, other things equal, and that behavioral intentions affect actual behavior, so long as there are opportunities to perform the behavior. The distinction between

educational aspirations are quite likely indicators of behavioral attitudes toward schooling

Cognitive, evaluative, and conative attitudes are always conceptually related, usually empirically correlated, and frequently confused (McGuire 1985), but only the conative attitude is conceived to influence behavior directly. From the perspective of these attitude-behavior studies, evaluative work attitudes are relevant to the way that people feel about graduate school but have only indirect connections to their actual attendance (via the impact of evaluative attitudes on behavioral attitudes). This perspective recognizes that people often do what they claim to dislike and fail to do what they claim to like, perhaps according to their perceptions of the consequences of their behavior, their beliefs about what constitutes appropriate action, or some other reason. Although the distinctions among cognitive, evaluative, and behavioral attitude components are old, perhaps ancient (McGuire 1985), Kiecolt (1988) observes that sociological research now rarely recognizes conative attitudes.

Second, social psychological attitude-behavior studies suggest that attitudes that affect the performance of an action are attitudes toward the action itself, not attitudes toward its consequences (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). Attitudes toward consequences of a behavior can affect attitudes toward the behavior, but their effect on behavior is indirect and mediated through conative attitudes toward the action itself.

Third, evaluative attitudes affect aspirations and intentions to perform behaviors, which in turn affect actual behavior. Even in properly conceived and executed empirical studies, the link between attitudes and behavior can be elusive, often because opportunities to act do not always occur. Ajzen and Fishbein advocate the analysis of intentions to act, which mediate attitudinal effects on behavior and can be observed even in the absence of opportunities to act. As general methodological points, they also argue that many empirical studies of attitude and behavior have gone awry from lack of specificity about the behavior under consideration.

evaluative and behavioral attitude components has wide but not necessarily explicit application. Job satisfaction studies, e.g., have long noted that the propensity to leave a job is distinct from dissatisfaction with it (Stolzenberg 1989). For an example of the difference between behavioral and evaluative attitudes, consider white attitudes toward black people. White *evaluative* attitudes toward blacks might be measured by describing hypothetical white and black people to survey respondents and then asking white respondents how much they like or dislike those fictitious characters. White *behavioral* attitudes toward blacks might be elicited by (1) an experiment in which subjects are asked to comply with simple requests made by white and black actors, (2) asking whites if they have ever engaged in various activities that are classified as hostile to blacks, (3) asking whites if they would engage in such activities, given the opportunity.

To sum up briefly, action theory and attitude-behavior studies both suggest that the school-continuation decisions of college graduates are driven by attitudes. Action theories seem to suggest that evaluative attitudes toward work are relevant, while attitude-behavior studies imply that behavioral attitudes toward school continuation itself are more germane. Both perspectives suggest that attitudes direct individuals toward continuing their education in specific fields of study rather than toward pursuing postcollegiate schooling in general. And both perspectives recognize that intentions to act cannot always be realized, which suggests that it is useful to distinguish intentions to continue school from actual postcollegiate school enrollment.

III ANALYTIC STRATEGY, DATA, AND METHOD

Strategy and Data

My strategy is to use microdata to estimate models of (a) the aspirations of college graduates to matriculate in several postcollege graduate programs and (b) their probability of actually doing so in one specific field. These models include measures of background SES, evaluative work attitudes, conative attitudes toward different types of schooling, and other factors such as academic ability, undergraduate grades, and early marriage, which are less central to our concerns here, but are nonetheless expected to affect school continuation. As discussed above, I expect post-collegiate school-continuation intentions and behavior to be largely unaffected by parental SES, weakly affected by evaluative work attitudes, and strongly affected by conative attitudes toward postcollegiate schooling. I examine college graduates only, since it is not meaningful to speak of graduate school attendance for persons who have not graduated college.

Data are taken from the 1972, 1976, and 1986 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72, Hilton and Rhett 1973). In 1986 the fifth follow-up of this survey was mailed to 14,489 members of the original 1972 sample of 22,652. Some 12,841 individuals returned the 1986 questionnaire, for a response rate of 89% (Tourangeau et al. 1987). Respondents were approximately 18 years old when first surveyed and about 32 years old at the fifth follow-up. Generally, variables in these data measure conditions or record events contemporaneously rather than retrospectively. In addition to its status as a benchmark longitudinal survey, NLS-72 is useful because the fifth follow-up contains specific questions about taking graduate school admission tests and matriculation.

Estimation

Analyses are performed with probit regression methods and latent factor methods appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables. Probit regression models relate a single dichotomous dependent variable to several independent variables. Probit regressions are straightforward to estimate and interpret, but they do not address issues that require simultaneous consideration of several contemporaneous dependent variables. Latent factor models consist of a measurement model, which relates unmeasured latent variables to their observed indicators, and a structural equations model, which relates latent and directly measured variables to each other. Because several endogenous variables in these models are dichotomous, the models are estimated with LISCOMP, a weighted least squares, LISREL-like program designed specifically for estimation of structural equation models involving multiple categorical variables (Muthén 1979, 1984, 1987, Xie 1989). In LISCOMP, when a variable has one dichotomous indicator, the relationship between the variable and the indicator is that of a probit regression. Because LISCOMP is exceptionally cumbersome to use and currently is available on a limited range of computing hardware, it is used only for estimation of the final model, which is depicted in figure 1, and in the list of equations in the appendix. Table 1 defines observed variables, table 2 defines unobserved variables, and table 3 gives means and standard deviations.

Operationalization of Theoretical Constructs

Actual graduate school matriculation—Earlier, I suggested that “graduate education” is more a rubric than a true type of schooling and that lumping together all postcollegiate educational programs may obscure the process by which some students continue their schooling after college while others do not. The NLS-72 explicitly identifies respondents who had matriculated in graduate management master’s degree (MBA) programs by the fifth follow-up interview in 1986, 14 years after high school graduation. The data do not identify the field of study of persons who continued their schooling past college in other subjects,⁹ but the NLS-72 appears to offer enough information to make significant progress toward understanding school continuation by contemporary American men. In particular, more men now matriculate in MBA programs than

⁹ The analysis can be thought of as a discrete-time event-history model with only one time period. Because the NLS data do not specify the date at which graduate admissions tests were taken, shorter time periods could not have been specified without deleting these essential variables.

TABLE 1
INVENTORY OF OBSERVED VARIABLES

Symbol	Name	Description
Background Characteristics		
x_1	BLACK	= 1 if respondent's race is black, 0 otherwise
x_2	WHITE	= 1 if respondent's race is white, 0 otherwise
x_3	SES	Socioeconomic status of family of origin
x_4	Fa < HS	= 1 if respondent's father did not graduate from high school, 0 otherwise
x_5	SATquan	Respondent's score, Scholastic Aptitude Test quantitative scale
x_6	SATverb	Respondent's score, Scholastic Aptitude Test verbal scale
x_{11}	MALE	= 1 if respondent is male, 0 otherwise
Collegiate Educational Characteristics		
x_7	SOCSCI	= 1 if college major was a social science field, 0 otherwise
x_8	SCIENG	= 1 if college major was engineering or a natural science, 0 otherwise
x_9	HUMFA	= 1 if respondent's college major was a humanities or fine arts field
x_{10}	BUS	= 1 if respondent's college major was business
y_1	UGPA	Undergraduate grade point average
Other Characteristics		
y_2	MARRIED	= 1 if respondent is married in 1976, 0 otherwise
Indicators of Job Values and Attitudes*		
y_3	EXPERIENCE	Previous work in the area
y_4	RELATIVE	Relative or friend in the same line of work
y_5	OPENING	Job openings available in the occupation
y_6	HOBBY	Work matches a hobby or interest of mine
y_7	INCOME	Good income to start or within a few years
y_8	SECURITY	Job security and permanence
y_9	INTEREST	Work that seems important and interesting to me
y_{10}	FREEDOM	Freedom to make my own decisions
y_{11}	PROMOTE	Opportunity for promotion and advancement in the long run
y_{12}	PEOPLE	Meeting and working with sociable, friendly people
Graduate and Professional School Admission Tests Taken by 1986		
y_{13}	GRE	= 1 if respondent took the Graduate Record Examination, 0 otherwise
y_{14}	LSAT	= 1 if respondent took the Law School Admission Test, 0 otherwise
y_{15}	GMAT	= 1 if respondent took the Graduate Management Admission Test, 0 otherwise
MBA Program Application and Matriculation		
y_{16}	ENROLL	= 1 if respondent has matriculated in an MBA or similar program, 0 otherwise

* Descriptions in this section are statements referred to in the question "How important was each of the following factors in determining the kind of work that you plan to be doing for most of your life?" Scored "1" if not important, "2" if somewhat important, or "3" if very important

TABLE 2
VARIABLES AND THEIR INDICATORS

Unobserved Variable and Description	Indicator
η_1 , college grades	y_1 , college grades
η_2 , early household formation	y_2 , married in 1976
η_3 , job value task familiarity	$y_3 - y_{12}$ in 1976
η_4 , job value self-fulfillment	$y_3 - y_{12}$ in 1976
η_5 , job value career advancement	$y_3 - y_{12}$ in 1976
η_6 , graduate school aspiration	y_{13} , GRE by 1986
η_7 , law school aspiration	y_{14} , LSAT by 1986
η_8 , MBA aspiration	y_{15} , GMAT by 1986
η_9 , propensity for MBA matriculation	y_{16} , MBA enrollment

NOTE — The coefficient of y_3 on η_3 is constrained to "1", the coefficient of y_7 on η_5 is constrained to "1", the coefficient of y_{10} on η_4 is constrained to "1", the coefficient of y_3 on η_4 and η_5 is constrained to "0", the coefficient of y_7 on η_3 and η_4 is constrained to "0", the coefficient of y_{10} on η_3 and η_5 is constrained to "0"

TABLE 3
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF OBSERVED VARIABLES
FOR 1,319 MALES

Symbol	Variable	Mean	SD
x_1	BLACK	0515	22120
x_2	WHITE	8976	30322
x_3	SES	4367	69772
x_4	Fa < HS	1584	36530
x_5	SATquan	533 79	107 324
x_6	SATverb	478 23	103 419
x_7	SOCSCI	1372	34421
x_8	SCIENG	1478	35507
x_9	HUMFA	0636	24428
x_{10}	BUS	1865	38966
y_1	UGPA	3 2941	1 03499
y_2	MARRIED	1645	37088
y_3	EXPERIENCE	2 1129	77330
y_4	RELATIVE	1 3169	58140
y_5	OPENING	2 2426	73207
y_6	HOBBY	1 7551	77904
y_7	INCOME	2 2471	67887
y_8	SECURITY	2 4601	64578
y_9	INTEREST	2 9029	31112
y_{10}	FREEDOM	2 6626	51448
y_{11}	PROMOTE	2 5511	63788
y_{12}	PEOPLE	2 5875	57094
y_{13}	GRE	2668	44249
y_{14}	LSAT	1175	32215
y_{15}	GMAT	1304	33687
y_{16}	ENROLL	1213	32660

in any other field of postcollegiate study. Some 67,137 people received MBAs in 1985–86, the year of the NLS-72 fifth follow-up. About a quarter of all master's degrees granted that year were in business and management—almost twice the number of law degrees, more than four times the number of medical degrees (M.D.'s), and more than 40 times the number of master's *and* doctor's degrees in sociology (see Andersen, Carter, and Melizio 1989). In 1989–90, nearly 300,000 people registered for the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), which is widely used for admission to business and management master's degree programs; there are now more than 700 different MBA programs in the United States (Graduate Management Admission Council, personal communication with Lawrence Hecht, 1990).

Aspirations to attend graduate school —The aspiration to attend graduate school is conceived of in this study as a continuous variable that ranges from weak ambition to determined intention. The NLS-72 indicates whether or not students took various graduate school admission tests, including the Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) by the time of the NLS-72 fifth follow-up survey. I interpret test taking as a stochastic indicator of an aspiration to matriculate in the graduate program to which the test corresponds. That is, people who take one of these tests are more likely than people who do not take that test to aspire to matriculate in the graduate program to which the test corresponds. In terms of the attitude-behavior literature cited above, our measure of aspirations is a measure of the behavioral attitude toward graduate study in a specific field. Substantively, this interpretation is based on two observations. First, these tests are designed and marketed specifically and solely to assist in graduate and professional school admissions (Graduate Management Admission Council 1985, Educational Testing Service 1986, Law School Admissions Services 1984). Second, rational individuals would take these tests only if they believe that they have some nonzero probability of making application to graduate school in the field to which the tests correspond. After all, test taking is not free, and it is neither intrinsically amusing nor useful for any purpose except the pursuit of graduate study. And test scores are transmitted only to accredited graduate and professional schools in the fields to which they pertain.¹⁰ Methodologically, our conception of test taking as a dichotomous

¹⁰ For example, GMAT scores are transmitted only to graduate schools of business and management, even university economics departments outside business schools are not permitted to receive GMAT score reports from the testing agency (personal communication, William Broesamle, Graduate Management Admission Council 1990).

indicator of a continuous unmeasured variable corresponds directly to the statistical model underlying probit analysis. In the probit model, independent variables cause an unobserved continuous variable, which in turn determines the probability that an observed binomially distributed event occurs (Hanushek and Jackson 1977).

Individuals can aspire to graduate study of more than one type or even be favorably disposed to all types of postcollegiate schooling. Because individuals may have favorable attitudes toward more than one type of graduate study, I also hypothesize that interests in fields other than business reduce the individual's propensity to matriculate in business school. As an estimation problem, this brings us beyond the usual probit and logit methods applied serially to one dependent variable after another, since these dependent variables can be empirically correlated. In LISCOMP these parallel analyses are represented by three correlated probit equations estimated simultaneously, correlations among disturbances for these unobserved propensities are explicitly permitted and reflect mutual influence among them.

SAT verbal and quantitative scores —Students' precollege scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) are included primarily because these scores measure "developed ability" to obtain high grades in competitive courses (Donlon 1984, p. 37). This ability is a melange of consequences of experiential, educational, social, and biological factors related to educational performance in American institutions of higher education. Test scores are a rough indicator of the time and effort required to achieve a given level of academic success (Klitgaard 1985). We expect that students for whom school is more difficult are less likely to wish to continue their studies than students for whom school is less demanding.¹¹

Race —With only 68 black men in the data, multiple group analysis cannot be extended to any estimation of different structural parameters for members of different races; instead, dichotomous exogenous control variables for race are added to the model.¹²

¹¹ In addition, we expect that students who have "tested well" on standardized admission tests in the past will be less resistant to taking additional standardized tests, including the GMAT, the LSAT, and the GRE. Holding constant the effects of SAT scores would hold this tendency constant.

¹² One of these variables is a dummy set equal to "1" for whites and "0" for others. The other is a dummy set equal to "1" for blacks and "0" for others. Coefficients of these variables measure effects of being white or black relative to the effect of being neither white nor black, which, in these data, nearly always reflect being Asian. Alternatively, we could have included dummies for being black and for being neither black nor white, in which case the coefficient for the black variable would measure the effect of being black relative to the effect of being white, rather than relative to the effect of being (most likely) Asian. In the formulation that I use, the difference

Socioeconomic status —In analyses reported in the Appendix, background SES is disaggregated into some of its essential components: father's years of schooling, mother's years of schooling, father's occupation, mother's occupation, and family income. I use the individual components of SES when considering their individual effects and when considering the hypothesis that different aspects of SES have different effects on postcollegiate school continuation. These models do not show different effects of the various components of the SES index. Consistent with results of previous studies of transitions to postcollegiate schooling, they do not show any effects of parental SES at all.

In the model summarized as figure 1, background SES is measured by a composite SES index. This index is included in the NLS-72 public release data and is based on characteristics of the respondent's family of origin in 1972, when he was a high school senior (U.S. Department of Education 1981, p. 125). Variables that constitute the SES index include father's years of schooling, mother's years of schooling, father's occupation, mother's occupation, family income, and indicators for the presence of various household items associated with socioeconomic differentiation.¹³ Because the SES index components are highly correlated, the index is estimated with reasonable accuracy when some components have missing values. Thus, the SES index is missing for fewer respondents than its various components. Where appropriate, I minimize missing data loss by using the index.

These models permit SES to have both direct and indirect effects on graduate study aspirations and actual MBA program matriculation. Indirect effects are permitted via job values, college grades, and the propensity to be married relatively early (i.e., before the 1976 interview, four years after "on-track" high school graduation). An indicator of whether or not the respondent's father graduated from high school ($Fa < HS$) also is included to measure possible effects of low parental education.

between the coefficient for the black dummy and the coefficient for the white dummy is exactly equal to the coefficient that would have been obtained in the alternative formulation.

¹³ These items included the presence of a newspaper, dictionary, encyclopedia, magazine, record player, tape recorder, color TV, typewriter, electric dishwasher, and two cars. Principal components analysis showed almost equal weights for all items on the first component (another item had a zero weight and was dropped), so the household item index is the mean number of items present (U.S. Department of Education 1981, p. k2). If the variance of background SES were highly attenuated among college graduates, it might not be possible for SES indicators to explain any variance in any dependent variable. However, the NLS-72 data do not suggest substantial attenuation of this sort, as shown in App. table A2.

beyond what would be shown as effects of the composite SES measure (see Manski and Wise 1983) ¹⁴

College major—College field of study is measured by including four dummy variables indicating majors in (1) social science, (2) natural science or engineering, (3) humanities or fine arts, and (4) business. A fifth category for other majors is omitted to avoid multicollinearity. College major is viewed as a behavioral indicator of the respondent's area of substantive academic interest. That is, college major is a behavior-based indicator of the respondent's attitude toward various fields of study. ¹⁵

Undergraduate grades—We expect that academic success in college affects postcollegiate school continuation probabilities because success of any sort is psychologically reinforcing, and reinforced activities tend to be continued. Further, undergraduate grades indicate academic ability, and we expect that student interest in school continuation usually varies inversely with the effort required of the student to do satisfactory academic work. Finally, the desire to attend graduate or professional school after college may increase students' motivation to succeed academically in college, since collegiate academic success increases the range of graduate schools to which students are likely to gain admission. We measure academic success in college by students' undergraduate grade point average (UGPA).

Early marriage—This variable equals "1" if the respondent was mar-

¹⁴ One's number of siblings might be hypothesized to affect school continuation beyond college because siblings compete for parental resources. According to this view, college graduates with fewer siblings would have more parental support for school continuation beyond college than college graduates with more siblings (see Blake 1989, Steelman and Powell 1991). I rejected this hypothesis at the start of this project for two reasons: (a) parental contributions to postcollegiate schooling tend to be very low (Berenson 1990), suggesting that there is not much parental support of graduate students for siblings to affect, and (b) men's probability of completing a graduate degree is virtually unrelated to their number of siblings. The following results were obtained from the NLS-72 data:

	No. of Siblings					
	0	1	2	3	4	5+
% college graduates who obtain postbaccalaureate degrees	27.2	34.4	30.8	32.8	30.4	28.6
N	283	613	736	515	280	364

¹⁵ A formal review of admission requirements at 100 MBA programs, and a less systematic review of law school admission requirements, indicates that no college major precludes graduate study in law or business and none grants a particular advantage for those seeking admission to graduate programs in either field, all other things being equal (Stolzenberg 1988).

ried in 1976 (at about the age of 22), and "0" otherwise. For men, we expect that the presence of a spouse appears likely to indicate a constellation of circumstances that help (in some ways) and hinder (in others) efforts to obtain a graduate or professional degree, with little net effect of early marriage on postcollegiate school enrollment. For women, we expect a strong negative effect of early marriage on graduate school attendance, early marriage is included in analyses of men's data primarily to facilitate subsequent sex comparisons.

Job attitudes —The NLS-72 includes 10 evaluative job-attitude questions (y_3 – y_{12}) that were asked at the baseline and 1976 interviews. Both 1972 and 1976 responses to these questions were subjected to maximum-likelihood exploratory factor analyses estimated in the context of the model shown above in figure 1. Repeated efforts to examine 1972 responses to these evaluative job-attitude questions—obtained when respondents were high school seniors—failed to find a coherent factor structure, we interpret this absence of structure as evidence that job values are not well developed by the senior year of high school, at least among those who go on to complete college (see Lorence and Mortimer [1985], for similar conclusions in an analysis of job involvement).

However, factor analyses of 1976 responses indicated a strong factor structure, which we interpret to mean that job attitudes are well developed four years after high school graduation. Table 4 reports results of exploratory factor analyses with promax rotation. Three moderately correlated ($r < .3$) factors are extracted: importance of task familiarity, importance of self-fulfillment, and importance of career advancement. In the final estimation of the model shown in figure 1, all factor loadings are reestimated simultaneously with all other coefficients in the model. This final estimation of factor loadings is done by an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) framework (Jöreskog 1969), in which three indicators are each constrained to unit loadings on one factor and zero loadings on the other two factors. The same number of restrictions used in an exploratory factor model is thus applied in the structural analysis of all variables. Zero loadings are imposed in six places where low loadings from the exploratory analysis make substantive sense. One loading on each factor in the exploratory factor analyses is fixed at unity in the final estimation. In this way, minimum structure is imposed in order to avoid prejudgment of results.

IV RESULTS

Table 5 reports structural equation coefficients (direct effects) for the model described by figure 1. Table 6 displays reduced-form coefficients

TABLE 4
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR JOB VALUES

INDICATOR	PROMAX ROTATED LOADINGS AND ERROR VARIANCES			
	Task Familiarity	Self-Fulfillment	Career Advancement	Error Variance
EXPERIENCE	480†	051*	— 049*	766
RELATIVE	297	— 012	— 006	915
OPENING	362	— 150	456	606
HOBBY	247	087	— 067	928
INCOME	— 012*	— 014*	768†	421
SECURITY	116	008	712	427
INTEREST	082	496	— 079	743
FREEDOM	— 030*	595†	— 006*	656
PROMOTE	— 126	327	575	516
PEOPLE	184	360	094	763

PROMAX FACTOR CORRELATIONS			
	Task Familiarity	Self-Fulfillment	Career Advancement
Task familiarity	1 000		
Self-fulfillment	276	1 000	
Career advancement	296	256	1 000

* Loading set to "0" in final estimation

† Loading set to "1" in final estimation

(total effects) of exogenous variables for that model. The Appendix reports additional analyses with disaggregated measures of SES, which are discussed below and which suggest that the findings would not be altered by disaggregating the SES index into measures of parental income, education, and occupation.

SES

Results confirm our expectation of weak or absent SES effects on school continuation by college graduates. In table 5, notice that the direct effect of parental SES on MBA program matriculation propensity (η_9) is virtually zero — 0 006 with a t -statistic of 0 16. Note that $F_a < HS$ is similarly ineffectual, with a coefficient of 0 009 and a t -statistic of 0 23. Table 6 shows similarly small total effects: 0 050 for SES, and 0 063 for $F_a < HS$.¹⁶ I also used single-equation probit analyses to look further for effects

¹⁶ Tables 5 and 6 suggest that certain infrequent configurations of SES components may have small to moderate direct and total effects on interest in MBA enrollment,

TABLE 5
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND UNSIGNED *t*-STATISTICS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	STANDARDIZED DEPENDENT VARIABLE (Unsigned <i>t</i> -Statistic)									
	Evaluative Attitudes					Measures of Aspirations				
	College Grades η_1	Married η_2	Career Advancement η_3	Self-Fulfillment η_4	Task Familiarity η_5	Disciplines Study η_6	Law Study η_7	Business Study η_8	MBA Enrollment η_9	
x_1 , BLACK ^a	059 (.48)	— 656* (2.47)	637* (3.99)	316 (1.51)	— 280 (1.13)	122 (.57)	163 (.70)	— 163 (.72)	— 095 (.53)	
x_2 , WHITE ^a	059 (.65)	082 (.51)	264* (2.45)	340* (2.05)	— 234 (1.36)	030 (.18)	— 198 (1.08)	— 330* (2.06)	007 (.06)	
Black-white difference	000	— 738	373	— 024	046	092	361	167	— 102	
x_3 , SES	— 047 (1.48)	— 006 (.11)	— 010 (.27)	011 (.23)	— 144* (2.95)	— 101* (2.41)	009 (.15)	092 (1.59)	— 006 (.16)	
x_4 , Fa < HS ^a	— 047 (.58)	120 (.92)	055 (.58)	— 079 (.66)	038 (.30)	— 005 (.06)	— 107 (.73)	101 (.71)	009 (.23)	
x_5 , SATquan	180* (5.04)	— 081 (1.33)	— 128* (3.04)	— 004 (.098)	— 108 (1.97)	— 030 (.60)	011 (.20)	138* (2.25)	015 (.32)	
x_6 , SATverb	226* (6.48)	— 014 (.23)	— 035 (.87)	— 091 (1.78)	— 181* (3.31)	157* (3.19)	223* (3.78)	030 (.50)	— 072 (1.76)	
x_7 , SOCSCI ^a	— 038 (.49)	— 372* (2.91)	067 (.78)	— 003 (.02)	— 561* (4.87)	041 (.40)	357* (3.20)	— 049 (.39)	— 058 (.65)	

x_8 , SCIENG ^a	206* (2 74)	- 025 (21)	310* (3 62)	- 217 (1 95)	- 110 (98)	- 076 (77)	- 690* (4 26)	006 (05)	031 (28)
x_9 , HUMFA ^a	266* (2 40)	- 123 (69)	- 364* (3 47)	098 (68)	180 (1 19)	- 086 (67)	340* (2 46)	- 450 (1 80)	- 364 (1 35)
x_{10} , BUS ^a	- 293* (4 40)	- 121 (1 12)	552* (6 43)	- 208* (2 03)	- 521* (4 78)	- 767* (6 27)	- 154 (1 26)	354* (3 19)	126 (1 65)
η_1 , college grades						244* (6 35)	042 (1 00)	122* (3 15)	- 010 (30)
η_2 , married early						001 (02)	047 (80)	- 147* (2 41)	030 (67)
η_3 , career advancement						- 152* (3 63)	214* (4 63)	322* (6 75)	013 (30)
η_4 , self-fulfillment						009 (18)	043 (80)	069 (1 17)	005 (14)
η_5 , task familiarity						- 001 (01)	- 328* (4 30)	- 205* (2 74)	- 019 (32)
η_6 , disciplines study aspiration									170* (4 25)
η_7 , law school aspiration									085 (1 72)
η_8 , business school aspiration									600* (18 12)
R^2	1592	0410	1075	0231	1887	2399	3010	2540	4354

^a Unstandardized, other variables are standardized

* Statistically significant, $P < .01$, one-tailed test

TABLE 6

TOTAL EFFECTS (REDUCED FORM COEFFICIENTS) OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	STANDARDIZED DEPENDENT VARIABLE			
	η_6 , Graduate School Aspiration	η_7 , Law School Aspiration	η_8 , MBA Aspiration	η_9 , Propensity for MBA Matriculation
x_1 , BLACK*	041	371	217	077
x_2 , WHITE*	007	— 043	— 171	— 089
Black-white difference†	034	414	388	166
x_3 , SES†	— 104	051	110	050
x_4 , Fa < HS*	— 025	— 104	079	063
x_5 , SATquan†	031	022	146	109
x_6 , SATverb†	205	275	076	035
x_7 , SOCSCI*	020	529	131	073
x_8 , SCIENG*	— 166	— 594	090	011
x_9 , HUMFA*	033	209	— 524	— 671
x_{10} , BUS*	— 873	105	583	352

* Unstandardized

† Standardized

of various components of the SES index. Some of those probit analyses are described in the Appendix. Those analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that there are no postcollegiate educational continuation effects of SES or its components (including, specifically, mother's education, father's education, family income, and father's occupational status). These results provide empirical support for the argument that findings would not be altered by using these components in place of or in addition to the SES index.¹⁷

and modest total effects on the MBA enrollment propensities of college graduates. Respondents with background SES 2 SDs above the mean, but whose fathers are high school dropouts, would show an increase in business-study interest of 0.285 SDs above the mean in table 5, and 0.299 SDs above the mean in table 6 (in table 5, $0.285 = 2 \times 0.092 + 0.101$, in table 6, $0.299 = 2 \times 0.110 + 0.079$). Similarly, respondents with background SES 2 SDs above the mean, but whose fathers are high school dropouts, have MBA enrollment propensities 0.163 SDs above the mean ($0.163 = 2 \times 0.050 + 0.063$), all other things being equal. The infrequency of these combinations reduces both the reliability and importance of these effects. These results do not affect my substantive conclusions.

¹⁷ It is possible that parental incumbency in certain specific occupations affects postcollegiate school continuation in general or postcollegiate school continuation in certain fields. That possibility is certainly worthy of further investigation, although it is different from the subject of the research described here.

Results are consistent with the hypothesis that parental SES loses its impact on school continuation after college by losing its effect on the educational aspirations of college graduates. Parental SES also has little impact on college graduates' aspirations for (i.e., behavioral attitudes toward) graduate study in business, law, and the disciplines, as indicated by graduate admission test taking appropriate for those fields (η_8 , η_7 , and η_6). In table 5, the direct effect of SES on MBA aspirations (η_8) is 0.092, and the direct effect of $Fa < HS$ on η_8 is 0.101, the t -statistic does not reach any conventional level of significance for either coefficient. The direct effects of SES and $Fa < HS$ on η_7 are also both statistically insignificant and small. SES does have a small, statistically significant negative direct effect (-0.101) on probability of taking the GRE. However, this one deviation from a general pattern of insignificant effects is too small to warrant sustained interpretation, and appears inconsistent with any relevant theories discussed earlier, all of which predict positive or zero SES and parental education effects on school continuation.¹⁸

Effects of Graduate-School-Aspiration Indicators

Looking at the far right column of table 5, notice that η_6 , η_7 , and η_8 all have positive effects on η_9 , MBA enrollment propensity. The standardized effect of the propensity to take the GMAT (η_8) on MBA enrollment propensity is 0.600, with a t -statistic of 18.12, a 95% confidence interval places this coefficient between 0.665 and 0.535. This effect passes any reasonable standard of statistical significance and is substantively large. (In comparison, the effect of schooling on occupation in most status attainment models is 0.5, see Jencks et al. 1972.) The coefficient for η_8 is the largest effect in the equation for MBA program enrollment and is consistent with the argument that aspirations—or behavioral attitude—toward graduate study in business is the major proximate determinant of MBA program enrollment. In brief, the link from SES to school continuation beyond college is *not* broken or sharply attenuated between aspirations and graduate school enrollment, at least for those who matriculate in MBA programs.

¹⁸ If the eight significance tests of effects of SES and $Fa < HS$ on η_6 , η_7 , η_8 , and η_9 were independent, and if the true effects were all zero, then the probability of obtaining one or more statistically significant tests at the 5% level would be 33.7%, at the 1% level, the probability would be 7.7% (by the binomial theorem). The direct effect of x_9 on η_8 is not statistically significant by itself. However, x_7 , x_8 , x_9 , and x_{10} are interpreted jointly, since they are dummy variables representing categories of a single polytomous variable. A joint test of the significance of x_7 , x_8 , x_9 , and x_{10} is difficult in the present context and is not essential to our arguments or interpretations.

Rather than breaking the link from parental SES to MBA program enrollment, the large coefficient of η_8 permits it to serve as the conduit through which effects of virtually all other determinants are mediated¹⁹ The combination of strong effects of η_8 with weak effects of college grades, scholastic aptitude test scores (discussed below), and parental SES on η_9 has profound implications poor college grades, low admission test scores, and humble socioeconomic origins are not strong impediments to the college graduate who aspires to the MBA degree

Thus, my analyses suggest rather clearly that parental SES does not affect educational continuation of college graduates because it does not affect behaviors that I interpret as indicators of educational aspirations Indicators of those aspirations, however, appear to have very powerful effects on postcollegiate school enrollment behavior, at least in the field of business administration

Attitudes

In addition to measures of aspirations for graduate study, our analyses report two types of attitude measures college major, which is interpreted as a behavioral measure of attitudes toward different fields of study, and evaluative job attitudes

Evaluative job attitudes —Above, I reasoned from attitude-behavior studies that evaluative attitudes toward work affect behavior only indirectly, through their influence on educational aspirations, which *do* directly affect behavior Following Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), I expect that effects of evaluative attitudes on aspirations will be substantially larger than effects of evaluative attitudes on actual behavior The results are consistent with that reasoning Evaluative work attitudes show virtually no direct effect on the propensity to enroll in MBA programs But, job attitudes do have moderate, statistically significant direct effects on all three measures of behavioral attitudes toward graduate study (η_6 , η_7 , and η_8) In table 5, the effect of career advancement attitudes (η_3) on behavioral attitudes toward the MBA (η_8) is 0.322 and the effect of attitudes toward task familiarity is -0.205 Multiplying by 0.600 (the effect of η_8 on η_9) indicates the indirect effect on the propensity to enroll in an MBA program (mediated through η_8) of these evaluative job attitudes 0.193 for career advancement and -0.123 for task familiarity

¹⁹ The measure of aspirations for graduate study in the disciplines, η_6 , also has a positive, statistically significant effect on MBA enrollment, but it is modest in size (0.170) The positive effects of all three graduate study interest variables suggests that attitudes toward graduate study in different fields do not compete with each other

These indirect effects are small, but, particularly in the case of the career advancement factor (η_3), certainly not trivial²⁰

Finally, table 5 shows that different job attitudes have substantially different effects on propensities to take graduate admission tests in law, the disciplines, and business. For example, the variable that indicates evaluative attitudes toward career advancement (η_3) has a moderate positive effect (0.322, $t = 6.75$) on GMAT-taking propensity, a smaller positive effect on LSAT-taking propensity (0.214, $t = 4.63$), and an even smaller negative effect on propensity to take the GRE.

Attitudes proxied by college major —Tables 5 and 6 show substantial direct effects of college major variables (x_7 – x_{10}) on measures of intentions for graduate study in the disciplines (η_6), law (η_7), and business (η_8). Attitudes or tastes proxied by each college major appear to exert substantial push toward graduate study in some fields, but even larger pushes away from others. The direct effect of x_{10} (undergraduate business major) on η_6 (taking the GRE) is -0.767 , the direct effect of x_8 (undergraduate major in science or engineering) on η_7 (taking the LSAT) is -0.690 , and the direct effect of majoring in humanities or fine arts on η_8 (taking the GMAT) is -0.450 . Reading down columns η_6 , η_7 , and η_8 in table 5, we notice that these negative coefficients of college major are the largest of any direct effects on these three variables. In comparison, the direct effect of x_{10} on η_8 is 0.354, the direct effects of x_9 and x_7 on η_7 are 0.340 and 0.357, respectively. Total effects in table 6 show much the same pattern.²¹

Notice also that the college major variables have very dissimilar effects on η_6 , η_7 , and η_8 in tables 5 and 6. These differences support my earlier argument for distinguishing various types of postcollegiate schooling. Had school continuation beyond college been treated as a unitary phenomenon rather than as three distinct activities, much of the impact of college major on postcollegiate school continuation aspirations would have been masked.

Direct effects of some college majors (SOCSCI, SCIENG) on actual

²⁰ These findings are consistent with a common perception that MBA degree holders tend to be more interested in remuneration and career progression than those who pursue other graduate and professional degrees.

²¹ In passing, it seems important to note that attitudes reflected by college major do not seem to be direct reflections of the intellectual content of different fields of study or of the admission requirements of graduate programs. For example, x_{10} has a strong negative effect on η_6 even though much of the subject matter of collegiate business programs—as well as a large proportion of faculty members—is drawn from fields including economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology. Similarly, MBA programs have aggressively encouraged applications from students with undergraduate majors in the humanities and sciences (American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business 1985).

MBA program enrollment propensity are weak and statistically insignificant at customary 5% one-tailed probability levels, the remainder are just statistically insignificant (HUMFA) or weak (BUS). All are insignificant at more stringent probability levels. However, substantial indirect effects of college major are mediated through the very strong effect of η_8 (our measure of behavioral attitudes toward business study) on actual MBA matriculation, which results in the strong total effects of college major on MBA enrollment propensity shown in table 6. The negative impact of attitudes proxied by humanities and fine arts major (x_{10}) is the strongest effect of any exogenous variable on actual MBA program matriculation.

College Grades and Academic Ability

Academic ability shows small to moderate effects on my measure of behavioral attitudes toward graduate study, and smaller effects on MBA enrollment propensity. These results confirm my earlier reasoning that students who find more success in school, and students who find that school requires less effort, are more likely to continue their schooling beyond college. However, those effects are small and do not suggest that academic ability or performance plays a major role in determining which college graduates go on to graduate school in business, or even wish to do so in business, law, or the disciplines.

In table 5, the direct effects of SAT quantitative (SATquan) and verbal (SATverb) scores (x_5 , x_6), and college grades (η_1) on MBA enrollment propensity all have absolute values below 0.1, indicating that they are substantively trivial. In table 6, the total effect of SATverb is virtually zero (0.035), the total effect of SATquan is larger, but still small (0.109). The total effect of college grades on MBA enrollment propensity is 0.108 (not shown but calculated from table 5 by summing its direct effect with its indirect effects, which are mediated through η_6 , η_7 , and η_8).

In table 6, x_6 has a total effect of 0.275 on the propensity to take the LSAT and .205 on propensity to take the GRE; neither of these propensities is affected to any statistically or substantively significant extent by x_5 . The total effect of SATquan on propensity to take the GMAT is small (0.146). Table 5 shows that college grades have small direct effects on taking the GRE (0.244, $t = 6.35$) or the GMAT (0.122, $t = 3.15$), but no impact on the propensity to take the LSAT (0.042, $t = 1.00$).

V DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Many earlier studies have conceived of background SES as an influence on how much schooling people want to obtain—their educational aspira-

tions Many others have seen background SES as a constraint upon people's ability to obtain schooling that they are presumed to want Because it appears that parental SES has lost its impact on school continuation by the end of college, our empirical results seem to suggest that *neither* view of SES is very relevant to school continuation by college graduates This conclusion is supported by patterns of direct, indirect, and total effects in these analyses, it obtains whether or not job values and college grades are held constant, and whether or not measures of behavioral attitudes toward postcollegiate schooling are controlled Unlike prior analyses, these results are based on analyses that explicitly recognize some key differences between graduate schools and earlier educational levels My results apply specifically to the field which issues the most graduate degrees to men (business and management), and my analyses directly measure, model, and control some attitudinal factors that appear to be relevant Finally, lest there be any suspicion that I have controlled for the mechanisms through which SES might work, results reported in the Appendix show no effect of background SES on MBA program matriculation even in analyses that include *only* SES measures as predictors of MBA program matriculation

Although earlier findings of severed links between parental SES and school continuation of college graduates may have seemed inconsistent with the Wisconsin model of socioeconomic achievement, these results suggest that the basic conception of that model remains applicable to postcollegiate schooling That is, my results identify educational aspirations as the conduit through which parental background effects on educational continuation are transmitted, *if they are transmitted at all* For college graduates, the path from aspirations to educational continuation is very strong The pipeline of causation is blocked between parental SES and school continuation aspirations That attenuation or break, rather than a weakening of the aspirations-attendance link, appears to sever the connection between background SES and school continuation

Why would parental SES effects on school enrollment aspirations vanish after college? I suspect that aspirations for postcollegiate schooling either develop or are revised in college Before college, students seem to lack sufficient information about graduate school to fully develop those aspirations College provides students with the opportunity to assess their enjoyment of and aptitude for postsecondary education, and also allows them to explore the subject matter of many postcollegiate educational programs Further, this compelling evidence arrives at an age when students are likely to look beyond their parents in forming their attitudes and plans The result, I think, is that aspirations to postcollegiate schooling are either formed or reformed in college without much parental influence in general or parental SES in particular

Taken together with Hout's (1988) results, my findings are consistent with the hypothesis that graduation from college marks a severe and general weakening of the link between parents' SES and the postcollegiate socioeconomic achievement of their offspring. Hout finds that occupational SES of college graduates is not substantially related to the SES of their parents, and we find no substantial parental SES effect on the further school enrollment of college graduates in MBA programs or even on their *interest* in further enrollment in law school or graduate programs in the disciplines or business. Because these students are buyers in the market for schooling and sellers in the market for labor, where occupations are assigned, I think that the mechanisms that produce Hout's results about postcollegiate occupational attainment are probably different from the processes that produce the strikingly parallel school continuation results that I, Mare (1980), and others report for those who have completed college. Richer data and further analysis of both school continuation and occupational assignment is required in order to compare those mechanisms in detail.²² But, whatever the mechanisms are, their effect seems to be major movement toward socioeconomic liberation of college graduates from their status origins.

I think that some of the most important implications of these findings concern the conceptualization of attitudes in theories of socioeconomic achievement. Some of those implications are quite specific. For example, I hypothesize and find that job values have moderate effects on educational continuation aspirations. I know of no other attempt to relate school continuation attitudes to job values while simultaneously considering the effects of background SES, academic ability, and related factors that are known to affect school continuation at earlier grades. My results seem to suggest that further examination of attitudes toward the consequences of schooling is likely to be worthwhile. A reasonable next step would be to incorporate measures of how students perceive the characteristics of specific occupations for which MBA programs, law schools, and graduate programs in the disciplines prepare their students. For example,

²² For example, it seems likely that background SES effects on school continuation aspirations decline gradually, though not necessarily linearly, over the college years, as the effects of collegiate experiences cumulate. In contrast, if educational credentialing (rather than actual learning) causes the decline of background SES effects on subsequent occupational attainment, the break between background SES and occupational attainment may be achieved rather suddenly when the college degree is conferred. I lack the data to test hypotheses about the timing of changes in background SES effects on educational aspirations of college students and know of no empirical analyses of this topic. Indeed the only relevant empirical result is the finding by Sewell and Shah (1967) that the path coefficient from background SES to college attendance is weaker than the path coefficient from background SES to college completion.

in addition to knowing respondents' attitudes toward career advancement, it would be useful to know how much money respondents *think* lawyers and MBA degree holders earn, how much job security they have, and how quickly their careers progress. More abstractly, these perceptions are cognitive attitudes about occupations, and I suggest that cognitive attitudes, as well as the evaluative and behavioral attitudes that have occupied us here, are likely to be useful in understanding the etiology of desires to continue schooling beyond college. Those desires, more than anything else, appear to determine whether or not college graduates persist or terminate their formal education.

Because my hypotheses about job values focus on the consequences of behavior, they are consistent with many theories of action. Most theories of action state that people act as they do in anticipation of the consequences of their deeds. Contemporary human capital analysis is an application of such theories and is based upon the assumption that people go to school in anticipation of the jobs they expect as a consequence of their education. My findings suggest that this model of schooling is not incorrect, but that it is quite incomplete. For example, in this study, job value measures do affect school-continuation attitude measures and, through them, educational persistence. However, the strongest effects in our analyses seem to represent students' desires to avoid studying subjects they dislike. This result is quite consistent with Bidwell and Friedkin's (1988) argument that school continuation is determined by the ratio of perceived rewards to perceived punishments at school: the subject matter of higher education can be a reward or a punishment, depending on the student's attitudes. If the perceived punishment-reward ratio tends to approach unity by the end of college, then the decision to continue or discontinue schooling would be strongly influenced by the student's taste for the subject matter of further education. I find these strong effects, and I think they suggest that human capital models of school continuation might be greatly strengthened by explicit inclusion of tastes for schooling itself as well as its expected long-run economic benefits. My results suggest that distinguishing between graduate education in different fields of study would be essential to further work of this type. Further progress along these lines would also require more explicit measures of college graduates' tastes and distastes for the various subjects studied in postcollegiate educational programs.

These findings are consistent with the recent work of Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and with the work of those who earlier distinguished between behavioral and evaluative attitudes. When applied to school attendance, that work suggests that much of the effect of evaluative attitudes on educational continuation can be badly underestimated or missed altogether by the failure to specify models in which behavioral attitudes (or

aspirations or intentions) toward school intervene between evaluative attitudes and school continuation behavior. Consistent with that thinking, I find that the effects of job values on MBA degree matriculation are mediated entirely through variables that I believe measure graduate school matriculation aspirations. Because the path from the MBA aspirations measure to MBA matriculation propensity is 0.6 in my analysis, the moderate impacts of job values on MBA aspirations are 70% larger ($1.7 = 1/0.6$) than the ultimate—and relatively small—effects of job values on actual MBA matriculation propensity. This result not only provides some insight into the structure of attitudes about work and schooling, but it explains why these attitudes have only modest impact on school attendance behavior. Rather than supporting Manski's (1990) well-publicized invitation to abandon intentions analysis, this finding suggests that such data can play an important part in understanding the connections between what people like and what they ultimately do. That connection may not be a central interest of economists such as Manski, but it remains an important part of the sociological enterprise, and I see no reason to abandon it.

I believe that further research on postcollegiate school continuation would benefit from additional measures of behavioral attitudes toward education, work, and other activities that impinge on school attendance by young adults. Behavioral attitude measurement was obviously not part of the design for the NLS-72, nor has it been an explicit part of any other large, general purpose, national survey that I know of. I have inferred behavioral attitudes from reports of past behavior in the NLS-72, but I suspect that it is possible to use survey questions to elicit behavioral attitudes. Perhaps one could observe behavioral dispositions by asking respondents what they would do in a hypothetical situation. Or perhaps respondents could be asked to choose among alternative tasks or prizes, each linked in some way to the objects of the relevant attitudes. Much creativity will be required to develop these instruments, but the effort is likely to be successful and useful.

Even without further instrument development, useful research could be done by extending the present analysis to women. I have done some work on sex differences which is not reported here, and some gender differences appear to be substantial. I also suspect that parental SES may affect the quality of schools attended by college graduates who continue their formal education. Parental SES, standardized test scores, and college grades may affect access to more competitive graduate programs or may influence students' motivation to attend them. Whether or not those hypotheses are true, the concepts and statistical methods used here provide a useful framework for investigating them, and I believe that the answers to them are likely to be useful.

APPENDIX A

Decompositions of Background SES Effects on School Continuation

Past studies suggest that the influence of all aspects of background SES on school continuation are substantively and statistically insignificant by the time that individuals complete college. Nonetheless, I empirically examined the hypothesis that different components of the NLS-72 SES measure might have different significant effects on postcollegiate school continuation. This examination was done with probit analyses of MBA program enrollment. Three of these analyses appear in Appendix table A1. The first 10 independent variables in table A1 are the exogenous variables in the model shown in figure 1 above. In comparing coefficients for model 1 to results for model 2, notice that the effects found for model 1 are virtually unchanged by the addition of variables representing father's schooling, mother's schooling, the natural logarithm of family income when the respondent was in high school, and father's occupational SES when the respondent was in high school. Further, I use the likelihoods to compute a significance test for the null hypothesis that these additional SES variables all have zero effect, net of the effects of exogenous variables in model 1, the test statistic is 2.752 (4 *df*), which is not significant even at a 10% level, (two-tailed test, see Myers 1990, p. 326). In model 3, a probit regression of school continuation on just the additional SES variables is run. For model 3 also, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that all four of these variables have zero coefficients ($P < .05$). In short, six different SES variables show no SES effects on continuation to graduate study in business, whether these variables are considered singly or as a group, and whether or not their effects are estimated net of the 10 exogenous variables from the model investigated in this article. These results are consistent with earlier results of other analysts and suggest that findings would not be changed by more detailed specifications of respondents' background SES.

Table A2 addresses the assertion that no variance of background SES is unduly reduced by restricting the analysis to college graduates. Observe that the variance of SES variables is greater among college graduates than among those who did not graduate college.

TABLE A1

PROBIT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MBA PROGRAM ENROLLMENT ON EXOGENOUS VARIABLES, WITH ADDITIONAL INDICATORS OF BACKGROUND SES

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
INTERCPT	- 894683 (243458)	- 3 402825 (3 113409)	- 1 345009 (966431)
BLACK	- 201842 (455589)	- 222179 (459506)	
WHITE	- 429804 (242963)	- 408657 (246347)	
SES*	082572 (070396)	- 223456 (291845)	
Fa < HS	089235 (197891)	169928 (218251)	
SATverb*	190491 (087948)	188168 (088834)	
SATquan*	- 029198 (090586)	- 032430 (091054)	
SOCSCI	- 092465 (186528)	- 105164 (187756)	
SCIENG	116450 (168548)	116588 (169633)	
HUMFA	- 934225 (419703)	- 913700 (416614)	
BUS	520250 (144580)	528136 (146035)	
Father's schooling		066203 (050793)	015259 (030361)
Mother's schooling		033044 (053128)	- 000187 (031990)
ln(income)		091064 (212756)	- 017393 (110125)
Father's Occupational SES		004791 (004844)	002665 (003210)
ln likelihood	- 296 036	- 294 660	- 310 812
χ^2	32 288	35 040	2 736
Pseudo <i>R</i>	227	237	066

NOTE — $N = 836$ The difference between N for this analysis and N for analyses reported in the main body of the article is caused by missing data on exogenous variables included in models 2 and 3, which do not appear in other analyses Pseudo R is that of Amimya as described by Judge et al (1985)

* Variable is standardized to "0" mean and unit variance

TABLE A2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF SELECTED BACKGROUND SES ITEMS

VARIABLE	MEN WITHOUT COLLEGE DEGREE (n = 8,202)		MEN WITH AT LEAST COLLEGE DEGREE (n = 2,565)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Father's schooling	12 08	2 26	13 80	2 67
Mother's schooling	11 96	1 91	13 24	2 19
Family income (in \$1,000s)	12 40	7 28	16 35	8 57
Father's Duncan SES score	37 78	22 24	51 12	23 73

NOTE —The SDs of these variables for men with college degrees are actually slightly higher than the SDs of the same variables for men without college degrees

APPENDIX B

Measurement Model

$$y_1 = \lambda_{11}\eta_1 + \epsilon_1$$

$$y_2 = \lambda_{22}\eta_2 + \epsilon_2$$

$$y_3 = \lambda_{35}\eta_5 + \epsilon_3$$

$$y_4 = \lambda_{43}\eta_3 + \lambda_{44}\eta_4 + \lambda_{45}\eta_5 + \epsilon_4$$

$$y_5 = \lambda_{53}\eta_3 + \lambda_{54}\eta_4 + \lambda_{55}\eta_5 + \epsilon_5$$

$$y_6 = \lambda_{63}\eta_3 + \lambda_{64}\eta_4 + \lambda_{65}\eta_5 + \epsilon_6$$

$$y_7 = \lambda_{73}\eta_3 + \epsilon_7$$

$$y_8 = \lambda_{83}\eta_3 + \lambda_{84}\eta_4 + \lambda_{85}\eta_5 + \epsilon_8$$

$$y_9 = \lambda_{93}\eta_3 + \lambda_{94}\eta_4 + \lambda_{95}\eta_5 + \epsilon_9$$

$$y_{10} = \lambda_{10,4}\eta_4 + \epsilon_{10}$$

$$y_{11} = \lambda_{11,3}\eta_3 + \lambda_{11,4}\eta_4 + \lambda_{11,5}\eta_5 + \epsilon_{11}$$

$$y_{12} = \lambda_{12,3}\eta_3 + \lambda_{12,4}\eta_4 + \lambda_{12,5}\eta_5 + \epsilon_{12}$$

$$y_{13}^* = \lambda_{13,6}\eta_6 + \epsilon_{13}$$

$$y_{14}^* = \lambda_{14,7}\eta_7 + \epsilon_{14}$$

$$y_{15}^* = \lambda_{15,8}\eta_8 + \epsilon_{15}$$

$$y_{16}^* = \lambda_{16,9}\eta_9 + \epsilon_{16}$$

Structural Model

$$\eta_1 = \gamma_{11}x_1 + \gamma_{12}x_2 + \gamma_{13}x_3 + \gamma_{14}x_4 + \gamma_{15}x_5 + \gamma_{16}x_6 \\ + \gamma_{17}x_7 + \gamma_{18}x_8 + \gamma_{19}x_9 + \gamma_{1,10}x_{10} + \xi_1$$

$$\eta_2 = \gamma_{21}x_1 + \gamma_{22}x_2 + \gamma_{23}x_3 + \gamma_{24}x_4 + \gamma_{25}x_5 + \gamma_{26}x_6 \\ + \gamma_{27}x_7 + \gamma_{28}x_8 + \gamma_{29}x_9 + \gamma_{2,10}x_{10} + \xi_2$$

$$\eta_3 = \gamma_{31}x_1 + \gamma_{32}x_2 + \gamma_{33}x_3 + \gamma_{34}x_4 + \gamma_{35}x_5 + \gamma_{36}x_6 \\ + \gamma_{37}x_7 + \gamma_{38}x_8 + \gamma_{39}x_9 + \gamma_{3,10}x_{10} + \xi_3$$

$$\eta_4 = \gamma_{41}x_1 + \gamma_{42}x_2 + \gamma_{43}x_3 + \gamma_{44}x_4 + \gamma_{45}x_5 + \gamma_{46}x_6 \\ + \gamma_{47}x_7 + \gamma_{48}x_8 + \gamma_{49}x_9 + \gamma_{4,10}x_{10} + \xi_4$$

$$\eta_5 = \gamma_{51}x_1 + \gamma_{52}x_2 + \gamma_{53}x_3 + \gamma_{54}x_4 + \gamma_{55}x_5 + \gamma_{56}x_6 \\ + \gamma_{57}x_7 + \gamma_{58}x_8 + \gamma_{59}x_9 + \gamma_{5,10}x_{10} + \xi_5$$

$$\eta_6 = \beta_{61}\eta_1 + \beta_{62}\eta_2 + \beta_{63}\eta_3 + \beta_{64}\eta_4 + \beta_{65}\eta_5 \\ + \gamma_{61}x_1 + \gamma_{62}x_2 + \gamma_{63}x_3 + \gamma_{64}x_4 + \gamma_{65}x_5 \\ + \gamma_{66}x_6 + \gamma_{67}x_7 + \gamma_{68}x_8 + \gamma_{69}x_9 + \gamma_{6,10}x_{10} + \xi_6$$

$$\eta_7 = \beta_{71}\eta_1 + \beta_{72}\eta_2 + \beta_{73}\eta_3 + \beta_{74}\eta_4 + \beta_{75}\eta_5 \\ + \gamma_{71}x_1 + \gamma_{72}x_2 + \gamma_{73}x_3 + \gamma_{74}x_4 + \gamma_{75}x_5 \\ + \gamma_{76}x_6 + \gamma_{77}x_7 + \gamma_{78}x_8 + \gamma_{79}x_9 + \gamma_{7,10}x_{10} + \xi_7$$

$$\eta_8 = \beta_{81}\eta_1 + \beta_{82}\eta_2 + \beta_{83}\eta_3 + \beta_{84}\eta_4 + \beta_{85}\eta_5 \\ + \gamma_{81}x_1 + \gamma_{82}x_2 + \gamma_{83}x_3 + \gamma_{84}x_4 + \gamma_{85}x_5 \\ + \gamma_{86}x_6 + \gamma_{87}x_7 + \gamma_{88}x_8 + \gamma_{89}x_9 + \gamma_{8,10}x_{10} + \xi_8$$

$$\eta_9 = \beta_{91}\eta_1 + \beta_{92}\eta_2 + \beta_{93}\eta_3 + \beta_{94}\eta_4 + \beta_{95}\eta_5 + \beta_{96}\eta_6 \\ + \beta_{97}\eta_7 + \beta_{98}\eta_8 + \gamma_{91}x_1 + \gamma_{92}x_2 + \gamma_{93}x_3 + \gamma_{94}x_4 + \gamma_{95}x_5 \\ + \gamma_{96}x_6 + \gamma_{97}x_7 + \gamma_{98}x_8 + \gamma_{99}x_9 + \gamma_{9,10}x_{10} + \xi_9$$

REFERENCES

- Ajzen, I , and M Fishbein 1980 *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior* Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice-Hall
- Alexander, Karl L , Bruce K Eckland, and Larry J Griffin 1976 "The Wisconsin Model of Socioeconomic Achievement A Replication " *American Journal of Sociology* 81 324-63
- Allport, G 1935 "Attitudes " Pp 798-844 in *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, edited by C Murchinson Worcester, Mass Clark University Press

- Alwin, Duane, and Arland Thornton 1984 "Family Origins and the Schooling Process Early versus Late Influence of Parental Characteristics " *American Sociological Review* 49 (December) 784-802
- American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business 1985 *Accreditation Council Policies, Procedures and Standards, 1985-86* (annual) St Louis American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business
- Andersen, C , D Carter, and A Malizio 1989 *1989-90 Fact Book on Higher Education, American Council on Education* New York Macmillan
- Astin, Alexander 1978 *Four Critical Years* San Francisco Jossey-Bass
- Bard, L 1976 "Who Goes to Graduate School and How They Get There " Pp 19-48 in *Scholars in the Making*, edited by J Katz and R Hartnett Cambridge, Mass Ballinger
- Becker, Gary S 1967 *Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income An Analytic Approach* Ann Arbor University of Michigan, Department of Economics, Institute for Public Administration
- Bellah, Robert N , et al 1985 *Habits of the Heart Individualism and Commitment in American Life* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Berelson, B 1960 *Graduate Education in the United States* New York McGraw-Hill
- Berenson, G 1990 *GAPSFA Applicant Profiles 1987-1990* Graduate and Professional School Financial Aid Service Princeton, N J Educational Testing Service
- Bidwell, Charles, and Noah Friedkin 1988 "The Sociology of Education " Pp 449-72 in *Handbook of Sociology*, edited by Neil J Smelser Newbury Park, Calif Sage Publications
- Blake, Judith 1989 *Family Size and Achievement* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Blau, Peter, and O D Duncan 1967 *The American Occupational Structure* New York Wiley
- Boudon, Raymond 1974 *Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality* New York Wiley
- Bourdieu, Pierre 1977 "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction " Pp 487-511 in *Power and Ideology in Education*, edited by J Karabel and H Halsey New York Oxford University Press
- 1984 *Distinction*, translated by Robert Nice London Routledge & Kegan Paul
- Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis 1976 *Schooling in Capitalist America* New York Basic Books
- Coleman, James 1990 *Foundations of Social Theory* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Donlon, T 1984 *College Board Technical Handbook for the Scholastic Aptitude Test and Achievement Tests* New York College Entrance and Examination Board
- Duncan, Beverly 1965 "Family Factors and School Dropout 1920-1960 " University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Cooperative Research Project no 2258, Office of Education
- Educational Testing Service 1986 *GRE Information Bulletin, 1986-87* Princeton, N J Educational Testing Service
- Fishbein, Martin, and Izek Ajzen 1975 *Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior An Introduction to Theory and Research* Reading, Mass Addison-Wesley
- Graduate Management Admission Council 1985 *85-86 Bulletin of Information and Registration Form* Princeton, N J Educational Testing Service
- Hallinan, M 1988 "Equality of Educational Opportunity " *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 249-68
- Hanushek, Eric, and John Jackson 1977 *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists* New York Academic Press

American Journal of Sociology

- Hauser, Robert 1989 "Trends in Black Schooling and the Decline in College Entry" *Selections* 4, no 2 (Autumn) 11-18
- Hauser, Robert, and D Anderson 1989 "Post-High School Plans and Aspirations of Black and White High School Graduates What Has Changed since the Mid-1970s?" Working Paper no 89-15 University of Wisconsin—Madison, Center for Demography and Ecology
- Hilton, T, and H Rhett 1973 *Final Report The Base-Year Study of the Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972* Princeton, N J Educational Testing Service
- Holland, J 1970 *Manual Vocational Preference Inventory* Palo Alto, Calif Consulting Psychologist Press
- 1972 *Professional Manual for the Self-Directed Search* Palo Alto, Calif Consulting Psychologist Press
- Hope, Keith 1984 *As Others See Us Schooling and Social Mobility in Scotland and the United States* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Hout, Michael 1988 "Expanding Universalism, Less Structural Mobility The American Occupational Structure in the 1980s" *American Journal of Sociology* 93 (May) 1358-1400
- Illich, Ivan 1983 *Deschooling Society* New York Harper Colophon
- Jencks, Christopher, et al 1972 *Inequality* New York Basic Books
- Jøreskog, Karl 1969 "A General Approach to Confirmatory Maximum Likelihood Factor Analysis" *Psychometrika* 34 183-202
- Judge, George G, W E Griffiths, R Carter Hill, Helmut Lutkepohl, and Tsoung-chao Lee 1985 *The Theory and Practice of Economics*, 2d ed New York Wiley
- Kalleberg, Arne 1977 "Work Values and Job Rewards" *American Sociological Review* 42 124-43
- Kalleberg, Arne, and K Loscocco 1983 "Aging Values and Rewards Explaining Age Differences in Job Satisfaction" *American Sociological Review* 48 78-90
- Kiecolt, K J 1988 "Recent Developments in Attitudes and Social Structure" *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 381-403
- Kingston, P, and J Clawson 1985 "Getting on the Fast Track Recruitment at an Elite Business School" *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 5 (4) 1-17
- Klitgaard, Robert E 1985 *Choosing Elites* New York Basic Books
- Kohn, Melvin, and Carmi Schooler 1988 *Work and Personality* Norwood, N J Ablex
- Law School Admissions Services 1984 1984-85 *General Information Book* Newtown, Pa Law School Admission Council
- Lorence, J, and J Mortimer 1985 "Job Involvement through the Life Course A Panel Study of Three Age Groups" *American Sociological Review* 50 618-38
- MacIntyre, Alasdair C 1981 *After Virtue A Study in Moral Theory* Notre Dame, Ind University of Notre Dame Press
- Manski, C 1990 "The Use of Intentions Data to Predict Behavior A Best Case Analysis" *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 85 934-40
- Manski, Charles, and David Wise 1983 *College Choice in America* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Mare, Robert 1980 "Social Background and School Continuation Decisions" *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 75 (June) 295-305
- McGuire, W J 1985 "Attitudes and Attitude Change" 2 223-346 in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3d ed Edited by G Lindzey and E Aronson New York Random House
- Muthen, Bengt 1979 "A Structural Probit Model with Latent Variables" *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 74 807-11
- 1984 "A General Structural Equation Model with Dichotomous, Ordered

- Categorical and Continuous Latent Variable Indicators " *Psychometrika* 49 115-32
- 1987 "LISCOMP Analysis of Linear Structural Equations with a Comprehensive Measurement Model" (user's guide) Mooresville, Ind Scientific Software
- National Research Council 1989 *A Common Destiny Blacks and American Society* Washington, D C National Academy Press
- Parsons, Talcott 1961 Introduction to *Theories of Society* by T Parsons, Edward Shils, K Naegle, and J Pitts Glencoe, Ill Free Press
- 1964 *The Social System* New York Free Press
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey 1985 "Organizations and Organization Theory" 1 379-440 in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3d ed Edited by G Lindzey and E Aronson New York Random House
- Pong, S, and D Post 1990 "Trends in Gender and Family Background Effects on School Attainment The Case of Hong Kong" *British Journal of Sociology* 42 (June) 249-71
- Rosenberg, M, and C Hovland 1960 "Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Components of Attitudes" Pp 1-14 in *Attitude Organization and Change*, edited by C Hovland and M Rosenberg New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Schein, E 1977 "Career Anchors and Career Paths A Panel Study of Management School Graduates" In *Organizational Careers Some New Perspectives*, edited by J Van Maanen New York Wiley
- Schuman, Howard, and M P Johnson 1976 "Attitudes and Behavior" *Annual Review of Sociology* 2 161-207
- Sewell, William, Sr, Archibald Haller, and G Ohlendorf 1970 "The Educational and Early Occupational Attainment Process Replication and Revision" *American Sociological Review* 35 1014-27
- Sewell, William, Sr, Archibald Haller, and Alejandro Portes 1969 "The Educational and Early Occupational Attainment Process" *American Sociological Review* 34 82-92
- Sewell, William H, Sr, and Robert Hauser 1975 *Education, Occupation, and Earnings Achievement in the Early Career* New York Academic Press
- Sewell, William, H, Sr, Robert Hauser, and David Featherman, eds 1976 *Schooling and Achievement in American Society* New York Academic Press
- Sewell, W, and V Shah 1967 "Socioeconomic Status and the Attainment of Higher Education" *Sociology of Education* 40 1-23
- Steelman, Lala, and Brian Powell 1991 "Sponsoring the Next Generation Parental Willingness to Pay for Higher Education" *American Journal of Sociology* 96 1505-29
- Stolzenberg, R, ed 1988 *Design for a Survey of New Matriculants in Graduate Schools of Business and Management* Los Angeles, Calif Graduate Management Admission Council
- 1989 "Job Quits in Empirical and Theoretical Perspective" Pp 99-130 in *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, edited by Arne Kalleberg Greenwich, Conn JAI Press
- Tourangeau, Roger, et al 1987 *The National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) Fifth Follow-Up (1986) Data File User's Manual* Washington, D C Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, Center for Education Statistics
- Treiman, Donald 1977 *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective* New York Wiley
- U S Department of Education 1981 *NLS Base Year 1972 through Fourth Follow-Up, 1979 Data File Users Manual, Volume II* Washington, D C Department of Education
- Xie, Y 1989 "Structural Equation Models for Ordinal Variables An Analysis of Occupational Destination" *Sociological Methods and Research* 17 325-52

Review Essay: The Dismal Science and Sex¹

Sex and Reason By Richard A. Posner Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1992 Pp 458

John H. Gagnon

State University of New York, Stony Brook

Within the social sciences there has been a 100-year struggle to extend the reach of economic metaphors and analyses to include all aspects of mental and social life. Outside the social sciences, in practical society, a parallel attempt to subject all forms of conduct to the discipline of commodification and pricing has become part of the normal order. This drive to marketize all conduct in the realm of everyday life (i.e., to create institutional forms that treat social actors as rational buyers and sellers of products in a market) and to apply economic metaphors to the understanding of conduct has met with substantial opposition. In the 19th century, resistance to life insurance, and in the 20th, aversions to markets for body parts (even blood) or to the renting-out of wombs are markers of deeply felt cultural boundaries between the priced and the unpriceable. Moralists and social scientists have criticized the extension of economic metaphors to the domains of social life in which setting a price or creating a market are viewed as ethically wrong or scientifically inadequate.

However, the boundaries between those forms of conduct that are appropriate to be "in play in the market" and those that are not, and those forms of conduct that are appropriate to be understood by economic modes of thought and those that are off-limits, have been shifting, with more and more forms of conduct becoming subject to both market discipline and economic interpretation. For Vilfredo Pareto (1935), the market stopped at the "economic," for Peter Blau (1964), the market stopped at love and the other affections, for the post-Beckerians, the market stops at nothing (except tenure). That a modern social theorist would write a book that tries to make sex—traditionally thought to be the most irrational form of conduct and the least subject to social control—understandable, and ultimately manageable, through market metaphors and practices is therefore not surprising.

It is surprising, though, that the author of such a book is a jurist, since the law, historically, has been viewed (however incorrectly) as the repository of lasting moral sentiments. The law itself, however, has been

¹ Address correspondence to John H. Gagnon, Department of Sociology, State University of New York, Stony Brook, New York 11794

vulnerable to the extension of the social sciences, sociology, psychology, and economics have penetrated the law schools, undermining the fiction that the law is anything more than a set of conventions for getting done what people want done, and from a laissez-faire economist's point of view, the problem of finding out what it is that people want done is best solved through submitting the issue to the market itself ²

Judge Richard Posner is a widely respected member of the federal judiciary (his name was floated as a candidate for the Supreme Court on the recent retirement of Justice White) with strong affiliations with the School of Law and the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago. He came to the problem of "sex," the law, and economic theory through a reading of Plato's *Symposium* (which he construes as being about "homosexuality" rather than Eros and wisdom among men of equal social status in classical Greece) and through a case decided in his court (with the decision being ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court) concerning whether women dancers could take off all their clothing while performing. Plato's spirited defense of "homosexuality" and the diversity of legal opinions generated by whether or not these women had the right to dance naked persuaded Posner that the relationship between sex and the law could profit from some disciplined thought.

The result of this thought is a dense, somewhat repetitive, and highly speculative brief that uses the metaphors of rational choice for thinking about sex. Posner considers his "economic theory of sexuality" to be (1) an extension of the work of Gary Becker (1976, 1991), (2) capable of integrating and transcending all other scientific insights and findings about sex, and (3) in direct opposition to all moral theories of sexuality (his list of theories ranges from those of Christianity to those of Ronald Dworkin) that are not reducible to "genuine social interests or practical incentives" (p. 4). He characterizes his own theory as functional, secular, and utilitarian and as libertarian in the tradition of J. S. Mill.

The first three chapters offer, in order, a rather casual review of previous theories of sexuality, a cross-cultural and historical survey of what is "known" about sexuality, and a truncated discussion of how the law of sex differs and has differed in various times and places. The first two chapters are largely narratives that take the forms of "Malinowski said . . ." or "the history of sex from the Reformation to Victoria . . ." Both severely underestimate the complexity and social embeddedness of all theories of sexuality and the difficulties of interpreting historical and cross-cultural data whose quality varies. Even moderate experts in these matters will not feel that they have learned anything new and in some cases, the text is in error (e.g., Kinsey was not appointed

² I would note that there is an interesting overlap between the view of those with a laissez-faire attitude toward the law and the view of critical legal scholars with a more Marxist bent. The former believe that the law is an instrumentality for getting done what people want done, the latter believe that the law is an instrumentality for getting done what some people want done.

by Indiana University to head the Institute for Sex Research, as Posner states on page 18, the institute was created by Kinsey as a wholly independent corporation to legally own the interviews and archives)

Of particular interest is the opposition between Posner's economism and the social constructionist approach to sexuality. Both theories are "environmentalist," that is, both theories examine the ways in which social incentives (including culturally acquired preferences) elicit and shape sexual activity. However, Posner's economic theory has a greater reach in its goal of using the same set of terms to explain all sexual conduct everywhere. In contrast, theories of sexuality generated by constructionists in the noneconomic sciences are more modest and more local in the claims made by their cultural and historical theories. Indeed, in the strong tradition of social constructionism there is a reflexive awareness that social theories and their application are responses to contemporary social conditions. It is Posner's claim that his theory is historyless and cultureless that makes a crucial distinction between Posner and the social constructionists.

Posner notes, with some pride, that power, exploitation (social domination), and ideology, which are key analytic ideas in constructionism, are not even concepts in his economic science. However, ideology is not missing from his analysis, since one of his criticisms of constructionism is that most constructionists are "left-leaning" utopians and insensitive to the deep and enduring, perhaps biologically rooted, human interests that are difficult to change, even though they may be immoral or unethical (p. 30). The dismal science returns here in full force.

The appeal to biology and to the bonding of sociobiology and economics deepens in the second part of the volume. Posner argues that his belief that the evidence supports the ideas of an innate sex drive and of the biological determination of potential and desirable sexual acts (including gender preference in sexual relations) is not foundational in his economic theory. His joining of biology and economics (what he calls a "bio-economic" theory) is, in his view, a matter of theoretical eclecticism (p. 88). However, the fit between the sociobiological and the economic is, of course, not accidental (as ideologists are wont to say).

If the biological argument is extraneous to the economic theory, the reader is left wondering why some contentious and unresolved questions such as the role biology plays in gender preference in erotic relations (aka homosexuality) are constantly resolved, obiter dicta, on the side of the biological (except for "opportunistic homosexuals," who are seen as being produced by a restricted market for women). Perhaps it is because the actual quality of the economic analysis is itself very modest (for the core discussion of this point, see the chapter on sex and rationality [chap. 5]). The economic theory propounded does not go beyond the assertions that individuals (1) have preferences that they have acquired (perhaps biologically) and (2) respond to incentives and opportunities provided for sexual activities in a social marketplace.

One might expect that a systematic analysis would follow this assertion, an analysis that would use data and economic models similar to those in Becker's *An Economic Treatise on the Family* (1991), to advance our understanding of sexual activity and offer us insights into those social mechanisms that could change undesirable conduct into desirable conduct. Instead, the analysis is largely metaphorical, for example, Posner writes that men without women are like the unemployed and, therefore, find sexual employment by having sex with other men. Another of his devices is post hoc speculation: the sequestration of women and noncompanionate marriage explain Greek pederasty, monasticism increased homosexuality among priests in the Middle Ages, and Swedish sexual permissiveness is explained by the low cost of nonmarital childbearing. In part, Posner's tendency to speculate rests on a lack of data (What was the rate of sex between men in the medieval celibate communities? Is it really true that Swedes are sexually permissive or is that a stereotype?) His ambition for his theories, however, makes him abandon caution in their application.

It is in this second section that Posner develops his "model of morally indifferent sex," which argues that, instead of the current U.S. practice of treating sex as a morally troubling or problematic domain of conduct, it should be pragmatically regulated (as he believes it is in Sweden) in much the same way that we regulate driving. We do regulate driving in order to reduce its costs, but we do not regulate it for moral purposes. It is at this point that there is a critical intersection between Posner's libertarian ideology and his goal of using social instrumentalities (in this case, the law) to create incentives for desirable sexual behavior and disincentives for nondesirable behavior. Optimal regulation of sex, then, depends on the mobilization of "practical, concrete, non-moralistic concerns" (p. 201). If someone has a deeply felt revulsion for a form of conduct that goes beyond the conduct's measurable "this worldly" consequences, Posner recommends that they read chapter 4 of J. S. Mill's *On Liberty* (p. 203).

The last half of the book (the third section) provides an "economic" explanation of specific forms of sexual conduct and a libertarian's perspective on how they should be regulated. Marriage, divorce, pregnancy and abortion, homosexuality, the erotic environment, coercive sex, and the separation of sex from reproduction are considered in turn. In many ways Posner's consideration of these particular cases is the most interesting discussion in the book, although it is the least systematic. Posner has a lawyer's mind that is intrigued by puzzles and he is at his best when he considers individual cases. This is particularly true in his consideration of legal cases that concern reproductive issues. There are moments when he gives in to his desire to shock, for example, when he discusses the commonalities of marriage and prostitution, as if this idea had not already been widely expressed by workers in the sex industry and feminists. And in other places, he goes awry in arguing that rapists are solely

motivated by the desire to have sex with women (here he again cites the sociobiologists) and not considering that an externality of rape, and of violence against women in general, is the subordination of women through the creation of a climate of fear and terror. Reading these chapters is something like being at an interesting seminar taught by a teacher with whom one does not necessarily agree theoretically but whose lecture is full of rewarding speculations.

I agree with many of Posner's libertarian conclusions about the regulation of sexuality, particularly his view that the less the government does about the regulation of conduct, in general, and sexual conduct, in particular, the better off we are. Indeed, I believe that, under all of his scientific trappings, Posner is an old-time moralist of the scientific sort (like Kinsey and other scientific sex reformers). To quote his own words: "Clear thinking about sexuality is obstructed by layers of ignorance, ideology, superstition, and prejudice *that the acid bath of economics can help us peel away*" (p. 437, emphasis added). Ah, blessed science that will lead us to a better world, or, perhaps, the dismal science is not so dismal after all.

Considered as a whole, this is an unsatisfying book, possibly because Posner thought the task was too easy. He has read widely but not thought deeply. His faith in science, in general, and in the theory machine of contemporary human capital economics, in particular, makes him a utopian in his own right. In any case, if clearing out the stables of sexuality were so simple, surely someone would have done it before now.

REFERENCES

- Becker, Gary S. 1976. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1991. *An Economic Treatise on the Family*. Enl. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Blau, Peter M. 1964. *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935. *The Mind and Society*. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Book Reviews

Identity and Control A Structural Theory of Social Action By Harrison C. White Princeton, N J Princeton University Press, 1992
Pp 423

Peter Abell

London School of Economics and Political Science

With two of his previous books—*An Anatomy of Kinship* (Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice-Hall, 1963) and *Chains of Opportunity* (Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1970)—Harrison White has quite brilliantly changed the way we conceive of some central but specific sociological problems. His latest offering is more ambitious, seeking to convey the foundations for a general theory of social structure and action. Will he have equal success on this broader canvas?

To start with, let us agree with the author's own assessment "This book is not easy to read because it aims for the largest possible range and yet it does so in verbal formulation." In fact, it is a very difficult book to read and I am by no means confident that I have mastered all the intricacies of its intent. That it should be so difficult is somewhat ironic because the prime intellectual stimulant to White's whole approach is network analysis—surely one of the more straightforward forms of sociological discourse. And Harrison White is, of course, one of the founders of modern network theory, his name being associated with a number of leading ideas. But in this book, he has ambitions for what I might term "phenomenological networks," which travel far beyond the allotted place that networks presently occupy in our thinking. Moreover, the sheer force of his intellectual curiosity and exuberance is only rarely kept in check, it constantly threatens to engulf the page in an often breathtaking kaleidoscope of allusions, insights, and connections. The breadth of the references is intimidating, extending to over 50 pages and spreading far beyond the social sciences, summaries introduce new material and are uncompromisingly difficult and are sometimes so succinct as to require repeated reading. Yet one is nevertheless left with the feeling that something extraordinary is afoot.

The prosaic world of networks wherein well-defined units (persons, sometimes collectivities) are concretely related is sundered in a variety of ways. In White's hands, units of analysis become layered identities "an identity is any source of action not explicable from biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute meaning." Identities in their simplest form—that is, as "stable social footings in an undifferentiated

Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from the author

social context"—arise from a "continuing urge to control" in a world that permanently threatens chaos. But processes of further identification (i.e., the acquisition of greater "control"—a word, incidentally, that appears to do a considerable amount of conceptual work) bring potential identities into networks of contention, engendering a mutual sense of definition that may then *organize* them into "disciplines."

When opposing contentions result in an equilibrium, the result is a social structure. Thus, the central concern of the book is to show how we may conceive of identities both developing into and resulting from social organization (or, in the special case, social structure). White promotes the equilibrium as a dynamic one where, presumably, in any stable discipline the birth and death rates of identity formation are equal. I failed to attach clear meaning to this and found myself thinking in terms of a static equilibrium whereby mutually contending identities hold in something like a Nash equilibrium. Be this as it may, a further or perhaps two further "layers" of identity are added to this basic picture. But note first that the concept of a person is entirely decentralized in White's analysis; persons, as all good phenomenologists would have it, are no more than social constructs—and in the present framework they are built out of previously established (and maintained?) identities. Personhood becomes possible by virtue of an identity expressed and achieved through a social discipline. But such persons are incomplete because further identity may be honed from the frictions/errors/contradictions of their multiple disciplinary locations. A final level of identity may also be derived from a coherent narrative or biography that rationalizes the experiences of the practical identity that is inherent in multiple location. It is this multilayered idea of identity that White wants to study as both cause and consequence of social organization (structure). The picture itself is not so foreign to us, after all, the functionalist idea of interacting roles comprising networks of normative expectations that generate the possibility of, first, intrarole conflict and then of interrole conflict when the same actor (person) is found to occupy more than one role, is not entirely dissimilar. White would, though, I suspect, dispatch this parallel with some alacrity.

His world is one of continuing creation and destruction in the face of the quixotic imperatives of the environment. Patterned social life is possible but only as metastable islands of reciprocally governed identities permanently at risk of invasion from both within and without as new contingencies arise. In this world, the aspirations of both structuralist and rational choice theory are severely curtailed. Structuralism works from "the myth of society," whereas rational choice propounds a "myth of the person" with each in its own way making premature ontological assumptions. Each may work temporarily in some locations, but that is all that could be hoped for. One of White's appendices is revealing in this respect. He likens persons to Kalman filters which pick up the trends of varying types in an apparently indeterminate time series. Persons are

so conceived of, with a propensity to control and to make fleeting appearances in the flux of events

If we follow White into the fragile world of fluxed multilayered identities, then how are we to practice social science? What shall we hold onto as relatively stable in order to observe the relatively unstable? Surprisingly, White is optimistic, he does think that the same dynamic models operate over and over again. He is not, however, happy with "averaging" statistical techniques (nearly all we have) but he does promote something close to my heart—the role of stories or narratives. Will he change the way we conceive of theory? I wonder, but to have raised the question is enough to set the book apart as something special.

Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. By Ronald S. Burt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 313. \$45.00.

Mark Shanley
Northwestern University

In this well-crafted and rich volume, Ronald Burt provides an integration of his previous network studies that makes a substantial contribution to research on the social structure of economic phenomena. This integration is especially effective when seen in conjunction with the work of Harrison White, Mark Mizruchi, Edward Laumann, Wayne Baker, and others who have applied network analysis to areas of policy interest.

The book succeeds on several levels, any of which would make it a contribution. It succeeds theoretically by providing a clear delineation of network concepts and a plausible logic for the behavior of actors in a network. It also succeeds in applying its framework to multiple levels of analysis to show both its richness and the issues that arise when it is applied to different aspects of social structure. In addition, Burt is successful in providing empirical support for his arguments. Finally, the book succeeds in linking its arguments with other sociological and economic theories of action to identify numerous areas for future research.

The first two chapters present and formalize a clear and plausible micrologic for networks that explains what actors gain from favorable location in a network and the means by which they obtain such gains. Its details and linkages with prior network research are beyond the scope of a brief review. Gains from a network come from access to "structural holes," which are defined by the absence of relationships between actors apart from those provided by a central actor of interest in the network—"the separation between nonredundant contacts" (p. 18). When parties are connected by a structural hole, an actor can play them against each other to gain advantage (the *tertius gaudens* or "third who benefits" role). Gains from being a *tertius gaudens* are limited by the extent to

which networks are constrained—the extent to which parties with whom you are associated are also associated with each other (or the absence of structural holes) The greater the number of these redundant ties in a network, the less gains accrue to the actor (p. 30)

In the next two chapters, these ideas are applied to topics at different levels of analysis In chapter 3, the application is to the industry/market level of analysis, while in chapter 4, the argument is applied to the problem of managerial advancement The comparison of these two studies from different levels of analysis shows the generality of Burt's argument and is a major strength of the book

In the author's longitudinal study of 77 American product markets, structural holes among supplier and buyer markets led to increased margins, while structural holes in producer markets led to reduced margins Furthermore, these hole effects are nonlinear and multiplicative, having their greatest effect as completely unconstrained action begins to be constrained It is gratifying that Burt's results are consistent with those from studies of industrial organization and competitive strategy

For managerial advancement, a more complex picture arises Among Burt's many results are that, for women and newly hired managers, promotion is aided by hierarchy, which allows individuals access to networks via sponsors For more experienced managers and those crossing social frontiers, on the other hand, advancement is associated with flat and entrepreneurial networks that go beyond the immediate work group The linkage of hierarchy with network action ideas in this study is very interesting and consistent with current work on managerial behavior and intergroup dynamics

The final three chapters link structural hole arguments with other lines of sociological and economic theory These are the most stimulating although the least developed portions of the book Chapter 5 recalls ideas of role sets by developing the idea that actors span multiple networks It also contains a fruitful discussion of level-of-analysis issues and an interesting one of the differences in analyzing from structure versus analyzing from actor attributes Chapter 6 links structural hole analyses with interface models of markets and population ecology studies to generate hypotheses consistent with both lines of research In both these chapters, the integrative potential of structural hole ideas is clear

Chapter 7 develops the idea of strategically manipulating the context of network behavior through such means as withdrawal from or expansion of a network or the embedding of network relations within other relationships Included in this discussion is an application of network ideas to resource-dependence and transaction-cost views of the firm that have become so influential in policy studies in recent years

The book is tightly argued, but a careful reading will be rewarded and summaries are provided after each chapter There are several helpful empirical analyses presented throughout the book that support the general flow of the argument Primarily methodological issues are presented as technical appendices

Rational Choice Theory Advocacy and Critique Edited by James S Coleman and Thomas J Fararo Newbury Park, Calif Sage Publications, 1992 Pp 232 \$39 95

Victor Nee
Cornell University

Sociological rational choice theory has its advocates and critics in this engaging volume edited by James Coleman and Thomas Fararo The essays in this book were prepared for a 1991 conference organized by Coleman when he was chair of the Theoretical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association The editors aim to stimulate interest in rational choice theory through debate over the fundamental issues and problems involved in extending the theory to sociology In their introduction, Coleman and Fararo specify the guidelines for a sociological theory that is "wholly satisfactory " According to them, such a theory must explain the behavior of social systems by reference to the behavior of individuals in the system and must be psychological insofar as it provides a model of the "springs of individual action " Rather than fully demonstrating the power of rational choice theory, the book elaborates the issues and problems involved in extending rational choice theory to the explanation of social action Five essays advocate the application of rational choice theory and five are critical of the theory

The first two of the advocacy essays address the problem of how to extend rational choice theory to sociology Siegwart Lindenberg argues persuasively that sociological rational choice theory can increase the realism and descriptive richness of underlying economic models by specifying variables that incorporate key features of the social context He proposes the method of decreasing abstraction to bridge the abstract analytic concerns of economics with the greater realism and description that characterizes sociological analysis Lindenberg might have reminded us that, in fact, sociologists have practiced a version of his method of decreasing abstraction for a long time We see this, for example, in linear-regression equations that combine human capital—an economic concept—with variables that specify the institutional or structural context in which actors seek to maximize returns on past investments in education Much in mainstream sociology, from status attainment to labor market research and demography, unreflectively builds on core rational choice assumption imported from economics Gary Becker must appreciate this point Rather than acting as if rational choice theory is an unwanted outsider, advocates of sociological rational choice theory might instead point to all the ways the assumption of individual optimization has already penetrated mainstream sociological models The battle for acceptance may be largely won, if it is true, as George Homans once wrote, that the implicit theory of most sociologists is rational choice theory

Margaret Mooney Marini provides a lucid and useful review of recent research in pointing out the limitations of expected utility theory Less

convincing is her recommendation that we need to revitalize the study of values and norms as a strategy to ground expected utility theory in sociology. If a better understanding of the internalization of norms and values becomes a focal point for research inspired by rational choice theory, we will have come full circle, back to the functionalism of Talcott Parsons.

As in past efforts to establish a new paradigm, advocates specify pre-suppositional requirements for the extension of the rational choice approach to sociology. David Willer's application of rational choice theory leads to his specification of elementary theory (ET), which he contends fulfills Coleman's (1990) criterion for a satisfactory sociological theory. His article elaborates the theory that he and his collaborators have developed to study elementary exchanges within established social relationships. Willer's ET model appears to be well adapted to research on network exchange in the laboratory setting, but sociologists also study larger social entities that do not assume social closure, such as class, gender, race, and ethnicity. In my view, the adaptation of rational choice theory to sociology need not entail the modifications ET stipulates. Certainly Homans's exchange theory did not require such modifications. Homans simply stated that economics studies a specialized form of exchange and sociology the more general form. He maintained that the rationality proposition of economics is readily derived from the more general propositions he used to explain social exchange.

A more seamless transition from economics to sociology is offered by Michael Hechter, Debra Friedman, and Satoshi Kanazawa. Their argument rests on the view that social order at the societal level is explained by reference to social dynamics giving rise to and sustaining a multitude of local orders. In their view, the state "free rides," so to speak, on the local order produced by actors in their everyday social transactions. To the extent that they are correct in their view that global order is a direct aggregation of local orders, then macrosociological analysis can also free ride on explanations worked out at the level of the small group. This assumption is implicit in their explanatory strategy, which does not specify causal mechanisms giving rise to global order above the level of the small group. In this respect, Hechter, Friedman, and Kanazawa represent a renewal of the tradition of sociological rational choice theory pioneered by Homans (1950, [1961] 1974) and Blau (1964).

The critics of sociological rational choice theory raise many formidable objections, many of which have already been raised in earlier debates. Thomas Scheff objects to rational choice theory because it neglects emotions as an autonomous motivator of action. According to Scheff, rationality in the utilitarian tradition implies that action is ruled by reason. However, Scheff's pioneering research in the sociology of emotions shows that emotions are a virtual wellspring of social action. How can a theory of action ignore emotions and still claim the mantle of general theory? Scheff acknowledges that behaviorism did not ignore emotions, but faults

it for viewing emotions not as the cause, but as the effect of prior action. Anger and frustration are important sentiments in research on relative deprivation and distributive justice, an area pioneered by sociological rational choice theorists in the 1950s. Anger once felt leads to negative feedback in social transactions, giving rise to conflict. Perhaps Scheff's concerns are more aptly directed at the stripped-down rationality proposition of economics.

Michael Hannan's contribution to the volume persuasively cautions against a tight coupling of microtheory and macrotheory. Following Darwin's example, Hannan contends that macrosociological theories should be sufficiently robust to stand on their own. In his view a loose coupling between microtheory and macrotheory represents a wise strategy for macrosociology in its current state of theoretical flux and uncertainty. Hannan's recommendation to macrosociological theorists contradicts Coleman's insistence on a tight coupling of microtheory and macrotheory. However, current philosophy of social science (e.g., Daniel Little's *Varieties of Social Explanation* [Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991] and Richard W. Miller's *Fact and Method* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987]) concurs with Coleman's view. New realists in the philosophy of social science insist on a careful specification of the causal mechanisms that link individual-level action to societal outcome.

The problem with Richard Munch's criticism of sociological rational choice theory is that he believes the rationality assumption belongs to economics, and therefore its application to social life is limited to explaining only that part of social life that deals with the allocation of scarce resources or what he calls the "economics of power." Munch's own definition of power is Weberian, emphasizing that power is ultimately based on coercive force, even when it is backed by legitimate authority. In my view, power defined as control over resources, as it is by Gerhard Lenski in *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), is preferable for the social sciences, defined as such, power is intrinsic to all social and economic transactions. A broader definition of power therefore undercuts the main objections raised by Munch's critique. Following Munch, in his essay, David Sciulli outlines a normative critique of the limits of rational choice theory. In his view, normative institutional constraints that restrain profit-oriented maximizing behavior of individuals rest outside the purview of rational choice theory. Sciulli argues that rational choice theory is vulnerable to the charge of having a conservative bias insofar as it tacitly accepts liberal complacency about the benign direction of societal change. Moreover, rational choice theory does not lend itself to the tradition of social criticism pioneered by the classical social theorists. According to Sciulli, value neutrality is a serious limitation of rational choice theory. Sciulli's normative critique overlooks the extent to which rational choice theory problematizes cooperation and collective action. By so doing, rational choice theory directly addresses the problem of suboptimal social outcome that arises from individual

maximizing behavior. While this may not satisfy the critical orientation of many sociologists, a theory should be evaluated for its explanatory power, not for its ideological orientation.

What distinguishes the new attempt to establish rational choice theory in sociology is the attention to the micro-macro transition between individual choices and their aggregation in system-level outcomes. This is a challenging task. Skeptics point to the difficulty inherent in combining more than two levels of analysis in a tightly coupled causal chain. Interactions between levels of analysis are complex and difficult to model. Yet for sociologists with a taste for intellectual adventure, the quest for satisfactory explanation may yield surprisingly good results.

Institutions and Social Conflict. By Jack Knight. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xiii + 234.

Satoshi Kanazawa
University of Arizona

The problem of institutional emergence has been approached in a number of ways, one of which is rational choice. Many sociologists have criticized the rational choice perspective, however, for its neglect of power. Starting from the Hobbesian state of nature, the perspective is said to assume that all actors are equally endowed, but this assumption is clearly inconsistent with even the most casual empirical observations. Rational choice theorists can now refer to Jack Knight's *Institutions and Social Conflict* to counter such criticism.

Knight presents a theory of institutional emergence and change that specifically incorporates power asymmetries between actors. The theory derives from general bargaining theory and explains how a particular form of social institution emerges spontaneously. Institutions are defined as socially shared sets of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways (pp. 2–3). These are what most sociologists call *norms*. Knight argues that institutions are by-products of conflicts over resource distribution between unequal actors when there are multiple equilibria. With simple but informative illustrations, he explains how, without any coercion, such distributional conflict results in the equilibrium that is favored by the more powerful actor.

Imagine an interaction between two actors (A and B), each with a binary behavioral choice (*L* and *R*). In the 2×2 game (*RL*), A prefers one equilibrium, whereas B prefers another (*LR*), although both prefer either outcome to the other two (*LL*, *RR*). Each actor thus has an incentive to constrain the other's choice to *L* (while choosing *R* him- or herself). To constrain B's behavior, A must manipulate B's expectation of A's behavior and, to do so, must constrain his or her own behavior through precommitment and threat. If B believes A will choose *R*, B will choose *L* and receive the payoff from the less favorable equilibrium (*RL*), rather

than choose *R* and receive the breakdown value (payoffs when actors cannot coordinate their choices) In the absence of external enforcement, the precommitment and threat by the more powerful actor are more credible because credibility is a function of attitude toward risk and time preference, and these are, in turn, functions of endowment The more resourceful actor can afford to take more risks and to have longer time horizons Thus if A has more resources than B, *and* if this resource asymmetry is common knowledge, then, in games with multiple equilibria, B will *voluntarily* choose that equilibrium which A prefers because B simply cannot do better *given* B's expectation of A's behavior

Individual bargaining is resolved by the commitments of those who enjoy a relative advantage in substantive resources Through a series of interactions with various members of the group, actors with similar resources establish a pattern of successful action in a particular type of interaction As others recognize that they are interacting with one of the actors who possess these resources, they adjust their strategies to achieve their best outcome given the anticipated commitments of others Over time rational actors continue to adjust their strategies until an equilibrium is reached As this becomes recognized as the socially expected combination of equilibrium strategies, a self-enforcing social institution is established [p 143]

This is a strong theory of the spontaneous and decentralized emergence of institutions Nevertheless, it is incomplete on two counts In the first place, although it explicates the micro-to-macro process by which institutions emerge from individual bargaining, the macro-to-micro process of how institutions, once established as enforceable rules, constrain individual choice is ignored The current institution governing the relationship between husbands and wives may have been the result of the resource advantage men have historically enjoyed over women (pp 136–37), but it is absurd to argue that each married couple *independently* arrives at the same equilibrium through bargaining Men and women learn the relevant rules long before they ever get married Knight's theory would have difficulty explaining institutional inertia because in his model institutions should change as the resource asymmetries of relevant actors change

In the second place, power asymmetry is completely exogenous While every theory must leave some element exogenous, power asymmetry is too important to Knight's theory, especially since current asymmetries are the likely result of prior institutional arrangements Knight briefly alludes to this possibility (p 192), but does not develop it Had he specified the feedback mechanism through which institutions affect resource asymmetries, the theory would have been more dynamic

These problems do not diminish the book's significant contributions *Institutions and Social Conflict* is important to sociologists because it offers one of the few deductive theories of the origins of norms I recommend, however, that interested readers read chapter 5 in which Knight discusses his theory before reading his criticisms of current theories of institutions in chapters 3 and 4

Inequality Reexamined By Amartya Sen New York and Cambridge, Mass Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press, 1992
Pp xiv + 207 \$29.95

Stein Ringen
University of Oxford

This is a book of considerable ambition, a new approach to an old problem—the problem of inequality as analyzed through the capabilities approach. In *On Economic Inequality* (1973), Amartya Sen produced an innovative treatise on the problem of inequality, but one that was still safely within the conventions of economic analysis. In *Poverty and Famines* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), he produced a supremely original analysis of the ultimate deprivation—hunger—free from the conventions of any social science subdiscipline. In that work he used “entitlements” as his organizing concept to demonstrate that famines are often not explained by food shortage or distribution, but by disruptions in peoples’ rights to food. Since then, he has developed his conceptual apparatus further in an avalanche of papers on the “capabilities approach.” In *Inequality Reexamined*, this approach is put to the test in a book that is very different from the 1973 one and looks more like sociology than economics.

The central question in the analysis and assessment of equality, Sen suggests, is “Equality of what?” We are all egalitarians now “virtually all the approaches to the ethics of social arrangements that have stood the test of time . . . want equality of *something*” (p. ix). Even libertarians like Nozick are taken into the fold because they argue for “extensive liberties to be equally guaranteed to each . . .” (p. 3). The question “Why equality?” is secondary and of relatively little interest.

The core in the author’s concept of equality is *freedom*. What the *capabilities approach* does is to make possible a relatively precise operationalization of the notion of equality of freedom. The approach is centered around the concepts of functionings and capabilities. Functionings are “beings” and “doings” which define how we live, such as consumption, self-respect, or participation in the community. A person’s capabilities are the various combinations of functionings he or she can achieve. Freedom, then, is defined as a person’s capability to achieve valuable functionings.

The power and originality of this approach is demonstrated in the treatment of freedom, opportunity, justice, and inequality of well-being. Freedom is analyzed directly as the extent of freedom itself rather than indirectly as a means to freedom. Opportunity becomes “real,” positive opportunity rather than a concept defined negatively as the absence of certain specified restrictions on choice. Justice and inequality are defined not in terms of resources (including Rawlsian “primary goods”), nor of goods achieved, but in terms of how resources are linked to achievements through capabilities defined as the freedom to achieve. The often as-

sumed conflict between equality and liberty is "altogether faulty" (p 22) The analysis of inequality is made possible without doing violence to the fact of human diversity and without any assumption that people are identical in preferences and endowments Discourse on freedom, equality, and well-being is becoming, and will long remain, discourse with Sen, and deservedly so

However, in this work, there are limitations to both power and originality The capabilities approach is applied to a wide range of issues beyond the space of well-being, such as Atkinson inequality, poverty/affluence, class and gender differences, Walzer-like spheres of inequality, the problem of too much choice, and equality/efficiency trade-offs On all these matters, Sen has much to say that is elegant, stimulating, and thought provoking, but these analyses add more conceptual sophistication than real innovation Above all, one might ask how original Sen is here, compared with his previous work In *Poverty and Famines* he analyzed well-being/deprivation as resources linked to goods In my reading, this is still the core of the capabilities approach The entitlements analysis was a breakthrough, capability is an eminently fruitful concept, but it is not a further breakthrough beyond entitlements If Sen has gone sociological, he may have overdone it and taken over sociology's bad habit of overconceptualizing

Much is still unclear in the capabilities approach, particularly when it comes to measurement Sen wants his approach to be seen as neither a "range of choice" nor an "equality of opportunity" approach, in the first case because information on actual achievements is needed to throw light on what the capabilities really are, and in the second case because that concept has taken on a specific and restricted meaning in the literature This is not convincing The clearing away of ambiguities will require conceptual simplification more than it will further sophistication This, I believe, will reveal that the approach is in fact a choice/opportunity one, albeit in terms of "real" choice/opportunity The otherwise courageous Sen is too timid here Equality of opportunity is a good concept now that we have the conceptual apparatus to do so, why not take it over and give it a proper meaning, instead of leaving it to the scoundrels?

Property, Bureaucracy, and Culture Middle-Class Formation in Contemporary Britain By Mike Savage, James Barlow, Peter Dickens, and Tony Fielding New York Routledge, 1992 Pp xvii + 266 \$85 00

Alan Dahl
Northwestern University

Property, Bureaucracy, and Culture begins by introducing the authors' "realist" approach to class analysis Assets that allow exploitation are potential bases of class formation But the particular characteristics of

those assets and historical contingencies determine whether actual social collectivities can act to enforce an exclusive claim on those resources and pass that claim on to their children

The book's primary claim is that advanced capitalism provided the potential for managerial class formation. However, such a formation would have to have been based on organizational assets. Since the authority that allows these assets to be exploited is invested in the position in a bureaucracy rather than in the manager who occupies it, class formation on the basis of organizational assets is inherently difficult. This situation, combined with the particularities of British economic history, prevented the development of managers as a class.

Professionals, however, exploit cultural assets, both as objectified in credentials and as embodied in the habitus, which are more easily appropriated by particular individuals, valorized across contexts, and passed on to future generations. Hence, professionals have established and defended their jurisdictional claims and reliably reproduced this advantage for their offspring, demonstrating resilient class formation despite countervailing contingencies.

A third middle class is based on property, the asset most disposed to class formation. However, the *petite bourgeoisie* controls such meager amounts that they have been historically marginal and are a peripheral focus of this book.

Many of the historical contingencies that prevented managerial class formation concern labor markets within the capitalist firm. Owners long retained personal control of firms and established patrimonial bureaucracies that maximized this control. Sponsorship and loyalty were the key to promotion. Managers were thus unable to negotiate uniform criteria of access to positions across firms. They were also prevented from bifurcating their labor market into dominant male and subordinate female segments. The authors' analysis of social mobility supports their claim that managers failed to enforce social closure around their positions and were unable to reliably reproduce middle-class status for their children. Recent downsizing of firms seemingly ends any potential for organizational assets forming the base of a managerial class.

For professional class formation, state contingencies were key. First, the 19th-century state provided a market for professional services, aiding the valorization of professionals' cultural capital in other markets. Through its link to education, the state also was the source of both the credentials and the genteel habitus that professionals used to defend their jurisdictional claims. The growing scale of public and private enterprises incorporated professionals into bureaucratic hierarchies, making them subject to labor market conditions similar to those of managers. However, professionals' control over credentials allowed them to segmentalize niches for their services. Examination of social mobility data shows that professionals were highly self-recruiting inter- and intragenerationally and that professional status provided the best chance of maintaining their middle-class status.

Mike Savage and his fellow authors acknowledge that contingencies outside the workplace have the potential to mediate the primary causes of middle-class formation. However, most factors they examine, including the growing diversity of household types and the 20th-century increase in middle-class home ownership, fail to affect professional solidarity and managerial disunity significantly. Similarly, the authors' analysis of marketing data reveals neither a unifying middle-class life-style serving as a shared symbol countervailing other divisions nor a distinct managerial habitus capable of being mobilized as a class resource. Rather, professionals have distinctive consumption patterns, but managers' tastes cannot be distinguished from the mass of British society.

One contemporary phenomenon does tend to unify managers and professionals. The authors chart the contemporary "escalator" effect of the metropolitan Southeast (of England) in which professionals and managers advance quickly, then exit to other regions to establish mature careers. By homogenizing career and spatial trajectories, this has the potential to lead to the formation of a national middle class.

Utilizing election results, Savage et al. conclude by explaining professionals' waning support of the Conservative party in favor of the centrist Alliance as a reaction to Thatcherite attacks on the state so crucial to professionals. This relationship is supported by the more liberal voting patterns of professionals as compared to managers and of professionals in the public sector as compared to their private-sector counterparts.

In general, this book integrates many current critiques of class analysis into a cogent, frequently convincing, and well-supported account of the history, trajectory and significance of the British middle classes. However, two reservations should be mentioned. First, although the concept of cultural capital is central to their analysis, the authors seem to lack sensitivity to the variety of ways symbolic resources and symbolic conflict can impact class formation. Second, Savage et al. utilize quantitative data, but they provide no measures of statistical significance.

Despite these last shortcomings, *Property, Bureaucracy, and Culture* is a valuable contribution to students of class analysis as a conceptually thorough and empirically honest blueprint for contemporary and historical class analysis.

Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory By Moishe Postone. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 424.

Bob Jessop
Lancaster University

In this complex, dense, richly argued, and rewarding monograph, Moishe Postone offers a fundamental reconstruction and reinterpretation of the core structure of *Capital*. Guided by the more accessible arguments of the

Grundrisse, he interprets *Capital* as concerned to provide a "categorical critique" of the historical specificity and dynamic of modern society. A categorical critique analyzes labor *within* capitalism in terms of the fundamental categories of capitalist society (i.e., the commodity, use and exchange value, concrete and abstract labor, and concrete and abstract time). It also aims to disclose the complex relationship between the surface forms of practice and thought and their deeper structure, which both endows capitalism with a directional logic and creates a growing contradiction therein which provides a possible basis for its overthrow. Postone's reading of Marx's critical theory differs from that of traditional Marxism. The latter, he suggests, is less concerned to develop an immanent, categorical critique than to evaluate capitalism from the transhistorical standpoint of a working class that is economically exploited and politically oppressed and seeks to emancipate itself from capitalist relations in the interests of all oppressed persons. Against claims about some predestined proletarian self-emancipation, Postone suggests that revolution will materially abolish alienated labor as it exists in capitalism and that the historical agency of capitalist overthrow is not (and cannot be) predetermined.

The argument is presented in three parts. First comes a trenchant critique of traditional Marxism in its various forms for failing to grasp the specificity of capitalism as a unique form of societalization, misreading the nature of the Marxian dialectic and treating it as transhistorical, and adopting a class-centered and/or market-focused approach to the capitalist antagonisms that thereby grounded the pessimism of critical theory in late capitalism. Second comes a presentation of the commodity form as the core category of capitalist society. Postone reconstructs the implications of the dominance of the commodity form (and cognate social forms) for social relations in capitalist society and then contrasts his reconstruction with that offered by Habermas. A third part develops a critique of capitalism, with special reference to labor-power, the crucial role of temporalized value in structuring the dynamic of capitalist development, and the periodization and trajectory of capitalist production. The work concludes with some observations on the general implications of Marx's theory for critical social theory.

The central argument running through the book is that the nature and dynamic of capitalism is best conceptualized in terms of a historically specific form of social interdependence which, while grounded in specific forms of practice and thought, acquires an impersonal and seemingly objective character. The resulting form of societalization subjects people to impersonal structural imperatives and constraints that are irreducible to issues of class conflict (let alone personal domination). In this sense the real historical subject of capitalism is the capital relation itself (and not capital or labor), since it is this that generates the ongoing historical dynamic of modern society and simultaneously creates the contradictions that might prepare its overthrow.

The merit of Postone's book consists in its sustained engagement with

value. This is analyzed not as an economic category (and certainly not as a distributional category) but as a fundamental organizational principle that engenders the key features of capitalist society. In emphasizing how the value form determines the dynamic of production, Postone explores the implications of three closely connected conceptual couplets: use value and exchange value, abstract and concrete labor, and abstract and concrete time. The discussion of time and temporality is especially novel and incisive. It enables Postone to reveal the distinctive directional logic of capitalist development (involving a trajectory that has no telos) and the uniqueness of "historical time" as a structuring principle of capitalist societies. In pursuing these substantive theoretical arguments, Postone also develops some important methodological and epistemological claims. In particular he suggests that Marx's *Capital* provided the materialist justification (rather than a mere anthropological inversion) of Hegel's idealist dialectic and that Marxism thus reconstructed is both self-reflexive and epistemologically consistent in its ability to explain both the dynamic of bourgeois society and Marxism's development in that context.

This is a challenging book with much to offer Marxist scholars and scholars of Marxism. Nonetheless there are some gaps that subsequent work in this vein should fill. The discussion of class conflict remains gestural (albeit consistent) and other important forms of the capital relation (such as the tax or state forms) are barely mentioned. Likewise, although Postone provides an interesting account of the contradictions within capitalism, he hardly considers how they might be materially abolished and what social forces might accomplish this. Despite its neglect of these issues, however, the rigor and richness of Postone's arguments makes this a key book even for those with other perspectives on capitalist dynamics.

The New Social Economy: Reworking the Division of Labor By Andrew Sayer and Richard Walker. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1991. Pp. 299. \$64.95 (cloth), \$22.95 (paper).

Vicki Smith
University of Pennsylvania

By what organizational, firm-level, state-level, and market-level mechanisms can complex industrial societies meet the needs of the largest number of people in a democratic, economical, and ecologically benign way? Do late 20th-century capitalist societies contain new, constructively transformative economic and production systems, as many political economists currently argue, or are they more fundamentally continuous with earlier institutional, class-specific arrangements?

The New Social Economy extensively, if not always convincingly, re-

views politicoeconomic and organizational literature to answer these and other questions. Its authors attempt to advance debate about power, production, markets, and industrial organization by highlighting the concept of the social division of labor. By focusing on this division, showing how institutions and practices build on it and expand it, Andrew Sayer and Richard Walker try to offer a more precise analytic tool for interpreting late 20th-century capitalist and socialist societies. Ideally, the concept of the social division of labor would be more theoretically significant than such concepts as the technical division of labor (which many labor-process theorists have privileged) or the social relational division of labor determined by ownership of private property (which Marxist class theorists have privileged).

Few observers of the contemporary political economy will challenge Sayer and Walker's core description of the social division of labor. According to these authors, it has become vastly more complex and global. It fragments people and work organizations when production and distribution become increasingly specialized, but it also integrates workers, firms, circulation processes (of information and money), and markets have become enmeshed in a deeply connected web of social and economic activities. Thus, it is no longer fruitful to analyze, for example, labor processes, firms, or markets as discrete domains that operate relatively autonomously.

Sayer and Walker walk through a series of topics, both to illustrate the extent of the social division of labor and to emphasize its theoretical significance. In one chapter, they analyze gender, class, and patriarchy, repeating many of the arguments made by feminists about the ways in which economic class fails to capture the experience of women or explain gender inequality outside the workplace. They point out that gender domination cuts across and, in important ways, actively shapes class and occupational stratification in the world of paid work. In other words, the division of labor shaped by social inequalities is fundamentally determinative of the technical division of labor, the former is more far reaching and long lasting as well.

Other chapters take on prevailing orthodoxies in the literature on work, corporate organizations, and political economy. Sayer and Walker feel that depictions of our economy as service based are exaggerated, pointing out that a vast number of services directly or indirectly produce material goods and often are embedded in industrial manufacturing sectors (although they are not always as clear as one would like about the implications of this point). Continuing in this vein, they object to dichotomous approaches that insist on distinctions between service and production, between shop-floor and office jobs. Boundaries in the contemporary social division of labor are far more fluid, positions more integrated, and interdependencies far more pronounced.

Chapters on "just-in-time" manufacturing and on Fordism and flexibility will interest those thinking about changes in labor and production

processes, as well as those attempting to understand the cultural specificity of productive arrangements. Here, as in other chapters, Sayer and Walker advocate a broader approach to studying the workplace, one which recognizes that the technical division of labor—the immediate ways in which workers directly interact with each other and with managers and deploy and manipulate machines, information, and raw materials—reveals only a narrow part of workplace social organization. Important insights here for those studying “new” flexible forms are that production systems should not be confused with employment relations (flexibility in one sphere does not necessarily entail flexibility in the other) and that organizational/industrial rigidities can coexist with certain types of flexibility. Indeed, in some cases apparent flexibility disguises deep-seated rigidities inside one organization.

Readers will find much useful description in this book but I doubt that many will be surprised by its claims. I suspect, for example, that many people have already concluded that orthodox class analysis fails to explain relations of domination and power in advanced capitalist society and must be filled out by analyses that broaden our understanding of the multiple bases of domination (feminist work providing one such analysis). I further suspect that many are already convinced that most of our standard categories for analyzing economic, production, and organizational structures are in need of reconstruction, given the obvious and increasingly complex character of the global economy.

Nevertheless, this book is an exhaustive and thoughtful approach to the theoretical dilemmas facing the field of political economy today. Sayer and Walker offer a clear conceptualization of the kinds of organizational and market networks and productive relations that might meaningfully advance us toward a more inclusive, nonexploitative society.

Farewell to the Self-Employed: Deconstructing a Socioeconomic and Legal Solipsism. By Marc Linder. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. Pp. 200. \$42.95.

Kevin Henson
University of California, Los Angeles

Farewell to the Self-Employed is a book that challenges our current perceptions about the proliferation of self-employed individuals in the United States. Instead of indicating hard-won economic and personal independence, Linder argues, the increase in the self-employed is, in many instances, evidence of employers' having unilaterally redefined the employer-employee relationship, thus circumventing the unions and redeploying both business risks and the costs of fringe benefits back to individual employees. Linder cites the disproportionately large expansion of “self-employed” maids, janitors, hairdressers, and child-care workers—

accounting for more than 25% of the increase within the nonagricultural self-employment sector—as “precisely the kinds of jobs that prompt the strongest doubts about their classification as self-employment” (p. 63). Thus, Linder locates much of the recent growth of the self-employed within the context of a general shift toward contingent or just-in-time staffing.

Three of the seven chapters (chaps. 2, 5, and 6) are devoted to debunking the taxonomic and legal definitions of the self-employed and critiquing existing government censuses of them. Chapter 2 explores in exhaustive detail the construction of the U.S. Bureau of the Census figures on the self-employed. Noting serious inconsistencies and problems in definitions and instructions to enumerators, Linder argues that the self-employment data is “virtually worthless.” Chapter 5 examines the often-convoluted legislative history of the self-employed as a class of workers. Linder presents an especially fascinating 1939 Wisconsin case in which the claimant, Marie Rybacki, was denied unemployment benefits after she was laid off as a “straw hat sewing operator” under the premise that she was self-employed as a housewife. The intricacies of tax law and its impact upon the incorporated self-employed are analyzed in chapter 6.

The self-employed, Linder contends in chapter 3, are neither a homogeneous class nor synonymous with the petty bourgeoisie. The current framework includes both small capitalists and dependent workers who are made to appear to be working on their own. Finally, in an all-too-brief chapter entitled “Substance” (chap. 4), Linder addresses several substantive issues about the self-employed. Linder, for example, notes the disproportionate growth of the self-employed in the service sector and the lower average incomes of these workers compared to wage and salary employees in comparable occupations. Additionally, Linder raises the question of the asymmetrical and dramatic rise in self-employment among women and their predominance in primarily low-paid occupations.

The book works best as a sustained challenge to the present classification and enumeration systems used to count the self-employed. Linder’s detailed analysis of the history and problems of categorization, operationalization, and enumeration of the self-employed provides a useful warning to sociologists and economists to use the existing government figures with both caution and skepticism.

While Linder’s critique of the conceptual and methodological problems of calculating the number of self-employed Americans is thorough, his analysis of the social forces driving the increase of the “pseudo self-employed” and of the social consequences these workers experience is insufficient. In particular, the recent explosion of nominally self-employed women in economically marginal occupations, as well as the feminization of contingent labor generally, certainly deserves a more comprehensive exploration. Because of its relatively tight focus, this book

will primarily be of interest to scholars of contingent labor or of the self-employed

Down on Their Luck A Study of Homeless Street People By David A. Snow and Leon Anderson Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1993 Pp. xiv + 391 \$45.00

Peter H. Rossi

University of Massachusetts

What can yet another monograph on homelessness tell us that has not been told in the more than a score already published in the past decade? Apparently quite a lot, as demonstrated by this newest work on the topic. David Snow and Leon Anderson make their significant contributions through skillful ethnography melded with analyses of administrative records and presented within a sophisticated conceptual framework.

The setting is Austin, Texas, 1984–86. The subjects are homeless men (and some women) who were contacted at the local Salvation Army shelter, the only shelter in Austin at the time. The approach is mainly ethnographic, involving the observation of and interaction with homeless people in the various settings in which they could be found and the tracing of a subsample of shelter residents through the administrative records of the Austin Police Department, the Texas Employment Commission, and several other local agencies. In addition a score of “key informants” who agreed to more intensive contact, including tape-recorded life histories, provided deeper and richer information.

A key feature of the authors’ interpretive framework is a constructed typology of the homeless that distinguishes largely among the newly homeless, those whose life-styles straddled the worlds of the homeless and the housed, and persons who were “outsiders” and had been thoroughly integrated into the homeless life-style. Although based primarily on the length of time the subjects had been homeless, the typology also recognizes differences in the degree to which homeless persons have adopted styles of behavior that accommodate to long-term homelessness.

An important contribution the authors make is to show that being homeless is hard work. Routed out of bed in the Salvation Army shelter before dawn, fed breakfast, and hustled out into the streets, the homeless pursue various strategies in securing enough money to get by. Selling blood plasma, hiring out for day labor, panhandling, collecting salvage, and selling articles are all ways of getting by, undergirded by the free shelter and food provided by social agencies. None of these strategies are lucrative enough to enable a homeless person to leave that condition. However easy it may be to fall among the homeless, it is certainly not easy to get out.

Particularly intriguing is the authors’ discussion of how the self-

identity of homeless persons is formed by their life conditions, how the public reacts to their presence, and how they are treated by the agencies they deal with. The reason adopted by the homeless for their plight is being "down on my luck," a phrase covering a wide variety of events that plunged them into destitution and deprived them of opportunities to work their way out.

The authors struggle valiantly to avoid blaming the victim, recognizing that deficiencies, depravities, and delinquencies are high among the homeless but at the same time maintaining that the causes of homelessness are to be found elsewhere in structural changes in our society. In addition, there is the question of causal direction. Snow and Anderson correctly maintain that cross-sectional studies finding deficiencies among the homeless are consistent with an interpretation that homelessness caused or exacerbated that condition.

There are also limitations to the monograph. First of all, it is a snapshot of Austin almost a decade ago when that city had only one shelter and very rudimentary social services for homeless people. In 1984 the surge in homelessness was just beginning to get public attention. Texas is among the states with the fewest social services, with no general assistance plan at the time, and even today, and low state expenditures on most social services. Snow and Anderson give insufficient attention to how the locality and historical context condition their findings. Second, other extensive research on the Austin homeless conducted in 1984 (*The Austin Homeless* by Donald J. Bauman et al. [Austin: University of Texas, 1985]) is largely ignored, although mentioned in footnotes and cited in the bibliography. This omission is particularly questionable because Bauman and his colleagues found much higher levels of alcoholism, mental illness, and criminal records in their census of the homeless than did Snow and Anderson. Contrary evidence can be disputed but can hardly be ignored, especially when the authors cite the Bauman et al. study when its results agree with theirs. Finally, as in other ethnographies, there is a tendency to credit informants with more wisdom and insight than they actually have. Being "down on my luck" is not a full account of how a person becomes homeless but it may be a comforting interpretation to hold.

All that said, Snow and Anderson have written the best ethnography so far of contemporary homelessness. Reading this book will give the reader a more intimate understanding of homelessness than reading most other books on the topic.

Talking Politics By William A. Gamson New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992 Pp. vii + 272 \$49.95 (cloth), \$15.95 (paper)

Robert D. Benford
University of Nebraska—Lincoln

Talking Politics is an important and timely book. William A. Gamson sheds considerable theoretical and empirical light on how ordinary people make sense of public issues. This elegant and insightful study comes at a time when social-movement scholars have renewed their once vibrant interest in culture. While the resurgence has yielded fruitful investigations of collective identity, oppositional consciousness, collective-action frames, media packages, vocabularies of motive, and movement cultures, something quite fundamental has been missing from this mosaic. We know little about the basic interpretive work that typically precedes consensus mobilization. Granted, we know a great deal about the attitudinal and microstructural traits of joiners, correlates of participation, recruitment tactics, frame-alignment processes, and the like. Yet we lack sufficient understanding of how people formulate their attitudes regarding public issues. How do people develop collective identities? How is political consciousness fashioned? Why do some movement frames resonate among particular audiences while others do not? What roles do media, popular wisdom, biography, and talk play in the social construction of shared definitions that could stimulate collective action? Gamson seeks to advance understanding of these fundamental sense-making processes by examining the political discourse of common folk.

In doing so, he utilized two types of data sources: media discourse and peer group conversations. Media-discourse data were derived from samples of television network news, national newsmagazine accounts, syndicated editorial cartoons, and syndicated opinion columns. Peer group conversational data were generated from a quota/snowball sampling technique yielding 37 respondent-generated focus groups comprised of four to six "working people" and a facilitator. Peer group members were familiar acquaintances, frequently co-workers invited by a sampled subject; consequently, groups tended to be racially homogeneous but of mixed gender. Not only does this technique yield interesting categorical comparisons (e.g., comparing blacks and whites on affirmative action), it provides a close approximation of spontaneous, "sociable public discourse." Facilitators stimulated discussion on a particular topic but did so in a frame-neutral fashion so as not to influence the tenor of the discourse. Numerous excerpts of conversations serve as rich illustrative material in support of Gamson's analyses as well as demonstrating the "natural" flow of these conversations. In what has become a Gamson trademark, he includes three methodological/data appendices that offer a clear, comprehensive account of the study's sampling techniques, coding criteria, and facilitators' instructions.

The media-discourse samples and the peer group conversations focused on four public issues: affirmative action, nuclear power, troubled industry, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Gamson and his associates (independent coders) identified several distinctive interpretations or frames for each of the issues. For example, for the nuclear power topic they identified "progress," "energy independence," "soft paths," "no public accountability," "not cost effective," "runaway technology," and "devil's bargain" frames. This coding procedure permitted analyses of the relationship between prevalent media frames, how people talk about public issues, and the development of collective-action frames by the peer groups.

In part 1, Gamson elaborates on three essential components of collective-action frames: injustice, agency, and identity. The injustice component involves a sense of unfairness, an expression of indignation regarding some circumstance or event. Gamson concludes that while "there is a strong overall relationship between the prominence of injustice frames in media discourse and in popular discourse," the "causal relationship is complicated and indirect" (p. 58). Agency refers to collective efficacy, a sense that citizen action could ameliorate the perceived injustice. Again, the relationship between the media's portrayal of agency and the citizens' sense of efficacy is complicated, often mediated by factors such as experiential knowledge and the actions of elites. The final component of collective-action frames, identity, concerns the process of developing "adversarial frames." Gamson found that most peer groups used an adversarial frame, even in the absence of a corresponding frame in media discourse. Groups were more likely to develop a collective identity when they shared a common social location such as race or class. Part 1 concludes with an all-too-brief chapter on the complex relationship between talk and action, a relationship that is not nearly as straightforward as much of sociology seems to assume.

Part 2 deals with the resources people use to make sense of public issues including media frames, popular wisdom, and experiential knowledge. He offers compelling analyses and discussions of the factors that affect whether particular frames resonate. This section also addresses issue-salience factors, especially issue engagement and proximity. In the concluding chapter, Gamson seeks to integrate the two parts to understand how political consciousness is developed and what its relationship is to collective action.

Students of social movements, political sociology, political communication, media studies, culture, and social problems will find *Talking Politics* well worth reading and passing on to their students. Gamson has struck again with a work that is likely to become a classic.

Linking Citizens to Government Interest Group Politics at Common Cause By Lawrence S. Rothenberg New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992 Pp. xvi + 306

Anne Costain
University of Colorado

Lawrence Rothenberg has written an ambitious book attempting to demonstrate the links between membership in a public interest group, the selection of policies and tactics within the group, and the impact of these choices on the U.S. political system. The book takes an economic, rational choice perspective but eases many of the strict assumptions underlying the application of this view to interest groups. Consequently, it is possible to see the book as both a testing of Mancur Olson's theory of collective action and a critique of it (*The Logic of Collective Action* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965]).

Rothenberg's subject is Common Cause, the public interest lobby founded by John Gardner to make the processes of American politics more equitable and democratic. Common Cause is, of course, a very difficult test of Olson's "logic of collective action." Not only are the goals of the organization nondivisible and diffuse, but there is no natural constituency for "good government" from which to recruit members. Rothenberg uses a multiplicity of sources to understand Common Cause, including mail surveys of Common Cause members (conducted by the group), public opinion surveys from the National Election Study and the General Social Surveys, the *Vanderbilt Television News Abstracts*, and interviews with Common Cause activists. The general picture of Common Cause that he provides is surprising because it meshes so completely with the popular stereotypes of the kind of people who belong to Common Cause. Members are disproportionately middle-aged, educated, upper-income, liberal, and identify themselves as members of the Democratic party. They agree on a wide range of issues from abortion to campaign-finance reform.

Rothenberg begins examining why these people joined Common Cause by laying out a model of selective learning. He hypothesizes that for the kind of people who are attracted to Common Cause, joining is a way to learn more about the organization. By receiving the mailings and other literature put out by the group, new members acquire information about its purposes. The initial cost of joining is low (\$20 for the first year, rising to \$30 in subsequent years), so joining is an inexpensive way to find out more about the group. Rothenberg provides empirical evidence demonstrating these patterns. About one-half of the members of Common Cause said they would leave the group if annual dues doubled. This number is particularly high among new members. Perhaps most convincing is the difference in knowledge about the group's positions on issues among members who have been in the organization for differing lengths of time. Compared with the long-time members, those who have belonged for two

years or fewer know little about the group's issue positions. Rothenberg correspondingly finds that purposive incentives are strongest for members with the greatest number of years in the group.

In his effort to build an integrated theory, Rothenberg also examines in detail how the staff of Common Cause selects which issues to lobby and what impact lobbying has on public policy. The staff of Common Cause chooses issues after consulting membership preferences but also displays heightened sensitivity to the priorities of activists within the group, a rational strategy for assuring organizational maintenance. The weakest aspect of the book, in my view, is Rothenberg's effort to link the lobbying of Common Cause to policy influence. This is a difficult task, although necessary, given the author's interest in providing a holistic view of how citizen preferences mediated by the organization have an impact on the formation of policy. The two cases examined, the anti-MX missile coalition led by Common Cause and the group's efforts at campaign-finance reform, both resulted in losses for the group's side. Although Rothenberg makes a good argument that the group did matter, the truncated picture of these legislative contests makes it hard to judge. In the MX case, the focus is on Common Cause as a lead group within a larger lobbying coalition. As such, it is difficult to tell how effective Common Cause is in comparison with other groups on the same side. The campaign-finance case has a different type of ambiguity. Common Cause, for the most part, lobbies this issue alone. Given the prevalence of ad hoc issue coalitions in Washington and Common Cause's failure to achieve its goals, one is left wondering if a coordinated lobbying campaign undertaken with other interests would have achieved more.

Linking Citizens to Government is rich in ideas. Its tying of citizens' attitudes to organizational politics and political outcomes is admirable. The book demonstrates the utility of seeking rational explanations for individual behavior, as advocated by Mancur Olson and others. By grafting learning theory onto a rational choice approach, though, Rothenberg suggests that individuals eventually make rational choices, but in the short run, may not act with strict rationality. For those who are interested in public interest groups, this volume, along with Andrew MacFarland's excellent study of Common Cause (*Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest* [Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984]), provides an unequalled opportunity to understand the role of one of the largest and most effective groups of its kind in American politics.

Through Jaundiced Eyes How the Media View Organized Labor By William J Puette Ithaca, N Y ILR Press, 1992 Pp 240 \$38 00 (cloth), \$16 95 (paper)

William DiFazio
St John's University

The argument by William J Puette in *Through Jaundiced Eyes* is not complex or subtle but neither, as he successfully demonstrates, is the media's antiunion bias He discusses the media's discrimination against unions in movies, television, and newspapers, historically, and by using two detailed case studies, the case of the Hawaiian labor leader Walter Kupau and the United Mine Workers Strike against the Pittston Coal Group This book's importance lies in its being a cultural study in an area, that of class and unions, mostly absent from the cultural studies literature Puette's analysis is also a corrective to the contention that media has a liberal bias For Puette, what must be explained is why a liberal media is typically antiunion For him this seeming contradiction is not surprising If media has a liberal bias, it is that of middle-class liberals discriminating against a working-class movement It is from this class bias that a multiform media has created an attitudinal framework that structures the viewer's perception of information and from which the media confronts the public with a continuous assault on the labor movement

Puette begins with a discussion of "Labor Framed" in the movies He argues that Hollywood's bias began once it perceived that the labor movement was becoming powerful He starts with silent anti-labor films such as *Lulu's Anarchists* and *The Riot* and moves on to talkies like *Black Fury*, *The Fountainhead*, *On the Waterfront*, and *Fist* For Puette all of these films share common themes unions are corrupt, authoritarian, dogmatic, antipatriotic, violent, and mob connected

Pro-union films, such as *Salt of the Earth*, are attacked by critics and not given wide release, while movies that emphasize union corruption such as *On the Waterfront* are celebrated and win Academy Awards Recently the pro-union movie *Matewan* suffered the same problem of not receiving a wide release and thus not being seen by the working-class and lower-class audience at whom it is aimed Puette often fails to go beyond the issue of bias in his discussions, failing to mention *Matewan's* important insight into the American labor movement that the union organizers were often alienated from the workers that they organized

He continues his descriptive, content analysis through the other key forms of media, explaining how television's bias is expressed through its ignoring labor conflicts that are solved through collective bargaining instead of strikes and its covering union issues from the employer's standpoint In the United States the labor question is portrayed as the concern of bankers, corporations, and Wall Street Labor is presented as an inconvenience to the smooth running of society and an obstruction to the free

market. Thus, every television news report contains business news and shows like "Adam Smith," "The Nightly Business Report," and "Wall Street Week" proliferate and present the ideology of business to viewers on a daily basis, without there being a single daily or weekly labor program presenting the union position.

Television dramas follow the same patterns and present unions as powerful and corrupt, even though unions are increasingly losing ground and represent only 15% of the labor force. The book has a useful appendix that gives the plot synopses of television programs that have dealt with union issues.

Puette covers newspapers' long history of presenting union leaders and workers as greedy, fat, overpaid, foreign-born, Communist agitators. He says that labor is no longer being covered by reporters with expertise on the labor movement. Instead, increasingly crucial labor stories are being covered by inexperienced business reporters ignorant of labor's history and the everyday workings of unions, who lack contacts with knowledgeable sources on the key issues.

His extensive section on cartoons is fascinating. He discusses the history of political cartoons from Thomas Nast to Doonesbury. This topic is certainly worthy of a book. Here the anti-union bias is framed by actual drawings of, for example, unionists holding bombs to destroy "Uncle Sam," or Eastern Airline workers portrayed during their strike as self-destructive hired guns while Frank Lorenzo, the company's owner, is shown as the picture of rationality.

He continues his analysis through the two case studies that demonstrate how the media structures its anti-union bias. In the case of the Pittston strike, the media deemed the miners' strike in the Soviet Union more newsworthy than the domestic one.

The weakest part of this book is Puette's inability to explain labor's pitiful response to this media assault. In fact, a basic problem throughout the book is that Puette is always too conciliatory to mainstream union positions. He always sides with mainstream AFL-CIO unionism in their struggles with the rank and file and is thus unable to criticize the many levels on which unions have failed in the past two decades, not the least of which is their refusal to partake in mass-mediated politics. He does tell us of the exceptions to the rule, the United Auto Workers campaign and the "Union, Yes!" campaign. Puette has successfully demonstrated the media's anti-union bias but has failed to explain why unions have opted out of struggling against this bias.

Still, this is a significant book that documents the media's failure to report class and union issues objectively. It is important for students to learn that the media portrays class and union issues in one dimension, to see how "Sixty Minutes" coverage of union issues sides with Coors Brewery's anti-union politics and to understand that the great 19th-century Republican cartoonist Thomas Nast's political cartoons were anti-union, based on his deep prejudice against Democrats and Irish Catholics. Puette's documentation of the media's anti-union bias is a

good beginning for both students and scholars. It is to be hoped that *Through Jaundiced Eyes* will stimulate more, serious research in this area.

Visions of a New Industrial Order: Social Science and Labor Theory in America's Progressive Era. By Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. Pp. xiii + 230. \$45.00.

Gretchen Ritter

University of Texas at Austin

Social scientists helped to shape policy responses to America's new industrial order during the Progressive Era. How and why they did so is detailed in Clarence Wunderlin's study of three labor economists—Jeremiah W. Jenkins, E. Dana Durand, and John R. Commons. The author argues that in defining the study of industrial relations and specifying an appropriate role for state regulation, these men had a profound influence on American political and economic development through the New Deal era.

The book is divided into three sections. The first part examines the work of Jenkins, Commons, and Durand between 1898 and 1903, when, in association with the United States Industrial Commission and the National Civic Federation, these men advocated voluntarist solutions to stabilize industrial relations. The next part concerns the response of Commons and Jenkins to the tumultuous events of the 1904–17 period, when the open-shop campaign by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) threatened to undermine industrial peace. Consequently, these scholars became more receptive to expanding the state's role in industrial relations. The final section deals with the mature work of Commons during the 1920s and 1930s when he developed his institutionalist theories of industrial society. In his conclusion, Wunderlin considers the lasting legacies of these labor economists and their role in the development of the administrative state.

Why did social scientists play such an important role in policy formation during the early 20th century? The author suggests that these scholars provided the empirical knowledge and theoretical understanding needed to respond to a changing social order. Further, in the divisions between the business and labor communities over how to order productive activity, social scientists portrayed themselves as neutral arbiters willing to advance the public interest by promoting mechanisms for class accommodation. At this important moment in state development, the role played by these social science experts helped to legitimate the establishment of administrative structures within government.

Perhaps the most interesting contribution of this book comes in the second to last chapter, which analyzes Commons's work on institutional economics. Commons is usually remembered as the father of American labor history (referred to as the "Commons school" of labor historiogra-

phy) Far less consideration has been given to his other intellectual interests Commons believed that in modern society, property was constituted not by tangible possession but by legal rights to goods and market access Thus, laws governing corporations and labor were of paramount importance Given the government's role in defining the rights and obligations of labor and capital, Commons came to moderate his earlier belief in voluntarism and espoused more corporatist solutions to the problems of industrial life The state should encourage conflict resolution through regular negotiations by the functional representatives from business and labor, assisted by academic experts Should such efforts fail, then the state should intervene and impose mandatory solutions to industrial conflicts This neocorporatist view, which remained relevant through the New Deal, reinforces Ellis Hawley's findings about this often forgotten chapter in the history of American thought Given the current renewal of interest in the role of institutions in economic and political development, this is a timely reconsideration of the work of an early institutionalist

This book would have benefited from greater attention to recent literature on American political development and labor history The author neglects scholarship on American state building by Stephen Skowronek and Theda Skocpol, among others (although it should be noted that Theda Skocpol's book on early welfare state development was published after Wunderlin's book went to press) Further, the growing literature on the judiciary's role in industrial relations development (e g , works by Victoria Hattam, William Forbath, and Christopher Tomlins) should have received greater attention Nor does Wunderlin make use of other relevant works in labor history concerned with state development and labor historiography by David Brody, Leon Fink, Richard Oestreicher, and Gwendolyn Mink Still, this should not distract from the contribution this book makes to our understanding of the early theories of industrial relations and economic regulation

Health Politics Interests and Institutions in Western Europe By Ellen M Immergut New York Cambridge University Press, 1992 Pp xxiii + 336 \$49 95

Ted Marmor
Yale University

The issues of health care—access to services, their cost, and their quality—are now controversial matters in every democracy, let alone the nations of Eastern Europe The “problems” the OECD nations face are superficially similar They confront aging populations whose understandably greater morbidity increases the pressure on service provision There is uncertainty about the quality of care in a world of medicine where many services are unevaluated and the most expensive—the technologi-

cal innovations in international trade—are terribly costly for the benefits they confer. Worldwide recession makes budget strain recurrently painful, not just intermittently stressful. And so, aided by the globalization of information transfer, comparative medical care studies are much in vogue.

With such developments come the disadvantages of rapid trade in ideas. Just as the United States is confronting the need to reform its broken system of private/public health insurance, the countries of central and eastern Europe are importing market models of private health insurance from across the Atlantic. Sweden, Great Britain, and the Netherlands are experimenting with forms of so-called “managed competition” that employ the labels of American models in efforts and contexts radically different from those of the original promoters.

There is no Food and Drug Administration to monitor the efficacy and safety of health policy ideas in international commerce, and there is every reason to believe the process of diffusion disseminates considerable numbers of myths, mistakes, and misapprehensions. Even if countries face similar problems, their sensible use of foreign experience requires the scrutiny of models of both explanation and prescription. That, in turn, requires attention to the process by which models are adapted in practice and the weight that will and should be given to inherited institutions.

Ellen Immergut, in her new book, *Health Politics*, is aware of all of these dangers, but her scholarly aim is not primarily prescriptive. Instead, she took on the immense task of making sense of the different paths European democracies followed in 20th-century enactments of national health insurance. She does so by a structured comparative study of the national programs enacted and implemented by Sweden, France, and Switzerland, nations that considered the same range of plans, but whose political processes produced sharply divergent programmatic roads to reform.

Her argument can be stated quite briefly, although the necessity for brevity here is at the expense of understating the elegance, forcefulness, and sheer evidentiary weight of her book. Sweden, France, and Switzerland not only faced comparable problems of health insurance coverage, their politicians considered a similar range of options from national health services to national health insurance to subsidization of the uninsured or underinsured. Immergut’s claim is that the differences in policy results cannot be understood without giving primacy to the substantive effects of different political institutions. In all three cases, political leaders proposed programs of broad coverage and the economic regulation of physicians, the proposals generated similar conflicts, but the legislative results emerged differently. In her schema, the Swedish results are the most broad ranging (or “socialized”), the Swiss the most privatized, and the French “a conflict-ridden compromise between the two.”

How does that happen? Institutional rules and procedures transform the demands and claims of interest groups by the conventions of the national political game. Some interests are advantaged, others not, some

policies are easier to enact, others less so or not at all. By this argument, it is not the power of interests—the fabled doctors, the organized insurance bodies, and so forth—that accounts for variation, but the character of the state and the differential opportunities and barriers it presents to these organized interests.

No one interested in the contemporary world of comparative health politics can fail to benefit from this careful, persuasive work of scholarship. Every once in a while a book comes along that deserves attention because it redirects the assumptive world of the analysts whose scribbling, as Keynes once noted, has effects long after an author's demise. *Health Politics* is such a book. We are in Immergut's debt for this path-breaking book. There are quibbles to be sure. The preface to the case studies is very extended and the author's main thesis, clearly stated at the outset, becomes somewhat repetitive in the course of the book. This, however, is a major work, one particularly valuable to those in the United States and Eastern Europe now wrestling not only with the question of what health policy to choose but also with the question of which inherited institutional arrangements they must confront and which forms they want to change.

All God's Mistakes: Genetic Counseling in a Pediatric Hospital. By Charles L. Bosk. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Pp. 222. \$24.95.

Carol A. Heimer
Northwestern University

Because Charles L. Bosk has written a book that works on three or four levels at once, a brief review is unlikely to do it justice. *All God's Mistakes* is simultaneously an ethnography (squarely in the tradition of Everett Hughes) about yet another shop floor and yet another profession devising everyday routines for managing other people's tragedies, a methodological treatise on some of the effects of alliances between researchers and those they study, and an essay on moral uncertainty and the fragility of autonomy in institutional settings.

Genetic counselors, on whom this book is focused, do three main things. They study the relation between genotypes and phenotypes, attempting to determine the genetic basis of particular physical problems and to predict likely manifestations of genetic anomalies. In addition to studying this as a general scientific problem, genetic counselors try to provide answers for particular people about the likelihood of bearing a child with a genetic problem, given the genetic characteristics of the parents, or of a recurrence, given that the parents have already had a child with some anomaly. They also try to say whether some particular anomaly seems to be genetically based instead of being an accident of gestation or birth. Using this knowledge, they then act as counselors for

patients—usually parents or prospective parents—and as consultants to other physicians, often obstetricians or neonatologists who are the higher-status “green-suited” physicians actually treating the patients. Genetic consultants provide a mopping up service, Bosk argues, cleaning up others’ messes and doing more than their share of the low-status hand-holding.

The decision-making autonomy of the patient is a central value for the genetic counselors. Ironically, it is one they ultimately betray. In counseling sessions, genetic counselors are careful to give information in a value-free way, trying their best not to suggest what patients should do. However, when they function as consultants to other physicians, what they say is framed by these other physicians. That sometimes means that not all options are presented. Thus the value-free stance of only giving information can, when other physicians are making use of that information, lead to value-laden results. Genetic counselors do not typically intrude into the conversation to press other physicians to give a fuller list of what options are open to the patient (or patient’s family) even when they strongly disagree with their colleague. Some of this reticence can be explained by the strong norm about the sacredness of a physician’s relationship with a patient, a norm another physician, particularly a lower-status one like a genetic counselor, might be especially likely to respect. Bosk also suggests that mechanisms, such as ethics panels or informed consent procedures, intended to ensure that patients’ and families’ voices are heard, often do more to protect the long-run interests of hospitals and physicians than of patients and their families. But even when autonomy is respected, the price is very high. Working in a field “where our ability to explain, to diagnose, and to describe outruns our ability to help” (p. xxiii), genetic counselors are ill-equipped, and unwilling, to support families facing painful choices. And those who are more willing to provide emotional support (lower-ranking staff members) are prevented from doing so by physicians worried about their technical competence. Ironically, then, autonomy comes at the price of abandonment.

Describing the world of genetic counselors, Bosk is ever sensitive to his own role in it. He tells us, for instance, about what he did not observe, or at least did not write up in his notes, as well as what he did, thinking carefully about what those lapses mean. He notes that he was *invited* to observe these genetic counselors and comments on how that affected his research. Of particular interest are Bosk’s comments about witnessing. Bosk argues that part of his function for the genetic counselors was to witness for them. Although he notes that, as an observer, he could serve as a legal witness if necessary (not irrelevant given the legal battles surrounding the care of damaged infants), this is not the main kind of witnessing that mattered. Instead, Bosk argues that he served for genetic counselors as they served for patients—as a person who watched as they agonized over the information and the decisions that had to be made. Although hard decisions are often deeply personal, one is not necessarily

better off going through all parts of the process in private. Having someone else observe at least a piece of the process enables one to say to oneself "Yes, I did think hard about that decision, and though ultimately the outcome may be no different than if I had made the decision quickly and with little thought, I can live with myself because I faced squarely the life-and-death implications of the decision and honored the life that might have been or will be." The witness of the agonized ambivalence gives a more concrete referent—the conversation was not just in one's head, it was not a fantasy.

As if this were not enough, Bosk packs even more into this compact book. *All God's Mistakes* also comments astutely on the diffusion of responsibility in collective medical practice, the decline of patient autonomy, the tendency for medical practice to be driven by new technologies, and the way research practices create distance from some of the people we study (the patients in Bosk's research) while creating closeness to others (physicians in Bosk's case). Some of it made me squirm with anxiety about my own work. The book will also be widely cited because quotation of Bosk's well-turned phrases will dress up others' less evocative prose.

The Social Cage: Human Nature and the Evolution of Society By Alexandra Maryanski and Jonathan H. Turner. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992. Pp. 213. \$39.50.

J. Richard Udry
University of North Carolina

This book is about the fit between human nature and the structure of society. By human nature the authors mean the biologically based behavioral predispositions that are a product of our evolutionary history. How shall we discover human nature? My naive approach has always been to look for universal characteristics across human societies. Those characteristics that are ubiquitous, surviving, and reappearing in every society, however diverse the ecological niches, however simple or complex the society, are candidates for human nature. A more popular method is to examine hunter-gatherer societies that remain (or have left traces), since this is the social form under which the final, distinctively human touches are presumed to have been added to our evolutionary heritage. Alexandra Maryanski and Jonathan H. Turner, both sociologists, use cladistics. They examine the behavioral characteristics of our closest evolutionary relatives, the great apes. They look for common patterns among great apes that might allow us to uncover the nature of our last common ancestor (LCA) with apes. Their portrait of the LCA is their template for human nature. "Our central finding is that, compared with most Old World monkeys, the reconstructed blueprint of the social structure of the LCA of apes and humans reveals the hominoid lineage as predisposed

toward low-density networks, low sociality, and strong individualism” (p. 13)

The remainder of the book is devoted to testing the fit between the various “stages” of human social organization and human nature as inferred from the LCA. On the way, they must deal with the differences between the LCA and humans: bipedalism and a large brain. They see these developments as adaptations resulting from a move out of the forest and onto the savannah. Both adaptations facilitated the development of language, which led to culture and the hunter-gatherer way of life but otherwise left our LCA heritage intact. The hunter-gatherer stage was the Garden of Eden in which social organization was congruent with our basic needs for equality, freedom, mobility, and individualism. This picture is such a contrast to other views of human nature from the 17th-century social philosophers to modern sociobiologists that it is bound to have provocative implications.

Between hunter-gatherers and modern times, the story goes distressingly downhill. Horticultural societies produced the constraints organized around kinship. Agricultural societies became even more constraining through the exercise of political power and the growth of intergroup conflict. Why would humans ever have left Eden? Maryanski and Turner’s view of our state of nature is far from Hobbesian. As long as there were not too many of us, hunting and gathering was a life of leisure and freedom. “The !Kung of Botswana . . . , when asked why they did not take up plant cultivation, are reported to have said, ‘Why should we plant when there are so many mongongo nuts in the world?’ ” (p. 93).

Following the biblical allegory, the original sin was population growth in the face of environmental constraints. Horticulture and agriculture produced more food, but meant a lot more hard work, and a social organization that grated on human nature. Humans have been trying ever since to escape from constraining social cages of their own design.

It is clear that the authors are headed toward a confrontation with the prevailing sociological wisdom. Maryanski and Turner think most sociologists see human nature as predisposed to close social ties and strong roots in a community. They must be thinking of early 20th-century sociologists. My view of contemporary sociologists is that they do not believe in human nature.

The authors grant that the early days of industrialization were grim but, contrary to what they take to be the traditional sociological view, they see later industrial and postindustrial society as more compatible with our biological predispositions than anything we have seen since Eden. And since democracy and individualism seem to them to be the social wave of the future, they see us finally constructing a society in which we can live comfortably with our natural selves.

Maryanski and Turner have given a startling answer to the question that most other contemporary sociologists have stopped asking. The radical social constructionists of modern sociology see “human nature” as socially constructed, and its lack of fit to social structure as an internal

structural problem How can we tell if there is a human nature? How can we tell whether Maryanski and Turner have got it right or wrong? On this point our authors are silent Until we know how to do this, we have just another evolutionary story to put on our shelves beside the stories of Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris, Lionel Tiger, Robin Fox, and Pierre van den Berghe, to which it offers such a sharp (and benign) contrast We will have to choose among these stories on the basis of aesthetics and plausibility *The Social Cage* is a good story and can stand proudly among its shelf mates

Mother-Infant Bonding A Scientific Fiction By Diane E Eyer New Haven, Conn Yale University Press, 1992 Pp 237 \$25 00

Kristin K Barker
Linfield College

This book is about the power of science in our lives Diane E Eyer traces the historical roots of "bonding," the belief that physical contact between mother and infant shortly after birth forms the necessary (biologically determined) connection between the two that ensures the social and emotional adaptation of the human species By taking us through the process of the acceptance and ascendance of bonding as both a scientific and cultural ideology, Eyer deconstructs scientific knowledge claims by revealing the importance of the cultural framework in which knowledge is produced and the actions of those who use these claims to pursue their own interests

On the basis of observations of 28 mothers and their infants, two pediatricians (John Kennell and Marshall Klaus) published the first research on bonding in the *New England Journal of Medicine* in 1972 The scientific basis of bonding was in part the appropriation of animal analogies—particularly drawn from rats and goats—to illustrate that maternal hormones were a strong determinant of behavior in the period immediately following birth Puzzled by the empirical observation that infants who had been in neonatal intensive care units often became victims of child abuse, Kennell and Klaus noted that female goats separated from their offspring immediately after birth (even for as little as five minutes) would often reject their infants when later reunited with them "By analogy, it was thought that if human mothers were separated from their infants during this time, they too might have trouble accepting the infants later" (pp 2–3) Scientific eyes, however, turned away from the abundant neutral and negative animal mother-infant analogies with no similar bonding mechanism Eyer knowledgeably applies the theory of positivism to the scientific research on bonding to illustrate its multiple methodological and epistemological weaknesses For example, she outlines the many ways in which the rules of scientific evidence, differentially and flimsily employed, resulted in the confirmation of bonding's significant merits

Bonding was informed by, and at the same time served as a cultural metaphor for, the widespread belief that woman (as a universal category) is inherently analogous to mother. It came to be scientifically, and subsequently culturally, accepted that mother-infant contact produced bonding that not only would have long-term effects on the subsequent relationship between mother and child, but would also act as a prophylactic against potential psychological and social maladaptations. In fact, those few minutes of mother-infant bonding were found to have a positive impact on the infant's developmental progress and to reduce the likelihood that the child would be a victim of child abuse or engage in future criminal behavior. Embedded within the concept/ideology of bonding is the long-standing conviction that women are "the prime architects of their children's lives and are blamed for whatever problems befall them, not only in childhood but throughout their adult lives" (p. 2).

Eyer does not offer a simplistic, conspiratorial picture of how science is used to gain power over women's lives, but instead weaves an elaborate and detailed account of the fluid ideological, political, professional, and economic terrain that gave life to the scientific fiction of bonding. Paradoxically, for example, the ethos of bonding appealed to all the players struggling for control over childbirth. For women giving birth, the concept of bonding provided a format to demand that the hospitals, doctors, and nurses break free of medical protocol to grant the mothers some control over their childbirth experiences and to create a more humane encounter with the newborn, with family and friends sharing in the birth and holding the infants instead of the babies' being quickly placed in the central nursery (pp. 173–84). For hospitals—under the increasing pressure from the natural childbirth movement that threatened its patient base—bonding provided a new rationale for their services and hence led to increased surveillance and control over women's birthing experiences (chap. 7). The rationale for bonding justified further scientific surveillance of women during their postnatal period instead of allowing them the autonomy to structure their hospital encounters. Fearful of having to relinquish all "normal" pregnancies to the home delivery movement, bonding gave obstetrics the scientific tools to articulate the need for continued medical surveillance (chap. 7). Nurses also latched onto the rhetoric of bonding to make professional claims and exercise their professional autonomy (pp. 44–46).

In this book Eyer makes several important scholarly contributions. Her account of mother-infant bonding is a commanding empirical account of the power of scientific discourse and the ultimate cultural authority bestowed on scientific experts. Although she does not tease out the theoretical threads, Eyer's book will also be useful for those interested in the processes by which professional jurisdictions are carved out and in the competition between professionals as they seize scientific discourse and maneuver for power. Finally, the book will benefit feminist scholars interested in the interplay between the ideological constructions of femininity and motherhood, and the corresponding ways in which those con-

structions are collapsed into each other and manipulated by institutions and professionals that continue to operate as nodes of patriarchal power

The "Girl Question" in Education Vocational Education for Young Women in the Progressive Era By Jane Bernard Powers Washington, D C Falmer Press, 1992 Pp x+138

Regina Werum
Indiana University

During the Progressive Era, the "girl question" in education mirrored general discussions of women's place in society Jane Bernard Powers argues that the women's vocational education movement was instrumental in shaping women's vocational education curricula and federal legislation Her primary goal is to illuminate "the richness and complexity of curricular change as a social movement" (p 5)

Powers relies on a wealth of qualitative historical evidence from state and national government sources, publications and proceedings from women's organizations, and private collections of women involved in the movement The book contributes to a growing body of historical literature on women's vocational education, notably John Rury (*Education and Women's Work Female Schooling and the Division of Labor in Urban America, 1870-1930* [Albany State University of New York Press, 1991])

The book consists of three parts Part 1 examines the main types of women's vocational training (home economics, trade education, and commercial training) and concludes that tension existed between feminist and traditionalist views over the role of vocational education and women's place in society *Home economics proponents* (traditionalists) argued that women and men should occupy "separate but equal" spheres and that women's vocational education should prepare them for home-making and community service The moderate *trade education advocates* agreed that separate spheres should exist but supported providing women with job skills for "feminine trades" and domestic service *Trade union advocates* opposed "separate but equal" gender spheres, they lobbied for expanded vocational training programs and women's equal access to all trades

Part 2 examines the "paradoxical relationship of feminism and traditionalism" (p 4) Powers identifies two main players in the women's vocational education movement trade education advocates and "domestic feminists" The National Women's Trade Union League (NWTUL) favored giving girls and boys the same vocational training and opposed restricting women's trade education to "feminine trades" But as the NWTUL was eventually shut out of the policy-making process, so was unorthodox trade education "Domestic feminists" included "family protectionists," such as the American Home Economics Association,

which stressed women's moral superiority as a reason for home economics training. Such conservative organizations eventually dominated the debate over women's vocational education and were the only ones involved in the policy-making process that led to the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act (federal funding for secondary-level vocational education). Commercial education was excluded from the movement's agenda because it was perceived as preparation for middle-class occupations. Conservative groups excluded "masculine" trade education from their agenda because it violated existing gender norms and a gender-segregated labor market.

In part 3, Powers describes the failure of women's vocational education courses to live up to their ambitious goals. She also describes the relative success of commercial education, which produced increased enrollments despite the lack of public funding and support from women's organizations. Powers notes that a gap existed between the intense rhetoric of the movement and the reality of vocational enrollments. Those for whom home economics and "feminine" trade education was ostensibly designed realized that these courses did not impart skills for well-paying jobs. Commercial education, however, attracted students because of increased labor market opportunities for women in the clerical sector.

In the introduction, Powers observes that historical literature on vocational education has largely ignored women's education. She describes women's vocational education as characterized by two paradoxes. One paradox exists in the relationship between the feminist and the traditionalist ideas present in the debate. The second paradox exists in the growth of commercial education enrollments despite the lack of public support and the stagnant home economics enrollments despite significant public support from women's organizations and the government.

In describing these paradoxes, Powers slights class imposition arguments. Although she purposefully abandoned social control arguments concerning women's vocational education because of their "simplicity and narrowness," her account *supports* social control arguments. Women's vocational education was *designed* to maintain existing social stratification by reproducing labor markets stratified by gender, race, and class. Powers shows that grass-roots resistance to official goals of vocational education existed. However, elite interests in vocational education prevailed. Although the working class resisted elite impositions about the content and purpose of vocational education, only conservative women's organizations were included in the policy-making process.

This book provides an excellent historical account of women's vocational education during the Progressive Era. But for sociologists, this volume raises questions about why conservative interests prevailed and how structural bases of power shaped women's vocational education. For instance, which role did government agencies (especially the Federal Board of Vocational Education) play in excluding moderate and militant organizations from the policy-making process? Powers's main interest lies in illustrating the role of women's organizations and not in the role of federal and other government agencies in implementing vocational

education programs. However, by focusing on white, middle-class organizations, Powers marginalizes those population groups who were mostly affected by restrictive vocational education: black women and women in rural areas. In sum, while this manuscript leaves important sociological questions unanswered, it provides a valuable resource for historical sociologists interested in social movements and in education.

The Evolution of Women's Asylums since 1500: From Refuges for Ex-Prostitutes to Shelters for Battered Women. By Sherrill Cohen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 262. \$39.95.

Craig McEwen
Bowdoin College

In response to concerns about increasing prostitution, early 16th-century European religious and civil authorities created a series of institutions to control prostitutes and other "anomalous women." Historian Sherrill Cohen describes in detail three such refuges in Tuscany around 1600: a "monastery," a refuge for converted prostitutes, and a home for "unhappily married women." Her account focuses on the development and governance of these three institutions and the nature of everyday life in them as well as on the social characteristics and, where possible, the lives of their residents and the circumstances of their arrivals and departures. Using as her sources a mix of statutes and constitutions, administrative and financial accounts, magisterial and police records, and occasional documents left behind by (and for) the women who occupied these refuges, Cohen succeeds admirably in bringing them to life while at the same time setting them firmly in the social and historical context of early modern Tuscany. In doing so, she advances our understanding of the development of the "asylum" and contributes to the study of the social control of women in early modern Europe. In addition, Cohen makes an important addition to the complex view of total institutions, not only as agencies of control, but also as places of refuge or even partial liberation.

The social control of women in 16th-century Europe was accomplished through marriage, "custody" by respectable relatives, convents, and municipally supervised brothels. As a consequence, Cohen argues, the Benthamite "panoptic regime" described by Foucault (*Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, translated by Alan Sheridan [New York: Random House, 1979]), characterized the situation of women in "Western patriarchal society . . . , with females being watched, measured, judged, and corrected when they deviate from prescriptions" (p. 6). "Anomalous women" challenged that order, however. What place was there for "young girls teetering on the precipice of lost innocence, women without reputable families to care for them . . . , economically displaced widows, and abandoned or 'disobedient' wives? Even more threatening, what was the place of the increasing numbers of unsupervised and

economically independent prostitutes? The refuges provided places where such anomalous women could be sheltered and reformed and then reinstated in Tuscan society either with old or new husbands or in the care of relatives

Not only were these early modern refuges an important part of the system for controlling women, but they also, Cohen argues, "were the training grounds for practices in the fields of correction and social welfare that were later applied to men and to the population in general" (p. 6). She thus extends previous assessments of the asylum's historical roots by Foucault and others who failed to recognize the importance of the models provided by these 16th-century institutions for women. Toward the end of the book, Cohen documents the linkages between these early Catholic refuges and the substantial efforts of Protestants in 18th–20th-century England, Australia, and America to house and rehabilitate prostitutes. She then argues that "the penal model of incarceration, penitence, and rehabilitation in the form of the modern penitentiary prison was originated by the early modern ex-prostitutes' asylums" (p. 143). She shows that in both England and America the same reformers helped to establish homes for prostitutes and new prison penitentiaries. More briefly and least adequately, Cohen attempts to connect the early modern refuge model with contemporary residences for women including maternity homes, battered women's shelters, and the YWCA.

Despite and because of the place of the refuges in the network of institutions regulating women, Cohen admirably refuses to treat them simply as instruments of control. In the context of the hostile social circumstances, such asylums "provided thousands of girls and women with the respite to get through a hard time or helped them on a less stigmatized, more law-abiding path in the long run" (p. 141). In fact, some women entered or returned to these institutions voluntarily while others were compelled to do so by relatives or local authorities. These institutions provided a real, although demanding, refuge while promoting reentry into the societal network of control, albeit often in improved circumstances. The daily regime was rigorous, but these refuges were among the few places in early modern Europe where a society of women could develop and be, at least to some extent, self-governing and nourishing. The portrait of the refuges that emerges thus is multidimensional and well situated in the social order of the period.

Sociologists might wish that this book employed a more clearly structured analytic framework for organizing and assessing the rich historical evidence. However, Cohen's historical analysis is broadly informed by sociological and feminist theory and adds its own contribution by telling well the complex story of an early modern social invention. Cohen's social history should widen the horizons of sociologists interested in understanding total institutions and the nature of the social control of women.

The Japanese Woman Traditional Image and Changing Reality By
Sumiko Iwao New York Free Press, 1992 Pp ix + 304 \$24 95

Glenda S Roberts
University of Hawaii

In *The Japanese Woman*, Sumiko Iwao, professor of psychology at Keio University in Tokyo, has produced an engrossing and provocative book mainly about the lives of the first postwar generation of women. She sweeps the landscape of women's lives, analyzing women's changing role in marriage and the family, their attitudes toward sex and motherhood, their interpersonal relationships and difficulties communicating with their spouses, and their roles outside of the household as employees, community activists, and politicians. She also comments on the recent trend of young women's delaying marriage and on career opportunities for the second postwar generation of women. Throughout she offers explicit comparisons with the United States and England, including an interesting discussion of how different cultural notions of "equality" have influenced recent employment practices.

Western journalists have often portrayed Japanese women as passive, submissive, and accommodating. Feminists have seen them as dominated, exploited, and lacking consciousness. Iwao has a different view. "Japanese women still conspire to use men as the worker bees of society" (p. 268). Iwao shows us women who knowingly manipulate the social structure to get as much out of it as possible. Throughout the book she tells us of women who are pushing beyond the domestic sphere to pursue paid employment, community politics, and consumer group activism, as well as the more accepted studious and leisure pursuits. As women learn from their experiences and become increasingly diversified, their husbands follow the straight and narrow road of the salaried employee, seemingly oblivious to the changes going on in their mates' lives.

Her major focus is on the first postwar generation, let me sum up her key argument about them. Now that many household chores have been turned over to machines or the market, housewives in Japan have much more latitude to pursue diverse activities with their higher incomes than did women in previous generations. If a woman has been careful about choosing a spouse whose family and employment situation will not curtail her autonomy, she can look forward to a well-rounded and enriching life in comfort. As Iwao says, "ironically, women expect men to be good and reliable breadwinners, which assures the economic leeway it becomes their prerogative to enjoy" (p. 7). While men work toward *karōshi* (death from overwork) in the marketplace, assuring themselves that they are the "respected superiors" in society, the joke is on them. Women, unhampered by the lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion that bind the men, have become free to develop a different set of priorities for life that center on human feelings, caring for others, a humane life, and preservation of the environment (p. 8). Of course, Iwao concedes

that if everyone pursued these luxury goods, both men and women would have to make do with fewer material comforts

Iwao's sampling bias should, by now, be obvious. Her case history model is of a woman who graduated from a four-year university at a time when only 11.3% of female high school graduates matriculated to such institutions and married a "salaryman" who entered a major trading firm. Elite urban women such as her model seek jobs that are "meaningful" but are not financially necessary.

Her inquiry does not reach the millions of women whose education stopped at high school or before and who married men who are employed in the less stable sector of the dual economy. Women of more modest means are likely to work at mundane jobs to keep their households afloat. Incidentally, Iwao's definition of "part-time" may be confusing (p. 158). In Japan, *paato* refers to an employee with irregular status. Some work as many hours as regular employees, even working overtime, and would prefer to be regulars (*Fujin Rōdō no Jitsujō* [Tokyo: Rōdōsho Fujinkyōku, 1991]). Iwao adopts a conventional stance in brushing off women's employment: "Because men do not count on women's income, women have the option to quit working if they so desire" (p. 164). Many blue-collar women simply do not have that option (see Glenda S. Roberts, *Staying on the Line: Blue Collar Women in Contemporary Japan* [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, in press]).

Perhaps because Iwao's focus is on the elite, she feels that the rewards of affluence "are ones women have won not by their own direct labors, but rather, by standing (with their hands tightly gripping the purse strings) behind the men who labored on the front lines of economic growth" (p. 267). While women's employment may not seem "frontline" to Iwao, in fact their direct contributions to the economy as a continuing source of cheap labor and their indirect contribution via domestic reproduction have been highly significant (see Mary Brinton, *Women and the Economic Miracle* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993]). Not all women are using their husbands as "worker bees."

As Iwao writes for a general rather than a scholarly audience, she presumes that the reader has no knowledge of Japanese society and culture. Her work is chiefly based on secondary sources, and there are fewer footnotes and statistical references than one would expect from a scholarly text. In her many avenues of exploration and speculation Iwao often gives insufficient evidence for proof (which can be frustrating), but does alert us to areas that beg to be studied in depth.

Many students will like this book for its assessments of current trends and its readability. Despite my quibbles, I would recommend it for classroom use if it is paired with more analytical texts based on primary data, such as Takie Lebra's *Japanese Women: Constraint and Fulfillment* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), and the aforementioned Brinton volume.

Domestic Allegories of Political Desire The Black Heroine's Text at the Turn of the Century By Claudia Tate New York Oxford University Press, 1992 Pp 302 \$35 00

Kathryn Ragsdale
University of Chicago

So many scholars offer so many varieties of "historicized" and "gendered" interpretations of texts that the terms threaten to become meaningless. It is both a relief and a pleasure, therefore, to see Claudia Tate restore value to these essential but overworked concepts. Tate historically situates the long-neglected "domestic novels" written by and for African-American women of the late 19th century and traverses contemporary interpretations to offer a persuasive depiction of the motives and responses of these novels' first readers. Works that appear to be little more than sentimental Victorian treatments of love and marriage served, Tate argues, as "expressions of racialized political desire" (p. 86). Tate accomplishes and legitimates her leap between form and content by demonstrating that such novels, with their depictions of virtuous black family life, were an essential counter to the spreading "retrogressionist" view of the era, in which blacks were deemed the moral inferiors of whites. At a time when women in general and African-American women in particular were mostly inactive politically, domestic novels served as a means for female participation in the larger social projects of racial affirmation and inclusion by providing gendered models for civil participation. The heroines of both liberal and conservative variants of the domestic novel—advocates of female equality and preservers of the domestic sphere, respectively—express the ideal of the companionate marriage and become citizens able to exercise electoral influence through their husbands. As Tate contends, marrying and voting were equally important civil rights to newly freed blacks and regarded by them as equal civil responsibilities.

Tate provides a recurrent counterpoint to her analyses of the domestic novels through her discussions of works by black male authors, in which protagonists are hobbled by racial prejudice and prevented from attaining "heroic agency." While such texts depict social justice as the "unrealizable object of racial desire" (p. 67), the female-oriented domestic novels optimistically portray heroines who are "agents of their own desire," capable of enacting their own decisions about their place in society (p. 69). The domestic novels thus are political in a second sense: their heroines travel paths toward self-advancement and individuation that set a critical example for readers in terms of improving both their personal lives and the circumstances of their race.

Construction of the analytical framework necessary for a proper appraisal of the domestic novels provides Tate with the opportunity to accomplish several ancillary tasks that enhance her central project. She extends her argument to an earlier period to support the value of two long-neglected, because unorthodox, slave narratives. She offers able

instruction on such points as 19th-century debates on the "woman question," 20th-century African-American literature, and the real material and political lives of African-Americans after Reconstruction. She is a rigorously self-aware guide throughout her introduction of these and other topics, explicitly noting and justifying her occasional use of contemporary materials and responses in an effort to better understand the past. While Tate, as noted earlier, effectively uses the terms of current literary and cultural studies, the very presence of such terms is likely to render her work inscrutable to the average undergraduate. Her study, however, has many potential uses among more sophisticated readers. Its substantive aspects make it informative for students of African-American studies (some of whom may find it provocative) and women's studies as well as students of American social history. Its methodology renders it an exemplary text for practitioners in the sociology of culture and historical sociology.

Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America By James Davison Hunter. New York: Basic Books, 1991. Pp. xiii + 416. \$13.00.

Lester R. Kurtz
University of Texas

"America is in the midst of a culture war," exclaims James Davison Hunter in this important contribution to a sociological analysis of public discourse. The struggle has profound implications that will reverberate "not only within public policy but within the lives of ordinary Americans everywhere" (p. 1).

Hunter takes us on a tour of familiar terrain, but goes deeper than the quotidian news stories about school prayer, abortion, and homosexuality. The wars he surveys constitute efforts by two polarized camps to "define America," and to establish "the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all others" (p. 42).

These cultural cleavages cut across old conflict lines, reflecting competing impulses toward orthodoxy and progressivism in setting standards for the family, art, education, law, and politics. They are not, Hunter claims, primarily class conflicts, despite affinities between the perspectives and various social groups. Rather, these wars are about "*allegiances to different formulations and sources of moral authority*" (p. 118, Hunter's emphasis) and "how we are to order our lives together" (p. 51).

Hunter's labels for the combatants are not satisfactory, but are a cut above the conservative-liberal and religious-secular dichotomies that they encompass. The orthodox party is committed to an "external, definable, and transcendent authority," whereas the progressive party defines moral authority "by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism" (p. 44).

Culture Wars presents this battle as the common theme running throughout all public policy debates in U S culture. Like any author writing on such a complex topic, Hunter oversimplifies, and his presentation of them is sometimes as repetitious as the conflicts themselves. Nonetheless, the work provides a valuable catalog of the struggle. The author remains remarkably evenhanded, if anything, he is overly generous, as when he suggests that "on all sides the contenders are generally sincere, thoughtful, and well meaning" (p. 63).

Who defines reality in the public culture? The process is shaped by the "knowledge workers," such as "public policy specialists, special interest lobbyists, public interest lawyers, independent writers and ideologues, journalists and editors, community organizers and movement activists" (p. 60). These people shape public rhetoric about the conflict in every sphere.

In each case, the dispute is highly symbolic, but revolves around the question of authority. In the family, for example, disputants ask: Who is responsible for the care of family members and who defines the institution's boundaries? To what extent should the state and other institutions intervene?

The issue of authority also translates into concrete questions about the role of women in society, symbolized by debates over gender-specific language and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The orthodox party claims that the ERA's passage would destroy the traditional family. One conservative legislator designated it as "an attack on motherhood" (p. 183). The progressives, however, contend that the amendment is necessary to formalize the equal status of women in economics and politics.

Another watershed issue is the question of homosexual rights, which "goes right to the heart of assumptions about the moral order" (p. 188). On one side of the cultural divide, gay rights are part of efforts to end all systems of oppression. On the other, they represent "the most vicious attack on traditional family values that our society has seen in the history of our republic" (p. 189).

The form of the conflict thus remains relatively constant as the content shifts from arena to arena, whether in educational institutions (which mediate cultural conflict), media and the arts (issues of censorship, bias, and free speech), the law (where religion and its role are publicly defined), or electoral politics.

Hunter's substantive material on the orthodox side is often more colorful and rich than on that of the progressives. For example, the founder of Campus Crusade for Christ insists that the 1963 Supreme Court ruling against prayer in the public schools has been the *primary cause* of the nation's woes. He provides statistics to prove his point: since the decision, "premarital sexual activity has increased over 200%, pregnancies to unwed mothers are up almost 400%, gonorrhea is up over 200% [and] adultery has increased from 100% to 250%" (p. 204).

Will the culture wars ever end, and if so, who might win? Hunter

surrounds his arguments with necessary caveats, but has some insightful observations. First, he identifies essential problems: the contenders "operate from different philosophical assumptions and by very different rules of logic and moral judgment" (p. 250). The combatants live in different worlds, despite shared linguistic and national bonds, and talk past one another. Moreover, a negotiated settlement is not likely because vocal advocates "at either end of the cultural axis are not inclined toward working for a genuinely pluralistic resolution" (p. 298).

Jeffrey Hadden and Anson Shupe suggest that the conservative Christian movement might have the resources to "take over the country" by the end of this century (p. 299), but Hunter is not convinced. The orthodox certainly have many resources, including some well-organized mass movements, an indigenous passion, and the presence of key advocates within circles of power. But the progressives also have crucial resources, beginning with the knowledge industry that shapes the debate and is, at best, agnostic toward orthodox concerns. Moreover, the state has a secular organization, not so much in ideology, but in its very organization, and finally, the country's major cultural centers (Washington, New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco) tend to be dominated by a progressive ethos.

Taking his cue from Gramsci, Hunter speculates that one possible denouement of the conflict might come from the assimilation of traditional intellectuals into a progressivist mainstream. First, by getting so involved in the public debate, they are abandoning the very separatism that gives them their distinctive voice. Second, the style of contemporary policy debates undermines their arguments. The assumed autonomy of modern rationality means that one cannot simply appeal to the traditional authority (p. 306), that is the thrust of the orthodox message. The knowledge sector has defined the rules for public argumentation in such a way that the orthodox lose simply by joining the debate.

Culture Wars naturally has its limitations. First, it misses some important analytical opportunities and fails to use key insights such as Weber's concept of elective affinities and the ideas of boundary maintenance from studies of religion and deviance. Hunter could benefit from rereading Kai Erikson's *Wayward Puritans* (New York: Wiley, 1966) about an earlier American culture war, as well as incorporating recent developments in cultural and discourse analysis.

More important, *Culture Wars* operates within the isolationism so typical of American sociology. The analysis is historically thin and fails to note the phenomenon's global context. It is no accident that Americanism was condemned by the Vatican in 1899, because America symbolized for the Vatican the corrupting influence of modern pluralism and attacks on traditional (i.e., its own) authority.

The issues outlined here are not peculiarly American ones, but represent the conflict of modern culture generally, with its long-term, simultaneous conflicting trends of increased diversity and increased unity (Durkheim's *Division of Labor in Society*). *Culture Wars* tells a story of

conflict between orthodoxy and pluralism in the United States, but it is a parable for the planet. Those wars are a microcosm of a worldwide struggle to determine how we will define our life together on the planet.

A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New England City By N. J. Demerath III and Rhys H. Williams. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. Pp. xvii + 358. \$29.95.

Howard M. Bahr
Brigham Young University

Typically church-state relations are studied in national and constitutional terms rather than local ones, and studies of community power neglect the religion-government connection. This notable effort to remedy these oversights combines a strong community study with an innovative conceptual framework. Despite its title and stated purpose to assess "how church and state actually relate" (p. 7), *A Bridging of Faiths* is not about the mutual interplay of these institutions. Instead, the emphasis is on how religion affects politics.

The city is Springfield, population 157,000, the closest mid-sized city to these authors' Amherst offices. It seems not atypical, though older (it was 350 years old in 1986), more Catholic, and more distinguished (it was a recent All-American City finalist) than most. The data are from archives and libraries, interviews with a snowball sample of 104 community influentials, and a general questionnaire survey ($N = 256$, response rate = 47%). The text follows city politics from the dominant Congregationalism of the early decades through growing religious pluralism to the displacement of the Protestant establishment. Since the 1950s, most elected officials have been Catholic.

The authors seem surprised to find "a considerable gap between current church-state law and the citizens' own knowledge and attitudes" (p. 139), more remarkable would be a citizenry well informed in *any* aspect of the law. If Springfielders lag behind the courts in the continuing trend toward complete separation of church and state, they sin in ignorance and apathy rather than treasonable intention. There is no consistent pattern of law avoidance: "clearly Springfield is no den of constitutional iniquity" (p. 139).

The core of the book is three "case study" chapters on 1980s community controversies where religious/moral appeals affected political decisions. The issues were (1) control of a winter overflow shelter for the homeless, (2) economic development of a black neighborhood, and (3) civic involvement in providing sex education and contraception/abortion services. These controversies were exceptional, for "effective religious influence is relatively rare in Springfield" (p. 137).

The conclusion above violates the authors' initial belief that they would discover "a city hall in thrall to a chancery . . . a civic infrastruc-

ture laced with ties to the Catholic diocese" (p 257) Their conspiracy theories died hard, only years of checking convinced them there was no "major church-state cabal tucked under the civic carpet" (p 259)

Even so, religion exerts civic power, and the authors call for more research on the nature of its influence Existing studies ignore cultural questions such as "how issues become public, what forms they take and what terms of discourse frame the debate" (p 169) They explore aspects of cultural (moral) power, and tell how "special-purpose religious movements" may stand in for conventional churches as wielders of cultural power in the political arena (p 171)

A fine summary chapter is weakened by framing the study's findings in the demolition of imperceptive straw people who hold erroneous expectations The authors say that many "constitutional Cassandras" will be surprised there were so few church-state violations, many social scientists will be surprised religionists have so much influence, and so on through political analysts and students of religion Even discounting all that surprise, the rest of the chapter deserves to be widely read and applied Interpreting the religion-politics connection, the authors consider community context (size and differentiation), patterns of access to power, and the nature of the issues (dominant vs minority, private vs public, cultural vs structural) They distinguish structural from cultural power, and show that each may create the other Perhaps not stressed enough is that religion and government each contain both structural and cultural elements

The book's problems, venial sins, not mortal ones, are mostly functions of faith First is the authors' faith that their findings are generalizable A proper postmodern awareness of the idiosyncracies of authorial input and the particularities of site, respondents, and method would dictate a circumspection about generalizing even *to* Springfield, let alone beyond it Instead, they embrace a "responsibility to move beyond the Springfield city line through cautious conceptualization and generalization" and dismiss tough issues of generalizability with a cute phrase on how "deep immersion in the historically specific can lead to intellectual drowning unless one resurfaces to breathe both out and in" (p 13) On the contrary, the merit of this provocative case study is not its representativeness

Also suspect is their faith that their data are sufficient to reveal the "intimate" essentials of Springfield itself They seem to underestimate the difficulties of *knowing* a city of more than 150,000 people, let alone its metropolitan context We know that a careful look at social relations in a single city block or street corner may take years

Sometimes their portrayals of local players are less than evenhanded They praise the "decorousness" of upper-status, pro-choice women whose arguments are "eloquent" and "well-crafted" In contrast, working class pro-lifers are intolerant "true believers," their movement one of "obstinacy and obduracy," their unifying theme a (perhaps, pathological) concern with sexual morality, pursued "relentlessly" (pp 224–26) Elsewhere, Catholics who might vote to restrict abortions are labeled

"ecclesiastical lemmings" (p 218) Also, the "city-state" is said to be "vulnerable to the assault of religion as a cultural force" (p 213), as if religion were a barbarian horde lurking outside the walls rather than an internal institution that creates solidarity Given the authors' admission that they anticipated "a wide variety of unofficial subventions of religious practice and unacknowledged tolerance of religious excess" (p 257), the reader cannot help but wonder about their sensitivity to "unacknowledged tolerance of secular excess " That, apparently, awaits a later volume

The Churching of America, 1776–1990 Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy By Roger Finke and Rodney Stark New Brunswick, N J Rutgers University Press, 1992 Pp xiv + 328 \$22 95

Kent Redding

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Conventional accounts of American religious history have been long on doctrinal detail and short (and often wrong) on numbers Had it done nothing more than provide a straightforward accounting of the growth of major denominations, *The Churching of America* would have been a useful addition to the literature But Roger Finke and Rodney Stark want to accomplish more than that They attempt to develop a comprehensive theory to explain the ebbs and flows of religious commitment in the United States and, along the way, gleefully skewer a number of common myths and misconceptions concerning American churches

A central theme of the book is that historians and sociologists of American religious groups have paid almost exclusive attention to the modernizers of religious doctrine, especially the rationalizing theologians associated with mainline denominations According to the authors, this privileging has led to systematically biased accounts of religious history that would have us believe that Americans have become increasingly irreligious, religious pluralism has fundamentally weakened faith in all religions, and the religious condition is a product of episodic "cultural crises and eruptions" (p 238)

Finke and Stark use "reason and arithmetic" (p 1) to argue that each of these points is fundamentally wrong A focus on numbers rather than ideas reveals that it was the colonists, in the time of the Puritans and the Pilgrims, who were the least religious By the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, only 17% of Americans were members of churches (compared with 62% in 1980) And this trend toward greater religiosity has been propelled, not thwarted, by pluralism Finally, the competitive dynamics of American religion produced "winner and loser" denominations, it was the agency of the partisans of this competition that best explain the trends in religious behavior

Just this sort of populist puncturing of "received wisdom" makes this book fun to read and a must for those interested in American religious history. Some readers may be less than pleased with attacks on the closely held theories of historians and sociologists of religion, but I found the empirical evidence for these attacks persuasive.

Less compelling is the authors' effort to build a new theory to replace those they cast aside. Their basic argument is that the religious environment works like a market economy, with mergers and spinoffs and competition between "firms" for "buyers." Finke and Stark attempt to weave three basic components—church-sect, rational choice commitment, and competition theories—into a whole, but they never quite succeed.

Church-sect theory is well known and works well to explain the sources of denominational schism. The authors give a persuasive account of how previous scholars have wrongly ascribed the processes of secularization within *particular* denominations to broader trends toward societal secularization. It is true, they argue, that mainline denominations have become more secularized and churchlike, but they have steadily lost their market share, while the overall market for religious goods has actually increased.

Meanwhile more sectlike groups, such as the Southern Baptists and the Assemblies of God, continue to have strong growth patterns in both real and relative terms. The rational choice commitment theory argues that these sectlike groups thrive because they demand more from their members, thereby raising the costs of religious adherence while, paradoxically, simultaneously raising the benefits of participation.

The competition theory, by contrast, is insubstantially supported by the analysis and poorly integrated into the theoretical scheme. The basic contention is that the competitive environment of religion in the United States has greatly fostered the growth of religious participation from the low rates of 1776 to the high rates of today. Curiously, the authors only briefly mention their 1988 work that supported the competition hypothesis ("Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies" [*American Sociological Review* 53:41–49]). And they casually dismiss research with which I have been involved (Blau et al., "The Expansion of Religious Affiliation: An Explanation of the Growth of Church Participation in the United States, 1850–1930" [*Social Science Research* 21 (1992): 329–52], Land et al., "Religious Pluralism and Church Membership: A Spatial Diffusion Model" [*American Sociological Review* 56 (1991): 237–49]), which has contradicted the competition hypothesis.

It remains unclear when competition applies and when it does not. Why are some groups so voraciously competitive and others not? If the religious market is so competitive, then why have the Congregationalists, for example, coasted so long (nearly 200 years according to the authors) on such a losing strategy? After all, even lethargic behemoths such as IBM and GM make market corrections. There are numerous other examples of where the market metaphor begins to break down; it should be

incumbent on the authors not to simply borrow willy-nilly from economics but to assess the limitations of such theories systematically

Another shortcoming is that even with all of the historical analysis detailed in the book, the authors generally disregard broader social phenomena taking place outside of the religious sphere, such as industrialization, increasing affluence and education, changes in the status of women, and so forth, the theory is almost entirely endogenous to religious life and thus insensitive to outside factors that change perceptions of the costs and benefits of religious commitment and shape the organizational domain of religious groups

These concerns aside, this remains an important and useful book, and historians and sociologists of religion would do well to quarrel and quibble with it in the years to come

The Church, Society and Hegemony A Critical Sociology of Religion in Latin America By Carlos Alberto Torres Westport, Conn Praeger, 1992 Pp xv+223 \$45 00

Samuel Silva-Gotay
University of Puerto Rico

In *The Church, Society and Hegemony* Carlos Alberto Torres, an Argentinean sociologist, approaches religious phenomena in Latin America from the philosophical and social traditions of Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Gramsci, that is, in relation to the capitalist mode of production, to demonstrate the connection between religion and the reproduction of the social order Torres gives a critical reading of these authors in chapters 1-4 His intention is not to confront their theories, but to "retrieve the fundamental theoretical coordinates that have been introduced and reappear time and again in the few critical studies of religion in Latin America" (p xiv) These categories in the sociology of religion are helpful in studying and explaining the social relations of religion as an ideology of legitimation, but not helpful in understanding and explaining religion as a revolutionary ideology that can, through liberation movements, delegitimize a regime of exploitation and oppression as it has done in Latin America during the past 25 years There, Liberation Theology and Christian revolutionary movements such as Christians for Socialism have become historical realities which cannot be explained by the classic categories

Torres's work belongs with Otto Maduro's *Religion y lucha de clases* (CRT, CEE Mexico, 1980), Pablo Richard's *Death of Christendom, Birth of the Church* (Maryknoll, N Y Orbis Books, 1987), and Samuel Silva-Gotay's *El Pensamiento cristiano revolucionario en America Latina y el Caribe Implicaciones para la sociologia de la religion*, edited

by Sigüeme Salamaca (4th ed , 1989) These are historical and sociological efforts to explain the development of revolutionary Christianity in Latin America One would have expected a critical examination of these contributions in order to place his own in the process of development of the sociology of religion in Latin America When Torres tries to elaborate his own categories he examines the typologies of Charles Glock, Gregory Lensk, Ivan Vallher, Ferreira de Camargo, and Pablo Richard He finds them insufficient and proposes four very inclusive criteria on which to base his own "provisional hypothesis" which he presents to "draw attention to the importance of elaborating a systematic theoretical framework" that will direct and guide empirical research on the popular church (p 106) He elaborates six typologies of internal tendencies of the Latin American church, which he divides between two "technical-theological criteria, first the Conservatives which includes the traditionalists (neo-Christianity), aperturists (social Christianity) and radicals (traditional catholic right), and second, the Renovationists which include the charismatic spiritualists, the populists, and the socialists" (p 99)

From here Torres proceeds to develop a "hypothesis for a theoretical framework for religion and churches in Latin America" based on Gramsci's concept of hegemony, conceived as the generalization of socio-economic, political, and cultural domination of a social class that crystallizes in a "historical block " Torres takes seriously Hugo Portelli's presentation of Gramsci's suggestion of a sociology of religion based on the link between ideology and common sense as it develops in the relationship between the state, religion, intellectuals, and hegemony Because the church includes all social classes, and the class struggle is present in the church, when the crisis of the historical block weakens the hegemony of the dominant class, then the subordinated rebellious and revolutionary groups and classes in the church play their part in the struggle for the construction of the next historical synthesis, as we can see in the struggles of Liberation Theology, the popular church, and specifically, the Tercer-mundistas of Argentina

Armed with these categories, Torres examines the political expression of the church in Argentina in its relationship to the dominant classes and participation in the formation of hegemony, from the colonial Christendom to the present At the end he asks about the new role of the church in the present situation after the church has lost prestige due to its legitimization of the terror of the military State, and after the left in the church has developed a more pluralistic and democratic project

Torres's effort is a good beginning He has a more complex task ahead of him His promised retrieval of the theoretical resources of the past appears to be limited to the case of Gramsci Torres insists on using the "philosophical and social tradition" of the classics, and ignores contemporary sociologists of religion (with the exception of Glock), whose insights on "civil religion" and "secularization" could be very useful The editorial subtitle, *Critical Sociology of Religion in Latin America*, is too

inclusive The title, *The Church, Society and Hegemony*, could have been more precise if *in Argentina* had been added

Armenian-Americans From Being to Feeling Armenian By Anny Bakalian New Brunswick, N J Transaction Publishers, 1992 Pp xii + 511 \$39 95

Jean Bacon
Williams College

Anny Bakalian's book adds another ethnic group to the mix of peoples considered under the general rubric of "white ethnics." Over the past 30 years, the fate of ethnic identity among the descendants of European immigrants has been a central question in the study of immigration and ethnicity. Bakalian's study of Armenian-Americans in the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area follows Herbert Gans ("Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America" [*Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (1979) 1-20]) in suggesting that what has changed across generations is not the strength but the nature or meaning of ethnic identity. There has been a shift from "traditional" to "symbolic" Armenianness. "Traditional" Armenianness, simply being Armenian by accident of birth, predominates among immigrants. "Symbolic" Armenianness predominates among subsequent generations. Unlike traditional identity, one chooses symbolic ethnic identity. It can be mobilized situationally to fulfill sociopsychological functions, but does not constitute the core of the self.

Bakalian's book is based largely on the results of a survey of 584 Armenian-Americans. Eighty percent of the sample was randomly drawn from mailing lists used by Armenian churches and the remainder obtained through a snowball sample accessing Armenian-Americans not affiliated with community organizations or churches. The survey covers a wide range of commonly researched behavioral manifestations of ethnicity. In addition it includes statements about Armenians and their values and behaviors that are designed to elicit respondents' attitudes toward various elements of Armenian culture. Information from participant observation, in-depth interviews with community leaders, and analyses of ethnic media supplements the survey data.

The first half of the book concerns the institutional and organizational structures of the Armenian-American community. Bakalian notes a general decline in participation and interest in community institutions with each successive postimmigrant generation. However, amid her discussion of this general pattern of decline, Bakalian touches on several interesting points. For example, in the chapter on churches and political organizations, she notes that later-generation Armenian-Americans have a continued high level of concern with the Genocide, the Turkish government's

1915 effort to eradicate Armenians from their homelands, and participated significantly in relief efforts after the earthquake in Soviet Armenia in 1988. Involvement in these issues fits with these generations' symbolic sense of Armenianness. In contrast to the divisiveness and controversy which characterize many of the problems that arise in Armenian churches and political parties, these two issues transcend parochial concerns and allow Armenian-Americans to "derive ego-satisfaction, enhance their self-worth, and feel empowered by group affiliation" (p. 164).

In the chapter on voluntary organizations and professional and social networks, she complements her discussion of the pattern of decreasing individual involvement with a brief discussion of changes in the overall structure of the network of voluntary associations. Turn-of-the-century immigrants built their communities around their towns of origin in Turkey. Post-World War II immigrants, however, began to restructure their communities along country-of-origin lines and founded voluntary organizations such as alumni associations and benevolent societies that were aligned with their more advantaged economic and educational backgrounds. While this development does not directly address the generational transition from traditional to symbolic Armenianness, it argues for the continued control of the public definitions of the community by immigrant generations.

The tension between traditional and symbolic Armenianness is most pronounced in the chapter on Armenian language that focuses on educational institutions and media. Although traditional, usually immigrant, Armenians are most concerned about maintaining the Armenian language and see it as central to Armenian ethnicity, the Armenian day schools some children attend necessarily instill a more symbolic sense of Armenianness in their pupils. Functioning in an American milieu, it is difficult for these schools to make the Armenian language so prominent or keep their students so isolated that they can resist the influences of symbolic ethnicity.

In later sections of the book Bakalian's focus shifts from community structures to other sources of Armenianness—Armenian cuisine, relationships with kin, and feelings of peoplehood. While earlier chapters focused on individuals' participation in and attitudes toward the community, this later portion focuses more exclusively on private behavior and more general attitudes toward Armenians as a people rather than as an immigrant community. Here is where the contours of the symbolic sense of ethnicity are filled out. Bakalian argues for a persistent strong sense of ethnicity, albeit one that is symbolic rather than traditional.

Although this book offers a thorough examination of the survey data, it offers little in the way of new theoretical insights into the formation and maintenance of ethnic identities. Intriguing discussions of the tensions and difficulties that face Armenian-Americans regarding the character and maintenance of community organizations and collective definitions of Armenianness are overshadowed by the individual-level orientation of the survey results. We can take away a good sense of the

distribution of behaviors and attitudes among different segments of the community, but we gain only a glimpse of community dynamics and how changing senses of Armenianness are developed and confronted in the lives of community members

Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in Israeli Society By Eliezer Ben-Raphael and Stephen Sharot New York Cambridge University Press, 1991 Pp x+287 \$39 50

Mervin F Verbit
Brooklyn College, CUNY

The trouble with Occam's razor is that it leaves some faces unshaven and others bloody Put less metaphorically, the attempt to understand human behavior by using a few key variables patterned in a few clearly specifiable ways often leaves some data unexplained and other data distorted Perhaps Max Weber's most important lesson for sociologists is that only comparative study can rescue us from the temptations of oversimplification and overgeneralization Eliezer Ben-Raphael and Stephen Sharot learned Weber's lesson well Their study of ethnicity, religion, and class in Israeli society demonstrates how these major phenomena can differ among societies and within societies in their structure, impact, and interrelationships

The main axis of the book is "ethnicity " The term is put in quotation marks here because, as the authors show in an instructively organized review of the literature, the word is not used by all social scientists to mean the same thing Ben-Raphael and Sharot provide a good summary of the various positions on just what cultural differences can appropriately be said to constitute ethnicity They also differentiate ethnicity's several dimensions and manifestations as they are reflected in a number of societies in which they have been studied, and they review some of the main attempts to understand the growth in ethnicity's significance in recent years Unfortunately, their summary of the conceptualizations and varieties of religion and class are not as comprehensive or systematic, but then, as I have noted, their main theme is ethnicity

The empirical part of the book is based on a survey of 826 men in Beer Sheva, most of whom were immigrants and all of whom were fathers of schoolchildren The sample represents four "ethnic" groups Poles, Romanians, Moroccans, and Iraqis The former two are part of Israel's Ashkenazi population (mostly European or American in origin), the latter two, part of the *edot ha'Mizrach* (mostly Asian or North African in origin) One of the strengths of the study is that it enables us to appreciate the variations within each of those two major groupings in Israeli society and thus avoid the kind of oversimplification that attributes too much to Ashkenazi-Sephardi differences alone

Another strength of Ben-Raphael and Sharot's approach is their appreciation of the complexity and the role of ideas. The ideal of *mizug galuyot* (literally, "fusion of exiles") implies that immigrants from the many diaspora communities should merge into a single unified society. On the face of it, that would seem to suggest a rejection of ethnicity. However, as the authors point out, cultural homogeneity is not the only possible meaning of *mizug galuyot*. The idea could also mean absorption into Western cultural forms, alternatively, it could mean cultural pluralism along with little social division and much crossing of lines in friendship and family groups. Other examples of sensitivity to ideological subtlety are Ben-Raphael and Sharot's examination of the perceptions of the hierarchies of group identities, their data on how their respondents conceptualize stratification, their analysis of how Israel's self-definition as the Jewish state affects the role of religion in Israel, and their recognition that an ethic of labor affects attitudes toward occupational stratification. Along the same lines, the inclusion of both objective and subjective factors serves to remind us of the importance of both.

Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in Israeli Society makes an important theoretical contribution to our understanding of the structure of subgroups and their cross-cutting dimensions and an important substantive one to our knowledge about Israeli society.

No study should be criticized for not doing what it did not set out to do (unless, of course, the omission compromises the analysis). Still, several questions are suggested by the book. Is Beer Sheva typical, or would research in other areas of the country produce different results? What patterns would other population subgroups show? To what extent do class differences rest on seniority, on the help available from family and friends, on nonascriptive objective factors, on value differences (e.g., differential emphasis on education), on "prejudice," and so forth? And how do these factors and others interact? What changes in self-awareness occur at immigration and with what consequences? (In this regard, one recalls the quip about American Jews who immigrate to Israel: in America they are most saliently "Jews" and in Israel they become "Americans.") What are the bases for people's sense of their religiosity? (Ben-Raphael and Sharot report, e.g., that Moroccans who define themselves as "secular" practice, on average, more of the five religious observances used in the religiosity scale than do Poles or Romanians who call themselves "religious.")

In sum, this work is theoretically informed, empirically balanced, an important contribution to knowledge, and suggestive of further work. In a period in which subgroup identity is growing in impact, and sometimes in deadly danger, it is a book worth reading and pondering.

Low Living and High Thinking at Modern Times, New York By Roger Wunderlich Syracuse, N Y Syracuse University Press, 1992 Pp xiv + 259

E Burke Rochford, Jr
Middlebury College

New Harmony, Brook Farm, Amana, and Oneida all represent communities in American history that are generally well known, if not always completely understood *Low Living and High Thinking at Modern Times, New York* addresses an intentional community that I suspect few scholars have heard of

Modern Times was a model community that emerged on Long Island in the mid-19th century At its height the community attracted approximately 150 members who resided on 90 acres of land During its 13 years of existence, Modern Times gained considerable public attention and criticism This was due in large part to the guiding ideology which distinguished this experiment in social organization the ultimate sovereignty of the individual and the principle of "cost the limit of price," (this is the phrase Wunderlich uses to describe an economy based on the exchange of labor and goods without capital gains) or "equitable commerce "

Under the leadership of Josiah Warren and his writing partner Stephen Pearl Andrews, Modern Times promoted a radical individualism favoring the idea that the individual had an absolute sovereign right to live as he or she pleased as long as this freedom did not impinge on the rights of others to do the same One could be a religious believer, or not, or cohabit in the context of marriage, or not As the motto of Modern Times stated, "Mind your own business" (p 82) In keeping with this philosophy there were no laws or rules and regulations, meant to direct or constrain the actions of community members While such ideas were radical at the time, of course, it is interesting that they parallel images of the self found among many middle-class Americans today In both cases a concern with the sovereignty of the individual idealizes the "unencumbered," and "autonomous" self (see Bellah et al , *Habits of the Heart* [Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1985])

But to say that Modern Times championed the sovereignty of the individual is not meant to imply an absence of shared ideas that held it together as a community At its core, Modern Times represented a protest against modern capitalism Warren and Andrews, through the system of "equitable commerce," fashioned an economic and social system based on exchange rather than profit Goods and services were exchanged at cost rather than sold for profit Community members used "labor notes" which represented promises to make payment through hours of work as the basis of exchange for necessary goods Warren also set up the community "time store" where he sold merchandise for little more than cost

In many respects this book is as remarkable for its archeology as its historical description and analysis As a sociologist who works with con-

temporary religious communities, I cannot help but be impressed by the extraordinary "digging for data" that has gone into this project. Wunderlich attempts to recreate the lives of 250 people who were residents, visitors, neighbors, or critics of Modern Times. He does this by using sources such as "land deeds, censuses, gravestones, muster rolls, maps, newspapers, minutes of town and school board meetings, eyewitness memoirs, letters and reports" (p. 4). In a real sense, the author has rescued Modern Times from what otherwise was an endless and perhaps terminal coma.

Yet the patient that Wunderlich brings back to life is often a source of disappointment for the scholar interested in the ongoing social lives of the people who settled at Modern Times. Because of limited and incomplete data, much of this book focuses on the philosophy of Warren and Andrews, and their critics. Only in the beginning chapters of the book, and occasionally thereafter, does the reader gain a relatively detailed sense of Modern Times as a vibrant community. For example, Wunderlich does describe how aspects of Modern Times' ideology and life-style (i.e., experimentation with sexual-marital reform) played a major role in mobilizing the public against the community. Its reputation as a "den of fornication" (p. 53) limited the growth of Modern Times and, ultimately, forced residents to rename the community "Brentwood" in an effort to overcome its negative public image. This sort of revealing discussion about the factors that directly influenced the fate of Modern Times as an alternative community is, however, the exception. Overall, we learn much more about social and economic ideas than we do about people's lived experiences. The author tells us more about how Warren's ideas related to those of Locke, Fourier, Emerson, Thoreau, Spencer, and John Stuart Mill, than about the settlers of Modern Times and their efforts to realize these ideals. Because of this, I found myself less than satisfied with the book in the final analysis.

I think this a useful and perhaps important book for scholars interested in utopian movements and communities, although it may be more interesting to American historians and political philosophers than to sociologists.

America's Utopian Experiments: Communal Havens from Long-Wave Crises. By Brian J. L. Berry. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1992. Pp. xviii + 273. \$40.00.

Fred Kniss
Loyola University Chicago

America's Utopian Experiments is one of several recent important works that indicate a resurgent interest in utopian communities. This scholarly resurgence might itself be of interest to Brian J. L. Berry because his

central task is to explain the long-term pattern of rises and falls in utopian activity

Berry proposes a theory of utopian cycles as an extension of the Kondratiev theory of long waves in macroeconomics. The periodic deflationary troughs posited by Kondratiev are associated with declines in prices, asset values, and real wealth. Technological and economic innovations that address the crisis often result in a rapid widening of the gap between rich and poor. According to Berry, the economic crisis also triggers a cultural crisis in the form of millenarian and apocalyptic visions that may be embodied in new forms of social organization. These utopian experiments offer a haven to those who have been hurt by the deflationary trough. Thus, they provide a safety valve for the larger society while at the same time providing experiments in social and cultural innovation that may contribute to long-term social change.

Berry supports his argument by showing that the pattern of utopian communal formation in the United States is strikingly correlated with long-wave economic rhythms. Each deflationary trough is accompanied by a peak in the cycle of new utopian community formation. The character of the utopian surge is determined by the nature of the socioeconomic crisis to which it responds. So, for example, the first utopian wave in the late 18th century responded to a crisis in a primarily evangelical and rural society that combined a Calvinist religious tradition with agrarian capitalism. The utopian experiments therefore were agrarian communistic groups motivated by religious anti-Calvinist millennialism. Similar arguments are made for each of the utopian waves Berry identifies.

Using such broad strokes, Berry paints a simple but elegant and convincing picture of the rises and falls of American utopianism. This basic argument is laid out in four chapters that bracket the 16 chapters that make up the bulk of the text. In each of the 16, he provides a history of a particular utopian movement. These are relatively short cursory treatments that are entirely dependent on secondary sources, but he uses them to provide specific support for his argument. Unfortunately, his argument is much less convincing in the details. Perhaps, rather than referring to his work as a painting in broad strokes, it would be better to think of it as a pointillist piece that is beautiful from a distance but whose sense diffuses when examined up close. There are a number of problems with the details, but I will highlight three that are particularly significant.

First, Berry's conceptualization of utopian communal formation is too broad and inclusive. He includes as "utopian" everything from early American Pietist sectarian groups to the government-sponsored planned communities of the New Deal to the student-based political movements of the 1960s. He includes as "formation" both the emergence of new movements and the expansion of old groups into new congregations or communities, although it would be reasonable to suspect that these two processes had different causal antecedents. Given his broad definition, it

is not so surprising that he finds utopian communal formation whenever he looks for it

Second, his assertion of a causal relation between economic crisis and utopian activity is not well supported. The correlation is certainly there, but he does not provide a satisfactory explanatory model that identifies the causal mechanism linking the two. The text is peppered with assertions like "Almost as a knee-jerk reaction to the primary trough that bottomed in 1824, ten short-lived Owenite experiments were started in 1825 and 1826" (p. 56). But Berry offers no evidence for why we should believe that these experiments were a *reaction* to the deflationary trough. The only causal link occasionally proffered is the long-debunked psychological frustration theory of social movements, and he provides little evidence for it. As he, himself, shows, many if not most founders of utopian experiments were well-educated members of the middle or upper classes.

Finally, his concern for painting the big picture leads him to downplay or ignore the particularities of his different case studies—that is, how specific events and intentional actions of utopians may have affected some of the processes he is trying to explain. This is ironic, given that the bulk of the manuscript is a presentation of case studies. His analyses/descriptions of particular cases are only weakly linked to his theory and seem primarily intended to highlight correlations between economic crises and internal events. Counterevidence is often ignored. For example, in his chapter on the Shakers, Berry points out that the deflationary troughs of the late 1780s, the mid-1840s and the early 1890s paralleled periods of Shaker revival and growth. However, the depression that hit its lowest point in 1873 coincided with a period of *decline* for the Shakers. Rather than using this counterevidence to refine his theory, Berry simply mentions it and passes over it without comment.

Despite these problems, Berry's book is worth reading—for two different reasons and for two different audiences. The opening and closing chapters will be of interest to serious scholars of utopian communities because they propose a provocative thesis and offer at least a plausible case for it. For generalists who are interested in a quick historical overview of the variety of American utopian experiments, the middle 16 chapters will be a valuable source of information and a good introduction to the secondary literature. It is a pity, though, that the two blocks of text were not better integrated.

Debt Cycles in the World-Economy Foreign Loans, Financial Crises, and Debt Settlements, 1820–1990 By Christian Suter Boulder, Colo Westview Press, 1992 Pp xii + 234 \$32.50

Herman M. Schwartz
University of Virginia

In *Debt Cycles in the World-Economy*, Christian Suter argues that foreign public debt crises in the periphery and semiperiphery have occurred regularly every 50 to 60 years starting with the 1820s. Long cycles of accumulation in the core of the world economy cause these recurrent debt crises. Waves of indebted states' being in default or debt-servicing difficulty coincide with stagnant periods in global Kondratieff and Kuznets growth cycles, which average 50–60 years and 18–25 years, respectively. The duration of crises and the method by which they are resolved are a function of the specific institutions that hegemonic powers use to uphold international property rights and the institutions linking savers and borrowers. Finally, debt-servicing difficulties do not arise automatically from global stagnation. Local economic and political processes interact with global ones to produce a range of reactions to global economic stagnation.

Suter tries to develop a general theory of public foreign debt crisis in order to overcome the fragmented knowledge that comes from studying the dyadic relationship between specific creditors and debtors and the shortness of vision that accompanies looking only at the methods of resolution for specific countries' debt-servicing problems. He argues that, at the beginning of Kondratieff upswings, rising core income and consequent imports from the periphery ease debt-servicing problems left over from the previous downswing. This promotes a settlement of outstanding defaults. At the peak of expansion in the core, the profit rate in the core tends to fall, leading to capital flows out to the periphery. There, booming exports and local income keep profits high. But shallow peripheral markets are quickly saturated. At the beginning of the Kondratieff downswing, demand in the core levels off and stagnates, leading to falling exports and income in the periphery, and hence to debt-service difficulty as state revenues shrink and foreign exchange becomes scarcer. Suter uses simple regression analysis to confirm that debt-servicing problems and settlement resolution cluster in time.

Overlaying this basic cycle is a trend toward greater institutionalization of debtor-creditor relations. At the beginning of the 19th century, market relations characterized international financial relations. By the end of the 20th century, a range of international organizations, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regulated debtor-creditor interactions. By providing a lender of last resort they "helped" debtors to reschedule debt rather than defaulting outright.

Suter's use of a world-system approach has three benefits. First, it dispels the tendency to view international debt problems as something

unique to the 1980s. Second, it shows how system-level phenomena—global economic environments that make debt servicing difficult—can determine the nature of domestic political regimes. Finally, it suggests why foreign debt problems recur over time and in the same places, and equally important, why settlements are likely to cluster.

I think this book would function well as a text for advanced undergraduate or perhaps graduate classes. Aside from the items noted above, it does not provide much beyond the existing literature. More sophisticated econometric analyses are available in, for example, Michael Edelstein's *Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) and *The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective*, edited by Barry Eichengreen and Peter Lindert (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989). Case studies concentrating on Peru, the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, and Liberia seem to miss both the economic and political point.

Economically the relationship between Britain and, for example, Australia or Argentina, was much more important than that with any of these countries—Britain invested about six times as much in Australia as in these three combined in the 19th century. And Britain exported more to Australia in 1914 than it did to France. Investigating this relationship would have revealed more about the links among foreign debt, international trade, and economic cycles than do these minor cases.

And despite his intent to link system-level-debt problems to regime characteristics Suter stunts the important *political* lessons of these cases. Charles Tilly (*Coercion, Capital and European States* [Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990]) suggests that relying on foreign capital rather than domestic revenue sources can cripple state-building efforts. Turkey and Egypt would be perfect places to examine this phenomenon, insofar as debt-servicing difficulties led creditors to take control of their treasuries (a pattern that IMF programs repeat, in a somewhat disguised form, today). In this respect, Suter's use of world-system theory continues to display this theory's tendency to view state building as an outcome of system-level processes, not as a cause of system-level characteristics in its own right.

Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity By Liah Greenfeld. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. Pp. 581. \$49.95.

Juan Díez Medrano
University of California, San Diego

Liah Greenfeld's book *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* addresses three questions: "Why and how nationalism emerged, why and how it was transformed in the process of transfer from one society to another, and why and how these different forms of national identity and consciousness translated into institutional practices and patterns of culture,

molding the social and political structures of societies which defined themselves as nations" (p. 3). To accomplish this task, she discusses the development of national identity in England, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States. Her analysis is framed by a classification of forms of nationalism along two dimensions: the conception of popular sovereignty (individualistic-libertarian or collectivistic-authoritarian) and the criteria of membership (civic or ethnic). These dimensions define four ideotypical forms of nationalism.

Greenfeld argues that the development of national identity was a means through which the educated middle class or the nobility tried to solve crises of identity and acute feelings of status inconsistency in periods of drastic changes in the social structure and status hierarchy. By elevating the "people" to the status of an elite, "the nation," these two social groups acquired or recovered their own senses of dignity.

According to Greenfeld, the story of nationalism starts in England where its protagonists were the upwardly mobile aristocracy and the bureaucratic class, both of whom replaced the old English nobility following the accession of the Tudor dynasty to the English throne. The identity crisis of these upwardly mobile social groups gave birth to a conception of England as a community of free and equal individuals entitled to political participation. However, this early conception of the nation was lost as it traveled from country to country and only the United States inherited it in its original form. In other countries the democratic conception of the nation degenerated into collectivistic and increasingly ethnic forms.

National identity became collectivistic primarily because the social groups who appropriated the concept (the old nobilities in Russia and France and intellectuals in Germany) had either abstract conceptions or no conception of democracy and also because the belief in the rationality of all individuals played a minor role in the cultural traditions within which these national identities developed. Only in Germany, however, did national identity become unequivocally ethnic. Key to Greenfeld's explanation of this ideological development is the fact that, unlike their French and Russian counterparts, German intellectuals lacked the support and recognition of the nobility. The extreme financial and social insecurity German intellectuals thus experienced led them to lose faith in the Enlightenment and to embrace a pietist world view (later secularized under romanticism) which contained within it the seeds of racism and authoritarianism.

Greenfeld also argues that in France, Russia, and Germany, new national identities were shaped by "ressentiment" toward the country from which the concept of national identity was borrowed (England for France and France for Russia and Germany). "Existential envy" toward these economically or militarily more powerful countries resulted in the "transvaluation" of the values attached to the borrowed concept of national identity or in the outright rejection of these values and the glorification of the indigenous culture.

Liah Greenfeld's book offers a masterful analysis of the dynamic and reciprocal interconnection between structure, culture, and individual psychology. This allows her to unveil the slow genesis of national identities and present major historical events (the English, French, and Russian revolutions, the American War of Independence, and the rise of nazism) in a new light. However, throughout the book, she pays insufficient attention to how people actually received the elite's conceptions of national identity. She also tends to underplay alternative visions of the nation in each of her case studies. While it is important to indicate which visions became hegemonic, the consideration of alternative visions of the nation is crucial when discussing the popularization of national identity. In connection to this, her view that elites developed national identities that were shaped by their own social position, aspirations, and cultural predispositions stands in obvious contradiction to her view that, once formulated, the elite's conceptions of national identity were transmitted intact to the rest of society. This contradiction is critical because the assumption that the elite's national identity was accepted as such by the masses is a *sine qua non* for her interpretation of the effect of national identities on political developments (e.g., the passivity of the German population in the face of the Holocaust). Finally, it is unclear why national identity plays a major role in her explanation of the rise of nazism or the Russian revolution, while it only plays a marginal role in her explanation of American racism. Is it that national identity is not so important in determining political developments after all, or that her depiction of American identity is wanting?

Policing and Punishment in China From Patriarchy to "the People"
By Michael R. Dutton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Pp. xii + 391. \$69.95.

Arif Dırlık
Duke University

In the concluding pages of *Policing and Punishment in China*, Michael R. Dutton makes passing reference to readers who may have "struggled through this text" (p. 347). His modesty is well placed, this is a difficult text. It is also a rewarding and stimulating one and well worth the "struggle."

The subject of *Policing and Punishment* is the "genealogy" of Chinese approaches to the definition, control, and punishment of crime from the earliest times to the present. Its goal, however, is to get at what policing and punishment reveals about Chinese society and social change in China, particularly, the relationship of contemporary Chinese society to its past. Ideals of order and the good society are the other side of the coin to definitions and control of crime. Referring to the *baojia* (mutual responsibility) system, a persistent institution in Chinese society, Dutton

writes that "it is only through, and in unity with, the system's mutual benefits and mutual aid functions that its policing, regulation and punishment aspects can effectively operate" (p. 31). Social control and social utopia coincide in this institution, as they do in the contemporary Chinese work unit (*danwei*), an expression at once of socialist notions of community and socialist methods of social control. By the same virtue, changes in the discourse on society point to significant historical change, where forms of policing and punishment that appear to be continuous with the past are endowed with a significantly different meaning in a new discursive field, informed by new conceptions of the good society.

Policing and Punishment is motivated by two interventions. Primarily, it engages the Chinese debate of the 1980s on "the transition to socialism," which focused on the part "feudal remnants" (the past) have played in distorting and obstructing Chinese socialism. Identifying collective and popular/mass involvement in policing and punishment with "feudal remnants," some of the protagonists in the debate such as the prominent Marxist theorist Su Shaozhi advocated greater emphasis on technical/professional methods of policing and punishment and "individuation" in the definition of crime as the means to overcoming "feudal remnants" to facilitate the "transition to socialism."

Dutton introduces into this debate Michel Foucault's ideas on crime and punishment. He is concerned to show, first, that forms of policing and punishment that appear as "feudal remnants," are not remnants but rather the products (in content, if not in form) of a socialist discourse on society, that drew both on earlier Chinese forms and Soviet formulations, but redeployed them in accordance with a contemporary Chinese vision of the good society. His historical survey is not history but genealogy, designed to demonstrate this thesis by showing that, whereas the *baojia* system of the past was designed to bolster the family as the basic unit and the paradigm of society, the contemporary systems of the work unit and the household (*hukou*) are informed by a vision of labor collectivism—hence the significance of "reform through labor" (*laogai*). Dutton writes "a whole range of traditional practices were selectively rearticulated and redeployed so that they bore upon the criminal. Household registration still secured the sites of banishment but these were now also sites of production. The family played a key role in the organization of punishment but, this time, as an ally of the state rather than as a co-object of its wrath. The use of public spectacle to shame and blame the wayward still operated, in the form of mass pronouncement meetings, but these meetings now functioned under the banner of the 'people's will.' At the center of many of these changes was the issue of planning" (p. 285).

The same reasoning underlies Dutton's challenge to calls for "individuation." It is not that premodern and contemporary definitions of crime in China are lacking in individuation, he argues, but that they presuppose different relations between the individual and the collective, hence different notions of individuality. The stress on individualism in the 1980s, he

further argues, has been accompanied not by the retreat but by the spread of "the carceral society" beyond the collective and beyond prison walls, the response to the spread of disorder created by economic individualism within a social context where commitment to collective goals persists

The second intervention is in the assumptions of Foucault's arguments that certain forms of regulation and punishment herald the coming of modern society. Dutton argues that certain practices such as registration and statistics, which have a long history in China, do not necessarily point to modernity (as Foucault argued was true in Europe), but were themselves shaped by the social context, and contributed to the perpetuation of collective forms of regulation rather than individualizing forms of policing and punishment. The challenge to Foucault here is one aspect of the author's overall argument against teleology, including the teleologies of "culturalist historicism" and "the transition to socialism." Dutton suggests instead a "conceptual specificity" that judges meaning in its discursive context and calls for solutions to problems that recognize the constructedness of legal rights and practices, as opposed to their subjection to utopian or conceptual teleologies.

Scholars of Chinese legal practices will no doubt find much to disagree with in the "genealogy" that Dutton offers. The argument also stresses function over contradiction (between form and content, community and control, state and society, etc.), so that the "discursive field" appears as a postmodern equivalent of an earlier structural functionalism. *Policing and Punishment* nevertheless addresses significant issues, is conceptually sophisticated and imaginative in the data it draws on, and offers a thought-provoking argument.

Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990 By Anthony W. Marx. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 347. \$42.50 (cloth), \$15.95 (paper).

Aldon Morris
Northwestern University

In *Lessons of Struggle*, Anthony Marx has written an important book on South Africa's internal opposition to white domination. He examines the nature, structure, and outcome of this oppositional movement from 1960 to 1990. The book is important for two reasons: it provides a substantive account of black South Africans' efforts to overthrow white domination and offers a theoretical analysis of that struggle that is applicable to social movements generally.

Marx's theoretical approach is clearly stated and guides his substantive analyses. The core argument is that, since social movements are driven by both material and ideological factors, both must be given equal analytic weight. Moreover, it is the dialectical interactions of the material and the ideological that determine whether an oppressive state prevails.

or whether an oppositional movement seizes power, thereby earning the opportunity to construct a new society. Using the South African case, Marx attempts to show that activists and revolutionaries who fail to systematically merge ideological and material realities as the foundation of their strategic and tactical struggle will fall short of toppling the state and seizing power.

When Marx turns his attention to South Africa's internal opposition, he discovers appropriate empirical cases for demonstrating his thesis. Thus, from the late 1960s until the late 1970s, the black consciousness (BC) movement, which relied solely on ideas, dominated the black struggle to end apartheid. Throughout the 1980s the struggle to dismantle white rule was dominated by the United Democratic Front (UDF), which relied almost exclusively on material forces to seize power. Finally, during the early 1990s, the black working class, who combined ideological and material forces, became the central engine of the struggle.

The BC movement, spearheaded by black students who were concentrated in segregated colleges and universities and led by charismatic personalities such as Steven Biko, preached that blacks needed to transform their consciousness in order to gain liberation. In their view, by the 1960s blacks had psychologically accepted their own inferiority following the effective governmental crackdown on the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress in the 1950s. The BC movement, reminiscent of the U.S. black power movement, spread ideas throughout the country about the positiveness of blackness and demanded that blacks become racially assertive. The dissemination of these revolutionary ideas was the *modus operandi* of the BC movement. Initially, the strategy worked. Black people, especially the youth, were seized by these ideas that erased their fears, enabling them to engage in widespread social protest.

Nevertheless, the state prevailed in the face of this widespread unrest because of its material resources and force. Thus, in 1976 the state killed dozens of unarmed black protestors in Soweto and elsewhere. The BC movement could not overcome this state power because it specialized in neither organization nor the mobilization of resources. This movement of pure ideas fell apart in the face of naked, brutal state power. In short order the BC movement was banned and rendered invisible.

The UDF quickly filled this vacuum. It concentrated on organization and the mobilization of resources. The focus of the UDF was on marshaling the material resources needed to seize power. Groups of every ideological stripe, race, and class were welcomed to join the struggle to create a nonracial society. Ideological coherence, whether around race, class, or nation was irrelevant. It was the ability to organize and fund these groups, especially at the local level, so they could engage in massive protests making South Africa ungovernable, that mattered to the UDF. Because of the UDF's incredible organizing and financial capacity, it nearly seized power in the wake of widespread monumental protest.

However, UDF's downfall occurred because its leaders, thinking victory was at hand, prematurely sought to dominate this ideologically di-

verse group. This attempt allowed the powerful force of conflicting ideologies to emerge behind the backs of UDF participants, unleashing chaos and conflict. The state, already aware of these ideological tensions, moved swiftly to exploit them and to set groups against each other. The state also coopted various UDF groups by strategically providing them with scarce resources. The UDF had no strategy to counter the state or to solve its internal ideological conflicts. This was so because the UDF had ignored the role of ideology in concrete struggle, concentrating instead on organizational building and mobilizing of resources. Consequently, the state won again by setting groups on each other and by using its tremendous force to crush and ban the UDF in 1988.

The black trade unions stepped forth to fill the new void. These unions had power because skilled black workers had become central to the South African economy, and blacks play a crucial economic role as consumers. But, for Marx, these unions were crucial to black liberation, for, unlike BC and UDF, they were characterized by organization and consciousness. The structural position of workers thrust them into developing a class identity that enabled them to construct a coherent political ideology. Moreover, workers had built sound democratically oriented worker organizations. It was this marriage of organization and ideology that made the black working class an effective opposition. Indeed, this synthesis constituted the glue behind the general strikes, advocacy of economic sanctions, and other collective actions of workers that were responsible for the state's decision to negotiate with the ANC. In short, when an opposition effectively merges material and ideological factors, major socioeconomic and political transformations become possible.

In conclusion, *Lessons of Struggle* is a valuable, well-written study. It is, of course, far from perfect. From it we learn little about the role of various social classes in South Africa and how they may affect the ultimate outcome of this important struggle because the focus is almost exclusively on the interactions between the state and the black opposition. Nor is it clear why ANC leaders, and not workers, are the major actors in current negotiations for a new South Africa. In fact, Marx's analysis of the working-class movement does not match the depth and persuasiveness of those devoted to the BC and the UDF. Perhaps this is because these dynamics are so recent and are still unfolding. Nevertheless, this movement is crucial to Marx's overall argument, for it supposedly contains the fruitful marriage of material and ideological factors.

Still, *Lessons of Struggle* is a rich empirical and theoretical study deserving serious scrutiny by scholars interested in social change and an important social movement that will affect world politics well into the 21st century.

Book Notes

Theory on Gender, Feminism on Theory Edited by Paula England New York Aldine de Gruyter, 1993 Pp xii + 377

In this volume, Paula England brings together a wide range of contributors, who address the treatment of gender by such varying theoretical traditions as those of functionalism, rational choice theory, world-system theory, psychoanalytic theory, network theory, and others After an introductory chapter by England, the second section of the book presents the central essays These are original papers by scholars who have worked extensively within each theoretical framework and have thought carefully about the complexities of incorporating the study of gender The third section of the book is comprised of an essay on feminist methodology by Joey Sprague and Mary Zimmerman and general position papers by Nancy Tuana, Linda Molm, Nancy Folbre, and John Wilson These essays summarize and critique earlier chapters and are followed with responses by those chapters' authors The genuine engagement of scholars with each other in print is rare, and this volume offers a stunning example of how provocative and fruitful such an engagement can be The book will be valuable both for theoretical specialists who want to learn more about how gender issues intersect with their own fields and for gender scholars who want to study theoretical perspectives with which they may be unfamiliar The volume will also be a valuable resource for graduate-level courses on gender

Beyond Economic Man Feminist Theory and Economics Edited by Marianne A Ferber and Julie A Nelson Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1993 \$35 00 (cloth), \$12 95 (paper)

The editors of *Beyond Economic Man* boldly state in their introduction that "this volume is the first of its kind " Indeed, the juxtaposition of feminist theory with economics is uncommon in seminars and workshops at major universities and is equally (if not more) exceptional in print Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson open their volume with an essay on the social construction of economics as a discipline—both in terms of practitioners and in subject matter—and the social construction of gender This is followed by essays by Julie Nelson, Paula England, Diana Strassman, and Donald McCloskey on whether the assumptions and core concepts of neoclassical economics are capable of dealing fully with the

Book notes are written by members of the book review editorial board

© 1994 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved
0002-9602/94/9904-0008\$01 50

realities of men's and women's lives. Nancy Folbre's chapter discusses treatment of socialism and feminism in economics, and Ann Jennings's paper concerns the institutionalist approach and feminism. The four remaining chapters provide commentary and critique. While the majority of this volume's contributors are economists, the book is of great significance to sociologists interested in the "imperialism" of economics in areas such as the family, households, and labor markets. It is highly readable and is refreshing in its opening of the door to a more self-reflective economics.

The Origin of Values. Edited by Michael Hechter, Lynn Nadel, and Richard E. Michod. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Pp. 342.

The Origin of Values brings together essays from a distinguished set of contributors, who argue for the importance of incorporating values into social-scientific explanation. Michael Hechter's opening essay discusses why the study of values has slipped from social-science discourse, then suggests a number of possible approaches to the origin of values. Subsequent chapters are grouped along social-scientific, psychological, and biological lines. The social-scientific section includes essays by Frederick Barth and Harrison White that relate values to social institutions and an essay by Aaron Wildavsky on the cultural contention surrounding values that affect public policy decisions. Tibor Scitovsky, George Akerlof, and Janet Yellen and Richard Herrnstein consider the ways values are handled in economics. Other chapters examine issues in the measurement of values and the balance between biological and social origins of values. The interdisciplinary character of the book is a testament to the importance of the topic and will offer readers access to scholars who have spent considerable effort thinking through the puzzle of where values come from and how they relate to human behavior and social structure.

Sociology and the Public Agenda. Edited by William Julius Wilson. New York: Sage Publications, 1993. Pp. xi + 391. \$49.95 (cloth), \$24.95 (paper).

Sociology and the Public Agenda, a volume in the American Sociological Association Presidential Series, is focused on the range of contributions that sociology can make in the policy domain. In the opening essay, William Julius Wilson argues persuasively that sociologists of various methodological persuasions have much to add to important policy debates and that sociologists need to exert greater effort to make their findings accessible to political leaders and the public. This essay is followed by three others that consider the relationship between intellectuals and policymakers. The rest of the book is divided into sections on citizenship, organizations and social movements, "high-priority" social problems such as homelessness and crime, and the public agenda in relation

to employment and child welfare. The book thus examines not only the general interaction between sociology as a discipline and the societal context, but carefully works through examples of how sociology can guide public policy agenda setting in a number of areas. Contributors include Rogers Brubaker writing on migration and citizenship, David Knoke writing on networks and the construction of public policy, and Robert Sampson writing on communities and crime.

Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America. Edited by Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993. Pp. ix + 287. \$29.95.

In *Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America*, edited by Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, noted economists including Finis Welch, Richard Freeman, Kevin Murphy, and others utilize data from the Census Bureau's March Current Population Surveys (CPS) to describe the dimensions of change in the distribution of economic inequality in the United States over the past two decades and to evaluate the validity of alternative explanations. Confirming what many have known or suspected, inequality in the distribution of individual earnings and family income is shown to have increased since the mid-1960s. The book's special appeal lies in the researchers' efforts to measure the importance of various economic, demographic, and governmental factors in producing the trend toward greater inequality. Examined in detail are the impact of changes in union density, the industrial composition of employment, the demand for college graduates, female headship, the number of children per family, and the labor force participation rate and earnings of married women. Also analyzed are the role of federal taxes and cash transfers and the effects of the minimum wage on the distribution of family incomes. This book's value for sociologists will not be in its resolving any debates, but in its spurring and directing additional analysis of CPS data to further elucidate the nature and causes of recent changes in the distribution of economic inequality in the United States.

The Politics of Pregnancy: Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy. Edited by Annette Lawson and Deborah L. Rhode. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. 348. \$32.50.

This well-integrated volume of essays focuses on the social context and implications of teenage pregnancy. The first part of the book examines the sociocultural construction of teenage pregnancy through time and among different social groups, and includes chapters on historical trends in the United States as well as comparisons of black and white teenagers and a chapter on the United Kingdom. The second section focuses on teenage sexuality and the factors involved in the choice to have a child. This is followed by chapters on the social constraints placed on the teen-

age father's role and the father's impact on children. Finally, the book addresses the historical and legal aspects of public policy relating to teenage pregnancy. The contributors to the volume represent a wide range of backgrounds from sociology to psychology, history, philosophy, law, and medicine. Sociological contributors include Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Kathleen Mullan Harris, Carol Joffe, and Annette Lawson. The book will be of interest both to laymen in this field and to sociological experts who seek exposure to the current research in adolescent pregnancy in other disciplines.

Gangs: The Origins and Impact of Contemporary Youth Gangs in the United States. Edited by Scott Cummings and Daniel Monti. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. Pp. 355. \$59.50 (cloth), \$19.95 (paper).

This collection of essays deals with the organization and behaviors of youth gangs in the United States. After two introductory essays that provide a background on the origins of gang research and survey some of the problems posed by gang violence, several essays examine particular youth gangs. Final chapters deal with the public's reactions to gangs and the related civil rights and legal issues. The value of the book lies in its attempt to bring together current attempts by experts in gang research in order to grapple with the questions of how gangs should be defined, how they arise, and how they are related to issues in the larger society. The fine-grained description in the case studies is also highly informative. Contributors to the volume include Joan Moore, Felix Padilla, Jerome Skolnick, and others.

The Changing Contract across Generations. Edited by Vern L. Bengtson and W. Andrew Achenbaum. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993. Pp. xviii + 311.

What are the obligations and rights of different age groups? Have these varied across time and place? These are two of the general questions addressed in *The Changing Contract across Generations*. Contributors from sociology, economics, history, social policy, and anthropology include Richard Easterlin, Judith Treas, Nancy Foner, Alice Rossi, and others. Their essays provide perspectives on "generational contracts," debunk conventional wisdom about generation gaps, use cross-cultural comparisons to suggest that conflict between generations is not normative or inevitable, and explore the role of family and kin networks in generational relations. The final three chapters predict that relationships between age groups will become increasingly strained due to changes in the politics of aging and suggest that areas of basic empirical research needed to understand the effects of an aging population on social relations. The interdisciplinary and integrated nature of this edited volume makes it a valuable resource for those interested in the sociology of aging.

Secularism, Rationalism, and Sectarianism Edited by Eileen Barker, James A. Beckford, and Karel Dobbelaere Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. 322. \$55.00.

This volume of essays, published in honor of Bryan Wilson, contains chapters by many fine scholars, including each of the editors. Fittingly, the volume is comparative, containing essays on secularization in Europe, the United States, Latin America, New Zealand, Great Britain, and Africa. It covers Buddhism and Protestant evangelicalism, and looks at charisma, new religious movements, religious experience and practice, religion and psychotherapy, and religion and the state, among other themes. Such a broad scope sacrifices depth on particular issues, of course. Yet this volume is useful precisely because secularization is itself a global phenomenon and one that operates at both the level of society and the level of experience. *Secularism, Rationalism, and Sectarianism* would make a good reader for an advanced undergraduate or a beginning graduate course. It will appeal to scholars of comparative religion and secularization, and to anyone interested in the relationship between religion and modernity.

Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education Edited by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby. Fundamentalism Project, vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Pp. 602. \$45.00.

Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance Edited by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby. Fundamentalism Project, vol. 3. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Pp. 666. \$45.00.

These works are the two latest volumes from the Fundamentalism Project and serve as the most up-to-date reference on fundamentalism. The global comparative focus, the editors' theoretical interpretation of findings, and the rejection of the polemical treatment too often afforded religious fundamentalism in academic writing make these sound contributions to scholarship.

Volume 2, *Fundamentalisms and Society*, documents the "intense and persistent efforts on the part of fundamentalists to secure what they describe as a traditional social and religious order" (p. 5). The volume traces how fundamentalist groups in various parts of the world form their sacred worldviews. Later chapters assess the impact of such worldviews on the role of women and the structuring of family and other interpersonal relations. Finally, the volume documents why struggles over such issues center on education and the media.

Volume 3, *Fundamentalisms and the State*, has a more diverse focus. Section 1 relates the impact of fundamentalists on the political process.

in various societies, the following section examines fundamentalism and economics, and the last section examines the effects of fundamentalist militancy on the state and public policy. Throughout there is a dual focus. What do fundamentalist groups view as legitimate economic and political process? How have they fared given the political and economic climates of their societies? This volume will be of interest not only to scholars of religion's relationship to the state, but to those interested in religion and violence.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

SPECIAL ISSUES

SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE UNDERCLASS IN THE UNITED STATES, Volume 38:4 (November 1991)

**SPECIAL ISSUE ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Volume 40:1 (February 1993)**

COERCION AND PUNISHMENT, Volume 38:2 (May 1991)

**FIVE PAPERS ON POSTMODERNISM, Volume 37:4
(November 1990)**

FIVE PAPERS ON AIDS, Volume 36:4 (October 1989)

**LANGUAGE, INTERACTION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS,
Volume 35:4 (October 1988)**

SPECIAL THEORY ISSUE, Volume 33:6 (December 1986)

**FEMINIST ISSUES AND WOMEN'S PROBLEMS, Volume
32:4 (April 1985)**

**THEMATIC ISSUE ON THE FAMILY, Volume 31:3
(February 1984)**

THEMATIC ISSUE ON JUSTICE, Volume 30.5 (June 1983)

\$18 per issue; 30% off to members.

**PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
FOR THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS**

For subscription/membership information, contact:

University of California Press, Journals Division

2120 Berkeley Way

Berkeley, California 94804

FAX 510/643-7127

Walter de Gruyter

Sociology in Europe

In Search of Identity

Birgitta Nedelmann and Piotr Sztompka, editors

The "European Revolution" of 1989 has not only brought about dramatic changes in the social structure of East and West European countries, but also in the social sciences. This volume evaluates how sociology has developed in the post-revolutionary period in selected European countries. Ten eminent representatives of sociology from these countries were presented with a set of questions which served as a common guideline for their contributions. In addition, two prominent scholars from Japan and the United States present views on sociology in Europe from the outside.

1993 x + 234 pages

Cloth \$49.95 ISBN 3-11-013845-X

Price subject to change



For North America
Walter de Gruyter, Inc.
200 Saw Mill River Road
Hawthorne, NY 10532

Berlin • New York



This publication is available from UMI in one or more of the following formats:

- In Microform--from our collection of over 18,000 periodicals and 7,000 newspapers
- In Paper--by the article or full issues through UMI Article Clearinghouse
- Electronically, on CD-ROM, online, and/or magnetic tape--a broad range of ProQuest databases available, including abstract-and-index, ASCII full-text, and innovative full-image format

Call toll-free 800-521-0600, ext. 2888,
for more information, or fill out the coupon below:

Name _____
Title _____
Company/Institution _____
Address _____
City/State/Zip _____
Phone () _____
I'm interested in the following title(s) _____

UMI
A Bell & Howell Company
Box 78
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
800 521-0600 toll free
313-761-1203 fax

Leading Journal

acta sociologica is one of the largest European sociology journals with more than 3000 subscribers. The journal provides rapid publication of high-quality articles carefully selected by a prestigious review committee. The journal has been published since 1955 by the Scandinavian Sociological Association. Issued quarterly.

Editor:

Peter Hedstrom, Stockholm, Sweden.

Representative articles from recent volumes

Mark Granovetter:

Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis

Robert Erikson, John H. Goldthorpe:

Individual or Family? Results from Two Approaches to Class Assignment.

Douglas A. Hibbs:

Market Forces, Trade Union Ideology, and Trends in Swedish Wage Dispersion.

Gudmund Hernes:

The Dilemmas of Social Democracies.

Göran Thernborn:

Cultural Belonging, Structural Location, and Human Action.

Send to: Scandinavian University Press, P O Box 2959 Tøyen, N-0608 Oslo, Norway
U.S. Office: Scandinavian University Press, 200 Meacham Ave., Elmont, NY 11003, USA

Please enter my subscription to *acta sociologica*

from Volume 1, 1993, ISSN 0001-6993, 4 issues per year Postage Included Airspeed delivery worldwide Prepayment required

SUBSCRIPTION RATE

- ☐ Private subscription, NOK 320 (outside Scandinavia), SEK 275 (In Sweden), NOK 295 (In other Nordic countries)
- ☐ Institutional subscription, NOK 670 (outside Scandinavia), SEK 600 (In Sweden), NOK 645 (In other Nordic countries)
- ☐ Please send me a free sample copy of *acta sociologica*

Please tick one box

- ☐ Cheque enclosed ☐ Please send invoice
- ☐ VISA ☐ Eurocard ☐ Mastercard ☐ AmEx ☐ Diners

Card No

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

 Expiry date _____

Make cheque payable to Scandinavian University Press and staple it to your order form

Name/Address (CAPITALS) _____

Signature _____ Date _____

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

*cordially invites you
to enter
your personal subscription to*

**AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY**

*New subscribers are eligible for
a 15% discount off the regular subscription rate.*

Please return the reply card printed on reverse.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

*cordially invites you
to enter
your personal subscription to*

**AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY**

*New subscribers are eligible for
a 15% discount off the regular subscription rate.*

Please return the reply card printed on reverse.

ENTER A NEW SUBSCRIPTION AND SAVE 15%!

	New	Renewal
<input type="checkbox"/> Individuals	<input type="checkbox"/> \$33 15 (J)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$39 00
<input type="checkbox"/> Institutions	<input type="checkbox"/> 73 95 (J)	<input type="checkbox"/> 87 00
<input type="checkbox"/> Students	<input type="checkbox"/> 22 95 (J)	<input type="checkbox"/> 27 00
<input type="checkbox"/> ASA and BSA Members	<input type="checkbox"/> 34 00	<input type="checkbox"/> 34 00

OUTSIDE USA? Please add \$9 00 for postage *Canadians, add 7% GST, plus postage*

BACK ISSUES AT 50% OFF

☐ Set of 36 available issues ☐ Individuals \$135 00 ☐ Institutions \$279 00

OUTSIDE USA? Please add 75¢ per copy for postage

☐ **Charge my** ☐ **Visa** ☐ **MasterCard** Exp date _____
Acct # _____
Signature _____
Phone (_____) _____
☐ **Check enclosed** (payable to journal)

Name _____
Address _____
City _____
State/Country _____ ZIP _____

Please mail to **The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division,**
PO Box 37005, Chicago, IL 60637 IF4XX

ENTER A NEW SUBSCRIPTION AND SAVE 15%!

	New	Renewal
<input type="checkbox"/> Individuals	<input type="checkbox"/> \$33 15 (J)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$39 00
<input type="checkbox"/> Institutions	<input type="checkbox"/> 73 95 (J)	<input type="checkbox"/> 87 00
<input type="checkbox"/> Students	<input type="checkbox"/> 22 95 (J)	<input type="checkbox"/> 27 00
<input type="checkbox"/> ASA and BSA Members	<input type="checkbox"/> 34 00	<input type="checkbox"/> 34 00

OUTSIDE USA? Please add \$9 00 for postage *Canadians, add 7% GST, plus postage*

BACK ISSUES AT 50% OFF

☐ Set of 36 available issues ☐ Individuals \$135 00 ☐ Institutions \$279 00

OUTSIDE USA? Please add 75¢ per copy for postage

☐ **Charge my** ☐ **Visa** ☐ **MasterCard** Exp date _____
Acct # _____
Signature _____
Phone (_____) _____
☐ **Check enclosed** (payable to journal)

Name _____
Address _____
City _____
State/Country _____ ZIP _____

Please mail to **The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division,**
PO Box 37005, Chicago, IL 60637 IF4XX

NOW AVAILABLE

Care of the Chronically and Severely Ill Comparative Social Policies

J Rogers Hollingsworth and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth
(both of the University of Wisconsin, Madison), editors

1994. xvi + 240 pages. References, index.

0-202-30485-X Cloth \$42.95 0-202-30486-8 Paper \$21.95

The contributors to this volume are specialists concerned with the health needs of three populations inadequately served in advanced societies: the frail elderly, the homebound with chronic illness, and the chronically mentally ill.

Japanese Auto Transplants in the Heartland Corporatism and Community

Robert Perrucci (Purdue University)

1994. Approx. 192 pages. References, index.

0-202-30528-7 Cloth \$37.95 0-202-30529-5 Paper \$18.95

Revealing the interplay between economy and society, this book examines a new form of government-business partnership called *corporatism*, and analyzes the tensions and conflicts between the corporatist project and the host communities in which these businesses reside.

Industries, Firms, and Jobs Sociological and Economic Approaches (Expanded Edition)

George Farkas (University of Texas, Dallas) and Paula England
(University of Arizona), editors

1994. xxviii + 349 pages. References, index. 0-202-30480-9 Paper \$21.95

In this expanded edition, the editors explore the links among industrial structure, segmentation, the internal structure of firms, job characteristics, technology, productivity, labor markets, and product markets.

Families in Troubled Times Adapting to Change in Rural America

Rand D. Conger (Iowa State University) and Glen H. Elder, Jr.
(University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

in collaboration with Frederick O. Lorenz, Ronald L. Simons, and Les B. Whitbeck

1994. Approx. 320 pages. References, index.

0-202-30487-6 Cloth \$46.95 0-202-30488-4 Paper \$23.95

Families in Troubled Times examines the plight of several hundred rural Midwestern families who lived through the economic decline of the 1980s, and traces the influence of economic hardship on the emotions, behaviors, and relationships of parents, children, siblings, husbands, and wives.

Prices subject to change



Aldine de Gruyter (a division of Walter de Gruyter, Inc.)

200 Saw Mill River Road · Hawthorne, NY 10532 (914) 747-0110

• P R I N C E T O N •

REGULATING THE SOCIAL

The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany

George Steinmetz

Why does the welfare state develop so unevenly across countries, regions, and localities? How are elite and popular conceptions of social reality related to welfare policies? George Steinmetz approaches these issues by exploring the complex origins and development of local and national social policies in nineteenth-century Germany.

"[This] book will meet the highest standards of both sociologists and historians. It will become the central text for discussions of the social policy complex in this period. . . ."—Geoff Eley

Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History: Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, Editors
Cloth: \$45.00 ISBN 0-691-03240-8

GAYS AND THE MILITARY

Joseph Steffan versus
the United States


Edited by Marc Wolinsky
and Kenneth Sherrill

Marc Wolinsky and Kenneth Sherrill have collected the affidavits filed on behalf of Joseph Steffan in his landmark lawsuit against the United States government, together with the counter-arguments of the Department of Defense and the extraordinary opinion of the U.S. District Court.

This unusual and innovative work addresses fundamental questions: How is sexual orientation determined? How and why have socially prejudiced stereotypes about male and female homosexuals developed? Why have gays faced special obstacles in defending themselves against discrimination? How much political power do gays have? These remarkable documents are essential reading.

All royalties from the sale of this book will be donated to the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund

Paper: \$14.95 ISBN 0-691-01944-4
Cloth: \$39.50 ISBN 0-691-03307-2



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

41 WILLIAM ST., PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • ORDERS: 609-883-1759 • OR FROM YOUR LOCAL BOOKSTORE



0002-9602(199401)99:4;1-S

AJS

American
Journal
of Sociology
Volume 99 Number 5
March 1994

*Spatial Diffusion of Swedish Trade Unions,
1890–1940——Hedström*

Why Strict Churches Are Strong——Iannaccone

Weak Ties, Employment, and Inequality——Montgomery

Cultural Form and Political Meaning——Berezin

*Institutionalized Decision Making and Prime-Time Program
Development——Bielby and Bielby*

*Unions and Labor Market Institutions in Advanced
Capitalism——Western*

The University of Chicago Press

MARTA TIENDA, Editor

IVAN ERMAKOFF, ROGER V GOULD, MARTIN RIESEBRODT, ROBERT J SAMPSON, and KAZUO YAMAGUCHI, Associate Editors

MARY C BRINTON, Associate Editor, Book Review

DAVID LINDSTROM, Assistant Book Review Editor

MARY BLAIR-LOY, GRACE KAO, CHAN-UNG PARK, and ALFORD A YOUNG, JR, Book Review Editorial Board

SUSAN ALLAN, Managing Editor

LAUREN FORD-TAGGART and CLAIR JAMES, Editorial Assistants

Consulting Editors PAUL D ALLISON • PETER BEARMAN • ROBERT J BURSİK, JR • GLENN R CARROLL • JOHN CASTERLINE • MARK CHAVES • KAREN COOK • NANCY DAVIS • NANCY DENTON • LAUREN EDELMAN • ROBERT R FAULKNER • SCOTT FELD • CLAUDE FISCHER • ROBERTO FRANZOSI • NOAH FRIEDKIN • MARK GRANOVETTER • LARRY GRIFFIN • DOUGLAS HECKATHORN • BARBARA HEYNS • FRED KNISS • GARY LAFREE • MARGARET MOONEY MARINI • J MILLER MCPHERSON • JAMES MONTGOMERY • DANIEL MONTI • JOEL PODOLNY • DUDLEY POSTON • CHARLES RAGIN • CECILIA RIDGEWAY • JOACHIM SINGELMANN • MATTHEW C SNIPP • GILLIAN STEVENS

International Consulting Editors JEAN-FRANCOIS AMADIEU (France) • NORMAN BRAUN (Switzerland) • ANDREAS DIEKMANN (Switzerland) • ULF HANNERZ (Sweden) • PETER HEDSTROM (Sweden) • JOHANNES HUININK (Germany) • NOAH LEWIN-EPSTEIN (Israel) • TOM A B SNIJDERS (The Netherlands) • HAYA STIER (Israel) • THOMAS VOSS (Germany) • JEROEN WEESIE (The Netherlands)

Editorial Board ANDREW D ABBOTT • WILLIAM G AXINN • GARY S BECKER • CHARLES E BIDWELL • DONALD J BOGUE • TERRY N CLARK • JAMES S COLEMAN • JOHN L COMAROFF • WENDY GRISWOLD • PHILIP M HAUSER • EVELYN KITAGAWA • EDWARD O LAUMANN • DONALD N LEVINE • DOUGLAS S MASSEY • WILLIAM L PARISH • MOISHE POSTONE • EDWARD SHILS • GEORGE P STEINMETZ • ROSS M STOLZENBERG • FRED L STRODTBECK • GERALD D SUTTLES • LINDA J WAITE • WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (ISSN 0002-9602) is published bimonthly in July, September, November, January, March, and May by The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, 5720 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, Illinois 60637 Subscription rates, U S A institutions, 1 year \$87 00, individuals, 1 year \$39 00 Student subscription rate, USA 1 year \$27 00 (photocopy of valid student ID must accompany subscription) ASA and BSA members, 1 year \$34 00 All other countries add \$9 00 for each year's subscription to cover postage Canadian subscribers add 7% GST Subscription agent for Japan Kinokuniya Company, Ltd Single copy rates institutions \$13 35, individuals \$6 25 Volumes 1-90 available from Schmidt Periodicals GmbH, Dettendorf, D-8201 Bad Feilnbach 2, Germany All volumes are available from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, and Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546 Subscriptions are payable in advance Subscriptions will be entered to start with the first issue to be published after receipt of order **Postmaster** Send address changes to *American Journal of Sociology*, The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P O Box 37005, Chicago, Illinois 60637

ADVERTISING space in THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY is available, as is rental of its subscriber list For information and rates, please contact the advertising sales staff, The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, 5720 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637 Advertising and list rental is limited to material of scholarly interest to our subscribers

Copying beyond Fair Use The code on the first page of an article in this journal indicates the copyright owner's consent that copies of the article may be made beyond those permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the U S Copyright Law provided that copies are made only for personal or internal use or for the personal or internal use of specific clients and provided that the copier pay the stated per-copy fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc Operations Center, 27 Congress St, Salem, Massachusetts 01970 To request permission for other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale, kindly write to Permissions Department, The University of Chicago Press, 5801 S Ellis Ave, Chicago, Illinois 60637 If no code appears on the first page of an article, permission to reprint may be obtained only from the author

Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Illinois, and at additional mailing offices

© 1994 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39 48-1984 (∞)

AJS

American Journal of Sociology

Volume 99 No 5 March 1994

CONTENTS

- 1157 Contagious Collectivities On the Spatial Diffusion of Swedish Trade Unions, 1890–1940
PETER HEDSTRÖM
- 1180 Why Strict Churches Are Strong
LAURENCE R IANNACONE
- 1212 Weak Ties, Employment, and Inequality An Equilibrium Analysis
JAMES D MONTGOMERY
- 1237 Cultural Form and Political Meaning State-subsidized Theater, Ideology, and the Language of Style in Fascist Italy
MABEL BEREZIN
- 1287 “All Hits Are Flukes” Institutionalized Decision Making and the Rhetoric of Network Prime-Time Program Development
WILLIAM T BIELBY AND DENISE D BIELBY
- 1314 Unionization and Labor Market Institutions in Advanced Capitalism, 1950–1985
BRUCE WESTERN

Book Reviews

- 1342 *American Apartheid Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* by Douglas S Massey and Nancy A Denton
LAWRENCE H FUCHS
- 1344 *Ideal Citizens The Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement* by James Max Fendrich
RONNELLE PAULSEN
- 1346 *Immigrants and the American City* by Thomas Muller
DOUGLAS S MASSEY

- 1348 *Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*
by Robert D Putnam, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y
Nanetti
MARCO MARAFFI
- 1350 *Social Order and Political Change Constitutional Governments
among the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek*
by Duane Champagne
ALFRED DARNELL
- 1352 *Social Policy in a Changing Europe*, edited by Zsuzsa Ferge and
Jon Eivind Kolberg
JILL S QUADAGNO
- 1353 *Creating Social Democracy A Century of the Social Democratic
Labor Party in Sweden*, edited by Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin,
and Klas Åmark
JOHN D STEPHENS
- 1355 *Belonging in the Two Berlins Kin, State, Nation* by John
Borneman
DANIEL S MATTERN
- 1357 *The Making of a Bourgeois State War, Politics, and Finance
during the Dutch Revolt* by Marjolein C 't Hart
BRUCE G CARRUTHERS
- 1359 *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism*, edited by Uta Gerhardt
MIKE FORREST KEEN
- 1361 *Social Movements Ideologies, Interests, and Identities* by An-
thony Oberschall
PAMELA OLIVER
- 1363 *The German-American Radical Press The Shaping of a Left Polit-
ical Culture, 1850-1940*, edited by Elliott Shore, Ken Fones-Wolf,
and James P Danky
WILLIAM S SOLOMON
- 1365 *The Future of Labour Movements*, edited by Marino Regini
ARTHUR B SHOSTAK
- 1366 *Alternatives to Lean Production Work Organization in the Swed-
ish Auto Industry* by Christian Berggren
PAUL S ADLER
- 1368 *Power in the Workplace The Politics of Production at AT&T* by
Steven Peter Vallas
RUTH MILKMAN

- 1370 *Post-Industrial Lives Roles and Relationships in the 21st Century*
by Jerald Hage and Charles H Powers
HARALD WENZEL
- 1372 *Alliance Capitalism The Social Organization of Japanese Business*
by Michael L Gerlach
GARY G HAMILTON
- 1374 *Social Mobility in Contemporary Japan Educational Credentials, Class, and the Labour Market in a Cross-National Perspective*
by Hiroshi Ishida
TAKEHIKO KARIYA
- 1376 *Re-Made in Japan Everyday Life and Consumer Taste in a Changing Society*, edited by Joseph J Tobin
JENNIFER ROBERTSON
- 1378 *Refuge of the Honored Social Organization in a Japanese Retirement Community* by Yasuhito Kinoshita and Christie W Kiefer
DIANA LYNN BETHEL
- 1380 *Making Gray Gold Narratives of Nursing Home Care* by Timothy Diamond
GUNNAR ALMGREN
- 1381 *American Stepfamilies* by William R Beer
CHANDRA MULLER
- 1383 *Gender on the Line Women, the Telephone, and Community Life*
by Lana F Rakow
DAPHNE SPAIN
- 1385 *Women in Control? The Role of Women in Law Enforcement* by Frances Heidensohn
PETER K MANNING
- 1387 *Neighborhoods and Crime The Dimensions of Effective Community Control* by Robert J Bursik, Jr , and Harold G Grasmick
RICHARD ROSENFELD
- 1389 *Crime in the Making Pathways and Turning Points through Life*
by Robert J Sampson and John H Laub
JOHN MODELL
- 1391 *Slm's Table Race, Respectability, and Masculinity* by Mitchell Duneier
PENNY EDGELL BECKER

- 1393 *Life Is Hard Machismo, Danger, and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua* by Roger N Lancaster
PAOLA PÉREZ-ALEMÁN
- 1395 *The Modern Christmas in America A Cultural History of Gift Giving* by William B Waits
MICHAEL KEARL
- 1397 *War and Television* by Bruce Cumings
LEWIS A FRIEDLAND
- 1399 *The Human Difference Animals, Computers, and the Necessity of Social Science* by Alan Wolfe
RANDALL COLLINS
- 1402 *Testing Testing Social Consequences of the Examined Life* by F Allan Hanson
STEVEN BRINT
- 1404 *What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*,
edited by Charles C Ragin and Howard S Becker
ALAN SICA
- 1405 *Hierarchical Linear Models Applications and Data Analysis Methods* by Anthony S Bryk and Stephen W Raudenbush
HENRIETTE ENGELHARDT
- 1407 *Last Chance High How Girls and Boys Drop In and Out of Alternative Schools* by Deirdre M Kelly
NILDA M FLORES-GONZALEZ
- 1409 *Land of Fair Promise Politics and Reform in Los Angeles Schools, 1885-1941* by Judith Rosenberg Raftery
AMY STUART WELLS

IN THIS ISSUE

PETER HEDSTRÖM is professor of sociology at the Department of Sociology, Stockholm University. His current research projects focus on structural aspects of organizational birth and death processes, diffusion processes in social networks, and vacancy chains in the market for conductors at symphony orchestras.

LAURENCE R. IANNACCONI is associate professor of economics at Santa Clara University. His research uses rational choice and microeconomic theory to model and interpret religious behavior.

JAMES D. MONTGOMERY is assistant professor of economics and a faculty fellow at the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University. For the 1993–94 academic year, he is also a national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is continuing to explore the relationship between social networks and economic outcomes, attempting to integrate sociological and economic conceptions of markets.

MABEL BEREZIN is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research focuses upon the reciprocal relation between cultural practices and institutions and political outcomes. She is completing a book manuscript on fascist Italy and is beginning to research the cultural dynamics behind the emergence of new political organizations in contemporary Latin Europe.

WILLIAM T. BIELBY is professor of sociology and department chair at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research interests include organizations, popular culture, gender, and quantitative methods. His current research examines social networks and careers in the television industry.

DENISE D. BIELBY is associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research interests are in the areas of gender, work, and popular culture. Her current research examines the coproduction of meaning between viewers and producers of television series. Her forthcoming book with Lee Harrington is on the subculture of soap opera fans.

BRUCE WESTERN is assistant professor in sociology and a faculty associate at the Office of Population Research at Princeton University. In addition to his work on the comparative development of labor movements, he also has research interests in political and economic developments in Eastern Europe, methods for comparative research, and issues of statistical inference in macrosociology.

Information for Contributors

Editorial Procedures: All papers deemed appropriate for the *AJS* are sent out anonymously to readers. The editors rely heavily on the judgments of those readers, although they are not bound by them. To protect anonymity, only the title should appear on the manuscript. Attach a cover page with the title of the manuscript, your name, and your affiliation. All identifying references and footnotes should appear on a separate page. Manuscripts are accepted for publication subject to the understanding that the *AJS* has the right of first publication. Submission of a manuscript to the *AJS* is taken to indicate the author's commitment to publish in this *Journal*. No paper known to be under consideration by any other journal will be reviewed by the *AJS*. In addition, the *AJS* is not a suitable vehicle for materials published elsewhere, in whole or in part. Upon publication, all rights, including subsidiary rights, are owned by the University of Chicago Press. The author retains the right to use his or her article without charge in any book of which he or she is the author or editor after it has appeared in the *Journal*.

Manuscript Acceptance Policy: While it is our policy to require the assignment of copyright on most journal articles and review essays, we do not usually request assignment of copyright for other contributions. Although the copyright to such a contribution may remain with the author, it is understood that, in return for publication, the *Journal* has the nonexclusive right to publish the contribution and the continuing right, without limit, to include the contribution as part of any reprinting of the issue and/or volume of the *Journal* in which the contribution first appeared by any means and in any format, including computer-assisted storage and readout, in which the issue and/or volume may be reproduced by the publisher or by its licensed agencies.

Preparation of Copy

1 Type *all* copy—including indented matter, footnotes, tables, and references—*double spaced*, allowing generous margins at the top, bottom, and sides of page. Please do not break words at ends of lines or justify right-hand margins. Do not use proportional spacing fonts. Indicate italics by underlining only. Number all footnotes, beginning with the acknowledgment note as number 1. *Provide a word count on the cover page of the manuscript.*

2 Begin each table on a separate page. Refer to each table in numerical order in the text. Tables should not contain vertical lines or more than 20 two-digit columns or the equivalent.

3 Clarify all mathematical symbols (e.g., Greek letters) with words in the margins of the manuscript.

4 Original or glossy prints of professionally drawn figures will be required if manuscript is accepted.

5 Include a brief abstract (not more than 100 words) summarizing the findings.

6 Submit *five copies* of the manuscript and abstract, on white paper. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 5835 South Kimbark, Chicago, Illinois 60637. *Manuscripts are not returned to authors.* Enclose a self-addressed stamped postcard to obtain acknowledgment of manuscript receipt. No other acknowledgment will be sent.

7 Each article submitted to the *AJS* must be accompanied by a check or money order for \$15.00, payable to The University of Chicago Press in U.S.

currency or its equivalent. Papers will not be reviewed until this fee has been paid. The submission fee will be waived for papers solely by student authors. Submissions from students must be accompanied by a faculty member's certification of their student status. Citizens of countries with restrictions on the export of U S dollars may request waiver of the submission fee.

Format of References in Text: All references to monographs, articles, and statistical sources are to be identified at the appropriate point in the text by last name of author, year of publication, and pagination where appropriate, all within parentheses. Footnotes are to be used only for substantive observations. Specify subsequent citations of the same source in the same way as the first one, do not use "ibid," "op cit," or "loc cit."

1 When author's name is in the text: Duncan (1959). When author's name is not in text: (Gouldner 1963).

2 Pagination follows year of publication: (Lipset 1964, pp 61-65).

3 For more than three authors, use "et al." For institutional authorship, supply minimum identification from the beginning of the complete citation: (U S Bureau of the Census 1963, p 117).

4 With more than one reference to an author in the same year, distinguish them by use of letters (*a*, *b*) attached to the year of publication: (1965*a*).

5 Enclose a series of references with a single pair of parentheses, separated by semicolons: (Duncan 1959, Gouldner 1963, Lipset 1964, pp 61-65).

6 Format for references to machine-readable data files is

Davis, James Allan. 1978. NORC ed. Chicago NORC. Distributed by Roper Public Opinion Research Center, New Haven, Conn.

Format of References: List all items, including machine-readable data files (MRDF), alphabetically by author (providing the full list of multiple authors) and, within author(s), by year of publication, in an appendix titled "REFERENCES." For examples, see text of articles in this issue.

(Rev 1/93)

Contagious Collectivities: On the Spatial Diffusion of Swedish Trade Unions, 1890–1940¹

Peter Hedstrom
Stockholm University

This article analyzes how distances and relations between actors are likely to influence the growth and spread of social movements. A formal theoretical model is developed that extends previous work on threshold models of collective behavior. Spatial distribution of a population influences the networks that are likely to emerge within the population, these networks, in turn, will influence the likely outcome of a mobilization effort. Key theoretical predictions are tested using data on the founding of local union organizations in Sweden, 1890–1940. The empirical analyses show that contagious spatial processes were of considerable importance for the growth of the Swedish union movement, thus supporting the theoretical argument. The analyses presented in the article provide an alternative interpretation of density-dependent founding rates to the one offered by organizational ecologists.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout most of this century, the population of collective actors—trade unions, political interest groups, and other forms of associations—has grown in size as well as in importance. Partly as a reflection of this, a considerable scholarly interest has been devoted to understanding the dynamics of collective action. Basically, the theories being developed have tried to answer two fundamental and interrelated questions (1) Why

¹ This research has been supported in part by grants from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and the Social Sciences and the Swedish Work Environment Fund. I wish to thank Olof Dahlback, Barbara Hobson, Carl Gunnar Janson, Irene Wennemo, and the *AJS* reviewers for valuable comments and Camilla Fjellstrom for excellent research assistance. The primary data on Swedish popular movements was collected by Carl Goran Andrae and Sven Lundkvist at the Department of History, Uppsala University, and made available to me by the Swedish Social Science Data Service at Goteborg University. Correspondence may be addressed to Peter Hedstrom, Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, SOFI S-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden.

do individuals form and join groups for collective action? (2) Under what circumstances is collective action most likely to emerge?

These two questions have proven to be extremely elusive and difficult to answer, and a great number of often contradictory theoretical accounts have been proposed. In addition, the types of theories being advanced have changed systematically over the years. In the past, most theories of collective action emphasized the importance of irrationality on the part of individuals and sought to identify various forms of "social strains" likely to trigger collective action (see Smelser 1962, Turner and Killian 1957). The microfoundations of these theories of collective action were provided by psychological perspectives that assumed that individual action was usually explained by causal factors of which the individuals themselves were unaware. "These otherwise diverse approaches had in common the assumption that individual behavior is nearly always guided in part by motives of which the actor is unaware, so that the means which an actor selects are seldom entirely appropriate to his or her conscious goals" (Turner 1991, p. 93). These conceptions of humans as being inherently irrational or arational are rather distinct from those employed in most contemporary theories of collective action, which tend to emphasize the importance of conscious actors carefully weighing the costs and benefits of various courses of action.

The single most important work for bringing about this paradigmatic shift in the analysis undoubtedly was Mancur Olson's (1965) analysis of the logic of collective action. Using standard microeconomic theory to analyze individuals' decisions whether or not to join an organization for collective action, Olson arrived at results that went against the grain of much of the received wisdom of sociologists and political scientists. Within sociology and political science it was generally assumed that once a group of individuals had become aware of their common interests, they would act on these; workers were assumed to form unions to increase their pay, and citizen groups with common interests were assumed to form political parties or lobbying groups (see Dahl 1961). A failure to do so would usually be interpreted either as a sign of irrational beliefs (that the individuals were unaware of their "true" interests) or as a sign of irrational behavior (that the individuals did not realize that forming a group for collective action was the appropriate course of action to satisfy their interests). But rational individuals aware of their "true" interests always were expected to form or join collective movements. Olson's results showed that this conclusion rarely holds true, rather one should expect rational workers not to join unions and rational citizens not to join political parties.

At the core of Olson's argument was the observation that in all but the smallest of groups, a particular individual's contribution will rarely

make a difference. Therefore, in most circumstances the beneficial consequences of joining a union, a political party, or any other type of organization providing a public good, are unlikely to offset the costs of participation, and hence one should expect rational beings to be "free riders." When individuals participate in these types of organizations, Olson argued, it cannot be explained by the public goods that constitute the organizations' official *raison d'être*, but must be explained by various forms of "selective incentives" provided by the organizations, such as the unemployment insurance offered by many European trade unions.

Despite its scholarly impact, Olson's theory is wanting in several respects. From a sociological point of view, one of the most important shortcomings of Olson's theory is that it neglects network structures, which tend to make individuals' decisions interdependent. Even though game-theoretic representations of Olson's argument, such as Hardin's (1982), imply certain forms of interdependencies between the actors in that the choice of each actor is influenced by the anticipated choices of all other actors, the social structure in which the process is assumed to unfold is rather innocuous. Previous theoretical and empirical work indicates that the social networks in which actors are embedded are likely to be of considerable explanatory importance, both because movement participants are often recruited through preexisting social ties and because information about the movement, its costs and benefits, often are spread through interpersonal contacts (see Snow, Zurcher, and Ekeland-Olson 1980, McAdam 1988, Marwell, Oliver, and Pahl 1988, Gould 1991).

The theoretical analysis in this article focuses on how the density of network ties in a population is likely to influence the growth and spread of social movements. I use data on the Swedish trade union movement to partially test the theoretical predictions because these data permit more detailed analyses of the contagiousness of collective action than has been possible in the past.

THRESHOLDS AND OTHER INTERDEPENDENCIES

A common assumption in most sociological theory is that an individual's behavior is influenced not only by the *anticipated* future behavior of other individuals, as assumed in the economic approach of Mancur Olson and other public choice theorists, but also by the *actual* past behavior of other individuals. Theorists as diverse as Gabriel Tarde (1903) and Robert Merton (1968) have agreed that individual behavior is shaped in part by the past behavior of others, although the mechanisms they used for explaining these interdependencies, of course, differed.

In a series of important articles, Mark Granovetter has formalized some of these ideas about actor interdependencies and applied them to

the problem of collective action (see esp Granovetter 1978, Granovetter and Soong 1983) Granovetter argued that an individual's decision to join a social movement is based on a comparison of the costs and benefits of participation and nonparticipation and that these depend in part on how many other actors already have decided to participate Granovetter argued that actors differ in terms of the number of other actors who must have already joined the movement before they decide to do the same, and he introduced the concept of "threshold" to describe this individual heterogeneity His analyses showed that even slight differences in the distribution of thresholds in a population can produce vastly different outcomes of a mobilization process

Granovetter's threshold model is of considerable importance for the analysis of collective action because it highlights an important explanatory mechanism and because it clearly demonstrates how personal interdependencies can affect the outcome of a mobilization process² However, a limitation of his model is that it does not allow for analyses of how the structure of interpersonal ties among the actors are likely to affect the outcome Rather than assuming that an actor's decision to join a social movement has the same effect on all other actors in the social system, as his theory implicitly maintains, it seems more realistic and potentially more fruitful to assume that the flow of influence is restricted and channeled through preexisting social networks linking the actors in the system³

The idea of a preexisting social network being the carrier of interpersonal influences has been most fully developed in the literature on diffusion processes (see Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1966, Brown 1981, Rogers 1983, Burt 1987) One of the earliest and best-known exponents of this tradition is Torsten Hagerstrand, who analyzed the spatial diffusion of agricultural innovations in Sweden (see Hagerstrand [1953] 1967, 1965) Hagerstrand found that those who adopted the innovation tended to be the neighbors of previous adopters From this finding he inferred that the spread of an innovation is most likely the result of an individual communication process, and in order to understand how this process

² Ideas similar to these also are at the core of Thomas Schelling's tipping model (Schelling 1971, 1978) and Pamela Oliver and Gerald Marwell's theory of the critical mass (see Marwell and Oliver 1993) Also, Jon Elster now advocates a similar type of explanation of collective action (see Elster 1989, pp 186-214)

³ It should be pointed out that, in their 1988 article in *Sociological Methodology*, Granovetter and Soong presented an extension of the original threshold model that allowed them to introduce a slightly more differentiated social structure two separate groups were allowed for and members of each group were assumed to weight the behavior of other individuals differently depending on which group they originated from

unfolds, Hagerstrand argued, it is crucial to consider the channels through which information flows

Hagerstrand argued that information primarily flows through "networks of social communication," which are composed of senders and receivers of information. According to Hagerstrand, variations in the characteristics of these networks are crucial factors that explain the variation in observed diffusion patterns, because the structure of the networks influences both the speed at which the innovation diffuses through a population and the proportion of the population that eventually adopts the innovation. He further argued that the structure of a particular network is, to a large extent, the outcome of various social and geographical barriers impeding the establishment of interpersonal contacts. He particularly emphasized the importance of the geographic distance between potential communicators.

Hagerstrand's hypothesis, which observed that social networks in part reflect actors' spatial locations, has also been supported by various research on friendship formation in informal groups. For example, in their classic study of the Westgate housing community at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1959) found that the probability of a friendship tie being formed was closely related to the geographic distance between the individuals. An important reason for the role of the spatial factor in the formation of social networks is that the greater the distance between two actors, the greater "the intervening opportunities" (Stouffer 1940) to find other actors to associate with. Also, the cost dimension is of importance in this context since travel or collecting information at a distance always carries a cost in terms of time, effort, or money (Zipf 1949, Boalt and Janson 1957). For these reasons, the spatial distribution of a population is likely to influence the web of social ties linking the actors in the system, and the structure of this network, in turn, will be consequential for the outcome of a mobilization effort.

SPATIAL DIMENSIONS, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

The theoretical model to be developed here incorporates important elements of both the threshold-type model advocated by Granovetter and the spatial diffusion model proposed by Hagerstrand.⁴ Actors' decisions on whether or not to join a collective movement are assumed to be partly influenced by factors unique to each actor and partly by the actions of

⁴ See Spilerman (1971, 1976), Hamblin, Jacobson, and Miller (1973), and Olzak (1992) for alternative approaches to analyzing the contagiousness of collective action.

other actors in the social system. More specifically, I assume that actors' choices can be described by the following logistic equation:⁵

$$\ln\left(\frac{p_{it}}{1 - p_{it}}\right) = L_{it} = a + \sum \gamma_k x_{ik} + \sum \beta_j q_{j,t-1},$$

where

p_{it} = actor i 's probability of joining the collective movement at time t ,

L_{it} = actor i 's logit of joining the collective movement at time t ,

x_{ik} = actor i 's value on the k th factor likely to influence the actor's propensity (logit) of joining the collective movement,

γ_k = the change in i 's propensity of joining the collective movement resulting from a unit change in the k th explanatory factor,

β_j = the change in i 's propensity of joining resulting from actor j deciding to join the collective movement,

$$q_{j,t-1} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if actor } j \text{ participated at } t - 1, \\ 0 & \text{if actor } j \text{ did not participate at } t - 1 \end{cases}$$

In order to highlight how the spatial dimension is likely to influence the mobilization process, one can simplify the above expression by collecting all individually specific factors into a single factor, that is, by assuming that $a_i = a + \sum \gamma_k x_{ik}$.⁶ Then one gets

$$L_{it} = a_i + \sum \beta_j q_{j,t-1}$$

The spatial and social network dimension can now be introduced into the model by assuming that actors are influenced only by the behavior

⁵ The present formulation assumes that the decision to join an organization for collective action resembles the decision whether or not to buy a private good. Even though casual empiricism suggests that people often act as if organizations for collective action provided private and not public goods, it would have been more theoretically satisfactory also to model how actors' choices are influenced by their contribution to the likelihood of the public good being offered. But this simplified model suffices for illustrating the consequences of spatially generated interdependencies.

⁶ It would be descriptively more accurate to assume that the a_i 's are also time varying since the actors' values on most of the relevant x factors are likely to vary across time. This would not pose any difficulties for the formal analysis, but it would add additional complexity without generating any new insights into the spatial process being analyzed. Therefore I decided not to introduce this additional complexity into the analysis at this stage. However, in the empirical analyses below this heterogeneity is allowed for.

of those actors whose existence they are aware of and that the probability of two actors being aware of each other is a decaying function of the distance between them

$$L_{it} = a_i + \sum \beta \pi_{ij} q_{j,t-1} = a_i + \beta \sum \pi_{ij} q_{j,t-1}, \quad (1)$$

where

- β = the change in actor i 's propensity to join resulting from contact with someone who has already joined,
- π_{ij} = the probability of contact between actor i and actor j , assumed to be a decaying function of the distance between them

Thus I assume that actor i 's propensity for joining an organization for collective action is in part a function of factors describing the actor (collected in the a_i term) and in part a function of the behavior of other actors in the social system. Some actors are likely to exert more influence on i 's behavior than others, the "closer" two actors are to one another, the more likely they are to be aware of and to influence each other's behavior.⁷

The assumption that an actor's propensity to join a movement depends in part upon the number of other actors participating is crucial for the argument presented here. As mentioned above, one important reason for this type of behavior is that the net benefit to be gained from participation partly depends on the number of other actors participating in the movement (see Granovetter 1978). However, this type of behavior also can be expected for an entirely different reason: prior decisions of other actors provide *information* about the likely costs and benefits of participation. Particularly before a social movement has become established (the type of situation I will consider below), the choice situation tends to be highly ambiguous, and the likely benefits of joining the movement are difficult to predict. In ambiguous situations like these, actors can at best arrive at informed guesses about the likely effects of joining the movement, guesses which are influenced by the available information. Because of their actual participation in the movement, actors inside a movement often have access to privileged information that is unavailable to those outside the movement. Insiders' decisions about whether or not to remain

⁷ The above model is a parameterized threshold model in which a_i corresponds to the threshold parameter. The higher it is, the fewer the number of other actors in the system who must have joined the movement before the decision-making actor decides to do the same. The value of a_i , in turn, is assumed to be a linear function of various factors characterizing the actor and his or her environment.

within the movement therefore provide valuable signals to the outsiders about the actual benefits of participation.⁸ In this type of situation, often the best strategy (even for exclusively forward-looking actors) is to base one's own decisions on the number of other individuals who have decided to remain within the movement.

To examine how the mobilization process is likely to unfold at the macro level given these micro-behavioral assumptions, I will simulate the model shown in equation (1). I will assume the existence of a set of 100 actors who are distributed in a two-dimensional (geographic or social) space. The space is conceived of as a flat surface and to each point in the surface corresponds a unique combination of X and Y coordinates. By knowing the actors' coordinates, one can describe their exact locations and calculate the distances between them. I measure the distance between a pair of actors (d_{ij}) as the straight-line distance, and I assume that the probability of contact between two actors (π_{ij}) declines with increasing distance:

$$\pi_{ij} = d_{ij}^{-1} \quad (2)$$

Each actor is randomly assigned X and Y coordinates from a uniform probability distribution (with a range of 0–100). The individually specific factors (the a_i 's in eq. [1]), which represent the total effect of all relevant factors describing the actor, are randomly assigned from a normal distribution with a mean of -1.5 and a standard deviation of 1.0 .⁹ The general influence parameter β , which describes how an actor's propensity to join changes when someone else decides to join, is set equal to 0.11 .

Figure 1 shows how the 100 actors are distributed in the two-dimensional space and how the mobilization process unfolds given the assumptions stated above. The dots represent the actors and the circles highlight the actors who have joined the collective movement at a particular point in time. As can be seen from the figure, eight actors join at time 1. They are the actors with a_i 's greater than zero.¹⁰ At time 3, four

⁸ See Banerjee (1992) for a discussion of the general logic and implication of this sort of behavior.

⁹ The reason for selecting this particular distribution is that I wish to guarantee that a few but not too many actors have an initial probability of joining, which leads them to join the organization at time 1 and thus ignites the mobilization process.

¹⁰ In order to simplify the analysis, the simulation is built upon the assumption that actors decide to join the movement when their logits exceed zero, i.e., when their probabilities exceed 0.5. An alternative specification would have been to base the decision on a comparison of the individual logit and a random number drawn from a uniform-probability distribution. Although the alternative specification is slightly more theoretically appealing, I decided against it since it would introduce complexity without producing any additional qualitative insights into the process being studied.




FIG 1 —Spatial diffusion of collective action organizations simulation results

additional actors have decided to join the movement, most of them are located nearby those who joined at time 1. The contagious process continues, first rather slowly and then more rapidly, until it reaches the equilibrium state of 92 participating actors at time 16.

How the participation rate develops through time can be seen more clearly from the rightmost graph in figure 2 (original space). The time trajectory has the typical S-shaped form that characterizes most contagious processes. In the early phases of the process, the rate of growth is rather slow. Then it rapidly increases until it approaches its saturation point and levels out.

In figure 2 one can also see what effects the size of the diffusion space and the corresponding network density are likely to have on a mobilization process. The size of the diffusion space is important because it influences the density of social ties in the population. The more tightly packed the population is in a particular region of the (social or) geographic landscape, the greater the density of social ties is likely to be, and the faster and more extensively information about the movement is likely to diffuse.

As mentioned above, the simulation process reached its equilibrium rate of 92% during time 16. If we shrink the diffusion space to 90% of its original size but leave everything else—including the actors' relative positions within the space—the same, figure 2 shows that the same




FIG. 2 —Speed of the diffusion process and size of the diffusion space ○ = original space, △ = 90% of original space, □ = 75% of original space, — = 50% of original space

rate would be reached five time periods earlier¹¹ Further reducing the space to 75% of its original size produces an additional increase in the density of social ties and therefore accelerates the process even further, an equilibrium of 97% is reached during time 9 And shrinking the space to half its original size results in an equilibrium rate of 100% reached during time 6

These insights into the role of spatial factors in explaining the dynamics of mobilization processes were arrived at by extending Granovetter's threshold model and relaxing his assumption of homogeneous interpersonal influences Making a more "realistic" model with a more tangible social structure also carries a cost, however the model becomes considerably more difficult to analyze While Granovetter was able analytically to derive how equilibrium outcomes depend upon the frequency distribution of thresholds, I had to settle for numerical simulations But even though the *particular outcome* of a simulation depends a great deal on how the initial participation propensities are distributed in space, experi-

¹¹ Technically, this shrinking of the diffusion space is accomplished by simply multiplying the original X and Y coordinates with .90 and then running the simulation again




FIG 3 —Sampling distributions of equilibrium rates and times to reach equilibrium rates based on Monte Carlo simulations Clockwise, from upper left-hand corner equilibrium time, original space, equilibrium time, 75 % of original space, equilibrium rate, 75 % of original space, equilibrium rate, original space

ments with different initial distributions have shown that the *general character* of the outcome is much more robust and in line with the results reported above This clearly can be seen from the empirically derived sampling distributions, summarized by the box plots in figure 3

As expected, a comparison of the box plots for original space and shrunken space reveals that the size of the diffusion space and the corresponding network density considerably influence the outcome of the mobilization process The median equilibrium rate initially was 14% When the space is reduced to 75% of its original size, the median equilibrium rate increases to 98% The speed of the mobilization process also is considerably influenced by the spatial factor In original space it takes almost as long to organize one-seventh of the population as it takes to organize virtually the entire population in shrunken space These analyses therefore underscore the potential importance of spatial and social network factors for the growth of social movements, both the speed of the mobilization process and the success of the movement in organizing the relevant population are likely to be influenced by the spatial distribution of the population

SPATIAL ASPECTS OF SWEDISH UNION GROWTH

Data and Methods

How can the ideas developed above be tested empirically? A decisive test would require not only relevant longitudinal data on individuals but also information on these individuals' relationships to all other individuals in the relevant population at different points in time. If this type of data is at all possible to collect, it definitely is not currently available. Hence, other strategies must be used. Instead of individual-level data, I will use data describing the formation of trade union organizations in different geographical areas. This approach allows for a reasonably reliable test of the key hypothesis developed above concerning the contagiousness of collective action.

I will analyze the spatial diffusion of Swedish trade unions during the period 1890 to 1940. The data being used have some rather unique features. Most important, they contain more or less every local union organization that existed during this time period. A total of 16,911 local union associations (*lokalavdelningar*) are included in the data file, and for each association I have information about the association's name, its geographic location, and the number of members at the end of each year from its "birth" to 1940 (or to its "death" if it occurred before 1940).

The unit of analysis to be used here is a jurisdictional district called *harad*. A total of 371 such districts exist, and for each district I have recorded the number of associations and the number of members for each year during the period 1890 to 1940. In addition, the area of the districts and the coordinates describing the centers of the districts have been calculated and included in the data base. From the population censuses of 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 I have collected demographic data describing the districts. The census data include information on population size and size of the industrial workforce. The demographic composition of the districts for the years between the census years have been approximated using linear interpolation.

At the turn of the century, social movement activity was extremely high in Sweden. In addition to the emerging labor movement, the temperance movement and the dissenting free church movement (*frikyrkorelsen*) organized large segments of the Swedish population.¹² Earlier research has indicated that the strength of these movements in various ways influenced the growth of the trade union movement (cf. Lundkvist 1977). In order to control for these influences, I have included data

¹² The temperance movement was dominated by the International Order of Good Templars (IOGT), the largest free churches were the Baptist church and the Swedish Covenant church.

on membership in various temperance and religious movements in the districts

As suggested by Strang (1991), event history methods provide a natural framework for analyzing diffusion processes. In contrast to standard diffusion models (such as those discussed in Mahajan and Peterson [1985]), I will not model the population-level process as such. Instead I will model lower-level processes operating on a district level, the population-level outcome simply is the combination of results of these lower-level processes. I will focus on the time at which the first union association was formed within a district and examine how the timing of this event was related to covariates describing the districts and the actions taking place in other districts. Since the events being analyzed are recorded on an annual basis only, a discrete-time event history approach is appropriate (see Allison 1982). Thus, I will estimate the parameters of the following type of model

$$\ln\left(\frac{p_{it}}{1 - p_{it}}\right) = a_t + \sum \gamma_k x_{ikt} + \beta Y_{i,t-1}^*, \quad (3)$$

where

- p_{it} = the hazard rate, or the conditional probability that the first association in district i will be formed at time t given that no association had been formed in the district prior to time t ,
- x_{ikt} = district i 's values at time t on the k factors likely to influence the likelihood of an association being formed,
- $Y_{i,t-1}^*$ = a weighted sum of the number of union members in other districts during the previous year,

and a_t , γ_k , and β are logistic regression coefficients to be estimated. The intercept of the equation (a_t) will be allowed to vary over time since it is likely that the propensity to form associations changed independently of changes in the covariates.

Following the work of Land, Deane, and Blau (1991), a variable (Y^*) has been included to examine the extent to which union activities in other districts influenced the formation of associations in district i . It has been measured in the following way

$$Y_{it}^* = \sum \pi_{ij} n_{jt},$$

where π_{ij} is the measure of inverted distance as defined in equation (2) and n_{jt} is equal to the number of union members in district j at time t . "Distance" here refers to the straight-line distance in kilometers between the centers of two districts. Thus, Y_{it}^* is equal to a weighted sum of the

number of union members in other districts at time t , where the weight is equal to the inverted distance between districts i and j ¹³

The parameter β in equation (3) measures how closely related the probability of forming an association in one district is to the (weighted) number of union members in other districts. If β is significantly different from zero, a diffusion process is likely to be operating (see Doreian 1980).

Before the parameters of the model are estimated the units must be changed from districts to "district-years" (Allison 1982). Each district contributes as many observations as the number of years it has been at risk. For example, a district that had its first association formed in 1890 will contribute only one observation, while a district where the first association was formed in 1900 will contribute eleven observations. Of the set of 371 districts, unions had been formed in 39 districts before 1890. Since no information is available on the demographic composition of these districts, they were excluded from the analysis. The remaining 332 districts contributed a total of 5,884 district-years.

Results

Figure 4 shows how the Swedish landscape was unionized, a certain center-periphery pattern can be discerned. In 1890 unions mainly could be found in urban areas (*stader*). Of the 39 districts with unions, 38 were in urban areas. In 1905 unions existed in approximately half of the districts and had spread to more rural areas as well. Of the 188 districts with unions about one-fourth were in urban areas. In 1940, the end of our study period, unions existed in basically every jurisdictional district, only seven districts were "nonunionized."

In 1937, an American newsreel anxiously reported that the United Auto Workers union was "spreading like the measles" (WGBH 1992). Table 1, which contains the parameter estimates of a set of logit equations, suggests that the diffusion of the Swedish union movement also resembled the spread of a contagious disease.

The first logit model in table 1 relates union foundings to a set of covariates that describe various demographic characteristics of the districts and the extent of movement activity in other districts. The first set of variables are time dummies, however, included in order to examine how the hazard rate changed over time.¹⁴ The parameter estimates asso-

¹³ In the analyses reported below the weight being used is $d_{ij}^{-0.5}$ and not d_{ij}^{-1} . I did not have any a priori reason to choose one over the other, and the former weight turned out to fit the data somewhat better than the latter weight.

¹⁴ The periodization used has been proposed by the Swedish labor historian Klas Åmark (1986) as being pivotal periods in the history of the Swedish union movement.




FIG 4—Timing of union foundings in Swedish jurisdictional districts, 1890-1940

TABLE 1
ESTIMATES FOR LOGIT MODELS PREDICTING THE FORMATION OF TRADE UNIONS IN SWEDISH JURISDICTIONAL DISTRICTS, 1890-1940

VARIABLES	MODEL			
	1	2	3	4
Intercept	-14 485 (-17 159)	-13 737 (-15 493)	-10 620 (-16 187)	-13 584 (-13 592)
$a_{1907-10}$	- 147 (- 671)	- 503 (-1 916)	- 1 158 (-4 012)	- 566 (-1 735)
$a_{1911-20}$	- 445 (-2 041)	- 876 (-3 020)	- 1 425 (-4 813)	- 866 (-2 631)
$a_{1921-23}$	- 751 (-1 754)	-1 878 (-3 015)	-2 116 (-3 103)	-1 498 (-2 153)
$a_{1924-29}$	- 420 (-1 176)	-1 862 (-2 717)	-1 589 (-1 826)	-1 254 (-1 446)
$a_{1930-33}$	- 171 (- 303)	-2 262 (-2 223)	- 616 (- 470)	-1 001 (- 762)
$a_{1934-40}$	-3 047 (-2 794)	-6 024 (-3 623)	-1 771 (- 806)	-3 731 (-1 556)
Size of industrial labor force _{<i>t</i>} (log)	779 (9 538)	780 (9 507)	813 (9 818)	792 (9 598)
Urban area _{<i>t</i>}	1 604 (8 524)	1 590 (8 416)	1 579 (8 388)	1 609 (8 516)

Size of district _{<i>t</i>}	005 (1 645)	004 (1 387)	000 (350)	004 (1 311)
No of members in IOGT (temperance) _{<i>t-1</i>}	001 (3 870)	001 (3 932)	001 (3 573)	001 (3 788)
No of members in Verdandi (temperance) _{<i>t-1</i>}	013 (2 568)	013 (2 625)	011 (2 170)	012 (2 436)
No of members in Blue Ribbon (temperance) _{<i>t-1</i>}	- 000 (- 364)	- 000 (- 208)	- 000 (- 065)	- 000 (- 351)
No of members in NTO (temperance) _{<i>t-1</i>}	- 005 (- 2 280)	- 004 (- 2 046)	- 005 (- 2 363)	- 005 (- 2 280)
No of members in Baptist church _{<i>t-1</i>}	- 000 (- 1 094)	- 000 (- 1 148)	- 000 (- 1 163)	- 000 (- 1 095)
No of members in other free church organizations _{<i>t-1</i>}	001 (3 145)	001 (2 992)	001 (2 642)	001 (3 086)
Y_{t-1}^* (log)	723 (10 803)	598 (7 281)	540 (4 075)	
No of union members in Sweden _{<i>t-1</i>} /1,000		004 (2 481)		
Union density _{<i>t-1</i>}			002 (9 933)	001 (1 401)
Union density _{<i>t-1</i>} ² /10,000			- 003 (- 4 373)	- 001 (- 697)
- 2 LLR	394 57	400 59	380 56	397 50

NOTE —Numbers in parentheses are *t*-values *N* = 5,884

ciated with these time dummies suggest that, net of changes in the other independent variables, the founding rate *decreased* gradually throughout the period (this time trend can be seen more clearly in the best-fitting second model). Most likely this result should not be interpreted as the effect of a gradual worsening of the union climate in Sweden but is more likely the result of unobserved heterogeneity, that is, that the districts that unionized late differed from those that unionized early in more relevant respects than those captured by this model. The results in table 1 also suggest that unions were more likely to be established in districts with large industrial labor forces and in urban areas.¹⁵

As mentioned above, I include covariates describing the strength of various temperance and religious movements because previous research suggests that these movements in various ways influenced the growth of the trade union movement. The results in table 1 indicate that the influence of the temperance movement was rather mixed. The number of IOGT and Verdandi members in a district increased the likelihood of a trade union being formed during the following year, while the other temperance organizations (Nationaltemplarorden [NTO] and to some extent also Blue Ribbon) appear rather to have delayed the spread of the union movement.¹⁶

The free churches also influenced the spread of the union movement. While the strength of the Baptist church in a district had virtually no effect on the likelihood of a union being formed, the other free churches—the Covenant church, the Methodist church, and the Salvation Army—appear to have facilitated the spread of the union movement; the stronger these churches were in a district, the more likely it was that a trade union would be formed during the following year.

The most important result for this discussion concerns the effect of the Y^* variable, which tests for the presence of spatial diffusion effects. The parameter estimate associated with this variable is highly significant, which suggests that the probability of a trade union being formed in a district was considerably influenced by union activities in other districts. If the t -values are used as indicators of the relative importance of the independent variables—as suggested by Allison (1982)—then the diffusion variable appears to have been one of the most important. According to model 1, union activities in other districts appear to have been even

¹⁵ The statistically insignificant size-of-district variable is measured in millions of hectares.

¹⁶ Verdandi is a temperance organization closely affiliated with the Swedish labor movement.

more important for union formation than the size of the district's own industrial labor force¹⁷

However, when interpreting these results it is important to keep in mind that the Y^* variable is equal to a weighted sum of the number of union members in other districts in which the weights are based on the geographic distances between the districts. Given the way in which this variable is constructed, it is conceivable that the effect of the Y^* variable mainly reflects the total number of union members in the country and that the spatial dimension is of little or no importance. In order to examine whether or not this is the case, the second model in table 1 includes an additional covariate: the total number of union members in Sweden during the preceding year. If the Y^* variable remains significant even after controlling for total membership, our confidence in the initial results is strengthened considerably. As can be seen from the table, the Y^* variable has a unique significant effect even when controlling for total union membership, thus underscoring the importance of the spatial dimension.

An important alternative approach to analyzing the growth and spread of union movements is offered by organizational ecologists. The core ecological argument states that the rate at which new organizations are founded is governed by how legitimate the organizational form is and the extent of competition among the organizations; legitimation is assumed to increase the founding rate while competition is assumed to decrease it. The extent of competition and legitimation in turn is assumed to vary systematically with density, that is, with the number of organizations in the population. Higher density is associated with higher competition and more legitimate organizational forms (see Hannan and Freeman 1989, Hannan and Carroll 1992).

The third and fourth models in table 1 are included to test the relative explanatory power of the ecological and the diffusion arguments. In the third model the Y^* variable is replaced with density variables. As can be seen, the nonmonotonic relationship found in so many ecological analyses is also found here; the coefficient associated with the main term is positive and the coefficient associated with the squared term is negative. However, when the Y^* variable is reentered into the analysis (as in model

¹⁷ I should point out that the spatial diffusion effects reported in table 1 may be somewhat inflated because I am confined to using administratively determined districts as the units of analyses. It is likely that these districts do not perfectly overlap with whatever units may be preferred on theoretical grounds, and this could result in a spatial autocorrelation without much substantive interest that would be absorbed in the diffusion terms.

4), the effect of the density variable virtually disappears while the Y^* variable remains highly significant. This result therefore gives further weight to the results reported above concerning the contagiousness of collective action.

On the basis of the theoretical analysis one should expect that the spread of information through the social or geographic landscape was of decisive importance for the formation of trade unions. These theoretical expectations are reinforced by the empirical results, which strongly suggest that the spread of the Swedish union movement was caused by a combination of local factors operating within districts and a contagious process operating between districts.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

With his analysis of the logic of collective action, Mancur Olson transformed the study of collective action. He highlighted the importance of a range of issues largely ignored by previous scholars, and he identified conditions under which rational actors are likely to act collectively. But in doing this he assumed the existence of atomized actors and thereby ignored one of the most central questions of sociology: How is individual action induced and constrained by social structure?

In this article I developed a theoretical model built upon the assumption that an individual's decision to join a social movement is influenced not only by the actor's own situation but also by the behavior of other actors included in the decision maker's immediate social network. The model predicted that mobilization processes are highly contagious. This prediction was tested using data on the founding of local union associations in Sweden during the period 1890–1940. The results of the empirical analyses revealed significant contagion effects, thus supporting the theoretical model.

The theoretical and empirical analyses presented in this article thus underscore how important it is to consider and theorize the social structure in which individual actors are embedded. I have shown that spatial properties and network densities are likely to influence considerably both the speed of a mobilization process and the success of a movement in organizing the relevant population. But much more work is needed along these lines.

The main reason for considering the role of space in the formation of organizations for collective action is that previous research suggests that social networks, to a large extent, are shaped by actors' spatial locations, and that the structure of these networks are important for explaining the emergence of social movements. This hypothesized correspondence

between geographic and social space is a reasonable approximation. But, if data were available, the precision in the empirical analysis undoubtedly would be enhanced by considering the actual web of contacts among the actors as well as alternative measures of distance based on social rather than geographic proximity.

Theoretically, more thought also needs to be given to the role of network structure in diffusing information about social movements. As suggested by Gould (1991), much more analytical work is needed on the role of multiplex networks, particularly on how multiple, overlapping networks of varying density and reach are likely to influence the diffusion of information and the outcomes of mobilization processes.

The analyses presented in this article seek to advance the sociological analysis of social movements, but some results are also of importance for the analysis of organizational dynamics more generally. Organizational ecologists have produced numerous studies of organizational foundings, focusing particularly on how the founding rates respond to changing density. Ecologists assume that the main mechanism accounting for the relationship between density and founding rates is the competition-legitimation theory briefly referred to above. This theoretical account seems plausible, but organizational ecologists have not presented any independent empirical proof for the role of legitimation and competition in accounting for these relationships. In this article I adopted a different theoretical approach that emphasized the importance of social networks and individual decision making. I argued that an actor deciding whether or not to start a new type of organization usually faces a highly ambiguous situation. In such situations, important information about the likely costs and benefits of founding an organization is provided by earlier decisions of other actors included in the actor's network. The type of network that would be important is likely to vary with the type of organization being studied.

In this study I focused on trade unions and argued that acquaintance networks are of particular importance. Since the structure of acquaintance networks is spatially restricted, founding processes are likely to be spatially structured. The empirical analyses confirmed this expectation and revealed that once the spatial locations of potential information sources were controlled for, the density of organizations in the population had virtually no effect on the founding rate. Whether the evolution of the Swedish trade union movement is idiosyncratic or not can be decided only through additional research. But if future research on other organizational populations finds results similar to those reported here, a reformulation of the ecological approach appears to be called for that would make it more adept in analyzing how spatial and structural heterogeneities influence organizational foundings.

REFERENCES

- Allison, Paul D 1982 "Discrete-Time Methods for the Analysis of Event Histories " *Sociological Methodology* 12 61-98
- Åmark, Klas 1986 *Facklig makt och fackligt medlemskap* Lund Arkiv
- Banerjee, Abhijit V 1992 "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior " *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108 (3) 797-817
- Boalt, Gunnar, and C G Janson 1957 "Distance and Social Relations " *Acta Sociologica* 2 (2) 73-97
- Brown, Lawrence A 1981 *Innovation Diffusion A New Perspective* London Methuen
- Burt, Ronald S 1987 "Social Contagion and Innovation Cohesion versus Structural Equivalence " *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (6) 1287-1335
- Coleman, James S , Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel 1966 *Medical Innovation A Diffusion Study* New York Bobbs-Merrill
- Dahl, Robert 1961 *Who Governs?* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Doreian, Patrick 1980 "Linear Models with Spatially Distributed Data " *Sociological Methods and Research* 9 29-60
- Elster, Jon 1989 *The Cement of Society A Study of Social Order* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Festinger, Leon, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back 1959 *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* London Tavistock
- Gould, Roger V 1991 "Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871 " *American Sociological Review* 56 (6) 716-29
- Granovetter, Mark 1978 "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior " *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (6) 1420-43
- Granovetter, Mark, and R Soong 1983 "Threshold Models of Diffusion and Collective Behavior " *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 9 165-79
- 1988 "Threshold Models of Diversity Chinese Restaurants, Residential Segregation, and the Spiral of Silence " *Sociological Methodology* 18 69-104
- Hagerstrand, Torsten [1953] 1967 *Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- 1965 "A Monte Carlo Approach to Diffusion " *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 6 43-67
- Hamblin, Robert B , Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L L Miller 1973 *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change* New York Wiley
- Hannan, Michael T , and Glenn R Carroll 1992 *Dynamics of Organizational Populations* New York Oxford University Press
- Hannan, Michael T , and John Freeman 1989 *Organizational Ecology* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Hardin, Russell 1982 *Collective Action* Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
- Land, Kenneth C , Glenn Deane, and Judith R Blau 1991 "Religious Pluralism and Church Membership A Spatial Diffusion Model " *American Sociological Review* 56 (2) 237-49
- Lundkvist, Sven 1977 *Folkrorelserna i det svenska samhället, 1850-1920* Uppsala Almqvist & Wiksell
- Mahajan, Vijay, and Robert A Peterson 1985 *Models for Innovation Diffusion* Sage University Paper Series, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences no 07-048 Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Marwell, Gerald, and Pamela E Oliver 1993 *The Critical Mass in Collective Action A Micro-Social Theory* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Marwell, Gerald, Pamela E Oliver, and R Pahl 1988 "Social Networks and Collective Action A Theory of the Critical Mass III " *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (3) 502-34

- McAdam, Doug 1988 *Freedom Summer* New York Oxford University Press
- Merton, Robert K 1968 *Social Theory and Social Structure* New York Free Press
- Olson, Mancur 1965 *The Logic of Collective Action* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Olzak, Susan 1992 *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Rogers, Everett M 1983 *Diffusion of Innovations* New York Free Press
- Schelling, Thomas C 1971 "Dynamic Models of Segregation " *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 1 143-86
- 1978 *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* New York Norton
- Smelser, Neil 1962 *Theory of Collective Behavior* New York Free Press
- Snow, David A , Louis A Zurcher, Jr , and Sheldon Ekeland-Olson 1980 "Social Networks and Social Movements A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment " *American Sociological Review* 45 (5) 787-801
- Spilerman, Seymour 1971 "The Causes of Racial Disturbances A Comparison of Alternative Explanations " *American Sociological Review* 35 627-49
- 1976 "Structural Characteristics of Cities and the Severity of Racial Disorders " *American Sociological Review* 41 771-93
- Stouffer, Samuel A 1940 "Intervening Opportunities A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance " *American Sociological Review* 5 (6) 845-67
- Strang, David 1991 "Adding Social Structure to Diffusion Models An Event History Framework " *Sociological Methods and Research* 19 (3) 324-53
- Tarde, Gabriel de 1903 *The Laws of Imitation* New York Henry Holt
- Turner, Ralph H 1991 "The Use and Misuse of Rational Models in Collective Behavior and Social Psychology " *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 32 (1) 84-109
- Turner, Ralph H , and Lewis M Killian 1957 *Collective Behavior* Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice-Hall
- WGBH 1992 "Sit Down and Strike Walter Reuther and the Rise of the Auto Workers' Union " In *The American Experience*, television series Boston WGBH
- Zipf, George Kingsley 1949 *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort* Cambridge, Mass Addison-Wesley

Why Strict Churches Are Strong¹

Laurence R Iannaccone
Santa Clara University

The strength of strict churches is neither a historical coincidence nor a statistical artifact. Strictness makes organizations stronger and more attractive because it reduces free riding. It screens out members who lack commitment and stimulates participation among those who remain. Rational choice theory thus explains the success of sects, cults, and conservative denominations without recourse to assumptions of irrationality, abnormality, or misinformation. The theory also predicts differences between strict and lenient groups, distinguishes between effective and counterproductive demands, and demonstrates the need to adapt strict demands in response to social change.

In 1972 Dean Kelley published a remarkable book titled *Why Conservative Churches Are Growing* (Kelley 1986). In it he documented a striking shift in the fortunes of America's oldest and largest Protestant denominations. After two centuries of growth that culminated in the 1950s, virtually all mainline Protestant denominations had begun losing members. The losses, however, were far from uniform. Liberal denominations were declining much more rapidly than conservative denominations, and the most conservative were growing. The varying rates of growth and decline meant that the mainline denominations' misfortune could not be attributed to pervasive secularization. A valid explanation could only be rooted in traits or circumstances that differed from one denomination to the next. Kelley proposed such an explanation. He traced the success of conservative churches to their ability to attract and retain an active and committed membership, characteristics that he in turn attributed to their

¹ I presented early drafts of this paper at the meetings of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Salt Lake City, Utah, October 1989, and of the Public Choice Society, Phoenix, March 1990, and at several department seminars. I thank many colleagues for their comments and suggestions, particularly Roger Finke, Benton Johnson, Dean Kelley, Darren Sherkat, James Spickard, Rodney Stark, William Swatos, and R. Stephen Warner. The work was supported in part by a grant from the Lilley Foundation. Address all correspondence to Laurence R. Iannaccone, Department of Economics, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California 95053.

strict demands for complete loyalty, unwavering belief, and rigid adherence to a distinctive lifestyle

Twenty years have done nothing to weaken the force of Kelley's argument. The trends he identified continue unabated, so much so that "small sects" such as the Mormons and the Assemblies of God now outnumber "mainline" denominations such as the Episcopal Church and the United Church of Christ. Statistical studies have confirmed that denominational growth rates correlate strongly with "strictness" and its concomitants (Hoge 1979), and new historical research has revealed that the mainline's *share* of the churchgoing population has been declining since the American Revolution (Finke and Stark 1992).

Even so, many researchers question the causal role of strictness. They look to other factors to account for commitment, participation, and membership. Hoge and Roozen (1979), for example, have argued that observed membership trends are primarily the consequence of "contextual factors" such as birthrates and socioeconomic conditions, rather than "institutional factors" such as strictness.

In this article, I argue that Kelley was correct. In showing how strictness overcomes free-rider problems I embed Kelley's thesis within a much broader rational choice approach to religion. I have previously claimed that rational choice theory provides an alternative paradigm in the sociology of religion, one that unifies many of the generalizations that currently compete for researchers' attention (Iannaccone 1992a, see also Warner 1993). Here I provide a unified approach to the study of Protestant denominations, Jewish denominations, cults, communes, and church-sect theory.

Having claimed that Kelley was correct, I should emphasize two qualifications. First, both my article and Kelley's book address church growth only indirectly. The primary argument concerns how strictness increases commitment, raises levels of participation, and enables a group to offer more benefits to current and potential members. It seems obvious that such groups enjoy a competitive advantage over their opposites (who suffer from less commitment, lower participation, and fewer perceived benefits), but the mechanics of growth remains a separate subject (this is addressed more directly in Iannaccone, Stark, and Olson [1993]).² Second, in modeling the benefits of strictness, I do not thereby assert that

² Kelley blamed his publisher for "insisting" on the misleading title, *Why Conservative Churches Are Growing*. In the preface to later editions, he emphasized that "the book is not primarily about 'conservative' churches—whatever *they* are!—or church growth. A more accurate title might be 'Why Strict Churches Are Strong'—whether 'liberal' or 'conservative,' whether 'growing' in membership at the moment or not" (1986, p. xvii, emphasis in original). For this article, I have adopted his preferred title in an effort to clarify my position and his.

these benefits persist, no matter how strict a group becomes. To the contrary, both theory and data imply "optimal" levels of strictness, beyond which strictness discourages most people from joining or remaining within the group. I will address this issue in the article's final sections.

RESTATING KELLEY'S THESIS

How do we define strictness? Kelley (1986, pp. 79–84) cataloged three traits of the ideal-typical strict church—absolutism, conformity, and fanaticism—and contrasted them to three traits of the more lenient church—relativism, diversity, and dialogue. Strict churches proclaim an exclusive truth—a closed, comprehensive, and eternal doctrine. They demand adherence to a distinctive faith, morality, and lifestyle. They condemn deviance, shun dissenters, and repudiate the outside world. They frequently embrace "eccentric traits," such as distinctive diet, dress, or speech, that invite ridicule, isolation, and persecution.

For the purpose of formal analysis, I shall narrow this catalog to a single attribute: the degree to which a group limits and thereby increases the *cost* of nongroup activities, such as socializing with members of other churches or pursuing "secular" pastimes. This radical simplification allows us to model and test Kelley's thesis. It also accords with Kelley's (1986, p. xxii) own belief that church strength depends largely on a single characteristic which he alternately called "seriousness," "strictness," "costliness," and "bindingness."

A cost-based definition of strictness highlights the paradox in Kelley's thesis. After all, it is the essence of rationality to seek benefits and avoid costs. If strictness increases costs, why should anyone join a strict church? The religious marketplace teems with less demanding alternatives. Why become a Mormon or a Seventh Day Adventist, let alone a Krishna or a Moonie, when the Methodists and Presbyterians wait with open arms? Mormons abstain from caffeine and alcohol, Seventh Day Adventists avoid eating meat, Krishnas shave their heads, wear robes, and chant in public, Moonies submit to arranged marriages, Jehovah's Witnesses refuse transfusions, Orthodox Jews wear side curls and yarmulkes, conduct no business on the Sabbath, and observe numerous dietary restrictions, and monks take vows of celibacy, poverty, and silence. These practices are problematic, not only because they deviate from "normal" behavior, but also because they appear completely counterproductive. Pleasures are sacrificed, opportunities forgone, and social stigma is risked, or even invited. The problem is epitomized by the burnt offering, a religious rite designed specifically to destroy valuable resources. How can burnt offerings and their equivalents survive in religious markets when self-interest and competitive pressures drive them out of most other

markets? As Kelley pointed out, the question is not merely one of survival, religious groups that demand such sacrifices are *more* successful than those that do not ³

I shall argue that strict demands “strengthen” a church in three ways they raise overall levels of commitment, they increase average rates of participation, and they enhance the net benefits of membership. These strengths arise because strictness mitigates free-rider problems that otherwise lead to low levels of member commitment and participation. Free riders threaten most collective activities, and religious activities are no exception. Church members may attend services, call upon the pastor for counsel, enjoy the fellowship of their peers, and so forth, without ever putting a dollar in the plate or bringing a dish to the potluck. Direct monitoring (of attendance, contributions, and other overt behaviors) fails to solve the problem because it tends to undermine critical group attributes such as commitment, enthusiasm, and solidarity. But seemingly unproductive costs provide an indirect solution. These costs screen out people whose participation would otherwise be low, while at the same time they increase participation among those who do join. As a consequence, apparently unproductive sacrifices can increase the utility of group members. Efficient religions with perfectly rational members may thus embrace stigma, self-sacrifice, and bizarre behavioral standards. Strictness works.

HOW STRICTNESS LEADS TO STRENGTH

Religion is a social phenomenon, born and nurtured among groups of people. In principle, perhaps, religion can be purely private, but in practice it appears to be much more compelling and attractive when experienced in groups.⁴ In the austere but precise language of economics, religion is a “commodity” that people produce *collectively*. My religious satisfaction thus depends both on my “inputs” and on those of others.

³ This pattern of success appears well beyond the confines of contemporary Protestantism. Rosabeth Kanter in her classic study of 19th-century utopian communities found that successful communes demanded much greater sacrifices of time, energy, and money than did unsuccessful ones (Kanter 1973, Hall 1988). The Mormon church has distinctive behavioral requirements and makes heavy demands on members' time and money, yet is the fastest growing religion of the modern era (Stark 1984). And one cannot ignore the continuing importance of fundamentalism worldwide (Lawrence 1989).

⁴ Since Christianity, Islam, and Judaism place greater emphasis on collective, congregational activity than do Buddhism, Hinduism, or Shinto, my argument applies most readily to Western religions. In another article (Iannaccone, in press), I attempted to generalize the model to accommodate both collective and privately oriented religious practices.

The pleasure and edification that I derive from a Sunday service does not depend solely on what I bring to the service (through my presence, attentiveness, public singing, etc.), it also depends on how many others attend, how warmly they greet me, how well they sing or recite (in English, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, etc.), how enthusiastically they read and pray, and how deep their commitments are. The collective side of religion encompasses numerous group activities such as listening to sermons, scriptural studies, testimonial meetings, liturgies, worship, hymn singing, and sacramental acts. However, it also extends to religious belief and religious experiences—particularly the most dramatic experiences such as speaking in tongues, miraculous healings, prophetic utterances, and ecstatic trances—all of which are more sustainable and satisfying when experienced collectively.

Free-Rider Problems

Like other collective activities, religion is susceptible to “free riding,” a problem first analyzed by Mancur Olson (1965) and the subsequent focus of much social-scientific research. The problem arises whenever the members of a group receive benefits in proportion to their collective, rather than individual, efforts. Because each member benefits whether or not he contributes to the common cause, each has a strong incentive to minimize his own efforts and “free ride” off those of others. If enough members yield to this temptation, the collective activity will surely fail. Free riding has wrecked many an enterprise, from small charities to global environmental initiatives.

Although most scholars have tended to overlook the problems that religions have had with free riders, Mary Douglas (1986, pp. 23–24) cites her own anthropological work to prove that “the exception of religious organization is clearly a mistake.” Indeed, she argues that it is “the history of religion [that] best bears out [Olson’s] theory.” It does not help our understanding of religion to protect it from profane scrutiny by drawing a deferential boundary around it. Religion should not be exempted at all.”

Two types of free-rider problems are particularly common in religion. The first arises in mixed populations where levels of religious commitment vary from person to person. In any such group, people with low levels of religious commitment tend to free ride off those with higher levels; they tend to take more than they give. They may do so unintentionally. Nevertheless, if only because their lower commitment inclines them to participate and contribute less than others, their mere presence dilutes a group’s resources, reducing the average level of participation, enthusiasm, energy, and the like. Heterogeneity can thus undermine in-

tense fellowships and major undertakings. Lacking a way to identify and exclude free riders, highly committed people end up saddled with anemic, resource-poor congregations. The Appendix contains a formal, game-theoretic illustration of free riding in mixed groups.

A second type of free-rider problem persists even when members share a common level of commitment.⁵ Participation no longer varies from person to person, but the *average* level of participation remains suboptimal and hence inefficient.

To see why, recall that religious commodities are collectively produced. As I have noted, this implies that individual members benefit both from their own religious participation and from that of others. But it also implies the converse: when people participate, they provide benefits to others as well as to themselves. So, for example, a church member who attends regularly, sings wholeheartedly, greets others warmly, and testifies enthusiastically enhances not just his own spiritual life but also those of his fellow members. Economists refer to such side effects as "externalities." Externalities breed inefficiency because they do not enter into the self-interested decisions of strictly rational actors. Such actors maximize personal benefits net of personal costs, not social benefits net of social costs. It follows that harmful externalities like pollution abound, whereas beneficial externalities like charity, reporting crimes, and community action go begging. Powerful externalities pose serious threats to social systems and physical environments. It should come as no surprise that they also threaten religious groups. Most citizens contribute only a tiny fraction of their personal resources to charity or to community action. Is it any surprise that they behave similarly in church?

One need not look far to find an anemic congregation plagued by free-rider problems—a visit to the nearest liberal, mainline Protestant church usually will suffice. But case studies of cults and communes provide more striking examples. In such groups, which can only survive with high levels of commitment, the costs of free riding are laid bare.

Consider, for example, the Shakers' problems with transient members. These so-called "winter Shakers" would join Shaker communities in the late fall, obtain food and shelter throughout the winter, and then leave when employment opportunities had improved. Indeed, the Shakers' problems were not limited to transients. A Shaker journal written in 1870 complains of "Mary Ann Austin [who] came & took her 7 girls after our expenses of raising them" (Bainbridge 1982, p. 361). Census data

⁵ I am using the word *commitment* to denote the value that one attaches to involvement in the group. I do not assume that highly committed people are any less rational than others or that they are less inclined to free ride. They participate more only because they derive greater utility from participation.

indicating 95% defection rates among members under the age of 20 corroborate these anecdotal accounts and underscore the magnitude of the problem (Bainbridge 1982)

The Divine Principles (DP or Moonie) movement studied by Lofland in the 1960s encountered similar difficulties. Lofland describes the problems posed by "exploiters" whose motives for joining DP conflicted with or undermined the goals of the movement. Some merely "attempted to extract some nonreligious benefit from the DP's, such as inexpensive room and board, money, or sex" (Lofland 1977, p. 152). Others actually used DP as a base from which to recruit customers for their own, competing, spiritualist churches (p. 156).

Free riding was by no means unique to the Shakers and the DP movement. Hines (1983) claims that "social misfits," "personal dissension," and inadequate "screening" undermined most utopian colonies in California. "Commitment problems" likewise plagued most of the 19th-century communes studied by Kanter (1973, cf. Hall 1988). Charles Guide's observation, quoted by Kanter (1973, pp. 157-58), is particularly apt: "Perhaps the gravest [peril] of all lies in the fact that these colonies are threatened as much by success as by failure. If they attain prosperity they attract a crowd of members who lack the enthusiasm and faith of the earlier ones and are attracted only by self-interest." This perverse dynamic threatens all groups engaged in the production of collective goods, and it applies to enthusiasm, solidarity, and other social benefits no less than to material resources.

Reducing Free Riding

Although it is theoretically possible for religious groups to overcome their free-rider problems through screening and monitoring, such schemes prove unworkable in practice. For example, one theoretically ideal solution is for groups to "internalize" their externalities by charging substantial membership dues and then using those funds to subsidize individual participation. In other words, the group should pay people to participate fully. But this solution requires that individual behavior be accurately observed and appropriately rewarded. In reality, the aspects of religious participation that confer the greatest external benefits (effort, enthusiasm, solidarity, etc.) are intrinsically difficult to monitor and reward.⁶ The willingness to pay membership dues is a poor proxy for these qualities because income correlates weakly with most dimensions of religious com-

⁶ Similar problems arise in the workplace and the home. A growing economic literature seeks to explain features characteristic of employment and marriage contracts as being means to reduce "shirking" (see Allen 1990).

mitment, and any attempt to directly subsidize the observable aspects of religious participation (such as church attendance) will almost certainly backfire. The Salvation Army will readily attest that the promise of free meals guarantees an audience of less than average commitment.⁷ How much greater would be the temptation to feign belief in the face of cash compensation? In practice, therefore, few churches reward attendance, sell their services, charge for memberships, or compensate any but a few full-time workers.⁸

There remains, however, an indirect solution to the free-rider problem. Instead of subsidizing participation, churches can penalize or prohibit *alternative* activities that compete for members' resources. In mixed populations, such penalties and prohibitions tend to screen out the less committed members. They act like entry fees and thus discourage anyone not seriously interested in "buying" the product. Only those willing to pay the price remain. The Appendix proves this result for a game-theoretic model.

Penalties and prohibitions can also raise average levels of group participation and group utility in homogeneous populations (whether they began as homogeneous or became so after the prohibitions persuaded the less committed members to leave). To see why, note that prohibiting an activity effectively increases its price, since the activity's full cost now includes the penalties that may be meted out if it is discovered. Increasing the price of an activity reduces the demand for it, but increases the demand for its substitutes, that is, for competing activities. Hence, a religious group can indirectly increase its members' levels of participation by prohibiting or otherwise increasing the cost of alternative activities. Governments often employ similar strategies. For example, many countries encourage the use of public transportation both directly, through subsidized fares, and indirectly, through special taxes and constraints on automobile usage.

Penalties and prohibitions increase group welfare if two conditions are satisfied. The first is that the inefficiency induced by free riding must be relatively large, otherwise costly efforts to reduce it are not worth the trouble. The second is that the activity being taxed, penalized, or prohibited must be a close substitute for the desired alternative, otherwise increasing the cost of the former will not significantly increase the demand

⁷ The Salvation Army is, of course, well aware of this phenomenon and uses it to further its goal of reaching indigents who are not normally found in churches. But note that even the army makes a point of scheduling its sermons before the free meals.

⁸ Exceptions exist. For example, many Jewish synagogues collect membership dues, and many Protestant churches used to charge pew-rental fees.

for the latter. For the mathematical derivation of these results, see Iannaccone (1992b).

It might at first seem that any group unable to monitor members' participation in its own activities will have an even harder time restricting their involvement in other activities, but this is not so. It is often much easier to observe and penalize mere involvement in competing groups than it is to accurately determine the level of involvement in one's own group. Alternatively, it may be possible to demand of members some distinctive, stigmatizing behavior that inhibits participation or reduces productivity in alternative contexts—having shaved heads, wearing pink robes, or being in an isolated location does the job quite effectively. Commenting on his religion's distinctive dress and grooming requirements, a Sikh put it thus: "The Guru wanted to raise a body of men who would not be able to deny their faith when questioned, but whose external appearance would invite persecution and breed the courage to resist it" (Singh 1953, p. 31).⁹

Restrictions on smoking, drinking, eating, sex, and other potentially private activities are harder to enforce, and it is possible that guilt, habit, and other self-enforcement mechanisms help keep members in line. Even in the absence of internal constraints, however, deception remains costly. A secret sexual liaison is not at all the same as an open relationship, private drinking from a hidden bottle is a poor substitute for social drinking at bars and parties, and a concealed smoking habit may be more trouble than it is worth. Restrictive religions can, and often do, raise the cost of deception by limiting the size of congregations, holding meetings in members' homes, and demanding that members routinely socialize with each other.

Costly strictures thus mitigate the externality problems faced by religious groups. Distinctive diet, dress, grooming, and social customs constrain and often stigmatize members, making participation in alternative activities more costly. Potential members are forced to choose whether to participate fully or not at all. The seductive middle ground is eliminated, and, paradoxically, those who remain find that their welfare has been increased. It follows that perfectly rational people can be drawn to decidedly unconventional groups. This conclusion sharply contrasts with the view, popular among psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and the media, that conversion to deviant religious sects and cults is inherently

⁹ As this quotation indicates, religious groups may consciously manipulate their doctrines and practices in order to limit free riding. The model does not, therefore, depend solely on evolutionary forces to weed out ineffective practices. Although such forces are surely at work, given the hundreds of new religions that are born and die every century, their effect is greatly reinforced by deliberate adaptations aimed at increasing commitment (Kanter 1973, Hechter 1987, Kraybill 1989a).

pathological, the consequence of either psychological abnormality or coercive "brainwashing" (Robbins 1988, pp 72–89)¹⁰

EVIDENCE AND APPLICATIONS

The proposed model does not merely "rationalize" strange behaviors and deviant demands. It also predicts the empirical correlates of strictness, extends Kelley's thesis, and throws new light on the hoary theme of church versus sect.

Measuring Strictness

To address these issues, one must first assess the relative "strictness" of different religions. Objective measures are hard to obtain, both because religious demands take many forms and because most data sources ignore the issue of cost,¹¹ but comparisons based on expert judgment and common sense will suffice here.

Consider, for example, the three major Jewish denominations. It goes without saying that Orthodox Judaism imposes the greatest costs on its members and that Reform Judaism imposes the least. Conservative Judaism falls between these extremes, though it is generally closer to Reform than to Orthodox. One may verify this ranking any number of ways—by employing expert judgment, conventional wisdom, official doctrine, or observable practices—the results never change.

Although Protestant denominations prove harder to classify, some generalizations again lie beyond dispute. Scholars, citizens, journalists, and church members all agree that "sectarian" groups, like the Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Seventh Day Adventists, are stricter and more demanding than mainline denominations like the Episcopalians, Methodists, and the United Church of Christ. Indeed, the standard ranking begins with the "liberal," "mainline" denominations, and runs through "evangelicals," "fundamentalists," "pentecostals," and finally "sects." A large body of empirical research confirms the general validity of this ranking (Stark and Glock 1968, Roof and McKinney 1987, pp 72–147). The members of more conservative denominations do indeed adopt a

¹⁰ The conclusion also contradicts the view of "commitment mechanisms" based on cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., Kanter 1973, p. 76). In contrast to rational choice, cognitive dissonance ultimately involves a lapse in rationality or, at the very least, an experience-induced attitude change.

¹¹ Surveys with dozens or even hundreds of religious items routinely ignore the costs that congregations or denominations impose on their members. (See, e.g., the General Social Survey, Gallup polls, or the Search Institute's recent 374-item "Effective Christian Education" survey of Protestant congregations.)

more restrictive lifestyle than their mainline counterparts. They are, for example, less likely to drink (Cochran, Beeghley, and Bock 1987), engage in premarital sex (Beck, Cole, and Hammond 1991), or experiment with alternative, "new age" religions (Tamney et al. 1991, Donahue 1991).

Expert judgments refine the standard Protestant ranking. Consider, for example, a study that surveyed 21 experts (church historians, sociologists of religion, denominational leaders, and seminary educators) nominated as "maximally knowledgeable and representative of the total spectrum of denominations" (Hoge and Roozen 1979, E-4).¹² The experts rated 16 major Protestant denominations on a series of seven-point scales. One of these scales provides an excellent operational definition of strictness and cost. It asks the respondent to rate each denomination according to the following criteria: "Does the denomination emphasize maintaining a separate and distinctive life style or morality in personal and family life, in such areas as dress, diet, drinking, entertainment, uses of time, marriage, sex, child rearing, and the like? Or does it affirm the current American mainline life style in these respects?"¹³ The results are reassuring. Liberal mainline denominations (Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, and the United Church of Christ) scored as the least distinctive, followed by moderate mainline denominations (Evangelical Lutheran, Reformed Church, Disciples of Christ, and American Baptist), conservatives and evangelicals (Missouri Synod Lutheran and Southern Baptist), and, finally, fundamentalists, pentecostals, and sects (Nazarene, Assemblies of God, Seventh Day Adventist, and Mormon).¹⁴

In order to assess this scale's reliability and to expand the set of denom-

¹² Hoge surveyed expert opinion in an effort to identify the empirical determinants of church growth. In the current context, his data provide something approaching a "double blind" experiment, since neither he nor his subjects anticipated using the results to predict church attendance, contributions, or other individual-level behaviors.

¹³ One reviewer expressed concern that this item and my use of it fail to distinguish between "true costly stigma" and "mere distinctiveness." However, I model this difference as a matter of degree. Social or geographical isolation varies along a continuum (from wilderness communes to Amish communities to Orthodox Jewish enclaves to Catholic neighborhoods), as do restrictions on grooming, dietary habits, sexual behavior, family life, drug use, etc. The theory concerns any "opportunity" cost, with no sharp line between large and small or real and symbolic. Note also that, when asked to score denominations according to the strictness of their beliefs, the experts produced a ranking that correlates almost perfectly with the distinctiveness ranking ($r = .91$).

¹⁴ One might wonder whether the experts' judgments simply mirrored the conventional denominational ranking. But the experts ordered the denominations quite differently when asked about their strength of ethnic identity and their style of governance (Hoge 1979).




FIG 1 —Attendance versus distinctiveness

inations, I replicated the survey using 16 new experts.¹⁵ Two findings stand out. First, the rankings remain unchanged across the two studies. Despite the passage of 15 years and the use of different raters, the correlation between the new and old distinctiveness scales is an astonishing .99. Second, the level of agreement among the experts is extraordinarily high. The reliability of denominational scores (as measured by Cronbach's alpha) is over .98,¹⁶ and the mean correlation between each expert's

¹⁵ My sample of experts included sociologists of religion, religious historians, and other religious scholars. I chose them less systematically than did Hoge, anticipating a second, more sophisticated replication. But the initial results mirrored Hoge's so closely that further work seemed pointless. I also had the experts rate the three Jewish denominations. As expected, they unanimously scored Reform Judaism the least distinctive and Orthodox Judaism the most distinctive. Details are available on request.

¹⁶ Typical survey-based scales are formed by summing an individual respondent's (standardized) scores on several survey items. Cronbach's alpha then provides a measure of interitem correlation across the sample of respondents. The present scale is formed by summing the (standardized) responses of 16 different experts. Hence, each individual expert acts like a different "item" or measure of the underlying characteristic (distinctiveness), and each denomination acts as a separate case. In this context, Cronbach's alpha provides an index of correlation among the experts, and thus is a measure of interrater reliability. The presumed statistical model is $s_{ij} = t_j + e_{ij}$, where s_{ij} denotes the i th expert's distinctiveness score for the j th denomination, t_j denotes the j th denomination's true distinctiveness level, and e_{ij} denotes the (random) error in the i th expert's judgment regarding the j th denomination.

ratings and the average standardized ratings of all other experts is .85. The experts' average score for each denomination can be read off the horizontal axis of figure 1.

A Theory of Church and Sect

I have shown that cost-based scales are reliable. They are also useful, yielding a formal theory of church and sect more elegant, general, and empirically fruitful than its predecessors.

Traditional theories of church and sect have been justly criticized as not being theories at all, but rather complex, multiattribute typologies that offer static descriptions at the expense of testable implications (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, pp. 19–23).¹⁷ The ideal-typical sect might be defined as a religious organization with a highly committed, voluntary, and converted membership, a separatist orientation, an exclusive social structure, a spirit of regeneration, and an attitude of ethical austerity and demanding asceticism. The ideal-typical church would have its own complex list of attributes: birth-based membership, inclusiveness and universalism, hierarchical structures, an adaptive, compromising stance vis-à-vis the larger society, and so forth. Notwithstanding a certain “intuitive rightness,” such lists fail to accommodate the majority of real-world religions, provide limited insight into nonideal, “mixed-type” cases, and lack predictions or causal arguments linking one attribute to another.

In contrast, the present scheme is simple, unidimensional, and powerfully predictive. It derives from a model that characterizes numerous religious demands as functionally equivalent solutions to free-rider problems. Religions that demand similar levels of sacrifice should therefore display fundamental behavioral similarities, despite the peculiarities of their individual histories, theologies, and organizational structures.¹⁸

Similarities do in fact appear when we group religions according to the (rated) stringency of their demands. Consider, for example, the summary statistics in table 1 obtained from the General Social Survey, 1984–90. (The table's membership groupings reflect the respondents' self-described religious preferences.) Compared to members of other Protestant denomi-

¹⁷ Weber introduced the church-sect distinction to sociology ([1904–5] 1958, [1922] 1963). Adam Smith introduced virtually the same distinction to economics more than a century earlier. Smith contrasted “established churches” and “small sects” at length in *The Wealth of Nations* ([1776] 1965, pp. 740–66).

¹⁸ For the purposes of the analysis it does not matter whether these demands take the form of explicit consumption restrictions, such as dietary laws, or behaviors that isolate or stigmatize members so as to restrict their interactions with nonmembers.

TABLE 1
PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONAL DIFFERENCES

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Sects	t-value*
Household income (in thousands of dollars per year)	38 0 (23 2)	31 0 (20 9)	31 6 (20 7)	27 0 (20 0)	8 9
Respondent education (in years)	13 8 (2 92)	12 5 (2 86)	12 1 (2 84)	11 3 (3 02)	15 1
Sunday attendance (services attended per year)	20 9 (25 4)	25 2 (29 2)	31 3 (33 4)	48 5 (42 7)	13 7
Weekday attendance (% attending weekday meetings)	2 7 (16 4)	6 3 (24 3)	11 5 (31 8)	32 3 (46 8)	14 4
Church contributions (dollars per year)	584 (1,388)	473 (937)	905 (1,843)	862 (1,818)	1 8
Church contributions (% of yearly income)	1 94 (6 49)	1 94 (3 80)	2 81 (4 65)	3 16 (4 81)	2 3
Membership in church-affiliated groups (% belonging)	37 8 (48 5)	40 1 (49 0)	44 6 (49 7)	49 5 (50 1)	3 6
Secular memberships (no of memberships)	1 90 (1 91)	1 48 (1 74)	1 27 (1 52)	91 (1 30)	9 4
Strength of affiliation (% claiming to be "strong" members)	32 6 (46 9)	38 7 (48 7)	45 5 (49 8)	56 0 (49 7)	8 5
Biblical literalism (% believing)	23 2 (42 3)	40 4 (49 1)	57 8 (49 4)	68 1 (46 6)	15 7
Belief in afterlife (% believing)	79 5 (40 4)	85 1 (35 6)	88 9 (31 4)	87 8 (32 6)	3 5
N of cases	763	1,802	941	575	

SOURCE —NORC General Social Survey, 1984–90, sample consists of nonblack, non-Catholic Christians

NOTE —In first four cols, nos shown are means, nos in parentheses are SDs. Definitions of denominational groups: liberal = Christian (Disciples of Christ), Episcopalian, Methodist, and United Church of Christ; moderate = American Baptist, Evangelical Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Reformed churches; conservative = Missouri Synod Lutheran and Southern Baptist; and sects = Assemblies of God, Church of Christ, Church of God, Jehovah's Witness, Nazarene, Seventh Day Adventist, and other fundamentalists and pentecostals.

* t-values are for two-tailed test comparing means for liberal and sect members




FIG 2 —Nonchurch memberships

nations, sect members are poorer and less educated, contribute more money and attend more services, hold stronger beliefs, belong to more church-related groups, and are less involved in secular organizations. The differences are strong, striking, and statistically significant. Moreover, for virtually every variable the pattern of variation is monotonic, increasing (or decreasing) steadily as one moves from liberal to moderate to conservative and, finally, to sect groups.¹⁹ Figures 1–4 show that these relationships remain strong even when disaggregated to the level of individual denominations. In figure 1, for example, the correlation between denominational distinctiveness and average rates of church attendance is .82.

The cost-based theory of church and sect rebuts the complaint that religious typologies are inherently ad hoc, rooted in the particulars of Christian theology and European church history and inapplicable to other religious traditions (Roberts 1984, p. 225, Eister 1967). The theory

¹⁹ The patterns in table 1 are not unknown to the sociology of religion, although figs 1–4 do provide a new view of the data. Numerous surveys of Protestant Christian groups find that denominations tend to fall into distinct types (Stark and Glock 1968, Roof and McKinney 1987). The present analysis builds on the work of Johnson (1963, pp. 542, 544, see Johnson 1971) who defined “churches” as religious organizations that “accept the social environment,” embracing the norms and values of the prevailing culture, and contrasted them to “sects” that “reject the social environment.”




FIG 3 —Strength of affiliation




FIG 4 —Income versus distinctiveness

TABLE 2
JEWISH DENOMINATIONAL DIFFERENCES

	Reform	Conservative	Orthodox
Individual practices			
Attends synagogue regularly (%)	8 6	19 0	54 1
Lights candles each Friday (%)	5 4	15 3	56 8
Avoids money on Sabbath (%)	6 5	13 1	57 7
Household practices			
Buys kosher meat (%)	3 5	20 7	68 5
Separates meat and dairy dishes (%)	3 4	18 9	66 7
Lights Hanukkah candles (%)	53 4	66 9	76 6
Has Christmas tree (%)	21 8	15 4	7 2
Networks			
Closest friends are all Jews (%)	7 6	15 8	39 1
Lives in Jewish neighborhood (%)	6 6	11 5	36 0
Opposes marrying non-Jew (%)	1 9	9 6	47 7
Household contributions per year			
Gives more than \$1,000 to Jewish causes (%)	5 4	9 44	22 5
Gives more than \$1,000 to nonJewish causes (%)	6 53	4 31	0
Volunteer hours per week			
Hours worked for Jewish organizations	1 08 (4 45)	2 34 (7 40)	5 62 (14 54)
Hours worked for secular organizations	4 02 (8 98)	3 62 (8 81)	2 24 (9 34)
Organizational memberships			
Jewish (outside of synagogue)	55 (1 45)	85 (1 49)	1 46 (3 24)
Non-Jewish	1 67 (3 09)	1 45 (2 35)	721 (1 36)
Years of education	15 8 (2 54)	15 2 (3 30)	14 8 (3 62)
Household income (in thousands of dollars)	64 7 (46 7)	55 5 (42 8)	41 7 (35 7)
N of cases	797	720	111

SOURCE — 1990 National Jewish Population Survey

NOTE —Nos in parentheses are SDs, for each variable, the two-tailed *t*-test comparing means for Reform and Orthodox is significant at the 5% level

grows from abstract considerations of collective production, rationality, and free riding and should therefore apply to other, collectively oriented religions, such as Judaism and Islam

This proves, in fact, to be the case. Data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey reveal patterns of interdenominational variation virtually identical to those observed within Protestantism (See table 2, which arranges Jewish denominations using the same distinctiveness

scale used in table 1) Compared to the members of Reform Judaism, Orthodox Jews are poorer and somewhat less educated, devote more time and money to religious activities, hold stronger religious beliefs, are more involved in their own religious community, and separate themselves more thoroughly from non-Jewish society Here again, the differences are strong, significant, and consistent One might even say that Jewish denominations fit the idealized church-sect continuum even more neatly than do the Christian denominations²⁰

Putting the Theory to Work

Unlike traditional typologies, the proposed theory of church and sect tells a causal story It claims that a high-cost group maintains its strict norms of conduct precisely because they limit participation in competing activities and thereby raise levels of participation within the group²¹ The theory thus predicts that increased strictness (or distinctiveness, or costliness) leads to higher levels of church attendance and church contributions, closer ties to the group, and reduced involvement in competing groups

The observed patterns in tables 1 and 2 support this prediction Relative to their more mainstream counterparts, members of sectarian groups—both Christian and Jewish—attend more religious services, contribute more money, and (in the Jewish case, at least) choose more of their closest friends from within their religion They are also less involved in competing activities They hold fewer memberships in outside groups, contribute less to outside causes, and have fewer outside friends This last set of findings deserves special emphasis because it reverses a well-known individual-level pattern Calculated at the level of the individual, correlations between church participation and outside participation are consistently positive and significant People who regularly participate in church activities also tend to involve themselves in a wide range of organizations and activities outside of the church So, for example, the zero-order, individual-level correlations between dollars contributed to Jewish causes and dollars contributed to non-Jewish causes are positive for all types of Jews (correlations are .56 for Reform, .57 for Conservative, and .12 for

²⁰ The results in table 2 come from the first truly random sample of American Jewry, the 1990 Jewish National Population Survey, gleaned from an initial survey of more than 100,000 Americans (Goldstein and Kosmin 1991) For similar results based on a 1970 survey of American Jews, see Lazerwitz and Harrison (1979)

²¹ Traditional church-sect theory does not generate this sort of a prediction At best, it provides a *definition* of the sect as a “type” of religion that separates itself from society *and* maintains high levels of participation *and* draws its membership from society’s poor (see Roberts 1990, pp 182–93)

Orthodox) The corresponding correlations between numbers of Jewish and non-Jewish organizational memberships are positive as well (19, 33, and 32, for the three respective groups) For Christians the correlation between membership in church-affiliated groups and the number of non-religious memberships is .26 But when they are calculated at the level of denominational averages, all these correlations are *negative* Hence both theory and data underscore that the group-level patterns represent more than the mere aggregation of individual-level correlations

Graphs provide another way to confirm the theory's predictions Figures 1–3 show that the categorical patterns of table 1 in no way depend on a few outlying denominations Figure 1 plots the relationship between (expert-rated) distinctiveness and average attendance in all available denominations, including Catholic Figure 2 confirms the prediction that distinctiveness functions to limit members' involvement in alternative activities and competing sources of satisfaction Sect members do indeed forgo secular memberships Figure 3 provides persuasive evidence that the members of costly groups free ride less Even though mainline denominations demand relatively little of their members, far fewer of those members describe themselves as "strong" members of their religion

The regressions in table 3 show that the group's impact persists even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as age, income, sex, education, race, and marital status Columns 1 and 5 regress attendance and contribution rates on background and SES variables alone Columns 2 and 6 add a measure of denominational strictness or cost, the distinctiveness scores generated by the experts In both regressions, the explanatory power of denominational distinctiveness is truly astonishing, particularly when one recalls that all the other variables are measured at the individual level Distinctiveness works in the predicted direction, is highly significant, more than doubles R^2 in the attendance regression, and increases R^2 by half in the contribution equations Columns 3 and 7 show that the signs, significance, and relative magnitudes of the estimated equation remain essentially unchanged under a nonlinear tobit specification (which combines features of both probit and OLS regression in order to account for censoring in the dependent variables)²² Columns 4 and 8 add several more individual-level variables to test whether the distinctiveness effect works through its correlation with (or impact on) individual beliefs and choice of spouse But

²² Annual rates of church attendance are censored at both ends, since they cannot exceed 52 ("weekly") nor fall below zero ("never") Contribution rates are censored only from below Tobit regression maximizes a likelihood function in which endpoint observations enter in a manner analogous to probit regression and internal observations enter in a manner analogous to standard OLS regression (cf. Greene 1990, p. 727)

TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION

	Attendance (1)	Attendance (2)	Attendance (Tobit) (3)	Attendance (4)	Contribution (5)	Contribution (6)	Contribution (Tobit) (7)	Contribution (8)
Constant	-2 16 (70)	-28 54 (8 37)	-39 51 (9 62)	-27 07 (4 92)	-1,627 (6 78)	-2,781 (10 62)	-3,252 (11 88)	-2,403 (6 73)
Age	24 (8 23)	30 (10 67)	33 (9 61)	26 (6 82)	15 63 (7 12)	18 70 (8 70)	19 85 (8 95)	16 18 (6 41)
Sex	7 54 (7 41)	7 87 (8 00)	9 28 (7 86)	7 24 (5 28)	-7 57 (10)	7 11 (09)	96 91 (21)	-57 25 (66)
Married	8 15 (7 45)	6 42 (6 05)	8 16 (6 39)	-6 39 (3 23)	414 58 (4 98)	340 28 (4 21)	429 55 (5 13)	-99 74 (79)
Education	1 03 (5 42)	1 5 (8 08)	1 86 (8 31)	2 12 (7 84)	74 98 (5 03)	94 00 (6 46)	102 98 (6 90)	102 26 (5 77)
Income	- 01 (4 35)	- 09 (3 41)	01 (3 23)	05 (1 42)	11 14 (5 63)	12 67 (6 59)	11 30 (5 73)	14 90 (6 65)
Distinct		6 29 (16 38)	7 28 (15 79)	5 31 (10 17)		270 76 (9 55)	266 94 (9 22)	243 56 (7 45)
Marsame				17 74 (9 46)				650 2 (5 42)
Afterlife				9 55 (5 13)				381 86 (3 22)
Literalist				12 73 (8 68)				322 12 (3 44)
R ²	05	11		22	12	18		23
N of cases	3,706	3,706	3,706	1,729	1,315	1,315	1,315	1,041

SOURCE.—General Social Survey, 1984-90, sample consists of nonblack, non-Catholic Christians

NOTE.—Absolute *t*-statistics are in parentheses Variable definitions Attendance = church attendance (services/year), contribution = household's religious contributions in 1990 dollars, sex, married, marsame, afterlife, and literalist = dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is female, married, married to someone of the same religion, believes in an afterlife, and believes the Bible is literally true, education = years of education, income = household's income (in thousands of 1990 dollars), distinct = measure of denominational distinctiveness

even though these variables prove statistically significant, they in no way wash out the direct impact of denominational distinctiveness. Indeed, I could not alter this fundamental result with any reasonable alternative subsample, estimation technique, time frame, or method of assessing denominational characteristics,²³ nor have I found contradictory results in regressions for other key dependent variables such as memberships and contributions outside of the church, church friends, and strength of membership. The corresponding Jewish survey regressions, available on request, yield essentially the same results.

We thus arrive at a persistent and powerfully sociological finding. The character of the group—its distinctiveness, costliness, or strictness—does more to explain individual rates of religious participation than does any standard, individual-level characteristic, such as age, sex, race, region, income, education, or marital status. The impact appears across both Christian and Jewish denominations, and it remains strong even after controlling for personal beliefs.²⁴

The Social Correlates of Sectarianism

A final set of predictions concerns the type of people most likely to affiliate with a group that limits one's involvement in alternative activities or constrains one's consumption of secular commodities. Simply put, those most likely to join are those with the least to lose. Losses grow in proportion to both the quantity and the quality of one's ties to the outside world. You are therefore less likely to join (or remain active in) an exclusive sect if you have an extensive set of social ties to friends and family outside the sect. You are more likely to join if you lack many such ties and are still more likely to join if you have friends or family in the sect. Stated in terms of cost and benefit, these predictions seem embarrassingly obvi-

²³ The key result remains robust despite (a) changed samples (e.g., Protestants only, whites only, married respondents, or the exclusion of extreme sects), (b) different estimation techniques (OLS, tobit, or logit), (c) alternate time frames (1984–90, 1972–83, or 1972–90), (d) alternative denominational measures (1990 distinctiveness ranking, 1979 ranking, and denominational dummies that distinguish “liberal Protestants,” “moderate Protestants,” “conservative Protestants,” “sect” members, and Catholics), and (e) the inclusion of additional explanatory variables (political orientation and a variety of attitudinal measures).

²⁴ Some researchers have claimed that Kelley's observations concerning the “institutional” determinants of participation, commitment, and membership were biased by a neglect of “contextual” factors, such as the average age, income, education, and birthrate within the membership of various denominations (Hoge 1979, pp. 193–95). Insofar as Kelley's thesis concerns commitment and participation, the present data support Kelley over his critics. For evidence that the criticism may not even apply to membership growth, see Kelley (1979, pp. 334–43).

ous Yet it took years of research before scholars would accept that a potential member's social ties predict conversion far more accurately than his or her psychological profile

Economic ties work in much the same manner as social ties There is little chance that a successful business executive will forsake all for a strict sect, let alone a wilderness commune The opportunity costs are simply too great But the costs are substantially less, and hence the odds of joining substantially higher, for people with limited secular opportunities, such as those with low wage rates, limited education, or minimal job experience This prediction is consistent with the patterns observed in figure 4 and tables 1 and 2—sect members average the lowest income and education, members of the most churchlike denominations average the highest

The prediction that sects tend to attract individuals with limited secular opportunities has two corollaries First, classes of people experiencing relatively limited secular opportunities (such as minorities, women, and the young) are more likely than others to choose sect membership over mainline church membership Second, a general decline in secular opportunities, such as that which occurs during recessions, will make sectarian groups more attractive relative to nonsectarian groups Both corollaries are strongly supported by previous studies (reviewed in Iannaccone 1988), and logistic regressions, available on request, show that being young, black, female, undereducated, or poor all significantly increase the odds of being a sect member

Limits to Strictness

Kelley's argument would seem to imply that a church always benefits from increased strictness, no matter how strict it is already The Presbyterians would grow faster if they become more like the Southern Baptists, who would, in turn, grow faster if they became more like the Mormons In fact, Kelley himself has stated that "strong organizations are strict the stricter the stronger" (Kelley 1986, p. 95)²⁵ In contrast, the present model implies that organizational strictness displays diminishing returns and that the optimal amount of strictness will depend on the socioeconomic characteristics of the members

To see this, recall that in the rational choice model, increased strictness

²⁵ Kelley (1986, pp. 95–96) did follow this assertion with the parenthetical proviso that "there may be a point of diminishing returns beyond which increasing strictness does not produce significantly greater strength, and might in fact prove counterproductive" But his theoretical argument and real-world examples admit no such exceptions

adds to the attractiveness of a church only because its benefits outweigh its costs. The benefits take the form of greater group participation, commitment, or solidarity. These benefits can be quite large, since free riding is a serious problem. But they are not infinite. They must be set against the costs of strictness, costs that take the form of stigma, self-sacrifice, social isolation, and limited opportunities to earn "secular" rewards or to enjoy "worldly" pleasures. As a group becomes progressively more strict, it eventually reaches a point beyond which the additional benefits of increased strictness are outweighed by additional costs.

Consider, for example, a group that has already isolated itself geographically, thereby eliminating all part-time members (at the cost of secular social ties and occupations). It is not at all clear that people who join such a group would also wish to submit to ritual disfigurement, vows of silence, regular fasting, or the rejection of all modern conveniences. Rather, it is clear that beyond some point increased strictness/costliness *must* drive away virtually all current and potential members. Even though hundreds were willing to join the Bhagwan Rajneesh in Antelope, Oregon, few would have followed him to the Arctic Circle. For any target population of potential members, there will therefore exist an *optimal* level of strictness. Groups that exceed this level will tend to scare off many potential members with what are perceived as excessive demands. Groups that fall short of this level of strictness will suffer from free-rider problems and hence from a pervasive lack of commitment that leaves many potential members feeling that the group has little to offer.

Kelley's thesis and data thus address only one tail of a two-tailed phenomenon. Closer inspection should reveal the existence of another class of unsuccessful groups, those that are so strict and sectarian that they simply wither and die. Stark and Bainbridge's (1985) study of more than 400 American-born sects strongly confirms this prediction. Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh Day Adventists notwithstanding, only 6% of all identifiable American sects are growing rapidly. Moreover, "nearly a third of all sects (32 percent) reached their high-water mark on the day they began. Twenty-one percent of these sects began to decline in membership from their very first day. Another 11 percent have not grown since formation" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, pp. 133-34). Relating these growth rates to the sects' levels of tension with society, Stark and Bainbridge (1985, p. 134) arrived at a conclusion that fits the rational choice model perfectly. "Many sects fail to grow (and are never transformed into churches) because their initial level of tension is so high as to cause their early social encapsulation. Once encapsulated, a sect may persist for centuries, depending on fertility and the ability to minimize defection, but it will rarely be able to recruit an outsider."

The Dynamics of Strictness

The notion of optimal strictness becomes especially important in a changing social environment. To remain strong, a group must maintain a certain distance or tension between itself and society. But maintaining this "optimal gap" means walking a very fine line in adjusting to social change so as not to become too deviant, but not embracing change so fully as to lose all distinctiveness.

This principle appears to characterize the Mormon church's response to the change in women's roles from 1940 through 1987. Iannaccone and Miles's (1990) time-series analysis suggests that the Mormon church may have skirted the twin dangers of intransigence and loss of distinctiveness by a combination of initial resistance to social change followed ultimately by long-run accommodation. They conclude that "particularly in dynamic social environments churches must engage in a continuing balancing act, trading off between religious traditions and social norms. A certain amount of tension with secular society is essential to success—the trick is finding, and maintaining, the right amount."

No group illustrates this continuing balancing act more dramatically than the Amish. As Kraybill (1989*a*, 1989*b*) has shown, the Amish have, throughout this century, engaged in "a dynamic process of negotiation which enables them to retain their ethnic identity while simultaneously adapting to economic pressures. The negotiated compromises permit the use of tractors at the barn but not in the fields, the hiring of cars and trucks but not ownership, the use of telephones in shops but not in homes, the use of modern farm machinery, if pulled by horses, and the use of hydraulic power in lieu of electricity" (Kraybill 1989*b*, p. 8).²⁶ These examples of selective adaptation challenge our image of the rigid sect, dogmatically determined to resist change at all cost. Strategic, cost-benefit calculations shape the "strange" practices of an extreme sect no less than they shape the "normal" practices of a mainstream church.

Knowing Where to Give In

A final extension to Kelley's thesis concerns the kinds of strict demands that benefit a church versus the kinds that backfire. Here the conclusion is straightforward: successful strictness must involve the sacrifice of external (nongroup) resources and opportunities that the group can itself re-

²⁶ This strategy appears to have been quite successful, since it has coincided with a growth rate far exceeding that of the Mennonites and the Brethren, two closely related Anabaptist groups that have followed much more assimilative courses (Kraybill 1989*b*).

place. In other words, a group can afford to prohibit or put out of reach only those "commodities" for which it offers a close substitute. Arbitrary strictness will fail just as surely as excessive strictness. Indeed, being strict about the "wrong" things will be perceived as "excessive" strictness. It is not hard to identify examples. Cults and communes that isolate themselves geographically, thereby depriving their members of the normal means of production, must provide an internal productive economy based on farming, manufacture and trade, or the like. Sects that isolate their members socially must provide alternative social networks with ample opportunities for interaction, friendship, and status.

Climbing out on a speculative limb, I would suggest that, in the last generation, the Catholic church in America has suffered from a failure to abide by this principle. I suspect that Kelley identifies only one-half of the problem when he attributes Catholic membership losses to the Vatican II reforms, whereby the church "leaped over the wall" to join the liberal, 'relevant,' ecumenical churches" (1986, pp. 33–35). The other half of the problem is found in its hard-line positions on birth control and priestly celibacy. The Catholic church may have managed to arrive at a remarkable, "worst of both worlds" position—discarding cherished distinctiveness in the areas of liturgy, theology, and lifestyle, while at the same time maintaining the very demands that its members and clergy are least willing to accept.²⁷

CONCLUSION

The strength of strict churches is neither a historical coincidence nor a statistical artifact. Strictness reduces free riding. It screens out members who lack commitment and stimulates participation among those who remain. Rational choice theory thus explains the success of sects, cults, and conservative denominations without recourse to assumed abnormality, irrationality, or misinformation. The theory also predicts differences between strict and lenient groups, distinguishes between effective and counterproductive demands, and demonstrates the need to adapt strict demands in response to social change.

The rational choice theory of organizational strictness accounts for empirical regularities that have fascinated sociologists for most of a century. Mainstream churches and extremist sects emerge as analytically distinct modes of religious organization rather than as ad hoc descriptive categories. The empirical correlates of sectarianism are derived as formal

²⁷ This interpretation may help to harmonize the apparently divergent conclusions drawn by Kelley, who sees Vatican II as a costly sellout, and by Greeley (1985), who sees *Humanae Vitae* as inducing a widespread reduction in Catholic commitment.

consequences of a sectarian strategy aimed at enhancing group commitment

Survey data strongly confirm the theory's key predictions. Members of stricter denominations devote more time and money to their religions and are more likely to describe themselves as strong members of their faith. They socialize more extensively with fellow members and are less involved in secular organizations. They have, on the average, lower incomes and less education. The patterns hold across the full spectrum of denominations, Christian and Jewish.

Other predictions await further research and better data. A study of unsuccessful sects is needed to test the theory's prediction that too much strictness causes just as much harm as too little. A study of the content of sectarian demands would help test the prediction that successful groups must provide substitutes for the external rewards that they effectively prohibit. Results from studies like these might also indicate whether the rational choice model is more consistent with observation than models derived from alternative social-psychological assumptions.

Like Kelley's original study, this article has addressed the issue of church growth only indirectly. I have tended to assume that "strong" churches—churches with high rates of commitment, participation, and contributions—will find it much easier to achieve high rates of growth. This assumption certainly seems reasonable and is supported by empirical studies of church growth (Iannaccone et al. 1993). However, it blurs the distinction between necessary and sufficient. In commercial markets, the strongest firms are not always the fastest growing. Highly profitable businesses sometimes choose to maintain their current size and forgo an increased market share. The Amish have pursued an analogous strategy in the religious marketplace. The current, static version of the strict church model does not adequately address this distinction. A dynamic version is needed to clarify the relationship between the strength and growth.

Rational choice theories of religious behavior are new, provocative, and relatively undeveloped. This article has explored one such theory and has thereby sought to show how costly, apparently unproductive, demands can strengthen an organization and benefit its members. The relative ease with which it has integrated Kelley's strict church thesis, traditional church-sect typologies, and the basic features of American denominationalism suggests that further work is well worth the effort.

APPENDIX

An Example of Free Riding in Heterogeneous Populations

This appendix analyzes a simple, game-theoretic version of the model described in the body of this article. The population consists of two

		LOW	HIGH
LOW		2 2	1 4
HIGH		4 1	3 3

FIG A1 —Both actors uncommitted

types of people, the religiously committed type Cs and the relatively uncommitted type Us. They make only two decisions: whether to join any given religious group and, contingent on joining, whether to maintain a high or a low level of participation. Each person acts rationally, choosing the group and level of personal participation that maximizes his or her welfare. Personal welfare depends on the person's own decisions and those of others. Specifically, each person's welfare rises when the other members of the group increase their participation levels. These assumptions capture the key features of the general model described in the body of the article. (Note that the model also accommodates a third type of person—type I, who is religiously indifferent or antagonistic. By definition, type I people derive no utility from religion. They will not join any religious group, and hence need not concern us further.)

Formal setup —We may model the situation with a series of matrices that specify the payoffs that people receive from their actions and from those of others. (The specific payoffs are unimportant, only their relative magnitudes matter.) Figure A1 describes the possible outcomes in a group consisting solely of uncommitted, type U, people. For simplicity, imagine that the group consists of just two people whose participation levels are noted along the top and side of the matrix. (Essentially the same argument applies to groups of three or more. In that case, however, the matrix depicts the situation from a single member's perspective. His or her own participation level is listed along the top and those of the other members are listed along the side.) The cells of the matrix show the net payoffs accruing to each member contingent on the choices they both make. The number above the diagonal is the payoff to the member whose choice is listed on top, and the number below the diagonal is the net payoff to the member whose choice is listed on the side. For example, if both choose low levels of participation, they end up in the top left cell, and each earns a payoff of two. If both choose high levels of participation, they end up in the bottom right cell, and each earns a payoff of three. When the members choose different levels of participation (top right and

		LOW	HIGH
LOW		4	3
	4		5
HIGH		5	6
	3		6

FIG A2 —Both actors committed

bottom left), the member with the low level of participation earns a payoff of four (since he or she free rides off the other member's high participation without making a corresponding contribution), whereas the member with the high level of participation earns only one (since his or her costly involvement went unmatched). Taken as a whole, the choices yield the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, in which each member is tempted to free ride off the other. The temptation arises because, regardless of whether the first member chooses a high or low level of participation, the second member maximizes his or her personal payoff by choosing a low level. Hence, the group is likely to gravitate toward the top left cell, with low levels of participation, and low levels of reward, all around. This outcome becomes progressively more likely as the size of the group, and hence the difficulty of monitoring the others, increases.

The situation is different for the more committed, type C people. Their payoff matrix, depicted in figure A2, does not lead to a Prisoner's Dilemma. Here, a low level of participation is no longer the dominant strategy. Rather, as long as the first person maintains a high level of participation, the second does best by responding in kind. In other words, type C people are not tempted to free ride. They therefore are likely to end up in the bottom right cell, enjoying the benefits of a high-powered group.

Free riding —Consider now the problems that arise when different types of people are able to mix. We have seen that a group consisting solely of type C people can maintain high levels of participation, and so be "strong," whereas a group of type U people tends toward low levels of participation, and so is "weak." (This result has nothing to do with differing levels of self-interest, rationality, or altruism among the two groups. Rather it depends entirely on the different costs and benefits they derive from group participation.) In practice, however, these two groups have difficulty existing side by side. The payoff structures are such that everyone prefers to be in groups where the other members maintain high levels of participation. Hence, type U people will tend to migrate from

	LOW	HIGH
LOW	2 4	1 5
HIGH	4 3	3 6

FIG. A3 —Mixed committed actor is along the side, uncommitted actor is at the top

the weak groups to strong ones (The migration cannot be prevented unless it is possible to ascertain people's true character or to accurately monitor their actual level of participation) The resulting mixed groups will have payoff structures like those in figure A3. In this matrix, which depicts the decisions of a type U person along the top and the decisions of a type C person along the side, the payoffs above the diagonal come from figure A1 and the payoffs below the diagonal come from figure A2. Examining the payoffs, we find that the type U person has the same unconditional incentive to free ride as in figure A1. But if the type U person maintains a low level of participation, the type C person has no incentive to do otherwise. Hence, the presence of type U people undermines what would otherwise be a strong group of type C people. The less committed people free ride, holding back resources of time, energy, and so forth from the group. And, faced with this free riding, even the committed members find it no longer worth their bother to participate fully (because their contributions to the group are effectively "stolen" by free riders). The situation therefore tends to degenerate until no one is participating fully. This result is inefficient because the type Cs end up worse off than before (earning a payoff of four rather than six) whereas the type Us end up no better off (since they earn two either way). Free riding has made all groups weak.

A costly solution —Figure A4 shows how seemingly gratuitous costs can mitigate the free-rider problem found in matrix A3. The cost consists of a uniform one-unit membership penalty. Members pay the penalty regardless of their participation level. Hence, all payoffs are one less than in the original mixed-group matrix, A3. If uncommitted people join this group they will make it just as weak as any of the others they join (since low participation is still their dominant strategy), but having done so they will find themselves in the top left cell earning a one-unit payoff (their standard two-unit payoff minus the one-unit membership cost). Since this one-unit payoff is less than they earn in a standard weak group,

	LOW	HIGH
LOW	1 3	0 4
HIGH	3 2	2 5

FIG A4 —Mixed group with one-unit membership cost

such as those depicted in figures A1 or A3, they will forsake the costly group, leaving it to the committed people. But once the Us leave, the Cs will find that they have a viable, albeit costly, strong group, in which all the payoffs are just one unit less than those in the (unobtainable) matrix A2. The Cs will therefore maintain high levels of participation and earn a five-unit payoff. To complete the proof, note that even after the group becomes strong, type U people still have no incentive to rejoin, since the best they can do is no better than the two-unit payoff that they earn in matrix A1.

Apparently gratuitous costs can thus divert uncommitted people from strong groups. Committed people end up forming costly groups, while the less committed people end up in standard groups, and the free riding that otherwise undermines all groups is mitigated. The problem and its apparently bizarre solution both arise as consequences of rational self-interest.

REFERENCES

- Allen, Douglas W. 1990 "An Inquiry into the State's Role in Marriage." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 13: 171-91.
- Bainbridge, William Sims. 1982 "Shaker Demographics, 1840-1900: An Example of the Use of U.S. Census Enumeration Schedules." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 21: 352-65.
- Beck, Scott H., Bettie S. Cole, and Judith A. Hammond. 1991 "Religious Heritage and Premarital Sex: Evidence from a National Sample of Young Adults." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 30 (2): 173-80.
- Cochran, John K., Leonard Beeghley, and E. Wilbur Bock. 1988 "Religiosity and Alcohol Behavior: An Exploration of Reference Group Theory." *Sociological Forum* 3 (2): 256-76.
- Donahue, Michael J. 1991 "Prevalence of New Age Beliefs in Six Protestant Denominations." Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Pittsburgh.
- Douglas, Mary. 1986 *How Institutions Think*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
- Eisner, Allan W. 1967 "Toward a Radical Critique of Church-Sect Typologizing."

- Comment on 'Some Critical Observations on the Church-Sect Dimension ' " *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 6 85-90
- Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark 1988 "Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities, 1906 " *American Sociological Review* 53 41-49
- 1992 *The Churching of America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in America's Religious Economy* New Brunswick, N J: Rutgers University Press
- Goldstein, Sidney, and Barry Kosmin 1991 "Religious and Ethnic Self-Identification in the United States, 1989-90: A Case Study of the Jewish Population " Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Washington, D C
- Greeley, Andrew M 1985 *American Catholics since the Council, an Unauthorized Report* Chicago: Thomas Moore Press
- Greene, William H 1990 *Econometric Analysis* New York: Macmillan
- Hall, John R 1988 "Social Organization and Pathways of Commitment: Types of Communal Groups, Rational Choice Theory, and the Kanter Thesis " *American Sociological Review* 53 679-92
- Hechter, Michael 1987 *Principles of Group Solidarity* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press
- Hines, Robert V 1983 *California's Utopian Colonies* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press
- Hoge, Dean R 1979 "A Test of Denominational Growth and Decline " Pp 179-97 in *Understanding Church Growth and Decline 1950-1978*, edited by Dean R Hoge and David A Roozen New York: Pilgrim Press
- Hoge, Dean R, and David A Roozen 1979 *Technical Appendix to Understanding Church Growth and Decline, 1950-1978* Hartford, Conn: Hartford Seminary Foundation
- Iannaccone, Laurence R 1988 "A Formal Model of Church and Sect " *American Journal of Sociology* 94 S241-S268
- 1992a "Religious Markets and the Economics of Religion " *Social Compass* 39 (1) 123-31
- 1992b "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives " *Journal of Political Economy* 100 (2) 271-91
- In press "Risk, Rationality, and Religious Portfolios " *Economic Inquiry*
- Iannaccone, Laurence R, and Carrie A Miles 1990 "Dealing with Social Change: The Mormon Church's Response to Change in Women's Roles " *Social Forces* 68 (4) 1231-50
- Iannaccone, Laurence R, Rodney Stark, and Daniel V A Olson 1993 "Religious Resources and Church Growth " Paper presented at the meetings of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Raleigh, N C
- Johnson, Benton 1963 "On Church and Sect " *American Sociological Review* 28 539-49
- 1971 "Church and Sect Revisited " *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 10 124-37
- Kanter, Rosabeth M 1973 *Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
- Kelley, Dean M (1972) 1986 *Why Conservative Churches Are Growing: A Study in the Sociology of Religion* Macon, Ga: Mercer University Press
- 1979 "Is Religion a Dependent Variable?" Pp 334-43 in *Understanding Church Growth and Decline, 1950-1978*, edited by Dean R Hoge and David A Roozen New York: Pilgrim Press
- Kraybill, Donald B 1989a *The Riddle of Amish Culture* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

- 1989b "Amish, Mennonites, and Brethren in the Quandry of Modernity, 1880-1980" Paper presented at the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Salt Lake City
- Lawrence, Bruce B 1989 *Defenders of God* San Francisco Harper & Row
- Lazerwitz, Bernard, and Michael Harrison 1979 "American Jewish Denominations A Social and Religious Profile" *American Sociological Review* 44 656-66
- Lofland, John 1977 *Doomsday Cult* New York Wiley
- Olson, Mancur 1965 *The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Robbins, Thomas 1988 *Cults, Converts, and Charisma* London Sage
- Roberts, Keith A 1984 *Religion in Sociological Perspective* Homewood, Ill Dorsey
- Roof, Wade Clark, and William McKinney 1987 *American Mainline Religion* New Brunswick, N J Rutgers University Press
- Singh, Kushwant 1953 *The Sikhs* London Allen & Unwin
- Stark, Rodney 1984 "The Rise of a New World Faith" *Review of Religious Research* 26 18-27
- Stark, Rodney, and William Sims Bainbridge 1985 *The Future of Religion* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Stark, Rodney, and Charles Y Glock 1968 *American Piety* Berkeley University of California Press
- Smith, Adam (1776) 1965 *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* New York Modern Library
- Tamney, Joseph B , Barbara A Bunch, Paul R Stieber, and Deborah L Zigler-Geis 1991 "The New Age in Middletown An Exploratory Study" Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Pittsburgh
- Warner, R Stephen 1993 "Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States" *American Journal of Sociology* 98 1044-93
- Weber, Max (1904-5) 1958 *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons New York Free Press
- (1922) 1963 *The Sociology of Religion*, translated by Ephraim Fischoff Boston Beacon

Weak Ties, Employment, and Inequality: An Equilibrium Analysis¹

James D. Montgomery
Northwestern University

This article adds a simple social structure and pattern of social interaction to a Markov model of employment transitions. In the model, society is composed of many small (two-person) groups. Unemployed individuals find jobs through strong ties (intragroup social interaction), weak ties (random intergroup interaction), and formal channels. Holding constant the total level of social interaction, the author examines how a change in the composition of social interaction affects the steady-state equilibrium. An increase in weak-tie interactions reduces inequality, thereby creating a more equitable distribution of employment across groups. Moreover, an increase in weak-tie interactions increases the steady-state employment rate if inbreeding by employment status among weak ties is sufficiently low.

I INTRODUCTION

Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1982) argued that, because they provide bridges between densely knit clusters of social structure, weak social ties are crucial whenever information is diffused through social interaction. In particular, he argued that weak ties play an important role in the labor market, where they provide job seekers with information from personal contacts in distant parts of the social structure. Subsequently, numerous researchers have addressed the microsociological implications of the "strength-of-weak-ties" hypothesis, by examining whether workers locating jobs through weak ties receive higher wages and status (e.g.,

¹ An early draft of this paper was entitled "The Effect of Weak Ties upon Equilibrium Employment Outcomes." Comments from the *AJS* reviewers greatly improved the exposition. Helpful comments were also received from seminar participants at McMaster, Chicago, and Stanford. Financial support from National Science Foundation grant SES-9109056 is gratefully acknowledged. The author is an assistant professor of economics and Faculty Fellow in the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University. Direct correspondence to James Montgomery, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208.

Bridges and Villemez 1986, Marsden and Hurlbert 1988, Wegener 1991, Montgomery 1992) Although useful for studying micro outcomes, the “egocentric” focus of this literature obscures the macrosociological relationship between social structure, employment, and inequality that is inherent in Granovetter’s analysis If weak ties are replaced by strong ties, society becomes fragmented Because the diffusion of job information is slowed, one might expect (in the new steady state) a lower employment rate and a less equitable distribution of employment throughout the social structure

To explore these macrosociological relationships, I add a simple social structure and pattern of social interaction to a Markov model of employment transitions In the model, the society comprises many small groups (For simplicity, I assume that each group contains two individuals and thus refer to these groups as *dyads* in the analysis below) Unemployed individuals may find jobs through strong ties (intragroup social interaction), weak ties (random intergroup interaction), and formal channels Although the model is quite stylized, it permits evaluation of Granovetter’s conjectures about the relationship between social structure and labor-market outcomes Holding the level of social interaction constant, one may vary the proportion of interaction that occurs through weak ties The analysis demonstrates that a change in the proportion of weak-tie interaction has both “efficiency” and “distributional” effects an increase in weak ties reduces inequality, thereby creating a more equitable steady-state distribution of employment across dyads Moreover, an increase in weak ties increases the steady-state employment rate if inbreeding by employment status among weak ties is sufficiently low

The present analysis focuses exclusively on these macrosociological implications of the strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis However, the model constructed below provides a unified theoretical framework for examining the micro- as well as the macro-implications of this hypothesis Thus, future extensions of the model might help guide and interpret microlevel empirical research After developing the model in Section II and analyzing its macro-implications in Section III, I return to this issue in Section IV

II THE MODEL

Consider a society in which all individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups ² I will refer to these groups as dyads For simplicity, I assume that individuals live forever and that dyadic relationships are

² More generally, one might assume that all individuals belong to n -person groups The present analysis examines the special case in which $n = 2$

permanent (i.e., individuals never change dyad partners). These dyads are the basic unit of analysis in the present model. Assuming that each individual is either employed or unemployed, each dyad is in one of three states: either both members are unemployed, only one member is employed, or both members are employed. Let z represent the number of employed members in a dyad (where $z = 0, 1$, or 2). I assume a continuum of individuals and normalize the mass of the population to one. With d_z representing the mass of dyads in each state, this normalization implies that

$$d_0 + d_1 + d_2 = 1/2, \quad (1)$$

and that the employment rate e may be written

$$e = d_1 + 2d_2 \quad (2)$$

I assume that job information may be transmitted through social interaction (both intragroup and intergroup) and formal channels. Social interaction is stochastic and occurs through pairwise matching. During a short time period, a given individual is either matched with his dyad partner, matched with some other individual drawn randomly from the population, or unmatched. The matching process is stochastically independent across time periods. During the next period, the individual is either matched with the (same) dyad partner, matched with a (different) random other, or unmatched. Each individual thus interacts repeatedly with his or her dyad partner through time.³ In contrast, because I have assumed an infinitely large population, an individual will never interact with the same contact twice through random matching.⁴ Let τ represent the rate of social interaction per unit time and let ω represent the proportion of social interaction that occurs through random matching (where $0 \leq \omega \leq 1$). Thus, an individual is matched with his dyad partner at rate $\tau(1 - \omega)$ and is matched randomly at rate $\tau\omega$.

The social structure and process of social interaction described above are obviously quite stylized. However, this model does represent a departure from the completely "atomistic" models of employment transitions previously considered by economists (cf. Clark and Summers 1979, 1982,

³ Note that the social interactions of dyad partners are not independent: an individual is matched with his dyad partner if and only if the dyad partner is matched to the individual.

⁴ Because my assumptions on social structure (i.e., dyads) and social interaction (i.e., pairwise matching) involve pairs of individuals, readers may experience some confusion. To lessen this, suppose individuals j and k belong to the same dyad. I use the term *dyad partner* to refer to the permanent relationship between j and k , and I use the term *contact* to refer to j 's pairwise-match partner in a given time period. Thus, j 's dyad partner (i.e., k) will sometimes be j 's contact, but j 's contact is not necessarily j 's dyad partner.

Burdett et al 1984, Devine and Kiefer 1991, chap 6)⁵ Because it assumes that jobs are located through social interaction as well as through formal channels, my model may be viewed as an (admittedly primitive) attempt to capture the "embeddedness" of economic actors in social relationships (Granovetter 1985)

Moreover, the model offers a potentially useful formalization of Granovetter's (1973) conception of social structure.⁶ In the present setting, the strength of a social tie corresponds to the duration of a relationship. The relationship between dyad partners, who are matched repeatedly through time, is interpreted as a "strong tie." Because social interaction occurring through random matching is transitory, these relationships are interpreted as "weak ties." Pairwise matches between dyad partners are thus strong-tie matches, random matches are weak-tie matches. Holding constant the level of social interaction (τ), one may vary the proportion of social interaction occurring through weak ties (ω). At one extreme ($\omega = 0$), individuals interact only with their strong ties (i.e., dyad partners) so that the society is fragmented into isolated cliques. At the other extreme ($\omega = 1$), social interaction occurs entirely through weak ties drawn randomly from throughout the society. Between these extremes ($0 < \omega < 1$), interaction occurs through both strong ties (i.e., dyadic matching) and weak ties (i.e., random matching).

Given this interpretation, this model departs somewhat from Granovetter's original graph-theoretic intuition. I formalize weak ties as transitory relationships rather than permanent relationships with infrequent interaction. However, the model remains useful because it permits evaluation of Granovetter's conjectures about the relationship between social structure and labor-market outcomes.⁷ In Section III, I examine the relationship between the composition of social interaction (ω) and the equilibrium levels of employment and inequality in the society. Because the macrosociological implications of Granovetter's hypothesis have been obscured by the egocentric focus of recent empirical work, the analysis focuses exclusively on these implications. However, as discussed in Section IV, the present framework could also be used to examine microsociological implications of the strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis, thus helping to guide and interpret microlevel empirical research.

I now complete the description of the model by specifying the transition

⁵ See Coleman (1964, 495–505) for a related attempt to add social structure to a Markov process. He examines the diffusion of medical information among doctors, some of whom share offices with a partner.

⁶ See Boorman (1975) and Fararo and Skvoretz (1987) for alternative formulations.

⁷ Although the Fararo and Skvoretz (1987) biased-net formalization seems closer to Granovetter's original intuition, their framework does not permit a comparable analytical analysis. Numerical simulations following Skvoretz (1990) might be an interesting direction for future research.

of individuals and dyads between employment states. My description here is informal. Readers interested in a more formal development should refer to Appendix A, where I specify the model in discrete time and then derive the continuous-time equations stated below by taking limits as the period length becomes infinitesimal.

The probability that an unemployed individual learns of a job through social interaction depends on the employment status of the individual's contact. To simplify the analysis, I assume that an employed contact (either the strong dyadic tie or a weak random tie) knows of a job opening with probability ϕ_c , while an unemployed contact (either the strong or a weak tie) never knows of a job opening.⁸ One might argue that Granovetter (1973, 1974) intends that tie strength should influence the probability that a contact knows of a job opening (even after conditioning on the contact's employment status). To examine this claim, future extensions of the model might specify more completely the process by which contacts obtain, store, and diffuse information. However, as reported in Section III, the proportion of social interaction occurring through weak ties (ω) has important macrosociological consequences even if tie strength per se does not influence the probability that a contact knows of a job.

Let s represent the employment status of the individual's dyad partner; the dyad partner may be either employed ($s = 1$) or unemployed ($s = 0$). Although one might assume that an unemployed individual's random-match contacts would be employed with probability e (equal to the employment rate in the population), the tendency for social ties to form between individuals with similar characteristics is well documented in the social network literature (Marsden 1988). In the present setting, one might thus assume that randomly matched individuals would be more likely to share the same employment status than chance would dictate.⁹ To allow for the possibility of an "inbreeding bias" by employment status among random-match contacts, I assume that an unemployed individual's random-match contact is employed with probability αe (where $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$).¹⁰ By varying the inbreeding parameter α , the model permits

⁸ The present analysis does not attempt to explain why firms might prefer to hire workers through employee referral. Elsewhere (Montgomery 1991), I discuss several possibilities and formalize one explanation. Even if employers do not strictly prefer referred workers, job seekers with employed contacts might be the first to learn of new openings.

⁹ Such inbreeding may be induced by "substructures" that inhibit social interaction between dissimilar individuals (Blau 1977, Marsden 1990).

¹⁰ Setting $\alpha > 1$ creates an "outbreeding bias" since random-match contacts would be *less* likely to share the same employment status than chance would dictate. Note that outbreeding may be limited (inducing an upper bound on α) because the number of unemployed-employed matchings cannot exceed the number of employed individuals (see Rytina and Morgan 1982).

unbiased random matching ($\alpha = 1$), complete inbreeding by employment status ($\alpha = 0$), or incomplete inbreeding ($0 < \alpha < 1$)

Now consider the rate at which unemployed individuals find jobs through social interaction. An unemployed individual is matched to his strong tie at rate $\tau(1 - \omega)$. Conditional upon being matched with his strong tie, the individual finds employment with probability $s\phi_c$. The individual is matched to a weak tie at rate $\tau\omega$. Conditional upon being matched with a weak tie, the individual finds employment with probability $\alpha e\phi_c$. Thus, individuals find jobs through social interaction at rate $\tau(1 - \omega)s\phi_c + \tau\omega\alpha e\phi_c$.

To complete the specification of the unemployment-to-employment transition, let ϕ_f represent the rate at which unemployed individuals find jobs through formal channels. Although my notation does not make the dependence explicit, I assume that ϕ_c and ϕ_f may be either constant or decreasing in e . While the model abstracts away from employers' decisions to create or destroy jobs, the assumption that ϕ_c and ϕ_f are decreasing in e captures (in a simple yet fairly general way) the effect of the existing vacancy structure (see White 1970, Sørensen 1977) on the equilibrium employment rate. Assuming a fixed number of jobs, an increase in the employment rate reduces the number of vacancies, presumably making it more difficult for the unemployed to locate jobs (through either social interaction or formal channels).

Adding together job-finding rates through social interaction and formal channels, the unemployment-to-employment transition rate λ may be written

$$\lambda(e, s) = \tau[(1 - \omega)s + \omega\alpha e]\phi_c + \phi_f \quad (3)$$

If we let λ_e and λ_u represent the unemployment-to-employment transition rates given that the individual's strong tie is employed ($s = 1$) or unemployed ($s = 0$), we obtain

$$\lambda_e(e) = \tau[(1 - \omega) + \omega\alpha e]\phi_c + \phi_f, \quad (4a)$$

$$\lambda_u(e) = \tau\omega\alpha e\phi_c + \phi_f \quad (4b)$$

To simplify notation, I suppress the dependence of these transition rates on the employment rate e (as well as the social-interaction parameters τ , ω , and α) and write them as λ_e and λ_u .

In Section III I examine the effect of the composition of social interaction (ω) on equilibrium inequality and employment. To build intuition for these results, it is useful to note here the effect of a change in ω on the transition rates λ_e and λ_u . If all social interaction occurs through weak ties, an unemployed individual's transition rate is not influenced by the employment status of his strong tie. $\lambda_e = \lambda_u$ if we assume $\omega =$

1 But as a larger proportion of social interaction occurs through strong ties, unemployed individuals with employed strong ties benefit while those with unemployed strong ties suffer λ_e rises and λ_u falls as ω decreases. Thus, unemployed individuals with employed strong ties have the advantage assuming that strong-tie matches sometimes occur $\lambda_e > \lambda_u$ for all $\omega < 1$.

Note further that the relationships between ω and the transition rates λ_e and λ_u depend on the level of inbreeding by employment status among weak ties (α). Given little inbreeding (i.e., $\alpha \approx 1$), weak-tie contacts are frequently informed of job openings. A decrease in ω thus generates a relatively large decrease in λ_u and a relatively small increase in λ_e . But if inbreeding is strong (i.e., $\alpha \approx 0$), most weak-tie contacts of unemployed individuals are themselves unemployed, a reduction in this form of social interaction has little effect on job-finding rates. A decrease in ω thus generates a negligible decrease in λ_u and a relatively large increase in λ_e .

Having specified the transition from unemployment to employment, I must also specify the process by which employed individuals become unemployed. I assume that employed individuals lose jobs at rate δ , where (for simplicity) this transition rate is independent across dyad partners.¹¹ Although one might expect job loss to be correlated across dyad partners (particularly in cases where one dyad partner located his job through the other partner), I leave this possibility for future work.

Although I have been describing the model from an individual's perspective, the employment transitions of dyad partners are interdependent. To determine the steady-state equilibrium, one must consider the flows of dyads between states 0, 1, and 2. These flows are depicted in figure 1. Given that each unemployed individual with an unemployed strong tie enters employment at rate λ_u , that dyads in state 0 contain two such individuals, and that d_0 dyads are in this state, the flow of dyads from state 0 to state 1 is $2\lambda_u d_0$. Similarly, because each of the dyads in state 1 contains one unemployed individual who enters employment at rate λ_e , the flow of dyads from state 1 to state 2 is $\lambda_e d_1$. Finally, because dyads in state 2 contain two employed individuals while dyads in state 1 contain only one, the flow from state 2 to state 1 is $2\delta d_2$, while the flow from state 1 to state 0 is δd_1 .

Let d_i represent the derivative of d_i with respect to time. Given the flows depicted in figure 1, the net flow of dyads from each state may be

¹¹ Although I have assumed that individuals live forever and never change dyad partners, a second (formally equivalent) interpretation of the model is possible: individuals die at rate δ and vacant dyad positions are filled immediately by (newly born) unemployed individuals.




FIG 1 —Flows of dyads between states

written

$$d_0 = -2\lambda_u d_0 + \delta d_1, \quad (5a)$$

$$d_1 = 2\lambda_u d_0 - \lambda_e d_1 - \delta d_1 + 2\delta d_2, \quad (5b)$$

and

$$\dot{d}_2 = \lambda_e d_1 - 2\delta d_2 \quad (5c)$$

A steady-state equilibrium requires that each of these net flows is equal to zero ¹²

III EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF WEAK TIES

Having specified the model, I now consider the following question. If we assume that the level of social interaction is held constant, how does a change in the proportion of weak-tie interactions affect the steady-state equilibrium? I may briefly summarize my results by noting that an increase in weak-tie interactions always has a positive “distributional” effect, thereby generating a more equitable steady-state distribution of employment across dyads. Moreover, if inbreeding by employment status among weak ties is small (i.e., $\alpha \approx 1$), an increase in weak-tie interactions also has a positive “efficiency” effect, which increases the steady-state employment rate. However, if inbreeding by employment status among weak ties is sufficiently large (i.e., $\alpha \ll 1$), an increase in weak-tie interactions decreases the equilibrium employment rate.

Although it is straightforward to measure efficiency by considering the equilibrium employment rate, inequality (and thus the distributional impact of a change in social interaction) might be measured in various ways. In the context of the present model, I define inequality as γ where

$$\gamma \equiv \frac{e(1-e) - d_1}{e(1-e)} \quad (6)$$

¹² More formally, a steady-state equilibrium requires a triple $\{d_0^*, d_1^*, d_2^*\}$, which satisfies eq. (1) and implies $\dot{d}_0 = \dot{d}_1 = \dot{d}_2 = 0$.

Using equation (6) along with equations (1) and (2), the mass of dyads in each state may be written as a function of the employment rate and inequality

$$d_0 = (\frac{1}{2})(1 - e)^2 + (\frac{1}{2})\gamma e(1 - e), \quad (7a)$$

$$d_1 = e(1 - e) - \gamma e(1 - e), \quad (7b)$$

and

$$d_2 = (\frac{1}{2})e^2 + (\frac{1}{2})\gamma e(1 - e) \quad (7c)$$

Thus, at each point in time, the state of the society is summarized by the pair $\{e, \gamma\}$

To build intuition for the inequality measure defined in equation (6), the reader might imagine that the employment rate was fixed at e and that jobs were randomly allocated to individuals independent of the employment status of their dyad partners. Because each individual would be employed with probability e and unemployed with probability $1 - e$, each dyad would be in state 0 with probability $(1 - e)^2$, in state 1 with probability $2e(1 - e)$, and in state 2 with probability e^2 . Because I have normalized the mass of dyads to $\frac{1}{2}$, randomization thus implies $d_0 = (\frac{1}{2})(1 - e)^2$, $d_1 = e(1 - e)$, and $d_2 = (\frac{1}{2})e^2$. Because $e(1 - e)$ dyads are in state 1, equation (6) implies that inequality would be zero. However, given $\gamma > 0$, equations (7a)–(7c) imply that there are “too few” dyads in state 1 and “too many” dyads in states 0 and 2 relative to the randomized outcome. Note that I have normalized the inequality measure so that $\gamma \leq 1$.

The inequality measure γ may be motivated in a second way. Let $\text{prob}\{E|j\}$ represent the probability that an individual is employed given that the strong tie is either employed ($j = E$) or unemployed ($j = U$) so that

$$\text{prob}\{E|E\} = \frac{2d_2}{e} = e + \gamma(1 - e), \quad (8a)$$

and

$$\text{prob}\{E|U\} = \frac{d_1}{1 - e} = (1 - \gamma)e \quad (8b)$$

When inequality is zero, the probability that an individual is employed does not depend upon the employment status of the individual's strong tie: $\text{prob}\{E|E\} = \text{prob}\{E|U\} = e$. However, as inequality rises, strong ties increasingly link individuals with the same employment status: $\text{prob}\{E|E\}$ rises and $\text{prob}\{E|U\}$ falls. As inequality reaches its maximum

($\gamma = 1$), dyad partners always share the same employment status $\text{prob}\{E|E\} = 1$ and $\text{prob}\{E|U\} = 0$

The society is in steady-state equilibrium when the net flow of dyads from each state (0, 1, and 2) is zero. Substituting equations (7a)–(7c) into equations (5a) and (5c), the net flows may be written as functions of e and γ . Letting e^* and γ^* represent the equilibrium employment rate and inequality level, a steady state requires $\{e^*, \gamma^*\}$ such that

$$d_0 = (1 - e^*)[\delta e^* - \lambda_u^*(1 - e^*) - \gamma^* e^*(\delta + \lambda_u^*)] = 0, \quad (9a)$$

and

$$d_2 = e^*[\lambda_e^*(1 - e^*) - \delta e^* - \gamma^*(1 - e^*)(\lambda_e^* + \delta)] = 0, \quad (9b)$$

where $\lambda_u^* \equiv \lambda_u(e^*)$ and $\lambda_e^* \equiv \lambda_e(e^*)$. Although I have omitted the expression for the net flow of dyads from state 1, note $d_1 = -d_0 - d_2$ so that $d_1 = 0$ if equations (9a) and (9b) are satisfied.

A formal analysis of the model is presented in Appendix B, where I prove the following theorems.

THEOREM 1 — *If $\phi_f(0) > 0$, there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium $\{e^*, \gamma^*\}$ where $\gamma^* > (=) 0$ if $\omega < (=) 1$.*

Theorem 1 states that equilibrium inequality is always (at least weakly) positive.¹³ A corollary to this theorem follows immediately from equations (8a) and (8b).

COROLLARY — *In steady state, $\text{prob}\{E|E\} > (=) e^* > (=) \text{prob}\{E|U\}$ if $\omega < (=) 1$.*

That is, individuals with employed strong ties are more likely themselves to be employed than the random allocation of jobs would dictate (assuming strong-tie interactions sometimes occur). Conversely, individuals with unemployed strong ties have a probability of employment that is (at least weakly) less than e^* . The next two theorems indicate how a change in the composition of social interaction affects equilibrium employment and inequality.

THEOREM 2 — *Holding τ constant, γ^* is decreasing in ω .*

Thus, weak ties have a positive “distributional” effect: holding constant the level of social interaction, equilibrium inequality falls as the proportion of weak-tie interactions increases.

THEOREM 3 — *Holding τ constant, e^* is increasing in ω if and only if $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}(e^*)$ where $0 < \bar{\alpha}(e^*) < 1$.*

¹³ The condition $\phi_f(0) > 0$ in theorem 1 rules out the possibility that a second equilibrium exists at zero employment. If $\phi_f(0) = 0$, individuals leave unemployment only by interacting with employed personal contacts. However, if the initial employment rate is zero, no contacts will be employed. Thus, an equilibrium would exist for $e^* = 0$.

Weak ties may have either a positive or negative efficiency effect: an increase in the proportion of weak-tie interactions raises the equilibrium employment rate if and only if inbreeding by employment status among weak ties is sufficiently low. In particular, an increase in ω raises e^* when there is no inbreeding ($\alpha = 1$) and decreases e^* when inbreeding is complete ($\alpha = 0$).

To build intuition for these results, consider first a society in which all social interaction occurs through weak ties (i.e., $\omega = 1$). Because dyad partners never interact, dyadic relationships are irrelevant. Employment status is not correlated across dyad partners, the distribution of dyads across employment states is that which would be generated by randomly allocating jobs to individuals (with probability e^*) independent of the employment status of their dyad partners. Inequality is thus equal to zero. As stated in theorem 1 and its corollary, $\omega = 1$ implies $\gamma^* = 0$ and $\text{prob}\{E|E\} = \text{prob}\{E|U\} = e^*$.

Now suppose that the proportion of social interaction occurring through strong ties increases (i.e., ω decreases) while the level of social interaction (τ) is held constant. As noted above, unemployed individuals with employed strong ties benefit from this change (λ_e increases) while those with unemployed strong ties suffer (λ_u decreases). As shown in figure 1, the transition rate of dyads from state 0 to state 1 decreases while the transition rate from state 1 to 2 increases. In the new steady state, there will be too few dyads in state 1 and too many dyads in states 0 and 2 relative to random allocation: the middle of the distribution shrinks while the tails grow. Inequality thus increases as the proportion of strong-tie interaction increases. As stated in theorem 2, γ^* increases as ω decreases. Because $\gamma^* = 0$ for $\omega = 1$, theorem 2 implies the strict inequalities in theorem 1 and its corollary

$$\gamma^* > 0,$$

and

$$\text{prob}\{E|E\} > e^* > \text{prob}\{E|U\},$$

for all $\omega < 1$. Strong-tie interactions thus induce a positive level of inequality and a positive correlation of employment status across dyad partners.

Consider further the "efficiency" effect of an increase in the proportion of strong-tie interactions. As ω falls, the increase in λ_e tends to increase the equilibrium employment rate while the decrease in λ_u tends to decrease this rate. Because relative changes in the λ 's depend on the inbreeding bias by employment status among weak ties, the inbreeding parameter α determines which effect dominates. Given no inbreeding (i.e., $\alpha = 1$), a decrease in ω generates a relatively large decrease in λ_u .

and a relatively small increase in λ_e so that e^* falls. Given complete inbreeding (i.e., $\alpha = 0$), a decrease in ω generates no change in λ_u and an increase in λ_e so that e^* rises. Because e^* falls for $\alpha = 1$ and rises for $\alpha = 0$, one might expect that a decrease in ω would generate no change in e^* for some intermediate value $\tilde{\alpha}$ between 0 and 1.

Approaching theorem 3 more intuitively, note that social interaction generates employment only if an unemployed individual is matched with an employed contact. From an efficiency perspective, social interaction between two individuals sharing the same employment status (either both employed or both unemployed) is "wasted." Theorem 2 implies that a decrease in the proportion of weak-tie interaction (ω) increases inequality and induces a stronger correlation of employment status across dyad partners. As ω falls, strong-tie interactions are thus more likely to involve dyad partners who are either both employed or both unemployed, more social interaction is wasted and the equilibrium employment rate, e^* , falls. However, an increase in inbreeding by employment status among weak ties (i.e., a decrease in α) increases the likelihood of unemployed-unemployed weak-tie matches so that social interaction through weak ties may also be wasted. If inbreeding is sufficiently strong (i.e., α sufficiently small), a decrease in the proportion of weak-tie interaction ω may thus increase rather than decrease the equilibrium employment rate, e^* .

Overall, the model suggests that equity and efficiency are maximal in "well-mixed" populations (see Rapoport 1963). Dyadic relationships represent structural "clumps" that inhibit population mixing and generate an inequitable distribution of employment across dyads (cf. Granovetter 1982, pp. 105–6). Because dyad partners are likely to share the same employment status, strong-tie interactions are, from an efficiency perspective, often wasted. If we assume that inbreeding by employment status among weak ties is low, the equilibrium employment rate thus decreases as the proportion of strong-tie interactions increases. However, such inbreeding represents a second way in which population mixing may be inhibited. If inbreeding is strong, unemployed individuals are likely to be matched with unemployed weak ties so that much weak-tie interaction is also wasted from an efficiency perspective. In this case, the equilibrium employment rate may be increasing as the proportion of strong-tie interactions rises.

IV TOWARD A MICROSOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Although the preceding analysis focused exclusively on the macrosociological implications of the strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis, the model developed above offers a unified theoretical framework for examining micro- as well as macrosociological relationships. Recent research has

examined the correlation between wages (or socioeconomic status) and the strength of the social tie used to find a job (Bridges and Villemez 1986, Marsden and Hurlbert 1988, Wegener 1991). Because this correlation becomes insignificant after controlling for worker characteristics, Bridges and Villemez argue that tie strength does not represent an important dimension of social resources. However, based on my analysis of a job-search model, I have shown elsewhere (Montgomery 1992) that this (negative) empirical finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis. Moreover, because that model predicts a correlation between the size and composition of a job seeker's network and the job seeker's reservation wage, I have suggested that researchers should focus more attention on job seekers' network structures (see also Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert 1986).

Because the model constructed in Section II does not specify the particular wages received by employed workers, it sheds little light on the empirical research just described. However, by extending the model so that wages differ across jobs (and assuming that employed contacts transmit offers correlated with their own wages),¹⁴ one could derive the predicted relationship among wages, the strength of the social tie used to find a job, and network structure (i.e., the wage earned by the job seeker's strong tie).¹⁵ To reevaluate the claim made by Bridges and Villemez (1986), one might consider whether the inequality

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\text{wage} \mid \text{found job through weak tie}\} \\ > E\{\text{wage} \mid \text{found job through strong tie}\} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

is predicted by the (extended) model. Following my (Montgomery 1992) suggestion to focus on network structure, one might also examine whether the (extended) model predicts a positive correlation between the wages of individuals linked by strong ties (i.e., dyad partners).

Analysis of these microsociological relationships must await a more complete specification of the extended model. However, the analysis in Section III has demonstrated that the composition of social interaction has important macrosociological implications: an increase in the proportion of weak ties decreases inequality and (potentially) increases employment. Assuming that the extended model does not necessarily imply inequality (10), the Bridges and Villemez result should not be taken as

¹⁴ In the simplest case, individuals would be either (*U*) unemployed, (*H*) employed in a high-wage job, or (*L*) employed in a low-wage job. Dyads would thus occupy six distinct states (*UU*, *UH*, *UL*, *HH*, *LH*, *LL*).

¹⁵ One could also derive the implications of the (extended) model for the length of unemployment spells, conditioned on either the type of tie ultimately used to find a job or the strong tie's employment status.

evidence against the strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis. Given the current state of theoretical research, the macro implications of this hypothesis seem clearer than the micro implications. Additional formal theorizing is needed to guide and interpret micro research on job finding and social tie strength.

V CONCLUSION

By embedding a simple social structure and pattern of social interaction in a Markov model of employment transitions, I have explored the macrosociological relationship between weak ties, employment, and inequality that is implicit in Granovetter's (1973, 1974, 1982) strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis. My analysis demonstrated that the composition of social interaction has both distributional and efficiency consequences: an increase in the proportion of weak-tie interactions decreases inequality and (assuming inbreeding by employment status among weak ties is sufficiently low) also increases the employment rate. Beyond establishing these macrosociological consequences, the model provides a unified theoretical framework—for examining the microsociological relationships between wages, job-finding methods, and network structure—that may help guide and interpret future empirical research.

The model constructed in Section II is obviously quite stylized. Beyond the extensions suggested in Section IV, future research might attempt to incorporate more realistic assumptions on social structure, firms, and network formation. One might generalize the assumed social structure by replacing the two-person groups (i.e., dyads) with mutually exclusive n -person groups. However, it would seem preferable to introduce repeated interaction between members of different groups, thereby creating some form of "relational interlock" (see Fararo 1989, chap. 2.11).

Future research might also follow Marsden and Campbell (1990) by attempting to explicitly incorporate firms into the analysis. Recognizing that strong-tie pairs will sometimes be employed in the same firm and that job loss sometimes results from mass layoffs, one could examine the consequences of correlated job loss between dyad partners. Moreover, once firms are added to the model, wage determination and the recruitment strategies of firms might be endogenized. In this setting, a change in social structure not only alters the allocation of workers to a fixed stock of jobs but also affects the number of jobs and the distribution of wages offered by firms.¹⁶

Finally, future research might attempt to endogenize network for-

¹⁶ Montgomery (1991) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1990) have previously examined the relationship between social structure and the equilibrium wage distribution.

mation Individuals form social ties for many reasons, "expressive" motivations may dominate "instrumental" motivations But following Boorman (1975, see also Burt 1992), one might examine equilibrium labor-market outcomes when networks are formed instrumentally Intuitively, employed individuals would have an incentive to form strong ties to other employed individuals because such ties provide insurance against potential job loss However, because the resulting increase in inequality will ultimately reduce the steady-state employment rate, a "social dilemma" may be created in which individually rational choices yield a collectively bad (i.e., Pareto-inferior) outcome

APPENDIX A

Discrete-Time Formulation of the Model

In this appendix, I formally develop the model described in Section II above To make my assumptions more transparent to readers unfamiliar with continuous-time models, I specify the model in discrete time (with period length $h \leq 1$) and then show that the equations in the text may be derived by taking limits as periods become very short (i.e., as $h \rightarrow 0$)¹⁷

Consider first the probability that an unemployed individual enters employment My discussion relies heavily upon the probability tree depicted in figure A1 Social interaction occurs through pairwise matching, I assume that the probability of interaction is linear in time In each period, the individual is matched with probability τh and is unmatched with probability $1 - \tau h$ Conditional upon social interaction, the individual is matched to the strong tie (i.e., the individual's dyad partner) with probability $1 - \omega$ and is matched to some weak tie (i.e., a random other) with probability ω The individual's strong tie may be either employed ($s = 1$) or unemployed ($s = 0$), each weak tie is employed with probability αe Employed contacts know of a job opening with probability ϕ_e , while unemployed contacts never know of job openings Finally, returning to the first branch of the tree, the individual searches for a job through formal channels if social interaction does not occur The probability of finding a job in this manner is assumed linear in time In each period, a worker searching through formal channels finds a job with probability $\phi_f h$ ¹⁸

¹⁷ See Karlin and Taylor (1975) for a discussion of the relationship between discrete-time and continuous-time Markov processes

¹⁸ Alternative specifications of this probability tree would imply the same continuous-time transition rates derived below In particular, one could assume that the individual finds a job with probability $\phi_f h$ in each period where this probability is independent




FIG A1 —Probability tree for unemployed individual

of social interaction. Readers may be troubled by the apparently asymmetric treatment of ϕ_c and ϕ_f in fig A1. ϕ_f is multiplied by h while ϕ_c is not. However, the arrival of job information through formal channels should be conceptualized as a *flow* (so that the probability of finding a job in this manner is proportional to period length) while the probability that a contact knows of a job opening depends on the *stock* of job vacancies known to that contact (so that this probability does not depend on period length). One might treat the ϕ 's more symmetrically by redrawing the lower branch of the probability tree. If no social interaction occurs, we may assume that the individual locates a firm (which may or may not be hiring) with probability h and does not locate a firm with probability $1 - h$. If this locating condition is met, the firm hires the individual with probability ϕ_f and does not hire with probability $1 - \phi_f$. In this way, ϕ_f has been redefined as a conditional probability that is independent of period length.

In figure A1, the letters in parentheses represent the individual's state (*U*) unemployment or (*E*) employment. Given that the individual begins in state *U*, one may use the tree diagram to compute the probability that the individual enters employment. Because this probability depends on whether the strong tie is employed ($s = 1$) or unemployed ($s = 0$), we obtain a pair of transition probabilities

$$\text{prob}\{U \rightarrow E | s = 1\} = \tau h[(1 - \omega)\phi_c + \omega\alpha e\phi_c] + (1 - \tau h)\phi_f h, \quad (\text{A1a})$$

$$\text{prob}\{U \rightarrow E | s = 0\} = \tau h[\omega\alpha e\phi_c] + (1 - \tau h)\phi_f h \quad (\text{A1b})$$

Equations (4a) and (4b) in the text may be derived by finding the transition probability per unit time as h becomes infinitesimal. Formally,

$$\lambda_e \equiv \lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{U \rightarrow E | s = 1\}}{h} = \tau[(1 - \omega) + \omega\alpha e]\phi_c + \phi_f, \quad (\text{A2a})$$

$$\lambda_u \equiv \lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{U \rightarrow E | s = 0\}}{h} = \tau\omega\alpha e\phi_c + \phi_f \quad (\text{A2b})$$

The probability that an employed individual loses a job is assumed to be a linear function of time. In particular, I assume that individuals lose jobs at the close of each period with probability

$$\text{prob}\{E \rightarrow U\} = \delta h, \quad (\text{A3})$$

where this probability is independent across dyad partners. As periods become infinitesimal, the transition rate is

$$\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{E \rightarrow U\}}{h} = \delta, \quad (\text{A4})$$

as specified in the text.

I now consider the transition probabilities of dyads, relying heavily upon the probability trees depicted in figures A2–A4. The social interactions of dyad partners are not stochastically independent: an individual can be matched to his or her dyad partner if and only if this partner is also matched to the individual. As indicated by the first branch of the trees depicted in figures A2 and A3, a strong-tie match occurs with probability $\tau(1 - \omega)h$ and does not occur with probability $1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h$. However, if a strong-tie match does not occur, the probability of weak-tie (random) matching is assumed independent across dyad partners. Conditional upon the strong-tie match not occurring, an individual is matched to a weak tie with probability $\tau\omega h/[1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h]$ and is unmatched with probability $(1 - \tau h)/[1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h]$. As implied in figure A1, an individual becomes employed with probability $\alpha e\phi_c$, conditional upon a weak-tie match, an individual becomes employed with probability $\phi_f h$,




FIG A2 —Probability tree for dyad in state 0

conditional upon being unmatched. Thus, conditional upon a strong-tie match not occurring, an unemployed individual finds a job with probability

$$\pi = \frac{\tau\omega h}{1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h} \alpha e \phi_c + \frac{1 - \tau h}{1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h} \phi_f h \quad (\text{A5})$$

Consider the probability tree for a dyad initially in state 0, which is depicted in figure A2. If a strong-tie match occurs, neither dyad member learns of a job opening and the dyad remains in state 0. If a strong-tie match does not occur, each dyad member finds a job with probability π . Because this probability is independent across the dyad partners, both become employed with probability π^2 , exactly one becomes employed with probability $2\pi(1 - \pi)$, and both remain unemployed with probability $(1 - \pi)^2$. The probability of job loss is also assumed independent across the dyad partners. Thus, if both dyad members find employment during the period, the dyad remains in state 2 with probability $(1 - \delta h)^2$, enters state 1 with probability $2\delta h(1 - \delta h)$, and enters state 0 with probability $(\delta h)^2$. Alternatively, if exactly one dyad member found




FIG A3 —Probability tree for dyad in state 1




FIG A4 —Probability tree for dyad in state 2

employment during the period, the dyad remains in state 1 with probability $1 - \delta h$ and enters state 0 with probability δh . Noting that the numbers in parentheses in figure A2 represent the dyad's state, one obtains the transition probabilities

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prob}\{0 \rightarrow 1\} &= [1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h][\pi^2 2\delta h(1 - \delta h) \\ &\quad + 2\pi(1 - \pi)(1 - \delta h)], \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A6a})$$

$$\text{prob}\{0 \rightarrow 2\} = [1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h]\pi^2(1 - \delta h)^2 \quad (\text{A6b})$$

Next, consider the probability tree for a dyad initially in state 1 depicted in figure A3. The unemployed dyad partner finds a job with probability ϕ_c , conditional upon a strong-tie match occurring, the unemployed partner finds a job with probability π , conditional upon the strong-tie match not occurring. Again, recognizing that either (or both) of the dyad partners may lose their jobs, one obtains the transition probabilities

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prob}\{1 \rightarrow 0\} &= \tau(1 - \omega)h[\phi_c(\delta h)^2 + (1 - \phi_c)\delta h] \\ &\quad + [1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h][\pi(\delta h)^2 + (1 - \pi)\delta h], \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A6c})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prob}\{1 \rightarrow 2\} &= \tau(1 - \omega)h[\phi_c(1 - \delta h)^2] \\ &\quad + [1 - \tau(1 - \omega)h][\pi(1 - \delta h)^2] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A6d})$$

Finally, consider the probability tree for a dyad initially in state 2, which is depicted in figure A4. Because both dyad members are initially employed, transitions occur only through job loss. As implied in figure A4,

$$\text{prob}\{2 \rightarrow 0\} = (\delta h)^2, \quad (\text{A6e})$$

$$\text{prob}\{2 \rightarrow 1\} = 2\delta h(1 - \delta h) \quad (\text{A6f})$$

To derive the continuous-time transition rates of dyads, I compute the limits of the transition probabilities (A6a)–(A6f) per unit of time as h becomes infinitesimal

$$\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{0 \rightarrow 1\}}{h} = 2\lambda_u, \quad (\text{A7a})$$

$$\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{0 \rightarrow 2\}}{h} = 0, \quad (\text{A7b})$$

$$\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{1 \rightarrow 0\}}{h} = \delta, \quad (\text{A7c})$$

$$\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{1 \rightarrow 2\}}{h} = \lambda_e, \quad (\text{A7d})$$

$$\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{2 \rightarrow 0\}}{h} = 0, \quad (\text{A7e})$$

$$\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}\{2 \rightarrow 1\}}{h} = 2\delta \quad (\text{A7f})$$

Multiplying these transition rates by the corresponding mass of dyads in each state results in the flow depicted in figure 1 above. This figure may, in turn, be used to derive the net flow of dyads from each state given in equations (5a)–(5c)

APPENDIX B

Proofs of Theorems

A steady-state equilibrium exists when the pair $\{e^*, \gamma^*\}$ satisfies equations (9a) and (9b). Although (9a) implies that $d_0 = 0$ when $e = 1$ and (9b) implies that $d_2 = 0$ when $e = 0$, neither of these extremes can constitute a steady-state equilibrium when δ and $\phi_f(0)$ are strictly positive. Ignoring these cases, one may set each flow rate to zero and solve for γ

$$\gamma = 1 - \frac{\lambda_u}{e(\lambda_u + \delta)} \equiv \gamma_0(e, \omega, \tau, \alpha, \delta), \quad (\text{B1a})$$

and

$$\gamma = 1 - \frac{\delta}{(1 - e)(\lambda_e + \delta)} \equiv \gamma_2(e, \omega, \tau, \alpha, \delta) \quad (\text{B1b})$$

Assuming that $\tau = 1$, $\omega = 25$, $\alpha = 1$, $\delta = 2$, $\phi_e = 5$, and $\phi_f = 25$, I plot $\gamma_0(e)$ and $\gamma_2(e)$ in figure B1. To build intuition for this figure, note that the net flow into state 0 increases as the employment rate rises (holding γ constant) and as inequality decreases (holding e constant). Thus, the net flow d_0 is negative above and to the left of $\gamma_0(e)$, while it is positive below and to the right of $\gamma_0(e)$. (By construction, $d_0 = 0$ whenever $\gamma = \gamma_0(e)$.) In contrast, the net flow into state 2 is increasing as the employment rate decreases (holding γ constant) and as inequality falls (holding e constant). The net flow d_2 is thus positive below and to the left of $\gamma_2(e)$, while it is negative above and to the right of $\gamma_2(e)$. (Again, $d_2 = 0$ whenever $\gamma = \gamma_2(e)$ by construction.)

Proof of Theorem 1

Differentiating γ_0 and γ_2 with respect to e ,

$$\gamma_0'(e) = \frac{\lambda_u^2 + \delta(\lambda_u - e\lambda_u')}{e^2(\lambda_u + \delta)^2}, \quad (\text{B2a})$$




FIG B1 —Steady-state equilibrium

and

$$\gamma'_2(e) = \frac{\delta[(1-e)\lambda'_e - \lambda_e - \delta]}{(1-e)^2(\lambda_e + \delta)^2} \quad (\text{B2b})$$

Equations (4a) and (4b) imply

$$\lambda'_u = \alpha\tau\omega\phi_c + \alpha\tau\omega e\phi'_c + \phi'_f \leq \alpha\tau\omega\phi_c, \quad (\text{B3a})$$

and

$$\lambda'_e = \alpha\tau\omega\phi_c + [\tau(1-\omega) + \alpha\tau\omega e]\phi'_c + \phi'_f \leq \alpha\tau\omega\phi_c, \quad (\text{B3b})$$

where the final inequality in each equation results from the assumption that the flow rates ϕ_c and ϕ_f are (perhaps only weakly) decreasing in e . Multiplying both sides of (B3a) and (B3b) by e yields

$$e\lambda'_u, e\lambda'_e \leq \alpha\tau\omega e\phi_c \leq \lambda_u \quad (\text{B4})$$

We can see from (B4) that the numerator of (B2a) must be positive: the γ_0 curve slopes upward. This curve intersects the horizontal axis at $e_0 \in (0, 1)$ where, by definition,

$$e_0 = \frac{\lambda_u(e_0)}{\lambda_u(e_0) + \delta}$$

Because γ_0 is upward sloping and $\gamma_0(e_0) = 0$, (B1a) implies

$$e > \frac{\lambda_u(e)}{\lambda_u(e) + \delta} \quad \text{for } e > e_0 \quad (\text{B5})$$

Using (B5), one can show $\gamma_2(e) > 0$ for $e < e_0$. Because $\gamma_0(e) < 0$ for $e < e_0$, the γ_0 and γ_2 curves never intersect in this region, implying there can be no equilibrium e^* less than e_0 . Moreover, (B4) and (B5) imply that the numerator of (B2b) is negative for $e \geq e_0$ so that $\gamma_2(e)$ is downward sloping in this region. The γ_0 curve intersects the horizontal axis at $e_2 \in [e_0, 1)$, where, by definition,

$$e_2 = \frac{\lambda_e(e_2)}{\lambda_e(e_2) + \delta}$$

Because the γ_0 curve is upward sloping and crosses the horizontal axis at $e_0 \in (0, 1)$ while the γ_2 curve is downward sloping (at least for $e \geq e_0$) and crosses the horizontal axis at $e_2 \in [e_0, 1)$, there exists a unique $e^* \in (0, 1)$ such that $\gamma_0(e^*) = \gamma_2(e^*)$. If $\omega < 1$, $\lambda_e(e) > \lambda_u(e)$ so that $e_2 > e_0$ and the γ_0 and γ_2 curves intersect at a strictly positive level of inequality

$$\gamma_0(e^*) = \gamma_2(e^*) > 0$$

If $\omega = 1$, $\lambda_e(e) = \lambda_u(e)$ so that $e_2 = e_0$ and the γ_0 and γ_2 curves intersect at zero inequality

$$\gamma_0(e^*) = \gamma_2(e^*) = 0$$

As noted in the text, the condition $\phi_f(0) > 0$ in theorem 1 rules out an interesting special case. Given $\phi_f(0) = 0$, $d_0 = 0$ for $e = 0$. Moreover, (B2b) implies that d_2 also equals zero for $e = 0$. An equilibrium thus exists at $e^* = 0$. However, a second equilibrium at a positive employment level will also exist if $\gamma_2(0) > \gamma_0(0)$. One can show that this occurs only if $\tau\phi_c(0)/\delta$ is sufficiently large: the rate of transmission of job information through social interaction must be large relative to the rate of job displacement.

Proof of Theorem 2

Differentiating $\gamma_0(e, \tau, \omega)$ and $\gamma_2(e, \tau, \omega)$ with respect to ω ,

$$\frac{\partial \gamma_0}{\partial \omega} = -\frac{\delta}{e(\lambda_u + \delta)^2} (\partial \lambda_u / \partial \omega), \quad (\text{B6a})$$

and

$$\frac{\partial \gamma_2}{\partial \omega} = \frac{\delta}{(1 - e)(\lambda_e + \delta)^2} (\partial \lambda_e / \partial \omega) \quad (\text{B6b})$$

Because equations (4a) and (4b) imply

$$\partial \lambda_u / \partial \omega = \alpha \tau e \phi_e > 0 \quad (\text{B7a})$$

and

$$\partial \lambda_e / \partial \omega = -\tau(1 - \alpha e) \phi_e < 0, \quad (\text{B7b})$$

both $\partial \gamma_0 / \partial \omega$ and $\partial \gamma_2 / \partial \omega$ must be negative. Graphically, an increase in ω causes both the γ_0 and γ_2 curves to shift downward, the equilibrium level of inequality γ^* must necessarily fall.

Proof of Theorem 3

Graphically, an increase in the proportion of weak-tie interactions (ω) raises the equilibrium employment rate (e) if and only if the downward shift in the $\gamma_0(e)$ curve exceeds the downward shift in the $\gamma_2(e)$ curve. Formally, this occurs when $\partial \gamma_0(e^*) / \partial \omega < \partial \gamma_2(e^*) / \partial \omega$, which implies

$$\alpha > \frac{(\lambda_u^* + \delta)^2}{(1 - e^*)(\lambda_e^* + \delta)^2 + e^*(\lambda_u^* + \delta)^2} \equiv \bar{\alpha}(e^*), \quad (\text{B8})$$

where $\lambda_u^* \equiv \lambda_u(e^*)$ and $\lambda_e^* \equiv \lambda_e(e^*)$. Since $\lambda_e^* > \lambda_u^*$ for $\omega < 1$, $\bar{\alpha}(e^*)$ lies strictly between 0 and 1. Thus, an increase in the proportion of weak-tie interactions raises the equilibrium employment rate given $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}(e^*)$ and lowers this rate given $\alpha < \bar{\alpha}(e^*)$. In particular, an increase in ω raises e^* when there is no inbreeding by employment states ($\alpha = 1$) and lowers e^* when inbreeding is complete ($\alpha = 0$).

REFERENCES

- Blau, Peter M. 1977 *Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Boorman, Scott A. 1975 "A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission of Job Information through Contact Networks." *Bell Journal of Economics* 6: 216–49.
- Bridges, William P., and Wayne J. Villemez. 1986 "Informal Hiring and Income in the Labor Market." *American Sociological Review* 51: 574–82.
- Burdett, Kenneth, Nicholas M. Kiefer, Dale T. Mortensen, and George R. Neumann. 1984 "Earnings, Unemployment, and the Allocation of Time over Time." *Review of Economic Studies* 51: 559–87.
- Burt, Ronald S. 1992 *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, Karen E., Peter V. Marsden, and Jeanne S. Hurlbert. 1986 "Social Resources and Socioeconomic Status." *Social Networks* 8: 97–117.
- Clark, Kim B., and Lawrence H. Summers. 1979 "Labor Market Dynamics and Unemployment: A Reconsideration." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1: 13–72.
- . 1982 "The Dynamics of Youth Unemployment." Pp. 199–234 in *The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences*, edited by Richard B. Freeman and David A. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

American Journal of Sociology

- Coleman, James S 1964 *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* New York Free Press
- Devine, Theresa J , and Nicholas M Kiefer 1991 *Empirical Labor Economics The Search Approach* New York Oxford University Press
- Fararo, Thomas J 1989 *The Meaning of General Theoretical Sociology Tradition and Formalization* New York Cambridge University Press
- Fararo, Thomas J , and John Skvoretz 1987 "Unification Research Programs Integrating Two Structural Theories " *American Journal of Sociology* 92 1183-1209
- Granovetter, Mark S 1973 "The Strength of Weak Ties " *American Journal of Sociology* 78 1360-80
- 1974 *Getting a Job A Study of Contacts and Careers* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- 1982 "The Strength of Weak Ties A Network Theory Revisited " Pp 105-30 in *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, edited by Peter V Marsden and Nan Lin Beverly Hills Sage
- 1985 "Economic Action and Social Structure The Problem of Embeddedness " *American Journal of Sociology* 91 481-510
- Karlin, Samuel, and Howard M Taylor 1975 *A First Course in Stochastic Processes* New York Academic Press
- Marsden, Peter V 1988 "Homogeneity in Confiding Relations " *Social Networks* 10 57-76
- 1990 "Network Diversity, Substructures, and Opportunities for Contact " In *Structures of Power and Constraint Papers in Honor of Peter M Blau*, edited by Craig Calhoun, Marshall Meyer, and W Richard Scott New York Cambridge University Press
- Marsden, Peter V , and Karen E Campbell 1990 "Recruitment and Selection Processes The Organizational Side of Job Searches " Pp 59-79 in *Social Mobility and Social Structure*, edited by Ronald L Breiger New York Cambridge University Press
- Marsden, Peter V , and Jeanne S Hurlbert 1988 "Social Resources and Mobility Outcomes A Replication and Extension " *Social Forces* 66 1038-59
- Montgomery, James D 1991 "Social Networks and Labor Market Outcomes Toward an Economic Analysis " *American Economic Review* 81 1408-18
- 1992 "Job Search and Network Composition Implications of the Strength-of-Weak-Ties Hypothesis " *American Sociological Review* 57 586-96
- Mortensen, Dale T , and Tara Vishwanath 1990 "Personal Contacts and Earnings It Is Who You Know" Mimeograph Northwestern University, Department of Economics
- Rapoport, Anatol 1963 "Mathematical Models of Social Interaction " Pp 493-579 in *Handbook of Mathematical Psychology*, vol 2 Edited by R Duncan Luce, Robert R Bush, and Eugene Galanter New York Wiley
- Rytina, Steve, and David L Morgan 1982 "The Arithmetic of Social Relations The Interplay of Category and Network " *American Journal of Sociology* 88 88-113
- Skvoretz, John 1990 "Biased Net Theory Approximations, Simulations and Observations " *Social Networks* 12 217-38
- Sørensen, Aage B 1977 "The Structure of Inequality and the Process of Attainment " *American Sociological Review* 42 965-78
- Wegener, Bernd 1991 "Job Mobility and Social Ties Social Resources, Prior Job, and Status Attainment " *American Sociological Review* 56 60-71
- White, Harrison C 1970 *Chains of Opportunity* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press

Cultural Form and Political Meaning: State-subsidized Theater, Ideology, and the Language of Style in Fascist Italy¹

Mabel Berezin
University of Pennsylvania

The paradigm linking meaning and content has shaped the empirical focus of cultural analysis. The pattern of state theatrical subsidy within fascist Italy challenges the assumption that narrative content is the principal vehicle of meaning. By shifting the unit of analysis from the text of plays to discourses about theatrical production, a rhetoric of appropriation and reappropriation emerges between regime bureaucrats and cultural entrepreneurs that suggests that theatrical form, and not theatrical content, contained fascist meaning. This finding is extended to posit that the divorce between form and content that characterized the fascist theater also distinguished fascism from liberal democracy.

On November 20, 1934, a play entitled *Civilization* (*Civiltà*) had its debut at the Goldoni Theater in Venice, Italy. The plot of *Civilization* concerned 10 women from 10 different countries who, while attending an "international congress of feminism," decide to strike out boldly on an air cruise over Africa. The women, who had "excluded men" from their voyage, find themselves in a dilemma when their airplane "falls in the desert." After a few days, their food and water give out and only

¹ I presented a version of this article to the Culture and the Arts Workshop of the European Consortium of the New School for Social Research and New York University, April 9, 1992. I wish to thank Vera Zolberg for inviting me to the workshop. The stimulating comments of workshop participants Anne Bowler, Jeffrey Goldfarb, Michèle Lamont, Magali Sarfatti-Larson, and Harrison White aided me in preparing the manuscript. The final form of this article benefited from the detailed criticism of the *AJS* reviewers. Michael Donnelly graciously reviewed my translations, Wendy Griswold and Joseph Soares offered suggestions on the theoretical framework, and Peter Bondanella shared his knowledge of Italian cinema with me. A Krupp Foundation Dissertation Fellowship of the Center for European Studies at Harvard University and a research foundation grant from the University of Pennsylvania supported this research. The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies provided institutional support in the summers of 1992 and 1993. Correspondence may be addressed to Mabel Berezin, Sociology Department, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6299.

the Italian "girl" has the courage to pray for their salvation. Their deliverance comes in the shape of a group of male aviators who, understanding the "folly" of their goals, had followed them. The men inform the women that they had fallen not in the desert but in "an experimental field for the cultivation of beans" and that they had gone only as far as Vienna. The women quickly renounce feminism and each one conveniently falls in love with one of the aviators (*Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori* [hereafter SIAE] 1935–41, 1:398).

Civilization was staged 12 years after Benito Mussolini's fascist movement picked up the reins of the Italian government. The "Fascist Revolution" aimed to create a new national culture. Art institutions would aid in diffusing new political meanings. When Italian fascism came to power, theater was a familiar and widely available type of popular culture, and Mussolini identified it as particularly useful in forging the bonds of the new national community (Mussolini 1933, pp. 7–9). The content of theatrical performances, the ideas and values that theatrical plot and script convey, would appear to be central to the transmission of the ideological program of fascism. *Civilization* contained many of the themes that we would expect to find in a fascist theater—nationalism, religion, male dominance, a fascination with technology, and a repudiation of feminism.² Yet, *Civilization* was not typical of the plays that appeared on the stage in fascist Italy. Plays with titles such as *The Husband I Want* (*Il marito che cerco*) and *A Wife's Revenge* (*La rivincita delle mogli*), which also had their debut in 1934, were more representative of the comedies of love and adultery that dominated the Italian stage.

Social scientists of various theoretical orientations view meaning as located in the content of particular art objects. Their first analytic question is narrative: What story does this picture, film, play, novel tell?³ The social science paradigm that links meaning to content suggests that a political organization, such as a totalitarian state, that sought to disseminate ideology through art would seek to affect the content of art objects. To invoke George Orwell, an analysis of Newspeak would enable one to understand the political ideology of 1984.⁴

The theater under Italian fascism presents a puzzle that challenges the social science assumption that meaning resides principally in narra-

² De Grazia (1992, p. 234) describes the International Conference of Women that occurred in Paris in July 1934. *Civilization* may represent a more topical criticism of women's rights than the available direct evidence suggests.

³ For a discussion of the general bias toward narrative and chronology in social analysis, see White (1990, pp. 21–25).

⁴ Ann Swidler's (1986, p. 278) definition of ideology as "explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning systems (both political and religious)" points to this emphasis on content in political and cultural studies of ideology.

tive content. Political ideology is a special case of public meaning—collectively shared understandings of social order.⁵ The history of cultural production in the 20th century offers numerous instances of art in the service of politics. Descriptive terms such as “socialist realism” or “Nazi architecture” suggest a straightforward relation between artistic content and political ideology. The relative infrequency of plays such as *Civilization* in fascist Italy suggests that the process by which art incorporates political ideology is less direct and raises my central question: How does art express political ideology?⁶

Earlier (Berezin 1991), I addressed the issue of ideological production by challenging the behavioral assumption that totalitarian regimes act differently from other types of states. In this article, I reconceptualize the relation between political meaning and ideological content. The Italian fascist regime, like all regimes that institutionalize political ideologies, did not paint pictures, design buildings, or create theater; it did give money in support of various cultural projects. I analyze the theatrical projects that received regime subsidies from 1927 to 1940. The defining characteristics of these projects suggest how a theater without fascist content could plausibly convey fascist ideology.

I argue, first, that the Italian fascist regime affected the form and not the content of theater and, second, that the regime could not have privileged form over content without the efforts of cultural entrepreneurs who linked their theatrical ambitions to the ideological goals of the regime. The pattern of state theatrical funding, analyzed in conjunction with the rhetorical strategy of appropriation and reappropriation that emerged between regime cultural bureaucrats and theatrical cultural entrepreneurs, suggests that it was theatrical form, the performative dimensions of theater staging and acting style, that contained fascist meaning.

The Italian case is a particularly useful entry to broad methodological questions about meaning currently confronting the sociology of culture because it forces us to ask how we might pose questions of meaning if we do not focus upon content. What constitutes content varies depending upon the art object. For example, the content of a play or a novel tends

⁵ Ideology is a contested term as its large definitional literature suggests (e.g., Boudon 1989, Eagleton 1991). Clifford Geertz's (1973a) discussion of ideology shapes my conception of the term. He argues that “the function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful” (p. 218). These authoritative concepts that underlie political meaning are not indigenous to the social situation and only arise when the cultural understanding of political order becomes strained.

⁶ This article focuses on works created under conditions of definitive political influence and does not assume that all artistic products are ideological conduits.

to reside in its plot, the content of a painting tends to lie in its subject matter. A painting of a battle scene has a different content than a painting of a Dutch burgher. Art objects have form as well as content. Style, the term that encapsulates aesthetic form, implicitly differentiates among art objects of the same genre and content. Style is how we distinguish a baroque painting from an impressionist painting, a realist novel from a modernist novel, a 15th-century Italian Madonna from a 17th-century Spanish Madonna. We experience art as form and content, scholars separate these two elements for analytic purposes. Literary and film critics and art historians analyze aesthetic form as well as content. In general, social scientists focus upon content at the expense of form.

I divide my analysis into five parts: first, I explore methodological approaches to the study of meaning; second, I describe the context of Italian theatrical communication—before and during the fascist period; third, I examine the theatrical projects that the regime subsidized; fourth, I show how regime cultural bureaucrats created a language of political and cultural style that “cultural entrepreneurs” appropriated to garner support for diverse theatrical projects; and fifth, I conclude with a plausible story of the political meaning of the subsidized theater that borrows from Georg Simmel ([1911] 1971) to relate fascism and theatrical form. Primary historical materials, consisting of letters, government documents, memoirs, plays, and newspaper accounts as well as critical histories of the Italian theater, provide the evidence for my argument.

METHODOLOGY AND MEANING

From Mass Communications to a “New” Cultural Sociology

A generation of social analysts in the United States, reacting to the fascist and Nazi movements, developed a school of mass communications research based on content analysis (McCormack 1982). This research assumed that totalitarian regimes achieved the consent of the governed through their ability to marshal new technologies, such as radio and cinema, to manipulate the content of ideas that reached the population. In the social science literature, *propaganda* became the operative term for the dissemination of political ideology through both political and non-political institutions (Ellul 1973, pp. 62–87). This approach viewed content as directly instrumental—meaning as univalent and not problematic—and its effects as tangible and measurable. Social analysts (Gitlin 1978, Gamson and Modigliani 1989) have contested this literature and the “hypodermic model” of political communication and persuasion that it assumed, but content analysis remains central to their interpretations.

After the initial reaction to totalitarianism, sociologists viewed social scientific contributions to cultural analysis as structural, rather than in-

interpretive After Leo Lowenthal's ([1944] 1984) pioneering work on popular figures in magazines, sociologists turned their attention to the economic and social institutions that produce culture (see, e.g., White and White [1965] 1993, Becker 1982) and left questions of meaning to literary critics (Watt 1957, Cawelti 1976) and art historians (Baxandall 1972).⁷ Other scholars have summarized the strengths and limitations of the "production-of-culture" approach to cultural analysis (Zolberg 1990, Wolff 1984, Williams 1982), yet it is worth reviewing its salient features. The underlying model of the production-of-culture approach challenged the unmediated link between artists and their work that was central to aesthetic theory. Artists produced, rather than created, art. Markets and complex organizations mediated the relation between cultural producers—artists, writers, musicians—and their products. Artists' intentionality was moot and considered principally a problem of individual psychology that was beyond the purview of sociologists. Audience response and the question of meaning that it implied, if considered at all, was an issue of market preference.

Interpretation as an analytic tool is beginning to challenge structural explanations of artistic production.⁸ Sociologists have turned to questions of meaning (Griswold 1987a, 1987b, Swidler 1986, Schudson 1989, Wuthnow 1987).⁹ While there are nuances among them, these sociologists of culture argue that an adequate cultural sociology is one that combines structural explanations with interpretation—that is, a willingness to engage in questions of meaning. They share a methodological orientation with their predecessors in mass communications because they typically begin their search for meaning in the content of cultural objects—that is, they focus on the narrative aspects of the object that they are studying in order to explicate ideas, themes, or values. These scholars differ from previous practitioners of cultural sociology because they have expanded the sphere of what constitutes the object of study. The narrower definition of the cultural object that bounded earlier approaches to cultural sociology restricted analysis to market variables such as price and production figures and to the career trajectories of groups of cultural producers.

⁷ Diana Crane's (1987) study of avant-garde art markets, which links institutional contexts to changes in artistic meaning, was an exception to this dominant trend.

⁸ Cultural sociologists have not abandoned the "production of culture" approach. Only one (Wagner-Pacific and Schwartz 1991) of five articles in a recent issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* entitled "Focus on Culture" was interpretive or raised issues of meaning.

⁹ The dominance of poststructuralism in European social theory has influenced the interest in meaning, however, the body of this literature remains firmly grounded in American and British empirical traditions. For summaries, see Lamont and Wuthnow (1990) and the debate between Denzin (1990) and Griswold (1990).

(e.g., White and White 1993, pp. ix–x) Sociological analyses that attempt to elicit meanings raise questions of methodology that were not germane to the productionist approach. Widening the field of cultural objects requires careful specification of what is the object, who is the cultural producer, and what constitutes an audience.

Vehicles of Meaning: Theater as Cultural Object

Griswold defines a “cultural object” as “shared significance embodied in form, i.e., an expression of meanings that is tangible or can be put into words. Thus, a religious doctrine, a belief about the racial characteristics of blacks, a sonnet, a hairstyle, and a quilt could all be analyzed as cultural objects” (1987b, pp. 4–5). Griswold’s definition reflects the expanded scope of cultural sociology, but it has two features that suggest continuity with past methodological assumptions. First, she reiterates the idea that discursive narrative reveals cultural content, and second, she suggests that form is simply a vehicle for content. Griswold’s discussion of genre as the “key to analytic comprehension” (1987b, p. 17), or to the construction of sociologically viable accounts of meaning, ascribes an importance to form that her initial definition belies. In short, genre is how we recognize a package of formal properties that permit us to draw distinctions between and similarities among cultural objects.

Theater as an artistic genre is vulnerable to misinterpretation if one neglects its formal dimension. The narrative content, or script, of a play is only part of theater. *How* theater is performed is as central to its meaning as *what* is performed. With rare exceptions (e.g., Goldfarb 1980, Levine 1984), the tendency to treat theater as literary text in social analysis (e.g., Griswold 1986, Williams 1979) is quite old (Carlson 1984). A tradition of social analysis dating back to Aristotle’s *Poetics* suggests that the meaning of theater lies in its content. Aristotle views plot, character, diction, and thought—the ideational aspects of theater—as primary aspects of theater, he sees spectacle and song—the performative aspects of theater—as secondary (Aristotle 1992, pp. 63–64). Yet, it is precisely theater’s experiential dimension, its theatricality, the “grammar of rhetorical and authenticating conventions” (Burns 1972, p. 33), which includes staging and acting style, that makes it adaptable to political ends. Anthropological theories of theater (Turner 1982, 1990) recognize that, to borrow from Aristotle, “spectacle” and “song” are the characteristics of theater upon which its ritual value, and political potential, depends.

Performance is to theater as the play of light and shadow is to painting. The particular blend of light and shadow in a painting, once created, remains whereas a performance is continually recreated (Becker 1982, p.

302) The formal dimension of theater is experiential and based on collective social action both among the actors and between the actors and audience. Theories that focus upon the meaning of social behavior, rather than theories of aesthetics, are germane to an analysis of theater. Georg Simmel's (1971) classical social theory underscores the salience of form in social life and his essay "Sociability" suggests a way to incorporate the disjuncture between form and content into cultural analysis.

Simmel theorizes a separation between the form and content of social behavior and argues that sociability is a genre of human interaction that has its own collectively recognized and inviolable rules or genre requirements. Conversation and coquetry, two forms of behavior that Simmel discusses, provide examples. Social talk and flirtation are meaningful as formal processes not as goal-oriented activities. Argumentation violates conversation, erotic activity violates coquetry. Sociability suggests the social and political salience of theatrical form. "Spectacle" and "song" as conversation and coquetry have the potential to create meaning simply in their formal dimensions.

Conventions of Communication: Producers and Audiences

To construct a viable account of meaning, certain assumptions are necessary starting points. Following Geertz (1973b, p. 12), I assume that meaning and culture are public. My conception of meaning suggests, first, that meanings are relatively stable within particular social, political, and cultural contexts and unstable as these contexts shift and, second, that political meanings are proximately knowable, if we carefully reconstruct context.

My conception of culture suggests the importance of communication. The meanings embedded in artistic practices (i.e., theatrical production) and artistic objects (i.e., plays) are codes that permit communication. The imposed cultures that revolutionary regimes, such as the Italian fascist regime, create may alter the material practices and artifices of culture, but they do not create new codes unless they manage to change the underlying communicative systems in society.

Intentionality, the message that the cultural producer wished to convey, and reception, the audience understanding of those intentions, is central to a cultural sociology that purports to deal with questions of meaning. In a universe such as Habermas's "ideal speech situation" (1979, pp. 1-68), there would be a perfect fit between the two. However, cultural producers often fail in their intentions or imperfectly understand them and audiences sometimes create other meanings than the ones originally intended. While cultural producers can tell us their intentions and audience popularity has been one traditional measure of reception, we

can never know exactly what is in the heads of social agents at either end (Griswold 1987*b*, pp 7–16) The interaction between context and choice is central to developing a sociologically relevant account of intentionality and reception that is not reducible to either individual psychology, in the case of the artist, or market preference, in the case of the audience

By context, I mean the social, political, and economic milieu in which cultural production occurs as well as the history of the cultural object or event in question By choice, I mean some ability to demarcate the range of alternative possible avenues a social actor such as an artist might have taken to a given end Empirically, this demands a mapping of observed patterns of cultural production and the use of comparison to formulate hypotheses about meaning (Griswold 1987*a*, 1987*b*, Geertz 1971) This conception of intentionality borrows from Skinner's (1988, pp 77–78) argument that the meaning of a text lies in an author's world and not in his or her head An author would not write a text, or stage a theatrical performance, that no one would or could understand

To understand a text, we must identify the conventions of communication that governed an author's writing and reconstruct the world of an author's empirical beliefs Griswold (1987*b*, p 6) echoes Skinner and adds the sociological proviso that it is "probable intentionality" that sociologists aim to construct We may apply the same criteria to audience reception A cultural product will not "mean" if an audience does not recognize it or it does not "resonate" with past experience (Schudson 1989) While there has been a recent trend in sociology of culture to ask selected audiences to narrate their experience of cultural products (Radway 1984, De Vault 1990), this method is foreclosed to the analyst working on historical cases, and the re-creation of probable context becomes doubly important

Applying this logic to the Italian case, we discover that specifying the proper model of cultural production is less than straightforward Historians (e g , Lyttelton 1987, pp 416–34, Acquarone 1978, pp 168–289) date the beginning of the Italian fascist regime to the late 1920s and 1930s, when it started to build fascist institutions I use the term *regime* as an analytic convenience to refer to a group of political actors who share a similar set of values and who command the bureaucratic structure of the state at a particular historical moment My usage does not suggest that all fascists were united in their ideas or that the regime was monolithic in its approach to social problems

The fascist regime, the group of political actors who commanded the Italian state from 1922, determined the political context in Italy until 1944 In the case of fascist Italy, the regime included Mussolini and the members of the National Fascist Party (Partito Nazionale Fascista, or

PNF) The PNF controlled the state, outlawed competing political parties, published voluminously on fascist ideology, and consciously looked to cultural institutions to promulgate its visions. We can assume intentionality in view of a rhetoric, if not a reality, of totalitarianism. Yet, plays with fascist content were few and far between. How do we talk about meaning, and in this particular case *fascist* meaning, if the contents of cultural objects seem to preclude it? Fascist meaning may be elusive because we are making erroneous methodological assumptions that the remainder of this article will attempt to untangle: (1) that a play is the proper unit of analysis, (2) that the state or the playwright is the cultural producer, and (3) that content would be the proper vehicle of fascist ideological communication.

THEATRICAL PRODUCTION, 1922–40: CONTENT AND CONSTRAINT Conventions of Italian Theatrical Communication

Persistent aesthetic and economic traditions dominated the Italian theater and limited the range of possible modes of theatrical communications. Centuries-old institutional arrangements stifled the development of modern theatrical practices and influenced the types of plays that were written for and performed on the Italian stage. The “crisis” of the Italian theater was part of local theatrical knowledge in the early 20th century (D’Amico 1931). The European stage flowered during the 1920s and 1930s. With the exception of Nobel Prize winner Luigi Pirandello, Italian theater lagged behind the rest of Europe.

“Bourgeois” theater was the term that theatrical critics in Italy (see, e.g., Corsi 1939, p. 25), as well as on the rest of the European continent, employed to refer to the text-based “well made” play that was staged in large indoor city theaters. International theatrical style at the beginning of the 20th century began to reject the artistic limitations that the bourgeois theater imposed and to reaffirm the importance of performance modes (Carlson 1984, Brockett and Findlay 1973). The function of the stage director as coordinator of diverse roles that were subordinated to a conception of a dramatic whole and the rejection of the “fourth wall” were the principal features of the new theatrical style. These new theatrical ideas yielded two new forms of practice, the idea of the director suggested a professional notion of theater and the emphasis upon the breaking down of space between audience and actors suggested a more ritualistic, interactive, and emotive form of theatrical practice.

Continental experimentation provided models of theatrical innovation upon which Italian theatrical reformers could draw (D’Amico 1933, pp. 505–11). In Italy, the availability of a new cultural model did not con-

tribute to its implementation. Entrenched Italian theatrical traditions that intertwined financial arrangements and aesthetic practices militated against change. Economic entrepreneurialism and an artistic individualism that bordered on eccentricity characterized the early 20th-century Italian theater. The company was the economic and aesthetic base of the Italian theater. Italian theatrical companies were small businesses that traveled from town to town staging a varied repertory. The Italian stage had no center such as London or Paris. Rome, Milan, Venice, Florence, Naples, and Turin were equally important in the theatrical world, and a new work was as likely to have its first performance in one of these cities as one of a number of smaller provincial towns. Company heads, *capocomici*, were financial and artistic directors of troops of traveling players. This type of theatrical organization, common to Western Europe from the 15th century, was rapidly becoming obsolete in the 20th century because it lacked economic viability (D'Amico 1931, p. 48). In Italy, there were ongoing attempts to form theater-based companies that failed and the traveling system persisted (Camilleri 1959, pp. 7–17).

The company system was an aesthetic, as well as an economic, mode of organization, and its dual function contributed to its persistence in Italy. In addition to his role as small businessman, the *capocomico* was frequently a *mattatore* or a “grand actor” (*grande attore*, see Pandolfi 1954, pp. 1–24). The grand actor, who could also be an actress, was the “star” of all theatrical performances and his or her presence dominated all other company members. The *mattatore* viewed his personality as central to theatrical interpretation and he did not consider fidelity to a playwright's text and a professionally trained supporting cast essential. A professionally organized theater that was theater- and director-based would render the *capocomico* economically and aesthetically obsolete.

Mattatore became associated with a repertory of roles and the public flocked to see them and not the plays. The “star system” had another consequence. Theatrical traditions determined the type and number of supporting roles. Actors' contracts stipulated which roles they would play and institutionalized the number of characters that each drama would have (Rispoli 1903, pp. 89–95). The system of formal roles constrained playwrights to write plays that included all the prescribed characters, and it discouraged actors, whose contracts limited them to set roles, from seeking professional training to discipline and expand their histrionic abilities. The only vehicle of upward mobility for an actor or actress in this system was to become a *capocomico*, this limitation encouraged theatrical companies that lacked financial viability to proliferate, and fail, as disgruntled company members sought to become stars. Advocates of reform within the theater attributed the “crisis,” the cycle of debt and aesthetic stagnation, to the company system—particularly to the

union of *mattatore* and *capocomico* in one individual and to the system of set roles (MacClintock 1920, pp 181–200, D'Amico 1931, pp 47–55)

Theatrical Repertory and Fascist Ideology

The content, ideas, and values embedded in the plot of plays that appeared on the Italian stage during the fascist period suggest that popular taste and economics—not ideology—drove the theatrical repertory. This statement is supported by data that are consistent with “local knowledge” but not consistent with regime rhetoric or with standard views of the link between ideology and content.

Historical accounts of Italian theater and fascism have sought to exonerate key cultural actors (Alberti 1974) from the taint of fascism or have analyzed plays with fascist themes (Cavallo 1987, 1990).¹⁰ Both approaches are unsatisfactory for sociological analysis. The first, which I label the “smoking gun” approach to the study of politics and culture, seeks to demonstrate that interactions between artists and the regime were innocuous and fails to adequately explore the process of politics involved in the state production of ideology. The second approach fails to take representativeness into account. Far more plays were written in fascist Italy than were staged. Failure to observe this distinction yields a distorted picture of the theatrical milieu. For example, Cavallo's (1987) analysis of “fascist” plays depends upon a reading of scripts that playwrights sent to the censor.¹¹ Only two of the 20 plays that he discusses were performed.¹²

The traveling company system poses sampling problems to the social scientist interested in representativeness. Theatrical companies rotated

¹⁰ A general scholarly reluctance to valorize any cultural production during the fascist period limited historical discussions of Italian theater to the pre–World War I period (e.g., Carlson 1981). Lately, there has been a resurgence of interest in cultural production under fascism (Forgacs 1990, Thompson 1991). Cinema was the first cultural form that scholars examined when they began the process of historical revisionism (e.g., Brunetta 1972, Hay 1987, Landy 1986). Angelini's (1988) study of Italian theater in the first half of the 20th century was the first survey that included the fascist period, Scarpellini (1989) provides an encyclopedic account of state theatrical organization. However, a recent review article on fascism and theater concludes, “In reality, we yet know little” (Pedulla 1991, p. 156).

¹¹ Censorship of the theater was not a fascist innovation. In an earlier work, I provide a discussion of how censorship worked in fascist Italy as well as statistical documentation on the divergence between what was written and what was staged (Berezin 1991, pp. 640–41). For a general account of censorship and the problems that it poses to sociological analysis, see Becker (1982, pp. 185–191).

¹² In a later work, Cavallo (1990, p. 11) acknowledges the problem of representativeness.

an average of 12, and sometimes as many as 20, plays through their repertoires in a season (Unsigned 1937) and spent no more than a few days in each city (Unsigned 1932). Systematic and unexploited evidence exists on the Italian theater for part of the fascist period. In 1934, the SIAE began publishing *Annuario del teatro Italiano*, an annual that provided plot summaries and performance information on every new play written and staged. The SIAE assigned copyright and their records are reliable. I take 1934 as a convenient starting point for systematic analysis. At that point, the regime had been in power for 12 years, and it was consolidating its social and political agenda. By 1934, we would expect fascist ideas to have become sufficiently diffused so as to appear in the content of new plays.¹³

Between 1934 and 1940, 354 new plays appeared on the Italian stage. I have developed four broad categories based on a reading of the plot summaries of these plays: (1) fascist, (2) possibly political, (3) private life, and (4) detective/mystery. The majority of the new plays (72%) focused on the dilemmas and absurdities of private life. Love stories and drawing-room farces that imitated French boulevard theater represented continuity in the Italian theatrical repertory (Grassi and Strehler 1964). My sample reading of the leading Italian theater magazines *Comedia* and *Scenario* for this period confirmed the prevalence of this "white telephone" genre, as the 1930s variant came to be known.¹⁴ Of the remaining plays, 15% had themes that could be characterized as possibly political in intent. Only 5% had themes that could be characterized as explicitly fascist. Detective/mystery plays of the Sherlock Holmes type exceeded the proportion of fascist plays (8% vs. 5%).¹⁵

Possibly political plays had ambiguous themes. History plays fit into this category. In addition, a play qualified for this category if public events seemed to impinge upon the private decisions of its central characters or if an idea that could be interpreted as a regime directive dominated the plot. *The Scorpions* (*Gli scorpioni*), a 1937 play written by the frequently staged Allesandro De Stefani, reflects the ambiguities of this category (SIAE 1938, p. 428). Its central character, a politician and lawyer, becomes dissolute as a result of the stresses of city living. He returns

¹³ I have reported these data elsewhere (Berezin 1991), and I repeat them here as they are essential for any discussion of Italian theater and fascism.

¹⁴ The Italian repertory did not differ in content from plays on the commercial stage in other European countries or in the United States during the 1930s. The cinema was similar to the theater in this respect (De Grazia 1989).

¹⁵ The numbers upon which I calculated the percentages are 19 fascist, 53 possibly political, 254 private life, and 28 detective/mystery (SIAE 1935–41).

to his country village to die and finds redemption in the soil. This plot may simply reflect the frequent romantic literary theme that juxtaposes city and country or it may have been intended to focus its audience's attention on the regime's ideology of "rurality" that linked economic development in the south to a vision of moral good. While the regime espoused the virtues of rural life, which years of scholarship on Italian peasant culture suggests were in short supply, it was pursuing an economic strategy toward the peasants that suggested that rurality, according to historian Adrian Lyttelton, was "ideological compensation for [financial] crisis" (1987, p. 352).

Fascist plays were of three types. The first re-created and personalized events of fascist history, the second explicitly espoused fascist values such as personal discipline and devotion to the nation, and the third promulgated the virtues of fascist policies such as the development of a new Roman empire and the invasion of Ethiopia. *The Last Romantics* (*Gl'ultima romantici*, see SIAE 1935–41, 1:421), staged in Rome in 1934, was typical of the plays that I categorize as fascist. It centers around the efforts of a rich capitalist to suppress the socialist ideas of one of his workers in the years before fascism came to power. In the process, he discovers that both his daughter and his mistress are sympathetic to socialism. The capitalist's son is a fledgling fascist who converts his father to fascism and arranges for the ideologically wayward daughter to marry a war veteran and to abandon her socialist ideals. The play ends with the son leaving his newly fascist family in the provinces as he departs for the March on Rome. *The Last Romantics* was Giovaninetti's only play that fell within this category. He did have a successful stage career after the war and "repudiated" *The Last Romantics* (*Enciclopedia garzanti dello spettacolo* 1977, p. 280).

Scholars have argued that audiences were not receptive to "fascist" plays and films (see, e.g., De Grazia 1989, p. 52, Pedulla 1991). Contemporary reviews of the plays that I categorized as fascist are inevitably glowing and probably inflated. For example, Renato Simoni, a drama critic of the *Milan Evening Courier* (*Corriere della sera*) not known for his fascist attachments, reviewed *The Offering* (*L'Offerta*), a play about the mothers of soldiers who lost their lives in the First World War, in religious terms. Simoni wrote that the play demonstrated "the goodness of emotion . . . a simple, meek, profound emotion, that fuses piety and human tenderness and the religion of the cross, of the dead, of the Nation, of maternal sacrifice" (Simoni 1934, p. 6). The audience responded with "great emotion" and "immediate and sincere and intense" applause. There were five curtain calls after the first act, seven after the second act, and six after the third. Given the tedious and maudlin plot of *The Offering*, it is highly unlikely that it played to any but the convinced.

While direct data on audience reception are difficult to acquire, a combination of sources permits us to draw inferences about theatrical taste in fascist Italy. The 354 new plays recorded in the *Annuario del teatro Italiano* between 1934 and 1940 represented 168 playwrights. Of these playwrights, 65% had only one new play staged during this period, 28% had two to five plays staged and 7% had six or more plays staged (the actual number ranged between six and eighteen). The 12 authors who constitute this 7% wrote 34% of the plays, which suggests that there was a limited pool of popular authors whose works the company heads continually staged.¹⁶ Of this group, three authors wrote one fascist play and one author wrote two fascist plays. In general, newcomers wrote fascist plays. Eleven of the 16 playwrights that wrote fascist plays had one, or at most, two plays staged in the period between 1934 and 1940.

The theatrical season that began in October 1937 and ended in May 1938 is the only year for which data are available on both new plays and plays in repertory (Unsigned 1937). An examination of theatrical repertory for the 1937–38 theatrical year reinforces the findings from the *Annuario*. Frothy comedies shared repertory space with modern Italian authors such as Luigi Pirandello and Gabriel D'Annunzio and classic Italian authors such as Giuseppe Giacosa and Carlo Goldoni. In addition, the high proportion of classic and contemporary foreign playwrights staged directly contradicted the regime directive to favor Italian plays (Berezin 1991, p. 641). Friedrich von Schiller and William Shakespeare shared the stage with Somerset Maugham.

I have encountered no direct evidence that suggests that there were playwrights who were not staged for ideological reasons. The case of Sem Benelli, a popular Italian playwright whose career spanned the fascist period, is instructive in this regard. Benelli was best known for his 1910 verse tragedy *The Dinner of Hoaxes* (*La Cena delle beffe*). Benelli claimed that the regime discriminated against his plays (Tannenbaum 1972, pp. 280–81, Benelli 1945). The exact reasons for this discrimination remain unclear. Benelli's principal grievance was that the SIAE, which in the late 1920s came under the control of the state and hence the regime, did not adequately discount the copyright fees on his plays, making them too expensive to produce in the numerous regime-sponsored amateur theaters. Company heads did continue to stage Benelli's plays throughout the fascist period, including four new works between 1934

¹⁶ The playwrights and the number of plays staged are Bruno Corra and Giuseppe Achille, 6, Cesare Giulio Viola, 6, Giuseppe Romualdi, 7, Ferdinando Guidi di Bagno, 7, Rino Alessi, 8, Carlo Veneziani, 8, Gherardo Gherardi, 10, Guido Cantini, 10, Giuseppe Adam, 11, Vincenzo Trieri, 14, Alessandro De Stefani, 15, Guglielmo Gianini, 18.

and 1940 In addition in the 1937–38 theatrical season, five of his plays were in repertory, which compared favorably with other popular authors Benelli's reputed loss of income was a minor nuisance that may have had a personal and not a political origin

Theatrical Market and the State Corporativism and the Emergence of State Paternalism

The data from the *Annuario* suggest that theatrical companies staged plays without reference to fascist ideology The proliferation of theatrical companies combined with increasing expenses made the theater unprofitable and the demand for profitability made company heads resistant to aesthetic, as well as political, innovation Debt constantly forced the *capocomici* to dissolve and recombine their companies A typical list of debts included the salary of actors and actresses in the company, playwrights' copyright fees, and theater rent In the years immediately preceding World War I, the costs of theatrical production soared The consolidation of theater ownership in the hands of a few firms made theater rents exorbitant and the emergence of the cinema as a competitive form of mass entertainment threatened to destabilize the entire theatrical system The theatrical community responded to these external threats by retrenching instead of innovating Successful company heads were risk averse and tended to stage the familiar, as established audience preferences were their only sure source of income and financial viability

Theater did not differ from other Italian industries that were equally "crisis" ridden in the 1920s and 1930s Corporativism—in conjunction with corporations, its organizational vehicles—was the regime policy that permitted the state to adjudicate market failures (Maier 1987, pp 70–120) Corporativism promoted the apparently incompatible goals of state subsidy and free markets In January 1927, the regime introduced corporativism in a 30-point doctrine called the *Labor Charter* (*La Carta del lavoro*) Private initiative drawn into the public sphere through the overarching presence of the fascist state was the cornerstone of corporatist doctrine Officially, the corporatist state opposed government subsidy of private industries such as theater The *Labor Charter* articulated this position "the corporative State considers private initiative in the field of production the most efficacious and useful instrument in the interests of the Nation" (Bottai and Turati 1929, p 37) However, the state can intervene in collective production when "private initiative is lacking or insufficient or when the political interests of the State are at stake Such intervention can assume the form of control, encouragement or direct management" (Bottai and Turati 1929, p 38) This statement was

sufficiently vague that the regime, while officially supporting independence, could subsidize or intervene as and how it chose. As it chose, it assumes significance.

Theater was an industry, as well as a producer of social and political meanings, and state industrial policy subsumed theatrical policy. In his first public memo, Gino Pierantoni, president of the Corporation of Spectacle (Corporazione dello Spettacolo), argued that, while the theater had "the highest value . . . as a spiritual entity," it was also "neither more nor less than other industrial firms" (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1931–33). Theatrical profits and productivity required the reduction of inefficiencies in the theatrical market (Pierantoni 1934). The Labor Charter aimed to provide market supports to stimulate private initiative at the expense of state subsidy. As the economic entrepreneurs in the theatrical system, the *capocomici* were the beneficiaries of state market incentives that included the reduction of production costs and the restriction of competition.¹⁷ Railroad discounts and regulation of theater rents lowered production costs. Laws that regulated the formation of new theatrical companies restricted the number of competitors in the theatrical market. *Capocomici* had to prove that they were financially solvent by making their finances public before they could mount a production (De Pirro 1940, p. 4). The state designated as "primary companies" those theatrical companies whose financial records passed its scrutiny. In 1931, there were 59 privately operated dramatic companies in Italy; in 1935, there were 22, 16 of which had existed previously.¹⁸ In 1938, the SIAE reported 35,580 theatrical performances in Italy. State-designated primary companies staged 10% of these performances, sold 33% of all theatrical tickets, and made 66% of theatrical profits—statistics that suggest that these companies dominated the theatrical market (SIAE 1938, p. 60).

The state system of market incentives and regulation may have created company heads who were loyal fascists, but it did not create a fascist theater. The "rules" focused upon stimulating production and not upon what was produced. Institutional arrangements within the Italian theater created market rigidities that continued to militate against aesthetic and political innovation. The regime and theatrical reformers recognized that forces external to the market, such as state subsidies, and outside of the company system would have to support innovation, either fascist or aesthetic, on the Italian stage.

A system, which I have elsewhere labeled "state paternalism" (Berezin

¹⁷ For a summary of theatrical legislation, see Camera dei Deputati (1929, 1935, 1936) and De Pirro (1940).

¹⁸ These figures are compiled from Unsigned (1931, p. 365) and Unsigned (1936, insert).

1991), developed that gave financial support to a number of theatrical projects, artistic structures with coherent visions, that the market could not sustain. Given corporativism's public rhetoric, which demanded private initiative in the arts, we can assume that, with private financial initiative lacking, the state stepped in because it somehow perceived that these theater projects would promote its interests.

I argue that we may reconstruct how theater became a vehicle of fascist meanings—meanings that were not dependent on content—by shifting our unit of analysis from plays to theatrical projects and by analyzing the pattern of state theatrical subsidy. Projects are more useful for attempting to understand meaning because it is easy to read ideology into isolated performances. The point is not that there were no plays with explicitly identifiable fascist themes, but that they were few and far between.

THE LOCATION OF FASCIST THEATRICAL MEANING

The Subsidized Theater: A New Cultural Object

Theatrical subsidies that carried the imprint of the fascist regime came from three sources: (1) Mussolini's discretionary funds, (2) the PNF, and (3) the state ministries (particularly the ministries of popular culture, education, and corporations). Public legal decrees and ministerial records provide evidence that permits us to map the terrain of fascist theatrical projects. We can reasonably assume that a project received state funding if the regime gave it legal status and placed it under an appropriate ministry or the PNF.¹⁹

Eleven theatrical projects received regime subsidy and legal status. The regime appropriated theatrical projects by making them a part of fascist organizations such as the *Dopolavoro*—the PNF's leisure organization—or by amending a project's statute to place it under a government ministry. Subsidized theatrical projects sold tickets to performances, but the regime, as well as the producers of these projects, assumed that they would not be financially viable without state support. The statute of the National Institute of Ancient Drama (*Istituto Nazionale del Dramma Antico*) provides an example of how the regime exerted control over theatrical projects. From its founding in 1914, the institute was a non-profit public agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Instruction, which became, during the fascist period, the National Ministry of

¹⁹ The combination of subsidy and legal status is a crucial distinction because the regime would occasionally provide emergency funds to insolvent company heads (Berezin 1987, pp. 175–83).

Education In 1927, the institute revised its statute and moved its seat from Siracuse to Rome The regime appointed an unsalaried president, who ran the board of directors, oversaw general finances, and governed the institute (Unsigned 1930, pp 66–72) The board consisted of cultural bureaucrats, as well as artistic directors and classical scholars

The two major funding periods (1927 and the mid-1930s) coincided with major policy periods within the regime The year 1927 marked the beginning of the period of consensus—the period of stabilization after the turbulence that accompanied the regime's coming to power A series of "Prizes of Encouragement" awarded to "authors, boards, institutes" that performed works or promised to perform works of "esteem and importance for culture and industry" (Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione 1927, pp 2713–23) constituted the first regime-sponsored subsidy of the theater The Ministry of Public Instruction awarded 36 prizes ranging from 5,000 lire to 235,000 lire Theatrical projects won seven prizes The PNF, the National Ministry of Education, and the Fascist Confederation of Professionals and Artists funded four additional projects in the mid-1930s During the thirties, the regime aggressively set out to forge a fascist empire with a distinctively fascist culture ²⁰

In general, subsidy of the arts represents a small portion of any state's budget The precise amount of money that fascist Italy allocated to theatrical projects is difficult to specify because figures are buried within the budgets of state organizations such as the PNF The 1926–27 Italian state budget suggests the extent of theatrical subsidy For that fiscal year, the entire state budget was 14,550,000 lire, resources allocated to the Ministry of Public Instruction were 1,477,000 lire, which represents 10% of the Italian state budget (Repaci 1962, pp 168–69) Theatrical grants represented 585,000 lire, or 40% of the Ministry of Public Instruction's budget This amount includes 385,000 lire in grants to the Dopolavoro and to the Gabriel D'Annunzio Institute As both organizations ran other types of activities—for example, the Institute was publishing the definitive edition of D'Annunzio's work—the percentage for 1926 is probably inflated

Three types of theatrical projects received funding open air theaters, small experimental theaters, and professional and amateur theater schools (*filodrammatiche*) In the absence of empirical research on the class composition of theater audiences in Italy both before and during the fascist period, scholars generally assume that the high cost of theater tickets limited its audience to the upper middle classes (Sanguanini 1989, pp 219–20, Forgacs 1990, p 47, De Grazia 1981, pp 160–62) In general, if the regime-subsidized theater were to convey fascist ideology, it

²⁰ Renzo De Felice (1974) provides the standard periodization

had to draw a broader audience than traditional "bourgeois" city theater. Subsidized theatrical projects cast a wide net over the class structure of Italian society.

Open air theater —Staging was the salient dimension of the open air theater projects that colonized public space in the name of the regime by performing in locations other than private, indoor theaters. Piazzas, antiquities, gardens, and even the banks of the Arno River in Florence, where the PNF staged its unsuccessful *18BL*, were all deemed appropriate venues for fascist open air theater. The National Institute for the Performance of Gabriel D'Annunzio's Drama (Istituto Nazionale per la Rappresentazione dei Drammi di Gabriele D'Annunzio) staged D'Annunzio's plays in the gardens of the estate that the regime had given to him. In 1926, the SIAE launched an effort to stage D'Annunzio's plays in parallel with a regime initiative to publish D'Annunzio's collected works. Both actions aimed to introduce the nation's post-World War I generation to Italy's "greatest living Poet" (Corsi 1939, p. 38). D'Annunzio helped to plan the project and chose the initial repertory and stage director, Giovacchino Forzano (SIAE 1971). In March 1927, the Ministry of Public Instruction awarded 150,000 lire to the SIAE to form the institute.

Founded in 1914 by the Italian classicist Ettore Romagnoli, the National Institute of Ancient Drama (Istituto Nazionale del Dramma Antico) aimed to re-create the feeling of the ancient world by staging performances of classical drama in Greek and Roman amphitheaters (De Pirro 1938, p. 69, Corsi 1939, pp. 76–77). Most of the National Institute of Ancient Drama's theaters were in Sicily, and their location necessitated travel to performances. Both institutes captured an upper-middle-class audience of traditional taste that was familiar with Italian high culture.

In contrast, Achille Starace, secretary of the Fascist party, and Giovacchino Forzano developed the Thespian Cars (*Carri di tespi*), traveling theater cars sponsored by the *Dopolavoro* to bring theater "to the people."²¹ The Thespian Cars, a fascist adaptation of socialist popular theater models (Berezin 1987, pp. 203–43, De Grazia 1981, pp. 162–64) that traveled throughout Italy from 1929 to at least 1939, were large trucks that carried a portable stage, props, and actors. They arrived in town to official fanfare a day before a performance and appropriated the town square or piazza for their stage.

Experimental theater —In emulation of their European counterparts, Italian playwrights had lobbied for small theater-based companies since the beginning of the 20th century (Miller 1966, Camilleri 1959). In contrast to the open air theaters that concentrated on staging, the experi-

²¹ For a history of the *Dopolavoro*'s activities, see De Grazia (1981).

mental theaters emphasized acting style and theatrical direction. *Experimental* was something of a misnomer in the Italian context. Given the "provincialism" that dominated the Italian theater of the early 20th century, experimental theaters represented an attempt to introduce a cosmopolitan repertory to the more sophisticated segments of the Italian theater audience; they were not a venue for avant-garde theater (Alberti et al. 1984, p. 42). The regime gave money to Luigi Pirandello's Art Theater (Teatro d'Arte), the Experimental Theater (Teatro Sperimentale) in Bologna, and Anton Giulio Bragaglia's Independent Theater (Teatro degli Indipendenti) in the 1920s and his Arts Theater (Teatro delle Arti) in the 1930s.

Theater schools — *Filodrammatiche* were a traditional feature of Italian theatrical culture. In the late 19th century, the Italian state began to regulate theater schools through licensing.²² In 1926, the Dopolavoro took over the local amateur theaters and developed national regulations and a system of contests and prizes (Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro [OND] 1929) that introduced competition and stratification. Fascist propaganda sources claimed that the number of *filodrammatiche* registered for Dopolavoro sponsorship increased from 113 in 1926 to 1,901 in 1930 (OND 1931, p. 76). In addition, the PNF subsidized an elite tier of amateur theaters located within the Fascist University Group (Gruppo Universitari Fascisti, or GUF, Valenti 1934, Lazzari 1979). In 1935, the state began to subsidize Silvio D'Amico's Royal Academy of Dramatic Arts (Reale Accademia d'Arte Drammatica), a professional theater school. The academy aimed to train actors and directors for the Italian stage (D'Amico 1941, p. 20).

The Pattern of Subsidy: Performing Fascism

The theatrical projects that continued to receive regime support, in contrast to the ones that lost support, are suggestive of the regime's ideological intentions (see table 1).

Acting Italian, acting fascist: Personal discipline and national incorporation — Acting schools and the amateur theater groups attached to them were 19th-century Italian theatrical institutions that the regime turned to its ideological advantage. These schools were only nominally about training for the theater, as Italian actors were frequently "children of art" (*figli d'arte*) who followed their parents into the craft. Diverse dia-

²² The law required that theater schools deposit a copy of their statutes with the Ministry of Public Instruction. The collection of statutes that survives in the Central State Archives in Rome suggests that, by the late 19th century, theater schools existed in major and minor cities throughout Italy.

TABLE 1

REGIME-SPONSORED THEATRICAL PROJECTS, 1927-40

Date Official Regime Support Began	Project	Cultural Entrepreneur	State Agency	Type
Continuing projects				
1927 (1914)*	National Institute of Ancient Drama	Ettore Romagnoli	Ministry of Public Instruction, National Ministry of Education	Open air
1929	Thespian Cars (<i>Carri di tespi</i>)	Giovacchino Forzano/Achille Starace	National Fascist Party	Open air
1927 (1923)*	Independent Theater	Anton Bragaglia	Ministry of Public Instruction	Experimental theater, open air
1937	Art Theater	Anton Bragaglia	Fascist Confederation of Professionals and Artists	Experimental theater
1927 (1800s)*	<i>Filodrammatica</i>	<i>Dopolavoro</i>	National Fascist Party	Theater school
1934	University Theater	Fascist University Group	National Fascist Party	Theater school
1936	Royal Academy of Dramatic Arts	Silvio D'Amico	National Ministry of Education	Theater school
Terminated projects				
1927	National Institute for the Performance of Gabriel D'Annunzio's Dramas	Italian Society of Authors and Editors (SIAE)	Ministry of Public Instruction	Open air
1934	<i>18BL</i>	Allesandro Pavolini	National Fascist Party	Open air
1927 (1922)*	Experimental Theater of Bologna	Dario Niccodemi	Ministry of Public Instruction	Experimental theater
1927 (1925)*	Art Theater	Luigi Prandello	Ministry of Public Instruction	Experimental theater

* Date project originated

lects divided the Italian populace, and acting schools combined popular amusement and training in standard spoken Italian. The schools flourished after the unification, when the nationalist need for linguistic consolidation became critical (Anderson 1983, pp. 41–49). In 19th-century Italian theater schools, learning to act meant learning to speak, and become, Italian. In fascist Italy, learning to act meant learning to become fascist, as the qualities of a good actor—discipline and subordination within an organization—were the qualities of a good fascist. In the amateur theater, one acted citizenship and national incorporation, whether that be fascist or Italian.

The Dopolavoro's amateur theater wed the 19th-century emphasis upon language training to the fascist interest in personal discipline and organizational behavior (OND 1929, p. 150). In an English-language propaganda pamphlet intended for international diffusion, an anonymous regime publicist noted: "The dramatic theaters of today have no improvised actors, anxious only to show off, but intelligent, cultivated performers who study with zest. Apart from the artistic merit attained by the amateur theater through its discipline and training, mention should be made of the importance accruing to the wider diffusion of good Italian" (OND 1938, pp. 29–31).

"Discipline" and "training" were antithetical to the acting style of the "improvised actor" or *mattatore* and the system of standardized roles. A Dopolavoro guidebook (OND 1929) on how to organize and conduct an amateur theater linked theatrical reform to fascist socialization. "The abolition of roles responds to a precise fascist concept to subordinate every personal desire to the success of the whole" (p. 28). According to the guidebook, the theatrical individualism that the *mattatore* represented was aesthetically and politically out of step. "Men are united in groups, in masses. Heroes, solitary giants, the protagonists who gesture and shout for themselves and of themselves, absorbing the attention of others, egotistical and egocentric, that shout: I am! I do! I say! I think! I feel! such a figure is dead" (pp. 100–101). The goals of PNF's University Theater were similar to the goals of the Dopolavoro's *filodrammatiche*. Its constituency was different. In contrast to the Dopolavoro's theaters that targeted a public that had neither access to nor desire for a university education, University Theater sought the elite.

In contrast to the University Theater and the *filodrammatiche*, Silvio D'Amico's Royal Academy equated personal discipline and professionalism. D'Amico aimed to create professional actors and directors—disciplined craftspersons who subordinated parts to the whole. That professionalism in the theater coincided with fascist values of discipline and hierarchy was a felicitous coincidence for both the regime and the theatrical world. D'Amico's new Italian actor would create "a life always

new, and fresh and lively” and his director would “create spectacle” (D’Amico 1941, pp 14, 15) D’Amico’s academy did not eschew the goals of national incorporation inherited from the earlier theater schools. The academy was located in Rome and used scholarships to recruit a national student body (D’Amico 1941). Language training was foremost on its agenda. Dialect and improperly spoken Italian militated against the formation of a national theater as the *mattatore*’s individualism militated against professionalism. According to D’Amico, “recitation” was the “fundamental instruction” required for a young actor in order to “correct with patient reeducation the bad habits originating in dialect” (D’Amico 1941, pp 23–24).

Emotion and spectacle. Feeling fascist incorporation —The amateur theater and *filodrammatiche* used acting style, a performative aspect of theater, to suggest a fascist ideological discourse of discipline and hierarchy. The open air theaters created spectacles in public spaces that revived the ritualistic dimensions of theater. Staging that focused upon the appropriation of public space sought to generate emotions that would make all participants feel incorporated into a fascist collectivity. The audience would transfer the feeling of collectivity that the aesthetic community created to a feeling of political community residing in the fascist state. In this regard, the open air theater was similar to the numerous rallies and public events that the fascists staged for purely political reasons.²³

Of the open air theaters, the National Institute of Ancient Drama and the Thespian Cars received continuous regime support while Gabriel D’Annunzio’s institute lasted one season. Given the regime’s desire to equate the fascist empire with the Roman empire, an organization that tried to revive classical dramas in their original locale was in its interests (Visser 1992). The statute of the National Institute of Ancient Drama explicitly linked fascist Italy to past imperial glories. The institute viewed itself as in the “avant-garde” of a movement to use the “glorious classical tradition” and to “recover the imperial heights of Greece and Rome” that had “its roots, not in vacant intellectualism, but in the history and in the future of Italy” (Unsigned 1929, p 215). The emotion or feeling of national incorporation that the institute would promote contrasted sharply with the “vacant intellectualism” of “bourgeois” theater and liberal Italy. The economic requirements of the tourist trade supplemented the institute’s ideological and aesthetic dimension. The institute’s president noted that “in addition to its artistic and educational ends classical dramas contribute to tourist facilities in our country” (Pace 1937, p 378).

²³ I am in the process of preparing a full-length manuscript on political spectacle in fascist Italy.

The Thespian Cars aimed to educate the aesthetic sensibility of the masses. Starace (1938) claimed that the project would "make it possible for persons to become acquainted with the best theatrical productions who in other times would have been constrained to ignore them for lack of means" (p. 48). The content of what was performed did not affect the aesthetic thrust of the performance. Over the nine years for which there is evidence, the Thespian Cars performed 44 different plays representing 37 Italian authors (Corsi 1939, pp. 263–88). The repertory consisted exclusively of Italian dramas and favored historical and canonical works that were "comic and sentimental in a very plain form and easily accessible to the simple creatures of the masses" (Corsi 1939, p. 279). Despite the reliance upon Italian classical authors such as Carlo Goldoni and Vittorio Alfieri—authors whose works demanded period costumes—the contemporary repertory of the Thespian Cars did not differ from what was staged in the company-based city theaters.²⁴

Fascist aesthetic education aimed to arouse the emotions, not stimulate the intellect. Rather than drawing intellectual distinctions based upon content, it used the theater's power of spectacle to engender feelings of community. Going to the theater became more important than what one saw at the theater. One fascist publicist drew a connection between the Thespian Cars and religious experience: "Like the faithful have in churches, seats adapted to collect themselves and raise their souls and thoughts to God, likewise a knowing, mature people have in theater seats adapted to raise their spirit to the beauty of art, and in it to find a surging force of life" (OND, n.d., p. 15). A critic writing in the theatrical review *Comedia* argued that in order to have a "theater worthy of Fascism and Rome," it would be necessary to "reach the brain [of the masses] by passing through its heart" (Cantini 1933, p. 12).

Spectacle was the vehicle of feeling, religious or fascist, which educated the heart. The Thespian Cars' productions packed the central town piazzas with throngs of people and employed costumes and lighting to command the attention of the audience. According to fascist sources, popular response was enthusiastic. The Thespian Cars "seemed like a gift of the regime, and a greatly effective gift it was. The public, coarse but intelligent, compressed and strained their astonished eyes in front of the spectacle" (Corsi 1939, p. 268). An American observer reported on the impressive scenic effects and noted that an audience watching a performance "shed tears of joy" (Di Robilant 1931, p. 599).

Gabriel D'Annunzio, playwright and novelist, was the quintessential

²⁴ The Thespian Cars staged 10 of the plays that appeared in the *Annuario's* listing of new plays. Of these plays, two fell into the fascist category and three fell into the possibly political category. The Thespian Cars' repertory appears in Corsi (1939, pp. 277–82).

romantic and nationalist hero. He was known for his amorous exploits and the lushness of his literary output. He wrote his first play in 1898 and his last in 1921, although for all effective purposes his playwriting ended in 1913. D'Annunzio was an avid supporter of Italian entry into World War I, and he began at that time to reconstruct himself as a warrior poet (Lyttelton 1987, pp. 16–18). In 1919, at the age of 56 and accompanied by a group of aesthetically inclined shock troops (*arditi*), he flew his own airplane into the border city of Fiume, claimed it for Italy, and installed himself as ruler (Ledeen 1977).

D'Annunzio's institute opened September 12, 1927—the eighth anniversary of his storming of Fiume—with a performance of *D'Iorio's Daughter* (*La Figlia di Iorio*) staged in the gardens of “La Vittoriale,” D'Annunzio's estate on the shores of Lake Garda. The popular play about Abbruzzian peasants depicted the danger of uncontrolled erotic passion. The institute's staging of the play was an exercise in fascist community. 600 persons responded to the “call for extras” to cast the play's chorus of peasants. The *Corriere della sera* reported that persons from “every strata” of Italian society, “youths from good family, professionals, artists, workers, even villagers” (Unsigned 1927, p. 5), showed up to audition for these roles. The staging was democratic and represented every sector of Italian society, the audience did not. Thousand-lire ticket prices limited the audience to the very affluent (Corsi 1939, p. 40, Praga 1928, p. 241).²⁵

Renato Simoni (1927) reviewed the performance in religious terms and argued that the staging helped the audience to merge emotionally with the drama. “Theater was abolished. Its limits were superseded. In the last act, the hill became a stage crowded with people, multicolored, excited, shouting. It was an artistically solemn moment. It seemed also to us that the countless throng pressed in the same passion, transformed by poetry, into poetry” (p. 5).

Marco Praga, another prominent Milanese drama critic described the performance as a “solemn celebration” (1928, p. 239). He noted that, when the play originally was performed in 1904, critics might have analyzed individual performances “in detail,” but the institute's staging was a “scenic representation of exceptional character” that critics “will judge in its totality and for its total results” (p. 252).

Fascist visions of spectacle shaped D'Annunzio's institute, yet *D'Iorio's Daughter* was the only play that it staged (*Enciclopedia dello spetta-*

²⁵ Both Corsi and Praga comment on the extraordinarily high price of the tickets. An *AJS* reviewer reminded me that expensive theater tickets cost only 5 lire each. But a review of my sources leads me to conclude that 1,000 lire was in fact the price of the tickets—although this does indeed seem rather expensive.

colo 1957, p. 99) The institute was under the auspices of the SIAE, which had been the principal professional association of Italian playwrights. When the regime began the process of taking over the SIAE in 1926 (Berezin 1991, p. 645), it marginalized playwrights within the SIAE and within the theater. No playwrights served on the board of the institute. A commemorative theater that celebrated the playwright as author of texts did not coincide with the regime's agenda to make playwrights, as creators of texts, a secondary aspect of theater. D'Annunzio's plays were performed frequently and there was no need for a special vehicle to see them. When the institute did not become self-supporting, it ceased. In 1927, the regime began subsidizing D'Annunzio's estate and, in 1933, made it an official museum, which included a room to house the airplane that D'Annunzio flew over Fiume and a mausoleum for the *arditi* that resembled a shrine. During his lifetime, D'Annunzio served as a cultural icon rather than a culture producer, and his plays were secondary to the theater of his life.

Theatricalizing coordination—Experimental theater was the venue in which spectacle and performance—staging and acting style—came together in the figure of the director. The audience for experimental theater was more restricted than the audience for either the open air theater or the amateur theater. In general, experimental theater aimed at a sophisticated audience that could distinguish among different types of staging and acting styles and draw meanings from them.

Among the advocates of experimental theaters, Anton Giulio Bragaglia, a set designer and director, received funding from the fascist regime from 1923 to 1943 (Alberti 1974, Verdone 1965). Bragaglia's Independent Theater emphasized the importance of the director in restoring a sense of spectacle to theater. He held performances in the ancient Baths of Caracalla in Rome as well as a small intimate theater (Verdone 1965, p. 36, Alberti et al. 1984). In contrast, Pirandello's Art Theater emphasized the primacy of the author and the text, and the performance styles and location were secondary (D'Amico and Tinterri 1987). The Experimental Theater of Bologna, directed by the popular playwright Dario Niccodemi, who was also president of the SIAE, aimed to bring "unknown authors" to the "attention and support" of the state (Teatro Italiano Sperimentale 1922, p. 1).

Funding patterns for the experimental theater were similar to patterns observed for the open air theater. The experimental theaters that were playwright based shared the same fate as D'Annunzio's commemorative theater. In a treatise on the arts, *Spiritual Imperialism* (*Imperialismo spirituale*, 1925), Franco Ciarlantini, a regime intellectual who studied the financial viability of Italian cultural enterprises, articulated a vision

of the arts that would eventually eliminate Pirandello's type of experimental theater (Carli and Fanelli 1931, pp. 141–42). Addressing the issue of government subsidy to Pirandello, Ciarlantini noted "At the moment in which I write, the Government has given its support to that noble artist Luigi Pirandello. But, with all respect to the great playwright and his sympathetic initiative, for now it is not exceptional theaters that we need, but theaters that know how to recapture Italian tradition with an appropriate sense of modernity" (1925, p. 84). The director—and not the playwright—replacing the *mattatore/capocomico*, represented an appropriate blend of tradition and modernity that was satisfactory both to the regime and to certain segments of the Italian theatrical milieu.

The case of Pirandello underscores the regime's fundamental indifference to the content of plays. The regime consoled Pirandello for the loss of his theater; he was elected to Mussolini's Italian Academy (Accademia d'Italia), and he served as a cultural ambassador until he died in 1936. Pirandello continued to lobby for company-based theaters in three major Italian cities (Alberti 1974, Giudice 1975, D'Amico 1931), although he was ambivalent toward the regime's rejection of his vision for the theater. He opened the 1935 theatrical season at the Argentina Theater with a "Roman salute" and, in Mussolini's presence, delivered a panegyric to the importance of the regime to the theater (Unsigned 1935, p. 6). At the same time, he wrote his final play, *The Mountain Giants* (*I Giganti della montagna*)—an indictment of state involvement in cultural production. After his death, the regime sponsored an elaborate public production of the play in the Boboli Gardens in Florence (Corsi 1939, p. 207).

Comparing theatrical projects—Projects that continued to receive funding displayed three characteristics: (1) they did not originate with the regime, (2) ideology was not a salient dimension of theatrical repertory, (3) they emphasized performance and not text—theatrical form and not content—and this emphasis crossed class boundaries.

First, the regime did not design theatrical projects. The Thespian Cars revived the prerailroad method of traveling theater as well as adopting pre–World War I socialist concepts of popular theater.²⁶ The theater schools were straightforward appropriations of preexisting theatrical institutions. In the prefascist period, experimental theater projects had failed to raise, or to adequately sustain themselves with, private money.

²⁶ Evidence exists that suggests that the People's Theater (Teatro del Popolo) of the Socialist Humanitarian Society (Società Humanitaria) served as a cultural model for the Thespian Cars (Berezin 1987, pp. 203–43).

Second, the content of the subsidized theater's repertory was not ideologically distinctive. Publicity brochures for subsidized theater projects and descriptions of them in official regime publications and theatrical reviews conspicuously failed to report or glossed over repertory. For example, fascist propaganda pamphlets on the Thespian Cars focused on production details and emphasized the technological complexity of the stage and the efficiency with which the group moved from town to town. An English edition of a Dopolavoro propaganda book noted that "in the eight years that it has been operating, it has never been necessary to postpone or even delay a performance, nor has it ever been necessary to make emergency arrangements on account of the failure of the trucks to arrive" (OND 1938, p. 41). Copious photographs of theatrical machinery and crowd-filled piazzas documented these points (OND 1931).

Third, fascist cultural policy was not uniform across social class boundaries. Fascism's ability to endow the lower middle classes with the cultural capital that they lacked was a large part of its appeal among these classes (Berezin 1990, De Grazia 1981, pp. 127–50). The subsidized theater projects were aimed at different types of audiences with different degrees of cultural sophistication and knowledge. What is striking about these projects is that the capacity to make theatrical distinctions within class categories was the same across class boundaries. For example, whether one was an upper-middle-class person attending a performance of classical drama or a lower-middle-class person enthralled by the pageantry of the Thespian Cars, one still had to understand given the general context that the regime had appropriated public space to create a new kind of aesthetic and political community. Similarly, an upper-middle-class audience accustomed to bourgeois theater would take the same message from experimental theater as a lower-middle-class or working-class person would take from a Dopolavoro *filodrammatiche*. Theater was now about order, discipline, and hierarchy.

The absence of the reporting of repertories, not the absence of a repertory, suggests that *how* a play was performed, not *what* was performed, constituted the focus of the regime's theatrical concerns. The secondary position ascribed to the repertory and the primary position ascribed to performance is central to understanding the meaning of the subsidized theater. Spectacle, emotion, and discipline, qualities of theater in general and not fascism in particular, dominated regime and theatrical discourse on the subsidized theater. Successful projects emphasized the collective and ritualistic aspects of theater that were reflected in the location and staging of performances and the professionalism—the hierarchy and coordination—reflected in the acting style. The performative, or formal properties of theater, dramatized political meanings without resorting to

overt political content²⁷ The prerequisites of theater as artistic genre merged with the requirements of fascism as political genre to create a fascist theater

The projects that did not continue to receive funding were playwright centered, that is, they emphasized the primacy of the author and his text Playwright-centered theater was characteristic of 19th-century theater The tradition of the *mattatore* hindered its diffusion in Italy, and Italian playwrights and *mattatore* frequently vied with each other for theatrical dominance The regime came to identify the 19th century with liberalism and words—the polar opposites of fascism and action Theatrical projects that supported the playwright, the emblem of 19th-century theatrical style, were less likely to receive continuing support At the same time, the regime could not ignore playwrights such as Pirandello and D'Annunzio, who were internationally known theatrical figures The regime found it expedient to provide them with funding and to permit their projects to fail in the marketplace

The regime did not expect subsidized projects to be profitable, but projects did have to generate popular interest if they were to be of any political use Eliminating emphasis on the author and the text did not guarantee success if the project completely lacked popular support Content made a difference to the audience, and the regime bowed to popular taste The *18BL*, the only subsidized project that its producers designed as explicitly fascist, was a popular failure and not repeated In 1934, several prominent Italian movie directors, theatrical personnel, and elite members of the PNF explicitly decided to create a “fascist” spectacle The creators of the *18BL* modeled it on Soviet mass propaganda spectacles (Salvini 1934, pp 251–52) The hero was a huge truck—the *18BL* The play represented three events in Italian fascist history—World War I, the fascist revolution, and subsequent state reconstruction (Bontempelli [1934] 1974, p 264) Staged in Florence, the audience sat on one bank of the Arno River (about 200 yards from the stage) and watched shapes and shadows on the other bank of the river The technological complexity of the staging took precedence over dialogue Collectivism governed the production Eight “directors” planned the staging, and although it had one star who played the truck, the rest of the cast consisted of a chorus (D'Amico [1934] 1964, pp 283–89)

The failure of the *18BL* elicited widespread discussion in regime publications A theatrical critic in the fascist theater review, *Scenario*, commented, “The Latin temperament that fortunately guides our spirit

²⁷ Goldfarb (1980, pp 111–12) reports a similar finding in his study of Polish student theater

and our taste, prevents us from conceptualizing a spectacle of this character" (Salvini 1934, p. 253). Another reviewer in *Gerarchia*, a regime review of politics, argued that the *18BL* failed because its creators (all committed fascist intellectuals) had misconceived the true nature of fascist theater. "The theater problem is a problem of the nation, which ought to have a theater of extremely Italian spirit and forms as it has a very Italian political constitution. To do this, it is not enough to construct an edifice but it is necessary to let gush from the subsoil those vital forces that want to ascend toward the sun" (Giani 1934, p. 1052). Critics spoke about the failure of the *18BL* as a failure of style or form, and not content or substance.

PRODUCING FASCIST THEATER: STYLE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Fascist Ideological Discourse: The Content of No Content

Subsidized theater wed theatricality to fascist culture. This marriage did not occur by regime fiat. Producing a fascist theater was an interactive process. It involved a dialogue of appropriation and reappropriation between regime intellectuals and theatrical producers that combined fascist ideology and theatrical reform.

Scholars, focusing upon the content of fascist ideas, have argued that fascist ideology was incoherent and opportunistic (Lyttelton 1973, p. 36, Zunino 1985). The distinction that fascists frequently made between liberalism and fascism lends coherence to fascist ideological discourse and is particularly germane to discussions of theater. In the 22 years that fascism ruled the Italian state, regime intellectuals and bureaucrats developed an ideological discourse that equated liberalism with content (words and thought) and fascism with style (action and behavior). Fascism focused on how to act, not how to think. Means took precedence over ever-changing ends, but prescriptions about behavior were constant. The fascist language of style was remarkably consistent over time. The language that central fascist figures employed to speak about fascism, its principal policy doctrine (corporativism), and its artistic production suggests that style was a formal and invariant component of fascist ideology, whereas content was contingent and dependent upon changing political and social circumstances. Given this view of fascism, the fascist theater did not choose form over content; fascism was form itself.

In his autobiography, Mussolini discussed the difficulties that he experienced when he attempted to define the fascist movement. He intended to create a new political category. "It was necessary to imagine a wholly new political conception, adequate to the living reality of the 20th cen-

tury, overcoming at the same time the ideological worship of liberalism, the limited and finally the violently Utopian spirit of Bolshevism. This was my problem—to find the way, to find the moment, to find the form” (Mussolini 1928, p. 68).

The “form” that Mussolini “found” and articulated in *The Doctrine of Fascism* (1932) was devoid of content. According to the *Doctrine*, fascism was a “general attitude toward life” (p. 10) based upon a “spiritual” idea (p. 12). Despite using the term in the title of this tract, Mussolini argued that fascism was “creed” and not “doctrine” (p. 24). He believed that “if Liberalism spells individualism, Fascism spells collectivism” (pp. 42–43).

Fascist collectivism found its concrete embodiment in corporativism.²⁸ In addition to its economic dimensions, which I discussed earlier in this article, corporativism was an ideology that focused on the organization of action rather than the ends of action—style rather than content. A malleable ideology, corporativism served as a metaphor for how one should live in fascist society. It provided a rhetoric or language in which to frame everyday experience that would reinterpret that experience in terms of fascist consciousness. The *Labor Charter*, its catechism, began with a biological metaphor: “The Italian Nation is an organism having ends, life, superior methods of power and endurance than those of the divided and regrouped individuals which compose it. It is a moral, political and economic unity that realizes itself integrally in the fascist State” (Bottai and Turati 1929, p. 35). The emphasis was upon the nation as a moral collectivity, and it was the individual’s duty to find his or her appropriate place within that collectivity. The specific content of fascist duty was historically contingent.

This language of style and behavior permeated fascist discourse in all social and political institutions. Fascist cultural bureaucrats, persons who held government posts and wrote on cultural matters but were not necessarily artists, developed a language that wed corporativism and art. The principal themes of this discourse were, first, that fascist art was emotional and collective as opposed to rational and individualistic “liberal” art and, second, that committed fascists naturally produced fascist art—whatever that happened to be.

In a speech entitled “The Artist in the State,” Giuseppe Bottai, one-time undersecretary and minister of corporations, minister of national education, and an author of the *Labor Charter*, emphasized the collective nature of art and its indeterminacy with respect to content. He argued that “every work of art perfects and validates the historic level of fascist

²⁸ Elsewhere I have elaborated the centrality of corporativism to the understanding of fascist ideology (Berezin 1990, 1991).

politics" by nature of the fact that it is produced in fascist Italy (Bottai 1940, p 182) In contrast to liberal democracy, which uses art to report "opinions and tendencies" (p 183), fascist art represented "experience of life and history" (p 183) and did not need to dictate content to its artists According to Bottai, Italian artists would realize that art was made of the same "hard metal" (p 183) as fascism, and suitable works would emerge

Corrado Pavolini, literary editor of *Il Tevere*, a radical fascist journal, argued that the new fascist theater would be corporative

In its larger sense, "corporativism" can define itself as a *musical condition* [*stato*] of consciousness as a spontaneous, gentle and virile need of harmony, of coherence, of civic equilibrium Becoming a generative force, an act of experience and source of ties not dissimilar to the marvels of Poetry

And it is in this sense that Italy today wants its Theater and it is in this sense that the Theater of tomorrow will not be if not for the masses from the moment that the individual has already become a note of that harmony, an atom of that collective musical consciousness, that has made possible the miracle of Fascism To neglect this immense occurrence one risks not understanding anything of the new glory of Italy and certainly one cannot think about the Theater outside of these terms For a liberal civilization a corporativist civilization has been substituted, in place of a bourgeois Theater, it is necessary to substitute a Theater for the masses [Pavolini 1936, p 366, emphasis in original]

Nicola De Pirro, from 1935 the inspector general of the theater, replayed the "music" of fascist theater when he asserted that theater under fascism would "once more [take] its place as a festival and intimate communion of the whole people" (De Pirro 1938, p 68) A fascist party text for a "course in political preparation" asserted that theater is "one of the most constant and important phenomena of social life" and that "fascist theater ought to bring to the stage high and virile actions and passions, capable [of] mov[ing] profoundly the soul of the crowd, [of] reawaken[ing] the best voices " Fascist theater would not consist of "cerebral involutions"—it would focus upon emotion, not content (PNF 1936, pp 67, 69, 70)

Fascist conceptions of theater emerged in drama reviews For example, a review of playwright/director Giovacchino Forzano's *Tales of Autumn, Winter, Spring* (*Racconti d'autunno, inverno, primavera*) that appeared in Fascist Labor (*Lavoro fascista*), the weekly newspaper of fascist trade unions, argued that content was not the defining feature of fascist theater ²⁹ The setting for this play was the Piazza Venezia in Rome where

²⁹ Forzano was one of the cultural entrepreneurs who wrote two new plays that, based upon content, fell within the 1934–40 category that I identified as "fascist "

Mussolini frequently addressed crowds. Economic sanctions that the League of Nations had imposed on Italy in response to the invasion of Ethiopia placed a certain Signora Francesca's business in danger of bankruptcy. The signora negotiated an agreement that saved her business but waited to sign the contract until Mussolini declared that Italy was an empire and "she [had] the honor of being the first person to stipulate a contract under the authority of the empire" (SIAE 1935–41, 3 285). The reviewer asserted that, "We know well that a fascist theater will be born in spite of every episode, that may seem accidental from the point of view of theater, and we will have a fascist theater even if plots do not speak a word of politics, but exude, the implicit, full, silent, persuasive force, of the *fascist style of life*, a Fascism that is ethical and practical, an ethic that will seem to be separated from every doctrine, as natural and as necessary as breathing" (Rocca 1937, p. 3).

Fascist Theatrical Discourse: Good Theater Is Good Fascism

Bureaucrats produced the rhetoric of fascist ideology. This rhetoric eschewed content and linked theater to corporativism, antiliberalism, and disciplined public and private behavior. Rhetoric, however, did not produce theater. A group of "cultural entrepreneurs," theatrical producers, bridged the gap between ideology and action by appropriating the fascist language of style to define their theatrical projects. Their appropriation was not only at the level of language as they wed their theatrical projects to the ideology of the regime and continued to receive regime funding. By linking theatrical innovation to fascist political innovation, they were able to suggest that good theater was good fascism.

DiMaggio (1986) coined the term "cultural entrepreneur" to refer to a group using cultural institutions to erect status boundaries. I adopt the term to describe individuals using a political institution, the Italian fascist state, to draw artistic boundaries. The careers of cultural entrepreneurs, Anton Giulio Bragaglia (1890–1960), Silvio D'Amico (1887–1955), Giovacchino Forzano (1884–1970) and, to a lesser extent, Ettore Romagnoli (1871–1938), shared several characteristics. In contrast to the cultural bureaucrats, the cultural entrepreneurs made their careers in culture, and not politics. They interacted with the regime by sitting on the boards of fascist theatrical corporations as theatrical experts rather than as policymakers. Their careers started before fascism, spanned the fascist period, and continued into the postwar period, with the exception of Romagnoli who died in 1938. None of them have reputations today as fascists. With the exception of Forzano, who is known for the librettos that he wrote for Italian operas, none of them had international reputa-

tions, in fact, their writings were never translated from Italian. Yet, in terms of the Italian theatrical scene in the 1930s they were the big winners. Why?

The cultural entrepreneurs promoted theatrical projects that embodied their theatrical visions. The presence of these cultural entrepreneurs, who saw themselves as advocates of theater in its totality and who did not have strong group attachments to either acting or playwriting, provided an opportunity for the regime to subsidize cultural producers who would most likely suit its ideological visions. Conversely, the regime offered the cultural entrepreneurs the opportunity to realize their long-standing theatrical ambitions. The successful cultural entrepreneurs defined their projects in opposition to the "old" Italian theater that was created for the upper middle class, was staged in private spaces, and was dominated by egocentric *mattatore* and careless acting. The old theater was emblematic of the bourgeois liberalism and individualism that fascism sought to overcome. The new theater would emphasize spirituality, collectivity, discipline, and professionalism. The cultural entrepreneurs did not miss opportunities to demonstrate that their theatrical projects matched the goals of the regime.

Casual opportunism describes Ettore Romagnoli's involvement with the regime. He was a prolific classical scholar who translated and wrote critical and philological studies of Greek drama (Savino 1937, p. 231, Carli and Fanelli 1931, pp. 651–54). Silvio D'Amico (1929, p. 159) described him as "one of the first apostles of open air theater" in Italy with a "faith" in the "eternal" quality of Greek drama. Romagnoli directed the National Institute of Ancient Drama from 1914 until 1929 when the regime rewarded him with election to the Italian Academy (Accademia d'Italia)—the institute that the regime founded in 1929 to mimic the French Academy. The regime required academy members to parade about in ornate fascist uniforms. For their participation in regime symbolism, members received a stipend of 3,000 lire a month, which was three times the average shopkeeper's salary (Tannenbaum 1972, pp. 292–93). Romagnoli's biographical entry in *The Working Nation* (*La Nazione operante*), "the golden register of fascism," noted that his translations from the Greek provided a "granite" base that was "indispensable" to those who wished to experience in Italian the "true essence" of the "world of ancient Greek poetry" (Savino 1937, p. 231). Romagnoli held professorships in classical literature at universities in Rome, Catania, Padua, and Pavia.

Before fascism came to power, Romagnoli wrote a series of occasional patriotic essays, *The Ancient Mother: Studies on the Italianness of Culture* (*L'Antica madre: Studi su l'italianità della cultura*), in which he linked the classical world to the modern Italian nation (Romagnoli 1923).

The leap from these early nationalist pieces to his 1933 essay *Mussolini on the Tenth Anniversary of the Fascist Revolution* (*Mussolini nel decennale della rivoluzione fascista*) was not far. Romagnoli introduced himself as a “student” of “Greek literature” and “*not a political man*” (Romagnoli 1934, p. 207, emphasis added). Invoking Aeschylus, who said that praise was better if it came from other countries, Romagnoli reported on the perception of Mussolini and fascism in British newspapers and described Mussolini as a “prodigious example of force of soul and indomitable will” (Romagnoli 1934, p. 208).

The activities of the other entrepreneurs were more directed. Giovacchino Forzano directed Gabriele D’Annunzio’s institute for its one season and was the theatrical force behind the Thespian Cars. Forzano was a prolific creator of public spectacle, and he did not limit himself with respect to genre or venue. The 1940 *Annuario* lists him as the author of 34 plays (SIAE 1935–41, 5–33). Forzano wrote the librettos for several operas and was artistic director of *La Scala* during the 1920s and 1930s. He wrote his most famous libretto for Giacomo Puccini’s *Gianni Schicchi* (Baldacci 1990, p. 81). In 1932, Forzano produced a “fascist” film, *Black Shirts* (*Camicie nere*) to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the March on Rome.³⁰ Between 1907 and 1939, 29 of Forzano’s plays were staged (Alberti 1990, pp. 109–12). With the exception of *Tales of Autumn, Winter, Spring*, Forzano favored historical dramas that lent themselves to period costuming and elaborate staging. Silvio D’Amico (1932, pp. 201–2) sneered that Forzano’s production of the opera *Il Trovatore* resembled an ancient Roman carnival because he brought 12 live horses on the stage. Such theatrical extravagances led one American commentator to describe Forzano as the “versatile live wire of the Italian theater” (Di Robilant 1931, p. 597). Italian commentators were less kind. Achille Starace, PNF secretary, in his capacity as head of the Dopolavoro, wrote a memo to Mussolini’s private secretary that described Forzano as a “megalomaniac” who was “noted above all for his financial opportunism” and was as “hated in the theatrical ambience as he is in the fascist ambience” (Segreteria Particolare del Duce, Carteggio Riservato [SPDCR] 1933).

Whether or not Forzano was as profligate with the regime’s money as Starace claimed, he was remarkably successful at getting access to it. A combination of flattery and opportunism fueled Forzano’s entrepreneurial efforts. He regularly wrote rather long-winded letters on oversize stationery in an ornate hand to Mussolini. In the 1930s, he became involved in a collaborative playwrighting venture with Mussolini that he chronicled in *Mussolini Dramatic Author* (*Mussolini autore drammatico*,

³⁰ De Grazia (1989, p. 74) claims that *Black Shirts* lost 4 million lire or \$550,000.

Forzano 1954) In the introduction to that volume, Forzano provides a lucid description of his entrepreneurial skills as he describes how he became artistic director of the Thespian Cars

During a drive in central Rome on a Sunday afternoon, his car broke down Giuseppe Bottai, undersecretary of the corporations, happened to drive by and noticed Forzano stranded on the roadside Bottai invited Forzano to accompany him to a soccer game while the car was being fixed At the soccer game, Bottai introduced Forzano to Augusto Turati, who was then secretary of the PNF The enthusiastic soccer fans prompted Forzano to exclaim to Turati, "If they could only be so enthusiastic for open air theatrical representations!" Turati rewarded Forzano for his astute observations with the "direction" of the regime's new "transportable" theater Forzano coyly admits, "The thing interested me much" and within days he met with the people who were already working on the project He concludes, "and so was born the Thespian Cars" (p xx) Forzano experienced this theatrical revelation while watching a game of soccer, and he was able to link a vision of theater to a vision of spectacle and creativity that was compatible with the regime's notions of collectivity

Romagnoli and Forzano represent two polarities in the field of cultural entrepreneurship Romagnoli's lifework as a classical scholar had an affinity with regime goals of empire, Forzano, an economic as well as cultural entrepreneur, used available institutions, including the fascist state, to promote his personal goals The large body of written work on the theater and its proper relation to society and the state that Silvio D'Amico and Anton Giulio Bragaglia produced suggests that both men viewed their involvement with the regime as a type of cultural mission

D'Amico, drama critic, university professor, author of numerous books and hundreds of articles, was an ardent and highly visible advocate for the reform of the Italian theater The founding of the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art in 1935 was D'Amico's personal coup In contrast to the other cultural entrepreneurs, his involvement with the Italian state began in 1911 when he began to work at the theater division of the Ministry of Public Instruction and to press his claims for a revitalized Italian theater (D'Amico 1922) During the twenties and thirties, his dedication to reforming the Italian theater encouraged him to bargain with the regime In the 1930s, D'Amico was a member of the Corporation of Spectacle (Corporazione dello spettacolo) and coeditor, with Nicola De Pirro, of the regime-sponsored theatrical review *Scenario*, which he resigned in 1937 to edit his own journal, the *Italian Review of Drama* (*Rivista italiana del dramma*) After World War II, D'Amico publicly repudiated fascism in *The Theater Must Not Die* (*Il Teatro non deve morire*, 1945)

Among the advocates of experimental theaters, Anton Giulio Braga-

glia's projects managed to receive regime funding until the beginning of the Second World War. Bragaglia was a set designer, director, and theatrical critic. His official bibliography lists 11 theatrical novelties, 15 books, and over 2,500 articles in a writing career that began in 1912 and ended in 1966 (Alberti 1978). Over half of his literary output appeared in the years 1922–43 when the fascist regime was in power.

D'Amico and Bragaglia competed to capture the regime's resources. In a polemic between the two men, D'Amico wrote, "I have for many years occupied myself exclusively with works and problems of culture, as a logical consequence, I have as much as possible refused to occupy myself with Bragaglia and that which he says, writes or does" (SPDCO 1941, p. 1). The source of the tension between D'Amico and Bragaglia reflected contradictory strains within fascism itself. D'Amico's long-standing position as drama critic for the Roman newspaper the *National Idea* (*L'Idea nazionale*) identified him with the nationalist and traditionalist side of fascism, whereas Bragaglia represented the futurist side of fascism. For D'Amico, modernization meant the reorganization of the theater and the demise of the company system with its aesthetic and economic inefficiencies; for Bragaglia, modernization meant the introduction of continental theatrical innovations in technology and staging to Italy.

D'Amico believed that the state, whether in the hands of a fascist or liberal regime, should support the theater because theaters were inherently not profitable and the ends of art and the exigencies of the market would never meet (D'Amico 1931, pp. 17–40, 1945, p. 24). In a 1931 polemic on the "crisis" of the Italian theater, written under the auspices of the regime's cultural journal *Critica fascista*, D'Amico linked the corporatist and collectivist aspects of fascism to theatrical reform.

In this treatise he argued, "Too often today, drama has lost that which is its reason for being—its contact with the soul of the people" (D'Amico 1931, p. 40). D'Amico's rhetoric put him in touch with the "soul" of the regime. His discussion of the religious nature of the theater was a more elegant rendition of a statement that a cultural bureaucrat could have written:

Religious means ties, *ecclesiastical* means unity. To speak to a theater public, means to make an appeal to the sentiments which draws them, links them, makes them one. And a poet speaking to the people means to discover in the people the most noble sentiments, if these sentiments were drowsy and hidden, he would awake them, revive the human assembly, and reacquaint it with its purest dreams, its highest aspirations, he would perform, in brief, a *religious* duty. [D'Amico 1931, pp. 44–45]

The company system based upon the individualistic *mattatore* destroyed the collectivist or religious aspect of theater. D'Amico's interest in mod-

ernizing and professionalizing the Italian theater turned corporativism to his advantage. Discipline and training would restore theater to its spiritual base. Referring to the traveling system, D'Amico says, "Art today can no longer be made by gypsies. Modern theatrical interpretation needs cultivated minds, clear-sighted care, happy recollections—all the things that are not reconciled with wagons and boardinghouses" (D'Amico 1931, p. 85). The Royal Academy of Dramatic Art, the state acting and directing school, would produce the professionalized and rationalized theater that D'Amico and the regime believed would save the Italian theater. Professionally trained actors and directors would become ideal corporativist men and women—aware of the necessity of subordinating the parts to the whole and of exalting the virtues of hierarchy. Shrewdly equating art with empire, D'Amico argued "Art is not a luxury. Art is a method of life, spiritual and economic, and moreover, also a method of conquest" (D'Amico 1931, p. 87).

Anton Giulio Bragaglia represents the apex of cultural entrepreneurship. In 1923, Bragaglia founded the Experimental Theater of the Independents (Teatro Sperimentale degli Indipendenti) in Rome. Bragaglia explicitly tied his theatrical program to fascism in his 1929 treatise, *The Theater of the Revolution (Il Teatro della rivoluzione)*. His theater was "independent" because he and his collaborators were "tied only to the modern battle" (p. 176). Never at a loss for rhetorical flourish, Bragaglia described himself as the "theoretic *animus* of antitheory" (p. 108, emphasis in original). Theater was a visceral, not intellectual, activity. "Theater is to theater people as land is to the peasants" (p. 108). He filled his theater with the "unschooled." His actors were "delinquents" (*squadristi*) of the theater.

There is a sleight of hand to Bragaglia's rhetoric. He argued for the purity of the expressive and the spontaneous, yet his theatrical productions served as a forum for experiments in new methods of set design, and he introduced continental stage technology to Italy (Alberti et al. 1984). His reputation and career survived the fascist regime (Verdone 1965). Before the Experimental Theater of the Independents folded, Bragaglia moved its location from the Baths of Settimus Severus to the Argentina Theater in Rome—a sign that he was moving toward a different type of fascism.

Bragaglia was attuned to shifting regime visions. In 1934, he used a review of the *18BL* as a forum to criticize what he described as an overreliance on content in the Italian theater. Bragaglia noted that European theater of the 1930s represented a "great period of renaissance in theatrical technology" with "small merit" to the contribution of Italians (Bragaglia 1934, p. 72). According to Bragaglia, the Italian theater was "*made of words*." Bragaglia called for the "Dramaturgical Trinity" of

“word, actor, and scenic climate (diction, light, and architecture)” (pp 72–73) to save the Italian theater from the “tyranny” of the “man of letters.” The ideal fascist theater created itself from the dynamism of the times

The “interpretation of revolutionary events” of the dynamism of the early fascist time, and the present reconstruction, offers ample poetic material to new theatrical genius. New genres demand new geniuses, original pioneers and proponents of the fascist idea, no longer the restricted staging of the bourgeois aristocratic theater, but open staging, in the vast piazzas of arms, and arenas and stadiums, where beautiful youth prepares for the struggle of tomorrow. Legendary tournaments of the protagonists of the revolution were enacted, where they exalted the joy of living, that explodes in a million forms. The model interpretation of myths emerging from revolutionary action will be fruitful for art [Bragaglia 1934, p. 75]

When his Independent Theater lost funding in 1936, Bragaglia preserved his last theatrical venture, the Arts Theater, by attaching it to the Fascist Confederation of Professionals and Artists, and he occupied various bureaucratic roles within the fascist corporative structure. When his theater reopened in 1937, the *squadristi* actors were gone and the playbill proclaimed that the new theater had moved to a “professional terrain.” The logo of the Fascist Confederation of Professionals and Artists was above the logo of the theater on the playbill. Bragaglia replaced his preindustrial references to land and peasants with those of a more corporatist view of theater. “Our theater is a theater of plays and directors. Everything in the theater is at the service of the director who serves the plays. An art program has no need of presumptuous *divas*, but of artists who work dutifully, not those who follow their own heads. This company does not support *divas* or stars but excellent professional actors” (Segreteria Particolare del Duce, Carteggio Ordinario [SPDCO] 1942, p. 2, emphasis in original)

Bragaglia’s theatrical visions did not change in the 20 years between his first theater and the Arts Theater, but his rhetoric did. He was able to adapt his theatrical projects to the regime because there was a certain “fit” between his early “revolutionary” experiments and his later professional theater. In 1940, the playbill for the Arts Theater announced, “Il Duce praised the manifestations of this exceptional theater that develops actions particularly precious for culture and the evolution of theater, and has approved the program of the next season” (SPDCO 1940). The program that Mussolini approved included a satirical work by Luigi Pirandello, *The New Colony*, an adaptation of Dostoevsky’s *Crime and Punishment*, Clifford Odets’s *Golden Boy*, and Sean O’Casey’s *Juno and the Peacock* (SPDCO 1940). The eclectic repertory included a large proportion of foreign works and works that, if one followed the letter of

existing censorship laws, would not have been permitted, which suggests that, in Bragaglia's case as in the other subsidized theater projects, the content of the repertory was secondary. Bragaglia's two theaters articulated the values and ideals that the regime wished to convey and, in both instances, the forms of behavior that the theaters publicized, expressive militarism, and later professionalism, took precedence to the repertory.

THEATRICAL FORM AND POLITICAL MEANING

Communicating Fascism: Intentionality and Context

I began this article by asking how art expresses political ideology. In the methodological section, I proposed that meaning as an analytic activity required the construction of a historically probable account that would reconcile plausible intentions and possible receptions. My evidence suggests that the ideological intentions of the fascist regime only partially contributed to the politicization of the theater. A process of cultural and political interpenetration, the explication of which requires the parsing of historical and political variables, shaped the formation of fascist theater.

Before the fascist period the history of Italian theater had not intersected with the history of European theater. The 19th-century European theater was text based. The "well-made play" relied upon realism and was staged in a large, indoor theater. Scholars then and now refer to it as "bourgeois" theater. The turn of the 19th century ushered in an idea of theatrical modernity that conceptualized theater as interactive ritual and depended upon a director as coordinator. Text became secondary to performance.

Nineteenth-century Italian theater never rose to the heights of its counterparts in France or Germany. The company system and the tradition of the *mattatore* stifled theatrical development. For the Italian theater to participate in the 20th century, after it had missed out on 19th-century developments, required reform. Fascism as ideology and regime emerged in the Italian political arena at the same time that reform became an issue in the theatrical arena. Fascism as ideology focused upon emotion in the collectivity, the fascist state, and disciplined behavior within the collectivity. Spectacle in public spaces was a regime strategy to generate feelings of collectivity. Disciplined behavior took place in organizations that ranged from the fascist party to theater companies. What one actually did within these organizations was secondary to how one did it.

Cultural entrepreneurs who had visions for a new Italian theater existed independently of fascism. Romagnoli wished to revive the theater of antiquity, Forzano aimed to create spectacle, D'Amico and Bragaglia

sought to create a modern theater—although their definitions of modernity varied. These cultural entrepreneurs introduced discipline and professionalism in the figure of the director, encouraged new acting styles, and created venues that permitted theater to become more ritualistic and socially inclusive. By equating the prerequisites of the modern theater with the ideological demands of fascism, they were able to achieve their aesthetic goals with regime subsidy. The regime appropriated theatrical ideas that were already dominant and the theater appropriated fascist ideas. This does not mean that a professional theater or theatrical spectacle is inherently fascist, but in this particular context the dialogue of appropriation and reappropriation that emerged created a fascist theater.

Recognition and Resonance Transgressing Sociability

The analysis of meaning always involves a dual question. What a cultural object “means” to its creators is different from what a cultural object might “mean” to its audience. Theater as an artistic genre offered inherent political possibilities and opportunities for stylistic manipulation. Recognition of these possibilities was not unique to the fascist regime. Theater’s political potential had long attracted Italian social analysts of differing political persuasions who viewed it as the ideal cultural institution for enforcing group cohesion (Gramsci 1977, pp. 303–7, 354–62, Gobetti 1974, pp. 77–80, 343–47). Theater as an artistic genre has two dimensions: first, the textual aspect, which deals with the content of the script and the playwright as the creator of scripts and, second, the performative dimension, which deals with acting style, staging, and coordination. The performative dimension of theater, the experiential dimension, makes theater akin to social life. A play is only a text, and not theater, if it is not performed.

The experience of theater from the point of view of both its creators and its audience is an inherently social process—one never stages or sees the same play twice. But theater is not perfectly akin to social life, it is play or, as Turner (1982, pp. 20–59) has noted, the space between structures—the formally mediated aspects of social life. The playfulness of theater brings us back to Simmel’s (1971) conception of sociability and points us in the direction of unraveling the meaning of the fascist theater. Sociability is based on an implicit knowledge of formal rules of behavior that participants in particular cultural and social contexts share. Simmel juxtaposes sociability, or form, against values, or content. “Where a connection, begun on the sociable level . . . finally comes to center about personal values, it loses the essential quality of sociability and becomes an association determined by a content—not unlike a business or religious relation, for which contact, exchange, and speech are but instruments

for ulterior ends, while for sociability they are the whole meaning and content of the social processes" (p. 131)

Sociability is an end in itself—it is "the *play-form of association*" (Simmel 1971, p. 130, emphasis in original). The transgression of sociability lies in the violation of the form, or genre, of social behavior, and all participants in a "sociable" connection recognize the transgression. The performance dimension of theater suggests a translation of Simmel—theater is the *play-form of art*. Drawing upon the link between theater and ritual, Turner (1982) argues that "'ludic' recombination" is the "essence of liminality" or theatricality and that in "liminality people 'play' with the elements of the familiar and defamiliarize them" (pp. 27–28). Form in social life and in art is so familiar as to be taken for granted, content is variable. For example, a theater audience expects different plays to be about different subjects, guests at a party expect diverse conversation. A contemporary Broadway theater audience would recognize a shift in form if they found a *mattatore* on the New York stage, party participants would be disconcerted if a fellow guest began to discuss personal problems. As Susanne Langer has stated, "*Familiarity* is nothing but the quality of fitting very neatly into the form of previous experience" (1951, p. 83, emphasis in original). Form, theatrical or social, has the capacity to communicate what is "familiar," and what is not, what is acceptable, and what is not.

The "subsidized" Italian theater, the fascist theater, used formal properties, spatial arrangement, and behavior or, translated into theatrical language, the "performance modes" of theater to convey political meaning by transgressing the boundaries of familiarity. The regime's pattern of subsidy "played" with theatrical form. This playing with form was likely to have resonated more with Italian theater audiences than could overt fascist content, which they could easily ignore. The evidence in this article suggests that theater audiences were resistant to fascist content. In addition, there is much anecdotal evidence, and some empirical evidence, that Italians viewed fascist content as a joke (see, e.g., Passerini 1984, pp. 84–153).

The form of a social, or theatrical, action is arguably a more cogent communicative practice than the specific content of an action. The fascist theater transgressed the boundaries of theatrical expectations. Each type of subsidized theater did this in a different way depending upon the demands of its own format, but the end results were the same.

Expectations of theatrical communication were to go to an urban indoor theater and watch a *mattatore* perform a familiar play. By shifting theater from private to public space, open air theater broadened the conception of theater and emphasized its ritual, or collective, value. Italian theater began in public space and had only moved into private space.

with the development of modern society (Toschi [1955] 1976) The Thespian Cars sought to instill the spirit of community in adults who were too old for the schools that the fascists were redesigning and too poor to partake of other cultural products (Koon 1985) Assembling the masses in the piazza to watch the spectacle created a temporary aesthetic community that, it was hoped, would evoke the feeling of the political community of the fascist state This public setting for the Thespian Cars contained cultural and political meaning that would not escape the ordinary Italian citizen, for the piazza was a secular and civil space—a market, a public meeting place, and a scene of sociability (Carandini 1986, p 47), and this held true across class boundaries In the early years of the fascist movement, the piazza became a politically charged locale Fascists and socialists fought for control of the piazza to assert political dominance (Lyttelton 1987, pp 2, 23) The fascist Thespian Cars in the piazza were an enduring reminder that the fascists had conquered the piazza and Italy The location of the performance was so charged with meaning it rendered a repertory superfluous³¹

Although amateur theater and acting schools appear to be unrelated to experimental theaters from the perspective of fascist ideology, the projects of D'Amico, the *filodrammatiche*, and Bragaglia were stylistically similar The formal properties of these theatrical projects—professional acting and corporatist organization of theatrical production embodied in the prominence of the director—conveyed more strongly than any play a central message of the fascist regime Just as a populace familiar with the nontheatrical uses of public spaces would have noticed when the regime appropriated those spaces, audiences familiar with the middle-class theater and its tradition of the *mattatore* would have attached some meaning to the move to a professional theater that was director based

The evidence that I have discussed suggests a more general conclusion I argue that the regime's support of the performance aspects of theater, rather than theater's content, was not simply utilitarian, there was a deeper connection between fascism and form The translation of corporatism for the masses was Believe, Fight, and Obey—a call to action without an object, to a style of behavior without a goal—as opposed to Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity—a call to values and content In liberal democratic societies, understanding the ideas and principles of a

³¹ An *AJS* reviewer suggested that Durkheim might provide as useful a theoretical framework as Simmel Indeed, while the fascist regime may have had a Durkheimian project in mind (see esp Durkheim [1915] 1965, pp 462–95), I argue that Simmel's view of sociability and the conception of transgression that it implies suggests a more cogent analysis of the interface between intention and reception

nation are central to political participation. In Italian fascist society, the content was secondary because the fascists wished to create a feeling of participation, not actual participation, in the community. Assembling a mass of people in a public square to watch a theatrical performance, or to listen to a speech of Mussolini, represented emotional participation in the community. Corporativism, whose only concrete injunction was to belong to a fascist corporation or union, created a large bureaucratic space in which any content was possible and formality itself became the dominant value. Style and feeling articulated in the language of community and discipline characterized not only fascism but the fascist theater. Individuals subordinated themselves to the "organism" of the state, felt the spirit of community, and assumed their proper productive tasks whatever they might have been.

CONCLUSION

What are the implications of this case for the problems with which we began—the transmission of ideology and the regime's construction of political meaning? When we shift our unit of analysis from the text of an individual play to a theatrical project, the regime's apparent lack of interest in content does not appear as puzzling as it did at the outset of this article. Theatrical projects included staging and style of acting as well as repertory or text. They contained whole visions of how to do theater and as such are a better index of what the fascists wished their theater to convey than the content of individual plays. Regime subsidies determined that spectacle—the quality that Aristotle in the *Poetics* characterized as the least important dimension of theater—eclipsed the content of theater.

While all case studies are by their nature limited, their value comes from their ability to generate hypotheses for future research. The Italian case suggests that studies of political meaning that restrict their analyses to the content of ideological doctrines and cultural products are potentially misleading. It finds, first, that the formal properties of a cultural product—the performance dimension of theater—convey meaning, in this instance fascist ideology, even when the content of a cultural product—text of a play—does not and, second, that a regime's capacity to create and disseminate meaning is dependent upon the availability of cultural entrepreneurs who mediate political meaning. The fascist regime had at its disposal a group of cultural entrepreneurs who promoted public spectacles that concentrated upon the form of presentation. The fascist regime did not create meanings, it chose theatrical projects that suited its ideological agenda from a field of available meanings.

The first finding builds upon recent work in the sociology of culture that focuses upon the creation of meaning and suggests a way to extend that literature into a more careful consideration of the formal properties of cultural products. The second finding suggests that cultural actors who translate the language of ideology into art limit the cultural power of political institutions, even totalitarian regimes, and points to the importance of agents in the production of political meaning.

REFERENCES

- Acquarone, Alberto 1978 *L'Organizzazione dello stato totalitario* Turin Einaudi
- Alberti, Alberto Cesare 1974 *Il Teatro nel fascismo* Rome Bulzoni
- 1978 *Poetica teatrale e bibliografia di Anton Giulio Bragaglia* Rome Bulzoni
- Alberti, Alberto Cesare, Sandra Bevere, and Paolo Di Giulio 1984 *Il Teatro sperimentale degli indipendenti (1923–1936)* Rome Bulzoni
- Alberti, Carmelo 1990 "Opere drammatiche di Giovacchino Forzano prime rappresentazioni e recensioni" Pp 109–12 in *Il Piccolo Marat Storia e rivoluzione nel melodramma verista*, edited by Piero e Nandi Ostali Milan Casa Musicale Sonzogno
- Anderson, Benedict 1983 *Imagined Communities* London Verso
- Angelini, Franca 1988 *Teatro e spettacolo nel primo novecento* Rome Laterza
- Aristotle 1992 *Poetics*, translated by S. H. Butcher New York Hill & Wang
- Baldacci, Luigi 1990 "Forzano drammaturgo" Pp 109–12 in *Il Piccolo Marat Storia e rivoluzione nel melodramma verista*, edited by Piero e Nandi Ostali Milan Casa Musicale Sonzogno
- Baxandall, Michael 1972 *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy* New York Oxford University Press
- Becker, Howard 1982 *Art Worlds* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Benelli, Sem 1945 *Schiavitù* Milan Mondadori
- Berezin, Mabel 1987 *Public Spectacles and Private Enterprises Theater and Politics in Italy under Fascism, 1919–1940* Doctoral dissertation Harvard University
- 1990 "Created Constituencies The Italian Middle Classes and Fascism" Pp 142–63 in *Splintered Classes*, edited by Rudy Koshar New York Holmes & Meier
- 1991 "The Organization of Political Ideology Culture, State and Theater in Fascist Italy" *American Sociological Review* 56 639–51
- Bontempelli, Massimo (1934) 1974 *L'Avventura novecentista*, edited by Ruggero Jacobbi Florence Valecchi
- Bottai, Giuseppe 1940 "L'Artista nello stato" Pp 181–84 in *Politica fascista delle arti* Rome Signorelli
- Bottai, Giuseppe, and Augusto Turati 1929 *La Carta del lavoro* Rome Diritto del Lavoro
- Boudon, Raymond 1989 *The Analysis of Ideology*, translated by Malcolm Slater Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Bragaglia, Anton Giulio 1929 *Il Teatro della rivoluzione* Rome Tiber
- 1934 "Lo Spettacolo per masse" *La vita italiana* 44 66–76

- Brockett, Oscar G., and Robert R. Findlay 1973 *Century of Innovation: A History of European and American Theatre and Drama since 1870* Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall
- Brunetta, Gian Piero 1972 *Intellettuali, cinema e propaganda tra le due guerre* Bologna R. Potron
- Burns, Elizabeth 1972 *Theatricality* London Longman
- Camera dei Deputati 1929 *Legislazione Fascista, 1922-28* Rome Camera dei Deputati
- 1935 *Legislazione Fascista, 1929-34* Rome Camera dei Deputati
- 1936 *Il Cinematografo e il teatro nella legislazione fascista. Raccolta delle leggi e dei regolamenti, amministrativi, tributari e corporativi* Rome Camera dei Deputati
- Camilleri, Andrea 1959 *I Teatri stabili in Italia (1898-1918)* Bologna Cappelli
- Cantini, Guido 1933 "Teatri all'aperto" *Comedia* 15 9-12
- Carandini, Silvia 1986 "Teatro e spettacolo nel medioevo" 6 169-225 in *Letteratura italiana*, edited by Alberto Asor Rosa Turin Einaudi
- Carli, Mario, and Giuseppe Attilio Fanelli 1931 *Antologia degli scrittori fascisti* Florence Bemporad
- Carlson, Marvin 1981 *The Italian Stage: From Goldoni to D'Annunzio* London McFarland
- 1984 *Theories of the Theater: A Historical and Critical Survey from the Greeks to the Present* Ithaca, N. Y. Cornell University Press
- Cavallo, Pietro 1987 "Culto delle origini e mito del capo nel teatro fascista" *Storia contemporanea* 28 287-339
- 1990 *Immaginario e rappresentazione. Il Teatro fascista di propaganda* Rome Bonacci
- Cawelti, John G. 1976 *Adventure, Mystery, Romance: Formula Stories as Art and Popular Culture* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Ciarlantini, Franco 1925 *Imperialismo spirituale. Appunti sul valore politico ed economico dell'arte in Italia* Milan Alpes
- Corsi, Mario 1939 *Il Teatro all'aperto in Italia* Milan Rizzoli
- Crane, Diana 1987 *The Transformation of the Avant-Garde* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- D'Amico, Alessandro, and Alessandro Tinterri 1987 *Pirandello capocomico. La Compagnia del teatro d'arte di Roma, 1925-1928* Palermo Sellerio
- D'Amico, Silvio 1922 "Cenerentola a Palazzo Venezia" *Comoedia* 4 433-38
- 1929 *Tramonto del grande attore* Milan Mondadori
- 1931 *Crisi del teatro* Rome Arte della Stampa
- 1932 *Il Teatro italiano* Milan Treves
- 1933 "Per una regia italiana" *Scenario* 2 505-11
- (1934) 1964 "Teatro di masse '18 BL'" Pp. 283-89 in *Cronache del teatro*, edited by E. Ferdinando Palmieri and Sandro D'Amico Bari Laterza
- 1941 *La Regia Accademia d'Arte Drammatica di Roma* Florence N. p
- 1945 *Il Teatro non deve morire* Rome Eden Edizioni dell'Era Nuova
- De Felice, Renzo 1974 *Mussolini il Duce. Vol. 1, Gli anni del consenso, 1929-1936* Turin Einaudi
- De Grazia, Victoria 1981 *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Leisure* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1989 "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960" *Journal of Modern History* 61 53-87
- 1992 *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Denzen, Norman 1990 "Reading Cultural Texts: Comment on Griswold" *American Journal of Sociology* 95 1577-80

- De Pirro, Nicola 1938 *Il Teatro per il popolo* Rome Novissima
- 1940 *Teatro* Turin Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese
- DeVault, Marjorie L 1990 "Novel Readings The Social Organization of Interpretation" *American Journal of Sociology* 95 887–921
- DiMaggio, Paul 1986 "Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston The Creation of an Organizational Base for High Culture in America" Pp 194–211 in *Media, Culture and Society A Critical Reader*, edited by Richard Collins et al London Sage
- Di Robilant, Irene 1931 "The Chariot of Thespis" *Theater Arts Monthly* 15 597–601
- Durkheim, Émile (1915) 1965 *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, translated by Joseph Ward Swain New York Free Press
- Eagleton, Terry 1991 *Ideology An Introduction* London Verso
- Ellul, Jacques 1973 *Propaganda* New York Vintage
- Enciclopedia dello spettacolo* 1957 Vol 4, edited by Silvio D'Amico Rome Le Maschere
- Enciclopedia garzanti dello spettacolo* 1977 Edited by Piero Gelli Milan Garzanti
- Forgacs, David 1990 *Italian Culture in the Industrial Era, 1880–1980* Manchester Manchester University Press
- Forzano, Giovacchino 1954 *Mussolini autore drammatico* Florence Barbera
- Gamson, William, and Andre Modighani 1989 "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power A Constructionist Approach" *American Journal of Sociology* 95 1–37
- Geertz, Clifford 1971 *Islam Observed Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- 1973a "Ideology as a Cultural System" Pp 193–233 in *The Interpretation of Cultures* New York Basic
- 1973b "Thick Description Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" Pp 3–30 in *The Interpretation of Cultures* New York Basic
- Giani, Giampiero 1934 "Dal Teatro di masse allo sperimentale dei GUF" *Gerarchia* 12 1052–53
- Gitlin, Todd 1978 "Media Sociology The Dominant Paradigm" *Theory and Society* 6 205–53
- Giudice, Gaspare 1975 *Pirandello A Biography*, translated by Alastair Hamilton London Oxford University Press
- Gobetti, Piero 1974 "Scritti di critica teatrale" Vol 3 of *Opere complete di Piero Gobetti* Introduction by Giorgio Guazzotti Turin Einaudi
- Goldfarb, Jeffrey C 1980 *The Persistence of Freedom The Sociological Implications of Polish Student Theater* Boulder, Colo Westview
- Gramsci, Antonio (1917) 1977 "Cronache teatrali" Pp 354–64 in *Letteratura e vita nazionale*, edited by Valentino Gerratana Rome Riuniti
- Grassi, Paolo, and George Strehler 1964 "Sixteen Years of the Piccolo Teatro" *Tulane Drama Review* 8 28–40
- Griswold, Wendy 1986 *Renaissance Revivals* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- 1987a "The Fabrication of Literary Meaning" *American Journal of Sociology* 92 1077–1117
- 1987b "A Methodological Framework for the Sociology of Culture" *Sociological Methodology* 14 1–35
- 1990 "Provisional, Provincial Positivism A Reply to Denzen" *American Journal of Sociology* 95 1580–83
- Habermas, Jurgen 1979 "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" Pp 1–68 in *Communication and the Evolution of Society* Boston Beacon Press
- Hay, James 1987 *Popular Film Culture in Fascist Italy* Bloomington Indiana University Press

- Koon, Tracy H. 1985 *Believe Obey Fight Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922-43*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Lamont, Michèle, and Robert Wuthnow. 1990 "Betwixt and Between: Recent Cultural Sociology in Europe and the United States." Pp. 287-315 in *Frontiers of Social Theory: The New Synthesis*, edited by George Ritzer. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Landy, Marcia. 1986 *Fascism in Film: The Italian Commercial Cinema, 1931-1943*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Langer, Susanne K. 1951 *Philosophy in a New Key*. New York: New American Library.
- Lazzari, Giovanni. 1979 *I Littorali della cultura e dell'arte*. Naples: Liguori.
- Ledeer, Michael. 1977 *The First Duce: D'Annunzio at Fiume*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Levine, Lawrence W. 1984 "William Shakespeare and the American People: A Study in Cultural Transformation." *American Historical Review* 89: 34-66.
- Lowenthal, Leo (1944) 1984 "The Triumph of Mass Idols." Pp. 203-35 in *Literature, Popular Culture and Society*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.
- Lyttelton, Adrian. 1973 *Introduction to Italian Fascisms from Pareto to Gentile*. New York: Harper & Row.
- . 1987 *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929*, 2d ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- MacClintock, Lander. 1920 *The Contemporary Drama of Italy*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Maier, Charles S. 1987 "The Economics of Fascism and Nazism: Premises and Performance." Pp. 70-120 in *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCormack, Thelma. 1982 "Content Analysis: The Social History of Method." *Studies in Communication* 2: 143-78.
- McLeod, Addison. 1912 *Plays and Players in Modern Italy*. London: Smith, Elder.
- Miller, Anna Irene. 1966 *The Independent Theatre in Europe: 1887 to the Present*. New York: Benjamin Blom.
- Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione. 1927 "Leggi, regolamenti, e altre disposizioni generali." *Bullettino Ufficiale* 54 (32): 2713-23.
- Mussolini, Benito. 1928 *My Autobiography*, translated by Richard Washburn Child. New York: Scribner's.
- . 1932 *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 4th ed. Rome: Novissima.
- . 1933 "La parola del capo del governo." *Bollettino della Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori* 8: 7-9.
- Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND). 1929 *Il Teatro filodrammatico*. Rome: Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro.
- . 1931 *I Primi cinque anni di attività dell'Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, 1926-30*. Rome: Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro.
- . 1938 *The "Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro" (National Leisure Hours Organization in Italy)*. Rome: Novissima.
- . n.d. *Carro di tespi*. Rome: Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro.
- Pace, Biagio. 1937 "Degli spettacoli classici in Italia." *Scenario* 6: 377-80.
- Pandolfi, Vito. 1954 *Antologia del grande attore*. Bari: Laterza.
- Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF). 1936 *La Cultura fascista: Testi per i Corsi di preparazione politica*. Rome: Libreria dello Stato.
- Passerini, Luisa. 1984 *Torino operaia e fascismo*. Rome: Laterza.
- Pavolini, Corrado. 1936 "Per un teatro di domani." Pp. 347-67 in *Storia del teatro italiano*, edited by Silvio D'Amico. Milan: Bompiani.
- Pedulla, Gianfranco. 1991 "Teatro e fascismo in Italia." *Passato e Presente* 10 (25): 145-56.
- Pierantoni, Gino. 1934 "La Corporazione dello Spettacolo nei primi tre anni del suo

- funzionamento " *Sindacato e Corporazione Bollettino del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale Informazioni Corporative* 61 (January-June) 745
- Praga, Marco 1928 "'La Figlia di Iorio' al vittoriale" Pp 238-55 in *Cronache teatrali* Milan Fratelli Treves
- Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1931-33 "Corporazione dello Spettacolo" Memo from Gino Pierantoni to minister of corporations, May 1, 1931 Busta 18 2 1410 Rome Archivio Centrale dello Stato
- Radway, Janice A 1984 *Reading the Romance Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature* Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press
- Repaci, Francesco A 1962 *La Finanza pubblica italiana nel secolo, 1861-1960* Bologna Zanichelli
- Rispoli, Consiglio 1903 *La Vita pratica del teatro* Florence Bemporad
- Rocca, Enrico 1937 "Le Prime teatrali 'Racconti D'Autunno, D'Inverno e Di Primavera' di Giovacchino Forzano all'Argentina" *Il Lavoro fascista* (January 23), p 3
- Romagnoli, Ettore 1923 *L'Antica madre Studi su l'italianità della cultura* Milan Unitas
- 1934 "Mussolini nel decennale della rivoluzione fascista" Pp 207-25 in *Discorsi critici* Bologna Zanichelli
- Salvini, Guido 1934 "Spettacoli di masse e '18BL'" *Scenario* 3 (3) 251-54
- Sanguanini, Bruno 1989 *Il Pubblico all'italiana Formazione del pubblico e politiche culturali tra stato e teatro* Milan Franco Angeli
- Savino, Edoardo 1937 *La Nazione operante*, 3d ed Novara Istituto Geografico de Agostini
- Scarpellini, Emanuela 1989 *Organizzazione teatrale e politica del teatro nell'Italia fascista* Florence La Nuova Italia Editrice
- Schudson, Michael 1989 "How Culture Works Perspectives from Media Studies on the Efficacy of Symbols" *Theory and Society* 18 153-80
- Segretaria Particolare del Duce, Carteggio Ordinario (SPDCO) 1940 "Teatro delle arti di Roma, Stagione A XVIII" Playbill Busta 509 102/1, Anton Giulio Bragaglia Rome Archivio Centrale dello Stato
- 1941 "Documenti di una falsificazione A Corredo del ricorso presentato da Silvio D'Amico contro A G Bragaglia all'autorità competente" Busta 509 102/1, Anton Giulio Bragaglia Rome Archivio Centrale dello Stato
- 1942 "Campagna delle arti" Playbill Busta 509 102/1 Anton Giulio Bragaglia Rome Archivio Centrale dello Stato
- Segretaria Particolare del Duce, Carteggio Riservato (SPDCR) 1933 Memo from Achille Starace to Benito Mussolini's secretary, March 3, 1933 Busta 85, Giovacchino Forzano Rome Archivio Centrale dello Stato
- Simmel, Georg [1911] 1971 "Sociability" Pp 127-40 in *On Individuality and Social Forms*, edited by Donald N Levine Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Simoni, Renato 1927 "'La Figlia di Iorio' al vittoriale" *Corriere della sera* (September 13)
- 1934 "'L'Offerta' rito in 3 atti di G Antona-Traversi Gismondi" *Corriere della sera* (November 20)
- Skinner, Quentin 1988 "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts" Pp 68-78 in *Meaning and Context Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, edited by James Tully Oxford Polity Press
- Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori (SIAE) 1935-41 *Annuario del Teatro Italiano*, vols 1-6 Rome Poligrafica Italiana
- 1938 *Lo spettacolo in Italia* Rome N p
- 1971 Letter 139, from Gabriel D'Annunzio to Tommaso Monicelli, February 27, 1927 Rome Archivio Storico Culturale
- Starace, Achille 1938 *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro* Milan Mondadori

- Swidler, Ann 1986 "Culture in Action Symbols and Strategies" *American Sociological Review* 51 273-86
- Tannenbaum, Edward R. 1972 *The Fascist Experience Italian Society and Culture, 1922-1945* New York Basic
- Teatro Italiano Sperimentale 1922 *La Soluzione di un problema insolubile* Bologna Neri
- Thompson, Doug 1991 *State Control in Fascist Italy Culture and Conformity, 1925-43* Manchester Manchester University Press
- Toschi, Paolo [1955] 1976 *Le Origini del teatro italiano* Turin Boringhieri
- Turner, Victor 1982 *From Ritual to Theater The Human Seriousness of Play* New York Performing Arts Journal Publications
- 1990 "Are There Universals of Performance in Myth, Ritual, and Drama?" Pp 8-18 in *By Means of Performance Intercultural Studies of Theater and Ritual*, edited by Richard Schechner and Willa Appel New York Cambridge University Press
- Unsigned 1927 "600 comparse nella 'Figlia di Iorio'" *Corriere della sera* (September 7)
- 1929 "Il nuovo statuto dell'istituto e la nomina a presidenza dell'On Prof Biagio Pace" *Bollettino del Istituto Nazionale del Dramma Antico Siracusa* 2 (5) 214
- 1930 "Notiziario dell'istituto" *Bollettino del Istituto Nazionale del Dramma Antico Siracusa* 3 (1-2) 66-72
- 1931 "Elenco delle compagnie drammatiche italiane" P 365 in *Almanacco del teatro italiano*, edited by Benvenuto Benvenuti Arezzo Contemporanea
- 1932 "Giro delle compagnie drammatiche (gennaio-febbraio)" *Bollettino della Societa Italiana degli Autori ed Editori* 7 (January-March) 18-26
- 1935 "Entusiastiche dimonstrazioni al capo" *Il Popolo d'Italia* (October 30)
- 1936 "Quadro delle compagnie drammatiche" *Bollettino di Segnalazioni Elenco delle Opere Teatrali Approvate Ministero per la Stampa e la Propaganda, Isperatto del Teatro*, vol 1
- 1937 "Le Compagnie primarie di prosa" *Scenario* 3 (10) 478-82
- Valenti, Antonio 1934 "Necessita del Teatro Rivoluzionario" *Comedia* 16 14-15
- Verdone, Mario 1965 *Anton Giulio Bragaglia* Rome Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografica
- Visser, Romke 1992 "Fascist Doctrine and the Cult of Romanita" *Journal of Contemporary History* 27 5-22
- Wagner-Pacifici, Robin, and Barry Schwartz 1991 "The Vietnam Veteran's Memorial Commemorating a Difficult Past" *American Journal of Sociology* 97 376-420
- Watt, Ian 1957 *The Rise of the Novel* Berkeley University of California Press
- White, Harrison, and Cynthia White (1965) 1993 *Canvasses and Careers* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- White, Hayden 1990 *The Content of the Form* Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
- Williams, Raymond 1979 *Modern Tragedy* London Verso
- 1982 *Sociology of Culture* New York Schocken Books
- Wolff, Janet 1984 *The Social Production of Art* New York New York University Press
- Wuthnow, Robert 1987 *Meaning and Moral Order* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Zolberg, Vera 1990 *Constructing a Sociology of the Arts* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Zunino, Pier Giorgio 1985 *L'Ideologia del fascismo* Bologna Mulino

“All Hits Are Flukes”: Institutionalized Decision Making and the Rhetoric of Network Prime-Time Program Development¹

William T. Bielby and Denise D. Bielby
University of California, Santa Barbara

Drawing upon institutionalist theory this article analyzes how the introduction of new cultural objects produced for a mass audience is managed through an organized discourse. Data come from announcements of prime-time television series in development for the 1991–92 season by the four U.S. television networks. Maximum-likelihood logit analyses support the conclusion that network programmers working in a highly institutionalized context use reputation, imitation, and genre as rhetorical strategies to rationalize and legitimize their actions. This study contributes to institutionalist theory and the sociology of culture by explaining the content and consequences of business discourse in a culture industry.

In this article we examine how the rhetoric of network television programmers shapes the introduction and evaluation of new prime-time series. Held accountable for decisions made under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, network programmers employ a carefully organized discourse to frame how their actions are appraised. Our analysis shows how programmers' rhetorical claims are organized to manage the reception of their decisions by important constituencies.

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1991 annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, held in Cincinnati, Ohio. We thank Robert Faulkner, Ryken Grattet, Valerie Jenness, John Meyer, Harvey Molotch, Richard Peterson, John Sutton, Joseph Turow, the *AJS* reviewers, and the members of the Comparative Institutions Seminar in the University of California, Santa Barbara, Department of Sociology for their comments and suggestions. We are grateful to Betsy Frank and to the employees of ABC/Capital Cities, CBS Inc., Fox Broadcasting Co., and NBC Entertainment who shared with us network program development promotional materials. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES 89-10039) and by the Academic Senate of the University of California. Address correspondence to William T. Bielby, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106.

© 1994 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/94/9905-0005\$01.50

We apply institutionalist theories of organizations (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) to understand how decision makers operating under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty cope with contradictory commercial and aesthetic assessment criteria. We develop hypotheses regarding the content and consequences of network programmers' rhetorical strategies for introducing new series, and we test our hypotheses using data from the networks' program development announcements for the 1991–92 prime-time season.

Our study contributes to an understanding of how the introduction of new cultural objects is actively managed in highly institutionalized and centralized culture industries. We analyze how industry context shapes the organization and content of decision makers' discourse and demonstrate how that discourse is used to manage the conflicts and contradictions inherent in the industry's structure. In the concluding section we discuss the implications of our work for the study of culture industries more generally and suggest avenues for future research.

INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG SUPPLIERS, NETWORKS, AND MARKETS

Each year, the four networks evaluate thousands of concepts for new series and purchase approximately 600 pilot scripts. From these, the networks select about 20% to be produced as pilots at the networks' expense (CBS Inc. 1990). About one-third of the pilots eventually appear on the prime-time schedule. For example, of the 112 pilots commissioned by ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox for 1991, 23 debuted in the fall and another 15 were scheduled as midseason replacements.

Until very recently, the FCC's Financial Interest and Syndication Rules (the "Fin-Syn" rules) have placed strict limits on the amount of prime-time programming that can be produced by the networks themselves, so most prime-time pilots and series are supplied by independent writer-producers working for outside production companies. Program suppliers include small independent companies and the television subsidiaries of the major film studios. Either as sole producers or in joint ventures with smaller companies, the major studios account for a majority of the series produced for network prime time. Program suppliers retain ownership of the series and license networks to one first-run and one rerun broadcast of each episode (Bielby and Bielby 1990, Cantor and Cantor 1992).

Since (with a few exceptions) the networks do not own the shows they broadcast, advertising revenues from network broadcasts are their primary source of profit from prime-time series. At the same time, the

licensing fees received by the program suppliers typically do not cover the cost of production. A typical sitcom costs about \$600,000 per episode to produce and is licensed to the network for about \$500,000. An episode of a typical one-hour drama costs about \$1.2–\$1.3 million to produce and is licensed to the network for \$250,000–\$300,000 less than the cost of production (*Channels* 1990). Program suppliers incur these short-term losses in anticipation of substantial profits from eventual syndication of successful series.

Thus, program suppliers and network programmers are mutually dependent. On the one hand, a writer-producer who creates a new series seeks access to a network's prime-time schedule. The supplier is hoping for a network run of at least three or four seasons, so that enough episodes will be produced to make the series profitable in subsequent syndication. On the other hand, the network programmer is dependent upon program suppliers for new series that will attract audiences that advertisers want to reach. A series that fails to deliver a sizable audience with a desirable demographic composition will be unprofitable for the network and its affiliates. However, participants in network program development are not simply interacting in a product market. They are also embedded in an institutional context that introduces a symbolic dimension that they manage and enact through their decisions.

DECISION MAKING AMID AMBIGUITY AND UNCERTAINTY

"Institutions" are routinely reproduced, taken-for-granted social practices that have "rule-like status" in thought and action (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Jepperson 1991). Network prime-time program development is an institution in this sense, and decisions about introducing new series are made in an "institutionalized" context. In such contexts, decision makers cope with ambiguity and uncertainty by substituting imitation, routines, and rules of thumb for rational calculation as decision criteria (March and Olsen 1976). To maintain legitimacy, they are likely to engage in activities that have "ritual significance" to outsiders, providing "prudent, rational, and legitimate accounts" of their actions (Meyer and Rowan 1977).

Highly institutionalized decision contexts exhibit two distinctive features: (1) technologies are poorly understood, and (2) actions are evaluated according to multiple, ambiguous, and contradictory criteria by external constituencies (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The context for decisions about new prime-time series is highly institutionalized in both respects. First, network programmers are making decisions about productions for which there are no agreed-upon standards of competence. An experienced pro-

grammer can probably distinguish well-crafted from mediocre scripts and make informed judgments about the quality of acting, editing, and direction of a pilot. Nevertheless, the programmer has no reliable basis for predicting whether audiences, advertisers, and critics will accept the series. In the words of Jeff Sagansky, president of CBS Entertainment, "All hits are flukes" (Frank 1991, p. 1, also see Cantor and Cantor 1992, p. 70). Gitlin (1983) found network executives consistently expressing views like these and concluded that the "problem of knowing" is a key feature of program development decisions.

Second, network programmers are making decisions that are subject to multiple, ambiguous, and often conflicting assessment criteria. Least ambiguous are criteria of commercial success. A commercially successful series is one that delivers a large audience with a demographic composition valued by advertisers. However, feedback from ratings comes months after the decision is made to schedule a series, and even that feedback can be misleading for a series that slowly builds an audience over the course of one or two seasons.

Criteria for critical acclaim are more varied, and critics often reserve their most favorable assessments for so-called quality series that the networks have dropped from their prime-time schedules. Critics' "obituaries" for their favorite canceled series often reveal the conflicting criteria that underlie judgments about aesthetic versus commercial success. For example, at the end of the 1990-91 season, *Wall Street Journal* critic Robert Goldberg (1991) celebrated the qualities of "subtlety in depicting relationships," "solid writing," and "innovative ideas" among canceled shows on his "Best of 1990-91" list, while *Los Angeles Times* critic Rick Du Brow (1991a) recently lamented the loss of "humanistic ensemble dramas," "well-crafted TV fiction," and "work of major social import."

Dozens of special interest groups also monitor network executives' programming decisions. They evaluate network series on issues as diverse as representations of race, age, gender, drug use, violence, birth control, and "traditional" family values (Montgomery 1989). In short, as a cultural object, a television series has a range of meanings attributed to it (Griswold 1987). A decision to develop a series for prime time is simultaneously a choice about a commercial commodity, an aesthetic endeavor, and a social institution. As a result, those making programming decisions will be variously evaluated according to perceptions of their business judgment, their aesthetic tastes, and the values they impart.

Because the industry is so highly centralized, programmers are more directly accountable to commercial interests than to other constituencies. DiMaggio (1977) has described such an industry context as a "centralized

brokerage system " Network programmers² mediate the business relationship between creative personnel employed by independent production companies and advertisers who bear the costs of distribution The programmer "brokers" the inherent conflict between the creative interests of the writer-producers who create and supply programs and the commercial interests of advertisers Programmers perform the monitoring function that would otherwise reside in the authority relations of a bureaucratic structure or in the professional standards and contractually mandated product specifications of a craft structure

In mediating the relationship between writer-producers and the networks, programmers do not give equal weight to creative and commercial concerns Writer-producers have almost no alternative to the four networks as distribution channels for their creations, despite the growth of cable and first-run syndication in recent years Most are also dependent upon one of the seven major studios for financing, and, of course, series creators have their own interests in commercial success Thus, as DiMaggio (1977) has theorized, in a mass-culture industry with a high level of market concentration such as network television, brokers are more directly accountable to commercial interests than to creative interests

RHETORICAL STRATEGIES FOR INTRODUCING NEW SERIES

"Framing" Prime-Time Program Development

A "frame" is a central organizing idea for making sense of events (Gamson 1988, Gamson and Modigliani 1989) Gamson (1988) and Snow and Benford (1988, Benford 1993) have applied the concept to represent how social movement elites develop rhetorical strategies to mobilize constituencies and shape understandings According to Gamson and Modigliani, meaning in media discourse is managed by assembling frames into "interpretive packages " A package "offers a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catchphrase, or other symbolic device" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, p 3)

We apply the frame concept to the vocabularies articulated by decision makers to justify their actions in highly institutionalized contexts In

² The term "network programmer" refers to the top executives who make decisions about the prime time schedule and work with independent producers to develop new series At the top of the management hierarchy is the president of the network's entertainment division Reporting to the president are vice presidents responsible for research, marketing, program development, and current prime-time programs

developing new prime-time series, network programmers are compelled to provide legitimate accounts for their decisions (Meyer and Rowan 1977) We argue that they do so by organizing discourse around widely accepted frames Specifically, in describing series in development, network executives invoke the framing devices of *genre*, *reputation*, and *imitation*

Genre, Reputation, and Imitation

Genre—Television genres are conventions regarding the content of television series—formulas that prescribe format, themes, premises, characterizations, etc In contemporary television, consensus among writers, producers, programmers, advertisers, and audiences over the boundaries of genres is probably greater than in any other area of popular culture Ideas for new series are “pitched” in terms of widely recognized genres, while network scheduling decisions, advertisers’ purchasing decisions, and audience viewing patterns are all based, to some extent, upon shared understandings about program categories

Since the late 1950s the television industry has recognized two basic genres for prime-time network series the half-hour situation comedy (“sitcom”) and the one-hour drama These genres are recognized and reproduced in the industry’s organizational structures Since the late 1970s the entertainment divisions of ABC, CBS, and NBC have contained separate units for comedy development and drama development, and corresponding units exist in the television divisions of the major studios Pilots for new sitcoms and dramas are easily recognized and labeled as such

Over the past several years the “reality” series has become recognized as a third basic prime-time genre The reality genre label is typically applied to inexpensively produced half-hour nonfiction series other than programs produced by the network news divisions The reality genre is less established than the sitcom and drama categories Nevertheless, the reality series’ existence as a distinct genre is recognized as such by programmers, producers, creative personnel, advertisers, critics, the industry press, and, increasingly, audiences

As industry conventions, genres can be viewed as forms of social organization that facilitate the coordination of production Work outside of established genres disrupts shared understandings and requires more effort to coordinate and promote (Becker 1982) Accordingly, a writer-producer seeking to sell a pilot that defies the conventions of established genres can expect resistance from network programmers Moreover, a programmer seeking to place such a series on the network schedule can

expect advertisers and local affiliates (who sell local advertising time) to demand reassurance that despite—or because of—its innovative elements, the new series will be accessible to audiences and commercially viable

Genres are more than just shared understandings that economize on the costs of doing business. They are taken-for-granted categories that guide thought and action, serving to rationalize and legitimate decisions made in a context that is characterized by a high degree of ambiguity and uncertainty. As such, they are readily available as a framing device. Thus, locating a series pilot with respect to an established genre provides an immediate frame of reference for the new and unknown cultural product. Even before the pilot is produced, the potential new series is linked to a category that is widely perceived as familiar, understandable, and appropriate.

Reputation —In culture industries the success of new products cannot be known a priori. As a result, those who propose new products are likely to be evaluated on the basis of reputations built upon prior successes (DiMaggio 1977, p. 442). The importance of reputation has been documented in studies of studio musicians (Faulkner 1983), filmmakers (Baker and Faulkner 1991), and television writers (Bielby and Bielby 1993, Gitlin 1983). Accordingly, we expect reputation to figure prominently in programmers' rhetoric about series in development. Linking new series to producers' prior hits reassures commercial constituencies that well-crafted episodes will be produced in an orderly and timely manner and will contain elements proven successful with audiences in the past. Similarly, linking a new series to a well-known celebrity establishes an association with a familiar and successful commodity.

Imitation —When decisions are made under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, decision makers often attempt to establish legitimacy by imitating the successful efforts of others (March and Olsen 1976, DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Accordingly, we expect network programmers to rely upon imitation as a rhetorical strategy in their discourse about series in development. A new production can be described as similar to another hit series, even if it is supplied by a different production team. In addition, network executives can emphasize a series' similarity to or origins in a product from another popular medium, such as a hit film, play, comic book, or novel.

In sum, in a context where formulas for producing successful products do not exist and "all hits are flukes," decision makers rely on rhetorical strategies to demonstrate that their actions are rational and appropriate. Network executives construct succinct interpretive packages by linking new series to established genres, to reputable producers, and to other popular and successful cultural commodities. If the series is successful,

external constituencies will view the executives' actions as understandable and familiar (Hirsch 1986)

The Sequential Organization of Programmers' Rhetorical Strategies

Network executives' discourse about program development is articulated in four stages. First, in March executives from each network make presentations to advertisers' representatives in which they announce the pilots in development for the new season. Second, at the affiliates' meetings in May network executives brief the press, advertisers, and executives from their affiliated stations about their fall schedules. Third, the annual press tour is held in late July. Critics from around the country come to Los Angeles to meet with network executives about the new season. Finally, in late summer the all-out marketing of the new season begins, including on-air promotions, advertising in the print media, and other publicity efforts. Throughout these four stages, the network executives are able to shape the reception of new series before critics, advertisers, and audiences have had the opportunity to view them. Each stage is covered in detail by the industry press, so network executives are speaking indirectly to the larger business and creative community as well as to those with whom they interact directly.

While informed observers of the industry are unlikely to take network programmers' claims at face value, until the series air observers have little independent information with which to judge those claims. Moreover, by introducing the new season in stages, network programmers can manage the decoupling of commercial and aesthetic evaluation. They can attend primarily to the bottom-line financial concerns of producers, advertisers, and the networks and speak to the critical community in their own language later as the new season approaches.

In their meetings with advertisers in March, network programmers outline their overall programming strategies and describe each of the series pilots they have commissioned for the new season. At this stage, the pilots exist only as scripts, and the programmers themselves have yet to see the product they are describing.³ Their discourse about the pilots is carefully constructed around the frames of genre, reputation, and imitation. The "interpretive packages" they present are, literally, packages. Each of the 300 or so advertising executives attending the meeting receives a press kit containing brief synopses of the network's pilots. We rely on these written descriptions from March 1991 for network programmers' claims about potential new series. Claims about overall develop-

³ There are a few exceptions, such as pilots that are holdovers from the previous season and spin-off pilots that are episodes of existing series.

HOME IMPROVEMENT
(working title)
COMEDY/HALF HOUR

It's not easy being a man these days. But Tim Allen, the star of this new domestic comedy from the creator of "Roseanne" and "Carole & Co.," is determined to re-establish the role of husband and father as provider and protector. He's a Mid-western everyman who is determined to re-establish the natural order of things -- with men in charge. A celebrity in his hometown, Tim epitomizes "Mr. Fix It" as the host of a local home improvement show. Unfortunately, his "personal home audience" is comprised of a no-nonsense wife and three skeptical boys who challenge Tim's attitudes and often question his solutions. But he pushes ahead, confident in the belief that most problems can be solved by simply increasing the voltage.

Production Company	Disney
Executive Producers/Writers	Matt Williams Carmen Finestra David McFadzean
Director	TBA

CAST

Tim Allen




FIG 1 —An example of a program development announcement for the 1991–92 prime-time season

ment strategies are ascertained from industry press accounts of statements by network programmers at the March meetings. Based on our understanding of the institutional context, we develop hypotheses about the content of the claims about potential new series and about the relationship between the claims and the probability of a pilot making it onto the network prime-time schedule.

DATA AND MEASURES

Linkage Claims: Reputation and Imitation

Synopses of potential new series are intended to generate interest in and support for the network's new offerings. Each description attempts to convey the content and potential of a new series in just a few sentences. The example in figure 1, from the ABC press kit, is typical.

In this example of ABC's *Home Improvement*, the series is linked to a genre (half-hour comedy), subgenre (domestic comedy), a celebrity (Tim

Allen), and a creator with a proven track record in situation comedy (Matt Williams, of *Roseanne* and *Carole and Company*)

We coded binary variables to represent linkages such as those in figure 1 for each of the 112 synopses in the press kits for the four networks. Two of the linkages represent claims regarding reputation. A *producer link* denotes that a series is identified with an executive producer associated with a prior successful series. A *celebrity link* indicates that the name of at least one cast member appears in the series' description.

Two linkages represent claims of imitation. First, some pilots are described in terms of prior successful series, even when the pilot's producer is not associated with the earlier show. For example, the Fox network's description of *The 50-Minute Man* begins as follows: "Magnum Remington Hunter. Forget 'em. We bring you Henry Fellows, private eye." We code descriptions such as these as linked to *prior series*. Second, some series are described in terms of the relationship to successful novels, films, or plays. For example, NBC's description of *Eerie, Indiana* makes reference to the work of author Stephen King, and CBS's *Big Girls Don't Cry* is described as a spin-off of the film *Mermaids*. We code claims such as these as linkages to *other media*.

The meetings in March and the descriptions of potential new series are covered in detail by the industry trade papers, the *Hollywood Reporter* and *Daily Variety*.⁴ Overall, there is a high degree of agreement between the linkages claimed in the network synopses and those reported in the industry press. For example, the *Hollywood Reporter* covered *Home Improvement* as follows: "*Roseanne* creator Matt Williams has created a domestic comedy called *Home Improvement*, starring Tim Allen as a Midwestern everyman who is determined to re-establish the natural order of things with men in charge. Williams, Carmen Finestra and David McFadzean executive produce for Walt Disney Television" (de Moraes 1991a, p. 6). Overall, nearly 90% of the linkages appearing in the network press kits were reproduced in the coverage by *Daily Variety* and the *Hollywood Reporter*, according to independent codings of the network and press descriptions. This consensus suggests that the networks are effectively using the framing mechanisms of reputation and imitation to shape media discourse about program development. That is, the industry trade papers are attending to and reproducing the claims contained in the structured discourse of the network programming executives. As Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 9) found in their study of media discourse on nuclear power, journalists "make official packages the starting point for discussing an issue."

⁴ Coverage of network executives' presentations of their development slates for the 1991-92 season appeared in *Daily Variety* and the *Hollywood Reporter* on March 20 and March 21, 1991.

Genre Claims

In addition to reputation and imitation, network programmers use genre as a framing device for discourse about new series. Without exception, network synopses locate the series with respect to the genres of comedy, drama, and reality, so we coded binary variables to reflect those classifications. In some instances, pilots were described in ways that mixed or even transcended the three established genres. For example, ABC describes *The Chameleon* as a “new form comedy series” combining live action with old film clips, while *Moe’s World*, a half-hour drama is described as combining fantasy, dreamscape, and animation. Overall, we classified 24 of the synopses as mixing or transcending established genres. Our coding is based on the networks’ *claims*, not on whether the series actually departs significantly from institutionalized conventions. Our interest is in how programmers use genre as a framing device, not in the actual format and content of the series.

Again, the success of network programmers’ rhetorical strategies is reflected in part by the extent to which their claims are reproduced in the industry trade papers. When the network synopsis contains language suggesting mixing or transcending genres, unconventional labels are often used in the trade papers as well. For example, NBC’s animated *Fish Police* is described in the industry press as an “animated ‘fish noir’” and “comedy spoof,” ABC’s *Saturdays* is described as an “hour long anthology comedy,” and Fox’s *Chameleon* is described as “action comedy, animated/live.”

Outcomes: Selection for Network Prime-Time Schedule

Our quantitative analyses examine the relationship between network claims regarding their series in development and the likelihood that a pilot will be “picked up” for the network prime-time schedule. The four networks announce their schedules at meetings in May with representatives from their local affiliated broadcast stations. Based on those announcements, we code whether a pilot has been selected to premiere in the fall and whether it has been selected as a possible midseason replacement.⁵

⁵ Between March and May, programming executives view the pilot episodes, conduct their marketing research, and make their decisions about the upcoming season. Decisions about the fall schedule are often made days and sometimes just hours before the meetings with affiliates and are accompanied by another round of claims about the series that have been selected for the upcoming season. In this article, we do not analyze the claims surrounding the schedule announcements. Nor do we analyze schedule changes made following the initial announcements.

Finally, our analyses include several control variables. Three binary variables control for differences among the four networks in the series development process. A fourth binary variable denotes whether or not a pilot has originated from the in-house production division of a network. Since networks profit directly from the eventual syndication of the few series they are allowed to own, in-house pilots may receive unique treatment in the process of making decisions about the prime-time schedule.

HYPOTHESES

Content of Programmers' Claims

We have argued that network programmers actively manage the reception of new series through an organized discourse of program development. That discourse is structured around the framing devices of reputation, imitation, and genre. Our hypotheses address both the content and consequences of the interpretive packages articulated by network programmers. We expect network programmers' discourse will be designed to (1) provide a legitimate account of decisions made in a context of ambiguity and uncertainty and (2) manage the multiple and often conflicting assessment criteria of commercial and creative constituencies.

Since the mid-1960s the evaluation of network prime-time programming on the basis of aesthetic criteria has been decoupled from assessment based on commercial success. Television criticism that was taken seriously by industry elites disappeared in the 1950s, and today television critics speak to and for viewers, not to the art world of writers, producers, and programmers (Lang 1958, Boddy 1990). The decoupling of assessment based on business and aesthetic criteria allows programmers to articulate seemingly contradictory claims about the creativity and commercial viability of new series. However, because they primarily represent management interests in brokering the relationship between series' creators and the networks, programmers' claims will emphasize the commercial viability of the new series. Specifically, programmers will describe new series in ways that draw attention to the reputations of the series' producers. Accordingly, we offer the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 1 —*In describing new series, claims emphasizing the reputations of series' creators are more frequent than any other kind of claim.*

A linkage to an established writer-producer is a powerful symbol for reassuring advertisers, affiliates, and network top executives that a new series is commercially viable. Establishing such a claim reduces the need to use other reputational or imitative rhetorical strategies to describe a new series. It also reduces the need to make claims about departing from widely shared conventions. Thus, we hypothesize

HYPOTHESIS 2 —A linkage to an established writer-producer reduces the probability that a series will be described in terms of other reputational or imitative linkages

HYPOTHESIS 3 —A linkage to an established writer-producer reduces the probability that a series is described as mixing or transcending traditional genres

Since the Fox network's inception in 1987, executives there have framed their programming strategies as innovative and unconventional (Block 1990, Du Brow 1991b). Accordingly, we expect descriptions of new series by Fox to contain fewer reputational and imitative claims and more claims about unconventional approaches. Specifically, we hypothesize

HYPOTHESIS 4 —Compared to the other three networks, the Fox network is less likely to frame new series in terms of linkages to established producers, stars, prior series, and products from other media. The Fox network is more likely than the others to describe new series as mixing or transcending established genres

Consequences of Programmers' Claims

Network programmers frame their new series in terms of the reputations of their producers and stars, their similarity to prior series and successful products from other media, and their conformity to or departure from established genres. We expect the actual scheduling decisions made by network programmers to be more highly associated with reputational claims about series' creators than with any of the other framing devices. More than any other group, network programmers seek to reassure those with commercial interests in the new productions. We expect that emphasis on the reputation of the series' creator will be the most effective rhetorical strategy for providing that reassurance. In addition, claims about series' creators reflect structural relationships between programmers as brokers and the writer-producers who supply new series. Accordingly, we expect reputational claims about series' creators to be more strongly associated with scheduling decisions than are other framing devices. As a result, we hypothesize

HYPOTHESIS 5 —Series described as originating from successful writer-producers are more likely to be selected for the network prime-time schedule than series not linked to creators with established reputations. Other reputational and imitative linkages have little or no effect on scheduling decisions

Claims about creativity and innovativeness reassure those judging network decisions on aesthetic grounds. However, series described as departing from established conventions are likely to be perceived as com-

mercially risky by advertisers, affiliates, and top network executives. Accordingly, we hypothesize

HYPOTHESIS 6 —Series described as mixing or transcending established genres are less likely to be selected for the prime-time schedule than series described as conforming to those genres

Again, we expect the Fox network to depart from the overall pattern. Because they rely on a less conventional programming strategy, we expect claims about the reputation of a series' creator to have a smaller impact on scheduling decisions at Fox than at the other three networks.

Finally, the institutional context of network programming makes it almost impossible to predict which series will succeed or fail before they appear on the network schedule. Even though programmers are likely to rely on the reputations of program suppliers in making scheduling decisions, prior success does not guarantee audiences will embrace a new series. Accordingly, we hypothesize

HYPOTHESIS 7 —Claims about the reputations of a new series' producer and cast, claims about the series' similarity to other shows or products from other media, and claims about its departures from established genres do not predict the series' subsequent commercial success

FINDINGS

Content of Programmers' Claims

Network programmers' statements about their overall programming strategies are often at odds with the language they use to describe specific series in development. The overall strategy is typically framed as a quest for fresh ideas and new talent, while established reputations are emphasized more heavily in descriptions of specific productions. For example, in describing program development at ABC, Stuart Bloomberg, vice president for development at ABC said, "We keep trying to branch out and bring new people to the network, like David Lynch and those kind of folks" (Bernstein 1991, p. F2). The article in the *Los Angeles Times* continues, "The plan, according to executives involved in the projects, is to bring new, less-expensive blood to the networks, while giving exposure to the cable producers." Some features of ABC's development slate were consistent with this claim. With 40 pilots in development, the network was looking at more potential new series than any other network. Furthermore, ABC had indeed commissioned a pilot from David Lynch as well as pilots from three cable networks (HBO, MTV, and Nickelodeon).

But as table 1 reveals, nearly half of ABC's synopses framed new series in terms of the reputations of their writer-producers. For example, the description of ABC's *Good and Evil* begins, "In the spirit of *Soap*,

TABLE 1
TRAITS OF SERIES PILOTS, 1991-92

	Number	%
Distribution of series pilots by network and genre		
Networks		
ABC	40	36
CBS	27	24
NBC	22	20
Fox	23	21
Total	112	101*
Genres		
Comedy	52	46
Drama	47	42
Reality	13	12
Total	112	100
Attributes of series pilots		
Linkages (not mutually exclusive)		
To successful producer	52	46
To celebrity	26	23
To prior series	7	6
To other media	17	15
No linkages	26	23
Producer links by network		
ABC	19	48
CBS	11	41
NBC	15	68
Fox	7	30
Mixed or new genre	24	21
In-house	15	13
On fall schedule	23	21
Midseason replacement	15	13

NOTE — $N = 112$

* Total exceeds 100% due to rounding error

the acclaimed producing team of Paul Junger Witt, Tony Thomas, and Susan Harris have created a domestic comedy awash with intrigue and misalliances." An untitled pilot from Tom Miller and Bob Boyett is described as "in the spirit of *Full House* and *Family Matters*," two successful series from the same producers.⁶ Another untitled pilot for

⁶ While ABC described this pilot as a show that "springs from a common phenomenon in American society—the blended family," *Daily Variety* reframed this claim, calling the show a "'Brady Bunch'-type blended family comedy" (Lowry 1991b). In this case, the interpretive package supplied by the network was repackaged by the industry press by invoking the framing devices of subgenre and imitation.

ABC is described as produced by "Jim Brooks, the creative force behind *The Mary Tyler Moore Show*." ABC's drama pilots included series identified with such successful producers as Stephen Bochco and Bill Finkelstein (*L.A. Law*), David Jacobs (*Dallas & Knots Landing*), and Stephen Cannell, "in the timeless tradition of *Rockford*, *Baretta*, *Columbo*, and *Kojak*."

The disparity between an overall programming strategy framed in terms of "new blood" and an emphasis upon producers' reputations in descriptions of specific series was even more pronounced at NBC. Brandon Tartikoff, according to *Daily Variety's* coverage of NBC's development slate (Lowry 1991a, p. 1), told his audience of advertisers' representatives to expect "a whole new NBC" in the fall. Tartikoff claimed that "the network would place less emphasis on 'pedigree' than promise, seeking to work more with unproven producers who may generate the new hits of the '90s as well as known commodities." In fact, more than two-thirds of NBC's series were described in terms of production teams associated with prior hit series (table 1). NBC's pilots were framed as coming from such "known commodities" as the producers of *Married with Children*, *WKRP in Cincinnati*, *Barney Miller*, *St. Elsewhere*, *Eight Is Enough*, and *Quantum Leap*.

Like his counterparts at ABC and NBC, Fox Entertainment Group President Peter Chernin emphasized innovative approaches, promising to bring back "excitement" to the one-hour form and to move away from "living room-based sitcoms" (Brennan 1991, p. 7). In contrast to the other networks, his network's framing of its pilots was more consistent with its claims about overall programming strategies. Less than one-third of the potential new series for Fox were linked to established writer-producers. As stated in hypothesis 4, Fox's propensity to make such reputational links was the lowest among the four networks (table 1).

Unlike executives from the other three networks, CBS's Entertainment President Jeff Sagansky refrained from emphasizing new and innovative approaches in outlining his network's overall programming strategy. Instead, Sagansky stressed a strategy geared toward "franchise" programming with broad audience appeal (de Moraes 1991b). His claims at the March meeting echoed his earlier comments about a strategy to attract "brand-name" producers back to his network and borrow "pretested" concepts (Lippman 1990). Yet despite Sagansky's willingness to articulate a conventional overall programming strategy, his network's descriptions of its pilots were actually less likely to include reputational links to established producers than were those of ABC and NBC (table 1).

Overall, table 1 provides strong support for our first hypothesis. Over three-fourths of the potential new series were framed in terms of at least one reputational linkage. Almost half were linked to an established

TABLE 2

DETERMINANTS OF LINKAGE OF SERIES PILOT TO ESTABLISHED PRODUCER

Independent Variable	Links to Producer	Links to Celebrity	Links to Other Media	Mixed or New Genre
Networks				
ABC	73	2 13***	-2 16***	- 47
CBS	41	1 02	-2 44***	-2 02**
NBC	1 60**	82	- 53	- 77
Genres				
Drama	- 58*	- 37	05	08
Reality	- 76	- 07	-2 05*.a	- 49
Links to producer		- 58	-2 48***	- 69*
Constant	- 49	-2 11	39	- 31
Log likelihood	-72 56	-54 53	-35 42	-53 74
Test of network effects χ^2 (3df)	6 86*	11 14**	11 90**	6 74*

NOTE — $N = 112$

.a Nondirectional test

* $P < .10$ ** $P < .05$ *** $P < .01$

writer-producer, much more than any other kind of linkage. In contrast, less than one-fourth were linked to an established celebrity, just 15% were linked to products from other media, and only 6% were linked to other series. Moreover, only 21% were described as mixing or transcending established genres. Thus, in framing their pilots to advertisers, network executives placed more emphasis on their ability to “broker” relationships with the established members of the creative community than they did on any other kind of framing device.

Estimates from a series of logistic regressions, reported in table 2, address hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 regarding the content of programmers’ claims. For each of the 112 network synopses, the probability of invoking a specific framing device is specified to be a function of the network and genre. Since we hypothesize that the ability to link a new series to an established producer reduces the need to make other kinds of claims, the variable capturing producer links is included as a predictor of the other framing devices.⁷

Overall, the results in table 2 are supportive of our hypotheses regarding the primacy of the producer’s reputation as a rhetorical strategy. Series linked to established producers are less likely than others to be

⁷ Because only seven series were linked to prior series (i.e., earlier shows other than those produced by the series’ creator), a separate logistic regression for this framing device was not estimated.

framed in terms of successful properties from other media or to be described as mixing or transcending established genres. Although not statistically significant, the effect of producer links on the propensity to link a series to an established celebrity is in the predicted direction as well.

The findings in table 2 also support our hypothesis about the distinctiveness of the Fox network's strategy for describing new series. Since Fox is the reference category for the network variables, the results show that the Fox network is less likely than the other three networks to frame series in terms of the reputations of established writer-producers and stars. Also, as hypothesized, the Fox network is more likely than others to describe new series as mixing or transcending established genres. Each of the point estimates for the network coefficients is in the predicted direction, and for each outcome the hypothesis of no network differences is rejected with a three degree-of-freedom chi-square test.

Although we offered no hypothesis about Fox programmers' propensity to frame new series in terms of properties from other media, the results from table 2 show that they were much more likely than their counterparts from the other networks to use this rhetorical strategy. Thus, even as the Fox programmers describe their strategy as defying the conventions of prime-time television, they seek to reassure commercial constituencies by making associations between their new series and successful films, plays, and novels.

Consequences of Programmers' Claims

To examine the consequences of programmers' claims, we evaluate whether or not a pilot is selected for the prime-time network schedule as a function of network, linkages, and genre. We examine two outcomes: (1) whether or not a series is selected for the network schedule (either for fall or as a midseason replacement), and (2) among those selected, whether a series is scheduled for fall or held in reserve as a midseason replacement. Hypothesis 5 is addressed by the relative impact of linkages to producers, stars, prior series, and other media on the likelihood of selection. Hypothesis 6 is addressed by the impact of framing with respect to mixing or transcending genres on scheduling decisions.

We control for network since the probability of selection will be influenced by differences across networks in the number of pilots commissioned relative to the amount of time to be filled with new series. An interaction term is included to test whether the impact of framing with respect to established producers is less consequential for scheduling decisions at the Fox network. This expectation is based on two factors. First, as described above, the Fox network has framed its programming strategy as departing from conventional network practice. Second, established

producers are less likely to have produced previous series for the Fox network, and therefore the ties between programming executives and the community of established producers are probably weaker at Fox than at the other networks⁸

Finally, we include a binary variable for in-house production, denoting whether a pilot is produced by the network's production division (e.g., a pilot from ABC Productions for ABC). Relaxation of the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules allowed the networks to produce more of their own programming in 1991–92 than had been the case during the previous two decades. Networks may have an economic incentive to favor their own pilots over those from independent producers, since future earnings from syndicating in-house series would return to the network.⁹

The dependent variable for results reported in table 3 is whether a pilot is selected for either the fall schedule or as a midseason replacement versus rejected altogether.¹⁰ Results reported in table 3 support our hypothesis regarding the primacy of producer linkages for scheduling decisions (hypothesis 5). The single best predictor of whether a pilot is selected for the prime-time schedule is whether or not it has been described as originating with an established producer of a prior successful series.¹¹ The negative interaction term is not statistically significant, suggesting that despite their claims regarding programming strategy, the Fox network is about as likely as the other networks to schedule series that have been described as originating from successful producers.

Claims made in March about innovative pilots may have reassured critics and members of the creative community. However, as expected (hypothesis 6), pilots described as deviating from established genres were less likely than other series to be selected for the network prime-time

⁸ Our original specifications also included an interaction term for the "mixed or new genre" variable and the Fox network to test the hypothesis that the Fox network was more likely than the other networks to select unconventional programming. However, there were too few cases to obtain a stable estimate of this interaction effect.

⁹ When program development and scheduling decisions were made for 1991–92, the ultimate outcome of proposed changes in government regulation was (and still is) largely uncertain. As a result, the effect of the "in-house" variable in our models provides only weak evidence on the issue of a network bias toward in-house productions.

¹⁰ Slightly stronger relationships are detected when the dependent variable is defined as whether or not a series is selected for the fall schedule.

¹¹ The logistic coefficient of .89 implies that series framed in terms of linkages to established producers are substantially more likely to be selected by the networks than series not associated with successful producers. Evaluated at the mean, the probability of selection increases from .33 to .55 when a series has been described as originating from a writer-producer with a proven track record in network prime-time television.

TABLE 3

DETERMINANTS OF LIKELIHOOD THAT A SERIES PILOT IS SCHEDULED TO APPEAR
ON THE 1991-92 NETWORK PRIME-TIME SCHEDULE

Independent Variable	Logistic Coefficient
Networks	
ABC	- 28
CBS	- 31
NBC	- 56
Linkages	
Producer	89**
Fox × producer	- 28
Prior series	11
Celebrity	33
Other	22
Genres	
Drama	03
Reality	32
Mixed or new genre	- 75*
In-house	21
Constant	- 86
Log likelihood	-68 56

NOTE — $N = 112$

* $P < .10$

** $P < .05$

schedules. Indeed, according to the logistic coefficients in table 3, the disadvantage of departing from established genres (- 75) almost exactly offsets the advantage of linkage to a successful writer-producer (89).

Results reported in table 4 reveal factors that differentiate between series that are held in reserve and those that premiere in the fall, among the 38 that were selected by the networks for their prime-time schedules. There are several reasons why networks are more likely to schedule series that pose the greatest commercial risks as midseason replacements. First, from the beginning of the season, networks attempt to build momentum among viewers for each evening's prime-time offerings. A single ratings failure can adversely affect viewership of the series that follow. Accordingly, networks are more likely to begin their season with new series they perceive viewers will readily accept. Second, by scheduling an unusual or unconventional series in midseason, the network has more time to use its promotional efforts to situate viewers to the "preferred reading" of the new show. With so many new series debuting in the fall, viewers might be less willing to sample those that are not easily situated within established genres. Finally, an order for a midseason replacement typi-

TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF LIKELIHOOD THAT A SERIES FOR 1991-92 IS SCHEDULED
AS A MIDSEASON REPLACEMENT

Independent Variable	Logistic Coefficient
Fox network	2.20
Linkages	
Producer	-2.76**
Celebrity	.89
Other	-2.04
Genres	
Drama	3.30*** ^a
Reality	-2.50
Mixed or new genre	3.72**
In-house	-2.14*
Constant	-1.04
Log likelihood	-15.94

NOTE — $N = 38$

^a Nondirectional test

* $P < .10$

** $P < .05$

cally requires less of a financial commitment from the network. The network can take a chance on more unconventional programming by ordering just six episodes rather than the usual commitment of at least 13. Moreover, if the new series fails to find an audience quickly, it can be moved to a slot on the prime-time schedule that the network has already conceded to the competition.

Results reported in table 4 provide modest support for our expectations. The logistic coefficients are quite large, but with so few cases they have relatively large standard errors.¹² Series that are framed as departing from established genres are more likely to debut in midseason, as are those that have not been linked to experienced producers. Thus, network programmers apparently believed that series they had described as innovative or unconventional or originating from unproven producers would have a more difficult time building an audience.

In short, claims made in March about links to established producers had real consequences for the scheduling decisions announced in May,

¹² To conserve degrees of freedom, the three binary variables for differences among the four networks have been replaced with a single variable differentiating Fox from the others. There were not enough cases in the sample to compute a reliable estimate of the effect of linkages to prior series, so that variable has been omitted from the model.

but genre and imitative claims by programming executives were largely irrelevant to those decisions. Despite claims by three of the four networks that their programming strategies would place a premium on innovative fare, pilots described as departing from conventional genres were actually less likely than others to be selected for the network prime-time schedules. If series described as unconventional were selected, they were typically held in reserve as midseason replacements. Following the rather spectacular ratings failure of such unconventional fare as *Twin Peaks* and *Cop Rock* during the previous season, it is perhaps not surprising that network programmers favored series that could be framed in terms of producers with proven track records over those that could be described as challenging the conventions of established genres.

Our final hypothesis, that programmers' claims would have no measurable effect on the commercial viability of new series, was tested in two ways. First, for series that were broadcast during the 1991–92 season, we examined whether our measures of how a series is framed predicted its average ratings for the season. Second, we examined whether the same measures predicted whether or not the series was selected to return for a second season in 1992–93.

Both tests supported our hypothesis, that is, we found no significant relationship between how a series is framed and measures of commercial success. In *t*-tests of an individual coefficient and in joint tests that all coefficients are zero, the null hypothesis of no effect could not be rejected (we have not compiled tables to report these nonsignificant results). In contrast, the association between ratings and the likelihood that a series will return for a second season is significant and substantial.

In sum, working in highly institutionalized contexts, programmers use the framing devices of reputation, imitation, and genre to construct interpretive packages that rationalize and legitimize their decisions. Their discourse emphasizes reputation over innovation and creativity, typically calling attention to the reputations of writer-producers with proven track records. The successful decoupling of commercial and aesthetic assessment is demonstrated by the opposite effects of claims about producers and claims about departures from established genres on scheduling decisions. Specifically, series described as originating from established producers are more likely to be selected for the prime-time schedule, and those described as defying conventions are less likely to be selected. Though network programmers appear to rely more heavily on established producers than on new talent, there is no evidence that the series originating from the more reputable producers have greater commercial viability. Thus, it does indeed appear to be true that in the highly institutionalized context of network television all hits are flukes.

DISCUSSION

Overall, what is most striking about our findings is the importance of claims about linkages to established writer-producers in the program development process. For the 1991–92 season, the framing device of linking a potential new series to established writer-producers is invoked much more frequently than any other rhetorical strategy, and it is the only one positively associated with the likelihood of a series being selected for a network's prime-time schedule. Other framing devices appear to be strictly symbolic, designed to shape perceptions of constituencies with conflicting assessment criteria in a context characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. In an industry where all hits are flukes, decision makers use rhetorical strategies to reassure others that their decisions are rational, appropriate, and legitimate.

If anything, our statistical findings understate the importance of actual links (as opposed to claims about links) between networks and established writer-producers. Not reflected in our statistical analysis are several new series from veteran producers selected for the network schedules without going through the normal development process of pilot production and evaluation. For example, *Flesh 'n' Blood*, from the producers of *Cheers*, was scheduled by NBC based on a six-minute presentation to network executives (de Moraes 1991c), while Gary David Goldberg's *Brooklyn Bridge* was sold to CBS on the basis of a script alone (Lowry 1991b).

The commitments to these shows reflect a recent change in the network development process. The networks are increasingly making multiyear, multiseries commitments to the most sought-after producers. For example, the network may commit to ordering a specific number of episodes of a series before seeing a pilot, or even a script, or it may agree to pay a financial penalty to the producer if the network fails to order a fixed number of episodes (CBS Inc. 1990, p. 26). At least six of the series in our data, all linked to established producers, had such commitments from the networks at the time the development slates were announced in March.

As the level of risk and uncertainty facing the industry increases (Marich 1991), these kinds of arrangements are likely to proliferate. Reliance on established writer-producers is likely to intensify, which should be reflected in the discourse framing the program development process in the future. In terms of the defining characteristics of a centralized brokerage system, (1) it is becoming more difficult to predict the success of a new series a priori, (2) pressures for commercial success are increasing, and (3) network programmers are becoming more dependent on contributions of the creative personnel who supply series. As a result, actively managing the reception of new series through carefully organized

rhetorical strategies will become increasingly important, but doing so successfully will become more difficult

CONCLUSIONS

Our study provides an explanation for the organization and content of discourse that introduces new cultural objects marketed to a mass audience. Our research extends Griswold's (1987) methodological framework for the sociology of culture by emphasizing how social agents actively manage the reception of new cultural objects through rhetorical strategies. Our analysis of prime-time television suggests that three factors shape the content of rhetorical strategies for introducing new cultural objects: (1) the degree of centralization in social arrangements that mediate the relationship among creators, audiences, critics, and commercial constituencies, (2) the degree to which the commercial viability of a new product can be unambiguously evaluated based on measurable features of the cultural object, and (3) the degree to which commercial and critical assessment of a new cultural object are successfully decoupled from one another. Our case study of prime-time television applies to a context in which the brokered relationship between creators and business interests is highly centralized, commercial and critical success cannot be predicted in advance, and critical and commercial assessment are decoupled from one another. We found that in such circumstances, decision-making brokers use linguistic framing devices of reputation, imitation, and genre to reassure commercial and creative constituencies that their actions are appropriate, legitimate, and rational. Because of the primacy of commercial viability in evaluating success, claims regarding the reputation of creators are emphasized over other rhetorical strategies.

Variation along these three dimensions should have consequences for the discourse used to introduce new cultural objects. For example, when the brokerage between creators and business interests is less centralized and success is more predictable, less emphasis should be placed on reputational claims about creators. In such circumstances, claims about creators' reputations should also be less strongly associated with access to channels of distribution. Furthermore, when critical and commercial assessments are more tightly coupled, linguistic claims about aesthetic qualities of the product should receive greater emphasis relative to claims about reputation and imitation.

The validity of our explanatory scheme for understanding the management of the introduction of new cultural objects can be assessed empirically in two ways. One is through historical analysis of the discourse in a specific culture industry. For example, in the early years of network prime-time television, critical acceptance should have been more impor-

tant for establishing the legitimacy of the new medium as a profit-making enterprise (Boddy 1990). Accordingly, we should find claims about aesthetic quality to be more common in programmers' discourse about new prime-time series in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Similarly, if attacks on the values imparted by contemporary television begin to seriously threaten the legitimacy of the industry, we can expect programmers' claims to increasingly emphasize the positive social values of the series they broadcast.

A second way to assess our approach to the management of the introduction of new cultural objects is through comparative analysis across culture industries. Prime-time television, feature film, popular fiction, and popular music differ in the organization of production, in levels of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity, and in the relative importance of critical reception for commercial success. They also differ in features of the product life cycle such as the length of time between creation, production, and distribution and the duration of popularity with audiences. These industry traits should be systematically related to the kinds of rhetorical strategies invoked by brokers and their effectiveness for shaping the reception of new cultural objects by business interests, critics, and audiences.

In sum, we have analyzed how language is used to manage uncertainty and ambiguity in a highly centralized and institutionalized culture industry. By specifying how institutional context and industry structure shape interaction among those engaged in the production, distribution, and consumption of popular culture, we have demonstrated the importance of three phenomena. First, we show that when confronted with high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty and conflicting assessment criteria, it is incumbent upon decision makers to develop rhetorical strategies that provide legitimate accounts of their actions. Second, we demonstrate that the content of that discourse will be organized around widely shared categories and symbols that have meaning to varied constituencies. Third, we show that in centralized culture industries, brokers' rhetorical strategies have consequences for creators' access to product markets and audiences. Others have shown how the structure of industries and markets constrain innovation in culture industries (Peterson and Berger 1975, DiMaggio 1977). Our analysis suggests that the strategic use of language and categories to manage commercial and creative interests can also have a causal impact on the sources and diversity of cultural objects reaching the marketplace.

REFERENCES

- Baker, Wayne E., and Robert R. Faulkner. 1991. "Role as Resource in the Hollywood Film Industry." *American Journal of Sociology* 97: 279-309.

American Journal of Sociology

- Becker, Howard S 1982 *Art Worlds* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Benford, Robert D 1993 "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement" *Social Forces* 71 677-701
- Bernstein, Sharon 1991 "Strange Bedfellows" *Los Angeles Times* (May 4), pp F1, F8
- Bielby, Denise D, and William T Bielby 1993 "The Hollywood 'Graylist'? Audience Demographics and Age Stratification among Television Writers" Pp 141-70 in *Creators of Culture*, edited by Muriel G Cantor and Cheryl Zollars Vol 8 of *Current Research on Occupations and Professions* Greenwich, Conn JAI Press
- Bielby, William T, and Denise D Bielby 1990 "Producing Prime Time Organizational Concentration and the Diversity of Network Television Programming" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D C, August
- Block, Ben Alex 1990 "Twenty-first Century Fox" *Channels* 10 (January) 36-40
- Boddy, William 1990 *Fifties Television The Industry and Its Critics* Urbana University of Illinois Press
- Brennan, Steve 1991 "FBC Strengthens Program Reserves with 23-Pilot Slate" *Hollywood Reporter* (March 21), pp 1, 7
- Cantor, Muriel G, and Joel M Cantor 1992 *Prime-Time Television Content and Control*, 2d ed Newbury Park, Calif Sage
- CBS Inc 1990 "Comments of CBS Inc" *In the Matter of Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules* Federal Communications Commission, Docket no 90-162 June 14
- Channels* 1990 "Primetime's Price Tag" *Channels* 10 (September 10) 50-51
- de Moraes, Lisa 1991a "ABC Pilot Slate Full of Big Names and Cable Concepts" *Hollywood Reporter* (March 20), pp 1, 6
- 1991b "New CBS Pilots Long on Machismo, Women's Humor" *Hollywood Reporter* (March 20), pp 1, 5
- 1991c "NBC to Bow Six Comedies, Two Dramas in Fall Shake-up" *Hollywood Reporter* (May 21), pp 1, 78
- DiMaggio, Paul J 1977 "Market Structure, the Creative Process, and Popular Culture Toward an Organizational Reinterpretation of Mass Culture Theory" *Journal of Popular Culture* 11 433-51
- DiMaggio, Paul J, and Walter W Powell 1983 "The Iron Cage Revisited Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields" *American Sociological Review* 48 147-60
- Du Brow, Rick 1991a "Humanity Loses to Reality" *Los Angeles Times* (March 30), pp F1, F12
- 1991b "Fox Network Goes Out on a Limb Again" *Los Angeles Times* (May 22), pp F1, F7
- Faulkner, Robert R 1983 *Music on Demand Composers and Careers in the Hollywood Film Industry* New Brunswick, N J Transaction
- Frank, Betsy 1991 *On Air Primetime Program Development, 1991-92* New York Saatchi & Saatchi Advertising
- Gamson, William A 1988 "Political Discourse and Collective Action" Pp 219-44 in *From Structure to Action Social Movement Participation across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow Greenwich, Conn JAI Press
- Gamson, William A, and Andre Modighiani 1989 "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power A Constructionist Approach" *American Journal of Sociology* 95 1-37
- Gitlin, Todd 1983 *Inside Prime Time* New York Pantheon

- Goldberg, Robert 1991 "TV Winners That Were Losers " *Wall Street Journal* (June 24), p A9
- Griswold, Wendy 1987 "A Methodological Framework for the Sociology of Culture " Pp 1-35 in *Sociological Methodology 1987*, edited by Clifford C Clogg Washington, D C American Sociological Association
- Hirsch, Paul M 1986 "From Ambushes to Golden Parachutes Corporate Takeovers as an Instance of Cultural Framing and Institutional Integration " *American Journal of Sociology* 91 800-37
- Jepperson, Ronald L 1991 "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism " Pp 143-63 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, edited by Walter W Powell and Paul J DiMaggio Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Lang, Kurt 1958 "Mass, Class, and the Reviewer " *Social Problems* 6 11-21
- Lippman, John 1990 "Running CBS' New Game Plan " *Los Angeles Times Calendar* (December 30), pp 5, 77-79
- Lowry, Brian 1991a "NBC, FBC Pilots Fall into Place " *Daily Variety* 231 (March 21) 1, 18-19
- 1991b "Pilots Lighted for Fall " *Daily Variety* 231 (March 20) 1, 14, 18
- March, James G , and Johan P Olsen 1976 *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations* Bergen Universitetsforlaget
- Marich, Robert 1991 "Networks Suffer 61% Profit Drop in 5-Year Period " *Hollywood Reporter* (May 24), pp 1, 8
- Meyer, John W , and Brian Rowan 1977 "Institutionalized Organizations Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony " *American Journal of Sociology* 83 340-63
- Montgomery, Kathryn C 1989 *Target Prime Time Advocacy Groups and the Struggle over Entertainment Television* New York Oxford University Press
- Peterson, Richard A , and David G Berger 1975 "Cycles of Symbol Production The Case of Popular Music " *American Sociological Review* 40 158-73
- Powell, Walter W , and Paul J DiMaggio 1991 *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Snow, David A , and Robert D Benford 1988 "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization " Pp 197-217 in *From Structure to Action Social Movement Participation across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow Greenwich, Conn JAI Press

Unionization and Labor Market Institutions in Advanced Capitalism, 1950–1985¹

Bruce Western
Princeton University

This article examines the dependence of unionization on labor market institutions and long-run trends in inflation, unemployment, and the sectoral composition of the labor force in 18 OECD countries. The large number of contending explanations highlights the difficulty in comparative sociology of drawing confident conclusions when there are few cases to compare. This problem is addressed through diverse evidence—a review of the comparative historical record and a time-series analysis—to form a Bayesian prior distribution, which is combined with a cross-sectional data set to sharpen conventional estimates of economic and institutional effects. This analysis indicates working-class organization in trade unions expanded in the postwar period where labor acquired an institutional influence over capitalist labor markets.

Just as advanced capitalist union movements face widespread decline (Visser 1991, 1992*a*), cross-national patterns of unionization have widely captured the attention of comparative researchers (Freeman 1989, Griffin, O'Connell, and McCammon 1989, Neumann, Pedersen, and Westergaard-Nielsen 1989, Stephens 1991, Visser 1992*b*, Wallerstein 1989, 1991, Western 1993*a*). While these studies use a range of different designs, explanations, and data, none have investigated the impact of long-run macroeconomic or sectoral trends on comparative working-class organization in trade unions despite strong theoretical justification. Even more striking is the disjuncture between the rich comparative historical studies of labor-movement development and the rather rarefied atmo-

¹ I gratefully acknowledge Dick Berk, Dahlia Elazar, Ruth Milkman, Ivan Szelenyi, Eleanor Townsley, Michael Wallerstein, and Maurice Zeitlin, and the *AJS* reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Rob Weiss for providing advice about Bayesian influence statistics and Simon Jackman for kindly providing computer facilities at Princeton University during summer 1992. Address all correspondence to Bruce Western, Department of Sociology, 2-N-2 Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544.

sphere occupied by the recent regression analyses. This article attempts to analyze the effect of long-run economic developments and combine comparative historical evidence in a unified Bayesian analysis of unionization.

This analysis highlights two methodological problems of comparative sociology. First, the proliferation of explanations of some outcome tends to reduce confidence in any one of those explanations because there are relatively few cases to compare. Second, while the quantitative data are spread quite sparingly over a statistical model, abundant comparative historical evidence is often set aside in the quantitative studies. Bayesian statistics provide an alternative to these two related methodological problems. The Bayesian approach provides a method for pooling sample and nonsample information in a single analysis, bolstering the information of the thin quantitative comparative data set. Combining information from a qualitative comparative history and time-series analysis provides additional support for the effects of the macroeconomy and labor market institutions.

UNION MOVEMENTS IN 18 OECD COUNTRIES

The development of postwar union movements in 18 nations within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) falls into three broad groups (Western 1993*a*, p. 267). One group of countries (including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) shows high and increasing union densities in the three decades from 1950. By 1985 over 70% of the workforces of these countries were unionized. Table 1, which describes labor market institutions in advanced capitalist countries, shows that the high-density countries were also characterized by stable industry and national-level collective bargaining for most of the postwar period. In this setting, unions play an active part in the formation and administration of macroeconomic policy. The expansive role of unions in economic management also extends to social welfare, as union confederations in the high-density countries administer unemployment insurance funds in "Ghent systems" (named for the Belgian town of the system's origin, see also Western 1993*a*, pp. 271–72, Rothstein 1989). Union movements in a larger heterogeneous collection of countries—Australia, Austria, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom—are moderately organized and share flat postwar unionization trends. Labor market institutions in these countries were also quite durable in the period since postwar reconstruction. The institutions tended to be more decentralized with collective bargaining strongest at the industry level (Western 1993*a*, pp. 270–71). Finally, the smaller union movements of Japan, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and

TABLE 1

KEY FEATURES OF POSTWAR LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN 18 OECD COUNTRIES

Country	Date Established	Chief Level of Bargaining	Features of Confederations and Affiliates
High-density countries			
Belgium	mid-1940s	National, industry	Two coordinated blue-collar confederations divided regionally, Ghent system
Denmark	mid-1930s	National, industry	Confederation coordinates craft union bargaining, many independent unions not covered by central agreements, Ghent system
Finland	late 1950s	National, industry	One blue-collar confederation but cohesiveness periodically limited due to independent role of communist union leaders, Ghent system
Sweden	1938	National, industry	One blue-collar confederation coordinates and directs affiliates, Ghent system
Middle-density countries			
Australia	1930s	Industry	One weak confederation with some power in collective bargaining
Austria	1945	Industry	One confederation with substantial control over 16 industry-level affiliates
Canada	late 1940s	Local	Three confederations with little power, bargaining patterned by province
Germany	1949	Industry	Confederation plays consultative role to 16 strong industry-level unions
Ireland	1946	National, industry	Intermittent national bargaining, strong coordinated industry unions
Italy	1971	Industry	Competition between three confederations, reformed in 1971 following merger
New Zealand	1930s	Industry	One confederation with some power in collective bargaining but little control over affiliates
Norway	1935	National, industry	Confederation coordinates bargaining and industrial action
United Kingdom	1930s	Industry	Weak confederation, strong industry and local unions

TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

Country	Date Established	Chief Level of Bargaining	Features of Confederations and Affiliates
Low-density countries			
France	1969	Industry, local	Multiple competing confederations divided across partisan lines
Japan	late 1950s	Local	Weak confederation with no control over enterprise unions
Netherlands	1948	National, industry	Three strong central confederations coordinated bargaining and merged in 1976
Switzerland	mid-1930s	Industry, local	Two cooperative confederations divided along partisan lines, strong industry-level unions
United States	1937	Local	Weak confederation, strong industry and local unions

the United States organize around 30% or less of their workforces and have exhibited slow declines in unionization since the 1950s. In these countries, with the exception of the Netherlands where national wage agreements have been common, establishment- or plant-level collective bargaining predominates (Western 1993*a*, pp 270–71). In all these countries then, the degree of centralization of collective bargaining and union involvement in unemployment insurance schemes provided a stable institutional context for union organizing (Western 1993*a*, pp 269–72, 1993*b*).

The cross-sectional association between the centralization of collective bargaining and unionization is maintained longitudinally in the Italian case. Italian collective bargaining before 1968 was conducted mostly at the industry level but employers, in practice, were not bound by the collective agreements. Weak industry-level organization accompanied weak shopfloor organization (Contini 1985). The two largest union confederations, the CGIL and the CISL, were closely tied to political parties (the communists, the socialists, and the Christian democrats). As a result, the confederations were split, and bargaining was uncoordinated and frequently competitive (Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman 1983, pp 503–6). Following the widespread unofficial strike waves of the Hot Autumn in 1969, the Italian union movement was significantly restructured, and legislation, the Statut dei Lavatori (1970), was passed guaranteeing and expanding rights for unions (Lange and Vannicelli 1982, Contini 1985). This represented a “durable transformation” in Italian industrial relations (Contini 1985, p 207). By the early 1970s moves for greater cooper-

ation between the unions were urged by the three metalworker affiliates. By 1972, the previously decentralized Italian union movement had formed a single organization merging the three confederations. Patterns of organization remained fluid as the unification movement in Italian unions was set back in the 1980s by the emergence of autonomous confederations representing skilled public-sector workers (Visser 1990, p. 133).

While changes marking institutional reform in Italy can be found in several other advanced capitalist countries (Western 1993a, pp. 269–70), Italy is the only country in the postwar period to experience unification of confederations, sweeping legal reform, and fundamental change in the practice of industrial relations. Italy is therefore alone in undergoing a radical reform of labor market institutions in the three decades after the war (Western 1993a, p. 271). Even more provocative for the argument of this paper, Italy is the only country to show a strongly nonmonotonic pattern of union density in the postwar period. Unionization declines through the 1950s and 1960s, but increases throughout the 1970s until the early 1980s (see also Lange and Vannicelli 1982, p. 128). Italy, the only country with a reascending trend in union density, is the exception that provides some evidence for the rule. Although durable labor market institutions, widely established in the OECD by the 1950s, shaped trends in unionization over the following 35 years, labor market institutions were transformed in Italy and we observe a radical reversal in deunionization in that country.

I argue that the association between labor market institutions and unionization has a causal basis (Western 1993a). Labor market institutions shape the capacity of unions to influence the supply and demand for labor, and unions use this institutional power to preserve or enhance their membership (Griffin et al. 1991, p. 120; Visser 1991, pp. 118–19; Western 1993a, p. 269). Specifically, under highly centralized bargaining, organizing is centrally coordinated, competition between unions for members is limited, and unions seldom waste resources trying to organize the same membership. Employers are also bound to central frame agreements by extension provisions that impose collective agreements on non-union workplaces, defusing employer opposition to unionism (Freeman 1989). Because union confederations under centralized collective bargaining also feature in national economic management, they can help direct employment to unionized or unionizable sectors. Where labor is excluded from economic management, unions are placed in a reactive position, inheriting investment decisions and subsequent patterns of employment (Griffin et al. 1991, p. 120). In short, centralized bargaining institutions are mechanisms for unionization.

Similarly, Ghent systems of union-administered unemployment insurance also generate high union densities. Under Ghent systems, workers

have contact with unions during spells of unemployment—unlike their counterparts in countries with state-administered unemployment insurance. Where unions are closely involved with workers' welfare outside the workplace, workers are more likely to maintain union membership. By implementing generous eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits and specifying job alternatives, union officials can also direct employment to the union sector (Rothstein 1989, Western 1993a, pp. 271–72).

This review of the comparative history of postwar labor markets indicates that (1) the basic national labor market institutions of the OECD have gone largely unchanged since the 1950s, and (2) union centralization and the Ghent system are positively associated with the level of union organization. The crucial Italian experiment supports the purported effects of the centralization of labor market institutions as the revival of the Italian labor movement closely followed the period of institutional change.

WORLDWIDE RECESSION AND THE GROWTH OF SERVICES

Economic explanations of unionization can be divided into two groups. The first relates the fortunes of unions to prevailing macroeconomic conditions. The second traces union decline to the decline of manufacturing employment and service-sector growth. Empirical studies of both theories generally focus on particular national experiences rather than cross-national differences (e.g., Farber 1990, Peetz 1990). In contrast to studies of service-sector growth, the most common version of the macroeconomic argument emphasizes the impact of the business cycle, neglecting secular changes in unionization and institutional conditions for union organizing (Booth 1983, Shefflin, Troy, and Koeller 1981). Although typical applications of both theories are thus not particularly comparative or historical, both theories identify prominent conditions for union organizing and implications of these theories can be extended in comparative and historical directions.

INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE POSTWAR OECD

A comparative and historical reformulation of the business-cycle theory associates persistent cross-national variability and secular change in inflation and unemployment with diverse unionization trends. This reformulation is put sharply by Freeman (1989, p. 1) who relates divergent patterns of unionization to worldwide recession through the 1970s. He argues: "The post-oil-shock world economy created a 'crisis of unionism' throughout the western world." Employers intensified their opposition

to unions in response to mounting cost pressures that came from high inflation and slow economic growth (see also Freeman and Rebeck 1989)

Viewed sociologically, the recession following the 1973–74 oil shocks originated in the growing capacity of the organized (and sometimes unorganized) working classes of advanced capitalism to protect their incomes from the corrosive effects of the market. The downward inflexibility of wages disrupted the Keynesian logic of state intervention in the economy. Attempts to reduce inflation by lowering aggregate demand raised unemployment. Expansionary policies, intended to reverse rising unemployment, drove up wages and prices (Goldthorpe 1984). Employers responded in several ways to the prospect of an unprecedented postwar profit squeeze. In the United States, union membership was eroded by plant closings and layoffs amidst a wave of industrial restructuring (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). Employers also intensified their opposition to unions, contesting union certification elections, increasing unfair labor practices, and employing anti-labor management consultants (Goldfield 1987). The severe blow dealt to labor movements by the recessionary 1970s is further evidenced by a period of international labor passivity extending from that time (Griffin, McCammon, and Botsko 1990).

The historical transformation of patterns of inflation and unemployment is summarized in figure 1. The top and bottom panels of figure 1 show the annual dispersion of inflation and unemployment rates across 18 OECD countries. Both series indicate similar patterns. Inflation and unemployment were low and stable through the 1950s and 1960s. Through the 1970s and 1980s economic conditions became more volatile as prices and joblessness rose rapidly. Rising unemployment and inflation in the 1970s and 1980s were accompanied by increasing variability. Thus while economic conditions were comparatively homogeneous in the two decades after the war, success in macroeconomic management was uneven in the 1970s and 1980s.

The relationship between unemployment and inflation is represented in the middle panel of figure 1, which graphs a smoothed plot of coefficients from annual regressions of inflation on unemployment in 18 OECD countries. This shows that a modest negative relationship between inflation and unemployment held cross-sectionally through most of the period before 1973. This association was reversed through the 1970s: countries with high inflation also tended to have high unemployment. The economic buoyancy of the 1950s and 1960s was replaced by recessionary conditions of a novel type in the 1970s and 1980s. The inflation-unemployment trade-off was supplanted by a positive relationship between price rises and joblessness (Bruno and Sachs 1985).

A simple inquiry into the association between the historical transformation of OECD inflation-unemployment regimes and unionization is pro-




FIG 1 —Inflation and unemployment in the OECD, 1951–85 The boxplots show the annual dispersion of inflation and unemployment for 18 OECD countries The middle panel shows a smooth plot of regressions of annual inflation rates on annual unemployment rates The breakpoint between high growth and low growth periods, 1973, is marked by a dashed line on the plot of regression coefficients

vided by examining discontinuities in unionization trends If the sharp change in the macroeconomic logic of the OECD affected the process of union organizing we could expect to see a change in patterns of unionization after 1973 (on Japan, see Freeman and Rebeck [1989, pp 597–99], on Denmark, Pedersen [1990]) Discontinuities in 1974 can be summarized in a simple step-function model, which specifies that the yearly percentage point change in union density steps to a new level after 1973 (More elaborate transfer-function models with weaker finite sample justifications yield substantively identical results)

The continuity of unionization trends through the 1970s recession is striking (table 2, col 1) Strong evidence of an effect is present in only four of the 18 countries In Sweden, for example, estimates indicate that union density grew by about 4 of a percentage point annually before 1973 and by about 8 after The change of 39 is given by the step-

TABLE 2

CHANGE IN UNIONIZATION TRENDS, AVERAGE INFLATION, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
RATES FOR 18 OECD COUNTRIES, 1973-85

Countries	Change in Union Growth after 1973	Inflation, 1973-85	Unemployment, 1973-85
High-density countries			
Belgium	—	Medium	High
Denmark	1 12*	Medium	High
Finland	- 65	Medium	High
Sweden	39*	Medium	Low
Middle-density countries			
Australia	29	Medium	High
Austria	07	Low	Low
Canada	- 13	Medium	High
Germany	07	Low	High
Ireland	- 36	Medium	High
Italy	- 07	High	High
New Zealand	06	High	Low
Norway	12	Medium	Low
United Kingdom	- 54	High	High
Low-density countries			
France	- 07	Medium	High
Japan	08	Medium	Low
Netherlands	- 60*	Low	High
Switzerland	37	Low	Low
United States	- 50*	Medium	High

NOTE — The coefficient for Belgium was not estimated because of missing data. Average annual inflation greater than 12% is classified as high, 6-12% is medium, less than 6% is low. Average annual unemployment under 2.5% is classified as low.

* $P < .05$ (one-sided test, bootstrapped)

function parameter. The largest change occurs in Denmark where pre-stagflation union growth is .3 of a percentage point, climbing to a growth rate of 1.5 percentage points a year after 1974. This is consistent with other findings that attribute accelerating Danish union growth in the 1970s to climbing unemployment combined with a Ghent system (Pedersen 1990). In the low-density countries, union decline accelerates after 1973 in the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the United States.

Viewed comparatively, the level of inflation and unemployment can be related to the level of union density. Post-1973 inflation and unemployment levels are not closely related to either changing unionization trends or the general level of unionization (table 2). Among the high-density countries, unemployment was high everywhere except Sweden. The relationship between high unemployment and union density is not strong, however, as unemployment was also high in three of the low-density

countries but below 2.5% in two others. The middle-density group also shows heterogeneous economic conditions, claiming the membership of both high- and low-unemployment countries and countries with a wide range of post-oil-shock inflation rates. Economic conditions are also highly variable in the low-density countries. Inflation is below 6% in the Netherlands and Switzerland, but over 10% in France. Unemployment shows even greater variability across the five low-density countries. Japan and Switzerland both maintained low unemployment rates, while unemployment was over 6% in the other three low-density countries.

This evidence indicates that the postwar history of divergence in inflation and unemployment in the OECD is not systematically related to variability in unionization. The oil-shock year of 1973 was generally not the break point for OECD labor movements that it was for OECD labor markets. Although the United States, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden are exceptions to this general proposition, economic conditions tended to be heterogeneous across levels of unionization.

SERVICE-SECTOR GROWTH IN THE POSTWAR OECD

The growth of service industry employment in the capitalist democracies was widely observed by sociologists of postindustrialism and postcapitalism (e.g., Bell 1976, Dahrendorf 1959, Block 1990). For many researchers, the historic decline of manufacturing and accompanying service-sector growth was a cause of union decline (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, Griffin et al. 1991, Lash and Urry 1987, Troy 1986). Service-sector growth suggests two mechanisms for union decline. First, service industries consisting of small spatially dispersed, owner-operated businesses, employing young, part-time, or female workers, present a more difficult organizing task than the homogeneous workforces of traditional manufacturing industries (Troy 1986). The growth of services also created immense structural mobility. This mobility, sociologists argue, weakens class attachments, undermining union membership (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 278, Lipset and Gordon 1953). From a comparative perspective, the pattern of manufacturing decline and service-sector growth may be sufficiently variable to associate with the broad range of union development.

Comparative evidence on service-sector employment growth casts doubt on sectoral change as a cause of de-unionization. Table 3 reports rates of employment growth in secondary and service industries for the longest time series of available comparable data. The decline of traditional industry sectors was slow in the low-density countries of France and the United States (table 3, col. 1). In Japan the percentage of workers in secondary industry actually grew from 1962 to 1985. The fastest decline of traditional industry employment was recorded by the highly orga-

TABLE 3

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT IN SERVICE AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS, 18 OECD COUNTRIES

Countries	Secondary Industry Employment	Consumer Services Employment	Social Services Employment
High-density countries			
Belgium	— 67	43	55
Denmark	— 40	16	77*
Finland	— 05	21	69†
Sweden	— 47	12	87
Middle-density countries			
Australia	— 45	55	24
Austria	— 20	36	41‡
Canada	— 30	78	— 19§
Germany	— 30	54	77
Ireland	14	34	29
Italy	— 11	58	66
New Zealand	— 28	09	34†
Norway	— 38	33	78
United Kingdom	— 67	42	40
Low-density countries			
France	— 28	29	48
Japan	16	36	19#
Netherlands	— 55	16	60‡
Switzerland	— 47	33	35
United States	— 30	35	23#

NOTE —Coefficients express average annual percentage point growth in employment in each industry sector. All secondary industry coefficients are for the period 1962–1985. Consumer and social services employment coefficients are for the period 1964–85, except where indicated. Secondary industry includes mining, manufacturing, utilities, and construction (international Standard Industrial Codes 2–5). Consumer services is defined as wholesale and retail trades and restaurants, hotels, and financial services (ISIC 6 and 8). Social services includes social, personal, and community services (ISIC 9).

* 1965–85

† 1971–85

‡ 1969–85

§ 1970–85

|| 1977–85

1967–85

nized Belgian labor force. Employment in Swedish secondary industry has also declined rapidly. This comparative pattern is the opposite to that predicted by service-sector growth theories, which link declining employment in traditional industry sectors to union decline.

Because unions successfully organized social services industries but failed to penetrate consumer services to the same degree (Visser 1991), columns 2 and 3 of table 3 distinguish growth rates in social, community, and personal service employment from growth in retail, entertainment,

and financial services. While employment growth in consumer services is charged with disorganizing labor movements, social service employment has generally grown faster. Furthermore, the growth of consumer services is not strongly related to levels of labor organization. In the United States, for example, researchers associate service-sector growth with three decades of union decline (Troy 1986, Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986, pp. 53–54), but American consumer services growth is lower than that in highly organized Belgium and five of the nine middle-density countries. By contrast, social services growth is weakly associated with unionization (col. 3). Social services employment grew quickly in three of the four high-density countries and slowly in three of the five low-density countries. No clear pattern prevails in the middle-density group, where social services employment in highly organized Austria grew more slowly than in the less organized countries of Italy and Germany. In sum, these data suggest that of all sectoral trends, only social service growth is related to unionization.

Historical trends in the economic conditions of OECD labor markets are highly patterned. In this sense economic conditions form a historical context for union organizing. Economic circumstances—rates of inflation and unemployment and the sectoral composition of the workforce—in the mid-1980s are quite different from those in the 1950s. These would seem to present union leaders and employers with novel challenges to organize and disorganize union movements. While this may be so, evidence that trends in economic conditions are systematically related to trends in unionization is weak. Similar recessionary experiences and trends in service-sector growth can be found in countries with very different levels of labor organization.

However, the influence of market conditions and the industrial structure on unionization cannot be rejected outright. In the low-density countries, economic theories of unionization broadly fit the facts. Manufacturing declined, the service sector grew. Inflation in the low-density countries was generally controlled at the expense of unemployment following the oil shocks in 1973–74 (table 3, low-density countries). For the economic explanations of unionization, both developments generate union decline. Although similar patterns are found in countries that maintained or increased levels of labor organization, the mechanisms identified by the economic explanations may only be operating in the low-density countries. Union movements in the high-density countries may have insulated themselves from debilitating economic forces, and the impact of economic conditions on union organizing may be conditional on the institutional context.

To this point, a comparative historical discussion has evidenced the institutional causes of labor movement development while modest sup-

port was given by time-series data for the effects of employment growth in social services. Because of the variety of the data analyzed, a direct confrontation of the various explanations has not been possible. This is remedied in the following section, where I analyze a Bayesian regression model of unionization that incorporates the above analyses of the effects of union centralization, the Ghent system, the 1970s recession, and service-sector growth.

A BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF UNIONIZATION

In the conventional approach of quantitative comparative sociology, qualitative historical information and the quantitative time-series information presented in the previous sections would be used to generate conjectures that are then operationalized in a regression equation (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990, Stephens 1979). The historical evidence, for example, is used to spark ideas for the researcher, but takes a back seat in the final test of the model. By discarding the historical discussion in the model estimation, the conventional approach wastes a rich source of information in favor of a small and typically collinear set of cross-sectional quantitative data (Western and Jackman 1994). An alternative to this conventional approach involves pooling all types of information—the time-series data, the historical discussion, and the weak cross-sectional data—and estimating a new model on the basis of this pooled data set. To pool the information, the historical discussion and the conclusions from the time-series analysis must be distilled into the coefficients of the statistical model. The researcher's confidence in these coefficients is supplied through judgments of their variance.

Pooling sample data with subjectively assigned coefficient values is characteristic of Bayesian statistics. In the Bayesian language, the assigned values represent the researcher's prior belief (or simply "priors") about the coefficients of the model. The assigned variances represent the researcher's confidence in those subjectively assigned coefficients. For example, if the researcher has only vague prior information, the prior variances should be quite large. The coefficients and variances constitute the prior information that is brought to an analysis of the sample data. A weighted average of prior coefficients and the coefficients calculated from the sample data yield a set of posterior distributions. These posteriors reflect how prior beliefs in the coefficients of the model have been modified by the sample data (App. B details this analysis).

The chief objection to Bayesian statistics is that priors are chosen subjectively, that is, they are chosen at the researcher's discretion, rather than being given by the data (Barnett 1982). Because of the subjective

character of the priors, Efron (1986, p. 4) argues that Bayesian methods fail to “reassure oneself *and others* that the data have been interpreted fairly” (emphasis in the original). Bayesians themselves concede that precise numerical specification of researchers’ prior opinions is a “preposterous” demand (Leamer 1991). The Bayesian response to this criticism has two parts. First, all data analyses—Bayesian or not—use prior information. In practice researchers draw on their experience, prejudices, and theories to make a large number of decisions in the course of a data analysis with an eye to generating results that can be interpreted in a plausible way (Leamer 1983, Western and Jackman 1994). Thus prior information is ubiquitous and the Bayesian approach provides a methodology for its explicit description and coherent incorporation. Second, because Bayesian conclusions depend on subjectively chosen priors that may not be shared, it is important to assess the sensitivity of posteriors to priors. This sensitivity analysis is detailed below.

MODEL SPECIFICATION

The model suggested by the previous analysis consists of a linear regression of union density on measures of macroeconomic conditions, sectoral composition, union centralization, and presence of the Ghent system. Macroeconomic conditions are measured by a change in the misery index—the rate of unemployment plus the rate of inflation—following the oil shocks of 1973. Consistent with relationships suggested by the time-series analysis, sectoral composition is measured by social service employment.

I add two controls to these variables, left cabinet representation and labor force size, that produced impressive results for a slightly larger sample of countries (Wallerstein 1989). Left parties’ representation in government (i.e., the “left party effect”) is expected to have a positive effect on union density because labor and social democratic parties have historically assisted union organizing through legislation and through the sympathetic administration of labor law. Labor force size is expected to have a negative effect because larger labor forces are costly for unions to organize. Labor force size is logged in the regression analysis. Although I include these variables in the model, my substantive focus is directed to the institutional and economic variables.

Previous research indicates that the left party and misery index effects will suffer from simultaneity bias. Large unions have influenced both variables (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, Lange and Garrett 1985). There is no statistical solution to this problem in small samples. However, knowledge about the signs of the effects suggests the direction of bias in

the coefficients. The likely positive effect of union density on left parties suggests the left party effect will be biased upward. The likely negative effect of union densities on the misery index means the misery index effect will be biased downward. It might also be objected that the union centralization effect is subject to simultaneity bias. This seems unlikely because patterns of union centralization were largely established by the 1950s before the emergence of unionization trajectories. The crucial experiment of Italian industrial relations reform provides additional evidence for the causal priority of union centralization over union density.

Data for institutional variables are reported in table 4. Headey's (1970) index of union centralization provides a good measure of the features highlighted by the institutional discussion of labor markets. This index combines information about the confederation's participation in collective bargaining, its control over strike activity of affiliates, and the size of its staff. Cameron (1984) reports a more recent and slightly modified index, and this is used for the analysis. His scores generally conform to the institutional description. Austria has the most centralized union movement. Sweden and Norway follow with similar levels of centralization. Danish decentralization reflects the predominance of craft organization and weak confederation control over industrial action. Among the low-density countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland have relatively powerful confederations. The second column of table 4 distinguishes the four high-density countries with a dummy variable for the Ghent system of unemployment relief in the postwar period.

To capture the dramatic shifts in employment and inflation trends in the early 1970s, I measure macroeconomic conditions by the change in the misery index from the 12-year period 1962–73 to the following period, 1974–85. This measure usefully distinguishes the successes of the post-oil-shock period (table 4, col. 3). The full employment regimes of Switzerland, Japan, and Sweden share low scores, while the stagflationary regimes of Belgium, France, and the Netherlands have the highest scores. Time-series evidence suggested a weak relationship between union organizing and employment in social services. Service-sector size is measured by the level of social service employment among wage and salary earners.

Finally, to help ensure that the priors are generated independently of the sample data, the dependent variable for the regression analysis is taken from a different source than that used for the time-series analysis (Visser 1991) and at a time point, 1988, beyond the period covered by earlier discussions (table 4, col. 7). In this series, membership figures reported by unions that include retired and nonfinancial members provide Irish and Italian densities about 20% larger than the time-series observations for 1985.

TABLE 4

LABOR MARKET SCORES, LEFT PARTY REPRESENTATION, AND UNION DENSITIES FOR 18 OECD COUNTRIES, 1985

Countries	Union Centralization (1)	Ghent System (2)	Change in Misery Index (3)	Social Services (%) (4)	Left Party Representation (%) (5)	Labor Force Size (in 1,000s) (6)	Union Density (%) (7)
High-density countries							
Belgium	6	1	13.5	32	27	4,092	78
Denmark	4	1	9.7	35	63	2,784	86
Finland	6	1	3.6	28	42	2,488	90
Sweden	7	1	6.1	37	90	4,237	86
Middle-density countries							
Australia	3	0	12.6	26	22	7,364	53
Austria	8	0	7.4	23	65	3,504	58
Canada	0	0	5.2	29	0	12,723	35
Germany	2	0	8.0	29	55	29,403	40
Ireland	4	0	4.4	23	9	1,377	58
Italy	2	0	3.0	25	13	22,763	63
New Zealand	3	0	6.1	24	22	1,458	51
Norway	7	0	6.0	34	45	2,039	68
United Kingdom	3	0	9.4	30	72	27,432	46
Low-density countries							
France	0	0	15.7	28	0	24,639	12
Japan	1	0	5.8	21	0	59,773	27
Netherlands	6	0	14.9	33	23	5,861	30
Switzerland	4	0	1.0	22	29	3,173	30
United States	0	0	7.8	31	0	116,801	16

SOURCE — See Appendix A

TABLE 5
PRIORS FOR A CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION MODEL
OF UNION DENSITY

Variables	Mean	SE \times 2	Variance
Intercept	0	63.3	1,000
Union centralization	15	30	225
Ghent system	20	20	100
Misery index	-25	1	25
Social service employment	25	1	25
Left party effect	15	15	0056
Labor force size	-6	6	9

SPECIFYING THE PRIORS

If the centralization index is rescaled to range from zero to one, the centralization coefficient of the regression model expresses the difference in union densities attributable to union centralization between the most and least centralized countries (Austria and France). The comparative institutional discussion and the effect of institutional change in Italy suggests that the centralization effect is positive. Confidence in this effect is limited by the decentralization of one high-density country (Denmark) and the relative centralization of two low-density countries (the Netherlands and Switzerland). My priors indicate that union centralization accounts for about 15 percentage points in the difference between the most and least centralized countries (table 5). My lack of confidence in this prior is reflected in the large variance. I specify a large confidence interval that overlaps zero, indicating the possibility that centralization has a negative effect, but indeed the positive effect may be as large as 45 percentage points (the prior mean plus twice the prior SE). I have more confidence about the Ghent system effect because it is widely known that only the four high-density countries have Ghent systems in postwar times (e.g., Rothstein 1989). Thus, my prior for the Ghent system effect excludes zero.

The effects of macroeconomic change and the sectoral composition of the labor force received little support from the time-series data presented above, but other research claims their relevance (see, e.g., Troy 1986, Freeman 1989). It is principally on the basis of this research that I place mildly informative priors on the two economic effects. Following Freeman's (1989) argument that worldwide stagflation created a "crisis of unionism," we can expect that a large increase in the misery index following the 1973 oil shocks drove unionization down and is thus associated with small union densities. The negative prior mean indicates that a one

percentage point increase in the misery index causes union density to drop by a quarter of a percentage point. This conjecture was unsupported by the time series analysis, thus the misery index is given a large prior variance. On the other hand, previous research and the evidence above suggests that social service employment growth stimulates union growth. A similar, although positive, effect is specified for social service employment.

I also put informative priors on the left party and labor force size effects on the basis of other analyses of other samples and data (Wallerstein 1989). I put a diffuse prior on the intercept because no strong prior expectations about its value are established by theory or previous research. Using this strategy, the posterior intercept will approximately be given by the sample data.

MODEL CHECKING

The Bayesian regression analysis assumes that the independent variables are linearly related to the dependent variable and that the sample disturbance has a normal distribution. Regression diagnostics show that the residuals from the least squares fit are symmetric and bootstrap sampling distributions of the regression coefficients approximated normality. Linearity can be explored with a set of techniques called "generalized additive models," which use smoothers (Goodall 1990) to fit conditional distributions of the dependent variables. A partial plot of the predictors against the smoothly fitted dependent variables provides a graphical representation of nonlinearities in the data (see fig. 2, see also Hastie and Tibshirani 1990). In small samples, nonlinearities are often generated by outliers. Switzerland is outlying in these data, and the plots shown here omit the Swiss case.

Marked nonlinearities were revealed in three continuous variables (fig.




FIG. 2 —Selected smooth plots of a generalized additive model of union density. A confidence band around the smooth plot is represented by the dashed lines.

TABLE 6

POSTERIOR MEANS, AND 80% CONFIDENCE REGIONS FOR REGRESSIONS
OF UNION DENSITY, FOR VARYING PRIOR INFORMATION

	Informative Prior	Diffuse Prior*	Noninformative Prior
Intercept	52 32 [28 30, 76 33]	64 88 [27 13, 102 62]	75 65 [25 27, 126 03]
Union centralization	18 20 [6 22, 30 19]	14 60 [-2 85, 32 05]	10 88 [-12 11, 33 88]
Ghent system	26 07 [17 87, 34 28]	29 36 [18 63, 40 09]	31 15 [18 90, 43 40]
Misery index	- 51 [-1 05, 03]	- 91 [-1 75, - 07]	- 1 20 [-2 30, - 11]
Social service employment	45 [- 07, 97]	32 [- 53, 1 17]	24 [- 93, 1 41]
Left party effect	16 [07, 24]	16 [02, 31]	17 [- 04, 39]
Labor force size	-3 20 [- 5 54, - 87]	-3 73 [- 7 32, - 14]	-4 30 [- 8 91, 32]

NOTE.—Nos. in square brackets describe 80% confidence region

* The diffuse prior takes the prior means and five times the prior covariance matrix

2) Social service employment shows the largest departure from linearity, with the effect flattening in the middle range. Substantively, this means that there is little difference in union densities for countries with between 25% and 30% of their workforces in social service employment. Above and below this range, the association between social service employment in unionization is positive. When the service sector is moderately sized, as in France or Germany, for example, the sample data indicate that additional employment in social services has no impact on the level of labor organization.

MODEL ESTIMATES

The Bayesian regression analysis is reported in table 6. When results based on the informative prior are considered, all parameters are signed consistently with theory. The two labor market institution variables, centralization and the Ghent system dummy, have large positive effects on union density. These estimates indicate that about 20 percentage points in the difference in union densities between the most and least centralized countries is attributable to union centralization. For example, union centralization accounts for about one-third of the difference in labor organization between Austria and France, the most and least centralized countries. The impact of the Ghent system is even larger, gener-

ating a difference of more than 25 percentage points between the Ghent and non-Ghent countries. In contrast to the analysis of time-series data, the negative effects of macroeconomic change and the positive effects of social service employment growth find some support in this cross-sectional analysis. Although the coefficients are substantively large, 80% confidence intervals for the two economic effects include zero. Left party and labor force size variables also have their predicted effects.

A sensitivity analysis provides further information about the stability of these results. In a Bayesian context we can assess the sensitivity of the posteriors to both the sample data and to the prior information. If the posteriors reported in the first column of table 6 are highly sensitive to the choice of prior, this suggests that the sample data add little to the prior information and inferences are driven by the priors alone. If a small number of observations from the sample data are highly influential for the posteriors, the results are similarly unstable and reflect information about a few cases rather than the whole of the data set in combination with the priors.

The sensitivity of the posterior to the prior can be investigated by examining how the posteriors change in response to a change in the priors. The amount of prior information can be reduced by increasing the prior variances. I report two further posteriors: one for a diffuse prior with prior variances multiplied by five, and another for noninformative prior information, that is, no prior information at all. This last set of results comes from the conventional least squares fit. As the prior information is gradually taken out of the analysis, the centralization effect gets smaller and the posterior 80% confidence region overlaps zero. The Ghent effect is more robust, becoming larger and retaining a relatively short confidence interval as the prior information becomes more diffuse. The misery index effect doubles in size under the noninformative prior and the confidence region no longer includes zero. The cross-sectional data thus point unambiguously to a "crisis of unionism" following the 1973 oil shocks while the time-series data do not. Unlike the misery index effects, inference about the effect of social service employment depends on prior information. As prior information is removed, the social service coefficient goes to zero and the confidence interval becomes 1.5 times wider. Finally, the left party and labor force size effects get larger as prior information is removed.

The sensitivity of the posterior to the data can be investigated with Bayesian regression diagnostics. Pettit and Smith (1986) discuss a statistic that indicates the influence of each sample observation on the joint distribution of the posterior (see App. B). As foreshadowed in the institutional discussion of union centralization, the influence statistic shows that the Netherlands and Italy are large outliers for these data. The Dutch union




FIG. 3—Bayesian influence statistics for an informative and noninformative prior distribution

confederations are unusually strong for the level of labor organization in the Netherlands. The Italian confederations, by contrast, are unusually weak. Both dimensions of sensitivity analysis—sensitivity to the prior and sensitivity to the data—are shown in figure 3. Here, influence statistics with the informative prior are plotted against influence statistics from the diffuse prior. If the sample data from a country have the same influence on the final results, regardless of the level of prior information, it will fall on the dashed line. However, as the prior information is reduced, the sample data generally have an increasing impact on the posterior so the quantitative information from most countries becomes more influential as the prior information recedes. Switzerland grows disproportionately in its influence on the posterior. Switzerland is thus consistent with the posterior but an outlier in the sample data. When prior information is eliminated, this country is shifted upward on the plot and, indeed, drives a large part of the story.

The posteriors for the misery index effect are now dominated by the

TABLE 7

POSTERIOR MEANS, AND 80% CONFIDENCE REGIONS FOR REGRESSIONS OF UNION DENSITY, FOR VARYING PRIOR INFORMATION, WITH SWITZERLAND OMITTED

	Informative Prior	Diffuse Prior*	Noninformative Prior
Intercept	65 86 [43 55, 88 17]	87 02 [54 78, 119 26]	101 53 [62 44, 140 61]
Union centralization	17 84 [7 39, 28 29]	13 59 [- 70, 27 88]	9 78 [- 7 39, 26 95]
Ghent system	26 37 [19 41, 33 32]	28 94 [20 50, 37 38]	30 15 [20 99, 39 31]
Misery index	- 87 [- 1 37, - 36]	- 1 45 [- 2 17, - 73]	- 1 77 [- 2 62, - 92]
Social service employment	27 [- 22, 75]	01 [- 71, 73]	- 15 [- 1 04, 73]
Left party effect	16 [08, 24]	17 [05, 30]	19 [03, 35]
Labor force size	- 3 65 [- 5 75, - 1 55]	- 4 53 [- 7 48, - 1 58]	- 5 23 [- 8 70, - 1 77]

* The diffuse prior takes the prior means and five times the prior covariance matrix

data with the Swiss case omitted (see table 7) The effect becomes nearly twice as large and the difference in the posterior means for the informative and noninformative priors is reduced This suggests a misery index effect around minus one, a percentage point increase in the average misery index after 1973 generates a percentage point decline in union density The social services employment effect by contrast is substantially smaller for the reduced data and is weakly negative when no prior information is used In short, Switzerland enhances the effects of the macroeconomic variable but suppresses the effect of the sectoral composition variable Other parameters are robust to the omission of the Swiss case

In sum, the quantitative cross-sectional data provide us with a way of revising our prior beliefs developed in the time-series analysis and institutional discussion The discussion pointed to the sizable impact of union centralization on union density Although the quantitative information was broadly consistent, the historical discussion probably provided excessive optimism about the size of the effect A centralization effect in the vicinity of 10 percentage points seems a reasonable conclusion in light of this evidence The effect of the Ghent system on the other hand was roundly supported by the priors and the data This analysis indicates that the Ghent system contributes about 25 percentage points to a country's union density The effect of worldwide stagflation, although finding little support from the time-series data, is confirmed in the cross-

sectional analysis. The reverse is true for the impact of social service employment.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This article has contrasted two explanations of unionization in the advanced capitalist countries. The first emphasized the impact of labor market institutions. A brief review of the historical evidence suggested patterns of union centralization and systems of union-administered unemployment benefits provided enduring contexts for labor movement growth. Quasi-experimental evidence for the impact of labor market institutions was provided by the confluence of institutional change in Italy and the sharp reversal in declining Italian union densities. An alternative account focused on the effects of long-run macroeconomic trends and service-sector growth. Although both factors had been widely claimed to influence union organization, comparative longitudinal data had previously not been investigated. Time-series estimates showed that despite a basic change in the pattern of economic conditions from the mid-1970s, labor movement development was largely unaffected. Similarly, service-sector growth showed little systematic relationship to unionization in the postwar period. Information from the institutional discussion and economic time-series analysis were drawn together in a Bayesian regression analysis. Here, stronger evidence was found for the impact of the macroeconomy, while the institutional effects were also supported. The balance of the diverse sources of evidence thus favors the institutional explanation of unionization.

Methodological and substantive conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. Methodologically, the small collinear data sets typical of quantitative comparative sociology do not contain enough information to investigate several alternative explanations. I tackled this problem by using more and more diverse information than is typically utilized in quantitative comparative research. A review of comparative historical evidence and an analysis of time-series data provided varying confidence in the effects of labor market institutions and economic conditions on unionization. I integrated this diverse information in a Bayesian analysis. This analysis bolstered a weak cross-sectional data set with an informative prior distribution based on the comparative historical material and the time-series analysis. A weakness of the Bayesian approach is that findings depend on subjectively chosen priors. If readers find the priors implausible, they will tend to find the posteriors implausible as well. I addressed this weakness through a sensitivity analysis that investigates the dependence of the posteriors on priors.

My substantive conclusion, derived from this analysis, is that working-

class self-organization in trade unions grows where labor acquires an institutional influence over the operation of capitalist labor markets. Where unions are decentralized and uninvolved in the allocation of social welfare—as in France, Japan, and the United States—unions have few resources for maintaining membership. Ghent systems in combination with nationally centralized labor markets, as found in Scandinavia, provide union movements with regular uncontested influence over the supply and demand for labor that is instrumental for their long-term growth.

More generally, the institutional structure of national labor markets constitutes an important axis around which class relations turn. On the one hand, the institutions themselves are resources in distributional struggles between workers and employers by providing them with means for controlling market forces. The outcomes of these struggles, on the other hand, may be tipped one way or another by the effects of institutions on the organization and disorganization of the working class. Where class representatives control institutions that domesticate exogenously shifting market and structural conditions, worker organization in trade unions has steadily expanded.

APPENDIX A

Data Sources

Union density series —Series for Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States were taken from Neumann et al. (1989). Denmark and France were taken from Visser (1989). Union membership and labor force figures for New Zealand come from the *New Zealand Official Yearbook* (1951–85, 1987–88). Irish union membership data is taken from the *The Statistical Abstract of Ireland* (Central Statistics Office 1951–87). Additional labor force data to complete Irish and New Zealand density series were taken from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's *Labour Force Statistics* (1963, 1980, 1987). The Japanese series comes from Kuwahara (1987). Pensioners are excluded from all series except Belgium. Data for the regression analysis are from Visser (1991).

Consumer price inflation —All series are taken from International Financial Statistics (IMF 1990).

Rate of unemployment —Data are taken from the sources described in Western (1993a).

Service and secondary industry employment of the workforce —For secondary and service industry employment, I used data from the OECD (1987). Service industry employment data were also taken from the OECD (1984). To supplement series for Ireland (1964), the Netherlands

(1969), and Sweden (1964), I used data from the International Labour Office (ILO 1966, 1971)

Left party cabinet representation —I used data from Bruno and Sachs (1985, p. 225). Data for Ireland came from Flora (1983)

Labor force size —Here, data came from Summers and Heston (1991)

Union centralization —I provided a score for New Zealand based on Cameron's (1984) coding scheme

Ghent system —The Ghent system dummy uses data reported by Rothstein (1989)

APPENDIX B

Bayesian Regression Analysis

Following Zellner (1971), for example, in the linear regression,

$$y = X\beta + \epsilon, \epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I),$$

if a prior distribution is specified for β ,

$$\beta \sim N(b_0, V_0),$$

then the posterior distribution for β is given by

$$\beta \sim N(b^*, V^*),$$

where,

$$V^* = (V_0^{-1} + s^{-2} X'X)^{-1},$$

$$b^* = V^*(V_0^{-1}b_0 + s^{-2}X'y)$$

In this application, s^2 denotes the residual variance calculated from the sample data

Pettit and Smith's (1986) Bayesian influence statistic, I_i , which expresses the influence of the i th observation on the joint posterior distribution of the regression coefficients is given by

$$I_i = \frac{u_i}{2(1 - u_i)} \left[u_i + \frac{e_i^2(2 - u_i)}{s^2(1 - u_i)} \right],$$

where

$$u = \text{diag}[s^{-2}(X'V^*X)],$$

and

$$e = y - Xb^*$$

REFERENCES

- Barnett, Vic 1982 *Comparative Statistical Inference*, 2d ed New York Wiley
- Bell, Daniel 1976 *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society A Venture in Social Forecasting* New York Basic Books
- Block, Fred 1990 *Postindustrial Possibilities A Critique of Economic Discourse* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Bluestone, Barry, and Bennet Harrison 1982 *The Deindustrialization of America Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry* New York Basic Books
- Booth, Alison 1983 "A Reconsideration of Trade Union Growth in the United Kingdom" *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 21 377-91
- Bruno, Michael, and Jeffrey Sachs 1985 *The Economics of Worldwide Stagflation* Oxford Blackwell
- Cameron, David R 1984 "Social Democracy and Labor Quiescence The Representation of Economic Interests in Advanced Capitalist Societies" Pp 143-78 in *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, edited by John H Goldthorpe Oxford Clarendon
- Central Statistics Office 1951-87 *Statistical Abstract of Ireland* Dublin Stationery Office (Published annually)
- Contini, Giovanni 1985 "Politics, Law, and Shop Floor Bargaining in Postwar Italy" Pp 192-218 in *Shop Floor Bargaining and the State Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Dahrendorf, Ralf 1959 *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Efron, Bradley 1986 "Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?" (with discussion) *American Statistician* 40 1-11
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 1990 *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Farber, Henry S 1990 "Decline of Unionization in the United States What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience" *Journal of Labor Economics* 8 S75-S105
- Flanagan, Robert J, David W Soskice, and Lloyd Ulman 1983 *Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Income Policies European Experience* Washington, D C Brookings
- Flora, Peter 1983 *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975 A Data Handbook in Two Volumes* Frankfurt Verlag
- Freeman, Richard B 1989 "On the Divergence in Unionism in Developed Countries" Working Paper no 2817 National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass
- Freeman, Richard B, and Marcus E Rebeck 1989 "Crumbling Pillar? Declining Union Density in Japan" *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies* 3 578-605
- Goldfield, Michael 1987 *The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Goldthorpe, John H 1984 "The End of Convergence Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies in Modern Western Societies" Pp 315-43 in *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations*, edited by John H Goldthorpe Oxford Clarendon
- Goodall, Colin 1990 "A Survey of Smoothing Techniques" Pp 126-76 in *Modern Methods of Data Analysis*, edited by John Fox and J Scott Long Newbury Park, Calif Sage
- Griffin, Larry J, Christopher Botsko, Ana-Maria Wahl, and Larry W Isaac 1991

- "Theoretical Generality and Case Particularity: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Trade Union Growth and Decline." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 32: 110-36
- Griffin, Larry J., Holly J. McCammon, and Christopher Botsko. 1990. "The 'Un-making' of a Movement? The Crisis of U.S. Trade Unions in Comparative Perspective." Pp. 169-74 in *Change in Societal Institutions*, edited by Maureen T. Hannan, David M. Klein, and Jennifer Glass. New York: Plenum.
- Griffin, Larry J., Philip J. O'Connell, and Holly J. McCammon. 1989. "National Variation in the Context of Struggle: Postwar Class Conflict and Market Distribution in the Capitalist Democracies." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 26: 37-68.
- Hastie, T., and R. Tibshirani. 1990. *Generalized Additive Models*. London: Chapman Hall.
- Headey, Bruce. 1970. "Trade Unions and National Wages Policy." *Journal of Politics* 32: 407-39.
- International Labour Office (ILO). 1966, 1971. *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*. Geneva: ILO.
- International Monetary Fund. 1990. *International Financial Statistics* (MRDF). Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- Kochan, Thomas A., Harry C. Katz, and Robert B. McKersie. 1986. *The Transformation of American Industrial Relations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kuwahara, Yasuo. 1987. "Japanese Industrial Relations." Pp. 211-31 in *International and Comparative Industrial Relations*, edited by Greg J. Bamber and Russell D. Lansbury. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Lange, Peter, and Maurizio Vannicelli. 1982. "Strategy under Stress: The Italian Union Movement and the Italian Crisis in Developmental Perspective." Pp. 95-206 in *Unions, Change and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy, 1945-1980*, by Peter Lange, George Ross, and Maurizio Vannicelli. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Lange, Peter, and Geoffrey Garrett. 1985. "The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980." *Journal of Politics* 47: 792-828.
- Lash, Scott, and John Urry. 1987. *The End of Organized Capitalism*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Leamer, Edward E. 1983. "Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics." *American Economic Review* 73: 31-43.
- . 1991. "A Bayesian Perspective on Inference from Macroeconomic Data." *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 93: 225-48.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Joan Gordon. 1953. "Mobility and Trade Union Membership." Pp. 491-500 in *Class Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification*, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Neumann, George, Peder J. Pedersen, and Niels Westergaard-Nielsen. 1989. *Long Run Trends in Aggregate Unionization*. Center for Labour Economics Working Paper no. 90-4. University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business.
- New Zealand Official Yearbook*. 1951-85, 1987-88. Wellington: Department of Statistics. (Published annually.)
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1963. *Manpower Statistics*. Paris: OECD.
- . 1980. *Labour Force Statistics, 1967-1978*. Paris: OECD.
- . 1987. *Labour Force Statistics, 1965-1985*. Paris: OECD.
- Pedersen, Peder J. 1990. "Arbejdsløshedsforsikring og faglig organisering, 1911-85" (Unemployment insurance and union organization, 1911-85). *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift* (National economic journal) 128: 230-46.

- Peetz, D 1990 "Declining Union Density" *Journal of Industrial Relations* 32 197-223
- Pettit, L I, and A F M Smith 1986 "Outliers and Influential Observations in Linear Models" Pp 473-94 in *Bayesian Statistics 2*, edited by J M Bernardo, M H De Groot, D V Lindley, and A F M Smith Amsterdam Elsevier Science
- Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague 1986 *Paper Stones A History of Electoral Socialism* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Rothstein, Bo 1989 "Marxism, Institutional Analysis, and Working Class Power The Swedish Case" *Politics and Society* 18 317-46
- Sheflin, Neil, Leo Troy, and C Timothy Koeller 1981 "Structural Stability in Models of American Trade Union Growth" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 96 77-88
- Statistiske Efterretninger* 1951-65 Copenhagen Danmarks Statistik
- Stephens, John D 1979 *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism* Urbana University of Illinois Press
- 1991 "Industrial Concentration, Country Size and Trade Union Membership" *American Political Science Review* 85 941-49
- Summers, Robert, and Alan Heston 1991 "The Penn World Table (Mark 5) An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-88" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106 327-68
- Troy, Leo 1986 "The Rise and Fall of American Trade Unions The Labor Movement from FDR to RR" Pp 75-109 in *Unions in Transition Entering the Second Century*, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset San Francisco Institute for Contemporary Studies
- Visser, Jelle 1989 *European Trade Unions in Figures* Boston Kluwer
- 1990 "In Search of Inclusive Unionism" *Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations*, no 18 Deventer Kluwer
- 1991 "Trends in Trade Union Membership" *OECD Employment Outlook* (September), pp 197-234 Paris OECD
- 1992a "The Strength of Union Movements in Advanced Capitalist Democracies Social and Organizational Variations" Pp 17-54 in *The Future of Labour Movements*, edited by Marino Regini Newbury Park, Calif Sage
- 1992b "Union Organisation Why Countries Differ?" Paper presented at the ninth world congress of the International Industrial Relations Association, September, Sydney
- Wallerstein, Michael 1989 "Union Organization in Advanced Industrial Democracies" *American Political Science Review* 83 481-501
- Western, Bruce 1993a "Postwar Unionization in 18 Advanced Capitalist Countries" *American Sociological Review* 58 266-82
- 1993b "Unionization Trends in Postwar Capitalism A Comparative Study of Working Class Organization" Ph D dissertation Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles
- Western, Bruce, and Simon Jackman 1994 "Bayesian Inference for Comparative Research" *American Political Science Review* 88 (in press)
- Zellner, Arnold 1971 *An Introduction to Bayesian Inference in Econometrics* New York Wiley
- 1991 "Reply to Stephens" *American Political Science Review* 85 949-53

Book Reviews

American Apartheid Segregation and the Making of the Underclass By Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993. Pp. x + 292.

Lawrence H. Fuchs
Brandeis University

This is a splendidly written, cogently argued book about a sorely neglected subject: residential segregation based on race. No one before Massey and Denton has made the case that the core issue in creating and perpetuating the underclass is residential segregation.

Massey and Denton take the reader on a brief tour of urban racial history that ends with the conclusion that the cities are generally more segregated than they were at the time of the Civil War or in the early 1900s. How that came to pass is told in its ugly detail here: the closing of hotels and roominghouses to blacks in white or mixed neighborhoods, the refusal of white businesses to serve black clients, the denial of membership to blacks on real estate boards, restrictive covenants, violent attacks on blacks who tried to move into white neighborhoods, red-lining by banks, blockbusting and screening by real estate operators, and other forms of discrimination (one study in suburban New York counted 46 separate techniques). Even some blacks developed a stake in residential segregation in the 1920s and 1930s, when black real estate tycoons, newspaper publishers, other businessmen and women, and black politicians found the black ghetto profitable.

Before the civil rights revolution, the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration provided loans to middle-class whites that encouraged their movement to the suburbs. The FHA had a particularly vicious system of rating neighborhoods that discouraged blacks from moving, since it held to a standard that properties should be occupied by the same social and racial classes. Urban renewal led to large public housing projects that became black reservations marked by extreme social isolation and an intensification of self-destructive behavior. Even the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 meant virtually nothing, since it was ineffectual in the face of long-established, powerful barriers to residential movement. So strong were these barriers that rising income seemed to have little effect on the ability of blacks to move, compared

Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from the author.

to Latinos and Hispanics (the poorest Hispanics are less segregated than the most affluent blacks in Los Angeles)

Massey and Denton show that one of the most important results of residential segregation is the weakening of the power of black citizens to make effective coalitions with others to improve their lot. Having an overwhelmingly black district may help to re-elect black aldermen, city councilmen, and state representatives and to get publicity for demagogic street politicians who thrive on the politics of victimization, it does not, however, get street lamps replaced, potholes fixed, competent teachers hired, or more patrolmen on the street. Although Massey and Denton never explicitly attack the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, which have produced electoral gerrymandering along racial lines, they make clear how deleterious it is for blacks to be ghettoized in electoral districts as a result of so-called pro-civil rights districting.

The authors explain how segregated neighborhoods lose businesses, jobs, police protection, good teachers, and community institutions, rendering so many of the inhabitants left behind angry and without hope. Residential segregation, they show us, concentrates self-destructive behavior in ways that are likely to defeat programs for empowering black neighborhoods. One obvious example: when children hear only black English, they are likely to be shattered in school by standard American English texts and tests and by teachers who confirm what they believe to be their stupidity when they fail. Of course, efforts could be made to upgrade early childhood education, create enterprise zones, initiate tax credits for new businesses and the working poor, and remake the welfare system to improve life in ghetto neighborhoods, but these authors will not hold their breath waiting for such interventions to make substantial changes in the lives of the racially residentially segregated. Only an assault on residential segregation itself will make inroads in reducing the underclass. The authors recommend eight policy changes, each of which seems plausible, to disrupt patterns of racially based residential segregation. But they leave readers with grave doubt as to whether political will and leadership can be mustered behind even a few of them. The widespread fear of blacks by whites, the unwillingness of blacks to risk their lives and families in hostile white neighborhoods, the continuing institutional practices of the real estate industry, and the self-interest of black and white politicians are obstacles that will be extremely difficult to overcome. Residential segregation itself remains the greatest obstacle to the progress of the poorest African-Americans and the single most significant force undermining domestic tranquility and unity. Although the policy recommendations presented here are thoughtful, the history of opposition to residential desegregation is bound to leave most readers depressed if not altogether despairing.

Ideal Citizens The Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement By James Max Fendrich Albany State University of New York Press, 1993 Pp xiv + 202 \$49 50 (cloth), \$16 95 (paper)

Ronnelle Paulsen
University of Texas

Ideal Citizens examines the politics and life choices of student activists involved in the early civil rights movement. The longitudinal study provides valuable information on how social movement participation changes the individual. The author counters the popularly held conception of sixties activists as throwbacks and turncoats by showing that the former student activists have consistently maintained a history of political involvement and active participation in social organizations. He argues that their ongoing activity is evidence of "good citizenship" that is unparalleled by the control groups in the study.

More specifically, this book provides the reader with information on two groups of students from Tallahassee: African-American students from Florida A&M and white students from Florida State University. The research is an investigation of political activists, student government leaders and a non-active control group. Data were collected at three points in time: the early 1960s, the early 1970s, and the late 1980s. The result is a 25-year account of political attitudes and involvement given by 88 white respondents and 114 black respondents.

The research in *Ideal Citizens* adheres to rigorous methodological standards. The long-term investment that was needed to collect the longitudinal data makes Fendrich's work a serious contribution to the field of social movements. In the book, there are some quotes from interviews, but the strength of the work turns on the quantitative analysis of the survey. Fendrich focuses on three research hypotheses dealing with (1) maturation or how participation had an impact on key life choices, (2) differences in political attitudes and participation between activists and nonactivists and between black and white activists, and (3) the presence of cohort effects that are explained using Mannheim's concept of generational units. Selected findings with regard to these hypotheses help to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the book.

First, the findings on life choices can be compared to other studies on civil rights activists. For example, McAdam's 1989 piece on Mississippi Freedom Summer (*American Sociological Review* 54: 744-60) shows that activists (black and white) tended to delay marriage and to have fewer children than nonactivists. Fendrich's sample provides for a more detailed comparison of black and white activists. The added specification shows similar patterns for the white respondents, but the black activists married and started having children at an earlier age. Black activists were also more likely to be divorced by the final wave of the Fendrich data.

The added specification of these data is also helpful in dispelling the myth that most activists during the 1960s were from the middle class. Most of the African-American activists in this research were from working-class backgrounds. This is contrary to the findings of studies like Orum's 1973 work, *Black Students in Protest* (ASA Rose Monograph Series). One of the strengths of *Ideal Citizens* is the way the author facilitates comparisons by supporting or contradicting other studies.

Second, the findings on political attitudes and behavior also facilitate comparisons. The measures of political attitudes include efficacy, a scale of radicalism versus conservatism, a measure of party identification (including socialism) for whites, and a measure of nationalism (including separatism) for blacks. With respect to nationalism, Fendrich finds "the most politically active students were the most likely to identify as nationalist or separatist" (p. 63) in the 1970s. This finding is not unlike the conclusions drawn by Gurin and Epps (*Black Consciousness, Identity and Achievement* [New York: Wiley, 1975]). Yet, in the 1980s the importance of nationalist ideology seemed to shift to an emphasis on ethnic identity that is "more similar to those [the identities] of Jews, Italians, and Irish Americans than to those of Black Muslims" (p. 75). The author argues that this creates a "new profile" for the maturing black activist that is not reflected in past research.

The political participation of respondents was measured using items on institutionalized as well as noninstitutionalized politics. The measures mirror those used by Jennings and Niemi (*Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981]) but the sampling in the Fendrich data makes the black/white comparisons much more interesting. In the 1970s, "African Americans had higher levels of organizational involvement, [but] whites had a history of more intense political activity [radical and protest behavior]" (p. 124). By the 1980s, the political behavior of both groups of activists was very similar and both groups were still "progressive" and "oppositional" in their politics.

The third and final hypothesis considers Mannheim's "generational unit" as an explanation for the continued good citizenship (i.e., political participation) of the activists. The weakness of this book is the application of the "generational unit" to the findings and the underdeveloped inclusion of the "new class" concept (p. 136) within this argument. While the data do allow for an intragenerational comparison of units (the activists, student leaders, and nonactives), they do not allow for a fair comparison to other generations. The author does not have enough evidence to make such sweeping conclusions about generational effects.

An alternative explanation of the differences experienced by sixties activists is suggested at the book's conclusion, when the author states, "Political identities and commitments originate in collective political experiences, not the other way around. The problem is not the political apathy of individuals but the poverty of collective opportunities to

act democratically to achieve collective goals" (p. 144). The author has clearly shown that the lives of the activists changed, they stopped being apathetic, due to their early experiences. If only the nonactive group of students had come in contact with the same opportunities and participated in similar political activities while they were in school, they too might be "good citizens"—or at least better citizens. Some mention of the importance of networks should be included in the discussion at the book's conclusion, but it is not. However, this omission should not deter anyone from reading *Ideal Citizens*. This book is a solid contribution to our knowledge of social movements, particularly, the legacy of the civil rights movement.

Immigrants and the American City. By Thomas Muller. New York: New York University Press, 1993. Pp. ix + 372. \$30.00.

Douglas S. Massey
University of Chicago

Thomas Muller argues that immigration is crucial to the economic health of American cities. Before 1914, he argues, cities prospered because large numbers of immigrants provided an inexpensive labor force that fueled economic growth and promoted capital accumulation. The cutoff of immigration after 1914 and the imposition of restrictive quotas in the 1920s undermined this growth and helped trigger the Great Depression of the 1930s. Low levels of immigration from 1940 to 1965 led to sustained economic decline in older cities, but the elimination of quotas and the revival of immigration after 1965 enabled them to recover, at least partially.

After outlining the "unending debate" on U.S. immigration in chapter 2, Muller constructs his argument in chapters 3 and 4, by drawing on the classic works of economic history and selected contemporary studies. As he notes, there is widespread agreement that the United States benefits from immigration in the aggregate. The controversy is about exactly who wins and who loses as a result of immigration, and by how much. The ensuing chapters evaluate such issues, paying particular attention to the effect of immigration on the status and well-being of blacks.

Muller concludes that Americans, whatever their socioeconomic, regional, or racial background, have little to fear from immigration, and that fears of cultural fragmentation are overblown. He cites a variety of facts inconsistent with the view that immigration harms native workers or places undue burdens on American taxpayers, and without denying the political tensions caused by immigration, he finds little evidence of linguistic or cultural balkanization. On the whole, he argues that immigrants constitute an "economic windfall" for the nation's cities.

An attractive feature of the book is its attempt to set immigration within a larger macroeconomic context. Although this goal was once at

the core of economics, it has been shunted aside in recent years by micro-level theorizing and research. It has been a long time since we have had a macroeconomic account of immigration of the quality, scope, and impact of those provided by Simon Kuznets or Brinley Thomas. *Immigrants and the American City* points us in the right direction, however, it falls short of the standard set by these great economists of the past.

Macro-level empirical data are presented in the book, but they are illustrative rather than analytic. Generally the evidence consists of simple comparisons between metropolitan areas that receive many immigrants and those that do not. Simple regressions are at times estimated to assess the effect of immigration on native economic status. These analyses are unlikely to impress anyone familiar with modern econometric methods. What is needed is for someone to carry forward the work of Kuznets and Thomas using modern statistical methods and data, a task this book does not accomplish.

Although Muller's propositions are plausible and, in my view, largely correct, they are poorly connected to the contemporary research literature on immigration. Many controversial statements are made without documentation. On page 51, for example, Muller states that "the termination of the [Bracero] program had little impact on the demand for workers, although wages did rise," but no study is cited to support this assertion. Likewise, on page 119 he states that "contrary to common perceptions, the economic behavior of undocumented aliens in major cities does not differ from that of legal entrants," but the author again cites no study to buttress this view.

These are not isolated examples. For one familiar with immigration research, it is remarkable how many studies supporting the book's main propositions have been overlooked. In his analysis of the effect of immigration on native economic status, for example, Muller does not cite the work of George Borjas, the leading economist in the area (he only makes passing reference to Borjas's recent book, written for a popular audience), and in considering immigrant entrepreneurs and ethnic enclaves, Muller never mentions the seminal work of Alejandro Portes.

In explaining the decline of cities after 1950, moreover, Muller underestimates the effect of white racism, and in his account of the lagging performance of blacks relative to immigrants, he repeats the same error and gives insufficient weight to the fact that immigrants are highly selected on the basis of human capital. Muller slides all too readily into cultural explanations for black disadvantage. "Black society did not fare as well, in part because it lacked the ingredients that launched many immigrants into the American mainstream" (p. 107). Such invidious comparisons only fuel black resentment toward immigrants.

Although Thomas Muller's book makes an important case for the contribution of immigrants to the health and prosperity of American cities, therefore, it does not adequately support this case either by grounding it in the contemporary empirical literature or by carrying out methodologically sound original research. As a result, we still await the definitive

macroeconomic account of modern immigration Brinley Thomas and Simon Kuznets, where are you?

Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modern Italy By Robert D. Putnam, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1993 Pp ix+258 \$24.95

Marco Maraffi
University of Milan

This is a challenging and ambitious book, and one that is bound to be controversial. Prima facie, it appears as a case study. How may we explain the difference in performance of regional governments in Italy? In fact, though starting off from such a specific problem, the book addresses much broader questions concerning representative institutions, the origins and conditions of effective government, the role of social relationships in shaping political behavior, and much more. The lessons that Putnam draws from his case study go far beyond Italy and suggest important implications for the development of democracy in the world. This is not a book for area specialists and deserves to be widely read and discussed by sociologists and political scientists alike.

The book brings together the results of more than two decades of empirical research on the Italian regions by Putnam and his collaborators. The original idea that sparked Putnam's interest is fairly straightforward. In 1970 an entirely new set of 15 regional governments were established in Italy, fulfilling a long-forgotten constitutional provision. Here was an excellent opportunity for a quasi-experimental study of the dynamics and ecology of institutional development and performance: the new institutions in fact had formally identical structures and mandates, while their social, economic, cultural, and political settings differed widely. To use the authors' imagery: How would the same plant develop in such diverse soils?

The performance of the different regions is appraised by a comparative evaluation of their policy processes, policy pronouncements, and policy implementation. On the basis of a composite index of performance (made up of 12 indicators of institutional success and failure), Italy's regions show remarkable differences in institutional performance, which remain stable over time. The most important result of this comparative analysis is, not unexpectedly, the confirmation that central and northern regions are more successful than their counterparts in the south.

How is this stark contrast to be explained? Established theory and research link effective and stable democracy to socioeconomic modernization. This generalization holds in the case under scrutiny as well: each region's institutional performance is highly correlated with its degree of social and economic development. Yet, socioeconomic modernity cannot

explain the marked interregional variations in performance *within* the country's developed northern and central regions and less developed south. At this point a wholly different explanatory variable is introduced "civic-ness." With Tocqueville in mind, and drawing on the republican philosophical tradition, the authors describe a "civic community" as one characterized by active participation in public affairs, vigorous associational life, horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, and mutual trust. The degree of civicness of each of Italy's regions (measured on the basis of four indicators, again contained in a composite index) appears to differ widely. What is crucial is that "civic" regions overlap almost perfectly with high-performance ones. Other variables (social stability, education, urbanism, political fragmentation, social conflict, etc.) do not add anything to the explanation of why some governments work and others do not. Civicness is the most important factor in explaining good government. Furthermore, the civic traditions, or the lack thereof, of the Italian regions can be traced back to the Middle Ages and the different patterns of social relationships that crystallized over this period (c. 1100). Vertical and hierarchical bonds of dependency and exploitation were forged in the South, while horizontal and cooperative bonds of mutual solidarity developed in the center and the north. Such contrasting traditions of social relationships were carried over to contemporary Italy through nine centuries of history and make themselves felt to this very day in the operation of regional institutions.

The general and far-reaching conclusion that Putnam draws from his empirical research is that social trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement and successful cooperation—what he terms "social capital"—are crucial factors in making democracy work (and in fostering economic prosperity, too).

The argument developed in the book is highly sophisticated and complex, both theoretically and empirically. A short review cannot possibly do it justice. The book can, and will, be criticized on a number of counts. I am not sure that the evidence upon which the argument is built and the theory is tested is appropriate (after all, Italy's regions are fairly weak institutions, not comparable with, say, the American states), objections can be raised to the way key concepts (performance, civicness) are operationalized, correlations are not causal explanations, and the reproduction over long periods of time of distinctive patterns of behavior is not adequately substantiated. Nonetheless, the book makes, in a lucid and elegant manner, a number of very important points and represents a significant advance in our understanding of the thorny issue of the interplay between "culture" and "structure" in social and political life. The authors themselves readily admit that their work cannot be conclusive, but they have traveled a good distance.

Social Order and Political Change Constitutional Governments among the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek By Duane Champagne Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press, 1992 Pp 317

Alfred Darnell

Vanderbilt University

Duane Champagne has written an interesting historical study of the sociopolitical conditions that contributed to different rates of formation of constitutional governments among American Indians, an underutilized population for sociological research and theorizing. Specifically, he examines the historical events in North America between the mid-1700s and late 1800s in order to explain why the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek formed constitutional governments at different times in spite of strong similarities among the societies. Champagne aspires to contribute to a greater understanding of "the conditions under which democratic governments can be formed, and under what conditions [they] become stable or institutionalized" (p. 1). The reader acquires an understanding of the processes that influenced the destinies of the four southeastern societies, but the generalizability of their experiences to other struggling democratic movements is less precisely made.

Champagne draws on extensive historical evidence in his analysis, which is designed around a Parsonian structural-functionalist model. The study identifies "differentiation within the polity and relations between the polity and other major spheres of society—culture, social solidarity, and economy" (p. 7). Each sphere corresponds to the A-G-I-L scheme: economy = adaptation, polity = goal attainment, social solidarity = integration, and culture = latent pattern maintenance. Using this format, Champagne assesses the variable rates of social-political differentiation and different normative infrastructures of each society.

To make his case, Champagne first establishes the social and historical conditions that are uniform and constant across the four societies in order to dismiss them as explanations of the variance in forming constitutional governments. He emphasizes similarities in their cultural differentiation and religious rationalization, overall worldviews, basic values, political solidarity and cultures, and economic organizations. He also shows that each community experienced similar influences from forces external to the communities. They fall into three broad categories: (1) an evolving world economy that imposed demands on indigenous economies to supply furs to a world market, (2) the shifting geopolitical conflicts among the British, the French, the Spanish, and an emerging United States during the 18th and 19th centuries that made pawns of American Indians, and (3) competition between federal and state governments to control the territories of the four societies once the United States became the dominant hegemonic force in the 19th century that resulted in the Indians' expulsion from their native lands. Champagne argues that these sources of change cannot account for different rates of political development because they do not deviate across the populations.

The Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek responded differently to the same pressures. The Cherokee transformed their political structure, while the Creek resisted changes in traditional political structure while trying to contend with changes originating from the outside. The responses of the Choctaw and Chickasaw fall between these extremes.

Champagne explains this variance as a product of the different ways in which kinship structures and religious institutions were differentiated from their respective political institutions. He holds that the Cherokee possessed a greater degree of differentiation of political institutions from cultural institutions than the other three societies, this differentiation accounts for the greater adaptability of Cherokee political and social orders to a constitutional form of government. The Creek, in contrast, were the least differentiated and possessed a political structure much more integrated with kinship and religious structures than the other three societies. The dependence of Creek political structures on these less malleable institutions inhibited their progress toward democratic and organizational characteristics necessary for the formation of constitutional governments.

Champagne's rigid structural-functionalist analysis tends to ignore the voice of indigenous peoples and contributes to problems with the way he conceptualizes culture. Culture functions on two levels for Champagne as an autonomous system commensurate with latent pattern maintenance and as part of an integrative dimension that interacts with the polity. In relation to the former, Champagne argues that the cultures of the four southeastern societies are essentially the same. However, when the four societies are examined with respect to the polity and culture's differentiation from political processes, they are considered different from one another. Champagne treats the polity as a distinct unit of analysis that functions independently of culture. This enables him to treat the cultures as equivalent but different when they interact with their respective indigenous political structures. Champagne manages this sleight of hand by claiming kinship structures and religion are not representative of cultural institutions. It seems more appropriate to view political structures as partial expressions of cultural perceptions in which decisions are made and acted upon in the political arena according to "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols" (see C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* [New York: Basic Books, 1973], p. 89). Champagne's failure to acknowledge that culture is represented in most sociopolitical institutions appears to be due to the necessity of placing social relations firmly within one of Parsons' four cells.

Champagne wants to make a contribution to understanding the evolution of democratic constitutional governments generally. Unfortunately, he does not explicitly address this theme and the analysis is confined to the four societies. It is left to the reader to draw any generalizations. In spite of these criticisms, Champagne has written a fascinating sociopolitical history of the four southeastern societies. The book is worth reading.

for its wealth of comparative insights and contribution to a growing, theoretically informed literature on the experiences of American Indians

Social Policy in a Changing Europe Edited by Zsuzsa Ferge and Jon Eivind Kolberg Boulder, Colo Westview Press, 1992 Pp vii + 318

Jill S Quadagno
Florida State University

Like many edited volumes, *Social Policy in a Changing Europe* is the final product of an academic conference What makes this book distinctive, however, are the extraordinary events that intervened between the planning of the conference and the final meeting—nothing less than the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe

When the editors, Zsuzsa Ferge and Jon Eivind Kolberg, first proposed the conference early in 1989 (in itself a momentous undertaking as the first East-West dialogue on the welfare state), they asked participants to compare the social policies of planned and market societies and to discuss what the two systems might learn from one another In March 1990, when the conference was held, mutual learning had seemingly become subordinated to more pressing objectives According to Ferge and Kolberg, the fledgling democracies now had “to learn the language of the market and of political democracy” (p 1)

Judging from the papers, scholars from the former socialist countries were eager to learn these lessons Perhaps too eager, for as John Myles and Robert J Brym warn, notions of democracy based simply on limiting the role of the state provide an inadequate model for economic and social renewal One need only recall, as Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward remind us, how in the 1980s, just such an ideology of limiting big government justified massive cuts in the American welfare state These lessons have already come to fruition in Hungary, where the welcome relief from state tyranny and centralized planning has led to the closing of hundreds of day care centers and the privatization of many schools

A common theme among the Western social scientists in the book is that now that systems of social protection against illness and old age have been established, the major challenge facing welfare states of postindustrial economies is designing social programs that reduce unemployment and create jobs The intriguing articles by Jon Kolberg and Hannu Uusitalo, by Jean-Pierre Jallade, and by Adrian Sinfield consider employment policy the core issue for welfare states of the late 20th century

This issue is certainly of concern to the former socialist regimes, which all face high unemployment Yet as Vladimir Shubkin explains, for a country like Russia that, for the first time in its history, is attempting to institute free labor markets even while dismantling its former programs of income security, the Western trajectory seems largely irrelevant In

Western social theory, the welfare state represents a compromise between politics and markets. It is created through processes of democratic politics supported by strong working-class movements and sustained within a capitalist economy with free labor markets. These conditions exist minimally in the new democracies, which must first establish free and democratic political systems while maintaining or creating income security programs among a people with a strong mistrust of central government planning of any sort. In the transition to a market economy, most of the east Europeans seem willing to accept the inevitable inequality that accompanies a capitalist economy. But can they also accept the central planning required to create welfare states to buffer those market forces when distrust of government authority runs so high? Can they understand, let alone accept, a benign role for the state? The answer to these questions in Poland, as Lena Kolarska-Bobinska explains, is no. Rather, the state must withdraw from its organizing role to be replaced by self-organizing movements from civil society.

Yet Western Europe is moving in the opposite direction. Articles by Stephan Liebfried and Kare Hagen analyze the potential for integrated social policy across the European economic community. Such a plan, with its implications for a large, centralized political authority, not surprisingly, is anathema to east Europeans so recently liberated from the crushing weight of Soviet rule. Ironically, thus, as Western Europe embarks on a search for greater unity and centralization, Eastern Europe searches for a return to civil society.

In the conference devoted to dialogue between East and West, it is easy to forget that the former socialist nations are as diverse as the present capitalist democracies. As Zsuzsa Ferge, Jan Hartl and Jiri Vecernik explain, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had market economies and fledgling welfare states before the communist takeovers, whereas Russia had neither in this century. In Yugoslavia ethnic conflict has eradicated all remnants of the welfare state, there is nothing left to save.

Of course, this volume is beset by the typical problems in edited books of unevenness of quality and occasional lack of focus. But such issues detract little from the momentous contribution of an intellectual event literally on the cusp of historical change.

Creating Social Democracy: A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden. Edited by Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin, and Klas Åmark. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. Pp. xxix + 500.

John D. Stephens
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

This edited volume, a translation of a 1988 volume published in Swedish, was commissioned by the Swedish Research Council of the Labor Move-

ment Archives and Library to commemorate the 100th anniversary in 1989 of the founding of the Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party, the ruling party in Sweden from 1932 to 1976 and 1982 to 1991. Arguably, the Swedish Social Democrats have been the most successful political party in any modern democracy measured simply by their length of stay in office. More important, because of Social Democratic political dominance, contemporary Swedish society has often stood as a testament to the achievements, and limitations, of Social Democratic reformism. This volume is an important contribution to the literature on this remarkable party and its reform efforts. The editors have assembled an impressive group of essays covering every aspect of the development of Swedish Social Democracy. The essays cover social policy, union-party relations, party organization, economic policy, agricultural policy, family policy, housing policy, local politics, educational policy, foreign policy, defense policy, and ideology. Each essay surveys the historical development of Social Democratic policy (or organization, union-party relations, etc.), in most cases extending back to or before the founding of the party in 1889. This English edition includes a brief overview of the history of Swedish Social Democracy in order to orient readers unfamiliar with Swedish history and an afterword covering the dramatic events since 1988.

With the exceptions of Goran Therborn, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, and Tim Tilton, the authors are not internationally recognized scholars, though social scientists with more than a passing interest in Sweden will certainly be familiar with the work of Villy Bergstrom and Clas-Erik Odhner, both labor movement economists. However, the remaining authors, primarily historians, have published extensively in Swedish on the topics of their contributions. While all of the authors are sympathetic to Social Democracy, the essays are not uncritical celebrations of Social Democratic achievements. For instance, though he has moved closer to Social Democracy in the last decade, Therborn has been a left critic of Social Democracy ever since the publication of his first book in the early sixties, which was considered a founding tract of the Swedish New Left.

It is impossible to survey the findings and insights of all 16 essays in this short review. Let me just mention a few which I found most interesting. In his essay on party program and economic policy, Bergstrom points out that almost all of the major policies of postwar Social Democracy were contained in the 1944 document, the *Post War Program of the Labor Movement*, and, moreover, most of the important points of the program, with the exception of the statist economic planning, sooner or later were implemented. Discussing the development of family policy, Ohlander shows that the Social Democratic women's organization always argued for family policy reforms at least in part from the standpoint of promoting gender equality, but that only recently did this become the prime motivator of party policy. Child allowances were originally primarily an instrument of population policy and the expansion of child care was motivated by labor supply concerns. Therborn argues that Social Democratic success was based on a fortuitous combination of favorable conditions, skill-

ful leadership, and luck. He emphasizes the late-19th-century strength of Swedish popular movements as one root of the strength of the labor movement in the 20th century. This in turn is based, in part, on the self-organization of the Swedish countryside. Esping-Andersen links the success of Social Democratic welfare state policy to the party's ability to use it as an instrument to pursue three goals: social equality, economic efficiency, and political power. That is, in addition to overt policy goals, reforms were generally also the instrument of the building of class coalition support bases. In his interesting essay on union-party relations, Åmark documents how union resistance to government-imposed income policy led directly to the Rehn-Meidner model of wage policy, macroeconomic policy, and labor market policy.

The main weaknesses of the book are, in a sense, due to its strengths. The historical sweep imposed on the authors means that each period is covered in frustrating (at least for the specialist) brevity. The authors rely heavily on archival work (and not, for example, interviews). Since confidential material, such as party board minutes, from the last 20 years has not been made public, the authors typically have less new to add for this period. For instance, relations between the unions and the party (particularly the finance ministry) were particularly tense during the Social Democrats' last period in government, and the precise source of this tension is the subject of some debate. The essay on this topic throws no new light on the subject. Moreover, since it was written in 1988, it cannot reflect the most important public document on this subject, the 1991 memoirs of Kjell-Olof Feldt, the finance minister during most of this period. Incidentally, though the afterword briefly covers the period since 1988 in which the Social Democrats declined drastically in the polls and then suffered their worst defeat since 1928 in the 1991 election, the individual essays were not revised in the light of these events. In some cases, this would significantly change the analysis of the most recent period. However, these drawbacks are minor, and this volume will be a valuable addition to the libraries of all scholars with an interest in European Social Democracy and Scandinavia.

Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation. By John Borneman. Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology, edited by E. Gellner et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv + 386.

Daniel S. Mattern
German Historical Institute

The city of Berlin has been viewed as a place always in the making but perhaps never to be. In *Belonging in the Two Berlins*, John Borneman continues this notion of Berlin's dynamic incompleteness. Borneman analyzes the remaking of Berlin—or, more accurately, the *two* Berlins—

after the end of World War II, as this process reflected the larger patterns of societal and state reconstructions in West and East Germany (i.e., in the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG] and in the German Democratic Republic [GDR]). Within the contexts of the current remaking of Berlin, now reunited and reappointed as the capital of a new/old state and the contemporary social and scholarly debate over the history and meaning of the Cold War, this book is timely and necessary.

Borneman's central concern is the relation of the state to everyday life (p. 18). The author has selected Berlin as the locus of this study because he believes it is here that one can see the problem manifestly. At such "border sites" as Berlin, the state is forced to articulate itself most strongly and most clearly, yet these are also places where national boundaries are most ambiguous (p. 18). Borneman asserts that in places like Berlin, states need to do their best "nation-building work" because there citizens find it easiest to challenge and resist the official state narrative. The choice of Berlin also reflects the author's intense interest in this place and these people, an interest that enlivens and personalizes this otherwise heady scholarly investigation.

According to Borneman, it was kinship that constituted the building blocks for the respective re-constructions of "nationness" in both the FRG and the GDR. Borneman positions the legal and categorical/nominal history of kinship in the two Berlins at the center of his discussion. The author's cogent analysis of laws pertaining to the construction of kinship patterns is complemented by his impressive ethnographic research, conducted between 1986 and 1989, which forms the most readable and fascinating part of the book. Borneman's conclusions show that the two Germanies developed as mirror-images of each other. In the 1950s West Germany aimed to restore patriarchal kinship patterns, whereas East Germany attempted to realize socialist ideals of equality. By the 1980s, the two societies had switched places: younger East Germans embraced sentimental relationships, younger West Germans eschewed sentimentality in favor of more practical arrangements.

On the whole, this study is one of the most interesting, provocative, and theoretically exciting examinations of post-World War II Germany to emerge since unification in 1990. Many recent books detail the political process of German unification and analyze the resulting problems, but Borneman, by examining the differences between these two societies before 1989, helps us understand the current malaise in Germany.

Borneman's argument that the FRG and the GDR developed into two distinct "nations" is intriguing but raises some cautionary flags. Borneman argues that building a nation "involves the (re)creation of belonging patterns that form the basis for feeling *zu Hause*, at home, in one place and not another" (p. 287). That seems reasonable as far as it goes. But the author has little to say about cultural commonalities (e.g., language) and shared historical experiences in the broader sense. Borneman's concentration on legal framing devices or state strategies—and the types of everyday resistance/accommodation different genera-

tions in the two Berlins engaged in—yields considerable insight. But ultimately, at least to this reader, the evidence seems incongruous with the ambitious claims made on its behalf.

The author's uniting of Cold War politics, state-building legitimization, and narrative tactics of East and West Berliners over the course of four decades contributes greatly to our understanding of the history of modern states and societies. His analysis of the dialectics of development between the Germanies over time is especially revealing, each society was shaped in no small measure by the decisions, experiences, and internal dynamics of its opposite across the great fault between East and West. But it is precisely in the context of the Cold War that one might argue for convergence rather than divergence of the two Germanies. Just as the FRG and the GDR pursued strategies of state building that produced distinctive internal narratives, they also experienced the same metanarrative in the form of the Cold War and late 20th-century economic development.

Some errors of fact and statements of dubious validity mar what is otherwise an original and creative study. Moreover, the excessive use of jargon and neologisms distract and at times interfere with the clear presentation of the author's argument. Historians might be troubled by the lack of documentation, but this should not prevent them from finding much useful information and food for thought in this book. Social scientists in all fields, especially those who work on Central Europe, will find this book stimulating. Finally, I hope I do not seem to be limiting this book by recommending it to teachers of *graduate* courses in view of its sophisticated use of theory. Borneman's theoretical expeditions aid our discovery of new ways of seeing what is unusual and perhaps unique about Berlin.

The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics, and Finance during the Dutch Revolt. By Marjolein C. 't Hart. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 238.

Bruce G. Carruthers

Northwestern University

The early modern Dutch Republic was a source of wondrous curiosity to 17th-century commentators, and it is today an important puzzle for sociological theorizing on the development of the nation-state. How could such a small country, with so few people and almost no natural resources, be so wealthy and powerful? The Dutch Republic (also called the United Provinces) was hobbled by a federated structure that made political decision making a laborious and frequently indecisive process, and it possessed a state that was anything but autonomous; nevertheless, the republic achieved the status of a great power during the 17th century. *The Making of a Bourgeois State* is a carefully researched, insightful analysis of this national outlier, written by a sociologically minded historian who

uses her detailed archival investigations to engage theories of state formation

t Hart follows Joseph Schumpeter in viewing tax structures as symptomatic of the political organization of the state. She understands that state fiscal structures underpinned military strength, and that no state could survive the rigors of early modern conflict without enough money. Western Europe in the 17th century was an inhospitable environment for political organizations that could not effectively mobilize resources. Whether or not war was hell, it was always expensive.

t Hart traces the development of the Dutch state over 80 years of warfare during which the Dutch fought against their Spanish overlords (1568–1648). How did the Dutch state manage to pay for its large army and navy? Dutch success in this regard was in marked contrast to their adversaries, the Spaniards, who underwent several national bankruptcies during the same period. There were three major options. The first involved the exploitation of “central means” revenue sources that were already directly controlled by the state (e.g., minting fees, tolls, feudal rights, customs revenues, state domains). Exploitation of these sources preserved and could even enhance state autonomy, and so this was the preferred option of state rulers. t Hart shows that these central means were difficult to exploit or expand, so the Dutch state had to look to the other strategies for its fiscal redemption.

The second option involved imposing higher taxes. In the early modern era, this could not be done unilaterally; the state was required to make accommodations with the local rulers and elites who performed the actual business of assessment and collection. The national government depended on lower levels of government to collect tax revenues. In the Dutch case, these were the seven independent provinces that together constituted the United Provinces. Political federalism and fiscal federalism went hand in hand.

The Dutch Republic showed a marked preference for indirect over direct taxes. Thus, excise taxes were a more important source of revenue than, for example, property taxes. One advantage of indirect taxation is that the severity of taxes is less visible. Collection is done by shopkeepers and merchants rather than government tax collectors. By the standards of the day, Dutch citizens carried an enormous tax burden and foreigners were perpetually amazed at the size and variety of Dutch excises.

No matter how effective the tax system was, revenues simply could not match war-driven expenditures. This set the stage for the third option, long-term borrowing. The successful use of this technique distinguished the Dutch Republic from other 17th-century European countries. No other government could borrow as much money as cheaply as the Dutch, and through this measure the burden of war was shifted into the future. Yet long-term debt was as much a political measure as a financial one. Through it, a community of interests was constructed between the government debtor and its creditors, which included many members of the urban commercial classes.

These latter two strategies saved the Dutch, and the success of both was enhanced by the robust and highly commercialized nature of the Dutch economy. As countries like England emulated Dutch public finance, the inherent limitations of a small domestic population and natural resource base became more telling, but for a time, the United Provinces were the envy of Europe.

The Dutch Republic didn't fit the familiar war-making, state-building pattern of so many other countries. It successfully fought wars, but no central state apparatus was constructed. Rather, what emerged was a truly bourgeois state: a decentralized, federated structure, run by and indebted to members of the bourgeoisie, with many "privatized" public functions (the most notable being the collection of many taxes by tax farms rather than government officials). In her wildest political dreams, Margaret Thatcher could hardly have devised a more capitalist state.

While this book is a study of a single case, with occasional sideward glances at other countries, 't Hart has drawn out the more general implications of her study. In stressing the political significance of long-term debt, she raises a very important issue, but her treatment only whetted my appetite for more. I look forward to her next offering, and trust that it will be equally delectable.

Talcott Parsons on National Socialism Edited by Uta Gerhardt New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993. Pp. vii + 357.

Mike Forrest Keen

Indiana University at South Bend

For many sociologists, Talcott Parsons has come to be known as a verbose and jargonistic scholar lost in the abstraction of grand theory. However, a much different picture emerges in *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism*. Drawing from unpublished manuscripts discovered in the Harvard Archives, as well as a number of previously published works, editor Uta Gerhardt has assembled a collection of articles, memoranda, newspaper columns, and radio broadcasts that chronicle Parsons's analysis and response to fascism and its most virulent manifestation, National Socialism. Through these writings, and Gerhardt's detailed bibliographic and social historical introduction, we see Parsons the political activist, applied social analyst, and practical policy advisor pursuing his ideas with remarkable clarity and forcefulness.

Eschewing the isolationism of his time, Parsons was one of the first in the United States to publicly denounce the Nazi movement and call for active and unconditional opposition to it. In his estimation, National Socialism posed a formidable threat to many of the institutional foundations of Western civilization. It constituted a direct attack on the fundamental values of rationality, ethical universalism, and the functional specificity of roles, status, and authority upon which these foundations

rest, in effect, the Nazis constituted an attack upon the touchstones of modernity. However, this was not an attack directed from without, but rather bred from within.

Drawing heavily upon his Weberian roots, Parsons felt that fascism was deeply rooted in the structure of Western society and the internal strains and conflicts that resulted from the processes of rationalization that characterize it. These developments within Western society had led to the social and economic dislocation and undermining of established cultural traditions among large segments of the population. The ensuing social disorganization generated economic and psychological insecurity, which in turn led to widespread anxiety that manifested itself in free-floating aggression and a tendency to unstable emotionalism and overreaction. This process of modernization, unevenly articulated throughout the social structure, divides the population into those elements that tend toward more rationalistic or "progressive" attitudes, and those that tend to hold on to more traditional or "backward" attitudes. The former exhibit an inclination to compulsive "debunking," further exacerbating the insecurity and proclivity of the latter to a "fundamentalist" reaction and providing fertile ground for the emergence of fascism.

While Parsons saw fascism as a powerful social movement incorporating a fundamentalist revolt against the rationalization of the Western world, several additional sociological factors peculiar to German society and its history had to be taken into account to explain the rise of Nazism. Because of its more rapid industrialization, the anomic impact of modernization was more intense in Germany than in other Western European nations. Other factors included Prussian militarism and the Junker landed nobility that maintained it, a highly developed patriarchal authoritarianism and bureaucratic formalism, and the prominence of romanticism in the German character along with a highly idealized sense of the nation (*Volksgeist*). Coupled with the humiliating defeat of World War I, these factors opened the door to the Nazi movement's mobilization of German romantic sentiments of aggressive nationalism through its promise of national restoration and glory embodied in the charismatic personage of Hitler, against foes both within and without. The Jews offered a convenient target as scapegoat, especially given the unique position of religion within their community, which kept them from becoming fully assimilated into the national culture, and their concentration in urban and professional enclaves, which had been highly rationalized.

Toward the end of the war, Parsons turned his attention to the problem of German reconstruction and reintegration into the community of nations. He vehemently opposed demands for German deindustrialization and based his own policy recommendations on his sociological analyses. Once the Nazis were removed, the allies should promote social, political, and economic stability that would allow the German people the maximum security, status, and expectation. In addition, the Junker class should be broken up, but the imposition of an un-German or unfair

regime should be avoided so as to allow for the neutralization and rechanneling of Germany's romanticism and aggressive nationalism

Written between 1938 and 1947, and the publication of *The Structure of Social Action* and *The Social System*, the writings collected here offer a unique glimpse into the practical implications, implicit values, and political orientation of Parsons's developing functionalist analysis of society and its social systems. In them, Parsons addresses some of the most vexing challenges of modernity, many of which continue to plague us today. The continuing horror of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the resurgence of nationalistic and fundamentalist intolerance throughout Europe and the United States gives these writings an unexpected and poignantly contemporary significance, though a critical evaluation of the adequacy of Parsons's arguments remains to be done.

Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities By Anthony Oberschall
New Brunswick, N J: Transaction Publishers, 1993. Pp 402. \$39.95

Pamela Oliver
University of Wisconsin

Anthony Oberschall has made great contributions to our understanding of social movements in his 25 years of writing on the subject. One of the leaders of the shift to the resource mobilization paradigm in the early 1970s, his 1973 *Social Conflicts and Social Movements* is one of the classics in the field and is still worth reading. Although now the target of the next generation of paradigm revolutionists, resource mobilization remains important for theorizing social movements from the standpoint of movement activists, thus stressing the rationality of movement action and the continuity of protests and movements with "normal" politics. The distinctive contributions of Oberschall's work are his explicit use of rationalist cost-benefit models of individual choice and the way he embeds mobilization in the underlying structures of social conflict and politics. He was also one of the first theorists to critique "mass society" theory and to stress the importance of social networks, prior organization, and "block recruitment."

Social Movements is a collection of 13 essays written between 1968 and 1992. All but five have been published elsewhere, mostly before 1980, and are printed as originally written except for an occasional footnote or introductory sentence.

Attempts have been made to make the book useful as a text. A new introductory chapter provides a good overview of the field of social movements from a rationalist perspective, in which collective action is treated as purposive. This chapter reviews the highlights of the recent empirical

literature and sensibly engages some of the critiques of the rationalist perspective, although it provides no treatment of "constructionist" lines of work on their own terms. It is clearly written and would make an excellent introduction for students. Several of the chapters are literature reviews that would similarly serve textlike purposes: "Theories of Social Conflict," "Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil," "Group Violence." Their weakness is that they have not been updated since their original publication in 1978, 1969, and 1970, respectively.

The empirical case-based chapters treat a wide range of phenomena. Two chapters provide examples of Oberschall's cost-benefit analyses, one of a particular protest event ("Loosely Structured Collective Conflict") and the other of "Protracted Conflict" (e.g., Northern Ireland). In each case, the theoretical framework and empirical data work together to teach the reader how to think about collective action. Four chapters synthesize a wide range of empirical sources to answer major questions about key historical events, including the diffusion of the 1960 sit-ins, the 1965 Los Angeles riot, the decline of the 1960s movements, and the international protest wave of 1968. Although generally presupposing that protest is rational, the task of these chapters is not to beat a theoretical drum, but to compile and weigh evidence about just how things worked in each case.

Two of the new chapters provide a "rationalist" treatment of culture, a treatment I found to be a useful addition to the literature, even though they ignore recent discussions of culture. Oberschall takes people's beliefs seriously and assumes they really believe what they say they believe. He then argues that, given their beliefs, their actions are rational. This line of argument is rather plausibly applied to European witch trials and the Religious Right. According to Oberschall, the witch craze in Europe occurs when elites genuinely believe in an active devil and demonic forces, before and after this period, popular folk beliefs still encompass witchcraft, but the authorities refuse to sanction these beliefs in legal proceedings. Oberschall's analysis of North Carolina's Religious Right is grounded in extensive fieldwork. He locates the group as the extreme wing of deeply rooted conservative Protestantism. He argues that conservative Protestantism is an internally consistent belief system from which conservative positions on "cultural" issues logically follow, and that the organizing efforts and more extreme positions of the religious right are viewed with suspicion by the conservatives.

The chapter on the women's movement is not up to the standard of the rest of the book. Relying superficially on a few secondary sources, it has a variety of errors of timing and emphasis and generally lacks an awareness of the depth of scholarship in the area. Symptomatic of casual scholarship on the topic is getting the preposition wrong in NOW's name. It is National Organization *for* Women, not *of*, a difference that has always captured important political meaning for feminists, since NOW has always welcomed male members and pursued "integrationist" politics.

It is useful to read through Oberschall's work because it combines thoughtful analysis with wide-ranging data on real instances of collective action. With the one exception, the chapters reveal a serious engagement with a wide variety of empirical cases, and a subtle appreciation for the interplay between individual decisions and structural conditions. The rationalist perspective has a lot of value. At the same time, one would like to see more engagement with recent scholarship in the field.

The German-American Radical Press: The Shaping of a Left Political Culture, 1850–1940. Edited by Elliott Shore, Ken Fones-Wolf, and James P. Danky. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. Pp. 247. \$36.95.

William S. Solomon
Rutgers University

"We do not know much about the newspaper," Robert E. Park wrote in 1923. "It has never been studied" ("The Natural History of the Newspaper," *American Journal of Sociology* 29:276). While this has changed, scholarly studies of news and newspapers have tended to focus on the contemporary mainstream press. Until recently, press history was largely the preserve of retired journalists, most of whom had worked for the mainstream press; their memoirs and histories reflected this orientation. The third edition of Frank Luther Mott's 901-page *American Journalism: A History, 1690–1960* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), long a standard work in the field, barely mentions what we now call alternative media. Michael Schudson's *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers* (New York: Basic Books, 1978) marked a refreshing change, although it, too, focused on the mainstream press.

A key exception to this focus has been the work of some historians of radical movements. The news media's political economy in the 19th century and into the early 20th century was such that modest means could create and sustain a publication. "In 1912 alone, there were 323 avowedly Socialist periodical publications issued in the United States" (Joseph R. Conlin, *The American Radical Press, 1880–1960* [Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974], p. 6). Historians have been addressing the plethora of ethnic, feminist, leftist, and labor publications that once were a prominent part of this country's media landscape. Shore, Fones-Wolf, and Danky seek to "provide a broad-based view of the complexity and richness" (p. 2) of one aspect of this landscape, the German-American radical press, and they have succeeded nicely.

The editors outline "four distinct phases" in their subject's historiography. The "memoirs" and "descriptive accounts" phases are in fact typical of most journalism histories written in the 19th century. It is the third phase, which viewed the foreign-language press as an aid or an

obstacle to assimilation, that starts to employ more explicit forms of analysis. The editors rightly critique this school of thought for "reading a teleological pattern back into the German-American press tradition" (p. 5). Ironically, the assimilationist approach was developed partly by Robert E. Park. Rather than seeing "in the general ethnic press the march to the melting pot," (p. 5) the editors contend that it is more accurate to view historical actors "in the context of their times" (p. 6). So it is back to basics, although this is necessary for historical ground-work: many radical publications were written in languages other than English and have thus received little study.

A few of the essays in this anthology are too narrowly focused or are not argued clearly, but all are well researched. One point that virtually all of the essays fail to address is the relationship between their subject and the mainstream press. The one tantalizing reference is in Dirk Hoerder's essay: a radical Austrian émigré rejected "a lucrative offer to change sides and join the staff of the Hearst-owned *New York Journal*" (p. 194). Since mainstream newspapers and radical ones did not differ dramatically in the size of their editions before the turn of the century, it would be most interesting to know how they viewed one another. Also helpful would be a discussion of police repression of the radical press, of obvious importance, yet cited only in passing. On a smaller issue, Bruce Nelson's essay fails to distinguish clearly among socialist, anarchist, radical, and labor newspapers—he presumes considerable knowledge on the part of the reader. Similarly, most of the essays do not translate the German words they use.

And yet, this is a solid collection. Carol Poore's study of an "illustrated people's calendar" (p. 108) evokes the concerns and hopes of German immigrants. Ruth Seifert's essay on the women's page of the *New Yorker Volkszeitung* (People's newspaper), or *NYVZ*, is a revealing discussion of differences within the German socialist movement on the subject of gender. Should German socialist women make common cause with bourgeois women on the suffrage question? Paul Buhle's work on the *NYVZ*, "the historical standard for American Marxist newspapers" (p. 168), is excellent. It outlines the newspaper's milieu in terms of both other German-American publications and the wider social order, and it sums up where the *NYVZ* fits in all this and why it evolved as it did.

In sum, this anthology is specialized yet nonetheless valuable. The 20th-century United States has witnessed the rise of a culture industry whose ownership is becoming increasingly concentrated, as media mergers continue without any government effort to invoke antitrust laws today, "23 corporations control most of the business in daily newspapers, magazines, television, books, and motion pictures" (Ben Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, 4th ed. [Boston: Beacon Press, 1992], p. 4). Part of the culture industry's ethos is the myth that it is pluralistic and rooted in democratic traditions. *The German-American Radical Press* helps to reshape more accurately the contours of U.S. media history.

The Future of Labour Movements Edited by Marino Regini Newbury Park, Calif Sage, 1992 Pp xii + 269 \$55 00

Arthur B Shostak
Drexel University

Long awaited and exceedingly welcomed, this hardcover collection of nine scholarly essays (eight by sociologists) is the first effort by the Research Committee on Labour Movements of the International Sociological Association To cut to the quick, most contributors doubt the staying power of movement attributes, though none question the long-term viability of unions per se

Often dense and demanding, the essays generally posit bleak prospects for unionism in Western nations Typical is the contention of Editor Marino Regini that if labor cannot soon create a unifying ideology of solidarity, it may revert back to something like 19th-century craft unionism, a scenario that will tempt scholars to "abandon the notion of labour movements altogether" (p 13) Jelle Visser, after first characterizing unions as "oppositions that never become governments," goes on to forecast "further social and organizational fragmentation of union movements, a decline of trade unions as movements" (p 28)

Over and over again the book's contributors highlight advantages European capitalists stand to gain from the European Economic Community's integrated market, advantages linked to labor's anticipated loss of élan, militancy, and solidarity Richard Hyman, however, takes a less dour tack and concludes that the development of modern forms of solidarity, while a monumental task, is not an impossible one Accordingly, "it may be premature to bid farewell to the working class—or to the labour movement" (p 166)

Similarly, Horst Kern and Charles F Sabel, in a fresh and discerning discussion of the dual German system of industrial relations, contend that "the same logic of industrial reorganization which is undermining the trade unions' current organization also creates the possibility for a fundamental reformulation of their strategies" (p 220)

Wolfgang Streeck, in turn, details a major new role unions can play on the supply side, a role based on "a policy of negotiated general upskilling, conducted and enforced in cooperative conflict with employers and in creative partnership with governments" (p 267)

Sociologists eager to try their hand at this kind of cross-cultural research will find much advice of value Michael Shalev, for example, explains how more can be made of official work-stoppage statistics, the better to protect the scholarly community from being caught "with its collective pants down the next time that there is a widespread eruption in labour markets" (p 127) Gøsta Esping-Andersen, after first noting wryly that "there seem to be as many future scenarios as there are academics," goes on to share three exceedingly useful models others can

draw on (a jobless growth model, a new service economy model, and a firm-based microregulation model, p. 143)

The volume's many strengths notwithstanding, two limitations are regrettable and revealing: paragraphs often go on interminably, as is characteristic of turgid academese. Major omissions are vexing, a characteristic of much arm-chair theorizing. Little or no discussion, for example, explores the many ongoing labor education projects, internal political upheavals, or organizational change campaigns that seek to assure that "movement" remains in the labor movement. Little or no use is made of polling data, field observation, or field interviews; reliance seemingly is placed instead only on secondary sources and the arcane musings of fellow academicians.

Despite its excessively bland and rarefied air, the volume rewards careful reading. Students of mass movements, bureaucracies, economic sociology, and labor studies, while appropriately outraged by the volume's price, will want a nearby library to secure a copy. Better still, one such reader might undertake a "translation" for use by union staffers and leaders, a gesture that could go far in assuring an informed future for labor.

Alternatives to Lean Production: Work Organization in the Swedish Auto Industry. By Christian Berggren. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 286. \$39.00.

Paul S. Adler
University of Southern California

A long tradition in sociology has criticized the automobile assembly line as a symbol of the oppressive and alienating character of modern mass production. The assembly line is Weber's "iron cage" of bureaucracy in the microcosm of the factory: its technical and economic superiority over less fragmented and regimented forms of work seems indisputable for mass production industries, even though its effect on workers' well-being seems equally indisputable.

This view has recently been undermined by the results of MIT's International Motor Vehicle Project (James Womack, Dan Jones, and Daniel Roos, *The Machine That Changed the World* [New York: Rawson Associates, 1990]). The MIT team surveyed auto plants in Europe, Japan, and the United States and concluded that plants that used a "lean production" variant of the assembly line displayed not only superlative productivity and quality but also a superior quality of work life. This lean production model was perfected by Toyota and has been implemented in one form or another by many auto companies in Japan as well as in their overseas transplants. The lean production model retains the assembly line with its detailed regimentation of the work process and its 60-second work cycles. But as compared to the assembly lines studied by

the earlier generation of sociologists, inventories and set-up times are much reduced, workers are given job security and more training, they are encouraged to stop the line when they see defects, and they are encouraged to make improvement suggestions. The MIT study has, however, generated heated debate, since in contrast with the rigor of its quality and productivity data, its claims regarding the quality of work life were largely unsubstantiated.

Christian Berggren's book is presented as a response to the MIT challenge. It summarizes the history of efforts in the Swedish auto industry to abolish rather than merely modify the assembly line. Volvo's Uddevalla plant represents the pinnacle of these efforts: there were no moving conveyers, work cycles were stretched to two hours, and work teams took on many tasks that were traditionally reserved for management (Uddevalla along with another innovative Volvo plant at Kalmar were recently closed due to a precipitous decline in Volvo's sales).

Berggren situates these innovations in the context of Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s, a context characterized by a very profitable product market and a very tight labor market. The combination of an extensive social democratic infrastructure, strong unions, and narrow interindustry wage differentials led to extraordinary levels of turnover and absenteeism in the Swedish auto industry. The resulting efforts to improve working conditions were thus less motivated by profitability pressure than by the need to stabilize the workforce and to respond to the factory management challenges created by growing product proliferation.

Berggren presents case studies of six innovative plants. These case studies often lack enough detailed performance data for readers to form their own assessment. Berggren is nevertheless successful in delineating Volvo's decentralized organizational change process, a process in which proponents of innovation, including Volvo's progressively minded CEO, Pehr Gyllenhammar, confronted conservative managers, narrow-minded engineers, overly cautious union officials, as well as the real costs and the inevitable unpredictability of such change projects. Alongside these case studies, Berggren summarizes the results of a survey of worker assessments of working conditions at several of the Swedish plants. Overall, the results confirm that the further the organization departs from the traditional assembly line model, the less monotonous and stressful the work becomes.

Despite its impressive achievements, Berggren's book suffers from two main flaws when judged as an intervention in the debate on lean production. First, Berggren does not marshal any data that could reassure us that the Uddevalla model could ever reach world-class productivity and quality. His comparisons with Volvo's main Torslanda plant are hardly compelling since Torslanda is a very inefficient plant even when compared to other European plants, let alone their Japanese competitors.

The second key weakness of the book reflects a similar weakness of the MIT study: the lean production model is presented as homogeneous

In a recent study of one unionized auto transplant—the NUMMI facility in northern California—I showed that Toyota had significantly modified its system to accommodate what it saw as the specificity of the U S labor market (see “The Learning Bureaucracy New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc.,” in Barry M. Staw and Larry L. Cummings, eds., *Research in Organizational Behavior*, [Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1993], 15: 111–94). NUMMI achieved world-class productivity and quality while allowing workers considerable power to shape both their working conditions and higher-level policy decisions. Both the Swedish and the lean production models permit “variants” and “hybrids,” and Berggren’s nuanced presentation of the Swedish cases should encourage future research to resist hypostatizing any of the competing models.

Berggren’s work is an important reminder that the assembly line is not the only possible way to organize mass production. Both Berggren’s analysis and the MIT study suggest that Alvin Gouldner was right 40 years ago to denounce the pessimistic “metaphysical pathos” surrounding the notion of bureaucracy and the iron cage assumption that efficiency in routine tasks can only be obtained at the expense of workers’ well-being. It remains for future research to test whether a break with the assembly line model or its intelligent modification is the better way to achieve superior technical-economic and human outcomes.

Power in the Workplace: The Politics of Production at AT&T By Steven Peter Vallas. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. Pp. xiv + 250. \$49.50 (cloth), \$16.95 (paper).

Ruth Milkman

University of California, Los Angeles

This case study of the impact of new technology and industrial restructuring on workers and unions at AT&T provides a useful account of an industry that has received relatively scant attention in recent sociological literature. Vallas situates his empirical analysis within the broader literature on the labor process, using his rich historical, survey, and interview data to assess the predictions of recent theories of deskilling, upskilling, and what he labels “hegemony” theories of labor control. He finds that all three theories contain partial truths, but that none survives this empirical test entirely intact.

A former union organizer for the Communication Workers of America (CWA), Vallas secured access to AT&T for this research through his union contacts. He was unable to secure full cooperation from AT&T management, but he did gain access to the company archives and also interviewed about 25 lower- and middle-level managers. With the CWA’s assistance he was able to conduct systematic surveys of workers at numerous AT&T work sites in New Jersey and New York, to engage in some on-site observation, and to interview 75 workers. The book

draws on all these data sources, and indeed the narrative is at its best when Vallas lets the workers speak for themselves

There is a lengthy discussion of the early history of labor relations at AT&T, based mostly in secondary literature, which Vallas uses as a vehicle to assess the adequacy of labor process theories. His most original finding here is that while AT&T management did adopt various Taylorist techniques and introduced extensive mechanization and deskilling in the 1920s, their motivation was simply to depress labor costs. Contrary to the thesis of Harry Braverman (*Labor and Monopoly Capital* [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975]) and the claims of contemporary unionists, Vallas finds no evidence "that the issue of control over work processes ever entered into the decision" to mechanize (p. 56). In his historical survey Vallas also documents the paternalistic system of labor control that emerged at AT&T in the 1920s, which he interprets as largely consistent with Michael Burawoy's theory of factory regimes (*The Politics of Production* [London: Verso, 1985]).

In his discussion of the more recent period, Vallas devotes considerable attention to the debate over new information-based technology and its effects on skill. He steers a middle course between the deskilling thesis rooted in Braverman's work and the more recent claims by such commentators as Shoshana Zuboff (*In the Age of the Smart Machine* [New York: Basic Books, 1987]) that new technology actually upgrades workers' skills and leads to increased worker empowerment. Vallas's qualitative and quantitative data on AT&T suggest a mixed picture: the largely female staff of operators and clerical workers experienced classical deskilling, while the overwhelmingly male craft workers were subjected to a more complex redistribution of skills, with some enjoying upgrading (or what Vallas calls "enskillment"). But Vallas takes exception to Zuboff's prediction that upgrading is ultimately accompanied by greater workers' control; instead he suggests that at AT&T managerial power has been enhanced by technological change *despite* considerable enskillment among some groups of craft workers.

Vallas also explores the effects of industrial restructuring on workers' consciousness. Here he argues that workers retain a generally oppositional consciousness, particularly the male craft workers, whose sense of manliness is linked to a workerist, antimanagement rhetoric (as others have also shown, e.g., David Halle, *America's Working Man* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984]). On this basis Vallas questions the validity of theories of managerial hegemony, and particularly Burawoy's prediction that such hegemony is reinforced by increased economic competition such as that occurring currently. This part of the analysis is less convincing than what precedes, since an oppositional consciousness of the sort Vallas documents, stressing the distinction between (male) blue-collar workers and management, is not necessarily incompatible with a broader pattern of consent to managerial hegemony. Indeed, Vallas's brief concluding observations about the impotence of the CWA in the face of recent managerial initiatives suggests precisely this.

Overall, this is a solid case study. Although it does not propose any major theoretical innovations, it offers some valuable points of critique in relation to previous theories, and enriches the empirical literature on the impact of industrial restructuring and new technology on American labor. Given the extensive research Vallas conducted, I would have preferred to see fuller use of the primary data, especially the interview materials. That would have strengthened what is in any case a primarily empirical contribution. Still, sociologists of the contemporary workplace will find much of value in Vallas's analysis.

Post-Industrial Lives: Roles and Relationships in the 21st Century By Jerald Hage and Charles H. Powers. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992. Pp. xi+248. \$39.95 (cloth), \$19.95 (paper).

Harald Wenzel
Free University Berlin

Being in two (or more) perspectives simultaneously marks the creative act, the emergence of the novel. George Herbert Mead saw this as a universal pattern governing the process of reality, evolution. For the microprocesses of the social world, for processes of communication, and for symbolic interaction, the concept of role-taking provides a convincing and instructive theoretical description.

This theoretical essay on postindustrial society by Jerald Hage and Charles H. Powers shows its creative potential in the integration of two different sociological perspectives: symbolic interactionism and structural functionalism. The concept of role is here of strategic importance: it is a central concept in both interactionist and functionalist approaches to the study of society. Functionalist sociology views roles as structures, whereas interactionism emphasizes role process. The authors want to preserve both insights simultaneously. Role figures for them as the key concept to analyze the communicative microprocess as well as the societal macroprocess. Communication as continuous role redefinition and the build-up of role networks supplanting older, industrial macrostructures, namely hierarchies and markets, characterize postindustrial life.

The authors see their task as a theoretical prognosis or extrapolation of already observable trends in the development of postindustrial society. They do not provide an empirical research monograph but rather the theoretical framework for such research.

Their starting point is the enormous knowledge explosion that theories of postindustrial or postmodern society see as a defining characteristic of the new era. Knowledge is being systematically created and expanded in research and development departments. Flexible and reprogrammable automation is the implanting of knowledge into machines, a potentially lifelong process of education and learning is the implanting of knowledge into minds. What, then, are the implications of this knowledge growth?

for roles, role relationships, and institutions in the work sphere and in the family? In both spheres routinized, simplified, and standardized procedures are on the decline. These are typical for the process of rationalization that dominates the industrial period. The postindustrial knowledge expansion shifts the concern to more complex problems for which a creative solution has to be found that fits their particular preconditions. Products and services are customized, personalized, individualized. This growing complexity of roles not only counteracts their rationalization, it refers to the continuing change of roles. Role change, or as the authors call it, role redefinition, is the basic feature of postindustrial life. Role scripts and rigid codifications of role behavior are abandoned and replaced by processes of negotiation, cooperation, improvisation, and autonomous decision.

Along with role change goes a significant shift in the process of communication. More complex roles and role relationships demand advanced abilities to interact and a heightened sensitivity for the emotional, non-verbal channel of communication that truthfully transmits the subjective, "inner" meaning of messages. To understand this meaning it is essential to transcend the role relationship, to embark, finally, upon an interpersonal relationship with the alter ego. In postindustrial society the expansion in the size of role-sets (it should be remembered that a direct consequence of the complexification of a role is the increasing variety of its alter-ego roles) is accompanied by a reduction in the size of the person set. In other words, the number of persons that fill the alter-ego role is diminishing. This means a greater variety of activities, but fewer people to share these experiences with. Relationships become more intimate, with a unique, individual alter ego to relate to. Ego and alter ego have complex selves, multiple identities that can entertain several perspectives simultaneously. This melding together of different perspectives opens up avenues to new, creative solutions. The complex, creative self is decentered, without a core identity, without unalterable beliefs.

Role behavior involving normative instructions and routinized, standardized procedures within hierarchical structures has restrained the self in industrial society from developing its creative forces. Unleashing these forces in postindustrial society requires the complete reconstruction of the institutional background of role behavior. Hierarchical organizations are to be replaced by role networks that transcend even the traditional organizational units of the corporation or the family. For example, in joint ventures corporations are linked by interorganizational networks, likewise, family members are linked to outside experts. In both cases the aim is to solve problems that are too complex to be solved in a routine manner within the traditional institutional framework. These problems might include the need to develop the next generation of memory chips or to plan a career.

The postindustrial reconstruction of society as it is outlined by the authors leads to a positive outlook. Human agency is advancing. During the period of transformation, however, some loss of friction is unavoidable.

able Role strain, burnout, status conflict, and role failure indicate that the new demands cannot be met without severe secondary effects

Finally, one should not leave a central theoretical thesis unnoticed—the authors historicize symbolic interactionism Only with the arrival of postindustrial society do the premises of symbolic interactionism—and one could add of pragmatist social theory—come true historically

The authors have given a remarkable, coherent theoretical outline of postindustrial society Continuous role redefinition, the increasing complexity of interpersonal relationships, the growth of networks linking role behavior to societal macrostructures and supplanting hierarchical organization and markets all provide a convincing picture of a type of society that has not yet completely arrived They have formulated a program for empirical research, too, that needs to be executed, if this picture is to be convincing in the long run

There are some minor shortcomings the discussion of the postindustrial, multiple self falls short of the findings that Paul Leinberger and Bruce Tucker have presented in their study of identities and work roles (*The New Individualists The Generation after the Organization Man* [New York Harper Collins, 1991]) or that Kenneth J Gergen has developed in his monograph exploring the increased role set of the postmodern self (*The Saturated Self Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life* [New York Basic Books, 1991]) Here we find an adequate description of the simultaneous entertainment of multiple identities that the authors call for on page 81

The authors' concept of knowledge remains unclear or at least undefined It is certainly not a purely cognitive type of knowledge they refer to Emotional, expressive, practical, constructive dimensions are implied Pragmatist philosophy obviously could provide this desideratum I mention this since knowledge growth must not be seen as an *independent* causal force in the change of roles and relationships Of course, in a sense all knowledge growth *is* role redefinition Last, but not least this is a book written in an extraordinarily clear and understandable scientific prose

Alliance Capitalism The Social Organization of Japanese Business By Michael L Gerlach Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1992 Pp xxii + 351

Gary G Hamilton
University of Washington

In the past five years, socialist economies have either collapsed or have undergone radical market reforms Seemingly, free market capitalism prevails worldwide It therefore comes as a shock to many that this capitalist world economy suddenly appears a lot less uniform now than it did only a few years ago Indeed, during the period of Cold War

politics, economic theorizing in sociology was caught up in the polar oppositions between capitalism and communism, between market and the state, with the so-called Third World economies being seen as derivatives of one or the other. These distinctions held our intellectual focus and oriented our analyses. However, the apparent collapse of one of the polar opposites in the real world has brought into question the theoretical adequacy of both concepts. Already a major intellectual shift is underway, a shift in orientation from political economy, with an inherent state-versus-market bias, toward economic sociology, with its concentration on economic organizations and economic processes. *Alliance Capitalism*, Michael Gerlach's excellent study on the organization of the Japanese economy, will surely hasten this intellectual reorientation.

Alliance Capitalism is an extremely successful book that demonstrates that market capitalism is "no monolithic system" (p. 1) and that Japanese business organization is not simply a variant of Western business practices. Unlike many studies trying to explain the successes of the Japanese economy, Gerlach's book is tightly focused on key organizational characteristics, especially the specific patterns of interaction among Japanese companies known as *keiretsu*, intercorporate alliances characterized by institutionalized business networks arising from multiplex, formal, and informal linkages among firms. These business alliances form vertically around production processes and horizontally across industrial sectors, so that the entire economy is organized by means of long-term, stable network affiliations. An example of the vertical networks is the Toyota group of firms, which links thousands of independent firms into a coordinated production system. An example of the horizontal networks, or what Gerlach calls "intermarket *keiretsu*," is the Mitsubishi group of firms, which consists of many embedded vertical networks that are loosely coupled across most industrial, financial, and commercial sectors.

This book specifically analyzes Japan's main intermarket networks. Gerlach starts the book by framing his topic. Many previous researchers, he contends, ignored the intermarket *keiretsu* or simply found them to be products of imperfect markets. More recent scholars, mostly Japanese, have tried to show that *keiretsu* are efficient forms of market organization or are the means by which firms spread risk. Gerlach rejects these simplistic explanations in favor of an institutional interpretation that emphasizes unique historical trajectories for different societies. Japanese economic organization has grown out of its own distinctive organizational processes. Gerlach broadens this point to suggest that the very concept of market capitalism needs to be rethought and linked to concrete institutions. In the end, there are many market capitalisms, the Japanese version being one unique form.

Having theoretically framed the topic, he devotes the rest of the book to a detailed examination of intermarket *keiretsu*. His interpretation is largely drawn from an analysis of a longitudinal database that he developed. The database consists of a range of financial and organizational details of Japan's 250 largest industrial and financial firms. A second

database of the 250 largest industrial and financial firms in the United States was used as a means to locate and emphasize the distinctive qualities of Japanese industrial structure. Examining the patterns of stockholding, interlocking directorships, bank loans, and trade relationships, as well as a range of financial data, Gerlach systematically develops one of the best analyses of intermarket *keiretsu* found in any language. Interspersed in this analysis are occasional case studies of particular business groups, interview material, and an integration of studies written in Japanese. Overall, the book makes a convincing case for Gerlach's main thesis that Japanese economic organization consists of complex intercorporate alliances in which rational action for firms leads not to profit maximization but rather to the stabilization of the firms' positions in a structure of incorporate networks.

Despite its overall excellence, the book has some weak moments that subsequent researchers may want to address. I will briefly mention only three. First, the institutional interpretation that Gerlach offers is underdeveloped and somewhat contradictory. In particular, he confuses a narrow historicist explanation of incremental organizational change for an institutional interpretation, which requires systematic linkages between organizational patterns and broader institutional environments. Second, the comparison between big businesses in Japan and the United States is merely suggestive and does not provide the in-depth contrast that would facilitate an institutional explanation. Third, Gerlach examines the Japanese economy as if it were isolated from the rest of the world. Does the structure of the global economy influence organizational patterns in the Japanese economy and vice versa?

These weaknesses, however, are relatively minor matters in a book that contains some of the best descriptions of the Japanese economy that are currently available. Gerlach clearly makes us rethink the organizational parameters of market capitalism.

Social Mobility in Contemporary Japan: Educational Credentials, Class, and the Labour Market in a Cross-National Perspective. By Hiroshi Ishida. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993. Pp. xx1 + 310. \$37.50.

Takehiko Kariya
University of Tokyo

Is Japan unique among other industrialized societies? Hiroshi Ishida's *Social Mobility in Contemporary Japan* offers answers to this question by focusing on social mobility and class structure. With thorough and sophisticated quantitative analyses of comparable data in Japan, the United States, and Britain, Ishida examines to what extent Japan differs in terms of social mobility from these other two societies.

Ishida's analyses focus on three issues: the effect of social background

on educational attainment, the effect of educational attainment on socioeconomic achievement (SEA hereafter), and the effect of one's class position on SEA. These analyses are connected with more general sociological theses, that is, "educational credentialism" theses proposed by Japanese sociologists of education, "the new middle class" theses by Japanese Marxist and non-Marxist social critics, and "industrialism" theses by Western sociologists.

Educational credentialism theses cover six propositions compared with the United States and Britain, in Japan, (a) educational attainment is more independent of men's social background, (b) the size of the difference between the effect of educational credentials and social background on SEA is greater, (c) the effect of educational credentials on SEA is larger, (d) the quality of higher education institutions has a greater influence on SEA, (e) the effect of educational attainment on SEA lasts longer, and (f) the effect of educational credentials on SEA is homogeneous among different social segments.

Surprisingly, the results of the analyses do not support all the propositions. Despite the credence given educational credentialism among both the public and scholars, Japan is not unique in the significance of educational attainment for social mobility. Ishida's analyses even show that Japan is less meritocratic than the United States in terms of the effect of educational attainment on SEA.

Ishida then goes on to target the "new middle class" theses, which consist of four hypotheses: (a) the "new middle mass" hypothesis, which proposes that the "status composition of various classes is highly homogeneous," (b) the "bipolarity" hypothesis that "the basis of distribution of various status attributes is polarized" into two extremes, capitalists and workers, (c) the "status inconsistency" hypothesis that "various status characteristics of classes are inconsistent so that classes cannot be characterized by consistently high and low status attributes," and (d) the "dual structure" hypothesis that "status characteristics of employees are differentiated not only by their class positions but also by [the] size of [their] firm" (p. 258).

Ishida's investigations give empirical validity only to hypothesis (d), while (b) and (c) are partially supported. The new middle mass hypothesis is not empirically supported. The evident dual employment structure and, to some degree, class differences and status inconsistency contradict the popular image of Japan as an egalitarian society.

These findings contrast Japanese society to prevailing images of post-war Japan. Japan is not a classless society, neither is it as meritocratic or as open as the United States and Britain. Japan is more mobile, but its mobility is mainly "forced mobility" due to its "*late, but rapid* industrialization" (p. 202, emphasis in original).

Because Japan is compared to the United States and Britain, Ishida's findings provide tests of two "industrialism" theses: industrialization promotes equal opportunities and increases "openness" in the class structure, or, once industrial societies reach the "mature" stage, relative inter-

generational class mobility and immobility become stable and cross-national differences diminish. Ishida's analyses find that the latter happens.

What can we learn from Ishida's masterpiece and what further questions are left? For industrialization theorists, cogent evidence is provided that Japan, as a non-Western industrial society, is not completely different from Western societies in terms of class mobility and immobility. Do other non-Western industrial societies show similar patterns to Japan? Does "late, but rapid industrialization" lead to similar processes of social mobility in other national cases? Extensive comparative studies including other non-Western societies will enrich theories of industrialization.

To social mobility researchers, further comparative studies with updated data should be interesting. Due to the limited data availability, Ishida used Japanese data collected in 1975. However, since the late 1970s, Japan has moved into the "mature" stage: both rapid economic and educational growth have slowed down. What impact does such "maturity" have on social mobility? Following social mobility in Japan into the 1980s and the 1990s will provide more dynamic views of the relationship between the pace of industrialization and changes in mobility.

Finally, analysts of Japanese society must take Ishida's findings carefully into account. Naive culturist or impressionist views of Japan need to be tested against his objective observations. Researchers may need to add class position as a factor to explain Japanese organizations' or individuals' behaviors more accurately. As for studies of Japanese education, scholars should focus upon the legitimation function of education. In addition, important concerns include why credentialism is widely accepted in Japan and how and what this ideology hides from the Japanese public's awareness of their contemporary society. The provision of these stimuli to future research shows this book's great achievement.

Re-Made in Japan: Everyday Life and Consumer Taste in a Changing Society. Edited by Joseph J. Tobin. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 264.

Jennifer Robertson
University of Michigan

Re-Made in Japan is both a very welcome and a somewhat frustrating addition to the literature on "Japan today."

Welcome are this book's twelve chapters (not including the introduction) that offer intriguing glimpses into institutions and cultural practices familiar to but generally understudied by scholars of Japan: department stores, the use of English in Japan, the technologization of rural Japan, baths and bathing, home redecorating magazines and catalogs, homes for the elderly, drinking etiquette, Japanese-French restaurants, fashion

and Japanese identity, travel souvenirs, Tokyo Disneyland, and tango in Japan

The title, however, is frustrating in that it hints at the long-standing stereotype of Japan as a reactive, imitative nation with a cultural premium on borrowing, adapting, interpreting, and transforming things Western. "The West," however, remains that mystified foil signifying genesis and production in opposition to Japanese mimesis and consumption. Although, as Tobin declares in the introduction, "the West is unmistakably present in Japanese daily life," only a few of the contributing authors place the West into a discursive context. Rather, the overall tendency is to deploy (as opposed to interrogate) the West as an "eponymous index" or tropological convention, that is, the West operates as synecdoche whose mention conjures up and authorizes a particular relationship between Japan and the Euro-American world. "Japan" and "the Japanese" are similarly invoked.

Tobin is aware of the stereotype of a reactive Japan and claims that the chapters are about "creative synthesis" and "Japanese importation rather than Western exportation." "The book is about not the actual West but about those aspects of the West (real or imagined) that the Japanese have made part of their culture" (p. 4). Thus his focus on the "active," "morally neutral," and "demystifying" word *domestication* as a centralizing theme. However, geography, politics, and economics are here collapsed. On the one hand, the notion of an "actual West" suggests (ahistorically) a fixed geographical referent, and on the other, "the West" is used to imply and invoke a culture of capitalism ("free-enterprise"), the products of which are available for transnational consumption. Postwar Japan is often described as a "Western" society in this latter sense. Tobin's reference to creative synthesis suggests his perception of the historically layered and knotty semiotic relationship between Japan and the West. But although the introduction slips in and out of a vocabulary that suggests the influence of cultural studies, appeals to a historically unitary Japan, together with countless references to the Japanese, constitute a returning rhetorical theme that compromises the "de-orientalizing" cultural criticism that the authors seek to pursue.

Nevertheless, the authors deserve credit for bringing to our attention cultural formations and practices that have been generally ignored, overlooked, discounted, or dismissed by Japanologists in search of, or complicit in the reproduction of, a pristine Japan. That the authors are professional scholars is equally important insofar as the bulk of publications on popular and mass cultures in Japan are the work of journalists and self-made "culture critics," who indulge in sweeping generalizations, trite formulas, impressionistic prophecies, and sensationalistic exposés. In this connection, it would have been appropriate, and certainly very useful, for the authors or editor to have problematized and historicized the terms popular culture and mass culture, given their centrality to the book's agenda. Hopefully, each of the authors will expand their essays into full-length monographs in the near future.

Refuge of the Honored Social Organization in a Japanese Retirement Community By Yasuhito Kinoshita and Christie W. Kiefer Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1992 Pp. x+220

Diana Lynn Bethel
University of Hawaii

Kinoshita, a Japanese gerontologist trained in anthropology in the United States, and Kiefer, an anthropologist, present the first English-language ethnographic glimpse of a Japanese retirement community. The work is a collaborative effort and fills a void in the ethnographic writing on Japanese retirement communities. The authors focus on social integration and community creation, central issues in the fields of social gerontology and the emerging subfield of gerontological anthropology. Fuji-no-Sato, the retirement community studied by Kinoshita beginning in 1982, provided a unique opportunity to observe processes of integration in the recently established facility, which had not yet developed its own community traditions and patterns of social life.

Kinoshita and Kiefer use a clear and simple three-layered concentric circle model of Japanese social relations (intimates, formal roles, and casual contacts) to analyze social patterns among residents. They propose that though Japanese generally display a cultural reticence toward developing relationships outside an established social framework and legitimacy-conferring formal roles, Fuji-no-Sato's conditions of geographical separateness, limited size, and frequent face-to-face interaction, encourage residents to develop close ties and a sense of community solidarity.

Parts 1 and 2 set the stage for part 3's discussion of social patterns in the retirement community. Part 1, entitled "Aging in Japan: An Overview," covers the historical, demographic, and socioeconomic background that has produced the phenomenon of Japanese retirement communities. It discusses (1) the aging society and improvements in the pension system that have allowed a greater number of older people to choose how they wish to live their later years, (2) family law and its transformations, beginning with the Meiji civil code to the present, which relate to care for the elderly, and (3) types of institutional living situations available to Japanese elderly. Also discussed is the acceptability of retirement communities, an especially thorny issue complicated by concerns that private enterprise may skimp on resident care and give priority to profits. Fuji-no-Sato provides a model, according to Kinoshita and Kiefer, by pioneering policies that safeguard the rights and promise of care for residents while at the same time achieving stability as an economic enterprise—a problem which has thus far plagued and undermined many retirement facilities in the private sector.

Characteristics of residents and the research site, located in a beautiful resort area, are described in part 2. The most striking resident attributes are clear markers of social class—high levels of educational achievement by both men and women, occupational status, and the range and type of hobbies and interests. Over one-third of the men had been executives

at major corporations and the rest had been mid-level managers in business or government, university professors, high school teachers, physicians, or other professionals. The most symbolic example of resident social status and occupational achievement is the former prosecuting attorney, a resident who represented the Resident Association in negotiations with the management.

Another indicator of socioeconomic level is part-time residence. Only two-thirds of the total residents lived in the community on a full-time basis. The remaining one-third were part-time residents who used their apartments as second, or vacation, homes. Also, many residents owned property in the nearby metropolis. They had been able to buy a condo as well as residence rights at Fuji-no-Sato after the sale of the family home (many are either childless or distant from their children, so would not bequeath property to the next generation) or upon receiving a lump sum retirement payment.

In part 3, Kinoshita and Kiefer focus on the social lives of residents as they interact with management and with each other in the Resident Association, in interest and hobby groups, and during the course of everyday life in the community. The authors discovered that, contrary to their expectations and despite the variety and frequency of contact, conditions in the retirement community did not encourage the development of close ties and a sense of community. Rather, inability or reluctance to dispense with formalities served to maintain barriers to social intimacy and kept relationships on a formal level. Kinoshita and Kiefer's study seems to indicate that the relatively privileged residents of Fuji-no-Sato held firmly to an ideology of status consciousness that inhibited the development of close ties. The authors suggest that a social intimacy may have developed but for the absence of work and family spheres, which left a vacuum that prevented full expression of the community component. (For a sharp contrast in resident characteristics and behavior, see my article on a rural Japanese social welfare institution for the elderly in *Japanese Social Organization*, edited by Takie Lebra [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992].)

Strangely enough, though the tenacious adherence to formality in a roleless context was a hindrance to the development of close relationships and a sense of community, it proved to be beneficial in enabling residents to set up a formal structure of representation to facilitate negotiations with the management and enhance the effectiveness of the Resident Association.

Kinoshita and Kiefer's book is a welcome contribution to the ethnography of aging in Japan. Though one might wish for a little more lively ethnographic presentation, it provides, as the first book-length study on the topic, requisite background information and serves as a useful introduction. Gerontologists, anthropologists, and others interested in looking beyond demographic statistics to understand the nature of the Japanese aging experience will also discover a valuable case study that illuminates one segment of Japan's diverse elderly population.

Making Gray Gold Narratives of Nursing Home Care By Timothy Diamond Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1992 Pp xv+280

Gunnar Almgren

University of Washington

In order to gather the primary source material for *Making Gray Gold*, sociologist Timothy Diamond trained as a nurse's aide and for one year worked in that capacity in a series of nursing homes. Written from the perspective of a participant-observer, this work is a rare and often evocative "view from below" of the American nursing home industry. Although the book resembles a journalistic exposé more than it does a dispassionate ethnography, it nonetheless offers a substantial contribution to the understanding of the sociology of nursing-home care as it currently exists in the United States. Because the dominant model of American nursing homes that emerged in recent decades is that of a highly profitable corporate enterprise, financially established upon the interdependence of several disadvantaged populations, *Making Gray Gold* is a unique and compelling illustration of the interplay between capitalism and stratification.

The metaphor used as the organizing theme for *Making Gray Gold* is the productive process of extraction, where gold is mined from resource ore. In this case the "resource ore" is the country's aged, dependent population. Through repeated use of participant-observer vignettes, Diamond describes the productive process as one where quite specific reimbursable activities and supplies are provided to (extracted from) the institutionalized elderly in closely measured quantities, documented, and then processed for payment. The process of extraction has little to do with patient care, as care is understood in its common usage, because the professionalized industrial model of health care recognizes and values a narrow range of activities that are only peripherally tied to the actual needs of institutionalized patients. According to the structure of this productive process, subjecting a protesting elderly patient to an overly cold or overly hot shower is defined as essential to patient care, is reimbursable, and ergo a legitimate patient care activity. However, allowing the patient a few minutes of time and attention to express a fear, share a thought, or tell a story is excluded from the formulary of productive activities and as such is a "nonproductive activity" subject to administrative sanction. *Making Gray Gold* affirms the view of the corporate nursing home as an efficient producer of a limited list of activities and outcomes, as specified through the regulatory and reimbursement structures sustaining the nursing home industry (as opposed to a cost-efficient system for providing humanistic patient care).

In the nursing homes of *Making Gray Gold* there are three groups of people: the elderly dependent patients, the nurse's aides, and those in authority. The elderly dependent patients are introduced and talked about frequently, but their story is clearly not the focus of the book.

Those in administrative authority, the professional nurses and nursing home administrators, are largely described and presented as faceless petty bureaucrats charged with keeping the productive process on track. Where they appear, the administrators and nurses are depicted as rigid, unimaginative, punitive, and uncaring. In contrast, the nurse's aides are consistently elevated to heroism. Both their plight and their contribution to whatever is human about nursing home care in America make up the main focus of the book.

As the essential labor force of a labor intensive industry, the certified nurse's aides (CNAs) described are usually minority women, either relatively new immigrants or disadvantaged African-Americans. Although they receive some training, the CNAs are classified and paid as unskilled labor. The CNAs in *Making Gray Gold* competed to find a job paying even 50¢ in excess of minimum wage for physically and emotionally demanding work. A white male, the author was one of the few CNAs included in the book that held only one job. Through the first-hand experiences of the author, the nursing-home industry is viewed as a renewal and rebirth of 19th-century capitalist exploitation, with the addition of international recruitment as a method to sustain the industry's low wage structure. One nurse's aide in training, responding to a supervisor's admonishment to refrain from criticism of the institution, whispered to the author, "Hey Tim, what do you think? Are they teaching us to be nurse's aides or black women?" (p. 24).

The essential riches of *Making Gray Gold* are in the narratives of daily encounters that occurred among and between two disadvantaged and oppressed populations at the bottom of the social hierarchy: minority women and the aged, institutionalized, and often impoverished white women constituting the majority of nursing home residents. These poignant observations make the book well worth reading by any scholar or future policy maker of long-term care. However, the book's dualistic orientation falls well short of the deeper sociological analysis that might have been gleaned from the material. Despite its unique and worthwhile contribution, *Making Gray Gold* seems more like the work of a serious journalist who has a passing acquaintance with Marxist sociology than the work of a sociologist.

American Stepfamilies By William R. Beer New Brunswick, N.J.
Transaction Publishers, 1992 Pp. 258 \$29.95

Chandra Muller
University of Texas

In the past few decades there has been much debate about the state of the American family. What are the changes? What is the source? Is it good or bad? William Beer describes a change, the new American step-

family, which he claims is an adaptation well suited to contemporary life. He presents a highly readable portrait of this hybrid.

Much of Beer's book focuses on the nature of the adult relationships, in part as a function of the children in the stepfamily. He describes remarriages in general and then increasingly complex stepfamilies, starting with "pure" stepfamilies and ranging to "yours, mine, and ours" stepfamilies. The second (and shorter) section of the book describes relationships among stepchildren. The heart of the book is a detailed examination of family dynamics based on a series of case studies conducted by the author. The thorough and engaging exposition of the complex lives of these families provides the foundation for understanding the nature of stepfamily relationships and how they differ from those of intact families.

For example, the reader is drawn into the lives of the families enough to understand the potential jolt to the sibling power structure or sibling rivalry that comes about from a remarriage or when a child is born into a stepfamily. Pecking order is usually based on age, and competition is usually over the attention of parents in an intact family. With remarriage or the birth of a child, the factors determining the pecking order of siblings may also be complicated by the presence or absence of biological ties to the parents. Another example of a difference between the nuclear family and the stepfamily is ambiguity in norms about relationships. Rules about sexual relationships, for instance between stepsiblings, are not as apparent. The responsibility of the stepparent to the stepchild is also less well defined, both legally and normatively.

A thorny issue that haunts Beer's analysis is the relative priority of the relationship of the stepparents as a couple and the stepfamily as a whole compared to the priority of needs of individual members, especially children. Researchers debate this question even for intact families in contemporary life, but the conflict becomes even more vexing for a stepfamily.

A potentially unsettling example for some readers is the conflict in a complex stepfamily described by Beer early in the book. Newlyweds Randy and Linda, who have each brought stepchildren into their joint family, face an agonizing decision about Randy's son, Alex. Alex is emotionally disturbed and neglected by his mother. Randy goes to court to try to curb the abuse but when offered custody declines because of the potential havoc it would bring to his precariously balanced new family. Randy sacrifices the potential help he could give to Alex for the good of the other members of the family, justifying his action with the logic that another dissolved marriage would spread deep distress among a wider number of people. Alex ends up in foster care for several years until his mother is more stable and takes him back. The issues raised by this scenario are disturbing and perhaps underdeveloped in the discussion.

The main point from this example is that the couple in a stepfamily must put their relationship above that of the previously established biological relationship between parent and child. This, Beer claims, is done in successful nuclear families and must also happen in stepfamilies. He

says that a problem with all families today is that they are less child centered

Beer identifies postindustrial society as one in which the family is centered around the needs and gratification of adults. The stepfamily, resulting from serial monogamy, is the product of this focus. We must wonder, then, if the children pay in terms of stunted or disadvantaged development. Beer attempts to answer this in his last and perhaps weakest section. He discusses stepfamilies in society—first in history and then in contemporary society. The main problem with the section is in the chapter that introduces data from the General Social Survey to answer the question of whether stepfamilies hurt children. The analyses are less than convincing and do not fit well with the rest of the book. Such a question must be answered using more systematic empirical evidence.

Beer intends to shed light on the kinds of interactions that are characteristic of the structure of stepfamilies. There are descriptions of many different kinds of relationships and families, some happy and loving and others turbulent and full of pain. Some succeed and others do not. The cases are described in rich detail and the author identifies many important patterns inherent in this new family form. He provides an enlightening account of stepfamilies narrated with well-developed insights about the relationships among members.

Gender on the Line: Women, the Telephone, and Community Life By Lana F. Rakow. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. Pp. xiii + 165. \$23.50.

Daphne Spain
University of Virginia

If you are the typical *AJS* subscriber, you have probably already used the telephone several times today. Those calls may have been business related, or they may have included informal contact with family or friends. Like Deborah Tannen's *You Just Don't Understand* (New York: Morrow, 1990), Lana Rakow's *Gender on the Line* documents differences between women and men in modes of communication. Rakow's book goes beyond Tannen's in its emphasis on changes in technology and their effects on community.

Rakow's thesis is that telephone talk is both gendered work (i.e., productive activity assigned to women) and gender work (social practices sustaining masculine and feminine identities). By examining the evolution of telephone technology in a small midwestern town, Rakow reveals how it was simultaneously an instrument of liberation from and reinforcer of women's traditional roles. She approaches her topic from the perspective of a feminist in the field of communication studies.

The book begins with three chapters describing the community of Prospect and "women's talk" and "women's place" in that community. The

second half of the book consists of interviews with six Prospect women about their telephone use (these were selected from a total of 43 interviews). Ranging in age from 14 to 80, these women represent a cross-section of the predominantly white, Christian farming town whose economic fortunes have declined over time. These chapters are presented in the women's own styles in a deliberate attempt to remove the authorial voice. A brief conclusion weaves together the theoretical and ethnographic components.

The Prospect Telephone Company was founded in 1902. The company changed from a magneto switchboard to a common battery board in 1950, allowing subscribers to simply pick up the telephone rather than crank it to get the operator. In 1954, the company changed to a dial system, which completely eliminated the need for an operator. Not until 1980 did all subscribers enjoy a private line. Many of the women interviewed by Rakow remembered when an operator connected all calls, several families shared the same party line, and the telephone was used only for emergencies or business.

Changes in telephone service paralleled and contributed to changes in the sense of community. Introduction of telephone service bound farm families together over considerable distances, and the operator was at the system's nucleus. If there was a fire, the operator would ring the fire ring and everyone would pick up the line. The operator also knew where to find people who were not at home (the original call forwarding that now costs extra). The loss of the operator meant the loss of what Jane Jacobs called the "public character" so essential to sustaining communities—the one person who could be relied on to know everything going on and to serve as "eyes on the street." The telephone operator was Prospect's "ears on the wire" performing the same function. The affluence and technological advances that allowed all homes to have private lines also contributed to the privatization of community.

Women in Prospect talk on the phone for a variety of reasons. Sometimes it is to perform work for the family business because men do not like to use the telephone. More often it is to participate in care giving by calling local friends or far-away family members. The telephone may have liberated women from the constraints of space and time binding them to their homes, but by becoming a tool for maintaining relationships, it reinforced their traditional roles as wives and mothers. Women's talk in Prospect consists mainly of "visiting" or "gossiping" about private issues, while men's talk revolves around public issues of politics and the economy.

Gender on the Line contains some interesting observations and several minor omissions from a social scientist's perspective. Among its strengths, for example, are very intriguing footnotes, with reference to such articles as Cheris Kramarae's "Gotta Go Myrtle, Technology's at the Door" (in *Technology and Women's Voices: Keeping in Touch* [New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988]) and the observation that, unlike women, men are seldom accused of fear of technology when they avoid

instruments such as the telephone, washing machines, and curling irons (p 60) Ruth Schwartz Cowan's *More Work for Mother* (New York: Basic Books, 1983) dealt with similar issues she points out that the baby bottle was probably the most important invention to affect women's roles as mothers, yet is rarely identified as "technology"

I expected to see a few issues raised that were not One was how the occupation of telephone operator became women's work Rakow's focus on women as users of telephones could have been strengthened by greater attention to the gendered nature of who made the system work On a more minor note, since Rakow makes much of the telephone's ability to transcend space, a section in the conclusion regarding the effects of cordless technology might have been appropriate (assuming few Prospect residents used it when her research was conducted in 1985)

The women of Prospect recognize their roles as caretakers of community and see the telephone as an instrument facilitating that work They also perceive what difficult work it is in the face of rising affluence and privatization Like public parks, transportation, schools, and entertainment, telephones have been transformed from enhancers of community to inhibitors of it Gender is on the line in the preservation of community whether at Prospect's local level or the national scale

Women in Control? The Role of Women in Law Enforcement By Frances Heidensohn Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992 Pp ix + 273

Peter K. Manning
Michigan State University

Frances Heidensohn endeavors here "to tell the story of women in policing [in the United States and Britain] within the context of social control today" (p 245) This stated aim requires that she fashion a dialogue between the structure, quality, and consequences of social control, especially for and by women, and features of Anglo-American policing Chapters outline concepts of social order and control, women in policing and policing women, and the role of the modern police, while two chapters analyze similarities and differences of the experience of police women in the two countries Two final chapters discuss contrasts and conclusions The author deftly concludes, "Women are not in control They might begin to ask men why" (p 247) The form of the question and to whom it should be addressed is indicative of her perspective

The concept of social control includes formal and informal aspects and public and private activities, according to the author, but is left undefined The author argues persuasively that histories of social control, especially those arguing for a "dispersal of discipline," fail to take into account both the role of gender in patterning social control structures and women's role in social control By focusing only on the role of women as victims or as oppressed by patriarchal structures, analysts overlook

the essentially reflexive nature of controlling activities. This insight is powerful, and could have been well linked to Jack Gibbs's brilliant analysis (*Control: Sociology's Central Notion* [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989]).

The key concepts and themes are carved from a small number of interviews (p. 229). The author balances irony, complexity, and reflexivity in her analyses, providing some sense of officers' views and struggles. Unfortunately, the quotes are neither very telling nor discussed in detail, leaving one to speculate about how order and comparison were rendered. On the whole, the quotes could have been from "men" or "women." Given her commitment to understanding the interactions between gender perspectives and experience in a controlling institution, it is a pity that men, even in the role of key informants, were not interviewed. This is lamentable particularly because Heidensohn cites Malcolm Young and Jennifer Hunt, who show that in large part the meaning of police work is based on the dialectic between symbolic categories within the work and categorizations of those outside. Heidensohn correctly sees the public and private side of police culture as fragile and desperately linked, and that symbolically women represent a threat to the myth of (police) male unity against the chaos of the outside world.

This is the only comparative, systematic study of women police. Comparisons of the reported experiences of British and American officers are made in the context of differences in law, policy, views of equality, weapons, and politics. In both countries women police found resistance of men to their entry and connected the entry of women into control institutions to moral movements to elevate morality and to insure equality of treatment of women and children. Oddly, her categories for comparison (sense of mission, pioneers, partners, transformative scenes, professionalism, soft cops, female cop culture, and top cops) although interesting, are not drawn from known schemes such as the occupations/natural history Chicago approach, making comparisons with other work tenuous. The resistance to women in policing is strong, persistent, and suffuses virtually every aspect of the female officer's career. This resistance is based in part upon a male wish to dominate and to avoid domination and in part to the symbolic threat women represent to traditional practices. Yet, as the author points out, the decline in the legitimacy of the police, the crisis in law and order in both societies, women's withdrawal of support for controlling institutions, all suggest a need to rethink not only structures of control but the quality and texture of control experiences. These themes are found in both societies, and in spite of differing legal structures and approaches, the presence of women in policing (9%–11%) is the same in both nations. It is surprising, therefore, that Heidensohn does not cite Kanter's work on gender ratios in organizations (*Men and Women of the Corporation* [New York: Basic Books, 1977]). The size of the "token minorities" in both organizations would lead one to predict that differences between men and women would be slight. Heidensohn disagrees (p. 224).

The book contains a subtle critique of feminist notions of social control (seeing a limited field of victimization rather from the role of women as controllers and their potential for altering the quality of social control) and of radical Foucaultian visions of generalized social control lacking consideration of the central role of gender. Heidensohn asks very fundamental questions. To what degree would changing the number of female officers alter the nature, direction, and consequences of social control? What consequences would result with respect to legitimation, reduction of violence, and humanization of practices? I might add a related question. How, in turn, would these changes affect men's relations to the state, social control processes, and control institutions?

In my judgment, the book's broad focus and absence of a tight theoretical perspective reveals more about social control processes than about policing. In fact, more detailed knowledge of the occupation in organizational context might have enabled more precise understanding of the focus of the interviewees' complaints. On the other hand, the author recognizes the bias in past research with respect to its focus on men, its limited vision, and rather narrow occupational concerns. The dialogue concerning the nature of social control urged by the author is important, especially given the dearth of systematic, theoretically driven analyses of policing.

Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective Community Control. By Robert J. Bursik, Jr., and Harold G. Grasmick. New York: Lexington Books, 1993. Pp. xii + 226.

Richard Rosenfeld
University of Missouri—St. Louis

Neighborhoods and Crime makes a persuasive case for the continued relevance of social disorganization theory in the study of crime. Bursik and Grasmick insist that disorganization theory, now well over a half-century old, is not some "hoary old framework" unable to meet the intellectual or policy challenges of contemporary urban crime patterns. On the contrary, its future appears "bright and exciting" (p. 59). The authors develop their argument by expanding Shaw and McKay's classic disorganization perspective into a "systemic control" model that links the effectiveness of local crime control to the broader "public controls" of political and economic institutions beyond the neighborhood. They then apply systemic control theory to the fundamental topics in the study of communities and crime, including community-level correlates of offending and victimization, fear of crime, gangs, and community crime prevention strategies. Their assessment of the relevant literature is informed, up to date, and exceptionally comprehensive. *Neighborhoods and Crime* is essential reading for researchers and graduate students.

needing a state-of-the-art assessment of the problems and prospects of "neighborhood criminology "

Neighborhood criminology is not without its problems, the most important of which, according to the authors, is the development of valid and reliable indicators for underlying concepts, including basic ones such as "gang," "fear," and "neighborhood ." Although their close examination of such problems is valuable, I am not fully convinced by their conclusion that the resolution of measurement issues "is the single greatest challenge facing the criminological community" (p 181) The greater challenge is to resolve the prior conceptual and theoretical problems that prevent meaningful measurement The two most important of these are (1) the expulsion of the concept of culture from disorganization theory and (2) the logical problem inherent in the proposition that crime results from the inability of a community to control crime

The idea of public control in Bursik and Grasmick's systemic model of crime calls attention to larger structural conditions affecting neighborhoods and whole cities Yet it ignores the influence of dominant cultural patterns on community institutions and crime rates The closest the authors come to the realm of culture is in a critique of "subculture" two-thirds of the way through the book, and this discussion is limited to the subculture of gang delinquency Even here, the treatment of subcultural theory is unnecessarily defensive, the burden is always on the cultural theorist to demonstrate why culture is "required" in an explanation of crime and delinquency No such heavy burden of theoretical relevance is placed on the concept of social disorganization Thus the authors conclude that the systemic control model is capable of explaining gangs and urban dynamics "without resorting to" other (i e , cultural) explanations (p 147) But what is it about cultural explanation that makes it something an analyst would have to "resort to," like a gun or a laxative, when all else fails?

Bursik and Grasmick criticize the circular reasoning in many subcultural explanations of crime People commit crimes because they are enacting subcultural values and roles, criminal behavior is then used to demonstrate the existence of criminal subcultures (p 139) However, as the authors recognize, a similar problem has plagued classic disorganization theory's central proposition that high rates of crime are produced by weak social controls (p 15) This problem is not solved simply by enlarging the scope of social control to encompass sources of control beyond the local community, that is, by making the theory "more structural " Nor is it solved by models that link crime and social control in complex, reciprocal causal chains of fear and "disorder " Disorder theory predicts that fear is elevated and community controls are eroded by neighborhood conditions that are not "intrinsically crime-related" (p 101) However, the conditions of disorder mentioned by the authors (groups of unsupervised teenagers, vandalism, graffiti, abandoned buildings, public drug and alcohol use) are criminal offenses or carry legal penalties (loitering, vandalism, property destruction, building code viola-

tions, drug law violations) We are left, at best, with an explanation specifying that small crimes can lead, directly or indirectly, to bigger ones The logical problem underlying this approach is underscored by the magnitude of the empirical association (about .80 in one recent study [p. 104]) between indicators of incivility and disorder on the one hand and community crime rates on the other This degree of measurement redundancy renders the development of meaningful causal models nearly impossible

Better measurement may help, but the logical problems that beset purely structural models, including nonrecursive ones, will continue until cultural analysis is brought back into neighborhood criminology Bursik and Grasmick criticize such "mixed models" for implying inconsistent explanations of crime Specifically, they reject the notion that neighborhood subcultures provide direct support for criminal activity However, this hardly exhausts cultural explanations of crime, and a broader conception of culture would enrich the structural explanations they favor Consider, for example, how the individualistic, competitive ethos of American culture impoverishes the sense of collective obligation and responsibility needed for "public control" in the systemic model—or for that matter, the cultural changes required to bring gang members into the "core" of crime prevention programs, as proposed in the final chapter In any event, their neglect of culture is made all the more conspicuous by the authors' thorough and careful advocacy of the continuing importance of social disorganization theory The future of the disorganization perspective will be even brighter when the hoary old conflict between cultural and structural theories of crime is ended

Crime in the Making Pathways and Turning Points through Life By Robert J. Sampson and John H. Laub Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993 Pp. ix + 309

John Modell
Carnegie Mellon University

Crime in the Making is imaginative and forthright, a well-argued research monograph with broad theoretical and methodological implications The authors' grasp of the issues and their analytic thoroughness make this account of the life-course organization of delinquency and crime thought provoking and, surely, long lasting

Sampson and Laub write comfortably within the conventional assumptions of criminology: offender, not offense, needs to be explained, connections between deviance and social class need not be examined with an eye to considering how the line drawn between "deviant" and "normal" may support structures of inequality, the "steady work habits" that promote "going straight" need not also be understood as compliance with bosses The authors seek empirical grounding for a position between

sociological criminologists, who eschew individual-based explanations for deviance, and scholars such as Michael R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, who so emphasize the persistence of individual deviance that social process falls from view. *Crime in the Making* confirms the considerable continuity in rule-breaking behavior over the life course while emphasizing social process to explain why so many cease and so many initiate deviance in adulthood. The authors' largest theoretical contribution is an explicit theory of informal social control over deviant behavior that they link to individuals' chosen (but also structurally influenced) ties with family and employer (on the "good" side) and peers (on the "bad" side).

The analysis rests on longitudinal data, collected by Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck between 1939 and 1964, on 500 white Boston delinquents and 500 nondelinquent counterparts. These data have never been subjected to secondary analysis for criminological purposes. Sampson and Laub seek to rehabilitate the Gluecks' reputation, and they offer a thoughtful analysis of the pair's outlook and method examined in its institutional context. They demonstrate that the generally atheoretical empiricism that led the Gluecks to presume multiple factors and to gather data from multiple sources is joined in the *data* they created with a passionate workmanship. Sampson and Laub find these data particularly pertinent not in spite of their age but *because* of it, inasmuch as "we are analyzing a sample which is largely an 'underclass' by today's economic definition, but in which race is not an explanation" (254). To make good fully on this promise, however, would demand an examination of the institutional, economic, and social-historical setting of Boston that is notably lacking.

The data analysis is extremely compelling social science and takes powerful advantage of the life-course sense of an "unfolding" through time. Each chapter examines key social influences upon rule breaking and crime, then examines these in their structural contexts and in terms of earlier manifestations of individual propensities to deviance. A number of parallel multivariate methods are employed, on the whole showing clear-cut (and clearly delimited) structural, developmental, and social-control contributions to deviant behavior. Where the matched-sample design often led the Gluecks into statistical snares, Sampson and Laub turn it to their advantage, as in their fine chapter 8 where they create a model for adult crime initiation and test it separately in the control sample and the delinquent sample.

Further pressing to explore the richness of the Glueck data, the authors move in their final empirical chapter to use the "detailed handwritten interviews, the interview narratives, and the volumes of miscellaneous notes and correspondence" (p. 205) archived for each subject. Seeking to avoid the temptation to use these merely for illustration, Sampson and Laub select cases randomly from within cells of a typology based on their model for adult criminality, admirably examining both main-diagonal and off-diagonal cases. They read these interpretively in

order to shift their focus from variables to “persons as the main unit of analysis” (p 204)

This is not entirely satisfying. The authors cannot divorce themselves from a variables focus, and they virtually treat their small intensive sample as a microscopic *quantitative* test of their hypotheses. Nor are they adept at discerning (or portraying) the inner logic of lives as revealed in data such as these. The interviews and notes may well lack insight, but if this is true, the authors might better have selected the best (maybe even the longest) within each type, and read these while imaginatively reconstructing the lives they document. The authors show us that familiar, conventional motives like occupational ambition or pride in family role are espoused by those who go or stay straight, but we learn very little about what it feels like to be energized, to have one’s life directed, by any other less familiar or less well articulated or less admirable motive. Put starkly, the authors’ theory of informal social control helps us understand how right behavior is maintained but leaves us with Gottfredson and Hirschi, or Hobbes, in understanding “crime in the making.”

This absolutely first-rate book does not do everything, but it does take on a huge subject, frame and test an important argument, and tame a vast data set. It deserves thoughtful examination by a wide range of scholars within and beyond sociology.

Slim’s Table: Race, Respectability, and Masculinity By Mitchell Dunneier. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Pp. 192. \$19.95.

Penny Edgell Becker
University of Chicago

Slim’s Table is an ethnography in the classical Chicago tradition—participant-observation in a South Side Chicago community. The South Side has been the object of intense scholarly attention, yet the author finds another story to tell within this much-covered territory. As is the beauty of ethnography when it is well done, he captures in the gathering of men at Valois cafeteria the very texture of personal experience and interaction, and he writes well enough to convey this to the reader with clarity and a certain charm.

The ethnography in this case is very well done and provides a solid foundation for the description that makes up the first two-thirds of the book. The verbal portraits of the men as individuals are finely drawn. The description of the regularities of their interaction is detailed and rings true, and the interpretation of what they share as a caring and moral community is compelling. The reader who has never stepped into Valois cafeteria (motto, See Your Food) puts down the book with a feel for the regulars—mostly black men, but some white men and university students—who frequent this hangout on the edge of the ghetto.

The strengths of the book are the careful nature of the research itself.

and the quality of the writing, particularly when the author is telling stories about the men, which consist of observations and stories that support several points Duneier wants to stress. For example, the caring community the men construct spans some conventional boundaries, such as age and race. His thesis is that respectability, self-control, and sociability are qualities the men share and that are reinforced by their modes of interaction at Valois and other nearby establishments. He notes that "participation in cafeteria life enabled a man to achieve a greater sense of his own worth through positive contact with members of other groups" (p. 92). Such "positive contact" provides a bridge from private life into what Duneier terms "society." He offers this portrait to counteract the stereotype of urban black men as sunk into the social pathologies of crime and violence.

The weaknesses appear in Duneier's attempt to link what he has learned in Valois with other sociological studies of black urban America. One expects the last third of the book to be more analytical. Instead, the book launches an attack on both scholarly and popular accounts of race and urban poverty and offers no compelling interpretation to replace them.

Some of Duneier's criticisms are on target. The academic world has too often joined the media to portray black men in America in the most crudely stereotypical ways. For example, the dismay expressed at the migration of middle-class blacks out of urban ghettos focuses on the loss of middle-class examples of morality, self-control, and dignity. Duneier finds these qualities in abundance in the financially poorer men he has studied and rightly questions the scholarly emphasis on the flight of the black middle class as decisive in perpetuating a morally impoverished culture in urban areas.

Yet Duneier maintains the same focus by spending a fairly long section discussing what urban ghettos lose when middle-class blacks move out. Duneier offers a model whereby the flight of the middle class brings about a vacuum of another kind. Middle-class persons are said to offer a type of charismatic authority, conferred by their "contact with the locus of authority of society" (p. 131). Middle-class blacks "are significant for the inspiration and coherence fostered by their presence in ghetto communities" (p. 133). Unfortunately, this entire discussion is muddled and extremely unclear. And, like some of the work he criticizes, it leaves aside other, more difficult questions, for example, What about resources? Goods and services leave urban areas along with middle-class blacks, and those left behind do not have the resources to demand government services or pay for private ones.

There are other problems in the book. The terms "black men" and "black community" are sometimes used interchangeably in the discussion in chapters 8 and 9, and Valois is referred to as part of the ghetto in some instances and outside of it in others. Duneier tends to lump scholarly work in with journalistic accounts as though they were more alike than they are. The last third of the book often reads like a wander-

ing polemic, and some of his criticisms are unfair. Duneier calls to account such prominent scholars as William Julius Wilson and Elijah Anderson for perpetuating the stereotype that black urban neighborhoods contain only pathology, yet what Duneier has identified is very close to what Anderson observes in *Streetwise* (University of Chicago Press, 1990)—the struggle *within* poor, black urban neighborhoods to maintain a culture of respectability in the face of violent street life. For example, Slim and the other men tell Duneier that they come out of the nearby ghetto to socialize at Valois because of the crime and violence on ghetto streets.

Duneier has a sincere desire to go beyond a stereotypical portrayal of the African-American men he has studied, and he is willing to tilt at giants when he thinks they have used the power of their publications to spread a one-sided and harmful view of black culture. That and the wonderful descriptive sections make this book well worth reading for scholars interested in race, poverty, and urban ethnography. I wish the author had more thoughtfully drawn out the implications of his findings for scholarship in these areas.

Life Is Hard: Machismo, Danger, and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua. By Roger N. Lancaster. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992. Pp. xi + 340. \$25.00.

Paola Pérez-Alemán
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Life Is Hard successfully analyzes culture and politics in the Nicaraguan Revolution, paying special attention to power in gender relations and sexuality. In the style of an anthropological study, Lancaster records the results of interviews and observations with three families living in a working-class neighborhood in Managua. The book traces the unfolding of the Nicaraguan Revolution through the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, from a micro-level perspective that contrasts with the usual narrowly focused macroeconomic analyses of Nicaragua.

Concentrating on power relations within the family, Lancaster argues that the revolution failed to address and transform the culture of machismo as well as the system of gender relations (between both men and women, and men and men). Machismo continued to be reproduced within the new types of relations that the revolution attempted to create. Furthermore, the lack of changes in the gender and sexuality dimensions had significant implications for the undoing (or "failure") of the Sandinistas. Lancaster elaborates that the decline in support for the Sandinistas (indicated by the 41% of votes received in 1990 compared to 63% earned in the 1984 elections) reflected the party's failure to appreciate the gender dimensions of politics. For example, the Sandinistas used male and female symbols in the 1990 political campaign differently than the winning

UNO coalition. The latter successfully promoted Violeta Chamorro's image as a mother, borrowing from traditional Nicaraguan family culture to gain support for their coalition.

By giving importance to an analysis of gender relations and sexuality in the Nicaraguan Revolution, Lancaster builds on the intellectual movement of the last decade, which aims at a new vision of social conflict and transformation and emphasizes the existence of more areas of conflict than social class. Instead of conceiving machismo or sexuality in terms of preexisting Marxist categories of "base" and "superstructure," Lancaster views them as plural systems of power, autonomous but intertwined, covering different symbolic and material terrains. This is no small issue in any analysis of the Nicaraguan Revolution, as the Sandinistas' conception of change prioritized class issues.

The book also addresses how Nicaraguans dealt with the acute economic hardship of the 1980s. The chapter "Coping with Less" reveals the survival strategies of people living in a crisis characterized by hyperinflation, dramatic wage-level drops, reduction of social programs, and increased poverty. Lancaster captures the breakup of families as men migrate to the United States, and the multiple networks of family, friends, and fictive kin who help people face the hardships through interactions that go beyond purely economic exchanges, including reciprocity and emotional support.

Of particular interest is the chapter entitled "Subject Honor, Object Shame," which analyzes the consequences of machismo on male relations. The study of machismo has generally focused on how this system negatively affects women: domestic violence, fathering children in multiple households, alcohol abuse, and male abandonment of family. Lancaster shows that machismo is also a means of structuring power relations between men and men. Moreover, in an excellent discussion of the social construction of sexuality, he argues that machismo is more than an ideology; it is also a way of organizing social relations.

Lancaster fails, however, to elaborate in his analysis the Nicaraguans' struggles to construct new cultural meanings. He emphasizes more the way machismo sets the conditions for the life of men and women, rather than their active resistance and redefinition of gender roles. This is particularly notable in his portrayal of women, which reveals more how machismo constrains them, instead of their individual and collective negotiation for new identities and spaces. On the contrary, women forged significant processes in Nicaragua during the 1980s to make gender issues part of the revolution's agenda. My own work and that of other scholars (Florence Babb, Helen Collison, Clara Murguialday) has shown how women have learned to contest the culture of machismo with new social practices. Lancaster's excessive attention to the practices that continue to reflect traditional relations obscures those that point to new identities.

Life Is Hard provokes thinking on how we might view revolutionary or transformation processes. Lancaster believes that success should be

measured by "whether a revolution systematically implements key elements of its class, structural, political, and ideological agenda" (p. 296). Therefore, the Nicaraguan Revolution failed to achieve its plans for equality and justice, both at the economic level and within the family. This perspective, however, hinders our understanding of a revolution that was not led solely by a purposive Sandinista party to establish its own program. This notion is too simple. Conflicts emerged at multiple levels that were not controlled by any one actor. Rather, a complex intermeshing of diversely situated groups has shaped the revolution in unforeseen ways, producing new political-economic relations. Instead of evaluating whether the Sandinistas implemented their agenda, it would be more instructive to try to understand the evolving political system and the newly arising problems and opportunities Nicaragua faces to achieve equality. Viewed from this perspective, we can be more perceptive to the small changes initiated in the past, and we can leave behind "gloomy visions" about the possibility for positive developments in the future.

While we may argue with Lancaster's conclusions, this book is nevertheless an important contribution. And though it focuses on the Nicaraguan Revolution, its relevance expands to scholars of gender, ideology, power, culture, and revolutions.

The Modern Christmas in America: A Cultural History of Gift Giving
By William B. Waits. New York: New York University Press, 1993. Pp. xix + 267.

Michael C. Kears
Trinity University

The social history of cultural consumerism and commercialism has, since the 1980s, been undergoing an academic renaissance. Whether inspired by the proliferating cathedrals of consumption now dominating urban landscapes, elitist greed during times of declining standards of living, or some collective sense of the obsolescence of the traditional work ethic, the era features such notable works as Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H. Plumb's *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England* (Indiana University Press, 1982) and Colin Campbell's *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Basil Blackwell, 1987).

It came, therefore, as no surprise that the ultimate consumptive ritual, the event upon which retailers depend for nearly 40% of their annual trade, should now be examined by cultural researchers. William Waits's *The Modern Christmas in America: A Cultural History of Gift Giving* is a research gem, focusing on the changing facets of this ritual during the 19th and 20th centuries. Based on content analyses of a longitudinal sample of 1,720 magazine articles on gift giving and 1,270 advertisements

(77 of which are included as illustrations), this is an impressive example of what can be gleaned through qualitative analysis

We learn that the first Christmas Americans would recognize dates back only to the 1880s, with complaints of its excessive commercialization and loss of religious significance appearing by the first decade of the 20th century. This supposed desacralization turns out to be an example of historical revisionism, for the holiday's timing and meaning have more to do with the near-universal impetus to give ritual to the winter solstice, rejuvenating both natural and social times. Nonetheless, Christmas was to be one of the few rituals having the symbolic power to give individuals needed out-of-time experiences of biographical renewal and continuity, to temporally remove them from the everyday tensions and unhappiness associated with a period of monumental sociocultural change, and to tap the nostalgia for ruralism and simpler times.

Three major themes appear throughout the book. The first involves how the custom of exchanging unique handmade items was altered by industrialization and urbanization. There first appeared "halfway items" (things purchased partially completed and finished by givers), followed by mass-produced products made to look as if they were handmade, and later by a range of manufactured items advertised as being "appropriate" or "ideal" as Christmas gifts. Also to disappear was the late 19th and early 20th century practice of exchanging manufactured gimcracks, the cheap, useless, and unaesthetic "doodads" given to family members and friends alike. Arising from the rural custom of giving to a wide circle of others, this practice succumbed with the large number of *Gesellschaft* relationships that characterize urban life.

The problem of "decontaminating" manufactured items, removing market value connotations and doubts about the appropriateness of utilitarian gifts, was to be rectified by product packaging, holiday wrappings, and advertising (e.g., "A thoughtful gift is a Gillette Safety Razor for his Christmas" or "What gift from a thoughtful husband can be more welcome than a Simplex Ironer?"). Santa also proved useful. Originally a small and often punitive elf (remember grandma's threats of coal or switches in one's stocking?), he is now an ever-cheerful, generous (e.g., non-profit-oriented) patriarch who labors with his nonunion elves in a cottage industry of yesteryear.

The second theme is the use of Christmas to reaffirm social bonds. Fewer and more expensive items were to be given to a considerably contracted circle of family members ("The Feminization of Christmas," "Within the Marital Bond," "Something for the Kid") and close friends. New standards of consumerism emerged, featuring new gifting tensions to replace those associated with making one's own presents. The new task of the Christmas shopper was to fathom the secret wishes of the gift recipients and to select that gift best symbolizing the relationship. Given the dramatic changes occurring in familial and occupational bonds, anxiety was inevitable when calculating the quality of relationships in pecuniary terms. Those no longer part of gift exchanges now received Christmas

cards, which circumvented the problem of defining relationships (such as between business associates) by simply saying nothing about them. Though gift exchanges contracted, reaffirmations of ever-wider solidarities occurred, from the community celebrations of the 1910s and 1920s (to ritually recapture the lost feelings of *Gemeinschaft* communion) to national-level observances of World War I (one could give to the nation by purchasing Liberty Bonds).

The final theme involves how various groups were to capitalize on the holiday. For industrialists, of course, mass production required mass consumption. Banks had their Christmas club savings accounts, which often paid less interest than regular savings accounts and attracted more working-class depositors. Store gift certificates reduced anxieties of gift givers while serving as a currency only within particular retail establishments. But it was not the case that these powerful interests somehow duped Americans into exploitive holiday observances. "At crucial points, [consumers] exercised control over the emerging celebration and shaped it to their liking" (p. 202). The holiday was also seized upon by Progressive Era reformers who sought to address the social problems of poverty and poor working conditions, leading to the rationalization of charity and the giving of Christmas bonuses.

Impressive as it is, *The Modern Christmas in America* could have achieved the status of a minor classic had it taken advantage of the research cited in the first paragraph coupled with the recent social histories of family and private life. Why, for instance, were the 1880s such a benchmark period? Useful would be Campbell's insights on how romanticism legitimated hedonistic consumer behavior and facilitated the industrial revolution by stressing sentimentalism, nonutilitarian aestheticism, and penchants for spontaneity and novelty. Integrating these and related sociocultural trends would have given even deeper insights into the shifting trends in Christmas observances so admirably detailed.

War and Television By Bruce Cumings. London: Verso, 1992. Pp. 309. \$29.95.

Lewis A. Friedland
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Bruce Cumings's *War and Television* reads like two books within a single cover. The title leads the reader to expect a general consideration of the effects of the medium of television on modern warfare. In the first half of this book Cumings offers reflections on a number of themes, including television and historical memory, the documentary, and the role of television in the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars. The second half is taken up with a rich and thick description of how "The Unknown War," a historical documentary on the Korean War for which Cumings was principal historical consultant, was assembled by Britain's Thames Television and

then picked apart and repositioned for a U S audience by the United States Public Broadcasting System (PBS)

Cumings is a major historian of the Korean War. Both his expertise and the historical amnesia surrounding his subject condition his reflections on television in general. In his introduction and first two chapters, Cumings elaborates his own general theory of television. The Gulf War realized "the full totalizing potential of war television: the medium as the only message" (p. 1). He asks how a medium that opens so much of the world to view manages to see and explain so little. He answers his question by linking television to a peculiarly narrow American liberalism, on the one hand, and postmodernity, on the other. For Cumings, liberalism limits the ability to express a nonrelativistic moral point of view, necessary for establishing historical truth, postmodern culture reduces history to images stripped from their context in historical time and space.

Cumings compares the "eyewitness" function of documentary to historicist empiricism. Both documentary and historian "record 'the facts'" (p. 53), yet the facts never speak for themselves. Following Roland Barthes, he notes that documentary still photography fixes the range of connotations available to its viewers. Although film and television appear more open, they also raise difficult questions of empirical truth and historical myth. Cumings then applies this critique to the television treatment of the Vietnam and Gulf wars. He describes the myth of television's "transparency," the idea that as a window on reality, television "lost" the Vietnam War for the United States, an idea embraced by Richard Nixon and Marshall McLuhan alike. Following Dan Hallin and others, Cumings notes how television carefully circumscribed the limits of legitimate controversy. His chapter on the Gulf War is brief and interesting, but most of this material has been covered in greater depth by subsequent scholarship (Douglas Kellner, *The Persian Gulf War and Television* [Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992]).

Cumings is at his best when he moves to the Korean War and the making of "The Unknown War." Cumings and British cowriter Jon Halliday insisted that the North Korean version of the war be included because it had never been told to the West. When the film moved to the PBS, pressure mounted to alter the film's historical interpretation from right-wing media watchdog Accuracy in Media (AIM) and retired generals like Richard Stilwell, who had fought in the war. Points of view contradicting the official U S version of the war were dropped, while others supporting it were added.

Cumings writes as a historian, media critic, and participant. His account demonstrates how the history of the Korean War became systematically distorted as it passed through the editorial filters of the U S public television system. However, the work as a whole remains impressionistic. Cumings takes little note of the findings of contemporary sociology of television news. Hallin's *The Uncensored War* is recommended for its portrayal of television's Vietnam coverage, but issues raised by leading sociologists of television news like Herbert Gans and Gaye Tuchman go

unacknowledged. This would be less of a problem if Cumings did not claim to be writing a generalized exploration of television and war. Such a treatment calls for a systematic discussion of the ways that news-gathering routines frame ideological issues, but that discussion never takes shape. If Cumings had more rigorously compared the differences between the British and U.S. historical documentary, for example, the book might have made its own contribution to this discussion. But much of the account remains descriptive and anecdotal.

The most significant U.S. sociology of television news has concentrated on the commercial networks. There has been little work of depth on the PBS system or the modern television documentary. Cumings's richly descriptive book may be of interest to sociologists of communication and the media in these two underexplored areas, but it is interesting primarily as an insider's account providing raw material for further comparative analysis.

The Human Difference: Animals, Computers, and the Necessity of Social Science. By Alan Wolfe. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Pp. xvii + 243.

Randall Collins

University of California, Riverside

Will sociology, Alan Wolfe asks, turn out to be a short-lived social science? It appeared at a moment in history when humans were throwing off the authority of the sacred and the traditional, and recognizing a sui generis realm of collectivities and individuals standing above the world of nature. By the late 20th century, sociology has lost its confidence and its sense of purpose. Its ideas come increasingly from the outside, the existence and the moral legitimacy of its subject matter are called into question.

On one side, sociology is being pressed back into nature. Biology, like sociology a young science—Darwin is later than Comte—has surpassed it by making continuous strides and now denies the uniqueness of sociology's turf. Morally, movements for animal rights and deep ecology castigate anthropocentric viewpoints and place earth first. On a related front, the uniqueness of humans is threatened by computer science, which promises to demonstrate human qualities are no more than those shared by machines. If these tendencies erode sociology from the side of the subhuman world, it is eroded simultaneously from the suprahuman realm of cultural codes. Structuralism and postmodernism dissolve the world into a meaninglessly shifting series of changes in a self-referential system of rhetoric. The Enlightenment optimism of early sociology, that human individuals can rise above both nature and the impositions of culture and take direction into their own hands, has given way on all fronts.

Wolfe remains an optimist. With a cool and even-handed style that

contrasts with the polemical tactics so often associated with these topics, he summarizes the principal arguments of each challenger and puts forward a rebuttal. A good deal of research, for instance, has been collected showing that animals can do things once believed to be uniquely human: communicate information, metacommunicate about their own messages, solve problems, use referential symbols, make tools, recognize themselves in mirrors, divide labor, and exhibit moral behavior such as self-sacrifice and peace making. Nevertheless, Wolfe points out there is no evidence animals have minds that can make interpretations or selves with the qualities of reflection and moral responsibility. One might also note that evidence on the various allegedly human qualities is scattered among animal species: ants can do some of these, birds or chimpanzees others, but nothing like the whole package is found except among humans. Humans have developed the capacity for creating macro organization and symbolizing it within individual minds, in a fashion that makes the human species more powerful than any of the others. By now, humans are far more dangerous to the other species than the other way around. From this viewpoint, efforts to mark humans as just another animal look silly.

Wolfe devotes a separate chapter to the environmentalist and animal rights movements. These reverse the Enlightenment themes of society as the peak of evolution and find humans not only cruel and self-centered in relation to other species, but an evolutionary dead end whose eventual extinction as the result of fouling their own environment would be no more than fitting. Wolfe's tone, usually cool-headed and fair, slips a bit here in his rebuttals; he asks us to expect, for instance, that poverty of creative imagination and a puritanical censorship would result from a society dominated by animal rights activists. To the deep ecologists and Gaia followers who denounce human centrism, Wolfe responds by moral counterdenunciations. The target here is too easy. Environmentalists are hardly an intellectual challenge to the existence of sociology, and Wolfe's argument here is a bit like fighting off a mouse with a bludgeon.

A little worthier foe is confronted in the chapter on postmodernism. Wolfe takes the interesting line that postmodernism has lost the Durkheimian recognition that society is simultaneously both sacred and profane, modernity, which is the only historical period to recognize this—principally via the insights of sociologists—is a difficult condition precisely because there is always the danger of elevating the sacred into an eternal canon to be worshipped or of falling into cynicism and seeing everything as a mundane self-interest. Postmodernism is literary criticism made half-wise by sociology, throwing rocks at all the sacred objects and in the process obliterating the creativity of the individual and the value of literature itself. For Alan Wolfe, like Wolf Lepenies (*Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989]), sociology is a hybrid between the insights of the realist social novelists and the methods of science, and so there is no question of dispensing with sociology's literary connection; it is precisely because postmodernism elevates literary theory at the expense of literature itself

that Wolfe regards it as pernicious. A fundamental commitment of the sociologist, for Wolfe, is like that of Balzac or Tolstoy to be a realist not on metaphysical grounds but in the minimal sense of "telling it like it is," showing the ethnographic insight of a Gans or a Goffman for finding out what people's lives are like. The fact that we recognize sources of class, ethnic, or gender bias in human thinking is no warrant for making ourselves nothing but ideological polemicists, it is one more hard problem that we must struggle with in the effort to bring home our best reports.

In the chapter on computers, Wolfe invokes as the criterion of distinctively human intelligence the Meadian principles: humans have not only brains but minds, not only bodies but selves. Wolfe proposes that the Turing test of artificial intelligence (AI) be supplemented by a "human essence test": we know we are in the presence of a human intelligence if "we modify our thoughts by the ways which we expect others to react to them" (p. 60). Human beings, unlike AI software, "do not make sense out of the world by searching through memory in an application of algorithmic rules . . . [but] rely on the social world around them to supply the contexts within which communication takes on meaning" (p. 61). Wolfe cites ethnomethodological research to the effect that our minds are not filled with scripts and rules, we have instead the capacity to deal with ambiguity and do not need situations to be defined because we do the defining ourselves, through social interaction. "Humans are distinct not because their brains store more information than machines but because they can store less and get away with it" (p. 65).

In the 1980s, the new wave in AI recognized just these difficulties with algorithm-driven software and instituted a hardware-driven connectionist approach. This method dispenses with storing specific schema and explicit rules, but tries to build up problem-solving capacities by the ongoing modification of microelectronic nets. Wolfe remains doubtful the neural network approach can produce a human self that can interpret social contexts. Although connectionists use metaphors of society for the relations among specialized agents within the computer brain, the connectionist computer is not social in relation to the outside world, the Meadian difference is what remains uniquely and unassailably human. Wolfe does not raise the possibility that sociologists could break the impasse to a genuinely humanlike AI by designing a machine whose basic activities would mimic the Meadian/Durkheimian model of a human being. As I have argued elsewhere, the first thing such a machine must do is tune in on emotional resonances with people, and then internalize the symbols that arise from moments of emotional solidarity. Wolfe, as a humanist, would probably see an AI constructed by sociologists as just as threatening as any other. But I think it need not be so. For the sociologist's AI, to acquire high-level human capabilities, must join human society, it would have to interact with us, to grow from a baby AI into an adult, and in the process would have the peculiarities of its social location just like any human being. It would lack a human brain and body but would have a human mind and a self.

Such a sociological AI would indeed raise questions about its legal rights, of the sort that Wolfe dismisses in the case of animals and other species lacking human interpretative capabilities and selves. That such legal issues can (and I think will) arise in the 21st century will be a headache, especially for the portion of society that will inevitably regard new discoveries as threats to traditional ideals. But human history is a long line of headaches. Human society is not going to disappear, although our various discoveries, technical and moral alike, will make it more complicated. And since sociology is the only field which tackles these complexities head-on, it is not going to disappear either.

Testing Testing: Social Consequences of the Examined Life By F. Allan Hanson. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Pp. ix + 378.

Steven Brint

University of California, Riverside

Without question, we are the most tested people in human history. Frequently, testing begins with amniocentesis before babies are even born. Some selective preschools test for admission. We have our intelligence tested periodically as young people and sometimes also as adults. We are tested with at least weekly frequency in school. We may submit to or volunteer for tests of vocational interest and personality. Performance on aptitude and job qualifying tests have an important impact on our life chances. Depending on where we work and whether our behavior is suspicious, we may be subject to drug and lie detection tests. At one time or another we will, in all likelihood, measure the state of our children's development, the state of our love life or marriage, our life interests, and even whether we are happy or not in relation to some reputedly "objective" test.

F. Allan Hanson has written a provocative, but uneven and in some ways wrongheaded, book about an important topic. Hanson writes not about a particular type of test, but about testing generally as a social phenomenon. He distinguishes between "authenticity" and "qualifying" tests and devotes a major part of the book to each of the two types. Authenticity tests seek to discover some quality of a person that is otherwise hidden, often a quality with moral or legal significance such as lying or drug use. Qualifying tests seek to discover a capacity or inclination to perform certain activities, such as intellectual work or piloting an airplane. He investigates the origins of several types of testing, how people experience testing, and what he takes to be the major social consequences of testing.

The largest problems with the book have to do with this last issue. Hanson wishes to establish two theoretical propositions. One is that tests are mechanisms for creating "the concept of the person" in contemporary society, and the second is that testing maintains the person under the

surveillance and domination of “the disciplinary technology of power” of modern societies. The difficulty is not that these Foucaultian-inspired ideas are completely wrong, but that they are very one-sided.

Hanson seems to believe that people become what they are tested to be. Everyone has encountered people whose sense of adequacy has been strongly affected, positively or negatively, by test results. But the range of responses is much wider than that. Some take tests not as accurate representations of underlying qualities, but as hurdles to get over or as irrelevant bothers. “I’m not a good test taker” is a common expression—part defense, part self-assertion. Tests may be important determinants of life chances without necessarily creating people in their image.

The idea that tests are part of the “disciplinary technology of power” is even more one-sided. Does it really make sense to include all driver’s tests or tests of piloting skills as part of a “technology of power”? These kinds of tests are better described as ways that the users of roadways and air routes reduce the risk of utter incompetence. Even drug testing is, in many cases, a way for people in complex organizations to suffer less at the hands of inattention and irresponsibility. Testing is certainly part of the disciplinary technology of power, but it is not simply that. (Like many other followers of Foucault, Hanson uses the concept “power” too globally. It has the same omnipresent and ineffable character in these accounts as God does in some religious writing.)

The muckraking flavor of this book is useful, but only to a point. To see this, one has only to imagine what a complex society without testing would look like. It might very well be a society in which people were more subject than they currently are to random injurious events and where significantly less opportunity existed for those less advantaged by background. It is very easy to imagine that elite universities, for example, would place greater stress than they currently do on old loyalties and common cultures. As Max Weber recognized, given the most common historical alternatives, bureaucracy has a comparatively progressive face.

Hanson is on stronger ground when he attends to the human drama of test takers, test givers, and test-taking situations. He shows how unscrupulous lie detection operators can create “false positives” by focusing test takers’ anxieties on the “hot” questions and by giving them plenty of time to worry about their answers. He shows how employers frequently use compliance with lie detector tests—the “literal objectification of mistrust”—as a certification of employees’ ability to trust each other. He is sensitive even to the humiliation that somatic problems like “bashful kidneys” can have in drug testing situations. In some sections on lie detection, Hanson’s sensitivity to the connections between body and mind are reminiscent of contemporary masters like Pierre Bourdieu and Jack Katz.

There are other valuable nuggets in the book. The book includes interesting discussions of the 1,500-year rule of the Chinese examination system, the tests by torture and combat that were so common in the West until the 13th century, and even the strategies that work to “beat” lie

detectors (Hint It is not rigid control over questions that are meant to stimulate guilty responses, but wild fluctuations that prevent the construction of a base line)

What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry Edited by Charles C Ragin and Howard S Becker Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1992 Pp viii + 242 \$49 95 (cloth), \$15 95 (paper)

Alan Sica

Pennsylvania State University

Scholars across the social sciences already owe a pedagogical debt of gratitude to the editors of this volume, the former for his guide to comparative analysis, the latter for his primer on scholarly writing With this new book, that debt is enlarged Ragin and Becker have assembled a group of interconnected papers by established figures, including Andrew Abbott, Douglas Harper, Stanley Lieberman, Jennifer Platt, Diane Vaughan, John Walton, Harrison White, Michel Wieviorka, and themselves As participants in an innovative workshop at Northwestern University in 1988, each was asked to evaluate the concept of "a case," in sustained dialogue with one another, regarding its epistemological status and use in contemporary research As could easily be imagined given their previous works, the resulting "eight answers," to quote Ragin (p 11), vary enormously, with half dedicated more or less to critique and the other four applied to the utility of the "case" within specific research projects The editors close the book with their own disparate analyses of the work their confreres presented This produces an unusually coherent and self-contained "conference volume " And because the editors were especially shrewd in selecting creatively oppositional participants, there is something of value in the book for almost anyone, except perhaps the narrowest survey researchers for whom a given "case" is fairly irrelevant

Each author goes about his or her task differently Platt, in a clear and openly didactic chapter, begins the book with a selectively historical treatment of how cases have been used in ethnographies, beginning with *The Jackroller* in 1930 She moves methodically through eight exemplars (including Becker et al , *Boys in White*) and concludes that very little methodological agreement has obtained about the precise use of "a case " For those who have not read the classic texts she selects for examination, this chapter will prove especially instructive Abbott then challenges the reader with his characteristic sharpness, range of sources, and willingness to play devil's advocate This time out—with help from Arthur Danto on narratology and Hayden White's typology of narrative tropes, among others—he challenges the standard notion that narrative accounts are by definition incapable of revealing relations of causality He opposes the usual antinomies of *either* stories *or* formal models with an intriguing insight *all* studies, no matter how apparently analytic and

free of narrative spirit (e g , those with large samples of apparently undifferentiated "cases") hinge on storytelling. And given this fact, he urges that narratives be more carefully attended to in sociological research, both in untangling causal mechanisms and as part of methodological rigor. This relatively long chapter may be the most rewarding, for its freshness of approach to the problem and the fruitful use made of work from areas of scholarship not often enough brought together.

Tied closely to his new book, *Identity and Control*, Harrison White's chapter argues that cases are used by the laity and literati in several distinguishable ways, and that social scientists recapitulate these uses after their own fashion. He illustrates three categories of same with reference to any number of sources, from Shakespeare to Immanuel Wallerstein, pointing out how social analysis could be improved if its practitioners paid closer attention to more common uses of "case." He brings into discussions, in a style uniquely his, a number of terms (e g , "parataxis" vs "hypotaxis") to demonstrate his argument, some of which readers might indeed find worth learning.

In sharp contrast to White's contribution, Lieberman's is brutally lucid. Referring to the locus classicus of comparative analysis, J. S. Mill's *Logic* (by way of Elizabeth Nichols's restatement), he insists that small samples make causal or generalizing statements very risky and advises researchers who work with a few cases either to avoid attributing causality or to redefine their labors entirely and obtain larger samples. "Put bluntly," says Lieberman (p. 117), causal comparisons of the kind Skocpol and similar researchers have been making for the last 15 years must be tempered before they "do too much damage" (p. 118) to the entire enterprise.

The second half of the book is taken up with circumspect reflections on the use of "cases" in particular projects: Walton on the California water wars, Harper's unique study of a rural mechanic, Wieviorka concerning what makes a "case" within a medical versus a sociological context, and Vaughan's more general thoughts about empirical units (e g , families, organizations, etc.) as cases, and how they affect the theory and practice of social research. The book closes tidily with the editors' separate evaluations of what came before. *What Is a Case?* is a useful book, reflecting a new level of methodological/theoretical self-awareness and subtlety of the kind that will benefit the discipline.

Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods
By Anthony S. Bryk and Stephen W. Raudenbush. Newbury Park,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992. Pp. xvi + 265.

Henriette Engelhardt
University of Berne

For a long time the connection of micro and macro levels created some difficulties in statistical modeling. In sociology, the term "ecological fal-

lacy" refers to problems that may occur in the context of deriving individual features from aggregate data. On the other hand, it is well known that the behavior of a system is often more than the sum of its parts.

This monograph offers a careful introduction to models designed to deal with interactions between individual and contextual effects. The so-called hierarchical linear models (or, random coefficient models in the econometric literature, covariance components models or Bayesian linear models in the statistical literature) represent a class of multistage regression models.

Chapter 2 introduces the general logic behind these models. Starting from exogenous microlevel data, individual effects are estimated first. Then, the estimated parameters are explained on the basis of characteristic features from the next higher hierarchical level. This procedure is necessary because two fundamental assumptions of the OLS model will be violated if system characteristics are directly introduced into a microlevel equation: (a) variance homogeneity and (b) independent error terms.

There are at least two essential methodological improvements of the suggested procedure. First, the deterministic effects of the influential macroeffects can be separated. Second, it is possible to include stochastic macroeffects into the analysis. Put differently, the usual individual error terms of linear models are extended by error terms associated with the macro level. This approach makes it possible to systematically analyze the overall variance components. The total variance of the dependent variable from single-level data analysis can be decomposed into the "within group" and the "between group" variation. The interaction of the individual and the contextual effects as well as the variation of the estimated coefficients then can be identified in an analysis of the covariance of the error terms.

Chapter 3 presents an introduction to the relevant statistical techniques. Point and interval estimators of the first and second hierarchical levels are derived. Regression estimation techniques (OLS, WLS, GLS) are described. There is also a presentation of Bayes estimation as well as full and restricted maximum-likelihood techniques for estimating variance and covariance components.

Chapter 4 illustrates the statistical procedure by theoretical examples. This chapter does not add anything new, but rather reformulates the general approach in a less technical way so that statistically less advanced readers get access to the approach.

Chapters 5–8 apply the general statistical method to empirical data. Those applications come from the domain of educational research. They show that the advantage of the method indeed lies in the possibility to separate the variance explaining the effects of different levels of analysis.

The last two chapters are written for the statistically more advanced audience. Chapter 9 assesses the statistical adequacy of the method. The last chapter is a mathematical appendix. It derives the statistical model and requires knowledge of matrix algebra. Additionally, it describes

Bryk and Raudenbush's computer program and an algorithm for the data analysis

This book is an important contribution to the analysis of hierarchical data. It presents the material in sufficient depth without ignoring the demands of nonspecialists. The general approach can be applied to both cross-sectional and longitudinal data. The authors exemplify the analysis of panel data by an application of their approach to linear and quadratic growth models (chap. 6). This type of analysis certainly can be extended by relating, for example, hierarchical models to methods of survival analysis. Thus, the present study also may serve as a starting point for tackling the macro-micro problem in a dynamic context.

Last Chance High: How Girls and Boys Drop In and Out of Alternative Schools. By Deirdre M. Kelly. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. ix + 276.

Nilda M. Flores-Gonzalez
University of Chicago

The guiding principle behind alternative schools is that they provide a second chance to complete high school. *Last Chance High* by Deirdre M. Kelly argues that rather than providing a second chance, these schools are more like waiting stations for those on the way to dropping out. Kelly examines the dynamics between students, teachers, and administrators at two alternative high schools and discusses how social and organizational factors contribute to the disengagement of students, which ultimately leads them to drop out of school.

This book is based on a year-long ethnographic study at two continuation high schools, a common form of alternative school. Besides on-site observation, school records, and interviews of students, teachers, and administrators, Kelly used research techniques whereby students participated in data collection.

Kelly makes a clear distinction between the terms "dropout" and "pushout." She explains that "dropout" connotes the individual choice to leave school, while "pushout" implies institutional action to remove the student from school. Pushing out can take the form of leading students to leave school voluntarily, expelling them, or transferring them to other programs. Many school-leavers, she argues, are not dropouts but pushouts.

Kelly traces the historical development of alternative schools in the United States, with particular emphasis on the continuation school movement in California. Up to the 1930s, continuation schools were part-time institutions where employed youth obtained vocational training and job placement. After World War II, their mission shifted from a vocational site to an adjustment model that sought to educate so-called deviant

school-age children In the 1960s, the adjustment model gave way to "divergent youth" education, which emphasized institutional rather than individual failure Since then, alternative schools have catered to students seeking or in need of a nontraditional education

Despite the common view that alternative schools are a safety net for students, Kelly effectively argues that these schools are also a safety valve for comprehensive schools They provide comprehensive schools with a dumping ground where behavior problems and academic misfits can be deposited An added benefit is that comprehensive schools can disguise dropout rates by transferring students into alternative programs Many of these students eventually drop out, are pushed out, or are transferred into GED or adult education programs

Although alternative settings offer many benefits to students, such as flexible schedules and small classes, students pay with the high cost of stigmatization According to Kelly, community perceptions, triggered by negative media coverage, mar the image of these programs Organizational arrangements such as unclear goals and lack of training in alternative teaching methods add to the stigma Furthermore, participants themselves—teachers, administrators, students, and their families—undervalue the programs It is not surprising that completion rates are very low

The assumption that alternative schools are progressive institutions that promote ethnic, class, and gender equality is disputed by Kelly She argues that the social and organizational cultures of the schools perpetuated and in many instances condoned traditional class and gender relations Although she found that positive ethnic relations were fostered at the schools, traditional notions of gender and class went uncontested, leading students toward working-class, sex-segregated jobs Kelly pays particular attention to the way in which traditional gender relations were played out in the classroom and in teacher-student relations While boys were encouraged to become economically independent, girls were taught to see their self-worth in terms of relationship to others, and to men in particular

Kelly shows how patterns of slipping in and out of the school system vary according to gender Boys and "tough" girls are frequently pushed out because of discipline problems, girls tend to "slip out quietly" Students' reactions to school, she argues, are symptoms of disaffection that are rooted in the social and cultural organization of the school School, she argues, is a soap opera where different actors come to play As scripts unfold, a complicated social picture is revealed in which family, peers, and school staff have conflicting relations

This book's main contribution lies in its depiction of the interplay of gender and class in high school life Reading this work will benefit researchers seeking to understand the social and organizational systems of high schools and how they impinge on students' educational careers An added bonus is the tracking of educational paths followed by a cohort of students from ninth grade to five years later Also, Kelly uses High School

and Beyond data to compare her data with more general trends. Although this book is well written and descriptively rich, it does not include more substantive theoretical explanations. This is not to discount its contribution to the field, for the book raises questions about the hidden curriculum that should be taken seriously.

Land of Fair Promise: Politics and Reform in Los Angeles Schools, 1885–1941. By Judith Rosenberg Raftery. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992. Pp. 200. \$37.50.

Amy Stuart Wells
University of California, Los Angeles

The Progressive Era, perhaps more than any other period of American history, remains incredibly elusive and difficult to define. At the turn of the century, the divergent groups of politicians, suffragists, educators, businessmen, doctors, and labor leaders who called themselves progressives—or were labeled as such by others—represented a broad range of political interests and opinions regarding social reform. This complexity is especially pronounced in the history of American education, where at least two distinct camps of progressive reformers—aptly labeled by historian David Tyack as the “administrative progressives” and the “pedagogical progressives”—frequently clashed over the goals and purpose of public education, particularly in urban areas.

Despite the intricacy of this era and the impact of its reforms on public schools, Judith Rosenberg Raftery, in *Land of Fair Promise*, has made a valiant effort to weave together historical, political, and sociological themes into a coherent portrait of the development of the Los Angeles Unified School District from 1885 to 1941. Using “themes of political and professional self-interest to explain the motivations behind many reforms” (p. 3), Raftery illustrates the contradictory aims of Los Angeles progressives, most of whom were Anglo and middle class, and immigrant groups, most of whom were non-Anglo, did not speak English, and were poor. The central theme revolves around the efforts of the American-born progressives to use the educational system to Americanize immigrant children and the competing attempts by immigrants to maintain their own sense of identity and community. This effort on the part of the immigrants is illustrated by their frequent requests for school-based language classes to teach their children their native tongue. Several interesting subthemes, including the tensions between the self-interest of the politically powerful women of Los Angeles shortly after suffrage and the needs of the immigrant population, also emerge.

Raftery presents most of her data in chronological order, beginning with an overview of early progressive reforms in the Los Angeles schools—kindergartens, after-hours playgrounds, health care services at the school site, and penny lunches. These programs grew out of progres-

sive women's involvement with the schools, at first on a volunteer basis and later, after the programs were institutionalized, as paid professionals. Raftery claims that the goals of the women who helped found each of these programs was Americanization of immigrant children first, and second, their own professional and political development. Regarding health care services, however, her historical evidence is quite weak.

In chapter 3, Raftery makes a similar argument in relation to the California Home Teacher Act of 1915, which provided certified teachers, trained in special courses, to teach mothers of immigrant children English and American—that is, white, middle-class—customs. The act was strongly backed by the General Federation of Women's Clubs, and Raftery argues that this state legislation “illustrates the new political power of recently enfranchised women and their strategies to continue their social reforms.” It also demonstrates, according to Raftery, how “special interest groups used the schools to promote particular programs” (p. 68). Thus, she describes what she sees as the “benevolent paternalism” on the part of educators and reformers as they strove to control immigrants and to turn them into acceptable Americans—paternalism that, through no accident, also benefited the reformers and the educators by providing political power and employment.

In the second half of the book, Raftery describes the more typical reforms of the “administrative progressives”—reforms to make education more efficient, scientific, and professional through the use of standardized tests, rigid tracking practices, and centralization of decision making. The downside of these reforms, in Los Angeles as elsewhere, was that poor, nonwhite, and non-English-speaking students were frequently labeled as slow learners, tracked into the lowest-level classes, and denied access to quality education programs. In addition, the increased political push on the part of white parents for greater racial segregation between the schools in Los Angeles meant that from 1920 to 1940 so-called progressive reforms were quite regressive in terms of bringing about equal opportunity for students of all races.

For sociologists and historians of education, *Land of Fair Promise* is worth reading, if for no other reason than the lack of books and articles on the history of the nation's second largest school district. But Raftery fails to pay enough attention to the distinctions between the two progressive camps that had such a profound influence on American education. The group Tyack calls the pedagogical progressives are virtually never mentioned in this book except in endnotes. Meanwhile, Raftery fails to distinguish one of the essential leaders of this pedagogical branch of the progressive education movement—John Dewey—from the more scientific administrative progressives of his day. While I consider these significant oversights for a historian, the book still makes a valid scholarly contribution.

"These papers argue indefatigably for the irreducible character of ethnicity. . . . Few, if any, scholars . . . have argued this position so consistently or so well."

—Donald L. Horowitz

"This may be the best book ever published on the week-in, week-out content of ordinary sermons. . . ."

—Mark A. Noll

"This is an excellent book. I recommend it highly."

—James Freeman

Ethnonationalism

The Quest for Understanding

WALKER CONNOR

Walker Connor, perhaps the leading student of the origins and dynamics of ethnonationalism, has consistently stressed the importance of its political implications. In these essays, which have appeared over the course of the last three decades, he argues that Western scholars and policymakers have underrated the influence of ethnonationalism and misinterpreted its nonrational qualities.

Paper \$14.95 ISBN 0-691-02563-0

Cloth \$39.50 ISBN 0-691-08784-9

All Is Forgiven

The Secular Message in American Protestantism

MARSHA G. WITTEN

In recent years mail deliveries have included a new kind of invitation to Protestant Christianity: slick brochures enumerating the social and psychological advantages of church attendance. Does this kind of secularity prevail in mainline Protestant churches as well? Marsha Witten looks for the answer to this question in an in-depth analysis of sermons on the Parable of the Prodigal Son.

Cloth \$19.95 ISBN 0-691-03280-7

Family Tightrope

The Changing Lives of Vietnamese Americans

NAZLI KIBRIA

Nazli Kibria draws on in-depth interviews and participant-observation with Vietnamese immigrants in Philadelphia to show how they construct their family lives in response to the social and economic challenges posed by migration and resettlement.

Cloth \$24.95 ISBN 0-691-03260-2

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

AVAILABLE AT FINE BOOKSTORES OR DIRECTLY FROM THE PUBLISHER 609-883-1759

CALIFORNIA SOCIOLOGY

*Andrew Jamison and
Ron Eyerma*

Seeds of the Sixties

Where did Sixties radicalism come from? Who planted the intellectual seeds that brought it into being? The authors answer with striking clarity using a combination of history and biography that vividly portrays an entire culture in transition

\$25 00 cloth

Tom Wells

The War Within

America's Battle over Vietnam

Foreword by Todd Gitlin

"The *War and Peace* of the movement to end American involvement in Vietnam. Like Tolstoy, he offers a massive cast of characters and a plethora of detail, but also a coherent theme"—Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Johnson Administration

\$30 00 cloth, illustrated

Helen Birch, Editor

Moving Targets

Women, Murder, and Representation
This pioneering collection of essays looks at our enduring fascination with women who murder. The authors explore how both fictional and real women are represented, as well as the way society responds to these women

\$35 00 cloth, \$15 00 paper

Mary R. Jackman

The Velvet Glove

Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations

"An explosive, powerful book—laying bare the uselessness of individualism as a solution to today's racial problems, while simultaneously exposing its domineering origins"

—Nancy Denton,
SUNY, Albany

\$38 00 cloth,

A Centennial Book

Robert J. Thomas

What Machines Can't Do

Politics and Technology in the Industrial Enterprise
"Anyone who journeys through *What Machines Can't Do* is going to [become] much more sophisticated about the sociology of introducing new technologies into existing organizations"

—Lester C. Thurow,
MIT

\$35 00 cloth, \$16 00 paper,
illustrated

Claude S. Fischer

America Calling

A Social History of the Telephone to 1940

New in paper—"A model for historians and sociologists and a standard to which all future research on technology will refer"

—Daniel Bell,

Harvard University
\$16 00 paper, illustrated

At bookstores or order toll-free 1-800-777-4726

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

CALIFORNIA SOCIOLOGY

Joshua Gamson

Claims to Fame

Celebrity in Contemporary America
"The most thoughtful and thoroughgoing sociological analysis I know of this strange and ubiquitous phenomenon, celebrity"—Todd Gitlin, UC, Berkeley
\$35 00 cloth, \$14 00 paper, illustrated

Louise B. Russell

Educated Guesses

Making Policy about Medical Screening Tests
Russell questions theories behind routinely administered tests. Her findings will sharpen today's health-care debate.

*A copublication with the
Milbank Memorial Fund*
\$30 00 cloth, \$10 00 paper

Elvin Hatch

Respectable Lives

Social Standing in Rural New Zealand
New in paper—"A valuable account that portrays the color and detail of farming and, in particular, some of the key values that order rural social life."

—*Rural Sociology*
\$13 00 paper, illustrated

CONGRATULATIONS

Martín Sánchez Jankowski

ISLANDS IN THE STREET

Gangs and American Urban Society
winner of

Robert Park Award

\$13 00 paper

Frances K. Goldscheider

& *Linda J. Waite*

NEW FAMILIES, NO FAMILIES

The Transformation of the American Home
winner of

Otis Dudley Duncan Award

\$14 00 paper

John Walton

WESTERN TIMES AND WATER WARS

State, Culture, & Rebellion in California
winner of

Robert Park Award

\$15 00 paper, illustrated

Roger N. Lancaster

LIFE IS HARD

Machismo, Danger, and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua
winner of

C. Wright Mills Award Ruth Benedict Award

\$25 00 cloth

David A. Snow & Leon Anderson

DOWN ON THEIR LUCK

A Study of Homeless Street People
winner of

Charles Horton Cooley Award

\$45 00 cloth, \$14 00 paper, illustrated

Jack A. Goldstone

REVOLUTION & REBELLION IN THE MODERN WORLD

winner of

ASA Distinguished Publication Award

\$17 00 paper

POETICS

● EDITORS

Editor C J van Rees, *Tilburg University, Department of Language & Literature, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands*

Associate Editors P Dimaggio, *Princeton, NJ, USA* and M Csikszentmihalyi, *Chicago, IL, USA*

● AUDIENCE

Linguists, Philosophers, Psychologists, Anthropologists, Sociologists interested in the philosophical, methodological and formal basis of observation, description and theory formation in poetics, theory of literary text structures, theory of literary communication, discourse theory and in the interfaces between these and neighbouring disciplines (philosophy, logic, mathematics)

● ABSTRACTED/INDEXED IN

Abstracts of English Studies, Arts & Humanities Citation Index, Current Contents/Arts and Humanities, Lingua e Stile, Poetique, Sociological Abstracts (SA), Linguistics & Language Behavior Abstracts (LLBA), Social Planning/Policy & Development Abstract (SOPODA), Sociological Abstracts (SA)

● ©1994 SUBSCRIPTIONS


Volume 23 (in 6 issues)
Subscription price Dfl 467 00
(US \$ 252 00) incl Postage
ISSN 0304-422X

● AIMS AND SCOPE

Poetics is an interdisciplinary journal for publications in the field of theoretical and empirical research on literature, the media and the arts. It welcomes

Journal of Empirical Research on Literature, Media and the Arts

Commenced publication 1972



ELSEVIER
SCIENCE
IMPRINT NORTH-HOLLAND

contributions which are theoretically based and empirically oriented. Poetics publishes not only advanced research reports but also overview articles. Some of the topics on which Poetics focuses are

- ☐ the theoretical and philosophical foundations of empirical research in art and culture
- ☐ the processing of literary texts and other media
- ☐ the historical development and the function of institutions which display, promote and/or judge works of literature, the media and the arts
- ☐ the sociology of producers, distributors and the public regarding specific forms of art, information and entertainment
- ☐ the contribution from disciplines and fields such as sociology, cognitive psychology, linguistics, discourse studies, historiography, economics and media research
- ☐ techniques current in empirical research and relevant to the scope of the journal

Occasional special issues, guest-edited by specialists, present the state of the art or discuss new developments in a particular field. Included among these special issues are *Computer Models and Technology in Media Research* in 1990, *Literary Understanding* in 1990, *Media Research and Literary Studies in the (former) GDR* in 1990, *Choice Behaviour Towards Books* in 1991, *Literary Studies Trends in the Nineties* in 1992, *Audience Research* in 1992.

Send this form to your regular supplier or to
ELSEVIER SCIENCE B V

Attn: Marlene Hamers
P.O. Box 103
1000 AC Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Fax: (+31-20) 5862 616

Customers in the USA/Canada, send to
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC

Attn: Judy Weissel, J
P.O. Box 945
Madison Square Station,
New York, NY 10160 0757

☐ Please send me a FREE inspection copy of
POETICS

☐ Please enter my 1994 subscription to
POETICS

☐ Yes, I would like to be on your Mailing List
(mailing code 08734)

ORDER FORM

☐ Payment Enclosed (Bank Draft / Eurocheque / International Money Order / Postal Cheque / Official Purchase Order Form)

☐ Please send me a pro forma invoice

☐ Charge my credit card

☐ Access ☐ Eurocard ☐ Visa ☐ American Express ☐ MasterCard

Card No

Valid Until

Name

Initials

Signature

Date

Vat Registration No

The Dutch Guilder price(s) (Dfl.) applies worldwide, except in the Americas (North, Central & South America). US \$ price(s) quoted applies in the Americas only. Customers in the European Community should add the appropriate VAT rate applicable in their country to the price(s).

Social Theory

The Multicultural
and Classic Readings
edited by **Charles Lemert**

"A rich, highly textured, historically sweeping and strikingly inclusive collection that aims to reconstruct, perhaps for the first time, the actual dialogue of contemporary social thought" —**Jeffrey Alexander**
672 pages • \$65.00 hc • \$22.95 pb

Cities and the Rise of States in Europe

A.D. 1000 to 1800
edited by **Charles Tilly**
and **Wim P. Blockmans**

In a sweeping, original work detailing eight centuries of city-state relations, Charles Tilly, Wim Blockmans, and their contributors document differences in political trajectories from one part of Europe to another and provide authoritative surveys of urbanization in nine major regions. They also suggest many correctives to previous analyses of state formation.

**Nov. 1994 • 340 pages • \$55.00 hc
\$21.95 pb**

Exceptions Are the Rule

An Inquiry Into Methods
in the Social Sciences
Joel H. Levine

*"Wise and witty, **Exceptions Are the Rule** also trenchantly expounds a new realism in methods for social science. Levine's book is a stunning achievement, fun to use and to teach from."*

—**Harrison White**

312 pages • \$52.50 hc • \$16.95 pb

Essential Statistics for Social Research

Second Edition
Michael A. Malec
289 pages • \$60.00 hc • \$24.95 pb

Careers and Creativity

Social Forces in the Arts
Harrison C. White

"A stunningly original volume. The author's accessible style and his gift for seeing and explaining the parallels between superficially disparate cultural fields make this a volume that seasoned professional and beginning student can both benefit from and enjoy."

—**Paul DiMaggio**

219 pages • \$55.00 hc • \$16.95 pb

The Homeless in America

Doug A. Timmer,
D. Stanley Eitzen,
and **Kathryn D. Talley**

"One of the best books on homelessness. The material is not only excellent and innovative, but also very readable and engrossing."

—**Joe R. Feagin**

**Sept. 1994 • 225 pages • \$37.50 hc
\$14.95 pb**

Law in the Sociological Enterprise

A Reconstruction
Lisa J. McIntyre

"Lisa McIntyre does here something new. With an elegance that evokes Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, she shows how law permeates the relationships of modern society. As she does so, what emerges is a new direction for sociological theory and research."

—**James S. Coleman**

**Apr. 1994 • 320 pages • \$49.95 hc
\$15.95 pb**

WESTVIEWPRESS

5500 Central Avenue
Boulder, CO • 80301-2877
1-800-456-1995, orders only please

imr INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW

A quarterly studying sociological, demographic, economic, historical
and legislative aspects of human migration and refugees

VOLUME XXVII

NUMBER 3

FALL 1993

The Uncertain Connection: Free Trade and Rural Mexican Migration
to the United States

WAYNE A. CORNELIUS and PHILIP L. MARTIN

Implementing the U S Legalization Program: The Influence of
Immigrant Communities and Local Agencies on Immigration Policy Reform

JACQUELINE M. HAGAN and SUSAN GONZALEZ BAKER

The Choice of Migration Destination: Dominican and Cuban Immigrants to
the Mainland United States and Puerto Rico

EDWARD FUNKHOUSER and FERNANDO A. RAMOS

Demographic and Socioeconomic Determinants of Female
Rural to Urban Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

MARTIN BROCKERHOFF and HONGSOOK EU

Circulatory Mobility in Post-Mao China: The Case of Temporary Migrants
in Kaiping County, Pearl River Delta Region

YUEN-FONG WOON

Will a Large-Scale Migration of Russians to the Russian Republic
Take Place Over the Current Decade?

JOHN B. DUNLOP

RESEARCH NOTE

Future Trends in International Migration to Europe

RAPHAEL-EMMANUEL VERHAEREN

CONFERENCE REPORT

Migration and Trade: The Case of the Philippines

PHILIP L. MARTIN

COMMUNICATIONS

Book Reviews • Review of Reviews

International Newsletter on Migration • Books Received

Subscription Rates	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years
Individuals	\$27 50	\$ 54 00	\$ 79 25
Institutes	\$54 00	\$103 50	\$155 50

Order from:

CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

209 Flagg Place, Staten Island, New York 10304-1199

Tel • (718) 351-8800 Telefax (718) 667-4598

Revue française de sociologie

publiée avec le concours de
L'INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE SUR LES SOCIÉTÉS CONTEMPORAINES
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE

59-61, rue Pouchet, 75849 Paris Cedex 17 – Tél 40 25 11 87 ou 88

OCTOBRE-DÉCEMBRE 1993, XXXIV-4

ISBN 2-222-96593-4

Les conflits Claudette LAFAYE
dans l'aménagement de la nature Laurent THÉVENOT

Âges, générations et christianisme Yves LAMBERT

L'observation des ouvriers
par le patronat Jean PENEFF

Les mariés du *Bottin Mondain* Luc ARRONDEL
Cyril GRANGE

NOTES CRITIQUES

Tribulations de la justice Jean-René TRÉANTON

Histoire de la sociologie Serge PAUGAM

LES LIVRES TABLES 1993

Abonnements

L'ordre et le paiement sont à adresser directement à
Centrale des Revues, CDR
11, rue Gossin, 92543 Montrouge Cedex – Tél (1) 46 56 52 66
CCP La Source 33-368-61 CDR-Gauthier-Villars
Les abonnements sont annuels et partent du premier numéro de l'année
en cours

Tarif 1994 L'abonnement (4 numéros) France 320 F
Etranger 400 F

Vente au numéro

Soit par correspondance auprès de
CNRS Editions, 20-22 rue Saint-Amand, 75015 Paris
Tel (1) 45 33 16 00 – Télex 200 356 F
Soit auprès des librairies scientifiques
Le numéro 110 F

Sciences Sociales et Santé

Vol. XI n° 1 Mars 1993 Revue trimestrielle

Sciences Sociales et Santé s'attache à organiser un débat entre les disciplines de sciences humaines (anthropologie, sociologie, histoire, psychanalyse, économie) dans le champ socio-sanitaire. La revue se propose de faire connaître les travaux et réflexions que ce champ suscite à l'intention de la communauté scientifique. Elle est publiée avec l'aide du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), de l'Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale et du Ministère de la Recherche et de la Technologie.

Sommaire

- Gérard Fabre** La notion de contagion au regard du sida, ou comment interfèrent logiques sociales et catégories médicales
- Emmanuel Hirsch** Au-delà des logiques et des catégories : notre responsabilité (*Commentaire*)
- Jean-François Montès** Le monde clos, ou la raison médico-économique
- Bernard Doray** Inclusions par l'économique ? (*Commentaire*)
- Alain Jourdain** La qualité de vie peut-elle guider les choix de planification sanitaire ? Les QALYs ou l'essai non transformé de l'Angleterre
- Gérard de Pouvourville** Que faire des QALYs ? (*Commentaire*)
- Laurent Peiser** La réforme des services de santé au Québec : quel avenir pour la profession médicale ?
- Clermont Bégin**
- Martine Bungener** Mythe et réalités de l'indépendance professionnelle : la longue peur de la profession médicale (*Commentaire*)

Notes de lecture

Livres reçus

Résumés (anglais, espagnol)



TARIF D'ABONNEMENT 1993

(4 numéros par an)

	France	Étranger
Étudiants	245 FF	290 FF
Particuliers	320 FF	360 FF
Institutions	500 FF	550 FF

Prix de vente au numéro : 130 FF

Les abonnements sont annuels et partent du premier numéro de l'année en cours. Le paiement est à effectuer à l'ordre de John Libbey Eurotext et doit être adressé à

John Libbey Eurotext, 6 rue Blanche, 92120 Montrouge, France

Education and Society is an established international journal which publishes original research and contributions dealing with major up-to-date issues concerning the relationship between education and society. It provides a new forum, where teachers and scholars throughout the world, working in education and related areas, are able to examine and evaluate current issues and problems in education and society — from a broad and balanced social, cultural and economic perspective. The journal, by focusing on both education and society, hopes to appeal to many educators and scholars from diverse educational backgrounds. Each issue of the journal contains a special symposium concerned with some of the more immediate problems affecting education, educational systems and society in a changing world.

The journal should be of interest to teachers, academics, research scholars, educational administrators and consultants, students in teacher training institutes and social workers.

Contributions are invited (normally no more than 5,000 words, typed double spaced in two copies) and should be addressed to the Editor, *Education and Society*, James Nicholas Publishers, P O Box 244, Albert Park, Australia, 3206.

In order to ensure that articles are of highest quality, all contributions are submitted to at least two independent referees before acceptance for publication.

The journal appears twice a year, in June and December. These two issues constitute one volume. An annual index is included in the December issue.

1993, Volume 11, ISSN 0726-2655

Subscription orders and requests for details should be addressed to

James Nicholas Publishers,
P O. Box 244, Albert Park
Australia, 3206.

EDITOR

Dr Joseph Zajda, *Australian Catholic University*

CONSULTING EDITORS

Professor Orlando Albornoz, *University of Venezuela*

Dr. Lilla Babaeva, *Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow*

Professor John Eggleston, *University of Warwick*

Professor Nigel Grant, *University of Glasgow*

Professor Henry Levin, *Stanford University*

Professor Zola Malkova, *Russian Academy of Education*

Professor David Nyberg, *State University of New York (Buffalo)*

Professor Douglas Sloan, *Columbia University*

Professor Seth Spaulding, *University of Pittsburgh*

Dr Joan Whitehead, *University of Cambridge*

Professor Charles Wille, *Harvard University*

Dr John Wilson, *University of Oxford*

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING ISSUES

Edward Berman **THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION REFORM IN THE 1990'S**

Johann LeRoux & M E Smit **THE ANTI-CHILD NATURE OF MODERN SOCIETY**

Douglas Ray **EDUCATION AND CULTURAL DIVISIONS IN CANADA**

Henry Giroux **BORDER PEDAGOGY AND THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERNISM**

George Psacharopoulos **ON QUALITY OF EDUCATION**

Kazim Bacchus **IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF BASIC EDUCATION**

John Martin Rich **ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL OF SCHOOL VANDALISM**

Peter McLaren **POSTMODERNISM POSTCOLONIALISM AND PEDAGOGY**

Martin Carnoy **EDUCATION AND THE THEORIES OF THE STATE**

Edmund King **CHANGING EDUCATION FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY**

James Bowen **SCIENCE EDUCATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT**


Stanley Aronowitz **WORKING CLASS IDENTITY AND CELLULOID FANTASIES**

Michael O'Loughlin & Malcolm Campbell

TEACHER PREPARATION EMPOWERMENT AND REFLECTIVE INQUIRY

H Svi Shapiro **EDUCATION AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIETY**

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY



JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH

Selected Articles Forthcoming in Volume XV, 1994

Union Activity and the Decline in American Trade Union Membership

Deregulation and Labor Earnings

American Trade Unions and Public Approval. Can Unions Please All of the People All of the Time?

District Elections and the Power of Municipal Employee Unions

A Simultaneous-Equations Model of the Relationship Between Public Sector Bargaining Legislation and Unionization

Quality Upgrading and Restrictive Hiring Practices in Unionized Jobs

Union Premiums in the Federal and Private Sectors: Alternative Evidence from Job Queues

Interest Group Tactics and Public Sector Labor Relations

The Political Effects of Grievance Handling by Stewards in a Local Union

U.S. Unionism and R&D Investment. Evidence from a Simple Cross-Country Test

Trade Unions and Quits: Australian Evidence

The Political Influence of Unions and Corporations on COPE Votes in the U.S. Senate

Cities, Unions, and the Privatization of Sanitation Services

American Unemployment in Historical Perspective

Unions and Productivity: Evidence from Academe

Timothy D. Chandler and
Peter Feuille

Richard K. Vedder and
Lowell E. Gallaway

Mark Meador and
Stephen J. K. Walters

C. Timothy Koeller

Wallace Hendricks

Paul Jarley and
Sarosh Kuruvilla

Stephen L. Mehay and
Rodolfo A. Gonzalez

Melissa S. Waters,
R. Carter Hill,
William J. Moore, and
Robert J. Newman

Jayanthi Krishnan

Madhu S. Mohanty

Susan Schwochau

David Meyer

John T. Addison and
Joachim Wagner

Mark Wooden and
Meredith Baker

William J. Moore,
Denise R. Chacere,
Thomas D. Curtis, and
David Gordon

The **Journal of Labor Research** is published quarterly by the Department of Economics of George Mason University. Subscriptions are on a calendar year basis and subscribers will receive all issues for the current year. Annual subscription rates are individuals, \$35.00; academic libraries, institutions, government agencies and business firms \$100.00. Foreign subscribers add \$10.00 to cover additional postage. All remittances should be made payable to **Journal of Labor Research**, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030.

Editorial correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to James T. Bennett, Editor, **Journal of Labor Research**, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate with a 100-word abstract. A submission fee of \$20.00 for nonsubscribers must accompany all manuscripts. Papers accepted for publication must conform to JLR style requirements; style sheet available on request.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

*cordially invites you
to enter
your personal subscription to*

**AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY**

*New subscribers are eligible for
a 15% discount off the regular subscription rate.*

Please return the reply card printed on reverse.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

*cordially invites you
to enter
your personal subscription to*

**AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY**

*New subscribers are eligible for
a 15% discount off the regular subscription rate.*

Please return the reply card printed on reverse.

American Journal of Sociology

ENTER A NEW SUBSCRIPTION AND SAVE 15%!

- | | New | Renewal |
|--|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Individuals | <input type="checkbox"/> \$33 15 (J) | <input type="checkbox"/> \$39 00 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions | <input type="checkbox"/> 73 95 (J) | <input type="checkbox"/> 87 00 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Students | <input type="checkbox"/> 22 95 (J) | <input type="checkbox"/> 27 00 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ASA and BSA Members | <input type="checkbox"/> 34 00 | <input type="checkbox"/> 34 00 |

OUTSIDE USA? Please add \$9 00 for postage *Canadians, add 7% GST, plus postage*

BACK ISSUES AT 50% OFF

- ☐ Set of 36 available issues ☐ Individuals \$135 00 ☐ Institutions \$279 00

OUTSIDE USA? Please add 75¢ per copy for postage

- ☐ **Charge my** ☐ **Visa** ☐ **MasterCard** Exp date _____
Acct # _____
Signature _____
Phone (____) _____
☐ **Check enclosed** (payable to journal)

Name _____
Address _____
City _____
State/Country _____ ZIP _____

Please mail to **The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division,**
PO Box 37005, Chicago, IL 60637

IF4XX

American Journal of Sociology

ENTER A NEW SUBSCRIPTION AND SAVE 15%!

- | | New | Renewal |
|--|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Individuals | <input type="checkbox"/> \$33 15 (J) | <input type="checkbox"/> \$39 00 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions | <input type="checkbox"/> 73 95 (J) | <input type="checkbox"/> 87 00 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Students | <input type="checkbox"/> 22 95 (J) | <input type="checkbox"/> 27 00 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ASA and BSA Members | <input type="checkbox"/> 34 00 | <input type="checkbox"/> 34 00 |

OUTSIDE USA? Please add \$9 00 for postage *Canadians, add 7% GST, plus postage*

BACK ISSUES AT 50% OFF

- ☐ Set of 36 available issues ☐ Individuals \$135 00 ☐ Institutions \$279 00

OUTSIDE USA? Please add 75¢ per copy for postage

- ☐ **Charge my** ☐ **Visa** ☐ **MasterCard** Exp date _____
Acct # _____
Signature _____
Phone (____) _____
☐ **Check enclosed** (payable to journal)

Name _____
Address _____
City _____
State/Country _____ ZIP _____

Please mail to **The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division,**
PO Box 37005, Chicago, IL 60637.

IF4XX

Essential Tools for Sociologists

Now in paperback

QUESTIONS ABOUT QUESTIONS

Inquires into the Cognitive Bases of Surveys

JUDITH M. TANUR, editor

"Provides a good sense of the range of survey problems investigated by the cognitive movement, the methods and ideas it draws upon, and the results it has yielded"
— *American Journal of Sociology*

\$16.95 327 pages 0-87154-841-0




SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS

On the Effects of Investments in Children

ROBERT H. HAVEMAN and BARBARA L. WOLFE

Drawing on an extensive two-decade longitudinal survey, the authors present a meticulous and candid investigation that directly links fractured families, a troubled economy, rising poverty rates, and neighborhood erosion to the impaired ability of many children to lead successful and productive lives

May \$34.95 cloth 320 pages 0-87154-377-X




FRINGE BANKING

Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor

JOHN P. CASKEY

The first comprehensive study of pawnshops and check-cashing outlets, *Fringe Banking* profiles their operations, their customers, and their recent growth from small family-owned shops to successful outlet chains

June \$29.95 cloth 192 pages 0-87154-195-5



WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULES

RICHARD B. FREEMAN, editor

These original essays assess the decline in the well-being of American workers — evidenced by spiraling income inequality and stagnant real earnings — and compares our employment and labor conditions with those of Western Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia

\$14.95 paper 224 pages 0-87154-277-3

\$39.95 cloth 0-87154-276-5



AFTER ELLIS ISLAND

Newcomers and Natives in the 1910 Census

SUSAN COTTS WATKINS, editor

\$49.95 cloth 448 pages 0-87154-910-7

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

112 East 64th Street, New York, NY 10021 • At bookstores, or call (800) 666-2211

Developing new and innovative approaches to the study of social systems and social change...

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN GLOBAL CHANGE

SERIES EDITED BY

Tom R. Burns

Uppsala University, Sweden
and

Thomas Dietz

George Mason University, Virginia, USA

NEW

Vol. 5

TAMING THE DRAGON

Transforming Economic Institutions in the
Face of Global Change
by Carlo C. Jaeger

*"[A] masterful piece of work.... Presented clearly
with little ambiguity...a truly interdisciplinary treat-
ment of the subject."*

—Gerald L. Young

Washington State University

Based on an original analysis of economic mechanisms as the result of complexities of cultural evolution, this book offers an investigation of the processes that have resulted in global environmental change. Demonstrating how and why world economic and environmental policies are dangerously out of synch with each other, Jaeger arrives at an understanding of human reality that stresses the importance of interpersonal relations.

June 1994 • 320pp

Cloth • 2-88124-637-0 • List Price: \$48/£31

Paper • 2-88124-638-9 • List Price: \$20/£13

All orders must be prepaid and include \$5/£1 per book
for postage and handling. The US dollar rate applies
to North America only. All other countries should
contact the publisher for applicable rates.

All prices are subject to change without notice.

NEW

Vol. 6

UNNATURAL SELECTION

Technology, Politics, and Plant Evolution
by Cary Fowler

*"This work will serve as the basic grounding for the
future discussion of biodiversity/ property rights of
living organisms. It brings important new material
that allows for new ways of thinking."*

—Cornelia Flora

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Fowler's book is the first full-length study to focus
entirely on the historical development of the con-
trol and ownership of living materials. Moving
from a detailed consideration of property rights in
the United States, the author explores current
efforts to create globally applicable mechanisms.

April 1994 • 352pp

Cloth • 2-88124-640-0 • List price: \$50.00 / £33.00

Paper • 2-88124-639-7 • List price: \$20.00 / £13.00

ALSO AVAILABLE

Vol. 4

AGENCY AND STRUCTURE

Reorienting Social Theory
Edited by Piotr Sztompka

*"[Agency and Structure] makes excellent reading
and advances the field of sociology as a whole."*

—Robert Brulle

George Washington University

A striking feature of the human condition is its
dual, contradictory, inherently split character: on
the one hand, autonomy and freedom; on the
other, constraint and dependence on social struc-
ture. Representing the work of a number of lead-
ing international sociologists, *Agency and Struc-
ture* addresses this central problem of the linkage
between human action and social structure in
sociological and social science theory.

1993 • 352pp

Cloth • 2-88124-592-7 • List price: \$48/£30


Paper • 2-88124-597-8 • List price: \$20/£12

GORDON & BREACH PUBLISHERS

820 Town Center Drive, Langhorne, PA 19047, USA or P.O. Box 90, Reading, Berkshire RG1 8J, UK

For faster service: US orders call (800) 545-8392/fax (215) 750-6343

Orders/inquiries in all other countries, contact the UK office: Call (0734) 568314/fax (0734) 568211



0002-9602(199403)99:5;1-L

AJS

American
Journal
of Sociology
Volume 99 Number 6
May 1994

*Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency—
Emirbayer and Goodwin*

*Brokerage, Influence in the National Health Policy
Domain—Fernandez and Gould*

*Continuities in Transnational Migration—Massey, Goldring,
and Durand*

*National Tolerance in Yugoslavia—Hodson, Sekulić, and
Massey*

Agrarian Change in Late Medieval England—Hopcroft

Collective Action and the Korean Uprisings of 1946—Shin

The University of Chicago Press

MARTA TIENDA, Editor

WILLIAM G AXINN, IVAN ERMAKOFF, MARTIN RIESEBRODT, ROBERT J SAMPSON, and KAZUO YAMAGUCHI, Associate Editors

MARY C BRINTON, Associate Editor, Book Review

DAVID LINDSTROM, Assistant Book Review Editor

MARY BLAIR-LOY, GRACE KAO, CHAN-UNG PARK, and ALFORD A YOUNG, JR, Book Review Editorial Board

SUSAN ALLAN, Managing Editor

LAUREN FORD-TAGGART and CLAIRE JAMES, Editorial Assistants

Consulting Editors PAUL D ALLISON • PETER BEARMAN • ROBERT J BURSİK, JR • GLENN R CARROLL • JOHN CASTERLINE • MARK CHAVES • KAREN COOK • NANCY DAVIS • NANCY DENTON • LAUREN EDELMAN • ROBERT R FAULKNER • SCOTT FELD • CLAUDE FISCHER • ROBERTO FRANZOSI • NOAH FRIEDKIN • MARK GRANOVETTER • LARRY GRIFFIN • DOUGLAS HECKATHORN • BARBARA HEYNS • FRED KNISS • GARY LAFREE • MARGARET MOONEY MARINI • J MILLER MCPHERSON • JAMES MONTGOMERY • DANIEL MONTI • JOEL PODOLNY • DUDLEY POSTON • CHARLES RAGIN • CECILIA RIDGEWAY • JOACHIM SINGELMANN • C MATTHEW SNIPP • GILLIAN STEVENS

International Consulting Editors JEAN-FRANCOIS AMADIEU (France) • NORMAN BRAUN (Switzerland) • ANDREAS DIEKMANN (Switzerland) • ULF HANNERZ (Sweden) • PETER HEDSTROM (Sweden) • JOHANNES HUININK (Germany) • NOAH LEWIN-EPSTEIN (Israel) • TOM A B SNIJDERS (The Netherlands) • HAYA STIER (Israel) • THOMAS VOSS (Germany) • JEROEN WEESIE (The Netherlands)

Editorial Board ANDREW D ABBOTT • GARY S BECKER • CHARLES E BIDWELL • DONALD J BOGUE • TERRY N CLARK • JAMES S COLEMAN • JOHN L COMAROFF • ROGER V GOULD • WENDY GRISWOLD • PHILIP M HAUSER • EVELYN KITAGAWA • EDWARD O LAUMANN • DONALD N LEVINE • DOUGLAS S MASSEY • WILLIAM L PARISH • MOISHE POSTONE • EDWARD SHILS • GEORGE P STEINMETZ • ROSS M STOLZENBERG • FRED L STRODTBECK • GERALD D SUTTLES • LINDA J WAITE • WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (ISSN 0002-9602) is published bimonthly in July, September, November, January, March, and May by The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, 5720 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, Illinois 60637. Subscription rates, U S A institutions, 1 year \$87 00, individuals, 1 year \$39 00. Student subscription rate, USA 1 year \$27 00 (photocopy of valid student ID must accompany subscription). ASA and BSA members, 1 year \$34 00. All other countries add \$9 00 for each year's subscription to cover postage. Canadian subscribers add 7% GST. Subscription agent for Japan Kinokuniya Company, Ltd. Single copy rates institutions \$13 35, individuals \$6 25. Volumes 1-90 available from Schmidt Periodicals GmbH, Detendorf, D-8201 Bad Feinbach 2, Germany. All volumes are available from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, and Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Subscriptions are payable in advance. Subscriptions will be entered to start with the first issue to be published after receipt of order. **Postmaster** Send address changes to *American Journal of Sociology*, The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P O Box 37005, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

ADVERTISING space in THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY is available, as is rental of its subscriber list. For information and rates, please contact the advertising sales staff, The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, 5720 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637. Advertising and list rental is limited to material of scholarly interest to our subscribers.

Copying beyond Fair Use The code on the first page of an article in this journal indicates the copyright owner's consent that copies of the article may be made beyond those permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the U S Copyright Law provided that copies are made only for personal or internal use or for the personal or internal use of specific clients and provided that the copier pay the stated per-copy fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. Operations Center, 27 Congress St., Salem, Massachusetts 01970. To request permission for other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale, kindly write to Permissions Department, The University of Chicago Press, 5801 S Ellis Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637. If no code appears on the first page of an article, permission to reprint may be obtained only from the author.

Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Illinois, and at additional mailing offices.

© 1994 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.


The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39 48-1984. (∞)

CONTENTS

- 1411 Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency
MUSTAFA EMIRBAYER AND JEFF GOODWIN
- 1455 A Dilemma of State Power Brokerage and Influence in the National Health Policy Domain
ROBERTO M FERNANDEZ AND ROGER V GOULD
- 1492 Continuities in Transnational Migration An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities
DOUGLAS S MASSEY, LUIN GOLDRING, AND JORGE DURAND
- 1534 National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia
RANDY HODSON, DUŠKO SEKULIĆ, AND GARTH MASSEY
- 1559 The Social Origins of Agrarian Change in Late Medieval England
ROSEMARY L HOPCROFT
- 1596 The Historical Making of Collective Action The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946
GI-WOOK SHIN

Book Reviews

- 1625 *Potter Addition Poverty, Family, and Kinship in a Heartland Community* by David L Harvey
ANN R TICKAMYER
- 1626 *American Dreams, Rural Realities Family Farms in Crisis* by Peggy F Barlett
SONYA SALAMON
- 1628 *Welfare States and Working Mothers The Scandinavian Experience* by Arnlaug Leira
KIMBERLY A REED



- 1630 *Every Child a Lion The Origins of Maternal and Infant Policy in the United States and France, 1890-1920* by Ahsa Klaus
BARBARA R BERGMANN
- 1632 *World Changes in Divorce Patterns* by William J Goode
ANNEMETTE SØRENSEN
- 1633 *Familiar Exploitation A New Analysis of Marriage in Contemporary Western Societies* by Christine Delphy and Diana Leonard
DENISE D BIELBY
- 1635 *Dividing the Child Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody* by Eleanor E Maccoby and Robert H Mnookin
MARYGOLD S MELLI
- 1637 *Lives on the Edge Single Mothers and Their Children in the Other America* by Valerie Polakow
KATHRYN M NECKERMAN
- 1639 *The Habit of Surviving Black Women's Strategies for Life* by Kesho Yvonne Scott
YVONNE D NEWSOME
- 1640 *Islands in the Street Gangs and American Urban Society* by Martin Sanchez Jankowski
MERCER L SULLIVAN
- 1642 *The "Underclass" Debate Views from History*, edited by Michael B Katz
PHILIP KASINITZ
- 1645 *The Lenses of Gender Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality* by Sandra Lipsitz Bem
CHRISTINE L WILLIAMS
- 1647 *Women's Paid and Unpaid Labor The Work Transfer in Health Care and Retailing* by Nona Y Glazer
JOHN P WALSH
- 1649 *Two Faces of Protest Contrasting Modes of Women's Activism in India* by Amrita Basu
PATRICIA CRAIG
- 1651 *Women and the Economic Miracle Gender and Work in Postwar Japan* by Mary C Brinton
JAMES R LINCOLN
- 1653 *Women and Japanese Management Discrimination and Reform* by Alice C L Lam
SAWAKO SHIRAHASE

- 1654 *Japan's Political Marketplace* by J Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth
STEVEN R REED
- 1656 *Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy, 1850-1990* by Bill Ong Hing
ZAI LIANG
- 1658 *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* by Susan Olzak
JOHN D MCCARTHY
- 1661 *New Immigrants, Old Unions Organizing Undocumented Workers in Los Angeles* by Hector L Delgado
DAVID P LINDSTROM
- 1663 *Fast Food, Fast Talk Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday Life* by Robin Leidner
CHLOE E BIRD
- 1664 *Labor Visions and State Power The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States* by Victoria C Hattam
RICK FANTASIA
- 1666 *Executive Defense Shareholder Power and Corporate Reorganization* by Michael Useem
NEIL FLIGSTEIN
- 1668 *The Impact of Ownership Structure and Executive Team Composition on Firm Performance The Resolution of a Leadership Paradox* by Eva M Meyerson
DAVID W ALLISON
- 1670 *Cages of Reason The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain* by Bernard S Silberman
CHARLES TILLY
- 1672 *Complex Epistemological Advice about Complex Objects The Logics of Social Structure* by Kyriakos M Kontopoulos
ARTHUR L STINCHCOMBE
- 1674 *Weathering the Storm Working-Class Families from the Industrial Revolution to the Fertility Decline* by Wally Secombe
DAVID I KERTZER
- 1676 *Peasants in the Middle Ages* by Werner Rosener
MAVIS MATE
- 1677 *Sacrificed for Honor Italian Infant Abandonment and the Politics of Reproductive Control* by David I Kertzer
ETIENNE VAN DE WALLE

- 1679 *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution* by Man-
soor Moaddel
JOHN FORAN
- 1681 *The Frontiers of Catholicism Politics of Ideology in a Liberal
World* by Gene Burns
KATHERINE MEYER
- 1682 *A Far Glory The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity* by Peter
L Berger
GUY E SWANSON
- 1684 *The Research Foundations of Graduate Education Germany,
Britain, France, United States, Japan*, edited by Burton R Clark
A H HALSEY
- 1686 *Catholic Schools and the Common Good* by Anthony S Bryk,
Valerie E Lee, and Peter B Holland
MAUREEN T HALLINAN
- 1688 *Talented Teenagers The Roots of Success and Failure* by Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi, Kevin Rathunde, and Samuel Whalen with
Maria Wong
ANTHONY MAIER
- 1690 *Secondary School Examinations International Perspectives on
Policies and Practice* by Max A Eckstein and Harold J Noah
DAVID P BAKER
- 1691 *Growing Up in a Classless Society? School to Work Transitions*
by Andy Furlong
ALAN C KERCKHOFF
- 1693 *America Calling A Social History of the Telephone to 1940* by
Claude S Fischer
LANA RAKOW
- 1695 *Behind the Postmodern Facade Architectural Change in Late
Twentieth-Century America* by Magali Sarfatti Larson
MITCHELL STEVENS
- 1697 *Writing Chicago Modernism, Ethnography, and the Novel* by
Carla Cappetti
JOHN A HALL
- 1701 Acknowledgments to Referees
- 1707 Contents of Volume 99
- 1724 Book Reviewers for Volume 99

IN THIS ISSUE

MUSTAFA EMIRBAYER is assistant professor of sociology at the New School of Social Research. He is currently working on two book manuscripts *The Relational Context of Action* (with Jeff Goodwin) and *Democratic Education in America, 1830–1990*, a historical study of the transformation of moral and civic education in American public schools.

JEFF GOODWIN is assistant professor of sociology at New York University. His interests include social theory, social movements, nationalism, and revolutions. With Vina Lanzona he is currently researching the role of women in the Huk rebellion in the Philippines; he is also examining the role of collective identities in the Irish National Revolution. He is completing a comparative analysis of revolutionary movements entitled "State and Revolution in the Third World."

ROBERTO M. FERNANDEZ is currently professor of organizational behavior at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. His areas of research include formal organizations, race and ethnic relations, and social networks. In his current research he is examining the role of skill and spatial mismatches on minority employment by studying a firm that is retooling and relocating from the central city to the suburbs.

ROGER V. GOULD is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at The University of Chicago. He studies the role of social networks in political action, particularly in social movements. He recently completed a book manuscript entitled "Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune."

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY is professor of sociology at the University of Chicago and director of its Center for Latin American Studies. In July 1994 he will join the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania as the Dorothy Swaine Thomas Professor of Sociology. He is the author (with Nancy Denton) of *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Harvard University Press, 1993) and (with Jorge Durand and others) of *Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico* (University of California Press, 1987).

LUIN GOLDRING is assistant professor of sociology and Latin American/Latino studies at the University of Illinois, Chicago. Her research interests include Mexico-U.S. transnational migration, immigrant incorporation in North America, and agrarian policy in Mexico. She recently published "La Migración México-EUA y la Transnacionalización del Espacio Político y Social" in the Mexican journal *Estudios Sociológicos*.

JORGE DURAND is professor at the University of Guadalajara and a research associate of its Center for the Study of Social Movements. He is the author of several books on Mexico-U.S. migration, including *Migración México-Estados Unidos: Años veinte* (Consejo Nacional de la Cultura, 1991), *Les lueve sobre mojado* (Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente, 1991), and *Más allá de la línea* (Consejo Nacional de la Cultura, 1994). With Douglas Massey he has

recently written *Miracles on the Border Retablo Paintings of Mexican Migrants to the United States* (University of Arizona Press, 1995 [in press])

RANDY HODSON is professor of sociology at Indiana University. His research interests are in social stratification and the sociology of work. In addition to examining ethnic relations and changing patterns of social organization in the former Yugoslavia, he is also studying—both through survey techniques and through analyzing the descriptions provided in ethnographies—the maintenance of dignity in the workplace. His recent publications include “Is Worker Solidarity Undermined by Autonomy and Participation?” with Sandy Welsh, Sabine Rieble, Cheryl Sorenson Jamison, and Sean Creighton (*American Sociological Review*, 58 398–416). He is coauthor with Teresa A. Sullivan of *The Social Organization of Work*, 2d ed. (Wadsworth, 1995 [in press]).

DUŠKO SEKULIĆ is associate professor of sociology and professor of International Studies at George Mason University. He is doing research on nationalism, the economic transformation of postcommunist Europe, and social stratification. His current publications include “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: International Consequences,” in *Nato The Challenge of Change* (National Defense University Press, 1993) and “Nationalism versus Democracy: Legacies of Marxism” (*International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol. 6). He is working on a book manuscript, “Nationalism and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia.”

GARTH MASSEY is the author of *Subsistence and Change: Lessons of Agropastoralism in Somalia* (Westview Press). With Randy Hodson and Duško Sekulić, he authored “Who Were the Yugoslavs?” (*American Sociological Review* 58 83–97). This year he is a Fulbright research professor at Godollo University in Hungary, where he is studying the changing social structure in rural Hungary.

ROSEMARY L. HOPCROFT is assistant professor of sociology at Kent State University. Her research interests are in economic sociology, broadly defined. Her current research examines the influence of local agricultural systems and property rights on agrarian and social change in preindustrial England, France, the Netherlands, and Prussia.

GI-WOOK SHIN is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Iowa, where he is also affiliated with the university's Center for Asian and Pacific Studies. His research interests include social movements, comparative-historical sociology, and the political economy of East Asia. He has just completed a book entitled *The Politics of Social Protest: The Roots and Legacy of Peasant Activism in Twentieth-Century Korea* (University of Washington Press, in press) and is currently engaged in a study of development, nationalism, and democracy in South Korea.

Information for Contributors

Editorial Procedures: All papers deemed appropriate for the *AJS* are sent out anonymously to readers. The editors rely heavily on the judgments of those readers, although they are not bound by them. To protect anonymity, only the title should appear on the manuscript. Attach a cover page with the title of the manuscript, your name, and your affiliation. All identifying references and footnotes should appear on a separate page. Manuscripts are accepted for publication subject to the understanding that the *AJS* has the right of first publication. Submission of a manuscript to the *AJS* is taken to indicate the author's commitment to publish in this *Journal*. No paper known to be under consideration by any other journal will be reviewed by the *AJS*. In addition, the *AJS* is not a suitable vehicle for materials published elsewhere, in whole or in part. Upon publication, all rights, including subsidiary rights, are owned by the University of Chicago Press. The author retains the right to use his or her article without charge in any book of which he or she is the author or editor after it has appeared in the *Journal*.

Manuscript Acceptance Policy: While it is our policy to require the assignment of copyright on most journal articles and review essays, we do not usually request assignment of copyright for other contributions. Although the copyright to such a contribution may remain with the author, it is understood that, in return for publication, the *Journal* has the nonexclusive right to publish the contribution and the continuing right, without limit, to include the contribution as part of any reprinting of the issue and/or volume of the *Journal* in which the contribution first appeared by any means and in any format, including computer-assisted storage and readout, in which the issue and/or volume may be reproduced by the publisher or by its licensed agencies.

Preparation of Copy

1 Type *all* copy—including indented matter, footnotes, tables, and references—*double spaced*, allowing generous margins at the top, bottom, and sides of page. Please do not break words at ends of lines or justify right-hand margins. Do not use proportional spacing fonts. Indicate italics by underlining only. Number all footnotes, beginning with the acknowledgment note as number 1. *Provide a word count on the cover page of the manuscript.*

2 Begin each table on a separate page. Refer to each table in numerical order in the text. Tables should not contain vertical lines or more than 20 two-digit columns or the equivalent.

3 Clarify all mathematical symbols (e.g., Greek letters) with words in the margins of the manuscript.

4 Original or glossy prints of professionally drawn figures will be required if manuscript is accepted.

5 Include a brief abstract (not more than 100 words) summarizing the findings.

6 Submit *five copies* of the manuscript and abstract, on white paper. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 5835 South Kimbark, Chicago, Illinois 60637. *Manuscripts are not returned to authors.* Enclose a self-addressed stamped postcard to obtain acknowledgment of manuscript receipt. No other acknowledgment will be sent.

7 Each article submitted to the *AJS* must be accompanied by a check or money order for \$15 00, payable to The University of Chicago Press in U S currency or its equivalent. Papers will not be reviewed until this fee has been paid. The submission fee will be waived for papers solely by student authors. Submissions from students must be accompanied by a faculty member's certification of their student status. Citizens of countries with restrictions on the export of U S dollars may request waiver of the submission fee.

Format of References in Text: All references to monographs, articles, and statistical sources are to be identified at the appropriate point in the text by last name of author, year of publication, and pagination where appropriate, all within parentheses. Footnotes are to be used only for substantive observations. Specify subsequent citations of the same source in the same way as the first one, do not use "ibid," "op cit," or "loc cit."

1 When author's name is in the text: Duncan (1959). When author's name is not in text: (Gouldner 1963).

2 Pagination follows year of publication: (Lipset 1964, pp. 61-65).

3 For more than three authors, use "et al." For institutional authorship, supply minimum identification from the beginning of the complete citation: (U S Bureau of the Census 1963, p. 117).

4 With more than one reference to an author in the same year, distinguish them by use of letters (*a*, *b*) attached to the year of publication: (1965*a*).

5 Enclose a series of references with a single pair of parentheses, separated by semicolons: (Duncan 1959, Gouldner 1963, Lipset 1964, pp. 61-65).

6 Format for references to machine-readable data files is

Davis, James Allan. 1978. NORC ed. Chicago NORC. Distributed by Roper Public Opinion Research Center, New Haven, Conn.

Format of References: List all items, including machine-readable data files (MRDF), alphabetically by author (providing the full list of multiple authors) and, within author(s), by year of publication, in an appendix titled "REFERENCES." For examples, see text of articles in this issue.

(Rev. 1/93)

Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency¹

Mustafa Emirbayer
New School for Social Research

Jeff Goodwin
New York University

Network analysis is one of the most promising currents in sociological research, and yet it has never been subjected to a theoretically informed assessment and critique. This article outlines the theoretical presuppositions of network analysis. It also distinguishes between three different (implicit) models in the network literature of the interrelations of social structure, culture, and human agency. It concludes that only a strategy for historical explanation that synthesizes social structural and cultural analysis can adequately explain the formation, reproduction, and transformation of networks themselves. The article sketches the broad contours of such a theoretical synthesis in the conclusion.

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a powerful new approach to the study of social structure. This mode of inquiry, commonly known as "network analysis," has achieved a high degree of technical sophistication and has proven extremely useful in a strikingly wide range of substantive applications. Since the seminal work of Barnes (1954) and Bott (1971), sociological studies utilizing network analysis have appeared with increasing frequency, a veritable explosion of such work has taken place over the last 15 years, particularly with the founding of two special-

¹ We would like to thank participants in the CROPSO Workshop at Harvard University (esp. Theda Skocpol) for their many helpful comments, as well as participants in the Sociology Staff Seminar at the New School for Social Research (esp. Janet Abu-Lughod, Diane Davis, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Arthur Vidich) and the Methodology Workshop at the New York University Sociology Department (esp. Wolf Heydebrand, Guillermina Jasso, and James Jasper). We would also like to thank Peter Bearman, Gerardo Del Cerro, Karen Gelb, Jeffrey Goldfarb, Roger Gould, Ann Mische, Calvin Morrill, John Padgett, Alessandro Pizzorno, Margaret Somers, Charles Tilly, and the *AJS* referees for their many helpful suggestions along the way. Correspondence may be addressed to Mustafa Emirbayer, Department of Sociology, New School for Social Research, 65 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003.

ized journals, *Social Networks* and *Connections*, in the late 1970s. Today network analysis is one of the most promising currents in sociological research. Its practitioners include some of the most highly respected figures in the profession: Ron Breiger, Ronald Burt, Mark Granovetter, David Knoke, Peter Marsden, Barry Wellman, and Harrison White. Many other prominent sociologists, such as Claude Fischer, Edward Laumann, Doug McAdam, David Snow, and Charles Tilly, draw extensively upon network concepts. The late George Homans, in his reflections upon the last 50 years of sociology, justly described network analysis as one of the most encouraging new developments in the discipline (Homans 1986, p. xxvi).

Despite its growing prominence, however, network analysis has yet to be subjected to a theoretically informed assessment and critique. The secondary literature on this perspective has tended to restrict itself to outlining basic concepts, discussing technical procedures, and summarizing empirical research findings. There has been an unfortunate lack of interest in situating network analysis within the broader traditions of sociological theory, much less in undertaking a systematic inquiry into its underlying strengths and weaknesses. Theoretical "precursors" of network analysis have often been invoked in passing—especially Durkheim and Simmel—but network analysis, itself a constellation of diverse methodological strategies, has rarely been systematically grounded in the conceptual frameworks they elaborated. In addition, there has been a notable absence in this literature of any sustained consideration of the potential usefulness of network analysis for historical investigation. Meanwhile, social theorists and historical sociologists, for their own part, have largely ignored developments in this field; we have yet to see a sustained discussion of this approach in recent works of social theory, even in the writings of such wide-ranging thinkers as Anthony Giddens (1984, 1987) and Jeffrey Alexander (1982, 1987, 1988a) or, alternatively, in studies of recent developments in comparative and historical research (e.g., Skocpol 1984, D. Smith 1991).² In short, the task of rethinking network analysis, sociological theory, and historical sociology in light of one another has been sadly neglected.

In this essay we aspire to accomplish precisely such a task. We begin with an exposition of the underlying theoretical presuppositions and conceptual strategies of network analysis, outlining the characteristic features of this approach in relation to broader currents in social theory. Along the way, we examine several exemplary studies that investigate historical processes of social change using the tools and insights of net-

² Giddens does, however, criticize the "structuralism" of Peter Blau, which has strong affinities with network analysis (Giddens 1984, pp. 207–13).

work analysis. Upon this basis we then elaborate a critique—a fundamentally *sympathetic* critique—of the network perspective, stressing its inadequate conceptualizations of human agency on the one hand, and of culture on the other. We carefully distinguish here between three distinct models in the network literature of the relationships among culture, agency, and social structure, each of these models, in our view, conceptualizes these relationships in varying degrees of theoretical sophistication. Throughout the essay, we attempt to ground our critical arguments carefully in *detailed and substantive* considerations of actual works of network analysis—studies that, in our estimation, rank among the most powerful and impressive applications to date of the network perspective. Throughout this article, our primary focus is on analytical categories, not on authors. Our concern with agency and culture has implications for network analysis in general, but our focus here remains on studies that attempt to explain social change over time—including the transformation of social networks themselves—and hence on specifically *historical* studies.³

Our argument is that while this new mode of structuralist inquiry—in all three of its versions—offers a more powerful way of describing social interaction than do other structural perspectives that focus solely on the categorical attributes of individual and collective actors, it has yet to provide a fully adequate explanatory model for the actual formation, reproduction, and transformation of social networks themselves. Network analysis all too often denies in practice the crucial notion that social structure, culture, and human agency presuppose one another, it either neglects or inadequately conceptualizes the crucial dimension of subjective meaning and motivation—including the *normative commitments* of actors—and thereby fails to show exactly how it is that intentional, creative human action serves in part to constitute those very social networks that so powerfully constrain actors in turn. In its less nuanced versions, in fact, the network approach emerges as the mirror image of its interpretive and hermeneutic counterpart (Schutz 1967, Rabinow and Sullivan 1979). Whether from the standpoint of objective social structures or of subjective experience, both of these perspectives in themselves provide no more than a description of social reality, ultimately, both fail to grasp in concepts the dynamic processes that shape this reality over time. We

³ We are not interested here, it should be pointed out, in the more purely methodological and technical contributions that network analysts have produced (e.g., Boorman and White 1976, Davis 1967, Freeman 1977, 1979, Harary, Norman, and Cartwright 1965, Lorrain and White 1971, White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976). Nor are we concerned with covering all of the many important empirical studies that have been produced in recent years using network techniques and concepts. See, e.g., Fischer 1982, Laumann and Knoke 1987, and Wellman 1979.

believe, by contrast, that an adequate approach to historical explanation must encompass both social structural and cultural perspectives on social action. We demonstrate how more sophisticated versions of network analysis do approximate such a strategy, and we sketch out the broad contours of our own synthetic explanatory perspective in the concluding pages.

ANALYZING SOCIAL NETWORKS

The Priority of Relations over Categories

Network analysis is not a formal or unitary "theory" that specifies distinctive laws, propositions, or correlations, but rather a broad strategy for investigating social structure. It is not, that is, a "deductive system" in which "lower-order propositions" follow "as a logical conclusion from general propositions under specified given conditions" (Homans 1964, p. 812). Rather, like modernization or dependency theory in the field of economic development, it is more a "paradigm" or a "perspective"—"a loose federation of approaches" (Burt 1980a)—than a predictive "social theory." As a result of the internal diversity of network approaches, network analysts themselves debate the usefulness of alternative models of social relations and methodological strategies. Indeed, important disagreements have arisen over the very definition of its fundamental concepts. Network analysts dispute the manner in which ideas such as social structure, network centrality, distance, cohesion, and social network itself—terms used by other sociologists simply as metaphors—can be operationalized for purposes of empirical research. (We have provided a short glossary of terms commonly used by network analysts in the appendix below.)

Nevertheless, network analysis proceeds from certain basic theoretical presuppositions and premises that are acceptable to most, if not all, of its practitioners. It holds to a set of implicit assumptions about fundamental issues in sociological analysis such as the relationship between the individual and society, the relationship between "micro" and "macro," and the structuring of social action by objective, "supra-individual" patterns of social relationships. The point of departure for network analysis is what we shall call the *anticategorical imperative*. This imperative rejects all attempts to explain human behavior or social processes solely in terms of the categorical attributes of actors, whether individual or collective. Network analysis, as Barry Wellman puts it, rejects explanations of "social behavior as the result of individuals' common possession of attributes and norms rather than as the result of their involvement in structured social relations" (Wellman 1983, p. 165). In other words, one

can never simply appeal to such attributes as class membership or class consciousness, political party affiliation, age, gender, social status, religious beliefs, ethnicity, sexual orientation, psychological predispositions, and so on, in order to explain why people behave the way they do "Network theory builds its explanations from patterns of relations," notes Ronald Burt "It captures causal factors in the social structural bedrock of society, bypassing the spuriously significant attributes of people temporarily occupying particular positions in social structure" (Burt 1986, p 106) ⁴ In this respect, network analysis pursues the Simmelian goal of a *formalistic sociology* (Simmel 1971, chap 3), one that directs attention exclusively to the overall structure of network ties while suppressing consideration of their substantive content (see also Bearman 1993, p 48) ⁵

Given this anticategorical imperative, network analysis emphatically rejects all varieties of culturalism, essentialism, and methodological individualism It stands fundamentally opposed, for example, to certain of the assumptions of structural-functionalism, which stresses the *normative integration* of societies Despite a common emphasis on the priority of structures over "essences"—an emphasis (deriving ultimately from the early Durkheim) that links both perspectives to tendencies in structural anthropology, linguistics, and ordinary language philosophy—network analysts "take seriously what Durkheim saw but most of his followers did not that the organic solidarity of a social system rests not on the cognition of men, but rather on the interlock and interaction of objectively definable social relationships" (Boorman and White 1976, p 1442) ⁶ It should be pointed out, on the other hand, that network analysis does not reject *all* of the tenets of structural-functionalism Many network analysts (e g , White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976, Burt 1982) employ functionalist notions such as "role," "role set," and "status," although they reconceptualize these notions into relational or network-analytic

⁴ Thus one network analyst (Brym 1988) is able to show in his work on intellectual radicalism among the fin-de-siècle Jewish intelligentsia in Russia that sharp discrepancies in political ideologies can develop even within narrowly circumscribed categories, depending upon the actors' different patterns of "structural rootedness" within particular social networks

⁵ This last formulation applies somewhat less well, it should be pointed out, to the third of the several network models that we shall go on to analyze, that of structuralist constructionism This model supplements a "static" and formalistic analysis of network structure with a more "dynamic" account of processes of identity transformation, one that necessarily devotes more attention to the content of network ties

⁶ Network analysts' disagreement with the structural-functionalist view of society is thus reminiscent of Selig Perlman's objection to those Marxist theorists who view the working class as "an abstract mass in the grip of an abstract force" (1979, p 6)

terms. In this regard, they can indeed be said to be working within the tradition of Merton and Rossi (1950), Parsons (1951), and Nadel (1957).

As a "structuralist" approach to social analysis, the network perspective necessarily also questions the explanatory potential of all those conceptual strategies that emphasize the nonrelational attributes and/or purposive actions of individuals or collectivities—strategies such as interpretive sociology, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, certain variants of Marxian analysis, and rational choice theory. From the network point of view, analytical approaches that direct attention to the "intrinsic characteristics," "essences," attributes, or goals of individuals, as opposed to their patterned and structured interrelationships, are all inherently suspect (Wellman and Berkowitz 1988, p. 5). Although certain rational choice analysts do employ the methodological tools and techniques of network analysis (e.g., Coleman 1990), and while, conversely, certain practitioners of network analysis today tacitly rely on instrumentalist conceptions of action (as we shall see below), network analysis itself as a broad perspective on social structure can clearly be distinguished from the radical individualism of rational choice theory.

Finally, network analysis departs in important ways from the "mainstream" sociological approach to empirical "quantitative" research. As both James Coleman and Andrew Abbott have observed, American sociology before the "watershed" moment of the 1940s was marked by a proliferation of qualitative community studies, influenced in large part by the Chicago school and, ultimately, by the writings of Robert Park (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1967), W. I. Thomas (1966), and Georg Simmel (1955). These theorists regarded social facts as *ecologically embedded* within specific contexts of time and space—that is to say, within particular *interactional fields* composed of concrete, historically specific "natural areas" and "natural histories." "All social facts," notes Abbott, were seen as "located in particular physical places and in particular social processes. They were also located within the temporal logic of one or more processes of succession, assimilation, conflict, and so on. The Chicago vision was of a social structure embedded in time, a structure in process" (Abbott 1992b, p. 14).

After the 1940s, however, American sociology shifted its focus of attention away from contextual determination and onto statistical survey research and other types of work that took as their unit of analysis not the community or the social group, but rather the individual. "In much of the work following this change," remarks Coleman, "the focus shifted from social processes within the community shaping the system's behavior to psychological or demographic processes shaping individual behavior" (Coleman 1986, p. 1315).

There was no comparable development of tools for analysis of the behavior of interacting systems of individuals or for capturing the interdependencies of individual actions as they combine to produce a system-level outcome. The far greater complexity required of tools for these purposes constituted a serious impediment to their development. The end result [was] extraordinarily elaborated methods for analysis of the behavior of a set of independent entities (most often individuals), with little development of methods for characterizing systemic action resulting from the interdependent actions of members of the system [Coleman 1986, p. 1316]

From this historical vantage point, contemporary network analysis can be viewed as part of a *second* crucial watershed period in American sociology, one in which empirical research is now directing its attention back again to the systemic level, this time assisted by the development of quantitative techniques and methods of a highly sophisticated nature. In this second pivotal moment, analytic concerns are shifting back once more to those questions of interactional fields and contextual determination that had been so central to sociologists before the “variables revolution” of the 1940s.

How, then, does network analysis propose to account for social behavior and processes? The answer is implicit in the preceding remarks. Such behavior and processes, it suggests, must be explained with reference to networks of social relations that link actors or “nodes.” These social relations, significantly, must be understood as independent of the actors’ wills, beliefs, and values; they must also be assumed to allocate scarce resources differentially (Wellman 1983, p. 176). Social structure, in this view, is “regularities in the patterns of relations among concrete entities, it is *not* a harmony among abstract norms and values or a classification of concrete entities by their attributes” (White et al. 1976, pp. 733–34, emphasis in original). A social network is one of many possible sets of social relations of a specific content—for example, communicative, power, affectual, or exchange relations—that link actors within a larger social structure (or network of networks). The relevant unit of analysis need not be an individual person, but can also be a group, an organization, or, indeed, an entire “society” (i.e., a territorially bounded network of social relations),⁷ any entity that is connected to a network of other such entities will do.

Network analysts often find it desirable to carry out their investigations at both the individual and group levels, such combinations highlight what some of them, in a Simmelian (1955) fashion, refer to as the “dualism” of groups and actors—the fact that the nature of groups is determined by the intersection of the actors within them (i.e., by the ties of their mem-

⁷ One recent writer, Margaret Somers (1993), prefers the term “relational setting.”

bers to one another as well as to other groups and individuals), while the nature of actors is determined by the intersection of groups "within" them (i.e., by their own various group affiliations, see Breiger 1974). Individual and group behavior, in this view, cannot be fully understood independently of one another. By thus facilitating analyses at both the individual and group level, network analysis makes it possible to bridge the "micro-macro gap"—the theoretical gulf between microsociology, which examines the interaction of individuals, and macrosociology, which studies the interaction of groups or institutions.

Thus the way in which network analysis conceptualizes social structure is at once more general and more concrete than alternative structuralist approaches. It is more *general* because many different kinds of groups, relations, and institutions that putatively organize or structure social processes can be understood in, or be "translated" into, network terms. And it is more *concrete* because these structures need not be treated as "black boxes," but rather can be disaggregated into their constituent elements of actors and relations. The significance of these two features of network analysis for empirical research is considerable. Network analysts are now able to provide far more precise and accurate representations of social structures and social relations than are proponents of competing research strategies.

Most network analysts, of course, also purport to do far more than simply describe the ways in which actors are connected in society. As Knoke and Kuklinski point out, "If network analysis were limited to a conceptual framework for identifying how a set of actors is linked together, it would not have excited much interest and effort among social researchers. But network analysis contains a further explicit premise of great consequence. The structure of relations among actors and the location of individual actors in the network have important behavioral, perceptual, and attitudinal consequences both for the individual units and for the system as a whole" (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982, p. 13). "The hallmark of network analysis," in Edward Laumann's (1979, p. 349) words, "is to explain, at least in part, the behavior of network elements (i.e., the nodes) and of the system as a whole by appeal to specific features of the interconnections among the elements." More specifically, the network approach investigates the *constraining* and *enabling* dimensions of patterned relationships among social actors within a system. It is this emphasis, in fact, that provides the link between its theoretical insights and its key contributions to empirical research. What network analysis provides, in particular, is a way of avoiding the pitfalls of what Arthur Stinchcombe terms "epochal interpretations" (or, more memorably, "epochal garbage"), that is, of causal explanations that proceed by "using the apparent causal structure created by narrative of a sequence of events

to create the illusion that epochal theories are being substantiated" (Stinchcombe 1978, p 10, see also Tilly 1992) Network analysis allows historical sociologists, by contrast, to pinpoint those wide-ranging and recurrent causal mechanisms "whose combinations produce," as Tilly expresses it, "the actual unique histories we observe" (Tilly 1992, p 11) How, specifically, does network analysis attempt such an important task?

Relational Analysis as a Way of Representing Social Structure

Network analysts generally make use of one of two conceptual strategies in order to explain how networks constrain and enable—and thus to account for various types of social behavior (Burt 1980*a*, 1987) On the one hand, many analysts adopt a "relational" or "social cohesion" approach that focuses on the direct and indirect connections among actors This approach explains certain behaviors or processes through the fact of social connectivity itself—as well as through the density, strength, symmetry, range, and so on, of the ties that bind From this perspective, very strong, dense, and relatively isolated social networks facilitate the development of uniform "subcultures" and of strong collective identities, this notion, of course, dates back both to Durkheim (1984) and to Simmel (1955, 1971, chap 18) Relational analyses, however, also demonstrate that "weak" ties indirectly connecting individuals or bridging the "structural holes" between isolated social groups may be crucial for many important social processes, such as locating employment opportunities (e g , Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992) The mathematical tools of "graph theory" have been helpful in developing these approaches (see Harary et al 1965)

One important application of network analysis that employs the relational or social cohesion approach is a study by Naomi Rosenthal et al (1985) of women's reform organizations in New York State during the latter half of the nineteenth century Rosenthal and her associates examine the organizational affiliations of 202 prominent women reformers in state reform activity during the years between 1840 and 1914 By mapping out these affiliations, they develop a detailed portrait of the "multi-organizational field" of social movement activity that obtained during that period Measures of centrality enable them to identify the particular groups that were most important to that network of reform organizations Other related methods provide them with careful measurements of the boundaries, shape, and texture of various clusters of such organizations Finally, "directional analysis" of flows of individuals across organizations provides them with a picture of "three uniquely shaped map configurations" of social movement clusters in *three distinct historical periods* between 1840 and 1914, each of these manifesting a "different

content to the relations among organizations and activity" (Rosenthal et al 1985, p 1043)

Another important line of network research employing relational analysis concerns itself with processes of recruitment to social movements. Its point of departure is a study by Snow, Zurcher, and Eklund-Olson (1980) that examines materials on a wide variety of movements. Snow et al.'s work suggests that individuals with preexisting ties to movement members are more likely to be contacted and recruited to those movements than are individuals without such ties, individuals with few or weak ties to alternative networks are more likely to respond favorably to these recruitment efforts than are individuals with strong commitments to countervailing networks. Snow et al.'s study does not employ sophisticated network analysis techniques, nor does it examine systematically the independent effects of network structures themselves, it focuses instead upon individual ties alone. And yet it does provide a useful corrective to social psychological and culturalist approaches that place undue explanatory weight upon such variables as "individual motivation" to the exclusion of actors' patterns of embeddedness within actual networks of social ties.

A series of studies by Doug McAdam (1986, 1988, see also Fernandez and McAdam 1988, 1989) further corroborates and advances this line of investigation. McAdam's studies are concerned with the participation of college students in the 1964 Freedom Summer project in Mississippi and focus on the patterns of social relationships of student participants, as compared to those of students who applied for the project, were accepted, but failed to participate. McAdam's principal conclusion is that "*all* of the applicants—participants and withdrawals alike—emerge as highly committed, articulate supporters of the goals and values of the summer campaign" (McAdam 1986, p 73). What clearly differentiates participants from withdrawals are not their socioeconomic characteristics nor attitudinal differences that "push" individuals into participating, but three structural "pull" factors that facilitated and encouraged participation: (1) participants belonged to a greater number of organizations and to more explicitly political organizations than did withdrawals, (2) participants had higher levels of involvement in prior civil rights activities than did withdrawals, and, most important, (3) participants had more ties—especially "strong" friendship ties—to other Freedom Summer applicants than did withdrawals.

An article by McAdam and Roberto Fernandez (1988, see also Fernandez and McAdam 1989) extends the scope of this analysis to include the effects of even more specifically structural variables such as the "network prominence" of applicants upon their eventual participation in Freedom Summer. McAdam and Fernandez argue that individuals' positions

within multiorganizational fields—in this case, the various networks of interlocking activist organizations at their respective universities—did under certain conditions significantly affect the likelihood of their being recruited to the summer project. It was not the *quantity* of individuals' ties to social movement organizations or to other applicants to Freedom Summer that determined their eventual participation, but rather the *pattern* of their interpersonal connections and common memberships within these organizations. To capture the effects of these patterns, Fernandez and McAdam employ a standard cohesion measure of centrality—"prominence"—in their analysis; they use it to focus attention on the density of applicants' ties to other more or less centrally located individuals within fields of overlapping organizations.

Despite his increasing interest in the significance of "networks as such" in movement recruitment, however—as opposed to social ties "treat[ed] . . . in piecemeal fashion" (Gould 1991, p. 717)—McAdam's research leaves out of consideration one further structural variable, namely, the *multiplexity* of networks themselves and the complex interactions among them. While McAdam's studies neglect the preexisting webs of relationships within which Freedom Summer applicants had been embedded before joining activist organizations, Roger Gould's (1991, 1992) studies of the Paris Commune explore the interactive effects of precisely such networks with more formal organizational structures. Together, Gould argues—not separately—these indigenous structures (specifically, the neighborhoods within which the Parisian insurgents lived) and the National Guard units to which the insurgents were assigned decisively affected their overall levels of solidarity and resistance. The key to this interaction process was the residential recruitment system of the National Guard: "Members of each battalion were tied to each other not only through their shared organizational affiliation, but also by the fact that they were neighbors." Gould finds that

insurgents in different neighborhoods influenced each other's degree of commitment to the insurrection through the network of links created by overlapping enlistments [in guard units]. High levels of commitment in one area enhanced commitment elsewhere when enlistment patterns provided a conduit for communication and interaction. . . . [Thus] neighborhoods responded to events in other areas where their residents served in National Guard units. For instance, resistance in the fifth arrondissement was positively affected by the fact that many of its residents served in the thirteenth legion, whose members demonstrated a strong commitment to the insurgent effort. [Gould 1991, p. 726]

Gould concludes from this that "cross-neighborhood solidarity" was a significant feature of the Parisian insurrection. "The interdependence of resistance levels across residential areas was . . . intimately tied not only

to the quantity, but also to the structure of overlapping enlistments" (Gould 1991, p. 727). Gould thus shows that structural analysis needs to take into account not only individual-level variables such as those that are employed in the McAdams studies, but also the complex influences of multiplex or overlapping networks of social ties.

Positional Analysis as a Way of Representing Social Structure

Many network analysts employ a different approach to conceptualizing social structure; their "positional" strategy focuses upon the nature of actors' ties not to one another, but to third parties. This strategy makes sense of certain behaviors and processes in terms of the pattern of relations that defines an actor's position relative to all other actors in the social system. Positional analyses emphasize the importance of "structural equivalence"—that is, the sharing by two or more actors of equivalent relations vis-à-vis a third actor—for understanding both individual and collective behavior (see Lorrain and White 1971). The relevant issue from this point of view is the specific "position" or "role" that a set of actors occupies within the system as a whole. Any such set is termed a "block." An algebraic procedure called "blockmodeling" partitions overall populations into sets of structurally equivalent actors (White et al. 1976, Boorman and White 1976).

Structural equivalence models differ from relational models in at least two crucial respects. First, while the latter fail to distinguish among the members of social "cliques" on the basis of those members' different types of ties to external actors, the former do concern themselves with the structure of the social system as a whole. They generate models "in which an actor is one of many in a system of interconnected actors such that all defined relations in which he is involved must be considered" (Burt 1980a, p. 80). Second, structural equivalence models pay no heed to whether actors in a given position have any direct ties to one another. A block, or set of structurally equivalent actors, from their perspective, may not be a densely knit social clique at all (White et al. 1976).

One interesting example of network analysis that makes use of blockmodeling and positional analysis is the work of Peter Bearman (1993) on local elite social structure in England during the century before the English Civil War. Bearman examines the actual patterns of kinship and patron-client ties that bound elite actors together (and that simultaneously drove them apart) during this period, and thereby "induces partitions" or "equivalency classes" of these actors that describe their patterned interactions more accurately than do the standard categorical classifications. Rather than specify the relevant elite actors from afar in such categorical terms as "middling," "rising," "falling," "court," or

"country" gentry, he generates specific blockmodels of their interrelationships in four discrete time periods between 1540 and 1640 "Individuals with distinctive personal biographies act coherently," he argues, "with respect to the interests which arise from the structural positions they share in local and national networks" (Bearman 1993, pp 11–12) Changes over time in the structure and distribution of these networks thus provide the key to understanding long-term structural changes Bearman's larger argument is that the social transformations that did occur at the elite level created the "structural prerequisites" for the widespread adoption of certain abstract theological tenets, which in turn would play a crucial role in inspiring the tumultuous political events that were to come They led, in other words, "to the formation of an elite subworld organized on the basis of social relations that transcended the [localist and kinship-based] traditional social order and created a context in which abstract religious [and constitutionalist] rhetorics could emerge as the critical determinants of elite social action in the century preceding the English Civil War" (Bearman 1993, p 1)

Another highly sophisticated and innovative historical case study employing the positional approach to structural analysis is John Padgett and Christopher Ansell's brilliant work on the rise of the Medici in early 15th-century Florence Padgett and Ansell, much like Bearman before them, employ the concept of structural equivalence to identify "the family, economic, and patronage networks that constituted the Medicean political party" (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p 1260), as well as their main rivals in Florentine politics, the "oligarchs" They use archival data on marital, economic, political, and personal ties to produce an "overall relational picture of Florence's social structure, within [a] 92-family ruling elite" (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p 1274) Through blockmodeling they find that they are able to predict actual party memberships far more accurately than through standard categorical analyses based, for example, on class and status Indeed, their analyses of marriage and economic ties in particular prove highly useful in revealing the connections among networks, groups, and party membership In a pointed reminder of the potential empirical usefulness of what we have termed here the "anticategorical imperative," Padgett and Ansell conclude that "rather than parties being generated by social groups, both parties and social groups were induced conjointly by underlying networks We do not argue that social attributes and groups are irrelevant to party formation, merely that their role needs to be understood within a deeper relational context *There is no simple mapping of groups or spatial dimensions onto parties, social attributes and group interests are 'merely' cognitive categories, which party mobilization, networks, and action crosscut*" (Padgett and Ansell 1993, pp 1277–78, 1274, emphasis added)

Blockmodeling also proves useful in explaining the superior capacity for collective action of the Medici party vis-à-vis its rival faction, despite the bitter division between those patrician elites and “new men” aligned with the Medici. The Medici party, Padgett and Ansell observe, was “deeply cleaved on two attributional dimensions simultaneously—social class (i.e., prestige) and neighborhood. Not only did the various components despise each other, they did not run into each other much either. Only the Medici family itself linked the segments” (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1281). In fact, the Medici family exerted an exceptional degree of centralized control over its followers precisely by bridging the “structural hole” between patricians and new men. (On the importance of structural holes more generally, see Burt [1992].) The more cliquish oligarch party, by contrast, was constantly beset with “cross-pressure[s] on each family instead of collective convergence,” due precisely to its far higher levels of network multiplexity and attributional homogeneity (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1279).

Padgett and Ansell reveal through an analysis of “network dynamics” just how these patterns of social relationships came about in the first place. “Elite marriage and economic networks,” they argue, “were reconfigured by working-class revolt and by wartime fiscal crisis, respectively” (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1287). As part of their strategy of reconsolidation in the aftermath of the Ciompi wool workers’ revolt of 1378, the temporarily victorious oligarchs deliberately excluded the losers’ elite collaborators, including the Medici, from their marital networks. “The oligarchic clique and the Medicean networks,” claim Padgett and Ansell, thus “both emerged in tandem, a single network, each reflexively and asymmetrically structuring the other” (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1298). In the meantime, foreign wars with Milan (1423–28) and Lucca (1430–33) had the effect of severely weakening the Florentine economy and of sending many elite families (with the notable exception of the Medici themselves, who enjoyed special papal ties) into bankruptcy. The elite families attempted to help themselves by depriving in turn the socially and politically more vulnerable new mercantile elements—the new men—of offices and tax revenues. After 1427, the Medici began to pursue economic relations with these new elements in their local residential neighborhoods. It was precisely at that moment that the Medici party emerged as a powerful and self-conscious political actor engaged in struggle against the dominant oligarch faction.

THREE NETWORK MODELS OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

Each of these two alternative models of social structure has its strengths and weaknesses. Proponents of the relational approach emphasize its

suitability for mapping the typical relations that individuals have with one another. It is more amenable to traditional survey research techniques, they claim, in contrast to positional approaches that require data for all the elements in the system. Proponents of structural equivalence, conversely, stress its more consistently *structuralist* nature, its capacity, that is, simultaneously to take into account all of the relational data pertaining to a given actor, including his patterns of external relationships—"the relations in which he is involved as well as the relations in which he is not involved" (Burt 1980a, p. 131). "A global [positional] approach," notes Michael J. Mandel (1983, pp. 376-77), "examines all interlocks between roles at the same time. [This] simultaneous consideration of all actors in an entire population . . . spotlights the interdependence of the different roles found in the population. Each role therefore has built into it the elements which differentiate it from other roles within the same overall structure." Positional analysts contend that this feature lends their models a significantly greater degree of predictive power. For example, in a reconsideration of a classic "cohesion" study by Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966), Burt shows how the structural equivalence of physicians better accounts for the informal social pressures that led to the diffusion of the use of the drug tetracycline than does their social cohesion (Burt 1987).

Network practitioners employ both of these approaches to make sense of an impressive array of substantive issues. Despite the considerable methodological usefulness of both strategies, however, we contend that each can be subjected to a number of important criticisms. The very assumptions and premises that have made network analysis in both of its methodological variants such a powerful tool raise serious questions about its adequacy as an overall research strategy. We contend that there have been three models implicit in the literature on network analysis—models of the relationships among culture, agency, and social structure—that have led to varying degrees of difficulty in elaborating satisfactory explanations of historical processes. The first of these implicit models, that of *structuralist determinism*, neglects altogether the potential causal role of actors' beliefs, values, and normative commitments—or, more generally, of the significance of cultural and political discourses in history. It neglects as well those historical configurations of action that shape and transform pre-given social structures in the first place. A second and more satisfactory—but still deeply problematic—approach is that of *structuralist instrumentalism*. Studies within this perspective accept the prominent role of social actors in history, but ultimately conceptualize their activity in narrowly utility-maximizing and instrumental forms. And finally, the most sophisticated network perspective on social change, which we term *structuralist constructionism*, thematizes provocatively

certain historical processes of identity conversion and "robust action." It is the most successful of all of these approaches in adequately conceptualizing human agency and the potentially transformative impact of cultural idioms and normative commitments on social action. However, even this perspective falls short in understanding the full complexities of the theoretical interconnections among culture, agency, and social structure. It too pays insufficient attention to the structuring influences of cultural and political discourses upon historical actors.⁸

Structuralist Determinism

All three of these basic approaches are represented by practitioners of both relational and positional network analysis. The aforementioned relational study by Rosenthal et al. (1985), for example, stands as an illuminating case study in structuralist determinism. Rosenthal and her associates delineate three distinct historical periods of women's reform activity in New York State between the years 1840 and 1914. The first of these, they claim, lasted from 1840 to the late 1860s, it was dominated by a women's rights movement and also featured high levels of involvement in antislavery and temperance organizations. The second period was a transitional one, between the end of the Civil War and the late 1880s there was comparatively little activity, many of the earlier groups disappeared, and "the possibility of creating new national organizations was limited" (Rosenthal et al. 1985, p. 1044). And finally, between the late 1880s and 1914, there was a resurgence of intense reform activity, centering around an increasing number of new organizations linked primarily by the suffrage issue. Rosenthal et al.'s delineation of these three periods of women's reform activity by means of relational analysis surely ranks as a significant and worthy contribution. But its limitations are also considerable: the study provides little systematic explanation as to precisely *why* these changes occurred from one historical period to the next, settling instead for a succession of static "map configurations" or relational "snapshots" of network patterns. The individual and social actions that led from one structural configuration of reform activity to the next are left unanalyzed, as are the developments in social structure and

⁸ Our term *structuralist constructionism* is coincidentally reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu's phrase, "constructivist structuralism" (Bourdieu 1990). But we do not imply by this any direct connection between the network analysts whom we are discussing and Bourdieu, although it is true that these various thinkers all share an underlying concern to overcome at both the theoretical and empirical levels the dichotomy between "subjectivist" and "objectivist" standpoints. Bourdieu's understanding of "fields," e.g., does bear striking analytical affinities with that of "social networks" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 114).

cultural and political discourse that underlay and motivated them. At best, Rosenthal et al. treat these various developments in their analysis as exogenous variables.

On the side of positional rather than relational analysis, the early work of Harrison White and his associates on blockmodeling techniques (White et al. 1976, see also Boorman and White 1976) provides another illuminating example of structuralist determinism.⁹ White's research includes studies of network data describing structural changes over time (White et al. 1976, pp. 763–68), each of these studies, however (like that of Rosenthal et al.), ultimately culminates in a succession of static representations of social structure. Each manages, that is to say, to generate “no models of processes over time.” White et al. recognize that transformations in social structure still need to be explained. “Models of structure are not sufficient unto themselves. Eventually one must be able to show how concrete social processes and individual manipulations shape and are shaped by structure.” One fundamental problem here is that many settings may admit not just a single equilibrium outcome, but multiple alternative equilibria. In turn the interesting questions may bear on what *external forces* may cause a social structure to pass from one equilibrium configuration to another” (White et al. 1976, p. 773, emphasis added). Toward the end of another important article on blockmodeling techniques and role structures, White and his collaborators further acknowledge that “the next analytic task is to provide ways to probe how role structures . . . actually come into being” (Boorman and White 1976, p. 1442). But again, they provide no systematic way of building a concern for human agency and processuality into their explanations.

Another shortcoming that both of these examples of structuralist determinism have in common is the assumption that social networks can best be conceptualized as linking together “concrete” entities such as persons and organizations, rather than as also embodying ideals, discursive frameworks, and “cognitive maps.” The latter, from their perspective, remain mere “abstractions.”¹⁰ Structuralist determinism rests analytically on a *reification* of social relations; it transforms the important *theoretical* distinction between a structure of social relations, on the one hand, and cultural formations, on the other, into an *ontological* dualism. It thereby “ruthlessly abstracts” the formal or “objective” dimensions of social relations from their cultural and intersubjective contexts so as to be able to represent and analyze such relations with sophisticated

⁹ We discuss below the rather different analytical perspective that White has subsequently adopted—e.g., in *Identity and Control* (1992).

¹⁰ For a telling example, see Granovetter's synopsis of Cambridge University Press's series on “Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences” (Knoke 1990, frontmatter).

technical tools, in the process, however, it drains such relations of their active, subjective dimension and their cultural contents and meanings. To compound the problem, this variant of network analysis then theoretically privileges one side of this dualism—namely, that of “social relations” itself (albeit social relations now blanched of both their active and symbolic aspects)—over that of cultural and discursive formations. It uses social networks (“social being,” in Marx’s famous formulation) to explain “social consciousness” and culture, but not (also) the other way around. Indeed, in Wellman and Berkowitz’s words (1988, p. 5), “symbols, meanings, and values . . . are a derivative and often residual concern.”

Structuralist Instrumentalism

Perhaps because of its theoretical limitations, structuralist determinism has given rise to relatively little empirical research on historical processes. Far more common has been the perspective of structuralist instrumentalism, which has also been adopted by practitioners of both relational and positional network analysis. This perspective certainly takes the historical role of social actors very carefully into account. However, it also draws implicitly upon “residual categories” from outside its own conceptual framework—in particular, a model of homo economicus—for explaining the formation and transformation of social networks themselves. There is a striking tendency among structuralist instrumentalists, in fact, to “smuggle” conceptions of agency into their investigations, whether overtly or covertly, from the domain of rational choice theory. Many, if not most, such network analysts assume unproblematically that actors—individuals and even groups or organizations—are utility maximizers who pursue their material interests in money, status, and power in precisely the ways predicted by theorists of rational choice. In effect, these analysts project their own anticategoricalism on the actors they study, neglecting how the latter’s own cultural and moral categories help to structure their beliefs and behaviors.

A useful example of structuralist instrumentalism on the side of relational analysis are Roger Gould’s aforementioned studies of the 1871 Paris Commune (1991, 1992). Gould begins by “posit[ing] an influence process in which a [Parisian] district’s resistance level is a function of a set of exogenous variables *and of the resistance levels of all the other districts*, weighted by the strength of its links with them” (Gould 1991, p. 721, emphasis in original). He investigates three such “exogenous variables” that help to explain these varying levels of resistance: (1) the levels of poverty in an arrondissement, (2) the percentage of skilled salaried workers residing therein, and (3) the percentage of white-collar, mid-

dle-class employees located in any specific neighborhood (Gould 1991, p 723) "Resistance was stronger," concludes Gould, "in areas that were poor and working class," although his "expectation that white-collar and unskilled workers would play less prominent roles in the insurrection is not supported" (Gould 1991, p 725) Gould departs here from his own anticategorical approach by relying upon "exogenous" gradational measures of poverty and occupational composition—in addition to social networks—in order to make sense of the mobilization in each arrondissement (see also Gould 1992, p 727)

Not only must Gould move from relational to gradational data in order to identify accurately the social base of the Paris Commune, but, more troublingly, he never provides a plausible causal account as to *why* Parisians would have risked their lives for the Commune in the first place. At times he seems simply to assume, dubiously in our view, that working people (or, at least, working-class males of 19th-century France)¹¹ would automatically fight and die for a state representing their class interests. He predicts, for example, that white-collar employees, "who often came from middle-class families," would have been less likely than artisans or workers to participate in the insurrection (Gould 1991, p 724). As noted above, this expectation is unsupported by the data, an outcome that Gould himself never explains. At other times, Gould emphasizes the importance of neighborhood (and cross-neighborhood) loyalty or solidarity. In this account, he argues that Parisians joined the insurgency not because of class interests per se, but rather because of "social pressure" from neighbors. "Failure to participate in the insurgent effort was construed as a betrayal of loyalty to the neighborhood and was sanctioned accordingly" (Gould 1992, p 748). This argument, however, fails to explain why or how certain ties and interactions among neighbors, which Gould does not specify concretely, generated such a powerful neighborhood loyalty in the first place, it begs the question as to how certain (unspecified) workers came to believe, and apparently managed to convince others, that "neighborhood loyalty" required nothing less than risking their lives for the Commune. Gould's assumptions about the purely instrumental foundations of political mobilization—whether class or status based—in the present stage of his research prevent him from analyzing such cultural and normative influences in a fully satisfactory manner. Gould implies that simply *belonging* to a neighborhood with a certain occupational composition (and ties to other such neighborhoods) produced pro-Commune solidarities. But why did such "belongingness" generate powerful solidarity instead of, for example, interpersonal indif-

¹¹ Gould does not say much about the complexly gendered character of the insurgency, simply noting that women were not admitted into the National Guard.

ference or even cutthroat competition, as among the oligarchic clique in Padgett and Ansell's study?

We recognize that Gould's work has thus far appeared only in journal articles and that later, more expansive versions might well exemplify a different sort of explanatory strategy. In its present form, however, we claim that it does relatively little to explore the specifically *normative* commitments of the social actors engaged in political resistance during the Commune. (The difficulty here is not that Gould neglects "culture" per se, but rather that the underlying logic of his argument—its *theoretical logic*—fails to accord normative commitments any independent explanatory significance.) In a more complete historical explanation, Gould would have to direct far more attention than he does to the specifically cultural bases of (cross-)neighborhood solidarity and their influence upon individuals' projects of action. Exactly what sorts of practices and rituals, he would need to ask, produced the powerful solidarities of Parisian neighborhoods and the National Guard? What role did political ideologies and cultural discourses play in sustaining or even expanding relations of solidarity? (Gould mentions the discourses of "socialism" and of "republican patriotism" in this context, but he never examines their *meanings* to workers and thus their causal significance in any systematic fashion.) And finally, what do sources of information such as diaries, letters, union records, and journalistic accounts reveal to us about popular cultural practices in 19th-century Paris and during the Commune itself? (See, e.g., Sewell [1980] and the sources cited in Edwards [1973, p. 175].) Such data sources would demonstrate how popular practices and popular culture, far from being "additional" factors or forces needing to be either "controlled for" or examined alongside of network structures, were in fact important dimensions of those structures themselves—grounded in, and sustaining, specific, identifiable social ties.

On the side of positional analysis, Peter Bearman (1993), too, adopts the perspective of structuralist instrumentalism. Bearman tells the story of changing elite social relations in England during the "long sixteenth century" by means of a sequence of blockmodel representations of elite social structure. By examining these blockmodels, he specifies "the slow and arduous process by which religious heterodoxy was embedded in the fabric of local elite social and political life," the tangible mechanisms "by which local elites came to perceive themselves and others as actors whose activity was of religious significance" (Bearman 1993, pp. 171, 132). Bearman's approach is not dissimilar to what Max Weber (1949) long ago termed the analysis of "elective affinity"—the study of how particular discourses and cultural formations come to find a "match" and to "resonate" with specific historically embedded actors. Where his approach differs from that of Weber, however, is in its tacit instrumen-

talism—that is, its tendency to devote almost all of its analytical attention to uncovering the “structural preconditions” for this elective affinity, rather than to also exploring the independent causal significance of these discursive frameworks themselves. Indeed, Bearman seems to attribute little more than purely material interests (in money, status, and power) to the historical actors at the center of his account. “The eclipse of localism, the decline of kinship, and the emergence of a national elite subworld,” he argues, “were aggregate outcomes of the gentry’s pursuit of local status and power” (Bearman 1993, p. 3). The search for “political advantage” was the driving mechanism, in other words, behind the crucial historical transformations of the period—and not (also) the beliefs, values, and normative commitments of these elite actors themselves. Bearman might well have noted, in the opening page of his study, that he is primarily investigating only one side of “the interaction between structural and ideational processes—the complex relationship between action and structure” (Bearman 1993, p. 1).

Structuralist Constructionism

Several network analysts have, in recent years, developed more sophisticated approaches than these to studying historical processes, approaches that take into account culture and agency as well as social structure. Again, practitioners of both relational and positional analysis have pursued such investigations. One revealing example of structuralist constructionism on the side of relational analysis is Doug McAdam’s recent work on Freedom Summer (1986, 1988). McAdam explicitly rejects many of the instrumentalist claims of other network analysts. He qualifies the notion, specifically, that “structural availability” for social movement participation renders “attitudinal affinity” to a movement completely irrelevant. Such a notion might hold true of “low-risk/cost activism,” but “participation in instances of high-risk activism [such as the Freedom Summer project and, we might add, the Paris Commune and the English Civil War] would appear to depend on an intense attitudinal and personal identification with the movement” (McAdam 1986, p. 73). Surely, high levels of such identification were required for the Freedom Summer volunteers to aspire to participate in such a demanding and potentially dangerous undertaking; moreover, the volunteers’ accounts of their own motives in open-ended application questionnaires clearly demonstrate that they felt a deep-seated idealism and a strong commitment to the project’s goals. “The real question is: Were the volunteers’ prior attitudes sufficient in themselves to account for their participation? My answer here is a qualified no. Attitudinal affinity [as well as] biographical availabil-

ity must be considered necessary but not sufficient causes of participation in high-risk/cost activism" (McAdam 1986, pp. 73, 87)

Exactly where, then, did this "attitudinal affinity" for the Freedom Summer project (or, more generally, for any social action) actually come from? One of McAdam's major innovations in *Freedom Summer* (1988) is to elaborate an implicit theory of *identity conversion* that takes seriously the formation of motivations and identities without sacrificing at all the moment of "structural location." McAdam argues that the key to his account lies in those organizations that drew "the applicants into civil rights activity *before* Freedom Summer. . . . Extremely risky, time-consuming involvements such as Freedom Summer," he contends, "are almost always preceded by a series of safer, less demanding instances of activism. In effect, people commit themselves to movements in stages, each activity preparing the way for the next" (McAdam 1988, pp. 50–51, emphasis in original). Individuals first come into contact with movement participants and engage in discussions and joint activities with them, confronting firsthand the issues that the movement has set out to address and gaining in the process a deeper understanding of and moral commitment to its goals. Then, eventually, "at the level of identity," they begin to "'play at' and [to] grow more comfortable with the role of activists themselves" (McAdam 1988, p. 51). Unlike many other network analysts, McAdam recognizes that actors can undergo far-reaching processes of identity formation in the course of their involvements in extraordinary affairs. Such an insight is especially important to bear in mind when analyzing their participation in "high-risk/cost" activities such as Freedom Summer—or, for that matter, in any major social or political movement.

In a recent publication, McAdam concludes that "network theory fails to offer a plausible model of individual action and therefore a convincing mechanism by which interpersonal contacts and organizational memberships draw individuals into activism" in the first place (Friedman and McAdam 1992, p. 160). Friedman and McAdam claim instead that network theory can yield robust explanations of collective action only when synthesized with a modified rational choice model of individual action, one that views collective identities (and not just material resources) as potentially powerful incentives for action. "One of the most powerful motivators of individual action," they write, "is the desire to confirm through behavior a cherished identity. . . . Integration into [activist] networks makes it more likely that the individual will value the identity of 'activist' and choose to act in accordance with it" (Friedman and McAdam 1992, pp. 169–70). It is our contention that the distinctive contribution of McAdam's work is, indeed, to expand the concept of purposive rationality itself to the point of bursting through the seams of

standard rational choice theory. It is historical actors' specifically normative commitments, rather than (or in addition to) their pursuit of material goals, that effectively drives their social movement participation.

If there is a weakness to McAdam's analysis of Freedom Summer, it lies in his insufficient attention to precisely this element of normative commitment to cherished ideals. In one of their articles Fernandez and McAdam (1988) note that recruitment contexts, "the residue of a protest culture," affected "the number and form of interactions among potential recruits," and thereby "exert[ed] an important influence on all the processes involved in recruitment" (Fernandez and McAdam 1988, p. 379). McAdam devotes several passages in his book (although not in his articles) to explaining the origins of these recruitment contexts on the eve of Freedom Summer. He discusses, for example, the role of demographic and economic developments in producing a youth cohort driven by an exaggerated sense of its own cultural importance and potency and the role of the liberalization of domestic politics under the leadership of figures such as John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. (McAdam 1988, pp. 13–24). And yet McAdam stops short of providing a satisfactory account of how established currents of American cultural (and political) discourse were selectively drawn upon by civil rights leaders and others and refashioned into a new and powerful definition of the situation. It was the compelling nature of this cultural and political definition that drew fresh recruits to the civil rights cause in the first place, and that helped to create those very networks themselves that McAdam regards as the starting point of his analysis. McAdam might have provided a more convincing account than he does of the cultural and political idioms of the day—not all of which, after all, were supportive of racial equality—and examined how and why certain of them came to have such a powerful resonance for so many people, especially young, relatively affluent college students, precisely at that specific historical juncture.

On the side of positional analysis using blockmodeling techniques, Padgett and Ansell's (1993) work on the Florentine Renaissance serves as a useful example of innovative research on networks, culture, and agency. Padgett and Ansell employ two important theoretical ideas to help explain the rise of the Medici family in early 15th-century Florence: "structural channeling of learning" and "robust action." All of the major figures in their account, they argue, were highly active and dynamic players. Cosimo de' Medici, for example, steered his family from a position of abject defeat in Florentine politics to one of near-total ascendancy during a period of no more than 40 years. And yet, claim Padgett and Ansell, Cosimo did not pursue from start to finish some omniscient "grand strategy"; rather, he shrewdly and opportunistically took advantage of the local "openings" that a succession of exogenous events had

fortuitously brought his way. Specifically, the reconsolidation strategies of the oligarchs after the Ciompi uprising of 1378 had left open several important “structural holes” in their marriage network, one around the Medici themselves and another around a different segment of the oligarchic elite which was based in the Santo Spirito quarter of Florence. The Medici learned that the latter “breach in the oligarchs’ defenses” could be successfully exploited through a focused marriage strategy. In addition, a “second structural chain reaction” was made possible by the oligarchs’ self-enclosure from the nonpatrician new men. This pattern, together with *neighborhood-based policies of tax extraction* during a period of financial crisis caused by foreign wars, led to defensive alliances of the new men first with one another in their own neighborhoods and then eventually with local neighborhood patrons among the elite—again, the Medici themselves. Thus, “the Medici party grew up from raw network material unintentionally channeled to them. Only very late in the game did [the Medici] adaptively learn of the political potential of the social network machine that lay at their fingertips. In almost Hegelian fashion, [the] oligarchs created the networks of their own destruction” (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1287).

The Medici were able to exploit the possibilities brought their way through such processes of “network cascading” by virtue of their own structurally anomalous position within the overall Florentine network. Involved in several different “games” at once—pursuing higher status through marriage strategies and simultaneously pursuing monetary gain and patronage influence through neighborhood economic contacts—the Medici sought after a multiplicity of not always compatible goals. Having such genuinely multivocal interests, they appeared inscrutable before their various followers (the new men and patricians) and outmaneuvered their “opponents into the forced clarification of their (but not [the Medici’s]) tactical lines of action” (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1264). The key to Cosimo de’ Medici’s style of robust action, note Padgett and Ansell, was “maintaining discretionary options across unforeseeable futures in the face of hostile attempts by others to narrow those options.

Victory means locking in others, but not yourself [Cosimo], to goal-oriented sequences of strategic play that become predictable thereby” (Padgett and Ansell 1993, pp. 1263–64). In this respect, Padgett and Ansell echo Eric Leifer’s conception of “local action” as those moves that allow actors in “face-to-face competition with others who have similar credentials to avoid claiming a (global) role until there is evidence [that such a role] will be conferred” (Leifer 1988, pp. 865, 866). They echo as well Charles Tilly’s conceptualization of “contentious action,” the resourcefulness of individuals and groups who “perform in dramas [repertoires of contention] in which they already know their approximate

parts, [but] during which they nevertheless improvise constantly" (Tilly 1992, p 15, 1986)

It is important here not to confuse Padgett and Ansell's notion of robust action with rational choice conceptualizations of instrumental action. It is true, of course, that Padgett and Ansell themselves speak repeatedly of the Medici's pursuit of money, status, and power. But they also take special pains to point out that none of these ends of action makes any sense at all outside the terms of the cultural categories, values, and beliefs prevailing in Florentine elite society at that particular juncture of history. Moreover, they quite explicitly distance themselves from the Machiavellian presuppositions of game theory by emphasizing the "mutually adaptive learning processes" and "bounded rationality" characteristic of elite conflicts, especially during "tumultuous times" such as those of the Milan and Lucca wars (Padgett and Ansell 1993, pp 1301–2, see also Padgett 1986). During such moments of "complicated chaos," they suggest, "the games themselves are all up for grabs. Rational choice requires a common metric of utility for footing, but revealed preferences (the basis for inferring trade-offs across goals/roles) only exist post hoc. Clear goals of self-interest are not really features of people, they are Florentine (and our) interpretations of varying structures of games" (Padgett and Ansell 1993, pp 1307–8).

If there is a major deficiency to the Padgett and Ansell account, it lies elsewhere. In their closing discussion of the Medici party's ultimate accession to state power, Padgett and Ansell fail to explain there precisely why Cosimo de' Medici came in the end to be considered nothing less than the "pater patriae," the father of his country, by so many of his contemporaries or why he was installed in power with the support of "those Florentines who have remained on the margins of our account thus far—the political neutrals" (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p 1308). The key to the problem, suggest the authors, is contained in "the cognitive category 'oligarch'." When the oligarchs were firmly in control, they were not labeled 'oligarchs'; they were republican 'public citizens of the state.' Loss of legitimacy and Medici victory are what got them their pejorative tag. No longer public-spirited and selfless in attribution, they came to epitomize class self-interest in Florentine eyes" (Padgett and Ansell 1993, p 1308). It was when the ruling families, squeezed by the fiscal crisis brought on by foreign wars, in turn sought to repress the new men that they earned the epithet "oligarchs." Clearly, this was a most significant moment in the history recounted by Padgett and Ansell, without it, the Medici, despite all of their tactical maneuverings, quite possibly would never have taken power at all. And yet, this crucial aspect of the story—the evident success of the Medici in manipulating toward their own ends the very content of such key terms as "public-spiritedness"

and "self-interest"—is left completely out of the picture until the final pages of the study. Moreover, the authors never provide their readers with any analysis as to why such issues as public-spiritedness, self-interest, and corruption might have had so much meaning for Florentines to begin with. Could the discursive framework of *civic republicanism* (Baron 1966, Pocock 1975), virtually unmentioned in this study, have profitably been brought into the story at precisely this juncture? (Might still other cultural and political discourses also prevalent during that historical period have emphasized such themes?) It was civic republicanism, after all—by itself or, more likely, in complex interaction with other discursive formations—that made possible that special combination of deep concern over social status and hatred of class interest (as opposed to civic virtue) that together allowed the Medici successfully to engage in robust action in the first place and ultimately to seize state power.

RETHINKING THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY

Social Networks and Cultural Narratives

Clearly, then, none of the three different network approaches that we have been examining offers a completely satisfactory approach to historical explanation. While each of these three models does represent a more nuanced understanding of the complex interrelationships among networks, culture, and agency than the one preceding, none completely succeeds by itself in addressing all of the difficult issues at hand. The model of *structuralist determinism*, for one, features a succession of network "snapshots" of social structure, while neglecting altogether the potential causal significance of symbolic and discursive formations and offering few insights into the concrete historical mechanisms leading from one such network configuration to another. *Structuralist instrumentalism*, by contrast, clearly acknowledges the explanatory significance of social action, but, on the other hand, conceptualizes the determinants of such action in excessively narrow terms, often relying on unwarranted assumptions about the overriding importance to historical actors of money, status, and power. And finally, *structuralist constructionism* affirms the possibility that actors' goals and aspirations might well be complex, multivalent, and historically determined, it inquires, for example, into such intricate processes as identity conversion, structural channeling of learning, and flexible opportunism. And yet not even this model, at least as it has been elaborated by network analysts to date, fully recognizes the (potentially) autonomous causal significance of cultural or political discourses in shaping the complex event sequences that it examines.

In recent years, by far the most significant theoretical steps taken in

the alternative direction that we are proposing have been the important writings by Harrison White on identity, temporality, and narrative. Formerly a leading exponent of structuralist determinism, White has now begun to argue that the interrelationships among network structures, culture, and agency themselves need to be reconceptualized. In *Identity and Control* (1992), he suggests that "agency is the dynamic face of networks," agency understood not only as a "by-product of control," but also as "ways of upend[ing] institution[s] and initiat[ing] fresh action" (White 1992, pp. 315, 245). Significantly—and perhaps surprisingly, given his earlier anticulturalist bias—White includes a theory of cultural symbols and discourses in this new version of his social theory; he now takes discursive "narratives" and "stories" to be among the key features of social life. "Social networks," he asserts, "are phenomenological realities, as well as measurement constructs. Stories describe the ties in networks. A social network is a network of meanings" (White 1992, pp. 65, 67).

White's diverse conceptualizations of "identity" play a prominent role in this new social network theory. "Identity," claims White, signifies "any source of action not explicable from biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute meaning" (White 1992, p. 6). Four distinct senses or levels of identity "come wound together in the same constructed reality." The first of these is identity as a "primordial and continuing urge" for "secure footing" in "an otherwise chaotic social world." The second is identity as a "social face," the basis "for our everyday construct for the person as an actor in a role [supplying] preferences that may guide him or her toward goals, and into rational action." The third is "identity from frictions and errors across different social settings and disciplines aris[ing] exactly from contradictions across disciplines, from mismatches and social noise." And the fourth is "identity as more-or-less coherent accounts, as biography *after the fact* as presented in accounts which may become woven into some unique narrative story" (White 1992, pp. 315, 312–14, emphasis added).

Despite its obvious importance for social network theory, what is perhaps most striking about White's new approach are two closely related omissions. First, White never explains precisely why actors or identities engage in these "contending control attempts" in the first place (as in his remarks on the first level of identity). It is clearly inadequate to explain away these control projects simply as some ahistorical "primordial and continuing urge" for "secure footing." And second, White neglects to analyze closely the role of cultural idioms and normative commitments in helping to shape the very identities and aspirations of historical actors. Indeed, he devotes very little space at all to exploring the internal structure and patterning of these symbolic formations. White

begins his book by declaring that he will be "focus[ing] upon the purely social" (1992, p. 14) as distinguished from the cultural level. This is a "perilous undertaking," as he himself clearly recognizes (White 1992, p. 14n. 20). White accordingly relegates "narratives" and "stories" to a secondary position in his theory, in favor of more social structural patterns such as networks of social interaction (his second and third levels of identity, e.g., are both constituted by actors' locations within role structures and disciplines). Ultimately, these narratives and stories fail to receive, even in the fourth and final level of identity (constituted by "accounts after the fact"), the sort of careful analytical attention that White accords to social networks throughout.

It is our contention here, by contrast, that networks, culture, and agency relate to one another in ways that not even White, nor even the structuralist constructionists whom he most closely resembles, have adequately conceptualized. Let us not be misunderstood on this crucial point: White is certainly correct in asserting that cultural (as well as political) discourses do inform—and are deeply embedded within—network patterns of social relationships. Social networks are, indeed, "phenomenological realities," as White puts it—or "networks of meaning." Culture and social relations empirically interpenetrate with and mutually condition one another so thoroughly that it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of the one without the other. This is the respect in which culture can, indeed, be said to constitute, in Charles Tilly's felicitous formulation, nothing less than the very "sinews" of social reality.¹²

And yet there is another—and itself no less critical—sense in which cultural discourses, narratives, and idioms are also *analytically autonomous* with respect to network patterns of social relationships. These symbolic formations have emergent properties—an internal logic and organization of their own—that require that they be conceptualized as "cultural structures" (Rambo and Chan 1990, Barber 1992) analytically separate from social structure.¹³ "When they are interrelated," note Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith, "symbols provide a *nonmaterial structure*. They

¹² An important illustration of this can be found in a recent article by Margaret Somers (1993) on the development of citizenship practices in 18th-century England. Somers demonstrates there how different types of political culture were embodied in distinctive "relational settings," or "patterned matrix[es] of institutional relationships among cultural, economic, social, and political practices" (p. 595). Political culture—and citizenship practices themselves—hardly stood apart from patterns of family life, social geography, and "the institutional dynamics of law, governance, and administrative structure" (p. 603). Citizenship, as Somers points out (following Karl Polanyi [1957]), is best conceived of as an "instituted process."

¹³ One could alternatively use the term "cultural frames" here as well (see, e.g., Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988, and the various articles on "collective action frames" in Morris and Mueller [1992]).

represent a level of organization that patterns action as surely as structures of a more visible, material kind" (Alexander and Smith 1993, p 156, emphasis added) This is an insight that goes back at least as far as the classical Parsonian distinction between cultural and social systems (Parsons and Shils 1951, see also Sorokin 1947), indeed, it originates in the later Durkheim, who in his religious sociology was the first to underscore the internal logic of systems of symbolic classification (Durkheim 1965, Durkheim and Mauss 1963, Douglas 1966, Alexander 1988*b*, 1988*c*, Kane 1991, P Smith 1991, Alexander and Smith 1993, Emirbayer 1993)¹⁴ Those who, like White in his more recent work, stress the utter inseparability of culture and social structure come close to denying this all-important theoretical insight They veer off in the direction, in fact, of what Margaret Archer has termed the fallacy of "central conflation" the assumption that because culture and social structure are mutually constitutive, "there is no way of 'untying' the constitutive elements The intimacy of their interconnection denies even relative autonomy to the components involved In the absence of any degree of autonomy it becomes impossible to *examine* their *interplay*" (Archer 1988, p 80, emphasis in original)¹⁵ Examples of cultural or discursive structures that need to be analyzed internally (as well as in their interplay with network structures) include the civic republicanism of Padgett and Ansell's Florence, the civil rights discourse of Freedom Summer, and the socialism and republican patriotism of the Paris Commune

Recognition of the analytical autonomy of cultural structures certainly does not necessitate a return to "values-based" sociology We are not speaking here of mere "norms" and "values," as Parsons and his followers did, but rather of much larger symbolic formations such as discursive frameworks and cultural idioms (For a discussion of how this perspective points well beyond the limitations of functionalist "value analysis," see

¹⁴ Another approach, that of "narrative analysis," also inquires into the inner logic of cultural structures See Steinmetz (1992) and Somers (1992) As Steinmetz summarizes it, this approach holds that "one should pay special attention to [such elements as] the central subject and actors, the form of the plot and its relation to the story, the rules for excluding events from the narration, the turning points, repetitions, and 'filling in' One should ask whether a given history assumes the form of a complete historical narrative, of annals, or of chronicles Finally, one should identify the narrator, the actors in the story, and the explicit or implicit audience" (Steinmetz 1992, p 501) Such a program for narrative analysis is not necessarily incompatible with late-Durkheimian approaches to cultural inquiry

¹⁵ White's own work can be said to vacillate between central conflation and what Archer (1988) terms "upward conflation," which, like its counterpart, "downward conflation," she defines as a variety of epiphenomenalism The former denotes for Archer an analytical privileging of the social structural realm, while the latter entails a reduction to the cultural domain

Alexander and Smith [1993]) Nor do these insights necessarily lead in the direction of a "reification" of culture, a rendering of cultural frameworks as "concrete social entities" with their own appropriate sets of institutions, rules, and resources. There is a significant difference between conceiving of cultural narratives, idioms, and discourses as symbolic patterns possessing their own autonomous inner logic, on the one hand, and thinking of them as substantively distinct "domains" of social life, on the other—surely a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," in Alfred North Whitehead's memorable phrase (see Goodwin 1994). And finally, in speaking of cultural structures we are not simply adding another "variable" to our complex explanatory equation, as if culture were itself nothing more than a residual category to be brought in after the fact in order to complete a task that social structural analysis alone had failed to accomplish. (For two compelling critiques of the "variables" approach in general, see Blumer 1969, chap. 6, Abbott 1992c.) The point we wish to make is perhaps articulated best by Theda Skocpol, who affirms that "*it [does] make a difference* which idiom or mixture of idioms is available to be drawn upon by given groups. Indeed, the very definitions of groups, their interests, and their relations to one another will be influenced by cultural idioms" (Skocpol 1985, p. 91, emphasis added).

Why is it so important, then, to think of symbolic formations as if they were analytically autonomous cultural structures? We propose that these cultural formations are significant because they both constrain and enable historical actors, in much the same way as do network structures themselves. Cultural structures *constrain* actors, to begin with, by blocking out certain possibilities for action, as, for example, by rendering it inconceivable for the oligarchs of 15th-century Florence to have pursued marriage ties with nonpatrician new men, even when it might have been materially advantageous for them to do so. Eviatar Zerubavel (1991) has referred to these cognitive categorizations phenomenologically as "islands of meaning"—an interesting analogue, certainly, to Ronald Burt's (1992, and Padgett and Ansell's own) concept of "structural holes." Cultural structures also constrain actors by preventing certain arguments from being articulated in public discourse or, once articulated, from being favorably interpreted by others or even understood (Swidler 1987). It is often under their aegis, moreover, that contending social groups wage their cultural and political battles. Each of these contending groups "sketch[es] out a different blueprint from a common set of [ideological] principles, out of the same terminology and the same essential set of concepts" (Sewell 1985, pp. 74, 76, see also Sewell 1980, Skocpol 1985, p. 89). Alexander terms this a context of cultural refraction. "In this situation different interests have been refracted through the same cultural lens" (Alexander 1988a, p. 155).

But cultural formations also *enable* historical actors in diverse ways—for example, by ordering their understandings of the social world and of themselves, by constructing their identities, goals, and aspirations, and by rendering certain issues significant or salient and others not (Indeed, by constraining actors' possibilities, these cultural formations *already* "enable" them as well, since, as Niklas Luhmann [1982, 1990] has pointed out, the "reduction of complexity" serves precisely to enhance the range of alternatives open to individual and/or collective actors)¹⁶ Symbolic polarities crystallize within cultural structures, dividing social and metaphysical reality into such antithetical categories as "pure" and "polluted," "just" and "unjust," and "sacred" and "profane." Such categories provide the groundwork for normative evaluations as well as for guidelines for action, as in the case of Renaissance Florence, where, as we have seen, the decisive moment occurred only when the Medici had succeeded in becoming identified in the minds of political neutrals as "pure," "just," and "public-spirited," while the oligarchs had come to be seen as exemplars of political "impurity," "corruption," and "self-interest." Under such circumstances, certain identities, interests, and courses of action come to be more valued than others, to the point where individuals and groups often prefer to sacrifice their own material interests out of a deep-seated commitment toward them, as in the cases not only of the Medici's ascension to power, but also of the English Civil War, the Paris Commune, and the civil rights struggle in the United States (see also Calhoun 1991). Struggles to redefine the cultural and symbolic definition of such situations, and in so doing to identify certain actors (and types of action) with purity and sacrality and others with impurity and pollution, constitute one of the most important dimensions of social conflict (see Emirbayer 1992*a*, 1992*b*). Pierre Bourdieu's trenchant insights into the dynamics of classification struggles are helpful here in bringing these conflicts into sharper focus (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 466–84, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, see also Emirbayer 1993).

Cultural structures are, then, both constraining and enabling of social action. They are also, in conclusion, multiple and interpenetrating. As Skocpol puts it, "Multiple cultural idioms *coexist*, and they arise, decline, and intermingle in tempos that need to be explored by intellectual and sociocultural historians" (Skocpol 1985, p. 91, emphasis added). There has probably never been but one overarching cultural idiom, narrative, or discourse operative in any given historical context. A full exploration of a case such as that of the rise of the Medici would thus have to feature not only a careful consideration of the internal logic of civic

¹⁶ We are grateful to Ann Mische for this observation.

republicanism, but also an inquiry into other popular idioms of the day—and of how these possibly interacted with (or stood in tension toward) civic republicanism itself. Social actors nearly always find themselves within a cultural “environment” (more on this specific concept below) marked by a rich plurality of cultural formations, while there might in certain cases be historical justification for arguing that one or another of these is primary, the question itself can only be resolved through careful empirical investigation.

Human Agency and Social Action

This last set of considerations allows us now to shift our focus of attention away from the analytical autonomy of cultural formations—the main topic of the preceding section—onto the question of their concrete interrelationship with other (network) structures and with the social actors that reproduce and transform them. This latter topic is surely every bit as significant as the former. For as Ann Swidler has pointed out, “It is the concrete situations in which cultural models are enacted that determine which take root and thrive, and which wither and die” (Swidler 1986, p. 280). Unfortunately, many—if not most—cultural sociologists today fail to address such issues, or even engage them in the first place, at least in a systematic fashion. All too often, they take cultural formations as unproblematically reflecting the beliefs and assumptions of certain categories of individuals, including entire social classes, nations, and even genders, without recognizing that these formations themselves have a relational character and are grounded in specific concrete settings. There moreover remains the question as to how structures of all types—cultural as well as societal—interrelate with social action itself and with the very potential for human agency. These questions require that we consider, in turn, the influence that cultural and societal formations have upon social actors and the transformative impact that social actors, for their own part, have upon cultural and societal structures.

We begin by affirming that White and the structuralist constructionists we have examined are surely on the right track in their common emphasis upon the role of human agency in history. Network analysts such as McAdam, Padgett, and Ansell quite correctly stress the volitional aspects of social life, the capacity of social actors to transform as well as to reproduce long-standing structures, frameworks, and networks of interaction. In this essay, we ourselves hold to such a view. In our understanding, human agency signifies that moment of freedom—or of “effort,” as Talcott Parsons termed it (1937)—that exists as an analytical dimension of all actual empirical instances of social action. Human agency, as we conceptualize it, entails the capacity of socially embedded actors to ap-

appropriate, reproduce, and, potentially, to innovate upon received cultural categories and conditions of action in accordance with their personal and collective ideals, interests, and commitments (Emirbayer and Mische 1994) We hope to have shown above why a recognition of this capacity for human agency is critical to any adequate attempt at historical explanation

On the other hand, it is also our implicit understanding in this article that such a capacity for human agency does not—and should not—mean precisely the same thing as “social action” per se While the moment of “effort” or agency is present in all empirical units of action, this dimension must be understood as an analytical moment only The “identification of actor and agency,” writes Jeffrey Alexander, renders one “guilty of [the fallacy of] misplaced concreteness Rather than replacing or reinterpreting the familiar dichotomy between actors and structures, [this] identification actually reproduces it in another form Actors per se are much more than, and [simultaneously] much less than, ‘agents’ [alone]” (Alexander 1992, pp 1–2, see also Alexander 1988a) Empirical action, then, is multiply determined It is not driven exclusively by human agency, but rather is deeply structured as well by several other “environments” of action (to use Alexander’s terminology), such as the societal (network) and cultural environments¹⁷ Each of these environments interpenetrates with and gives shape and direction to the moment of human agency itself Any empirical instance of action is structured *simultaneously* by the dynamics of societal as well as cultural structures, even though—in principle, at least—it is never *completely* determined and structured by them Long before Alexander, Parsons had come to this very same conclusion as well, by means of his structural-functionalist model and his celebrated “AGIL” schema (Parsons and Smelser 1956, Parsons 1961) More recently, Jurgen Habermas, too, has relied heavily upon this analytical distinction in his major work, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984–87)

Our aspiration here is not to endorse any one of these particular theories of social action unambiguously—certainly not the structural-functionalism of Parsons, for example, with its powerful idealist and consensualist tendencies The fundamental point that we wish to make, rather, is that network analysis errs seriously in ignoring the conceptual insights shared by all of these various theories, in particular the notion that agency and structure interpenetrate with one another in all individ-

¹⁷ Like Parsons and Sorokin, Alexander also speaks of a “personality” environment—an analytical move that we certainly endorse, even though we have not had the opportunity to discuss personality structures in this particular context (see Smelser 1968, Chodorow 1989, and Goodwin 1992)

ual units (as well as complexes) of empirical action, and that all historical processes are structured at least in part by cultural and political discourses, as well as by networks of social interaction. Earlier we had quoted from Margaret Archer, who called for an analysis of the complex interaction (or "interplay") between cultural and social structural formations. Here we suggest that it is precisely through empirical social action—multiply determined, and undertaken by concretely situated historical actors—that these various analytical environments relate to one another. The several environments of action ought never to be reified as separate, concrete entities, much less hierarchized as if one of them (social networks) were always more causally significant than the others.

Two crucial implications follow immediately and directly from these remarks. One is the notion that historical actors' very identities, goals, and aspirations are themselves fundamentally constructed phenomena. This is a point perhaps most forcefully articulated in the classical sociological literature by George Herbert Mead (1962), who argued that the mind and the social self—no less than society itself—arise and are sustained through interaction, and that the human subject must be regarded as an ongoing developmental process. More recently, Craig Calhoun, too, has suggested that identity "is not a static, preexisting condition that can be seen as exerting a causal influence on collective action, at both personal and collective levels, it is a changeable product of collective action." In particular, identity cannot be "adequately captured by the notion of interest. Identity is no more than relatively stable construction in an ongoing process of social activity" (Calhoun 1991, pp. 59, 52). Structuralist constructionists such as McAdam, Padgett, and Ansell develop these points quite forcefully. The insight that "risky and unusual collective action places one's identity on the line in an especially powerful way" (Calhoun 1991, p. 61) receives strong corroboration, for example, in McAdam's arguments about processes of identity conversion in social movements. And Padgett and Ansell's perceptive remark concerning the "varying structures of games"—and therefore of "goals of self-interest"—during times of "complicated chaos" illustrates this point as well. There is simply no such thing as a prestructured individual identity, both individuals and societies are the products and the contents—but not the starting points—of interaction. "What is primary is the intersubjective process" (Calhoun 1991, p. 59).

It is important to note here, incidentally, that individual autonomy is itself a constructed phenomenon, that is, individual autonomy is only made possible by the sheer multiplicity of structures—societal as well as cultural—within which social actors are situated at any given moment. Not only is autonomy linked to location within overlapping and intersecting networks of social ties, as Simmel pointed out long ago (1955,

1971, chap 18, see also Coser 1975, Burt 1980*b*), but it is also made possible by actors' location among a multiplicity of cultural structures, such as idioms, discourses, and narratives¹⁸

Of course, if cultural and societal (network) structures shape actors, then it is equally true that actors shape these structures in turn. Cultural and social structures do not, in other words, by themselves bring about or somehow "cause" historical change. Rather, it is the actions of historical subjects that actually "reconfigure" (given historically conducive circumstances) existing, long-term structures of action, both cultural and societal (Sewell 1992*b*, p. 46). Hence the *second* implication of our earlier remarks: namely, that for a more comprehensive understanding of processes of change, it is necessary to devote more attention not only to the structural levels of causation, but also to those more ephemeral dynamics of historical "events," that "relatively rare subclass of happenings" that transform such structures in "significant" ways (Sewell 1992*b*, p. 31).¹⁹ While structuralist determinists such as the early White (and Rosenthal et al. 1985) neglect altogether this dimension of historical events, contingencies, and processes of social change in favor of static, side-by-side comparisons of network configurations, structuralist instrumentalists are considerably more sensitive to the causal significance of human agency. It is the structuralist constructionists, however, such as McAdam and his associates and, especially, Padgett and Ansell, who most successfully incorporate this level of analysis into their explicit frameworks of explanation. Indeed, their notions of "robust action," "identity conversion," and "channeled network cascading" capture far better than any other network concepts the inherent processuality and temporality—the "sequential connectedness and unfolding" (Griffin 1993, p. 1097)—of social action (Ricoeur 1985, Abbott 1992*b*, 1992*c*, Sewell 1992*c*, Griffin 1992, Aminzade 1992). Together they reveal more clearly than ever before the extent to which, as Sewell has put it, "structures [find themselves] at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social encounters they shape" (Sewell 1992*a*, p. 20).

The most fruitful direction in which network analysis can now proceed is thus toward a deeper exploration of just such analytical themes. Network analysts would do well, in our view, to thematize more explicitly than they have the inherently constructed nature of individual and collective identities. They would do well also to thematize the complex ways

¹⁸ Here, too, the various structures of the "personality" environment—and the tensions and contradictions among them—must be noted, although once again it would take us too far afield to discuss these structures at greater length.

¹⁹ For a provocative and historically grounded discussion of "the interaction of system and event," see Sahlins (1981, 1991).

in which actors' identities are culturally and normatively, as well as societally, determined—the empirical interpenetration, in other words, of those cultural and social structures that we have been arguing must be carefully distinguished from one another on an analytical plane. And finally, network analysts would do well to distinguish theoretically the different orders of temporality and causation that appear already in their historical explanations—the orders, that is, of long-term structural determination, on the one hand, and of the dynamic efforts and projects of historical actors, on the other. It is only by taking these various theoretical notions into account that network analysts will realize most fully the considerable research potential that already inheres in their techniques, their methodologies, and their highly distinctive view of the social world.

CONCLUSION

Despite the quantity and quality of the scholarship that network analysis has produced over the past 20 years, historical sociologists and social theorists have failed to examine and systematically to criticize its fundamental theoretical presuppositions. The abstruse terminology and state-of-the-art mathematical sophistication of this unique approach to the study of social structure seem to have prevented many of these “outsiders” from venturing anywhere near it. The result has been an unfortunate lack of dialogue among network analysts, social theorists, and historical sociologists, and a consequent impoverishment of their respective domains of social inquiry. In network terms, all three camps have remained isolated cliques separated from one another by structural holes, with unbridgeable subcultural styles and mutually incomprehensible discourses. By examining and criticizing the theoretical presuppositions of network analysis, we have tried to provide some sort of a link—a “weak” tie, so to speak—between these various camps, and thereby to render this approach more accessible to sociologists in a wide range of fields.

We have shown how network analysis, despite its forbidding self-presentation, actually proceeds from a few specific, simple, and elegant theoretical presuppositions. Its principal achievement, we have argued, has been to transform a merely metaphorical understanding of the embeddedness of actors in networks of social relationships into a more precise and usable tool for social analysis. We have also suggested, however, that despite its powerful conceptualization of social structure, network analysis as it has been developed to date has inadequately theorized the causal role of ideals, beliefs, and values, and of the actors that strive to realize them, as a result, it has neglected the cultural and symbolic moment in the very determination of social action. Network analysis gains

its purchase upon social structure only at the considerable cost of losing its conceptual grasp upon culture, agency, and process. It provides a useful set of tools for investigating the patterned relationships among historical actors. These tools, however, by themselves fail ultimately to make sense of the mechanisms through which these relationships are reproduced or reconfigured over time. Our own position is that a truly synthetic account of social processes and transformations that takes into consideration not only structural but also cultural and discursive factors will necessarily entail a fuller conception of social action than has been provided thus far by network analysts.

APPENDIX

A Short Glossary of Network Analysis Terms

The following definitions are meant to orient the general reader to the basic terms of network analysis as well as to convey the way in which certain more general sociological concepts have been "translated" into these terms.

Actor —A person, group, organization, thing, event, and so on, linked to others in a network. This is sometimes referred to as a "node."

Asymmetric tie —A relation whose form, content, or both is different for the linked actors. See also *symmetric tie*.

Block —A set of structurally equivalent actors in a multiplex network. See also *multiplex network* and *structural equivalence*.

Blockmodeling —A technique for finding or "partitioning" (and graphically representing) structurally equivalent actors (or blocks) in a network.

Boundary problem —The problem of defining the population of actors to be studied through network analysis in a way which does not depend on a priori categories, in other words, the problem of delimiting the study of social networks which in reality may have no limits.

Catnet (from *category* and *network*) —A socially cohesive set of structurally equivalent actors hypothesized as more able and likely to share ideas or a common culture and to engage in collective action than other sorts of real or latent groups. See also *social cohesion*.

Centrality —The number of an actor's ties to others, weighted by the number of the latter's ties to others.

Clique —A group of actors in which each is directly and strongly linked to all of the others. Compare *social circle*.

Content —The specific nature or type of relation linking actors in a network (e.g., exchange, kinship, communicative, affective, instrumental, or power relations).

Density —The ratio of actual relations or ties among a set of actors in a network and the maximum possible number of ties

Distance —A function of the number and strength of social ties separating two actors

Dualism —The idea that the nature of groups is determined by the intersection of the actors within them (i e , by the actions of their members), and that the nature of actors is determined by the intersection of groups “within” them (i e , by their group affiliations)

Egocentric network —An actor (sometimes called the “anchorage”), the actors with which it has relation, and the relations among those actors This is sometimes referred to as a “personal network ”

Form —The formal properties of the relations among actors in a network (e g , strength or weakness, density, symmetry or asymmetry)

Multiplex network —A network with two or more types of relations linking actors (e g , exchange and communication in a market or communicative and affective ties in a clique)

Network —The set of social relations or social ties among a set of actors (and the actors themselves thus linked)

Network structure —The patterning of relations and “holes” among actors in a network See also *structural holes*

Position —A set of structurally equivalent actors or nodes (e g , a block)

Positional approach —An analysis that focuses on the patterning of structurally equivalent relations among actors See also *relational approach*

Range —The number of an actor's ties to others See also *centrality*

Relational approach —An analysis that focuses on patterning of socially cohesive relations among actors See also *positional approach*

Role —The pattern of relations of a set of structurally equivalent actors (i e , a block) to other blocks

Simultaneity, the principle of The idea that all *positions* and *roles* (see above) are determined relative to one another and thus cannot be assumed or altered independently of one another

Social circle —A group in which each actor is directly and strongly linked to most (e g , 80%), but not necessarily all, others This is sometimes called a “social cluster ” Compare *clique*

Social cohesion —The presence of a dense network of strong ties among a set of actors See also *clique* and *social circle*

Social structure —The persisting pattern of ties among actors, more specifically, a network (microstructure) or the network of networks (macrostructure)

Strength of ties —The relative frequency, duration, emotional inten-

sity, reciprocal exchange, and so on which characterize a given tie or set of ties

Structural equivalence —The sharing, by a set of two or more actors who are not necessarily linked themselves, of equivalent relations to a third actor

Structural hole —The absence of a relation among actors in a network (a crucial element of *network structure*)

Symmetric tie —A relation whose form and/or content is the same for the linked actors See also *asymmetric tie*

REFERENCES

- Aminzade, Ronald 1992 "Historical Sociology and Time" *Sociological Methods and Research* 20, no. 4 (May 1992) 456–80
- Abbott, Andrew 1992a "From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism" *Sociological Research and Methods* 20 428–55
- 1992b "Of Time and Space: The Contemporary Relevance of the Chicago School" Sorokin Lecture, delivered to the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans
- 1992c "What Do Cases Do?" Pp. 53–82 in *What Is a Case?* edited by Charles Ragin and Howard Becker New York: Cambridge University Press
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1982 *Theoretical Logic in Sociology* Vol. 1 *Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Controversies* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press
- 1987 *Twenty Lectures: Sociological Theory since World War II* New York: Columbia University Press
- 1988a *Action and Its Environments* New York: Columbia University Press
- , ed. 1988b *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies* New York: Cambridge University Press
- 1988c "The New Theoretical Movement" Pp. 77–101 in *Handbook of Sociology*, edited by Neil J. Smelser Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage
- 1992 "Some Remarks on 'Agency' in Recent Sociological Theory" *Perspectives* 15 1–4
- Alexander, Jeffrey C., and Philip Smith 1993 "The Discourse of American Civil Society: A New Proposal for Cultural Studies" *Theory and Society* 22 151–207
- Archer, Margaret 1988 *Culture and Agency* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Barber, Bernard 1992 "Neofunctionalism and the Theory of the Social System" Pp. 36–55 in *The Dynamics of Social Systems*, edited by Paul Colomy London: Sage
- Barnes, John A. 1954 "Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish" *Human Relations* 7 39–58
- Baron, Hans 1966 *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
- Bearman, Peter 1993 *Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540–1640* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press
- Blumer, Herbert 1969 *Symbolic Interactionism* Berkeley: University of California Press
- Boorman, Scott A., and Harrison C. White 1976 "Social Structure from Multiple Networks. II. Role Structures" *American Journal of Sociology* 81 1384–1446

American Journal of Sociology

- Bott, Elizabeth 1971 *Family and Social Network*, 2d ed New York Free Press
- Bourdieu, Pierre 1984 *Distinction A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- 1990 *In Other Words* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loic J D Wacquant 1992 *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Breiger, Ronald L 1974 "The Duality of Persons and Groups " *Social Forces* 53 181–90
- Brint, Steven 1992 "Hidden Meanings Cultural Content and Context in Harrison White's Structural Sociology " *Sociological Theory* 10 194–208
- Brym, Robert J 1988 "Structural Location and Ideological Divergence Jewish Marxist Intellectuals in Turn-of-the-Century Russia " Chap 13 in *Social Structures*, edited by Barry Wellman and S D Berkowitz New York Cambridge University Press
- Burt, Ronald S 1980a "Models of Network Structure " *Annual Review of Sociology* 6 79–141
- 1980b "Autonomy in a Social Typology " *American Journal of Sociology* 85 892–925
- 1982 *Toward a Structural Theory of Action* New York Academic Press
- 1986 "Comment " Pp 105–7 in *Approaches to Social Theory*, edited by Siegwart Lindenberg, James S Coleman, and Stefan Nowak New York Russell Sage
- 1987 "Social Contagion and Innovation Cohesion versus Structural Equivalence " *American Journal of Sociology* 92 1287–1335
- 1992 *Structural Holes The Social Structure of Competition* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Calhoun, Craig 1991 "The Problem of Identity in Collective Action " Pp 51–75 in *Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology*, edited by Joan Huber Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Chodorow, Nancy 1989 *Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Coleman, James 1986 "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action " *American Journal of Sociology* 91 1309–35
- 1990 *Foundations of Social Theory* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Coleman, James, Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel 1966 *Medical Innovation* Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill
- Coser, Ruth 1975 "The Complexity of Roles as Seedbed of Individual Autonomy " Pp 237–63 in *The Idea of Social Structure Essays in Honor of Robert Merton* New York Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
- Davis, James A 1967 "Clustering and Balance Theory in Graphs " *Human Relations* 20 181–87
- Douglas, Mary 1966 *Purity and Danger* London Penguin Books
- Durkheim, Émile 1984 *The Division of Labor in Society* New York Free Press
- Durkheim, Émile, and Marcel Mauss 1963 *Primitive Classification* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Edwards, Stewart, ed 1973 *The Communards of Paris, 1871* Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press
- Emirbayer, Mustafa 1992a "The Shaping of a Virtuous Citizenry Educational Reform in Massachusetts, 1830–1860 " *Studies in American Political Development* 6 391–419
- 1992b "Beyond Structuralism and Voluntarism The Politics and Discourse of Progressive School Reform, 1890–1930 " *Theory and Society* 21 621–64
- 1993 "Useful Durkheim " CSSC Working Papers Series no 159, New School for Social Research

- Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Ann Mische 1994 "What Is Agency?" Manuscript New School for Social Research
- Fernandez, Roberto M , and Doug McAdam 1988 "Social Networks and Social Movements Multiorganizational Fields and Recruitment to Mississippi Freedom Summer " *Sociological Forum* 3 (3) 357-82
- 1989 "Multiorganizational Fields and Recruitment to Social Movements " In *Organizing for Social Change Social Movement Organizations across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans Greenwich, Conn JAI Press
- Fischer, Claude S 1982 *To Dwell among Friends Personal Networks in Town and City* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Freeman, Linton C 1977 "A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness " *Sociometry* 40 35-41
- 1979 "Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification " *Social Networks* 1 215-39
- Friedman, Debra, and Doug McAdam 1992 "Collective Identity and Activism Networks, Choices, and the Life of a Social Movement " Pp 156-73 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by Aldon D Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Giddens, Anthony 1984 *The Constitution of Society* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- 1987 *Social Theory and Modern Sociology* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Goodwin, Jeff 1992 "The Libidinal Constitution of Social Movements The Case of the Huk Rebellion " Paper delivered at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, Pittsburgh
- 1994 "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions " *Theory and Society*, in press
- Gould, Roger V 1991 "Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871 " *American Sociological Review* 56 716-29
- 1992 "Trade Cohesion, Class Unity, and Urban Insurrection Artisanal Activism in the Paris Commune " *American Journal of Sociology* 98 721-54
- Granovetter, Mark 1973 "The Strength of Weak Ties " *American Journal of Sociology* 78 1360-80
- Griffin, Larry 1992 "Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology " *Sociological Methods and Research* 20, no 4 (May 1992) 403-27
- 1993 "Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology " *American Journal of Sociology* 98 1094-1133
- Habermas, Jurgen 1984-87 *The Theory of Communicative Action* Boston Beacon Press
- Harary, Frank, Robert Z Norman, and Dorwin Cartwright 1965 *Structural Models An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs* New York Wiley
- Homans, George C 1964 "Bringing Men Back In " *American Sociological Review* 29 809-18
- 1986 "Fifty Years of Sociology " *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 xii-xxx
- Kane, Anne 1991 "Cultural Analysis in Historical Sociology " *Sociological Theory* 9 53-69
- Knoke, David 1990 *Political Networks The Structural Perspective* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Knoke, David, and James H Kuklinski 1982 *Network Analysis* Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Laumann, Edward O 1979 "Network Analysis in Large Social Systems Some Theoretical and Methodological Problems " Chap 18 in *Perspectives on Social Network Research*, edited by Paul W Holland and Samuel Leinhardt New York Academic Press

American Journal of Sociology

- Laumann, Edward D , and David Knoke 1987 *The Organizational State A Perspective on National Energy and Health Domains* Madison University of Wisconsin Press
- Leifer, Eric M 1988 "Interaction Preludes to Role Setting " *American Sociological Review* 53 865-78
- Lorrain, Francois, and Harrison C White 1971 "Structural Equivalence of Individuals in Social Networks " *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 1 49-80
- Luhmann, Niklas 1982 *The Differentiation of Society* New York Columbia University Press
- 1990 *Essays on Self Reference* New York Columbia University Press
- Mandel, Michael J 1983 "Local Roles and Social Networks " *American Sociological Review* 48 376-86
- McAdam, Doug 1986 "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism The Case of Freedom Summer " *American Journal of Sociology* 92 64-90
- 1988 *Freedom Summer* New York Oxford University Press
- Mead, George Herbert 1962 *Mind, Self, and Society* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Merton, Robert K , and A S Rossi 1950 "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior " Pp 40-105 in *Continuities in Social Research*, edited by Robert K Merton and Paul F Lazarsfeld New York Free Press
- Morris, Aldon D , and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds 1992 *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Nadel, S F 1957 *The Theory of Social Structure* Glencoe, Ill Free Press
- Padgett, John F 1986 "Rationally Inaccessible Rationality " *Contemporary Sociology* 15 26-28
- Padgett, John F , and Christopher K Ansell 1993 "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434 " *American Journal of Sociology* 98 1259-1319
- Park, Robert, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie 1967 *The City* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Parsons, Talcott 1937 *The Structure of Social Action*, 2 vols New York Free Press
- 1951 *The Social System* New York Free Press
- , ed 1961 *Theories of Society* New York Free Press
- Parsons, Talcott, and Edward Shils 1951 *Toward a General Theory of Action* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Parsons, Talcott, and Neil Smelser 1956 *Economy and Society* New York Free Press
- Pelzman, Selig 1979 *A Theory of the Labor Movement* Philadelphia Porcupine Press
- Pocock, J G A 1975 *The Machiavellian Moment* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Polanyi, Karl 1957 "The Economy as Instituted Process " Pp 243-70 in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*, edited by Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry Pearson Glencoe, Ill Free Press
- Rabinow, Paul, and William Sullivan, eds 1979 *Interpretive Social Science A Reader* Berkeley University of California Press
- Rambo, Eric, and Elaine Chan 1990 "Text, Structure, and Action in Cultural Sociology " *Theory and Society* 19 635-48
- Ricoeur, Paul 1985 *Time and Narrative* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Rosenthal, Naomi, Meryl Fingrut, Michele Ethier, Roberta Karant, and David McDonald 1985 "Social Movements and Network Analysis A Case Study of Nineteenth-Century Women's Reform in New York State " *American Journal of Sociology* 90 1022-54
- Sahlins, Marshall 1981 *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities* Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

- 1991 "The Return of the Event, Again " Pp 37–100 in *Chio in Oceania*, edited by A Biersack Washington, D C Smithsonian Institution Press
- Schutz, Alfred 1967 *The Phenomenology of the Social World* Evanston, Ill North-western University Press
- Sewell, William H , Jr 1980 *Work and Revolution in France The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1985 "Ideologies and Social Revolutions " *Journal of Modern History* 57 57–85
- 1992a "A Theory of Structure Duality, Agency, and Transformation " *American Journal of Sociology* 98 1–29
- 1992b "Three Temporalities Toward an Eventful Sociology " Manuscript University of Chicago
- 1992c "Introduction Narratives and Social Identities " *Social Science History* 16 479–88
- Simmel, Georg 1950 *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* Translated and edited by Kurt H Wolff New York Free Press
- 1955 *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* Translated by Kurt H Wolff and Reinhard Bendix New York Free Press
- 1971 *Georg Simmel On Individuality and Social Forms*, edited by Donald Levine Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Skocpol, Theda, ed 1984 *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1985 "Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power A Rejoinder to Sewell " *Journal of Modern History* 57 86–96
- Smelser, Neil J 1968 "Social and Psychological Dimensions of Collective Behavior " Pp 92–121 in *Essays in Sociological Explanation* Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice Hall
- Smith, Dennis 1991 *The Rise of Historical Sociology* Philadelphia Temple University Press
- Smith, Philip 1991 "Codes and Conflict " *Theory and Society* 20 103–38
- Snow, David A , and Robert D Benford 1988 "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization " *International Social Movement Research* 1 197–217
- Snow, David A , E Burke Rochford, Jr , Steven K Worden, and Robert D Benford 1986 "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation " *American Sociological Review* 51 464–81
- Snow, David A , Louis A Zurcher, Jr , and Sheldon Ekland-Olson 1980 "Social Networks and Social Movements A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment " *American Sociological Review* 45 787–801
- Somers, Margaret 1992 "Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action " *Social Science History* 16 591–630
- 1993 "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere " *American Sociological Review* 58 587–620
- Sorokin, Pitrim 1947 *Society, Culture, and Personality Their Structure and Dynamics* New York Harper
- Steinmetz, George 1992 "Reflections on the Role of Social Narratives in Working-Class Formation " *Social Science History* 16 489–516
- Stinchcombe, Arthur 1978 *Theoretical Methods in Social History* New York Academic Press
- Swidler, Ann 1986 "Culture in Action Symbols and Strategies " *American Sociological Review* 51 273–86
- 1987 "The Uses of Culture in Historical Explanation " Paper presented at the 82d annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago

American Journal of Sociology

- Thomas, W I 1966 *On Social Organization and Social Personality*, edited by Morris Janowitz Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Tilly, Charles 1986 *The Contentious French* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- 1992 "History and Sociological Imaging " Manuscript New School for Social Research
- Weber, Max 1949 *From Max Weber*, edited by Hans Gerth and C Wright Mills New York Oxford University Press
- Wellman, Barry 1979 "The Community Question The Intimate Networks of East Yorkers " *American Journal of Sociology* 84 1201–31
- 1983 "Network Analysis Some Basic Principles " Pp 155–200 in *Sociological Theory 1983*, edited by R Collins San Francisco Jossey-Bass
- Wellman, Barry, and S D Berkowitz, eds 1988 *Social Structures* New York Cambridge University Press
- White, Harrison C N d "Notes on the Constituents of Social Structure " Manuscript Harvard University, Department of Sociology
- 1992 *Identity and Control* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- 1993 "Narratives into Times " Manuscript Columbia University, Department of Sociology
- White, Harrison C , Scott A Boorman, and Ronald L Brieger 1976 "Social Structure from Multiple Networks I Blockmodels of Roles and Positions " *American Journal of Sociology* 81 730–80
- Zerubavel, Eviatar 1991 *The Fine Line* New York Free Press

A Dilemma of State Power: Brokerage and Influence in the National Health Policy Domain¹

Roberto M. Fernandez
Stanford University

Roger V. Gould
University of Chicago

This article shows that occupancy of brokerage positions in the U.S. health policy domain's communication network is a crucial determinant of influence. However, the ability to convert structural position into power is contingent on the type of brokerage position occupied and whether the actor is a government organization. In the government sector, actors in representative positions are more influential to the extent that they take public stands on events, whereas liaison and itinerant positions only confer influence if their occupants remain impartial. The article concludes that the influence of government organizations is contingent on their capacity to link disparate actors in the communication network while remaining uncommitted to specific policy agendas.

Although the connection between power and position has captured sociologists' attention for many years (Hunter 1953, Burt 1977, Laumann and Pappi 1976, Galaskiewicz 1979), the notion of brokerage—the occupancy of a structural position that links pairs of otherwise unconnected actors—has only begun fairly recently to figure in this debate (Galaskiewicz and Krohn 1984, Marsden 1982, Laumann and Knoke 1987, Gould 1989, Gould and Fernandez 1989, Knoke and Pappi 1991). Discussions of brokerage shift attention from the effects of network structure on an actor's bargaining power in dyadic exchanges (e.g., by creating monopoly positions) to the implications of one actor's network position for the possibil-

¹ We would like to thank Ed Laumann and David Knoke for generously providing access to the national health policy domain data. Ken Dauber, Art Stinchcombe, and the *AJS* reviewers gave us helpful advice and criticisms. Correspondence may be directed to Roberto M. Fernandez, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305.

ity of transactions among other actors. For example, brokerage behavior can be observed in transactions that bridge social strata (Bonacich 1973, Lomnitz 1977), local versus national levels in patronage networks (Blok 1974, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984), and the boundary between legal and illegal economic activity (Steffensmeier 1986).

From our perspective, the most interesting difference between brokerage and other pivotal structural positions is that a broker's power appears to be incompatible with the overt pursuit of his or her own interests. For example, Gould (1989) showed that occupants of brokerage positions in a community elite only derived influence from their position to the extent that they were poor in mobilizable resources. Similarly, Padgett and Ansell (1993) argued that Medici influence in 15th-century Florence depended on the inability of other elite Florentine families to discern Cosimo de' Medici's interests.

In this article, we argue that occupancy of brokerage positions, coupled with impartiality with respect to private interests, is a central and constitutive element of state power. Using data on the U.S. health policy domain, we show that occupancy of brokerage positions in the network of communication among organizational actors is positively related to influence. However, government organizations that are in a position to broker communication among disparate actors are only influential to the degree that they refrain from taking stands on policy events. For nongovernment organizations, on the other hand, occupancy of a brokerage position is positively related to influence regardless of an actor's tendency to take stands on issues. This suggests that government organizations are influential in the policy domain because they make it possible for other actors to communicate indirectly on issues of interest to them, but this influence depends on the degree to which state actors remain visibly above the fray of interest politics.

In the next section, we present a formal conceptualization of brokerage. Then, we discuss the role of information brokerage in policy domains and develop a set of hypotheses about the relationship between influence, impartiality, and the various types of brokerage. After characterizing each organization in the health domain in terms of the degree to which it is situated in five structurally distinct brokerage positions, we present regression analyses of the ways in which occupancy of these positions and policy-event participation interact as determinants of influence reputation.

A THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF BROKERAGE

A number of theoretical and empirical studies of brokerage have appeared in research areas as diverse as patron-client systems (Carlos and

Anderson 1981), networks of restricted exchange (Marsden 1982), and community elite structures (Burt 1976, Gould 1989) For our purposes, the most important area in which the brokerage concept has had a theoretical impact is the study of interorganizational relations (see, e g , Aldrich 1982, Galaskiewicz 1979, Knoke and Laumann 1982) While interest in the concept is growing among organization scholars, a general, rigorous formulation of brokerage behavior has only recently been developed (see Gould and Fernandez 1989)

Following past theoretical treatments (Aldrich 1982, Marsden 1982), we define brokerage as a relation in which one actor mediates the flow of resources or information between two other actors who are not directly linked ² In past work (Gould and Fernandez 1989), we have extended this simple conception of brokerage by allowing for the possibility that actors in a social structure may be differentiated with regard to activities or interests, so that exchanges between some actors may have a different meaning or function from exchanges between other actors Such differentiation may be taken into account by partitioning the system into a set of mutually exclusive classes or subgroups of actors and to distinguish communication of resource flows within groups from flows between groups

When brokerage relations cross such boundaries, the subgroup affiliation of the broker is also relevant brokers play different roles depending on the group to which they belong (Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers 1976, Friedman and Podolny 1992) For instance, a "representative" role is created when one member of a subgroup takes upon itself or is given the role of communicating information to, or negotiating exchanges with, outsiders In the context of interorganizational relations, an example of this role would arise if the leading firm in an industry were to act as a spokesman for the rest of the industry in discussions with government regulatory agencies If the criterion for grouping actors was to be based on shared interests (as opposed to function or activity), then another example of the representative role would be the trade association (see

² Using a similar idea, Galaskiewicz and Krohn (1984, p 547) refer to organizations that both send and receive high levels of resources as "transmitters", they argue that this role corresponds to "a reallocation or redistribution function, helping to circulate financial resources in the community " Laumann and Knoke (1987, chap 8) employ the same strategy, defining interest groups as brokers when they send and receive information at high levels but exhibit less than chance levels of internal communication Our conception of brokerage differs from theirs in two significant ways First, our conception is more restrictive in that it does not permit the endpoints of the brokerage relation to be directly connected Second, we have a finer grained strategy, since it permits variation in brokerage capacity across individual organizations, not simply across network subgroups

Litvak 1982, Tierney 1987) This example illustrates the general point that the type of brokerage role assigned to an actor is contingent upon the criterion according to which actors are grouped. Because of the highly political nature of the national health policy domains and the resulting diversity of policy preferences among organizational actors in the arena, our analyses of brokerage assign organizations to groups on the basis of shared interests.

In Gould and Fernandez (1989), we show that there are five structurally distinct types of broker (or equivalently, five types of brokerage relation) that follow from a partitioning of actors into nonoverlapping subgroups (see fig. 1). The first type is a "liaison" (Gould and Fernandez 1989), a brokerage relation in which all three actors occupy different groups. One example of liaison brokerage is the mediator or arbitrator in interorganizational bargaining relations such as union-management negotiations (See Kochan [1975, 1980] for studies of collective bargaining from an interorganizational relations perspective.) Another prominent sociological example is the "middleman minority," a marginal group that mediates economic transactions between social groups who do not transact directly because of a "status gap" (Blalock 1967, Bonacich 1973). The most significant liaison brokerage positions in the health policy domain are held by congressional subcommittees, the Office of the Secretary of the Health and Human Services, and the director of the National Institutes of Health (see appendix, below).

The second type of brokerage is the "representative" role described above. The third type is the "gatekeeper" role, in which an actor screens or gathers resources from the outside and distributes them to members of his or her own subgroup. The gatekeeper and representative types of broker, because they perform, in Aldrich and Herker's (1977) terms, "information processing" and "external representation" functions, have clear relevance for research on "boundary-spanning" roles (see Adams 1976, 1980, Friedman and Podolny 1992). An example of a gatekeeper organization is the Census Bureau, which is charged with gathering and processing information and passing it on to other government agencies. In our data, the American Medical Association (AMA) occupies such a position with respect to the health professionals group.

Fourth, the two principals may belong to the same subgroup while the intermediary belongs to a different group. The individual or organization in such a position is termed a "cosmopolitan" or "itinerant" broker. This type of brokerage may be performed by "federation management organizations" (see Provan 1983) such as the United Way (Galaskiewicz 1982, 1985, Provan, Beyer, and Kruiybosch 1980, Pfeffer and Leong 1977), which are differentiated—both in interests and activities—from the groups of organizations they coordinate. The director of the National




FIG 1 —Graphic representation of five types of brokerage relation (solid points are actors, ellipses correspond to subgroup memberships)

Institutes of Health and the Health Care Financing Administration are examples of organizations occupying this type of brokerage position in our data

Finally, all three actors may belong to the same group, this role is termed the “local broker” or “coordinator” This is a “null” type in the sense that it describes any brokerage relation in which no partition is imposed on the actors, but it also describes mediation between actors within a specified subgroup

Because it is framed in relational terms, this conceptual typology of brokerage calls for operationalization using social network data. Accordingly, we measure occupancy of brokerage positions using data on the network of communication flows in the health policy domain. We discuss the details of our brokerage measures in the section on methods.

BROKERAGE AND INFLUENCE IN POLICY DOMAINS

In our conception, brokers permit communication between pairs of actors who do not regularly communicate with each other. There are two reasons why the ability to establish such indirect links should be crucial in national policy domains. First, the sheer number and diversity of organizational actors in such an environment makes it extremely unlikely that any given actor will be able to maintain routine communication ties with all others. This is particularly true for policy arenas that can be characterized as "issue networks" marked by fluid and complex patterns of participation, as compared with the stability and simplicity of "iron triangles" and corporatist political systems (Heclo 1978, Jordan 1981). As a result, organizational actors constrained by monitoring costs should focus their communication efforts on actors likely to provide them with useful information, that is, actors who themselves have many communication links. Also, organizations are unlikely to communicate regularly with actors whose interests focus on areas of health policy that overlap only slightly with their own. Consequently, actors whose ties bridge specific policy areas facilitate the flow of information in the policy domain.

Second, actors in brokerage positions may link pairs of other actors who need to communicate as a result of a specific policy initiative that unexpectedly makes their interests interdependent. For example, a proposed change in Medicare that would eliminate payment for a particular drug might attract the attention of both the pharmaceutical industry and the American Association for Retired Persons, giving them a reason to communicate where none had existed previously. Actors tied to both interest groups will be in a position to establish a temporary but essential communication link between them. This is suggested by the argument (Knoke and Burleigh 1989, Knoke and Pappi 1991) that indirect linkages (which outnumber direct ties) are necessary for the formation of "action sets" in policy domains (for a similar argument for a very different setting, see Mayer [1966]).

For these reasons, organizational actors linking otherwise unconnected pairs of actors play a critical role in policy domains because they permit information to flow easily among a large and diverse set of actors, which in turn allows actors to coordinate their efforts to formulate and influence policies (Laumann and Knoke 1987). This leads to our first hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 1 —*For all five brokerage types, actors who control two-step paths between pairs of other actors are perceived as more influential, on average, than actors who do not*

We argue, however, that influence derived from this kind of structural position depends on two things: the extent to which actors pursue specific policy goals and the degree to which these actors are expected to play certain types of brokerage roles. When occupants of brokerage positions support particular policies, actors who do not support these policies may choose not to rely on them as brokers for fear that they will not mediate communication impartially.³ The consequence is that the actor's brokerage position will not lead to actual brokerage behavior. In addition, some actors are not candidates for the role of impartial broker regardless of their structural position and pattern of policy event participation: most organizational actors in the private sector are a priori seen as pursuing particularistic interests. Indeed, the pluralist conception of democracy is predicated on the idea that the diversity of private interests in civil society simultaneously undergirds and necessitates political institutions that are defined as serving the *public* interest (Anderson 1979, Tierney 1987). Brokering the flow of communication in a disinterested way is thus a crucial role limited to government actors in the collective effort to formulate and evaluate policies; their efficacy in this role is limited by the extent to which such actors are perceived as unbiased with respect to policy events (for a parallel argument, see Heinz et al. 1990). Note that we are *not* arguing that state actors are totally passive with respect to policy events; on the contrary, there is considerable evidence that government organizations often act quite aggressively in favor of specific policy initiatives (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Rather, our argument is that if state actors do take sides in policy events, they will cease to be treated as brokers by other actors in the system.

However, we expect that government organizations will be differentially subject to this constraint, depending on the type of brokerage role they occupy. This is because the five structurally defined brokerage types differ in the degree to which they entail impartial behavior. Specifically, occupants of liaison and itinerant roles, who by definition link actors with interests dissimilar to their own (i.e., actors in other policy domain

³ Knoke and Pappi (1991) examine the relationship between policy-event participation and network "betweenness" (which is related to total brokerage; see Gould and Fernandez 1989), and find that betweenness is not associated with event participation after controlling for influence and other organizational attributes. In contrast, we are interested in a complementary question: Is the relationship between network position and influence sensitive to event participation? In other words, we are interested in the connection between brokerage position and influence precisely when actors are *not* active on policy events.

subgroups), will be able to convert their structural position into influence only if they generally refrain from public advocacy of policies.⁴ In contrast, occupants of representative and gatekeeper roles should derive influence from their position irrespective of their stands on issues, because boundary spanners are expected to share the goals of their own groups (which, for government organizations, will consist predominantly of other government organizations) when mediating communication between members of their group and other groups. Indeed, our theoretical argument implies that government organizations *must* pursue some policy goals, namely, those that affect their viability as servants of the public interest. Ruggie (1992) shows, for example, that the U.S. government justified its creation of the diagnostic related groups (DRG) system of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement by arguing that DRGs would protect the market against undue intervention by federal agencies.⁵

HYPOTHESIS 2 —*Among government organizations, the relationship between influence and occupancy of liaison and itinerant brokerage positions will be attenuated by a tendency to take stands on policy events*

HYPOTHESIS 3 —*Among government organizations, the relationship between influence and occupancy of representative and gatekeeper brokerage positions will not be attenuated by a tendency to take stands on policy events*

HYPOTHESIS 4 —*For nongovernment organizations, the relationship between influence and liaison, gatekeeper, representative, and itinerant brokerage position will be unaffected by advocacy of specific policies*

Finally, advocating specific policies should *enhance* rather than attenuate the relationship between coordinator brokerage and influence. The reason is that, while policy events produce cleavage on the level of the policy domain as a whole, they unify actors within particular interest groups. An actor that consistently aligns itself with the other members of its subgroup will appear impartial with respect to that group, even though actors outside the group will see it as partisan.⁶ Consequently,

⁴ Of course, actors may advocate a policy on the grounds that it will serve the public interest, a stand that might be considered impartial. We maintain, however, that from the standpoint of actors *opposed* to the policy, such a stance will not appear impartial, regardless of the arguments used to justify it (with some notable exceptions, see n. 5 below).

⁵ In fact, we expect government actors to frame arguments in this way regardless of whether the arguments are sincere. For instance, members of Congress may justify a salary raise for themselves by arguing that it will attract talented people to public service and weaken the incentive to take money from private interests.

⁶ This argument presupposes that groups are relatively homogeneous with respect to the stands they take on policy events—which will be the case to the degree that subgroup boundaries actually identify interest groups. The subgroup boundaries we

HYPOTHESIS 5 — *Taking stands on policy events will contribute to the influence of coordinators, whether or not they are government organizations*

DATA AND METHODS

The data we examine here are taken from Laumann and Knoke's (1987) study of the social structure of the national energy and health policy domains under the Carter presidency. Detailed descriptions of the project and the various data collection procedures can be found in Laumann and Knoke (1987), Laumann, Knoke, and Kim (1985), and Prensky (1986).⁷ We restrict our attention to data from the health policy domain.

Our dependent variable, influence reputation, was measured by presenting each respondent with a list of actors in the policy domain and asking them to check off organizations that he or she saw as "especially influential and consequential in formulating national health policy" (Laumann and Knoke 1987, p. 445). "Influence reputation" is equal to the number of such nominations each actor received from other actors in the policy domain.

Reputational measures of influence have a long and controversial history in political sociology (see, e.g., Hunter 1953, Laumann and Pappi 1976, for a concise review of debates regarding measures of influence, see Laumann and Knoke [1987, chap. 5]). In the present context, there are three reasons to use influence reputation as the dependent variable rather than behavioral measures (such as those based on decision outcomes or exercise of formal authority). First, we agree with Gamson (1966) that influence reputation is itself a resource and is therefore not reducible to tangible resources like money or control over jobs, although these certainly play a part. Actors may carry weight in policy delibera-

impose in our analyses (following Laumann and Knoke [1987]) meet this criterion. In analyses not reported here, we found that joint membership in a subgroup is strongly associated with taking a common stand on policy events.

⁷ In brief, Laumann and Knoke (1987) used multiple criteria to identify the population of core organizational actors in the health policy domain during the Carter years (1977–80). In addition to major federal agencies (departments and congressional subcommittees charged with health regulation) a list of nonfederal organizations were identified from five sources: mentions of organizations involved in health issues in computer-generated abstracts of major newspapers and weekly periodicals, participation in health-related hearings before major congressional subcommittees, a computer-generated list of amicus curiae participants in health cases in federal appellate courts, lobbyist registrations for health issues, and additional names suggested by experts in health policy. For the nonfederal sources, organizations that appeared five or more times across the five sources were selected for participation in the study. Interviews with prominent members of each organization were completed in 89.4% of the cases.

tions simply because they are collectively defined as carrying weight. Second, there is considerable evidence that a broad consensus obtains in the health policy domain concerning the identities of key players (Laumann and Knoke 1987, pp. 179–81), indicating that influence reputation is at least a reliable measure in this case. Third (and most significant for our purposes), influence based on brokerage, if it exists, is by definition invisible to methods that focus on the ability to determine policy-event outcomes. If brokers are influential in the ways we have hypothesized, it is precisely because they facilitate negotiations without attempting to bias the outcome.⁸

To collect data on communication flows, organizational informants were asked to identify all the organizations with which their organization "regularly and routinely discusses important health policy matters." Informants were then asked which organizations usually initiated the discussions. From this information, we constructed a 135×135 binary matrix here in which "1" indicates the presence and "0" the absence of relations between each pair of organizations. The i, j th cell of the matrix is coded "1" if either or both of the following conditions held: (1) organization i reported having initiated communication with j , (2) organization j reported having received communication from i . Note that this procedure does not guarantee symmetry, that is, a "1" in the i, j th cell does not imply anything about the j, i th cell.

⁸ One reviewer was concerned that distortions might result from the fact that all actors in the domain receive equal weight in determining the influence reputation of other actors in our measure. Ideally, we would test for this possibility by computing "prominence" scores from the original 135×135 matrix of influence votes, unfortunately, we do not have access to this matrix. However, Laumann and Knoke (1987) report that the average agreement among pairs of actors in the health policy domain was 72%, i.e., randomly chosen pairs of actors agree on who is influential for roughly three out of four cases. Moreover, highly influential actors did not differ substantially from less influential actors in their assessments of "who mattered." This convinces us that adjusting the influence measure to give greater weight to the assessments of (endogenously identified) influential actors would produce only minor differences in the distribution of the dependent variable. This reviewer also raised the related question of why we used influence reputation across the entire policy domain rather than within-cluster influence votes for coordinator brokerage and out-cluster influence votes for liaison and itinerant brokerage. We did not choose this strategy because we do not believe that an actor's influence is perceived only by those directly involved in its brokerage relations. On the contrary, the fact that an organization plays an important role as a coordinator of communication within its own group has major implications for the way actors outside the group perceive and interact with it. For example, the Health Insurance Association of America, an umbrella group representing commercial insurers, recently became the principal target of lobbying efforts by consumer groups because of its key role in formulating the insurance industry's response to the Clinton health care reform package ("Lobbyists of Every Stripe on Health Care Proposal," *New York Times*, September 24, 1993).

Using this matrix, we characterize each organization in terms of its occupancy of brokerage positions in interorganizational information flows, taking into account the interest cluster (see below) of the sender, mediator, and receiver of information. This yields a set of measures for the five brokerage types described above (see fig. 1, for a complete discussion of the measurement approach, see Gould and Fernandez [1989]). The brokerage measures we use are "partial" brokerage scores for each of the five brokerage types. These variables measure the extent to which organizations control the communication paths between pairs of organizations, thus they are a variant of "betweenness" centrality (Freeman 1977, Gould and Fernandez 1989). Each organizational actor in the network is assigned a set of five "raw" brokerage values, which are equal to the number of ordered pairs of other organizations in the appropriate groups that are connected indirectly (i.e., by a two-step path) by the actor without being directly linked.⁹ To measure the degree to which each actor controls each two-step path between other organizations, we weight each of the five raw measures by the inverse of the total number of indirect links between each pair of organizations. This weighting reflects the probability that each pair will actually use the focal actor as an intermediary, rather than some other actor. We refer to this measure as "partial" brokerage because it takes into account the fact that the focal actor may only partially control information flows among other actors. For example, if the focal actor is the only intermediary between the two other actors, it is completely in control of any flow between the two actors. In this instance, we would assign this two-step path a weight of one in computing the focal actor's brokerage score. However, the focal actor only partially controls this flow if there are other potential intermediaries. (Note that these other potential intermediaries may or may not be in the same group as the focal actor.) In that case, we would

⁹ Note that the scheme we describe here is mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e., we account for all the possible ways an actor might stand as an intermediary on two-step paths between pairs of others that are not directly linked. Consequently, we may define total brokerage as the sum of the scores across the five types of brokerage position. Another way of interpreting total brokerage is that it is the degree to which an actor stands between pairs of others (who are not themselves directly linked), *regardless* of the group affiliation of the sender, broker, or receiver of the information. In this dataset, total brokerage is a linear function of Freeman's (1977) "betweenness" because all paths between pairs of actors are of length two or less. However, brokerage is not in general a linear function of betweenness because the latter takes account of shortest paths of any length (Gould and Fernandez 1989). Nor does betweenness permit differentiation among the various types that follow from a partition of the network into subgroups. The theoretical issues we address in this article lead us to focus on the differentiated character of organizational actors in the health policy domain and, consequently, on the five brokerage types discussed above.

measure the focal actor's partial control over the communication between the pair of organizations by weighting the link by the reciprocal of the total number of two-step paths between the pair in question ¹⁰

We define the five brokerage roles with reference to a partition of the organizational actors into subgroups on the basis of interest similarity. Laumann and Knoke (1987) gave organizational informants a list of 56 health policy issues and asked them to indicate on a six-point scale (0–5) their level of interest in each issue. After consulting various press and academic sources as well as a panel of experts, Laumann and Knoke designed this list to represent a broad range of the health issues that were salient in the policy domain during the Carter presidency. Prensky (1986) reports the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis of the 135 organizations in the health domain, which grouped the organizations into 15 distinct clusters. ¹¹ Organizations and their brokerage scores are listed by clusters in the Appendix. The clusters are labeled to correspond to issues in which the organizations constituting the cluster show a high level of interest. For example, the mental health cluster is primarily composed of mental health organizations and organizations that deal with substance abuse. These organizations tended to express a high level of interest in mental health and federal funding issues. The consumer cluster comprises

¹⁰ It is worth stressing that the brokerage measure used here does not necessarily reflect the actual amount of brokering each organization does. Rather, it measures an actor's structural potential to act as a broker. If an organization, *i*, sends information to *j*, and *j* sends information to *k*, this does not mean that the information passing from *i* to *j* is necessarily related to the information flowing from *j* to *k*. The intermediate position of *j* in the *i*–*j*–*k* path is a necessary but not sufficient condition for *j* to act as a broker for *i*. Thus, this measure may be more accurately termed "brokerage potential." For ease of exposition, we will use the term "brokerage" interchangeably with "brokerage potential." More refined data would enable us to track specific information from *i* to *k* through *j*, revealing the amount of brokerage activity that *j* actually engages in. Of course, the absence of a tie between *i* and *k* might be meaningless if it were unproblematic for *i* to establish communication with *k* whenever the need arose. However, we think this is highly unlikely. There are many reasons why actors might have difficulty initiating direct contact with other actors to whom they have no previous ties. Organizations employ receptionists precisely because they find it necessary to screen incoming attempts at communication. Even in settings that are traditionally thought of as posing no obstacles to interaction, such as securities markets, actors establish restricted interaction patterns that remain stable over time (Baker 1984, Carruthers 1991).

¹¹ Briefly, the cluster analysis used an average similarity criterion in a hierarchical, agglomerative algorithm (Spath 1980) and was performed on a 135 × 135 matrix of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients describing organizational overlaps in issue interests. This technique combines organizations into clusters based on the average correlation among the organizations that are eligible to be combined. With the exception of a few organizations from the two government clusters being placed in other clusters, these interest clusters correspond exactly to Laumann and Knoke's (1987) "issue publics."

consumer organizations and organizations that represent governmental providers of care (For a detailed discussion of the interest clusters, see Laumann and Knoke [1987])

Participation in policy events was recorded by requesting that respondents report whether their organization had publicly taken a stand (either for or against) on each of 85 distinct events. Our measure of event participation is the total number of events on which respondents reported having taken a stand.

An alternative strategy in computing brokerage scores would be to define subgroups based on patterns of event participation rather than issue interest profiles. We do not pursue this strategy for two reasons. First, as we argued in our theoretical discussion, agreement on particular policy events often reflects a short-term confluence of goals among actors rather than long-term similarity of interests. Laumann and Knoke's (1987, pp. 320–42) analysis of "event scenarios" similarly suggested that patterns of alliance in the health domain continually shifted across policy events. Clustering actors on the basis of shared policy-event participation will, consequently, do a poorer job of identifying durable subgroups than will a clustering based on similar patterns of interest in general health issues.¹²

Second, if brokerage positions were defined with respect to event participation, our ability to test hypotheses 3–5 would be compromised. Our objective is to ascertain whether structural position and impartiality interact in their effects on influence reputation, but because impartiality is directly connected to patterns of activation on policy events, defining subgroups in terms of the latter would artificially create a relationship between brokerage position and taking a stand.

In order to address hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5, we distinguish among government organizations, profit-seeking organizations, and voluntary associations. We disaggregate the analyses into government and nongovernment organizations, and include a dummy variable for profit-seeking organizations in analysis of the latter category. (Because there are only five profit-seeking organizations in the policy domain, we did not conduct tests for interactions between this dummy variable and other variables.)

¹² We directly tested our intuition on this matter by comparing a cluster analysis based on event participation profiles to the clustering based on interest profiles. Confirming our suspicion, we found that the former failed to identify distinct subgroups in the health policy domain. That is, the dendrogram for this analysis revealed only a trivial clustering: at each level of similarity, virtually every actor is either in its own cluster or absorbed into one large "residual" cluster. In contrast, the issue interest analysis generates a nontrivial clustering in the sense that actors are classified into multiple, nonoverlapping subgroups at a point well above the minimum similarity level. (Dendrograms from these analyses are available from the authors.)

Finally, we include as controls a variety of organizational characteristics likely to be associated with influence. We measure organizational age by coding the number of years since the founding of the organization, and organizational size by the number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees. Because voluntary associations often rely on volunteers for much of their work, this measure does not accurately reflect their size, for voluntary associations, we have coded organizational size by adding the number of FTE volunteers to the number of full-time staff.

Our analyses also include a variable measuring the degree to which the organization sees itself as a player in the health policy field in order to control for possible spurious relationships. These organizations vary substantially in the degree to which they devote their activities to the national health policy domain. While organizations like the United Auto Workers and the National Urban League met the criteria to be included in the domain (see *n* 7 above) and therefore appear in these data, they are not primarily oriented toward health issues. We coded a self-reported variable describing the percentage of effort that each organization devotes to health policy. This variable enables us to control for the possibility that actors marginal to the health policy domain are less likely to be perceived as influential, independent of their values on the other variables.

RESULTS

Before presenting the analyses that model the effects of brokerage position on influence reputation, it is worth reporting some descriptive and bivariate statistics for the brokerage scores. Table 1 provides means and

TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS AMONG UNSTANDARDIZED
PARTIAL BROKERAGE MEASURES AND NETWORK CENTRALITY MEASURES FOR
INFORMATION FLOWS IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN

	b_o	b_{io}	b_{oi}	w_o	w_i	t	Mean	SD
Liaison (b_o)		359	321	978	162	992	71 655	174 164
Representative (b_{io})			962	490	843	473	7 657	11 646
Gatekeeper (b_{oi})				450	827	436	7 955	11 802
Itinerant (w_o)					266	990	4 400	9 688
Coordinator (w_i)						267	740	1 286
t							92 407	193 360
In-degree	731	613	626	775	402	775	41 593	27 400
Out-degree	764	649	630	803	440	809	41 595	21 571
Prominence	674	622	603	712	425	720	397	174

NOTE.— $N = 135$. Here, t = calculations computed from the sum of the five types.

standard deviations along with the correlation matrix for the five brokerage measures and total brokerage. All the correlation coefficients are positive, indicating that organizations that occupy one kind of brokerage position are likely to occupy other types of brokerage position as well. However, there is considerable variation in the strength of this tendency. Among the five types, the highest correlations are between liaison and itinerant "outside" brokerage (labeled, respectively, b_o , and w_o) on the one hand, and on the other hand, among the representative, gatekeeper, and coordinator "inside" types (b_{io} , b_{oi} , and w_i). The main distinction that appears in this pattern of results is whether or not the broker is a member of the same subgroup as the sender or receiver of the information flow. In the former case, the subtypes involve an intermediary that brokers information for organizations outside of its subgroup. Another point needs to be made with regard to table 1: the fact that total brokerage is highly correlated with the liaison and itinerant types implies that much of the brokerage observed in this network occurs through intermediaries who tend to be set apart in distinct groups from those organizations for whom they broker.

Tables 2 and 3 present multiple regression analyses that test hypothesis 1, because hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 distinguish between government and nongovernment organizations, we present disaggregated regression results here. (Pooled analyses yield the same conclusions with respect to hypothesis 1.) For all five brokerage types, the extent to which actors control two-step communication paths is positively related ($P < .05$)¹³ to influence reputation, net of the effects of organizational attributes. Moreover, this pattern holds for both government and nongovernment actors.

To test hypotheses 2–5, tables 4 and 5 report regression results that parallel the models in tables 2 and 3 but include a coefficient estimate for the interaction between the five brokerage types and the extent to which organizations took public stands on policy events. A positive interaction indicates that a high level of policy-event participation enhances the positive impact of brokerage position on reputed influence, a negative interaction term implies that the effect of brokerage on influence reputation is weakened by a record of taking stands on policy events.

Consistent with hypothesis 2, the metric coefficients in columns 1 and 4 of table 4 show that the association between liaison and itinerant bro-

¹³ Note that all of our hypotheses imply one-tailed significance tests, the critical t -values marked in the tables are chosen accordingly. Statistical tests for the control variables, however, should be two-tailed. For ease of exposition, we highlight coefficients based on one-tailed tests only, and report the t -values for readers interested in converting to two-tailed tests.

TABLE 2

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH INFORMATION BROKERAGE TYPES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Liaison (1)	Representative (2)	Gatekeeper (3)	Itinerant (4)	Coordinator (5)
Metric coefficients					
Brokerage type	055** (3 802)	687** (3 761)	660** (3 681)	1 202** (5 330)	3 511* (1 752)
Event participation	304 (956)	1 244** (5 602)	1 275** (5 672)	243 (947)	1 315** (4 741)
Organization's age	026 (380)	- 028 (- 394)	- 028 (- 395)	020 (347)	- 016 (- 186)
ln(organization size)	-4 219** (-3 802)	-3 263** (-2 453)	-2 567* (-1 956)	-4 477** (-3 788)	-2 717 (-1 708)
% effort devoted to health domain	111 (1 276)	- 005 (- 061)	004 (047)	099 (1 359)	010 (091)
Constant	60 012** (5 480)	52 683** (5 223)	47 154** (4 604)	59 363** (6 856)	52 558** (4 337)
Standardized coefficients					
Brokerage type	677	454	436	766	262
Event participation	176	719	737	140	760
Organization's age	049	- 051	- 052	038	- 029
ln(organization size)	- 386	- 299	- 235	- 410	- 249
% effort devoted to health domain	152	- 007	006	137	013
Adjusted R^2	649	646	640	746	490

NOTE.—Three cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 28$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

kerage roles and reputed influence is attenuated for government actors who frequently took stands on policy events. The model predicts that the effect of liaison brokerage (all three actors in different subgroups) on influence reputation (number of nominations as influential) is reduced by .002 ($P < .01$) for every policy event on which an actor takes a public stand. For itinerant brokerage (endpoints share membership in a subgroup while the broker belongs to a different group), the effect on reputed influence is reduced by .034 ($P < .01$) for each additional stand taken on policy events.¹⁴

In order to give the reader a better sense of the impact of these interactions, we present figures 2 and 3, which depict these effects graphically.

¹⁴ The small magnitude of these interaction effects is due to the scaling of the brokerage and event participation variables. The standardized coefficients (table 4) show that the interactions are quite large relative to the main effects.

TABLE 3

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH INFORMATION BROKERAGE TYPES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Liaison (1)	Representative (2)	Gatekeeper (3)	Itinerant (4)	Coordinator (5)
Metric coefficients					
Brokerage type	225** (5 181)	1 212** (4 408)	1 151** (3 905)	2 649** (4 395)	6 551** (2 752)
Event participation	015 (076)	- 041 (- 193)	004 (019)	147 (761)	133 (595)
Organization's age	045 (738)	137** (2 245)	113* (1 821)	088 (1 428)	147* (2 273)
ln(organization size)	6 512** (6 230)	5 913** (5 377)	6 080** (5 440)	6 725** (6 236)	6 314** (5 447)
% effort devoted to health domain	- 007 (- 127)	029 (545)	032 (580)	005 (087)	035 (616)
Profit-seeking organizations	-43 701** (-4 255)	-45 286** (-4 274)	-45 528** (-4 202)	-47 515** (-4 517)	-47 073** (-4 162)
Constant	-8 401 (-1 431)	-11 151* (-1 866)	-11 190** (-5 440)	-11 331* (-1 897)	-12 635* (-1 994)
Standardized coefficients					
Brokerage type	448	396	364	360	258
Event participation	006	- 017	002	063	057
Organization's age	059	179	149	116	192
ln(organization size)	604	548	564	623	585
% effort devoted to health domain	- 009	040	043	006	048
Profit-seeking organizations	- 394	- 409	- 411	- 429	- 425
Adjusted R^2	541	511	491	510	452

NOTE —Six cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 98$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

Using the unstandardized coefficient estimates from table 4 (cols 1 and 4), the figures plot the predicted number of influence nominations for different combinations of values on brokerage position and event participation, with all other variables evaluated at their means. In the absence of interaction effects, the predicted surface would be a flat plane slicing through the three-dimensional space defined by influence, brokerage, and event participation. The interaction terms have the effect of introducing curvatures to these surfaces. In the region of the plotted surfaces that correspond to actors who rarely take stands on policy events, the slopes are quite steep, showing strong positive effects of both brokerage posi-

TABLE 4

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH INFORMATION BROKERAGE TYPES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Liaison (1)	Representative (2)	Gatekeeper (3)	Itinerant (4)	Coordinator (5)
Metric coefficients					
Brokerage type	140** (5 731)	- 303 (- 801)	174 (418)	2 165** (6 659)	- 1 093 (- 342)
Event participation	1 077** (3 398)	410 (1 180)	958** (2 887)	949** (3 317)	1 166** (4 204)
Brokerage \times event participation	- 002** (- 3 909)	097** (2 881)	043 (1 286)	- 034** (- 3 574)	576* (1 795)
Organization's age	035 (645)	028 (434)	- 004 (- 055)	014 (289)	018 (217)
ln(organization size)	- 2 849* (- 2 485)	- 3 781** (- 3 240)	- 2 349* (- 1 801)	- 3 251** (- 3 206)	- 2 448 (- 1 607)
% effort devoted to health domain	010 (137)	030 (398)	021 (238)	014 (227)	012 (119)
Constant	45 353** (5 132)	57 251** (6 445)	46 815** (4 637)	47 318** (6 098)	50 362** (4 337)
Standardized coefficients					
Brokerage type	1 708	- 200	115	1 380	- 082
Event participation	622	237	553	548	673
Brokerage \times event participation	- 1 455	840	377	- 995	405
Organization's age	064	051	- 007	025	033
ln(organization size)	- 261	- 346	- 215	- 298	- 224
% effort devoted to health domain	014	042	029	020	016
Adjusted R^2	787	734	651	835	537

NOTE.—Three cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 28$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

tions on influence.¹⁵ At the opposite end of the event participation scale, on the other hand, the surfaces are essentially flat (actually slightly negative in fig. 2), indicating that occupancy of these brokerage positions is unrelated to influence reputation for government actors who frequently take stands on specific policy events. These findings conform exactly to our prediction that government organizations cannot derive influence

¹⁵ In fig. 1 above, a small region of the predicted surface extends beyond the range of the observed data: at the highest values of liaison brokerage, the predicted number of influence nominations exceeds the observed maximum. For the vast majority of possible combinations of values on the independent variables, however, the regression model yields realistic values for influence reputation.

TABLE 5

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH INFORMATION BROKERAGE TYPES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Liaison (1)	Representative (2)	Gatekeeper (3)	Itinerant (4)	Coordinator (5)
Metric coefficients					
Brokerage type	210** (3 425)	1 266** (2 893)	1 235** (2 517)	2 618** (2 896)	6 207 (1 532)
Event participation	− 031 (− 134)	− 018 (− 071)	031 (124)	141 (583)	118 (448)
Brokerage × event participation	0007 (364)	− 002 (− 160)	− 003 (− 216)	002 (045)	013 (105)
Organization's age	043 (685)	139* (2 216)	116* (1 819)	088 (1 407)	145* (2 186)
ln(organization size)	6 538** (6 210)	5 869** (5 152)	6 021** (5 210)	6 728** (6 192)	6 347** (5 163)
% effort devoted to health domain	− 008 (− 148)	030 (553)	033 (592)	005 (083)	035 (609)
Profit-seeking organizations	− 43 798** (− 4 242)	− 45 100** (− 4 208)	− 45 236** (− 4 121)	− 47 523** (− 4 493)	− 47 268** (− 4 102)
Constant	− 7 715 (− 1 246)	− 11 432* (− 1 826)	− 11 585* (− 1 807)	− 11 245* (− 1 787)	− 12 475* (− 1 904)
Standardized coefficients					
Brokerage type	417	413	390	356	244
Event participation	− 013	− 008	013	060	050
Brokerage × event participation	052	− 027	− 038	007	019
Organization's age	056	182	152	115	190
ln(organization size)	606	544	558	624	588
% effort devoted to health domain	− 011	041	044	006	048
Profit-seeking organizations	− 395	− 407	− 408	− 429	− 427
Adjusted R^2	537	505	486	505	446

NOTE—Six cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 98$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

from liaison and itinerant brokerage position unless they are perceived as impartial with respect to policy outcomes.

The results in table 4 are also consistent with our predictions in hypotheses 3–4. Among government actors, the effect of gatekeeper and representative brokerage on influence is not weakened by a record of taking stands on policy events. Indeed, column 2 in table 4 shows that representative brokerage and event participation interact *positively*, that is,




FIG 2 —Influence, liaison brokerage, and event participation for government organizations ($N = 28$, $I = 30.077 + 140B + 1.077E - .002B \times E$)

brokerage position has a stronger association with influence reputation among actors who take frequent stands. Our theoretical discussion did not predict this finding, we will discuss possible interpretations of this result below.

Table 5 reports the regression models for nongovernment actors, including a dummy variable for profit-seeking versus nonprofit organizations. In hypothesis 4, we predicted that the relationship between the first four types of brokerage position and influence would be unaffected by policy event participation because private-sector actors would not be expected to remain disinterested in their interactions with other actors in the policy domain. Table 5 shows that the results are consistent with this prediction: none of the interaction terms between taking a stand and liaison, gatekeeper, representative, and itinerant brokerage is significantly different from zero at the .05 level.

With respect to our final hypothesis (5), tables 4 and 5 show mixed results. We predicted that, regardless of sector, the effect of coordination brokerage on influence reputation would be enhanced by event participation because an actor with a record of taking stands on policy events will




FIG 3 —Influence, itinerant brokerage, and event participation for government organizations ($N = 28$, $I = 29\,289 + 2\,165\,B + 949\,E - 034\,B \times E$)

be construed as “locally” impartial by actors in the same subgroup, provided that the stands taken are congenial to the interests of the group. The regression model for government organizations confirms this prediction (table 4, col 5), while the model for nongovernment actors does not (table 5, col 5) the interaction term is positive and significantly different from zero ($P < .05$) only in the former model. In the case of nongovernment actors, the association between coordinator brokerage position and influence does not appear to depend on event participation.

To determine whether our measures are better at identifying brokerage positions than measures of general network centrality or “connectedness,” we estimated the same regression models using a variety of centrality measures in place of the measures of brokerage position. One way to test for this possibility would be to include our measures along with centrality scores in a regression model of influence reputation. However, brokerage scores are highly correlated with other measures of network centrality (see table 1 above). This is in no way accidental, indeed, in our conception of brokerage, it is necessarily the case. That is, it would be impossible to play the role of intermediary between many pairs of

disconnected others without having large numbers of incoming and outgoing sociometric contacts. We are not, in short, claiming that centrality has nothing to do with the phenomenon we are investigating, only that the particular kind of centrality we refer to as brokerage position interacts in a distinctive way with impartiality. Our test for the uniqueness of the brokerage measures is thus more indirect: we demonstrate that liaison and itinerant brokerage scores interact with event participation in ways that are systematically different from network centrality.¹⁶

Tables 6 and 7 report estimates for separate regressions of reputed influence on prominence, in-degree, and out-degree, controlling for the same factors as before; tables 8 and 9 report the results with interactions between each of the three centrality measures and event participation. Prominence is equal to the first eigenvector of the communication matrix, normalized by its maximum value (Knoke and Burt 1983); this measure weights each actor's centrality by the centrality of the actors to whom he or she is linked. In-degree is the total number of communication ties received, out-degree is the total number of ties sent (Freeman 1979).

As in tables 2 and 3, all three centrality measures are positively related to influence reputation for both government (table 6) and nongovernment organizations (table 7); in fact, the proportion of variance explained is consistently higher in these regression models than in those using the

¹⁶ We cannot think of a theoretical argument that would predict an interaction between network position and impartiality without invoking the concept of brokerage. Consequently, even if we were to observe an interaction of impartiality with other centrality measures in their effects on influence, we would still conclude that our hypotheses about brokerage were confirmed. Such a finding would merely convince us that our measure was no better than other centrality measures at identifying the structural potential for brokerage. Several reviewers have nonetheless requested that we conduct analyses of the effects of brokerage position net of alternative measures of centrality. This would address the question of whether our particular measures are best suited to testing our theoretical predictions. Because of the high correlations between the brokerage and network centrality measures, however, attempts to separate their effects in the same equation are plagued by multicollinearity. Our strategy for addressing the measurement issue is as follows. Conceptually, the high correlations mean that a large portion of each variable's main effect on influence is common to *both* brokerage and centrality. We therefore allow all of this common part to be allocated to each of the alternative measures in turn and then assess whether the results are consistent with our theoretical predictions regarding their interactions with event participation. While the concept of brokerage implies connections to other actors, connections do not logically imply brokerage relations. Therefore, we argue on logical grounds that the common part of the centrality-brokerage effect should be allocated to brokerage. In tables 2–5, we assign the common variance to brokerage; in tables 6–9 we allocate the common variance to centrality. The fact that the interaction effects do not surface for the centrality measures increases our confidence that the conceptual difference between brokerage and centrality is reflected empirically in our measures.

TABLE 6

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH NETWORK CENTRALITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	METRIC COEFFICIENTS		
	Prominence (1)	In-degree (2)	Out-degree (3)
Metric coefficients			
Network position	1 000** (6 618)	730** (7 500)	851** (7 403)
Event participation	200 (908)	068 (324)	087 (411)
Organization's age	011 (213)	039 (835)	- 003 (- 072)
In(organization size)	-2 169** (-2 256)	- 618 (- 684)	-2 828** (-3 162)
% effort devoted to health domain	025 (399)	009 (162)	027 (467)
Constant	15 644 (-1 692)	7 430 (822)	22 606** (2 842)
Standardized coefficients			
Network position	801	868	872
Event participation	116	039	050
Organization's age	020	073	- 006
In(organization size)	- 199	- 057	- 259
% effort devoted to health domain	035	013	038
Adjusted R^2	806	836	833

NOTE —Three cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 28$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

brokerage measures.¹⁷ But table 8 shows that the interaction between standard centrality measures and taking a stand does not exhibit the pattern we observed for brokerage position. Specifically, none of the interaction terms for government organizations is significant at the .05 level, in other words, there is no reliable evidence that the relationship between influence reputation and centrality for these actors is affected by their tendency to take stands on policy events.

Because we wish to compare these results with respect to the size of effect rather than in terms of statistical significance, tables 2–9 report the effects of brokerage position, network centrality, event participation, the interaction terms, and the controls in standard deviation units. Notice

¹⁷ Part of the difference in variance explained results from the fact that the estimates in tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 are disaggregated by brokerage type, leading to lower variances for the brokerage measures than for the centrality measures in tables 6 and 7. Re-

TABLE 7

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH NETWORK CENTRALITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Prominence (1)	In-degree (2)	Out-degree (3)
Metric coefficients			
Network position	823** (5 463)	829** (7 387)	735** (5 587)
Event participation	- 100 (- 501)	- 259 (- 1 405)	- 121 (- 605)
Organization's age	133* (2 283)	098* (1 834)	117* (2 015)
ln(organization size)	5 317** (4 972)	4 741** (4 826)	5 399** (5 102)
% effort devoted to health domain	053 (1 035)	026 (559)	044 (871)
Profit-seeking organizations	- 39 882** (- 3 878)	- 34 376** (- 3 638)	- 39 604** (- 3 872)
Constant	- 32 677** (- 5 119)	- 22 827** (- 4 394)	- 28 497** (- 4 743)
Standardized coefficients			
Network position	473	609	486
Event participation	- 043	- 110	- 051
Organization's age	174	128	153
ln(organization size)	493	439	500
% effort devoted to health domain	071	035	060
Profit-seeking organizations	- 360	- 310	- 357
Adjusted R^2	553	629	558

NOTE.—Six cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 98$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

that, in each of the regression models using brokerage position among government actors, the beta weight for the interaction term ranks either first or a close second in magnitude. In the liaison and itinerant brokerage regressions for government organizations (table 4), the interaction terms ($\beta = -1.45$, $\beta = -.995$) are 85% and 72% as large, respectively, as the largest effects, that is, those of brokerage position ($\beta = 1.708$, $\beta = 1.380$). The corresponding figures for the interactions in the models using

gressing influence on total brokerage, i.e., the sum of the scores for all five types (see n. 9 above), yields an R^2 of .71 for government organizations and .55 for nongovernment. Our goal, in any case, is to test a set of theoretical predictions about the relationship between brokerage position and influence, not to provide a predictive model of influence.

TABLE 8

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH NETWORK CENTRALITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Prominence (1)	In-degree (2)	Out-degree (3)
Metric coefficients			
Network position	1 015** (5 991)	743** (6 902)	915** (6 951)
Event participation	337 (482)	329 (381)	581 (1 083)
Network \times event participation	- 181 (- 207)	- 002 (- 312)	- 005 (- 1 002)
Organization's age	012 (229)	040 (825)	001 (026)
ln(organization size)	- 2 114* (- 2 079)	- 568 (- 606)	- 2 545** (- 2 713)
% effort devoted to health domain	021 (313)	003 (041)	007 (114)
Constant	14 615 (1 368)	6 122 (604)	17 644* (1 883)
Standardized coefficients			
Network position	812	883	938
Event participation	195	190	336
Network \times event participation	- 090	- 163	- 348
Organization's age	022	074	002
ln(organization size)	- 194	- 052	- 233
% effort devoted to health domain	029	004	010
Adjusted R^2	797	830	833

NOTE —Three cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 28$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

prominence, in-degree, and out-degree are 11%, 18%, and 37%, respectively (see table 8).

Although we made no predictions in our theoretical section concerning interactions between network centrality and event participation among nongovernment organizations, we note that the results for these actors are the converse of the pattern we observed for government actors: while there are no apparent interactions between brokerage and taking a stand in the private sector, table 9 reveals that all three centrality measures interact positively with event participation in their effects on influence reputation. Given our argument that private-sector actors are expected to pursue particularistic goals in the policy domain, this result is not surprising: it suggests that nongovernment organizations are better able

TABLE 9

METRIC AND STANDARDIZED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING INFLUENCE VOTES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN WITH NETWORK CENTRALITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS FOR NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Prominence (1)	In-degree (2)	Out-degree (3)
Metric coefficients			
Network position	619** (3 420)	682** (5 092)	571** (3 570)
Event participation	- 896* (-1 989)	- 782** (-2 423)	- 744* (-1 841)
Network × event participation	017* (1 964)	011* (1 960)	012* (1 767)
Organization's age	110* (1 888)	076 (1 426)	097* (1 666)
ln(organization size)	5 564** (5 247)	4 970** (5 101)	5 649** (5 351)
% effort devoted to health domain	039 (766)	014 (308)	032 (630)
Profit-seeking organizations	- 39 536** (-3 904)	- 34 428** (-3 700)	- 39 698** (-3 927)
Constant	- 23 664 (-3 041)	- 16 418** (-2 704)	- 21 124** (-2 911)
Standardized coefficients			
Network position	356	500	377
Event participation	- 383	- 334	- 318
Network × event participation	442	328	364
Organization's age	144	100	127
ln(organization size)	516	461	524
% effort devoted to health domain	053	019	043
Profit-seeking organizations	- 357	- 311	- 358**
Adjusted R^2	566	640	486

NOTE.—Six cases are lost because of missing data on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of influence votes. $N = 98$, t -values are in parentheses.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$, one-tailed test.

to promote their private agendas to the extent that they have extensive connections both to government actors and to other private-sector actors. The fact that this interaction does not appear in analyses using brokerage scores provides indirect evidence that brokerage position is empirically as well as conceptually distinct from network centrality.

DISCUSSION

The analyses presented here largely support our hypotheses concerning the role of brokerage position in the U.S. health policy domain. To begin with, regression analyses without interaction terms consistently revealed

a positive association between occupancy of various types of brokerage and influence reputation among both government and private-sector actors (hypothesis 1, see tables 2 and 3). However, this finding in itself does not distinguish between brokerage position and more conventional measures of network centrality, all of which appear to enhance an actor's perceived influence (see tables 6 and 7).

The interaction between our brokerage measures and actors' patterns of event participation tells a different story. At high values of event participation, the effects of brokerage position on influence became zero, or trivially small, for government organizations. In other words, government actors with a record of taking stands on many policy events derive less influence, and in the extreme, zero influence, from *haison* and *itinerant* brokerage positions than government actors with a record of impartiality (hypothesis 3, see table 4). This finding supports our argument that the power of the state derives in part from a structural position that mediates the flow of information in the policy-making process, but that this form of power vanishes if government actors publicly endorse specific policy initiatives. Note however that organizations *without* brokerage positions that stretch over various interest clusters apparently get influence *only* by taking stands on policy events. Therefore, as bases of influence, activism and "outside" brokerage appear to interfere with one another. Although a related argument was formulated by Gould (1989) and Padgett and Ansell (1993) for other social settings, our findings provide more direct evidence that power based on brokerage is incompatible with the overt pursuit of an agenda.¹⁸

We also predicted that the converse would hold for representative and gatekeeper brokerage, that is, government influence derived from these positions would not be attenuated by event participation (hypothesis 3). Our analyses confirmed this prediction, and in fact showed that taking stands on policy events actually augments the effect of representative brokerage for government organizations (table 2). We argued earlier that government actors should be expected to take stands on some policy events, namely, those that pertain directly to their role as public servants. It is possible that the positive interaction for representative brokerage—which, in this case, corresponds to a government actor mediating commu-

¹⁸ Because our data are cross-sectional, we cannot rule out the possibility that influence reputation causes actors to occupy brokerage positions rather than the converse. Clearly, since organizations will find it in their interest to communicate with influential actors, some types of network position—e.g., degree centrality—are likely to increase as a result of perceived influence. But given the results we observed for the *haison* and *itinerant* brokerage types, we find it implausible that the causal arrow runs only from influence to network position. It is difficult to see why influential actors would be more likely than other actors to lie on two-step paths between members of other clusters when they rarely take stands on events, but no more likely to lie on such paths

nication from a government organization to a nongovernment organization—reflects the influence accruing to government actors who defend the role of other state actors in the policy process.¹⁹ However, our data on policy-event participation are not sufficiently fine grained to corroborate this interpretation, we would need to know whether the particular events on which these actors took a stand were consequential for the government's role as a servant of the public interest

Finally, our prediction that coordinator brokerage would interact positively with event participation (hypothesis 5) met with only partial support from the data. In the government sector, occupancy of coordinator positions is associated with greater influence when actors take stands on numerous policy events, whereas nongovernment actors who take stands on policies derive neither more nor less influence from coordinator brokerage than those who do not

This prediction was motivated by the argument that event participation signals impartiality with respect to an actor's own interest group, even as it is perceived as partisan behavior by actors outside the group. One reason we did not observe a statistically reliable estimate of an interaction between event participation and coordinator brokerage in the private sector may be that our partitioning of actors into subgroups does not guarantee complete consensus (i.e., agreement on policy events) within interest clusters. In analyses not reported here, we found that the level of consensus is higher within the two government clusters than within the private-sector clusters, this suggests that event participation is more likely to lead to a perception of "local impartiality" for government actors than for nongovernment actors

CONCLUSION

Central to the concept of a policy domain is the idea that the network of communication among consequential actors is critical for the representation of interests and the formulation of effective policies. We have built on this idea by proposing that occupants of what we call "brokerage positions" will be influential in policy-making to the degree that they facilitate communication among actors who would not otherwise interact

when they take frequent stands. Indeed, if influence reputation and event participation jointly affected occupancy of liaison and itinerant brokerage position, we would expect the interaction to be positive. The absence of a reasonable theoretical alternative to our argument reinforces our confidence in the causal relationships we have posited.

¹⁹ The logic of this interpretation implies that the interaction should be more positive for representative brokerage than for gatekeeping, because in the latter case communication is initiated by an actor in the private sector. The fact that we did not observe a statistically significant coefficient for the interaction of gatekeeping brokerage and event participation is consistent with this argument.

But to fulfill this role, actors must be perceived as relatively impartial with respect to policy initiatives, consequently, the role of broker devolves on government organizations that refrain—publicly, at least—from taking sides on policy events. Insofar as brokerage position is associated with perceived influence for such actors, we infer that they actually do perform this function, we also conclude, however, that this form of influence is contingent on the degree to which government actors remain uncommitted to policy agendas. The result is a paradox of state power: an influential position in the policy domain surrenders its influence when its occupants pursue specific goals. Moreover, this paradox represents an instance of what appears to be a fairly general phenomenon: actors whose structural position bridges “synapses” in a social network derive an advantage from this position only as long as they do not openly try to use this advantage.

Although our data were collected under the Carter administration, we think that our theory provides insights into the process of national policy-making in general, and into the possibilities for health policy in the 1990s in particular. Our findings suggest a sobering consideration regarding the implications of government-led health care reform. Although the federal government may succeed in overhauling the national health care system, it may only be able to do so by sacrificing its privileged position as a broker of disparate interests in the health policy arena. If the already tarnished image of government organizations as servants of the public interest is further eroded in the eyes of powerful health care actors, the domain may fragment and the possibility of coordination and negotiation concerning future policy issues will deteriorate. Events surrounding the initial efforts of the Clinton administration to push for a managed competition health care system provide a glimpse of this difficulty: complaining that the administration has excluded physicians from policy discussions, the traditionally staid AMA abandoned its usually discreet lobbying approach and organized the equivalent of a mass protest in Washington in March 1993 in an effort to reenter the policy arena.²⁰ Formal announcement of the White House health reform plan in September 1993 immediately provoked massive mobilizations of interest groups across the health care landscape.²¹ Reform-minded government leaders, it appears, face a real dilemma: much as they might like to promote significant policy changes, doing so might undermine the very process by which consensus on such changes is built.

²⁰ “Doctors Plan Protest in Capital over Health Care,” *New York Times* (March 22, 1993).

²¹ See, e.g., “The Lobbyists Converge: The Pressure Is on from Amateurs and Pros,” *New York Times* (September 24, 1993), “Doctors Rebel over Health Plan in Major Challenge to President,” *New York Times* (September 30, 1993).

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
PARTIAL BROKERAGE SCORES BY ORGANIZATION CLUSTER FOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY DOMAIN

	b_o	b_{to}	b_{oi}	w_o	w_i	t
Mental health ($N = 12$)						
American Academy of Child Psychiatry	1 386	2 185	2 505	188	328	6 592
American Psychiatric Association	17 932	10 659	13 139	404	2 063	44 198
American Psychological Association	62 718	22 545	20 709	2 406	2 140	110 518
Association for the Advancement of Psychology	24 706	14 723	14 436	1 896	1 586	57 347
Children's Defense Fund	31 942	9 105	9 377	1 818	331	52 574
Mental Health Association	12 630	5 071	7 437	539	923	26 601
National Women's Health Network	21 843	3 961	3 769	864	214	30 652
National Coalition of Hispanic Mental Health and Human Service Organizations						
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers	4 525	6 040	3 129	183	482	14 360
National Association of Community Health Centers	7 990	9 062	8 127	1 125	1 433	27 737
National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors	63 182	9 807	11 376	3 208	714	88 287
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration	062	592	1 538	000	405	2 597
Consumers ($N = 16$)	16 941	11 624	13 422	680	1 568	44 234
American Dietetic Association	46 668	2 280	4 088	2 418	019	55 473
American Nurses' Association	233 802	40 995	47 529	17 193	5 479	345 000
National League for Nursing	26 113	6 074	8 147	2 110	1 780	44 224
NAACP	33 383	7 525	10 600	1 414	901	53 823
National Farmers' Union	8 520	2 609	2 511	816	368	14 823
National Health Law Program	19 034	4 485	7 041	992	899	32 451
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation	124 838	21 290	15 251	5 941	1 732	169 053
AFL-CIO	37 364	7 985	10 547	805	1 321	58 021
AFSCME	22 723	5 255	5 248	1 126	412	34 765
Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO	2 050	1 315	1 127	247	640	5 379
American Association of Colleges of Nursing	3 706	545	256	254	000	4 762

American Health Planning Association	32 139	6 390	4 919	3 616	585	47 649
National Association of Counties	33 659	8 023	12 913	1 620	1 672	57 887
United States Conference of Mayors	23 689	6 745	8 206	1 088	1 640	41 369
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health	248 676	26 133	37 422	14 343	1 843	328 419
Health Resources Administration	130 247	20 564	20 909	8 312	2 275	182 307
Finance (<i>N</i> = 19)						
AARP/National Retired Teachers' Association	39 095	10 940	7 112	2 272	772	60 191
National Council of Senior Citizens	19 642	4 655	4 533	248	380	29 458
Washington Business Group on Health	15 640	5 934	5 931	464	1 213	29 183
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Associations	162 597	40 805	30 724	16 694	3 671	254 491
Hospital Corporation of America	1 676	689	773	137	000	3 275
UAW	32 889	7 598	6 045	2 557	360	49 449
American Health Care Association	16 905	6 084	2 952	1 215	552	27 708
American Hospital Association	33 055	14 166	11 037	2 225	2 612	63 094
Federation of American Hospitals	30 580	11 126	7 758	2 642	1 344	53 449
Group Health Association of America	18 562	6 850	6 113	1 479	1 109	34 114
Health Insurance Association of America	15 274	7 740	5 739	1 043	892	30 689
National Council of Health Care Services	99 948	31 476	21 802	8 461	3 671	165 358
National Conference of State Legislatures	23 499	6 187	6 141	1 900	259	37 986
National Governor's Association	37 058	11 278	10 872	1 930	498	61 635
Health Care Financing Administration	257 782	53 791	42 169	24 470	3 671	381 885
House Subcommittee on Health—Democratic party and staff	163 547	24 037	38 091	14 158	2 066	243 900
House Subcommittee on Health—Republican party and staff	144 418	25 513	27 564	12 664	1 567	211 727
Senate Subcommittee on Health—Democratic party and staff	282 732	36 763	43 294	22 953	1 621	387 366
Senate Subcommittee on Health—Republican party and staff	181 310	25 119	35 985	16 120	1 176	259 710
Health professionals (<i>N</i> = 15)						
American Academy of Pediatrics	75 449	8 612	9 972	4 220	626	98 880
American Academy of Physician Assistants	2 203	181	169	156	000	2 709
American Association of Nurse Anesthetists	000	020	000	000	000	020
American Chiropractic Association	2 616	000	059	114	000	2 789
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists	8 749	1 299	1 519	180	251	11 998
American Dental Association	52 506	5 037	4 151	2 647	150	64 491
American Medical Association	252 573	34 604	37 831	8 686	3 921	337 616
American Osteopathic Association	4 191	059	038	284	000	4 572
College of American Pathologists	1 989	314	876	016	168	3 363

TABLE A1 (Continued)

	b_o	b_{1o}	b_{o1}	w_o	w_1	t
Renal Physicians' Association	760	000	000	018	000	778
Chamber of Commerce of the United States	20 341	3 572	1 287	1 282	115	26 597
Planned Parenthood Federation of America	23 193	1 633	2 000	1 152	000	27 978
Association of American Medical Colleges	167 311	15 434	15 944	11 008	740	210 437
Council of Teaching Hospitals	9 193	1 253	1 823	909	000	13 178
Federal Trade Commission	67 423	21 499	22 206	4 706	4 186	120 020
Abortion ($N = 2$)						
National Abortion Rights Action League	7 664	718	175	223	000	8 780
National Urban League	25 704	1 173	3 522	1 940	000	32 339
Public health ($N = 4$)						
American College of Preventive Medicine	39 857	3 067	11 736	1 669	267	56 596
American Public Health Association	125 258	12 375	17 191	6 814	267	161 904
Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine	277	104	032	000	000	414
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials	4 037	497	465	217	000	5 216
Government 1 ($N = 6$)						
Coalition for Health Funding	222 888	000	318	17 457	000	240 662
National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine	147 879	4 024	2 218	8 788	048	162 957
Health Services Administration	85 917	2 572	968	4 923	028	94 407
House Subcommittee on Labor and HEW Appropriations—Republicans	395 383	4 486	6 391	20 963	107	427 330
Senate Subcommittee on Labor and HEW Appropriations—Democrats	466 617	5 212	6 140	24 128	020	502 118
Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research—Republicans	423 235	7 046	6 295	24 423	082	461 083
Targeted disease 1 ($N = 11$)						
American Association for Dental Research	494	236	261	048	000	1 039
American College of Cardiology	5 291	228	347	124	000	5 989
American Society of Hematology	1 390	318	468	126	000	2 302
Endocrine Society	2 861	762	1 213	193	234	5 263
American Cancer Society	26 835	2 548	3 493	845	183	33 904
American Diabetes Association	21 977	4 452	5 378	602	817	33 225
American Heart Association	21 142	2 779	2 824	948	393	28 086
American Social Health Association	1 295	000	000	153	000	1 448

Candlelighters Foundation	3 744	587	198	066	000	4 595
Friends of Eye Research, Rehabilitation, and Treatment	1 312	556	497	296	000	2 661
National Institute of Dental Research	5 277	2 238	4 348	2 566	000	14 429
Health research ($N = 13$)						
American Federation for Clinical Research	494	291	213	000	000	998
American Society for Microbiology	8 639	2 229	1 191	350	000	12 408
Society for Investigative Dermatology	000	350	470	018	106	944
Environmental Defense Fund	3 141	1 929	1 554	166	000	6 791
American Association of Dental Schools	14 543	072	050	692	000	15 357
Director of National Institutes of Health	429 257	86 479	82 310	32 773	9 001	639 815
National Cancer Institute	18 624	7 873	5 377	1 803	1 943	35 619
National Institute on Aging	22 370	7 314	2 687	1 066	083	33 520
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases	19 409	9 590	17 039	3 569	5 000	54 607
National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases	35 869	8 719	10 955	2 914	926	59 383
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences	5 031	2 175	2 605	399	696	10 905
National Institute of General Medical Sciences	4 530	2 924	2 486	329	1 902	12 172
National Institute of Neurological Communicative Disorders and Stroke	18 949	2 655	1 810	819	000	24 233
Targeted disease 2 ($N = 3$)						
American Gastroenterological Association	083	000	000	000	000	083
Citizens for the Treatment of High Blood Pressure	20 753	743	378	404	000	22 279
National Kidney Foundation	64 661	1 893	2 610	4 063	000	73 226
Targeted disease 3 ($N = 11$)						
American Speech-Language-Hearing Association		2 939	1 771	213	091	10 021
Arthritis Foundation	5 008		1 325	184	115	8 352
Cystic Fibrosis Foundation	5 313	1 415	9 719	1 457	2 455	35 558
Epilepsy Foundation of America	14 493	7 433	9 248	970	856	46 899
Joint Council of Allergy and Immunology	25 740	10 085		000	000	752
National Association for Retarded Citizens	752	000	000	000	944	33 051
National Foundation for Ileitis and Colitis	13 679	6 836	11 183	409	155	17 282
National Hemophilia Foundation	11 033	1 966	3 967	161	252	6 359
National Society for Autistic Children	4 770	471	866	240	717	14 120
United Cerebral Palsy Associations	6 515	2 999	3 648	173	575	15 553
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development	7 410	3 480	3 915	2 923	282	80 801
	55 335	11 814	10 448			

TABLE A1 (Continued)

	b_o	b_{10}	b_{01}	w_o	w_1	t
Drug industry ($N = 7$)						
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc	7 575	4 321	3 233	097	000	15 226
Merck and Company	2 689	2 162	1 632	159	000	6 642
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals	3 428	1 779	2 109	062	000	7 378
Upjohn Company	33 190	7 561	8 035	1 814	000	50 601
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association	25 209	6 188	6 458	901	000	38 755
FDA Commissioner and staff	179 945	21 051	21 674	11 558	000	234 228
FDA Bureau of Drugs	111 053	13 609	18 668	10 003	000	153 333
Food ($N = 3$)						
Consumer Federation of America	43 627	3 904	3 246	2 410	000	53 187
Community Nutrition Institute	16 126	2 959	657	1 546	000	21 289
FDA Bureau of Food	24 202	1 235	4 717	1 808	000	31 962
Government 2 ($N = 4$)						
Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services	646 300	13 559	7 032	84 624	000	1751 510
Office of Management and the Budget	180 016	786	797	8 721	000	190 320
White House Office	144 434	582	578	7 633	000	153 226
House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment—Democrats	738 372	6 123	3 655	37 053	000	785 199
Isolates ($N = 9$)						
Medical Library Association	5 328	494	590	378	000	6 789
National Rehabilitation Association	10 075	2 000	000	1 420	000	13 495
National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, RWDSU, AFL-CIO	3 467	937	948	173	103	5 629
United Mine Workers	64 265	3 169	4 400	2 450	000	74 285
American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy	4 135	628	765	301	000	5 828
American Association of Professional Standards Review Organizations	1 709	177	1 429	232	111	3 658
American Insurance Association	669	000	000	000	000	669
Health Industry Manufacturers Association	5 961	000	000	394	000	6 354
National Association of Home Health Agencies	9 681	1 936	2 811	1 824	111	16 363

REFERENCES

- Adams, J Stacy 1976 "The Structure and Dynamics of Behavior in Organizational Boundary Roles " Pp 1175-99 in *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, edited by Marvin D Dunnette Chicago Rand McNally
- 1980 "Interorganizational Processes and Organizational Boundary Activities " *Research in Organizational Behavior* 2 321-55
- Aldrich, Howard 1982 "The Origins and Persistence of Social Networks A Comment " Pp 281-93 in *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, edited by Peter V Marsden and Nan Lin Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Aldrich, Howard, and Diane Herker 1977 "Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure " *Academy of Management Review* 2 217-30
- Anderson, Charles W 1979 "Political Design and Representation of Interests " Pp 271-97 in *Trends toward Corporatist Intervention*, edited by Philippe C Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Baker, Wayne E 1984 "The Social Structure of a National Securities Market " *American Journal of Sociology* 89 775-811
- Blalock, Hubert M 1967 *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations* New York Wiley
- Blok, Anton 1974 *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village* New York Harper & Row
- Bonacich, Edna 1973 "A Theory of Middleman Minorities " *American Sociological Review* 38 583-94
- Burt, Ronald S 1976 "Positions in Networks " *Social Forces* 55 93-122
- 1977 "Power in a Social Topology " *Social Science Research* 6 1-83
- Carlos, Manuel L , and Bo Anderson 1981 "Political Brokerage and Network Politics in Mexico The Case of the Dominance System " Pp 169-87 in *Networks, Exchange and Coercion*, edited by David Willer and Bo Anderson New York Elsevier
- Carruthers, Bruce G 1991 "State-building and Market-making The Politics of Public Debt in the English Financial Revolution, 1672-1712 " Ph D dissertation University of Chicago, Department of Sociology
- Eisenstadt, S N , and L Roniger 1984 *Patrons, Clients and Friends Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Freeman, Linton C 1977 "A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness " *Sociometry* 40 35-41
- 1979 "Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification " *Social Networks* 1 215-39
- Friedman, Raymond A , and Joel Podolny 1992 "Differentiation of Boundary Spanning Roles Labor Negotiations and Implications and Role Conflict " *Administrative Science Quarterly* 37 28-47
- Galaskiewicz, Joseph 1979 *Exchange Networks and Community Politics* Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- 1982 "Modes of Resource Allocation Corporate Contributions to Nonprofit Organizations " Pp 235-54 in *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, edited by Peter V Marsden and Nan Lin Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- 1985 *Social Organization of an Urban Grants Economy* New York Academic Press
- Galaskiewicz, Joseph, and Karl R Krohn 1984 "Positions, Roles, and Dependencies in a Community Interorganizational System " *Sociological Quarterly* 25 527-50
- Gamson, William A 1966 "Reputation and Resources in Community Politics " *American Journal of Sociology* 72 121-31
- Gould, Roger V 1989 "Power and Social Structure in Community Elites " *Social Forces* 68 531-52

- Gould, Roger V , and Roberto M Fernandez 1989 "Structures of Mediation A Formal Approach to Brokerage in Transaction Networks " *Sociological Methodology* 19 89-126
- Heclo, Hugh 1978 "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment " Pp 87-124 in *The New American Political System*, edited by Anthony King Washington, D C American Enterprise Institute
- Heinz, John P , Edward O Laumann, Robert H Salisbury, and Robert L Nelson 1990 "Inner Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems " *Journal of Politics* 52 356-90
- Hunter, Floyd 1953 *Community Power Structure* Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press
- Jordan, A Grant 1981 "Iron Triangles, Wooly Corporatism and Elastic Nets Images of the Policy Process " *Journal of Public Policy* 1 95-123
- Knoke, David, and Frank Burleigh 1989 "Collective Action in National Policy Domains Constraints, Cleavages, and Policy Outcomes " *Research in Political Sociology* 4 187-208
- Knoke, David, and Ronald S Burt 1983 "Prominence " Pp 195-222 in *Applied Network Analysis*, edited by Ronald S Burt and Michael J Minor Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Knoke, David, and Edward O Laumann 1982 "The Social Organization of the National Health Policy Domain " Pp 255-270 in *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, edited by Peter V Marsden and Nan Lin Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Knoke, David, and Franz Urban Pappi 1991 "Organizational Action Sets in the U S and German Labor Policy Domains " *American Sociological Review* 56 509-23
- Kochan, Thomas A 1975 "Determinants of the Power of Boundary Units in an Interorganizational Bargaining Relation " *Administrative Science Quarterly* 20 434-52
- 1980 "Collective Bargaining and Organizational Behavior Research " *Research in Organizational Behavior* 2 129-76
- Laumann, Edward O , and David Knoke 1987 *The Organizational State Social Choice in National Policy Domains* Madison University of Wisconsin Press
- Laumann, Edward O , and Franz U Pappi 1976 *Networks of Collective Action A Perspective on Community Influence Systems* New York Academic Press
- Laumann, Edward O , David Knoke, and Yong-Hak Kim 1985 "An Organizational Approach to State Policy Formation A Comparative Study of Energy and Health Domains " *American Sociological Review* 50 1-19
- Litvak, Isaiah A 1982 "National Trade Associations Business-Government Intermediaries " *Business Quarterly* 47 34-42
- Lomnitz, Larissa Adler 1977 *Networks and Marginality Life in a Mexican Shantytown* New York Academic Press
- Marsden, Peter V 1982 "Brokerage Behavior in Restricted Exchange Networks " Pp 201-18 in *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, edited by Peter V Marsden and Nan Lin Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Mayer, Adrian C 1966 "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies " Pp 97-122 in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, edited by Michael Banton London Tavistock
- Padgett, John F , and Christopher K Ansell 1993 "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434 " *American Journal of Sociology* 98 1259-1319
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Anthony Leong 1977 "Resource Allocations in United Funds Examination of Power and Dependence " *Social Forces* 55 775-90
- Prensky, David 1986 "Interorganizational Structure and Organizational Participation in a National Policy Domain " Ph D dissertation University of Chicago, Department of Sociology

- Provan, Keith 1983 "The Federation as an Interorganizational Linkage Network " *Academy of Management Review* 8 79-89
- Provan, Keith, Janice Beyer, and Carlos Kruybosch 1980 "Environmental Linkages and Power in Resource-Dependence Relations between Organizations " *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25 200-225
- Rogers, Everett M , and Rekha Agarwala-Rogers 1976 *Communication in Organizations* New York Free Press
- Ruggie, Mary 1992 "The Paradox of Liberal Intervention Health Policy and the American Welfare State " *American Journal of Sociology* 97 919-44
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T Tierney 1986 *Organized Interests and American Democracy* New York Harper & Row
- Spath, Helmuth 1980 *Cluster Analysis Algorithms* London Ellis Harwood
- Steffensmeier, Darrell J 1986 *The Fence In the Shadow of Two Worlds* Totowa, N J Rowman & Littlefield
- Tierney, John T 1987 "Organized Interests in Health Politics and Policy-making " *Medical Care Review* 44 89-118

Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities¹

Douglas S. Massey
University of Chicago

Luin Goldring
University of Illinois at Chicago

Jorge Durand
Universidad de Guadalajara

Researchers working in Mexican communities have observed both regularities and inconsistencies in the way that transnational migration develops over time. This article presents a theory that accounts for these uniformities and discrepancies and proposes a method to compare the process of migration across communities. It also argues that studies must report and control for the prevalence of migration within communities. Data from 19 Mexican communities show that predictable demographic, social, and economic changes accompany increases in migratory prevalence. Although international migration begins within a narrow range of each community's socioeconomic structure, over time it broadens to incorporate other social groups.

During the 1970s, field investigators working in Mexico began to uncover empirical regularities in the way that migration to the United States developed over time. The earliest emigrants from a community were almost always males of working age, usually married family heads from some identifiable niche in the socioeconomic structure. Typically they came from the middle of the local hierarchy—not so poor that they could not afford the costs and risks of migration, but not so affluent that migration was unattractive. Within the United States they went to a few specific locations to work in particular sectors of the economy, such as railroads, agriculture, or manufacturing. They adopted strategies of

¹ Address all correspondence to Douglas S. Massey, Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, 3178 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6298

movement appropriate to the work they did, settling for prolonged periods to work in manufacturing or moving back and forth for agricultural labor

Over time the proportion of people with U S experience tended to increase within the community. As migratory behavior spread, foreign experience accumulated in the population, kinship ties to migrants multiplied, and the stream diversified to include younger unmarried males, women, and children. Migration became progressively less class selective and more representative of the whole community. Within the United States the array of locations, occupations, and economic sectors where migrants worked expanded, and the timing and duration of U S trips reflected these changes.

Eventually, most men were drawn into the migrant workforce and a large plurality of women and children began migrating as well. In places with long and well-established histories of migration, information about jobs, housing, and life in the United States became widely diffused, and nearly everyone was related to someone who had been north of the border. The social, economic, and demographic composition of the outflow reached a high degree of diversity. In the United States the number of branch communities consisting of migrant families who appeared to have settled abroad permanently began to grow.

These trends were first noted by Joshua Reichert for the town of Guadalupe, Michoacán (see Reichert 1979, 1981, 1982, Reichert and Massey 1979, 1980). Richard Mines uncovered similar patterns in the town of Las Animas, Zacatecas (Mines 1981, 1984, Mines and Anzaldúa 1982, Mines and de Janvry 1982). A systematic comparison of these communities by Mines and Massey (1985) showed that rising out-migration set off structural changes that made additional migration more likely. The self-feeding character of migration has been noted in other communities within Mexico (Wiest 1973, Massey et al. 1987, Alarcón 1992) as well as other countries (Baucic 1972, Fergany 1982, Pessar 1982, Rhoades 1979).

Despite these commonalities, studies have also found discrepancies among communities with respect to key variables in the migration process, such as the proportion of people with migration experience, the class background of migrants, the proportion of documented migrants, the number of migrant women and children, the importance of settled versus recurrent strategies, the number and types of destinations, and the kind of U S occupation held. Both Mines and Massey (1985) and Massey et al. (1987) attributed these community-level differences to structural factors that shaped the course of migration at each location.

As Mexican community studies accumulated during the 1970s and 1980s, however, intercommunity differences became more and more salient and began to overshadow the continuities identified by earlier inves-

tigators Whereas some studies found that migrants were primarily landless workers (see Cornelius 1976*a*, Stuart and Kearney 1981), others concluded that they were mainly landowners (López 1986) or both landowners and sharecroppers (Mines 1981) Although married men dominated the migrant workforce in some towns (Wiest 1973, Cornelius 1976*a*, 1976*b*, Dinerman 1982), in others the participation of women and children came closer to that of men (Reichert 1979, Fernández 1988, Cornelius 1990)

Findings concerning the relative importance of different migrant strategies became particularly confused In some studies, migrants appeared to favor a strategy of temporary migration, moving sporadically to the United States for short periods of work (Cornelius 1978) In others, they engaged in recurrent migration, moving back and forth annually for seasonal wage labor (Reichert 1979, López 1986) In some settings, migrants adopted a settled strategy, establishing themselves in one place for long periods of time (see the town of Santiago analyzed by Massey et al [1987]), while in others, they employed several strategies at once, without appearing to favor any one in particular (see the town of Chamitlán in Massey et al [1987])

In order to resolve the tension between earlier findings of a common migratory process and the growing evidence of intercommunity differences, Durand and Massey (1992) reviewed studies of 25 Mexican communities They found that "apparently inconsistent generalizations about Mexico-U S migration are not necessarily contradictory when they are examined in comparative perspective Rather, diverse outcomes occur in various communities when common processes of migration are shaped and differentiated by structural variables operating at the community level" (p 4) They argued for "a research design that would incorporate the study of many different communities into a common analytic framework" (p 4) Goldring (1990, 1992*b*) reached similar conclusions from her comparative analysis of two migrant communities

This common analytic framework ideally should involve more than the simple application of a standard survey instrument to a range of different communities Although such an exercise would address the issue of sample generalizability, it would not provide a means of analytically comparing communities with different histories and levels of migration Given the cumulative nature of migration processes, fruitful comparisons must somehow take into account prior migration histories

People living in communities where migration has just begun, for example, generally face significant deterrents to international movement Since the number of migrants is small, few nonmigrants have friends and relatives who have been abroad, and even if they do, the migrants are likely to have limited knowledge about jobs, housing, and transporta-

tion at destination sites. In contrast, people living in a community characterized by a long history and high prevalence of out-migration are very likely to be connected socially to people who have been abroad, and these people tend to have considerable knowledge about conditions and resources at points of destination. In communities with a well-developed migratory tradition, in other words, nonmigrants have access to valuable social capital that can be used to facilitate movement.

International migration is a costly and risky enterprise, and those who undertake it are usually selected on demographic, social, economic, and psychological grounds. Social capital, however, plays a powerful role in mitigating these costs and risks, and its accumulation over time tends to reduce the selectivity of migration. Variation in the amount and quality of social capital can, therefore, produce very different migration streams over time and across communities, making migration patterns appear to be discrepant when, in fact, they reflect the same underlying process.

The conceptual framework called for by Durand and Massey requires a technique that permits direct comparison among communities with different histories and levels of migration. In order to satisfy this methodological need, we introduce a new analytical tool: the migration prevalence ratio. For any community in any year, the prevalence ratio is defined as the number of people with international migratory experience divided by the total number of people alive. It can be calculated retrospectively for any year in the recent past given just two pieces of information about every community member: the date of birth and the date of his or her first foreign trip.

This ratio, when calculated for different years within a community, provides a simple indicator of how widespread migratory experience has become at any point in time. It serves as a proxy for the extent of a community's involvement in the migratory process and allows us to compare communities at very different stages of migratory development. In this way, the prevalence ratio partially controls for the effect of differences in the history and timing of migration. In essence, it standardizes the units of comparison.

In this article, we employ prevalence ratios to characterize the underlying process of transnational migration as it develops across a range of community settings. Our data, drawn from representative samples of 19 Mexican communities, are compiled using identical methods and instruments as part of a single, comprehensive study. Guided by the proposition that the nature of migration shifts as it becomes more widespread in a community, we describe the demographic, social, economic, and geographic character of international migration as communities go from low to high prevalence. Taking account of migratory prevalence provides a useful way of resolving apparent inconsistencies in the literature by

revealing common patterns in the development of international migration across communities

Simply knowing the prevalence of migration does not, of course, identify which specific structural conditions (e.g., immigration policies, political conditions, or economic trends) might have influenced migration at key historical junctures. Although we recognize that structural factors shape the local expression of migratory processes in different communities at different times, our purpose here is not to study the effect of these differentiating factors but to characterize the basic processes across a range of sites.

We begin with a review of recent research on transnational migration that highlights the empirical commonalities and differences observed by earlier researchers. We then elaborate our methodological approach and describe a data set that allows us to employ it. Finally we use the data to characterize the migratory process as it develops across 19 communities that differ with respect to economic structure, ethnic composition, rural-urban status, and emigration history.

A CUMULATIVE THEORY OF MIGRATION

Prior empirical work suggests that transnational migration unfolds in a relatively consistent way over time. It displays a distinct tendency to become more prevalent and to broaden its base of demographic, social, and economic representation within the community. These trends follow theoretically from the fact that migration affects individual motivations and social structures in ways that encourage additional migration. As a result, transnational migration tends to become a self-reinforcing process that acquires an internal momentum all its own. Over time it becomes increasingly independent of the conditions that originally caused it.

This theoretical logic predicts the emergence of common empirical trends across diverse communities as migration becomes more prevalent. The seemingly diverse array of migration patterns that arises from the various case studies is explained by the different levels of migratory prevalence that each community has achieved.

Although we drew our theoretical argument primarily from research on Mexico-United States migration during this century, and to a lesser extent from recent research on migration from the Caribbean and Latin America, we put it forward as a general conceptual model. It is meant to apply to cases of transnational labor migration where host-country immigration policies are relatively open, particularly those cases where clandestine migration is feasible.

Transnational labor migration may originate for a variety of complementary reasons. Migrants may observe wage differentials between ori-

gin and destination areas and respond to expected positive returns to foreign labor (Todaro and Maruszko 1987). Households may seek to diversify risks to their economic well-being by sending family members to work in different regional labor markets, one of which is foreign (Stark 1991). Migrants may be recruited by foreign employers seeking to import workers for specific tasks (Piore 1979). People may be impelled to move because structural transformations in the local economy eliminate traditional sources of sustenance (Sassen 1988) or because political upheavals cause people to fear for their physical safety (Portes and Rumbaut 1990).

No matter how international migration begins, the first migrants from a community are likely to experience it as a very costly and risky enterprise, both in monetary and psychological terms. They have little or no knowledge of conditions in the host country and are ignorant of its culture, language, and ways of life. In most cases, they incur the expenses of the trip and absorb the opportunity costs of income forgone while moving and looking for work. They arrive having to pay off these overhead expenses and are thus relatively dependent on their first employer. Given their lack of knowledge about prevailing wage rates, work habits, legal conventions, and social expectations, they are vulnerable to exploitation and mistreatment, especially if they are undocumented and do not speak the language of the host country.

Given these costs and risks, the first transnational labor migrants usually come not from the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy but from the lower middle ranges (Portes 1979, Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Such people have enough resources to absorb the costs and risks of the trip but are not so affluent that foreign labor is unattractive.

Since families in low-wage countries typically follow a patriarchal sexual division of labor within the household, the first migrants are usually married men of prime labor force age who seek to maintain their economic and gender roles through migration (Lindstrom 1991, Pedraza 1991, Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992, Alarcón 1992, Goldring 1992c). Among rural and working-class families, men are seen as better able than women to absorb the physical risks of international movement (Reichert 1979), and given prevailing gender differentials in wage rates (England 1992), men can be expected to earn more on average, than women. Thus, if a family seeks to maximize foreign earnings by sending one worker abroad, the logical choice is the male household head or perhaps an older son.

This pattern of male-led migration appears to hold well for sending areas throughout the central and western states of Mexico. Mexican women in the northern states, however, have historically crossed the border to work as domestics, service workers, and industrial operatives (Ruiz and Tiano 1987, Taylor 1980). Moreover, Donato (1992) has shown that the gender composition of migration is shaped strongly by historical

relationships between nations, patterns of social organization in sending countries, and other structural factors

Whether male or female, however, the earliest migrants leave their families and friends behind and strike out for solitary work in an alien land. Most transnational migrants begin as target earners (Piore 1979), seeking to earn as much money as possible as quickly as possible in order to recoup their initial investment, attain a predetermined income goal, and return home to family and friends. They have little interest in permanent settlement abroad.

Once one or more people have come and gone in this fashion, however, the situation in the sending community does not return to the status quo ante. Each act of migration generates a set of irreversible changes in individual motivations, social structures, and cultural values that alter the context within which future migration decisions are made. These changes accumulate across time to create conditions that make additional migration more likely. Massey (1990) has labeled this self-generating process "the cumulative causation of migration," following Myrdal (1957). Reichert (1981) calls it the "migrant syndrome" and Alarcón (1988, 1992) refers to it as "northernization."

At the individual level, participation in a high-wage economy induces changes in tastes and motivations that turn people away from target earning and toward persistent migration (Piore 1979). Satisfaction of the wants that originally led to migration creates new wants. Access to high wages and the goods they buy creates new standards of material well-being, and first-hand experience in an affluent society raises expectations and creates new ambitions for upward mobility. As migrants earn high wages and alter their consumption patterns, they adopt new lifestyles and local economic pursuits become less attractive (Goldring 1992*a*, 1992*b*, 1992*d*).

The first-hand experience gained from migration makes the satisfaction of these new wants increasingly feasible. Once someone has migrated and returned, that person has direct knowledge of employment opportunities, labor-market conditions, and ways of life in the destination country; they use these understandings to migrate again with fewer risks and costs than before (Massey 1986). Once it has been experienced, therefore, migration becomes a familiar and reliable socioeconomic resource that can be employed again and again as new needs arise and motivations change (Reichert 1979, Mines 1981).

Empirical research in Mexico shows conclusively that once a man has migrated to the United States, the odds are extremely high that he will migrate again (Massey 1987*b*, Massey et al. 1987). Indeed, the probability of taking an additional trip rises monotonically as the number of trips increases (Massey 1985). The more a man migrates, the more he is likely

to continue migrating, a pattern that has proved to be remarkably persistent in the face of restrictive immigration policies (Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992)

Given their status as target earners, during the first few trips and in the early history of migration from a community, migrants tend to live under rather spartan conditions, sleeping in barracks or sharing apartments with other men and sleeping in shifts to save money. They work long hours and have little social life. In some cases they work two eight-hour shifts in the same day (Durand 1992). Most of their earnings are repatriated in the form of savings or remittances (Massey et al. 1987). Migrants see themselves as members of their home communities and not as participants in the host society (Piore 1979).

As migrants spend increasing time abroad, however, this form of social life becomes more and more problematic. As stays abroad lengthen and the number of trips rises, pressure from family members wanting to migrate grows (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992, Alarcón 1992). The first relatives to accompany a married migrant are typically unmarried sons of working age, since they have the greatest earnings potential after the father and their migration is consistent with prevailing gender roles. Over time, however, unmarried working-age daughters, wives, and younger children are likely to accompany him as well. Other relatives, such as nephews, nieces, and cousins, eventually join experienced migrants. As increasing numbers of young men acquire migrant experience, they also begin to travel north in groups based on friendship as well as kinship (López 1986). As a result, the demographic base of migration steadily widens and the mean age of migration drops (Reichert and Massey 1979, Piore 1979, Massey et al. 1987).

The act of migration not only induces changes within individual migrants that make further movement more likely, it also initiates changes in social structures that spread migration through the community (Mines 1981, Massey et al. 1987). Each migrant is inevitably linked to a set of nonmigrants through a variety of social ties that carry reciprocal obligations for assistance based on shared understandings of kinship, friendship, and common community origin (Lomnitz 1977). Given the expectations and practices associated with kinship and friendship, each act of migration creates a set of people with social ties to the receiving country. Nonmigrants draw upon these ties to gain access to employment and assistance abroad, substantially reducing the costs and risks of movement compared to earlier migrants (Taylor 1986, Massey and García España 1987).

Every new migrant thus reduces the costs and risks and increases the attractiveness and feasibility of migration for a set of friends and relatives. With these lowered costs and risks, additional people are induced

to migrate for the first time, which further expands the set of people with ties abroad. This additional migration reduces costs and risks for a new set of people, causing some of them to migrate, and so on. Once the number of network connections reaches a critical threshold, migration becomes self-perpetuating because each act of movement creates the social structure necessary to sustain it (Massey 1990). Empirical studies in Mexico clearly show that having network connections greatly increases the likelihood of international movement (Taylor 1986, Massey and García España 1987, Massey et al. 1987).

As migrants make successive trips, they accumulate foreign experience and knowledge that render ties to them increasingly valuable. As information about the destination country and its socioeconomic resources accumulates in the population, the costs of migration steadily drop to make the cost-benefit calculation positive for an increasingly large set of people, while the risks of movement steadily fall to render migration a feasible risk-diversification strategy for a growing number of households. Over time, therefore, migration becomes progressively less selective and more representative of the community as a whole.

Migration also changes the cultural context within which decisions are made, and international movement becomes increasingly attractive for reasons that are not purely economic. Migrants evince a widely-admired lifestyle that others are drawn to emulate. Although some of its attractiveness is material—based on the ability to consume goods and purchase property—the lifestyle also acquires a strong normative component (Reichert 1979, López 1986, Alarcón 1992). In communities where foreign wage labor has become fully integrated into local values and expectations, people contemplating entry into the labor force literally do not consider other options: they expect to migrate frequently in the course of their lives and assume they can go whenever they wish.

As migration assumes a greater role in the community, it becomes increasingly important as a rite of passage for young men, providing an accepted means of demonstrating their worthiness, ambition, and manhood to others (Reichert 1979, Alarcón 1992). Moreover, as women become more integrated within postindustrial society, they begin to push for more egalitarian gender roles and encourage activities that lead to longer stays abroad, such as investing in household goods and buying property in the destination country (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992, Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Goldring 1992*b*, 1992*c*).

Over time and with extensive movement back and forth, communities of origin and destination increasingly come to comprise transnational circuits—social and geographic spaces that arise through the constant circulation of people, money, goods, and information (Rouse 1989, 1991, 1992). As these circuits develop, practices and values that once demar-

cated distinct societies begin to have a transformative influence on each other. Over time, migrant communities become culturally "transnationalized," incorporating ideologies, practices, expectations, and political claims from both societies to create a "culture of migration" that is distinct from the culture of both the sending and receiving nation (see Reichert 1979, Rouse 1989, 1991, 1992, Georges 1990, Goldring 1992*b*, 1992*c*, Smith 1992)

As migration is increasingly taken for granted, the demographic composition and socioeconomic role of the place of origin undergo a dramatic transformation. In many places, women, children, and older people dominate a reduced population except during the few weeks or months when migrants return for holidays and celebrations (Reichert 1979, Mines 1981). In economically marginal agricultural areas, farming and other traditional activities lose importance (Mines 1981). As the place of origin becomes a site of rest and recreation, in sharp contrast to the routine of work abroad, its social meaning undergoes changes (Rouse 1989, 1992, Goldring 1992*a*, 1992*b*, 1992*d*). Migrants spend money collectively on infrastructure and other community projects aimed at transforming the landscape into a place of leisure, a place where migrants and their families can display their status and exercise political claims and power (Goldring 1992*a*, 1992*b*, 1992*d*, Smith 1992, Goldring and Smith 1993).

The first migrants from a community typically go to a specific niche in the destination country's political economy, yielding little diversity with respect to destination, occupation, or strategies of movement. Early migrants follow the path of the first migrant because that is where the costs and risks of migration are lowest and the chances of success greatest. Once they have identified a promising migrant worker, moreover, labor recruiters and contractors tend to use them as vehicles to recruit additional workers from their circle of friends and relatives (Mines and Anzaldúa 1982). As experience in the host country accumulates, however, and as more people are drawn into the process, some migrants inevitably seek out better opportunities in new places and occupations. In this way the diversity of foreign destinations, jobs, and strategies increases.

As the migration process proceeds, however, typically someone from the sending community achieves a position of responsibility that enables him or her to channel employment, housing, and other resources to fellow townspeople (Mines 1981, Massey et al. 1987). The position may be a crew boss in a railroad, a foreman in a factory, a union representative in a company, a majordomo in a restaurant, a labor contractor for a grower, or perhaps even a business owner. Although it is impossible to predict where or how it will occur, sooner or later someone attains such a position and begins to recruit fellow townspeople for work.

At this point, the migration stream begins to focus more narrowly and

the diversity of jobs, destinations, and strategies begins to constrict, a process Jones (1982*a*, 1982*b*, 1984) has called "channelization." This concentration does not necessarily involve a single foreign location for a particular labor-exporting community (Mines 1981, Goldring 1990, 1992*b*), but the overall pattern of early diversity followed by increasing concentration in one or more sites is a general feature of the process by which migrants establish branch communities in receiving societies.

As migrants make repeated trips and accumulate more time abroad, as wives and children join the migrant workforce, as more people become involved in the migration process, and as stronger links are formed with specific employers in particular locations, a growing number of migrants and families settle in the host society. They acquire informal ties to its inhabitants and establish formal links with institutions such as banks, government, and schools. They learn the host-country language and become permanent legal residents. Empirical studies show that the probability of settlement rises steadily as migrant experience increases (Massey 1985, 1987*b*, Massey et al. 1987).

As families settle around specific places of employment, branch communities of long-term and permanent out-migrants begin to form. These communities anchor the networks and further reduce the costs and risks of movement by providing a secure and familiar environment within which new migrants can arrive, find housing and employment, and learn the ropes in the receiving country. Increasingly, migration is channeled to these communities and the diversity of destinations associated with a place of origin is further reduced.

As migrants become part of established communities in the host country, they adapt themselves to the local setting. Whether or not they have legal documents, they send their children to school, learn a minimum of the host country's language, and use financial institutions and social services. Over time the local landscape of the receiving community is transformed (Goldring 1992*a*, 1992*b*, 1992*d*). Whether or not they are immigrant entrepreneurs, the migrants contribute to the creation and growth of a market for specialized foods, entertainment, and cultural products. The formation of ethnic neighborhoods represents a process of socioeconomic adaptation and transformation that permits many "foreign" practices to be maintained in the new setting.

If the process of migration continues long enough, networks reach a point of numerical saturation. Larger and larger shares of the transnational community reside in the branch communities, more births occur abroad, and virtually all who remain in the home community are connected either to someone living abroad or to someone with substantial foreign experience. When networks reach this level of development, the

costs of migration stop falling with each new entrant and the process of migration loses its dynamic momentum for growth

As the process approaches its limit, migratory experience becomes so diffused within the community that the stock of potential new migrants gets very small, increasingly it is composed of young children and the elderly. Labor shortages begin to occur in core sending regions and local wage rates rise (Gregory 1986). If the process of saturation coincides with a recessionary period abroad, an oversupply of immigrant workers may result, leading to lower wages and making it more difficult for experienced migrants to find work for friends and relatives. These developments further dampen the pressures for migration and cause the rate of entry into the migrant workforce to decelerate and trail off. The prevalence of migration and the stock of migrant experience then approach an upper asymptote.

Observed in the aggregate, this asymptotic trend may be difficult to detect, because new communities are continuously drawn into the migratory process. As the rate of out-migration decelerates in communities with long-standing traditions, new communities are drawn into transnational circuits and their rates of out-migration begin to accelerate. As a result, the total flow of migrants may remain constant or steadily increase. Only by studying data at the community level can we identify the general sequence of events that occur in the process of transnational migration.

Thus, our theory posits a cumulative model of transnational migration. It outlines how, once initiated, the process builds upon a growing base of knowledge, experience, social contacts, and other forms of social and cultural capital in self-reinforcing fashion. It argues that the process of migration alters sending and receiving localities in such a way that further migration is encouraged. Subsequent migration is made to and from communities that are undergoing profound cultural, economic, social, and even physical changes.

This theoretical argument elaborates upon earlier studies, synthesizes strands of theory that have appeared in diverse sources, and sharpens the underlying conceptual linkages. As constructed to this point, the model applies primarily to transnational migrant circuits arising in nonmetropolitan locations. The dynamics of international migration from large metropolitan areas have not been well studied. This topic merits further empirical research and may necessitate modifications in the theory.

DATA

Data for this analysis come from simple random samples gathered during 1982–83 and 1987–91 in 19 communities located in the Mexican states

of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Nayarit, areas that have traditionally sent large numbers of migrants to the United States (Gamio 1930, Dagodag 1975, North and Houstoun 1976, Consejo Nacional de Población 1986, Jones 1988). Information about the samples is summarized in table 1. Within each community, 100–200 households were randomly selected and interviewed during the months of November through January, yielding sampling fractions that ranged from .029 to .699, depending on the number of households on the sampling frame. In all cases but one, the frame covered the entire community. In San Francisco del Rincón, Guanajuato, we constructed a frame for a single working-class neighborhood and sampled it instead.

These procedures produced a total sample size of 3,400 households across 19 communities, covering a total population of about 236,000 people. Refusals were generally not a problem, although the rate reached 15% in one case and 11% in another, in 14 cases the refusal rate was 5% or less, and overall the rate was only 4.8%. The higher refusal rates in the two communities reflect generalized distrust stemming from local political conditions rather than suspicion of our study *per se*.

The winter months are generally the best time to locate and interview returned migrants within Mexico, since most come back to spend the holidays with their families. In the case of La Yerbabuena, however, initial fieldwork revealed that large numbers of migrants also returned in July (because they worked in Florida's winter citrus harvest), so we sent an interviewer during the summer to complete the survey. In general, however, the Mexican community samples are representative of dwellings occupied during the winter months of 1982–82 and 1987–91 in 19 nonmetropolitan Mexican communities.

These community data were supplemented with nonrandom samples of out-migrants located in the United States during the summer subsequent to each winter's survey. From the community samples, we determined where in the United States migrants went and then sent interviewers to those areas to survey out-migrant households that had permanently settled abroad. Snowball sampling methods (Goodman 1961) were used to compile this U.S.-based sample. In most of the communities, 20 out-migrant households were interviewed, but in Mineral de Pozos only 10 were sampled. In Tepec we were unable to include any U.S. households, because this sample was incorporated from another study after the fact and no U.S. sample had been originally compiled (see Massey et al. 1987). Although these U.S. samples are not representative of all out-migrants, they do provide some control for biases stemming from selective emigration and settlement in the United States.

In choosing communities for study, we sought to include a range of sizes and economic bases, but the prevalence of U.S. migration was not

TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF 19 MEXICAN COMMUNITIES SAMPLED FOR A STUDY OF MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

Community	State	1990 Population	Year of Survey	Households on Sampling Frame	Size of Sample	Sampling Fraction	Refusal Rate	Size of U S Sample
Small cities								
San Francisco del Rincón	Guanajuato	52,291	1987	780*	200	256	034	20
Los Reyes	Michoacán	32,474	1989	6,776	200	029	037	20
Ameca	Jalisco	30,882	1991	1,776	200	113	044	20
San Felipe Torres Mochas	Guanajuato	20,614	1990	3,771	200	053	047	20
Ixtlán del Río	Nayarit	19,645	1990	4,472	200	045	029	20
Romita	Guanajuato	16,535	1988	2,723	200	073	057	20
El Salto	Jalisco	11,546	1982	1,903	200	105	038	20
Las Varas	Nayarit	11,541	1990	2,693	200	074	010	20
Towns								
Chavinda	Michoacán	7,437	1982	1,925	200	104	015	20
Nahuatzen	Michoacán	7,025	1990	1,441	200	139	057	20
Ario de Rayón	Michoacán	6,429	1989	1,395	200	143	050	20
Unión de San Antonio	Jalisco	4,760	1988	799	200	250	115	20
San Diego de Alejandría	Jalisco	3,516	1988	510	200	392	038	20
Amacueca	Jalisco	2,685	1982	579	106	183	038	20
Ranchos								
Santa María del Valle	Jalisco	2,321	1988	534	200	375	010	20
La Yerbabuena	Michoacán	2,240	1989	448	150	335	152	20
Tepec	Jalisco	1,573	1982	438	94	215	037	0
Mineral de Pozos	Guanajuato	1,737	1988	248	150	605	085	10
La Soledad	Guanajuato	1,080	1991	143	100	699	029	20
Total		236,331		33,354	3,400	102	048	350

* Sampling frame constructed for a neighborhood within the city, all other frames cover the entire community

itself a criterion for inclusion. Although samples were gathered in five large metropolitan areas with populations over 100,000, these data are excluded from the present analysis. Limited data suggest that U S -bound migration from Mexican urban areas may be rising (Cornelius 1992), but we believe that the social dynamics of migration from major cities are sufficiently different from those of smaller towns and cities to warrant separate study.

The populations of the communities under study range from 1,000 to just over 50,000. The eight small cities included in the data set have populations in excess of 10,000 inhabitants and include two industrial cities (San Francisco del Rincón and El Salto), several commercial cities serving agrarian hinterlands (Los Reyes, Ameca, San Felipe, Ixtlán, and Romita), and one coastal community engaged in fishing, tobacco growing, and sugar cane cultivation (Las Varas). All except the last community are seats of their respective *municipios* (the rough equivalent of a U S county).

The six communities designated as towns have populations ranging from 2,500 (the official definition of an urban place in Mexico) to 10,000, all are essentially agrarian communities. Chavinda and Arrio de Rayón are located in Michoacán's lush Zamora Valley, a region of intense, highly capitalized commercial agriculture. Amacueca, located in southern Jalisco, is a more traditional agrarian community of small landholders and *ejido* farmers. Unión de San Antonio and San Diego de Alejandría are located in the Los Altos region of Jalisco, a dry, windswept region of rain-fed agriculture and cattle ranching. Finally, Nahuatzen is a Tarascan Indian community located in the highlands of Michoacán. Except for Arrio, all of these communities are *municipio* seats.

The five smallest communities are rural *ranchos*, political dependencies within their *municipios* with populations under 2,500 inhabitants. Three of the communities (Santa María, La Yerbabuena, and Tepec) are small outlying settlements in agrarian regions, they are composed of poor tenant farmers and small landholders. The small *ranchito* of La Soledad is located just outside the city of Irapuato, Guanajuato, and its inhabitants divide their time between agrarian and industrial pursuits. Mineral de Pozos is a half-abandoned mining town whose deposits gave out around the turn of the century, turning it into a poor farm town.

Respondents living in these communities were interviewed using ethnographic methods (Massey 1987a, Massey et al. 1987). Within each household we gathered basic information about the social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the head, the spouse, the head's children, and other household members. We also determined which household members had ever been to the United States and from them gathered basic data about their first and most recent trips: the date, duration, and

destination, as well as the migrant's legal status, occupation, and wage earned on those trips. From each household head we collected a detailed life history that included a labor history (including a migration history), a property history, a marital history, and a fertility history.

THE PREVALENCE OF MIGRATION

The fundamental insight emerging from our earlier theoretical discussion is that migration unfolds in a regular, predictable way over time. We argue that questions about migrants' characteristics—whether they are predominantly male or female, young or old, legal or illegal, rich or poor, sojourners or settlers—are misplaced because these traits do not describe the migrant flow *per se*, but rather, a phase in its development. These outcomes must be understood as qualities of the migration stream that evolve as part of a larger developmental process, not as fixed characteristics of migrants from particular communities. We therefore classify communities according to their level of migratory prevalence and examine the characteristics of migrants in communities at roughly the same level of migratory development. Our objective is to chart the changes that occur in a community as it moves from limited participation in transnational migration to a state of mass involvement.

Tracking changes in this fashion allows us to overcome the problems inherent in making general conclusions based on individual case studies. It also provides a more tractable way of describing migratory processes that emerge over time in a cumulative, nonlinear fashion. A disadvantage of the technique is that it tends to dehistoricize migration: specific events such as the Bracero Program of the 1940s or the economic crisis of the early 1980s may occur at different prevalence levels in different communities, a fact that should be kept in mind when interpreting our findings.

We define a community's stage in the migratory process based on prevalence ratios computed for each year in each community. These ratios are calculated using every respondent's date of birth and the date of his or her first U.S. trip. The denominator of the ratio is the number of people 15 years old or older alive in a given year, and the numerator is the number of such people who have ever been to the United States up to and including that year. Within each community, we computed prevalence ratios for each year from 1940 to the survey date to create an annual estimate of the proportion of adults who have ever been to the United States.

Since this computation is based on retrospective data, it assumes that migrants and nonmigrants experienced similar rates of mortality and internal out-migration in the past. The mortality assumption is likely to be quite robust. Although small numbers of survivors from early periods

can produce random fluctuations in the ratios, there are not likely to be large mortality differentials based on migrant status. In order to enhance the stability of estimates, however, we do not consider prevalence ratios for years before 1940.

To the extent that the communities experienced permanent out-migration within Mexico, however, and to the degree that this internal migration is a substitute for international migration, the ratios will tend to overstate the prevalence of U S migration. This overestimation results because internal migrants who were in the base population in earlier years had left by the time of the survey and were thus excluded from the denominator, biasing the ratio upwards. This bias tends to be more severe in earlier periods because the number of permanent internal out-migrants accumulates over time. Since prevalence ratios tend to rise over time, however, the bias is conservative: an upward bias in earlier years acts to mitigate the curve of rising prevalence that is observed empirically.

Another source of potential bias stems from permanent out-migration to the United States. To the extent that we have failed to include people who began migrating at some point in the past and then settled in the United States permanently, we have excluded cases that contribute strongly to the numerator and proportionately less to the denominator, thereby biasing the prevalence ratios downward. Moreover, because settlement tends to occur among those who have built up considerable U S experience, we are most likely to exclude people who left on their first trips some time ago, thereby exacerbating the bias more in earlier periods than later ones, and thus yielding a pattern that is not conservative with respect to the empirical trends we observe. To the extent that we have captured the experience of settlers through the snowball samples compiled at U S destination sites, we have mitigated this problem.

Although these potential biases should be kept in mind, we believe that our conclusions are robust. In order to gauge the potential for bias, however, table 2 presents information about internal and international migration in each of the 19 samples. The first column shows the year of the first U S trip in each community to indicate the rough beginnings of international migration, and the second column reports the prevalence of U S migration as of the survey date. The third and fourth columns report the corresponding data for trips within Mexico, and the last column shows the percentage of adult respondents born within the community (an indicator of the degree of in-migration).

The sample clearly offers a wide range of U S migratory experiences. Some communities, such as La Yerbabuena, became heavily involved in U S migration early on and rapidly moved toward mass migration: the first migrant left this community in 1923, and by the survey date 60%

TABLE 2
PREVALENCE OF INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Community	Year of Earliest U S Migration	Prevalence of U S Migration in Survey Year (%)	Year of Earliest Mexican Migration	Prevalence of Mexican Migration in Survey Year (%)	% of Population 15 and Older Born in Municipio
Small cities					
El Salto	1923	21	1936	14	62
San Francisco del Rincón	1920	21	1918	5	84
Romita	1940	17	1933	8	78
Los Reyes	1943	30	1923	21	57
San Felipe Torres Mochas	1940	30	1921	21	78
Ixtlán del Río	1941	27	1928	16	45
Ameca	1942	31	1936	18	76
Las Varas	1943	29	1944	11	55
Towns					
Chavinda	1914	34	1930	9	79
Amacueca	1920	34	1927	17	82
San Diego de Alejandría	1919	43	1926	23	78
Unión de San Antonio	1925	23	1926	23	83
Ario de Rayón	1935	39	1949	11	76
Nahuatzen	1940	18	1936	28	95
Ranchos					
Tepec	1940	18	1915	16	85
Santa María del Valle	1923	25	1928	13	78
Mineral de Pozos	1949	9	1937	23	87
La Yerbabuena	1923	60	1928	10	83
La Soledad	1939	28	1932	6	95
Average	1932	28	1930	15	77

NOTE —Prevalence ratios are calculated for migrants 15 years old and older whose first trip was for two months or longer, for trips made in the period 1940-89

of the entire adult population had been to the United States. Similarly, San Diego de Alejandría began sending migrants in 1920, and by the time of the survey 43% of its adult population had acquired U S experience. At the other extreme, U S out-migration did not begin in Mineral de Pozos until 1941, and only 9% of its adult population had migrated by the survey date. Across all communities, the prevalence of U S migration averaged 28% in the survey year.

Internal migration constitutes a potential source of bias in estimating prevalence ratios for international migration to the extent that it is permanent, substitutes for U S migration, and is prevalent. If internal migration is not permanent, then migrants are likely to have their experience reflected in the computed ratios because they returned to be interviewed.

If internal and international migration are not substitutes, then people with and without U S experience are equally likely to migrate internally and thus little bias enters the computation of prevalence ratios, because the absence of experience affects the numerator and denominator equally. Even if internal out-migration is permanent and acts as a substitute for international migration, moreover, the bias would be small if it were not very prevalent.

Although we have no way of knowing whether there is much *permanent* out-migration to Mexican destinations, the overall prevalence of internal migratory experience does not appear to be high, averaging only about 15% overall, about half the prevalence of international migration. The ratios range from 5% in San Francisco del Rincón to 28% in Nahuatzen. In some communities, like Tepec and San Francisco del Rincón, internal migration began in the early teens of this century, whereas in others, like Ario de Rayón and Las Varas, it began in the 1940s. There is little evidence, however, that U S and Mexican migration are substitutes for each other. If that were true, we would expect an inverse correlation between the two sets of prevalence ratios across communities, in fact the correlation is nearly zero (.02).

In most cases, the communities have experienced little in-migration as well. Overall, 77% of the adult respondents were born in the *municipio*, but the percentage varies somewhat by size. The percentage is exceptionally high in small *ranchos*, where it averages 86%, but is somewhat lower in towns (78%) and cities (68%). The percentage of locally born residents is lowest in Ixtlán del Río and Las Varas, both in the state of Nayarit, and the latter in a growing coastal area.

In general, therefore, although internal migration cannot be dismissed as a potential source of bias, the evidence marshaled in table 2 suggests that it is unlikely to be serious in most cases. To the extent that internal migration does bias the computation of prevalence ratios, however, it will tend to be conservative if the observed empirical trend is one of rising prevalence over time. Although it is not practical to show graphs of prevalence ratios for all 19 communities in the sample, figure 1 plots trends for six cases for the period 1940–89. Ratios are shown for all community members, as well as for men and women separately.

To varying degrees, the communities show a pattern of rising prevalence over time, which suggests that any bias stemming from internal migration is likely to be conservative in nature, working against the direction of the apparent trend. Despite the general consistency of the trend, however, there are pronounced differences in the rate of change over time. In general, trends in U S migratory prevalence follow one of three characteristic patterns.

La Yerbabuena and San Diego display the classic pattern of rapidly




Fig 1 —Trends in the prevalence of U S migration in six Mexican communities, 1940–89

rising prevalence noted first by Reichert (1979) (Indeed, La Yerbabuena is his community of "Guadalupe," which we have resampled.) The top curve shows prevalence ratios for men, the bottom one is for women, and the middle curve captures the trend in prevalence for the population as a whole. In both places, U S migration really took off as a cumulative process in 1942, when the United States initiated labor recruitment in Mexico under the auspices of the Bracero Program (Galarza 1964, Samora 1971). After this date, the prevalence of migration among adult men rose very rapidly, reaching 50% in La Yerbabuena by 1950 and 80% by 1980. Women were largely uninvolved until 1970, when their prevalence levels began to rise, very steeply in La Yerbabuena, to reach 40% by 1989. The lag between the onset of male and female movement is 20–30 years in both communities.

The second pattern, observed in Unión de San Antonio and La Soledad, is that of a rapid rise in the prevalence of migration early on, followed by a stagnation and decline during the 1950s and 1960s, then a revival of growth during the early 1970s. A decline in the prevalence of U S migration does not mean that new people were not entering the migrant workforce. It simply means that the number of new migrants in any year was less than the number of people turning 15, causing a decline in the average prevalence of migratory experience within the population. The last pattern, that of very slow growth, is expressed by Mineral de Pozos and El Salto. In these communities, prevalence ratios rose very slowly and never achieved high levels.

Our purpose here is not to explain intercommunity differences in the timing and rate of growth in migratory prevalence but to describe the characteristic changes that occur in migration flows as prevalence moves from low to high. We accomplish this task by classifying communities according to their stage in the underlying process of migration each year, based on the estimated prevalence ratios. We inspected trends in prevalence ratios for all 19 communities in order to discern whether rough break points could be defined to capture distinct phases in the developmental process of transnational migration, but in the end we simply created four progressive categories at evenly spaced, arbitrary cutpoints.

The first stage occurs when under 10% of adult community members have been to the United States. At this stage, migration is overwhelmingly male and may persist for prolonged periods without increasing. The next stage occurs when 10%–19% of all community members have acquired experience abroad. In this phase of the process, male migration continues apace but women have not yet begun to migrate in large numbers. The third stage is reached when the overall prevalence ratio varies between 20% and 29%. Here, male migration decelerates as women begin

to enter the migrant flow in significant numbers, causing the overall prevalence ratio to reach a temporary plateau. The fourth stage occurs when prevalence varies between 30% and 39%. At this stage, female migration accelerates and male movement continues, bringing the level of community participation to high levels. The fifth stage constitutes a situation of mass migration, with overall prevalence ratios above 40%—as prevalence among women approaches 30%, that among males reaches 80% or more.

These five prevalence categories correspond roughly to successive stages in the process of migration. In the ensuing section we employ them as independent variables to study qualitative changes in migrant streams as communities move from an initial, tentative participation in U S migration to a situation of mass involvement. Specifically, we examine changes across communities in the stock of U S experience, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of migrants, and the nature and destination of U S trips as the communities go from low to high prevalence.

COMMONALITIES IN TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION

The Accumulation of Social Capital

Table 3 examines changes in U S experience that occur as migration becomes more prevalent. For each community and year from 1940 to the present we computed prevalence levels among men, women, and all community members, then we calculated the total stock of U S experience and the percentage of people with kinship links to U S migrants. We assigned each community-year to one of the five prevalence categories and computed averages by prevalence level to derive the numbers shown in the table. Because communities were sampled at widely different rates, the averages computed in this and all subsequent tables were estimated using the inverse of the sampling fraction as a case weight.

In interpreting our findings, it is important to remember that only two communities reached the highest prevalence category. In contrast, 18 communities achieved migration levels placing them into the second prevalence category, 15 reached levels putting them in the third category, and eight reached levels placing them in the fourth category. All communities, of course, contribute years to the first prevalence category (since each community begins at a low prevalence level). This distribution across categories suggests that patterns of change will be fairly robust across the first four categories but that those in the fifth category should be interpreted with some caution, since they are based on the experience of just two communities, both agrarian. Heterogeneous patterns may

TABLE 3
PREVALENCE RATIO, RATE OF CHANGE IN PREVALENCE, AND CUMULATIVE
U S EXPERIENCE IN COMMUNITY

CHARACTERISTIC	PREVALENCE OF MIGRATION IN COMMUNITY				
	0%–9%	10%–19%	20%–29%	30%–39%	≥40%
Prevalence ratio (%) *					
Males	14.3	27.8	41.6	58.7	80.8
Females	9	5.1	11.3	12.5	29.8
All	7.6	15.7	25.4	33.7	54.9
Change in prevalence ratio (mean absolute % change [t to $t + 1$]) *					
Males	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4
Females	3	6	6	1.0	2.0
All	7	8	8	1.1	1.4
Cumulative stock of U S experience (mean years per person) **					
Males	1	1.1	3.6	2.7	7.3
Females	0	7	1.3	1.8	3.7
All	1	1.1	3.5	2.6	7.1
Kinship links to U S migrants **					
% with migrant parent	13.8	27.7	41.6	60.5	75.4
% with migrant grandparent	1.8	4.7	10.3	19.3	40.1
% with migrant sibling	22.6	38.6	59.0	62.7	77.8
% with no migrant relatives	65.6	45.2	25.3	10.3	7.8
Community-years (N)	228	384	234	56	23
No. of communities	19	18	15	8	2

* Estimated from the sample of all household members in 19 communities

** Estimated from the sample of all household heads in all 19 communities

partially reflect the progressive selecting out of communities with rising prevalence

The first panel traces shifts in the prevalence of U S migration as communities pass through the various phases of the migration process. Although the total prevalence ratios follow directly from the criteria used to define the five stages, trends for males and females capture the interplay of sex-specific movements at different phases of the migration process. At the earliest stages of migration, few people, male or female, have been to the United States: only 14% of men and under 1% of women. In the ensuing phases, however, migration spreads progressively throughout the adult male population, and by the time mass migration is achieved eight out of ten men have been abroad.

The prevalence of U S migration among females lags behind that of males at all phases of the migration process, but the differential grows progressively smaller as migration becomes more prevalent. At low levels

of migration, male prevalence levels exceed those of females by a factor of nearly 16 : 1. Moving through the next two levels, the differential drops to 5 : 5 : 1 and then to 3 : 7 : 1. In the fourth category, the ratio climbs minimally, to 4 : 7 : 1, but in the highest prevalence category, when 30% of all adult women have been to the United States, the sex differential drops to 2 : 7 : 1. As Reichert (1979), Mines (1981), and others noted, transnational migration begins among men but ultimately incorporates women as well.

The next panel of the table shows how rapidly U.S. migration spreads within community populations at different phases of the migration process. We estimate the instantaneous rate of change in prevalence by computing the average absolute percentage change in prevalence between times $t - 1$ and $t + 1$, where t stands for the target year, which is then classified by prevalence category for presentation in the table. These computations reveal that male migratory behavior spreads at a relatively constant rate. At the lowest prevalence level, the absolute percentage change for males is 1.5%, a figure that fluctuates only 0.1%–0.2% across prevalence categories.

In contrast, the rate of change of migration for women is much lower in the first prevalence category, but it nearly doubles in the second stage, remains constant in the third, climbs again in the fourth, and doubles again in the fifth. Thus, transnational migration appears to spread among men at a fairly constant rate irrespective of the degree of migratory prevalence that has been achieved, but the spread of migratory behavior accelerates rapidly among women as prevalence rises, yielding a steady acceleration in migration at the community level.

The last two panels of table 3 show how U.S. migrant experience and network connections accumulate as migratory behavior becomes more diffused in communities. Special questions put to household heads allow us to compute the total amount of time people have spent migrating to the United States and whether or not certain relatives had gone to the United States before them.

As these figures indicate, the spread of migration brings about qualitative changes that alter the decision-making context for actors at different points in the developmental process of migration. Potential migrants deciding whether or not to migrate from a community with a low prevalence of migration generally have little access to information about potential jobs and opportunities in the United States. At low prevalence levels, the typical household head has accumulated only 0.1 years of experience in the United States, only 14% have a parent with migrant experience, 22% have a sibling with U.S. experience, and just 2% have a migrant grandparent.

As U.S. migration spreads within the community, however, kinship connections to the United States proliferate and migratory experience

accumulates to the point where nonmigrants contemplating a move can draw on substantial social capital to reduce the costs and risks of a U S trip. Moving through the second, third, and fourth prevalence levels, the average years of U S experience per person grow from 1.1 to 2.6 and the percentage of people with a migrant parent increases from 28% to 60%. Across the same categories, the percentage with a migrant sibling goes from 39% to 63% and the percentage with a migrant grandparent grows from 5% to 19%.

Once a level of mass migration has been achieved, potential migrants considering a trip have a vast store of experience and kin connections they can use to gain access to jobs, housing, and other resources in the United States. At the highest prevalence level the typical household head has accumulated an average of seven years of experience in the United States, 75% have a parent who has been to the United States, and 78% have a sibling who has been there. Indeed, the depth of kin connections to the United States is such that 40% have a grandparent with U S migrant experience.

This growth of the stock of migratory knowledge and experience and the proliferation of network connections to the United States are both causes and effects of the spread of migratory behavior throughout the community. They are effects because each new migrant adds to the stock of experience and expands the range of network connections. They are causes because connections to experienced migrants constitute a valuable form of social capital (Coleman 1988) that people who have not yet migrated can employ to improve their odds of obtaining a job and income in the United States.

Increasing Demographic Diversity

According to the theory we outlined above, as migration becomes more prevalent in a community its demographic base progressively broadens. This hypothesis is generally confirmed by the data presented in table 4, which examines the demographic background of migrants leaving sample communities at different stages in the migration process. In this table, migrants are classified by the prevalence level of the place they were in when they made their first trip.

The first panel shows that the share of females rises as migration develops and expands. Although there is a slight drop between the third and fourth prevalence categories, the rate climbs sharply in the fifth category. Whereas only 6.7% of U S migrants leaving on their first trip are female in the lowest prevalence category, by the time mass prevalence is achieved 44% of new migrants are women. Thus, the share of women rises as migration moves from being a rare to a mass phenomenon.

TABLE 4

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS ON THEIR FIRST U S TRIP

CHARACTERISTIC	PREVALENCE OF MIGRATION IN COMMUNITY				
	0%-9%	10%-19%	20%-29%	30%-39%	≥40%
Sex					
Female (%)	6 7	25 6	32 6	27 5	44 3
Age of male migrants (years)					
0-14 (%)	10 3	13 9	19 5	27 8	42 6
15-19 (%)	20 7	23 2	29 8	33 7	39 8
20-34 (%)	57 6	53 7	44 2	40 6	13 6
≥35 (%)	11 4	9 2	6 6	8 0	4 0
Mean age	23 7	21 8	19 4	19 9	14 5
Diversity (above groups, $n = 4$)	57	74	83	83	78
Diversity (5-year groups, $n = 11$)	52	67	68	64	51
Age of female migrants (years)					
0-14 (%)	54 4	43 9	42 7	39 6	33 8
15-19 (%)	2 9	13 0	16 5	14 5	24 8
20-34 (%)	27 9	32 2	27 0	32 2	24 3
≥35 (%)	14 8	10 9	13 8	13 6	17 1
Mean age	13 7	16 4	16 3	17 7	20 1
Diversity (above groups, $n = 4$)	20	69	83	81	87
Diversity (5-year groups, $n = 11$)	16	50	63	66	72
Household position					
Head (%)	86 0	59 7	43 3	41 5	19 2
Spouse (%)	3 4	15 2	12 4	10 6	23 2
Son (%)	7 3	15 1	25 7	30 7	38 5
Daughter (%)	3 0	8 6	16 6	14 1	18 7
Other (%)	3	1 4	1 9	3 1	5
Diversity ($n = 5$)	18	53	71	66	78
No of migrants (unweighted)	227	1,148	1,480	635	343

The representation of different age groups likewise broadens over time. Among men the proportion of migrants 35 years old or older falls steadily as communities proceed through the five categories of migratory prevalence, going from 11% and 9% at low prevalence levels at 4% at mass levels. The percentage of males who are 20-34 years old likewise declines across stages, going from 58% to 14%. In contrast, the percentage of males who are 15-19 years old steadily rises from 21% to 40% and the mean age correspondingly drops from 23.7 years to 15 years, yielding a progressive "greening" of the male migration flow.

In general, lower prevalence levels correspond more to earlier historical periods than do higher prevalence levels. For those in the lowest prevalence category, the mean year of migration for people leaving on their

first U S trip was 1953, it was 1964, 1971, and 1974, respectively, for those in the second, third, and fourth categories. Among migrants in the highest category, the mean year of migration was 1981. Thus, older migrants who began migrating when communities were characterized by low prevalence levels are less likely than those leaving from communities with high levels to have survived to the survey date to report their trip. The selective mortality of older migrants from earlier periods constitutes a conservative bias, however, and the drop in the mean age of first migration is probably even more pronounced than indicated by our data.

These figures suggest that transnational migration begins among males in their peak labor force years and spreads progressively to other age groups. In order to measure this increase in age heterogeneity more succinctly, we computed entropy indices (Shannon 1948, Theil 1972, White 1986) to measure diversity at each level of prevalence. These indices are reported in table 4. The entropy index (henceforth called the diversity index) is defined by the formula

$$\text{Diversity} = \frac{- \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times \log(p_i)}{\log(n)} \times 100, \quad (1)$$

where n is the number of categories (in this case, age groups) and p_i is the proportion of people in category i .

The index varies between 0 and 100. Minimum diversity occurs when all people are concentrated in one category and the index equals zero. Maximum diversity occurs when each category contains the same proportion of people, yielding an index of 100. We computed indices to measure diversity by prevalence category within each community separately, then averaged them to obtain the indices shown in the table. The resulting figures indicate average within-community diversity. We computed indices for the four broad age groups shown in the table, as well as for more detailed five-year age groups (11 categories).

Both sets of indices show an increase in age diversity occurring among male migrants subsequent to the initial stage of transnational migration, although there is a drop in diversity at the highest level of prevalence. According to calculations based on the five-year age intervals, diversity is limited at first, with an index value of 52. It then rises to 68 by the third prevalence phase before edging downward to 51 in the mass-migration phase. Thus, the concentration returns to a level that is close to the original value, but migrants are now concentrated in different, younger, age groups.

The next panel of table 4 shows the age composition of female migrants

by prevalence level. Moving from low to mass prevalence categories, it is clear that developmental trends in diversity roughly parallel those of men, moving toward steadily greater heterogeneity with respect to age. In the case of women, however, the trend continues unabated through the mass migration category. The diversity index computed for five-year age intervals increases from 16 in the lowest prevalence category, through values of 50, 63, and 66 in the intermediate categories, to end up at 72 under conditions of mass migration (compared to a value of 51 among men).

Unlike men, however, the average age of female migrants increases steadily as migration moves through the successive stages. In general, the percentage of women younger than 15 drops, while the percentages of those who are 20–34 years old and of those 35 and over rise. Thus, whereas among men migration begins among older married household heads and then spreads to younger heads, older sons, and finally to young boys, female migration appears to begin among young and working-age daughters and then spreads to wives and older women. The order of precedence in migration thus appears to be fathers, older sons, older daughters, young mothers and children, and then older women.

This conclusion is consistent with the information presented in the last panel of table 3, which shows household position by stage in the migration process. These data must be interpreted with caution because household position is measured at the time of the survey, not at the time that migrants left on their first trip. Thus, a significant number of the household heads shown in the panel are likely to have been sons when they actually made their first trip.

As a community moves from a state of low to intermediate to mass prevalence levels, the share of household heads among migrants progressively falls while the proportion of sons, spouses, and daughters rises. Accordingly, diversity in household positions begins with a low value of 18 at the lowest prevalence level and ends up at a high value of 78 under conditions of mass migration.

Sons begin their upward trend at an initial level of participation that is quite low compared to heads but is over two times that of spouses and daughters (7% at the lowest prevalence levels), and they eventually come to dominate the outflow (38% at the highest prevalence levels). Daughters rapidly increase their participation (from 3% at the lowest level to 19% at the highest). Spouses are only a small part of the flow at the lowest level of prevalence (3%), but they increase their representation, substantially matching sons, in the second prevalence category. The share of spouses then drops, but rises again in the highest category, surpassing the proportion of daughters (23% vs. 19%).

The order of precedence is consistent with the prevailing division of labor within the household and with norms about how men and women should occupy and move through space. It also reflects changes in norms that occur as wives negotiate with husbands in order to secure a larger economic role for themselves through migration and as they seek to join family members abroad. The prevailing view of Mexico-U.S. migration, which sees women as an undifferentiated group of wives following their husbands abroad, thus needs modification.

Rising and Falling Diversity of Trip Characteristics

According to the developmental model outlined above, the diversity of trip characteristics should first rise and then fall as migration unfolds over time. This curvilinear pattern is evident when U.S. destinations are examined by the prevalence of migration, an analysis that is carried out in the top panel of table 5.

Although southern California attracted a majority of all migrants at every prevalence level except the first, the share going to Los Angeles rose and then fell, while the portion going to Ventura County increased steadily. Those going to the inland valleys represented the highest initial share, but their proportion fell, rose again, and then dropped. The percentage going to the San Francisco Bay area generally rose across developmental stages, the proportion going to Texas and Illinois fell, and the share going to other locations dropped, except in the last prevalence category.

The trends observed in the highest prevalence category are largely due to the particular communities represented here. People from La Yerbabuena and San Diego de Alejandría, the two places that achieved mass migration, are overwhelmingly involved in agricultural work in the United States, which is reflected in the destinations to which they travel.

It is somewhat difficult to see the curvilinear shift in diversity from the geographic distributions shown in the table, because they are aggregated across communities and grouped into broad zones. The pattern of changing diversity is more clearly detected using indices computed from detailed geographic categories (not reported in this article, no. of categories = 67). At the lowest level of prevalence, migrants go to a relatively small number of U.S. locations (diversity = 35), but the range of destinations increases markedly when prevalence reaches the second category (diversity = 46). It then stops increasing and remains between 43 and 46 across the remaining stages.

A similar pattern typifies the distribution of migrants by trip duration, shown in the second panel of table 5. Once again diversity is relatively

low in the first prevalence level, then it increases as prevalence moves through the second and third phases, decreases slightly in the fourth category, and then falls further when migration reaches a mass stage. At low levels of prevalence, migrants take either long or short trips. In this category 54% of the trips lasted under one year and 20% for five years or more. This bimodal distribution yields a mean trip length of 3.4 years.

As migration spreads and becomes more prevalent, the share of people staying over five years at first rises but then progressively falls. The proportion taking moderate-length trips (one–five years) rises but then drops, and the average trip length shortens. The greatest levels of diversity (91 and 90) are reached in the third and fourth prevalence categories, but diversity falls back to 87 during the mass phase. At this prevalence level, only 24% of people stayed over five years, 49% stayed under one year, and 27% stayed one–five years.

Although there are no strong developmental trends in the aggregate distribution of migrants by legal status, there is a pattern of rising, falling, and then rising diversity within communities. At low prevalence levels the diversity index is only 43, it rises to a peak of 57 in the second prevalence stage, and by the time mass migration has been achieved it has fallen back to 54. In the initial phases of migration, 46% of all migrants are undocumented, 16% are legal, and 38% are *braceros*, but at the final stage *braceros* have dropped to zero and the share of legal migrants has increased to 64%.

The foregoing results suggest an orderly shift in migrant strategies across developmental stages. At the beginning of the migration process, migrants tend either to adopt a settled strategy of long-term residence or a short-term strategy of back-and-forth movement. During intermediate stages migrants experiment with variations on these strategies as they try out different locations and different jobs. As the developmental process proceeds, however, migrants turn toward settled strategies, which are made more attractive by the formation of stem communities in the United States, or toward recurrent strategies, which are enabled by the emergence of well-developed migrant networks. In some cases a community may “specialize” in more than one strategy, depending, for example, on whether migrants have achieved a toehold in more than one destination or occupation (Goldring 1992b).

In order to study migrant strategies, we employed the criteria used by Massey et al. (1987) to characterize the period between migrants' first and most recent trips. New migrants made their first trip to the United States during the three years prior to the survey. Settled migrants either stayed in the United States for three years on their most recent trip or had an average trip duration of at least three years between their first

TABLE 5

CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRST U S TRIP

CHARACTERISTIC	PREVALENCE OF MIGRATION IN COMMUNITY				
	0%—9%	10%—19%	20%—29%	30%—39%	≥40%
U S destination					
California					
Southern California (%)	24 0	55 6	52 4	44 1	42 4
Los Angeles County (%)	15 1	43 8	36 2	22 1	3 9
Orange County (%)	5 9	3 0	4 8	5 2	3 9
Riverside County (%)	5	5	1 3	1 8	7
San Diego County (%)	4	3 6	3 0	2 4	2
Ventura County (%)	2 1	4 7	7 1	12 6	33 7
San Francisco Bay area (%)	8 4	7 1	7 6	10 8	1 3
Inland valleys (%)	27 3	14 5	13 2	28 9	5 3
Salinas Valley (%)	6 7	1 7	3 0	6 9	9
Other California (%)	5 4	2 4	2 7	2 7	1 3
Texas (%)	11 8	8 7	10 9	5	5
Illinois (%)	6	2 3	1 8	2 0	2
Other (%)	15 9	7 9	8 2	4 0	48 0
Diversity (above groups, $n = 12$)	46	57	56	63	63
Diversity (original groups, $n = 67$)	35	46	43	44	46
Trip duration					
1—2 months (%)	14 2	11 1	7 7	8 2	6 0
3—5 months (%)	20 9	14 9	11 7	14 1	11 4
6—11 months (%)	19 2	17 9	20 0	24 8	31 9
1—2 years (%)	18 3	19 0	20 3	20 8	19 3
3—5 years (%)	7 3	7 3	12 8	11 7	7 4
>5 years (%)	20 0	29 9	27 5	20 5	24 1
Mean trip length (years)	3 4	4 6	3 5	2 4	1 9
Diversity (above groups, $n = 6$)	71	87	91	90	87

Legal status					
Bracero (%)	37 8	15 1	3 9	8 3	0
Undocumented (%)	45 7	55 8	63 6	61 8	36 0
Documented (%)	16 5	29 1	32 5	29 9	64 0
Green card (%)	7 3	8 8	6 3	9 6	39 0
Legalization or amnesty (%)	5	6	2 1	8	1 6
Citizen (%)	6 5	12 7	19 0	16 3	22 2
Tourist (%)	2 2	7 0	5 1	3 1	1 2
Diversity (above groups, $n = 6$)	43	57	56	47	54
Strategy					
New	9	1 5	2 8	5 3	1 0
Temporary	14 2	15 4	12 2	11 0	5 5
Recurrent	50 4	38 2	44 8	49 5	73 4
Settled	34 5	44 9	40 3	34 3	20 1
Diversity (above groups, $n = 4$)	46	59	67	73	61
U S occupation					
Agriculture (%)	83 3	52 1	41 5	71 1	84 1
Nonagriculture (%)	16 7	47 9	58 5	28 9	15 9
Skilled manual (%)	2 0	5 6	7 9	1 9	2
Unskilled manual (%)	11 1	27 3	27 3	17 8	10 0
Services (%)	2 9	10 7	17 8	7 1	4 4
Other (%)	6	4 4	5 6	2 2	1 3
Diversity (above groups, $n = 5$)	24	60	71	51	57
Diversity (original groups, $n = 55$)	15	34	45	27	33
Diversity (males, original groups, $n = 48$)	24	30	39	39	41
Diversity (females, original groups, $n = 41$)	16	37	50	34	38
No of migrants (unweighted)	227	1,148	1,480	635	343

NOTE ---The diversity figures for "original groups" are based on a breakdown of the data into smaller, more specific categories not reported in this article

and last trip. Recurrent migrants took at least three trips and averaged one trip every two years or spent at least half of the time between their first and last trip in the United States. Finally, temporary migrants, the residual category, took fewer than three trips, averaged fewer than one trip every two years, or spent less than half of their time between trips in the United States. We used the midpoint of the period between the first and last trip as the year by which to classify strategy by prevalence. For people who had made only one trip, we used its date to define the relevant prevalence category.

As the migration process unfolds in stages and transnational movement becomes more prevalent, migrants generally shift away from settled and temporary strategies and increasingly favor a strategy of recurrent movement. Across the five stages, the relative number of migrants employing a temporary strategy falls from 14% to 5%, the share using a settled strategy drops from 34% to 20%, but the proportion using a recurrent strategy increases from 50% to 73%. At the same time, the diversity of strategies rises from 46 at the lowest prevalence level to 73 at the fourth prevalence category but drops to 61 when mass migration has been reached.

Thus, the general tendency is toward greater diversity in strategies over time, despite some curvilinearity. When migration becomes extremely prevalent, however, there is a tendency toward renewed specialization, focusing principally on a recurrent strategy. The growing predominance of recurrent migration is enabled by the accumulation of social capital in the form of network connections and community migrant experience, which enable anyone, even new migrants, quickly to adopt a pattern of recurrent movement back and forth for regular periods of paid labor abroad.

The last panel of table 5 shows shifts in the U.S. occupations held by migrants at different stages in the migration process. Once again, there is a pattern of rising and falling diversity. Occupational variation increases sharply between the first and third prevalence levels, then declines across later phases. There is, however, an apparent reversal of the shift away from agricultural employment between the third and fifth prevalence levels. Whereas the proportion of migrants working in agriculture drops from 83% at the lowest prevalence level to 42% in the third category, it rises again to 71% and 84% during the last two phases.

The general tendency is probably toward greater concentration in urban jobs as prevalence rises, the apparent respecialization in agriculture within the last two categories reflects the nature of the communities that achieved high levels of prevalence. Whether specialization in U.S. agricultural labor is itself a factor that promotes the emergence of mass

TABLE 6
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANT HOUSEHOLD HEADS
PRIOR TO LEAVING ON THEIR FIRST U S TRIP

CHARACTERISTIC	PREVALENCE OF MIGRATION IN COMMUNITY				
	0%-9%	10%-19%	20%-29%	30%-39%	≥40%
Education					
None (%)	23 2	23 5	16 4	21 6	6 4
1-5 years (%)	54 5	36 8	29 9	50 0	65 3
6+ years (%)	22 4	39 7	53 7	28 4	28 3
Mean years of schooling	2 7	3 7	5 2	2 9	4 3
Diversity ($n = 20$)	36	53	55	51	63
Land ownership					
Landowners (%)	6 1	8 1	4 9	5 1	5
Business ownership					
Business owners (%)	9 3	5 8	7 4	3 9	8 1
Mexican occupation					
Agriculture (%)	61 2	48 7	38 0	70 0	57 5
Nonagriculture (%)*	29 4	38 7	46 9	15 5	10 8
Professional-manager-owner (%)	0	1 0	3 2	0	0
Technical-sales-clerical (%)	5 8	7 2	6 0	3 0	2 0
Skilled manual (%)	7 2	12 8	18 1	6 5	6 2
Unskilled manual (%)	9 6	11 3	10 7	2 8	2 0
Services (%)	6 9	6 5	8 8	3 2	8
Not in workforce (%)	9 4	12 6	15 1	14 5	31 7
Diversity (above groups, $n = 7$)	32	50	59	47	41
Diversity (original groups, $n = 64$)	27	45	48	48	38
No migrant household heads	172	670	674	190	57

NOTE — The diversity figures for "original groups" are based on a breakdown of the Mexican occupations into 64 categories more specific than the seven general categories reported in this article

* Categories of nonagricultural employment may not sum to nonagricultural total due to rounding error

migration or whether those communities we selected just happened to be small agrarian towns cannot be determined from these data

Increasing Socioeconomic Heterogeneity of Migration

The gradual accumulation of network connections and migratory knowledge across developmental stages makes migration an increasingly common social and economic practice and lowers the costs and risks of movement, making migration a less selective process. Table 6 examines the socioeconomic selectivity of migration in terms of education, property ownership, and Mexican occupations. These variables are measured for migrants in the year before they take their first U S trip.

Changing educational distributions are somewhat difficult to interpret because the stages of migration tend to occur at different historical times. Overall levels of education have been rising in Mexico and the local availability of postprimary education has expanded over time. In general, both educational levels and diversity increase as migration becomes more prevalent, indicating that the educational selectivity of migration decreases. Mean education increases from 2.7 to 4.3 years from the lowest to the mass prevalence level, and the diversity index increases from .36 to .63, after remaining relatively constant in the second through fourth prevalence categories.

Distributions of property ownership also suggest that migration becomes less socioeconomically selective as migration spreads throughout the community, although there is some curvilinearity. In the first two prevalence categories, 6% and 8% of the migrants are landowners, but the percentage drops to about 5% in the third and fourth stages and ends up at 0.5% in the mass prevalence category. Trends in business ownership are less clear. In the initial stage, 9% of migrants are business owners, but as migration becomes more prevalent, the proportion falls, rises, falls again, then rises.

It is possible that some of these fluctuations reflect a process in which early migrants use remittances to acquire businesses or property that later migrants in the family report as being their own prior to their first departure. That is, the accumulation of property over time by individuals who pass it on to family members may explain some of the fluctuations. It may also reflect the particular kinds of communities that achieve high levels of migratory prevalence.

The broadening of socioeconomic representation is suggested by the Mexican occupational data, shown in the last panel of table 6. At the lowest level of prevalence, migrants are drawn largely from agricultural occupations: 29% come from nonagrarian pursuits, while 61% report an agrarian occupation. Among nonagricultural occupations, migrants are distributed relatively evenly among four categories: technical-sales-clerical workers make up 6%, skilled manual workers 7%, unskilled manual workers 10%, and service workers 7%. As migration proceeds through the third prevalence category, however, there is a clear shift of migrants' origins to include a higher proportion of nonagricultural backgrounds. By the time this stage is reached, 38% of all migrants are engaged in agricultural occupations, while nonagricultural workers have risen slightly to a 47% share. The increase is particularly large for skilled workers.

The trend toward lower shares of agricultural backgrounds among first-time migrants reverses in the fourth prevalence category, where the share jumps sharply to 70%, before falling back down to 58% in the

last category. This increasing predominance of agricultural backgrounds probably again reflects the nature of the communities achieving high levels of prevalence in our sample, but it might also reflect Mexico's sharply worsening economic conditions during the early 1980s. The "crisis" sent many people north, as did the possibility of legalization through the Immigration Reform and Control Act.

The occupational data in table 6 also show that the proportion of migrants reporting no Mexican occupation prior to leaving on their first trip increases across prevalence categories. In the initial prevalence category 9% of migrants report not having worked before leaving Mexico, a percentage that rises steadily through the fourth phase and jumps to 32% in the highest prevalence category. This pattern reflects the decline in the mean age of migration noted in table 4, which yields a steady increase in the percentage of migrants outside of the labor force. This pattern also suggests a phenomenon of "northernization," whereby U.S. migration gains force as a social and cultural phenomenon and people increasingly migrate abroad without gaining local occupational experience first.

As migration moves from low to mass prevalence, the degree of diversity in migrant's occupational backgrounds follows a curvilinear pattern. When calculated using the broad occupational groups shown in table 6, it grows from 27 to 48 and then falls back to 38. When based on more detailed categories (55 categories, not reported in this article), it rises from 32 to 59 and then falls back to 41. Although there is some tendency for occupational diversity to constrict between the third and the mass phases in curvilinear fashion, the overall tendency is toward broader representation and less socioeconomic selectivity in the stream of out-migrants.

CONCLUSION

Field investigators working in Mexico during the 1970s and early 1980s uncovered a variety of empirical continuities in the way that transnational migration developed within communities. Migration to the United States generally began with a small number of migrants leaving the community from a rather narrow socioeconomic and demographic niche. Over time, however, the number of migrants tended to grow and eventually came to incorporate virtually all groups and classes in the community.

In this article we outlined a cumulative theory of migration that accounts for empirical regularities observed by earlier investigators. Migration tends to increase in prevalence and become more diverse because transnational movement causes relatively permanent changes in individual motivations, social structures, and cultural milieus, and these changes

cumulate over time to change the context within which subsequent migration decisions are made. As information about migration grows and network connections to the United States ramify, the costs and risks of international movement drop and migration becomes more attractive. As more people are induced to migrate, knowledge and network connections expand further, inducing more people to migrate, and so on. With time, migration becomes a generalized social and economic practice.

No previous study has examined developmental processes of migration using such a broad sample of communities surveyed using identical methods and procedures. Drawing on data from 19 Mexican settlements, we defined five basic stages in the social process of migration based on the overall prevalence of migration in the community. We showed that when high prevalence levels are achieved, the vast majority of townspeople are related to someone who has been to the United States and average U.S. experience has accumulated to very high levels.

This accumulation of social capital qualitatively changes the decision-making environment for potential migrants and makes transnational movement accessible and attractive to community members. Although the first international migrants tend to be married male household heads of prime labor force age, usually from a nonagricultural background and often from a property-owning class, as migration becomes more prevalent and social capital accumulates, this profile changes.

Migration spreads among males at a relatively constant pace, but among females its prevalence grows at an increasing rate. As a result, the representation of females among migrant cohorts increases markedly as the level of prevalence rises. The range of ages steadily broadens among both men and women. Among the former, migration generally spreads from fathers to older sons and then to young boys. Among women, migration begins among older daughters and young wives, then moves to older wives and young girls. As migration develops from an isolated set of events to a mass phenomenon, it also becomes less selective in class terms. Educational and occupational backgrounds become more diverse as the percentage of landowners and agricultural workers falls.

At early stages in the developmental process of migration, migrants from a community tend to go to a rather narrow geographic and occupational niche in the United States, largely following in the footsteps of the first migrants. As networks develop and migrants acquire greater experience abroad, however, they seek out new opportunities in new locations. Eventually, however, someone achieves a position of authority that allows him to distribute employment to the people in his community network, which causes the diversity of destinations to stop rising.

Our empirical analyses showed that geographic diversity was low in

the initial stages of migratory development, increased dramatically during the intermediate stages, and then stayed constant or fell slightly as a mass level of migration was achieved. Movement strategies and trip durations displayed a pattern of rising and then falling diversity as communities moved from the lowest to the highest prevalence category. Occupations and legal statuses for migrants in the United States displayed a general trend toward greater diversity across developmental stages.

Thus, using a broad sample of Mexican communities, we find evidence of common developmental patterns of migration that are in line with the empirical observations of early investigators and the developmental theory of network migration outlined above. Our results reinforce Durand and Massey's (1992) conclusion that common migration processes occur across a wide range of Mexican communities, even though their expression may be shaped by factors operating at the community level.

We also underscore Durand and Massey's caveat that care must be taken when attempting to generalize from isolated community studies. As we have shown, depending on whether one selects a community where transnational migration is incipient or well established, the "nature" of transnational migration may be characterized very differently in social, demographic, and economic terms and the patterns of movement may vary considerably. In order to aid in future comparative work, investigators undertaking case studies of migrant communities should report the degree of migratory prevalence so that others can determine what phase the community has achieved in the developmental process and can avoid comparing communities at markedly different stages.

Our contribution thus lies in synthesizing available material and suggesting a conceptual model that can reconcile seeming discrepancies reported in individual case studies. If identifiable patterns are associated with the expansion of migratory behavior and accumulated experience, then these differences should be the result of diverse histories and levels of migration experience. Simple cross tabulations of data from multiple sites offer little insight into the process of migration unless they are standardized for purposes of comparison. We introduce the prevalence of migration as a conceptual and empirical measure that can capture the cumulative process of migration as it unfolds.

Having discussed commonalities in migration from a broad sample of Mexican communities, we next need to study the structural factors and population processes that shape the spread of migration within communities to understand why some places rapidly attain a state of mass migration while others develop more slowly and achieve only modest rates of out-migration. We hope to address these more complicated multilevel analyses in future research.

REFERENCES

- Alarcón, Rafael 1988 "El Proceso de 'Norteamericanización' Impacto de la Migración Internacional en Chavinda, Michoacán " Pp 337-58 in *Movimientos de Población en el Occidente de México*, edited by Thomas Calvo and Gustavo López Zamora El Colegio de Michoacán Press
- 1992 "Norteamericanización Self-Perpetuating Migration from a Mexican Town " Pp 302-18 in *U S -Mexico Relations Labor Market Interdependence*, edited by Jorge Bustamante, R Hinojosa, and Clark Reynolds Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Baucic, Ivo 1972 *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problems of Returning Emigration Workers* The Hague Martinus Nijhoff
- Coleman, James S 1988 "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital " *American Journal of Sociology* 94 S95-S120
- Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO) 1986 *Encuesta en la Frontera a Trabajadores Indocumentados Devueltos por las Autoridades de los Estados Unidos de América Diciembre de 1984* Mexico City Consejo Nacional de Población
- Cornelius, Wayne A 1976a *Mexican Migration to the United States The View from Rural Sending Communities* Migration and Development Monograph C/76-12 Cambridge, Mass MIT Center for International Studies
- 1976b "Outmigration from Rural Mexican Communities " *Interdisciplinary Communications Program Occasional Monograph Series* 5 (2) 1-39 Washington, D C Smithsonian Institution
- 1978 *Mexican Migration to the United States Causes, Consequences, and U S Responses* Migration and Development Monograph C/78-9 Cambridge, Mass MIT Center for International Studies
- 1990 "Labor Migration to the United States Development Outcomes and Alternatives in Mexican Sending Communities " Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development Working Paper no 38 Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, Washington, D C
- 1992 "From Sojourners to Settlers The Changing Profile of Mexican Labor Migration to California in the 1980s " Pp 155-95 in *U S -Mexico Relations Labor Market Interdependence*, edited by Jorge Bustamante, R Hinojosa, and Clark Reynolds Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Dagodag, W Tim 1975 "Source Regions and Composition of Illegal Mexican Immigration to California " *International Migration Review* 9 499-511
- Dinerman, Ina R 1982 *Migrants and Stay-at-Homes A Comparative Study of Rural Migration from Michoacán, México* Monographs in U S -Mexican Studies, no 5 La Jolla, Calif Program in United States-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego
- Donato, Katharine M 1992 "Understanding U S Immigration Why Some Countries Send Women and Others Men " Pp 159-84 in *Seeking Common Ground Women Immigrants to the United States*, edited by Donna Gabbacia Westport, Conn Greenwood Press
- Donato, Katharine M , Jorge Durand, and Douglas S Massey 1992 "Stemming the Tide? Assessing the Deterrent Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act " *Demography* 29 139-58
- Durand, Jorge 1992 "Paso del Norte Patronos Migrantes en el Occidente de México " Ph D dissertation University of Toulouse, Department of Geography and Management
- Durand, Jorge, and Douglas S Massey 1992 "Mexican Migration to the United States A Critical Review " *Latin American Research Review* 27 3-42

- England, Paula 1992 *Comparable Worth Theories and Evidence* Hawthorne, N Y Aldine de Gruyter
- Fergany, Nader 1982 "The Impact of Emigration on National Development in the Arab Region The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic " *International Migration Review* 16 757-80
- Fernández, Celestino 1988 "Migración hacia los Estados Unidos Caso Santa Inés, Michoacán Pp 113-24 in *Migración en el Occidente de México*, edited by Gustavo López and Sergio Pardo Zamora El Colegio de Michoacán
- Galarza, Ernest 1964 *Merchants of Labor The Mexican Bracero Story* Santa Barbara, Calif McNally & Loftin
- Gamio, Manuel 1930 *Mexican Immigration to the United States* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Georges, Eugenia 1990 *The Making of a Transnational Community Migration, Development, and Cultural Change in the Dominican Republic* New York Oxford University Press
- Goldring, Lunn 1990 "Development and Migration A Comparative Analysis of Two Mexican Migrant Circuits " Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development Working Paper no 37 Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, Washington, D C
- 1992a "Blurring Borders Community and Social Transformation in Mexico-U S Migration " Paper presented at the Conference on New Perspectives on Mexico-U S Migration University of Chicago, October 23-24
- 1992b "Diversity and Community in Transnational Migration A Comparative Study of Two México-U S Migrant Circuits " Ph D dissertation Cornell University, Department of Rural Sociology
- 1992c "Gendered Memory Reconstructions of the Village by Mexican Transnational Migrants " Paper presented at the eighth World Congress of Rural Sociology, University Park, Pa , August
- 1992d "La migración México-EUA y la Transnacionalización del Espacio Político y Social Perspectivas desde el México Rural " *Estudios Sociológicos* 10 (29) 315-40
- Goldring, Lunn, and Robert C Smith 1993 "Substantive Citizenship and Transnational Communities Sociolegal Dimensions of Mexico-U S Transnational Migration " Manuscript University of Chicago, Population Research Center
- Goodman, Leo 1961 "Snowball Sampling " *Annals of Mathematical Statistics* 32 117-51
- Grasmuck, Sherri, and Patricia R Pessar 1991 *Between Two Islands Dominican International Migration* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Gregory, Peter 1986 *The Myth of Market Failure Employment and the Labor Market in Mexico* Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierette 1992 "Overcoming Patriarchal Constraints The Reconstruction of Gender Relations among Mexican Immigrant Women and Men " *Gender and Society* 6 393-415
- Jones, Richard C 1982a "Channelization of Undocumented Mexican Migrants to the United States " *Economic Geography* 58 156-76
- 1982b "Undocumented Migration from Mexico Some Geographical Questions " *Annals, Association of American Geographers* 72 77-87
- 1988 "Micro Source Regions of Mexican Undocumented Migration " *National Geographic Research* 4 11-22
- Lindstrom, David P 1991 "The Differential Role of Family Networks in Individual Migration Decisions " Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Washington, D C , March 21-23
- Lomnitz, Larissa 1977 *Networks and Marginality* New York Academic Press

- López, Gustavo 1986 *La Casa Dividida Un Estudio de Caso Sobre Migración a Estados Unidos en un Pueblo Michoacano* Zamora El Colegio de Michoacán
- Massey, Douglas S 1985 "The Settlement Process among Mexican Migrants to the United States New Methods and Findings " Pp 255-92 in *Immigration Statistics A Story of Neglect*, edited by Daniel B Levine, Kenneth Hill, and Robert Warren Washington, D C National Academy Press
- 1986 "The Settlement Process among Mexican Migrants to the United States " *American Sociological Review* 51 670-85
- 1987a "The Ethnosurvey in Theory and Practice " *International Migration Review* 21 1498-522
- 1987b "Understanding Mexican Migration to the United States " *American Journal of Sociology* 92 1372-403
- 1990 "Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration " *Population Index* 56 3-26
- Massey, Douglas S , Rafael Alarcón, Jorge Durand, and Humberto González 1987 *Return to Aztlan The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Massey, Douglas S , and Felipe García España 1987 "The Social Process of International Migration " *Science* 237 733-38
- Mines, Richard 1981 *Developing a Community Tradition of Migration A Field Study in Rural Zacatecas, Mexico and California Settlement Areas* Monographs in U S -Mexican Studies, no 3 La Jolla, Calif Program in United States-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego
- 1984 "Network Migration and Mexican Rural Development A Case Study " Pp 136-55 in *Patterns of Undocumented Migration Mexico and the United States*, edited by Richard C Jones Totowa, N J Rowman & Allanheld
- Mines, Richard, and Ricardo Anzaldúa 1982 *New Migrants vs Old Migrants Alternative Labor Market Structures in the California Citrus Industry* Monographs in U S -Mexican Studies, no 9 La Jolla, Calif Program in United States-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego
- Mines, Richard, and Alan de Janvry 1982 "Migration to the United States and Mexican Rural Development A Case Study " *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 64 444-54
- Mines, Richard, and Douglas S Massey 1985 "Patterns of Migration to the United States from Two Mexican Communities " *Latin American Research Review* 20 104-24
- Myrdal, Gunnar 1957 *Rich Lands and Poor* New York Harper & Row
- North, David S , and Marion F Houstoun 1976 *The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U S Labor Market An Exploratory Study* Washington, D C Linton
- Pedraza, Silvia 1991 "Women and Migration The Social Consequences of Gender " *Annual Review of Sociology* 17 303-25
- Pessar, Patricia R 1982 "The Role of Households in International Migration and the Case of U S -Bound Migration from the Dominican Republic " *International Migration Review* 16 342-64
- Piore, Michael J 1979 *Birds of Passage Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies* New York Cambridge University Press
- Portes, Alejandro 1979 "Illegal Immigration and the International System Lessons from Recent Legal Immigrants from Mexico " *Social Problems* 26 425-38
- Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén C Rumbaut 1990 *Immigrant America A Portrait* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Reichert, Joshua S 1979 "The Migrant Syndrome An Analysis of U S Migration and Its Impact on a Rural Mexican Town " Ph D dissertation Princeton University, Department of Anthropology

- 1981 "The Migrant Syndrome Seasonal U S Wage Labor and Rural Development in Central Mexico " *Human Organization* 40 56–66
- 1982 "A Town Divided Economic Stratification and Social Relations in a Mexican Migrant Community " *Social Problems* 29 411–23
- Reichert, Joshua, S , and Douglas S Massey 1979 "Patterns of U S Migration from a Mexican Sending Community A Comparison of Legal and Illegal Migrants " *International Migration Review* 13 599–623
- 1980 "History and Trends in U S Bound Migration from a Mexican Town " *International Migration Review* 14 475–91
- Rhoades, Robert 1979 "From Caves to Main Street Return Migration and the Transformation of a Spanish Village " *Papers in Anthropology* 20 57–74
- Rouse, Roger C 1989 "Mexican Migration to the United States Family Relations in the Development of a Transnational Migrant Circuit " Ph D dissertation Stanford University, Department of Anthropology
- 1991 "Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism " *Diaspora* 1 8–23
- 1992 "Making Sense of Settlement Class Transformation, Cultural Struggle, and Transnationalism among Mexican Migrants in the United States " *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 645 25–52
- Ruiz, Vicki L , and Susan Tiano, eds 1987 *Women on the U S -Mexico Border Responses to Change* Boston Allen & Unwin
- Samora, Julian 1971 *Los Mojados The Wetback Story* Notre Dame, Ind University of Notre Dame Press
- Sassen, Saskia 1988 *The Mobility of Labor and Capital A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Shannon, C E 1948 "A Mathematical Theory of Communication " *Bell System Technical Journal* 27 379–422, 623–56
- Smith, Robert C 1992 "'Los Ausentes Siempre Presentes' The Imagining, Making, and Politics of a Transnational Community between New York City and Tlucmani, Puebla " Paper presented at the conference of the Latin American Studies Association, Los Angeles, September
- Stark, Oded 1991 *The Migration of Labor* Cambridge, Mass Basil Blackwell
- Stuart, James, and Michael Kearney 1981 "Causes and Effects of Agricultural Labor Migration from the Mixteca of Oaxaca to California " Working Paper in U S -Mexican Studies, no 28 La Jolla, Calif Program in United States–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego
- Taylor, J Edward 1986 "Differential Migration, Networks, Information, and Risk " *Research in Human Capital and Development Migration, Human Capital, and Development* 4 147–71
- Taylor, Paul S 1980 "Mexican Women in Los Angeles Industry " *Aztlan* 11 99–131
- Theil, Henri 1972 *Statistical Decomposition Analysis* Amsterdam North Holland
- Todaro, Michael P , and Lydia Maruszko 1987 "Illegal Migration and U S Immigration Reform A Conceptual Framework " *Population and Development Review* 13 101–14
- White, Michael J 1986 "Segregation and Diversity Measures in Population Distribution " *Population Index* 52 198–221
- Wiest, Raymond E 1973 "Wage-Labor Migration and the Household in a Mexican Town " *Journal of Anthropological Research* 29 108–209

National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia¹

Randy Hodson
Indiana University

Duško Sekulić
George Mason University

Garth Massey
University of Wyoming

This article analyzes patterns of tolerance among nationalities in the former Yugoslavia. Greater tolerance among urban residents, those from nationally diverse republics, and those with nationally mixed parentage and less tolerance among religious people strongly support the modernization theory of ethnic relations. The association of unemployment with intolerance and outbreaks of violence in areas with greater national diversity support theories of ethnic competition. Factors associated with modernism produce greater tolerance but increase the possibility of ethnic conflict. Humanity's dilemma is how to preserve the benefits of modernism for increased intergroup contact and tolerance while avoiding its potentially tragic implications.

The demise of Communist party hegemony in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has been followed by the recrudescence of ethnic and nationalist political activity (Dobbs 1991, Pfaff 1992). While ethnic and national identities are providing a basis for political solidarity, they are at the same time underpinning conflict among nationalities in several parts of the region (Voirst 1991). This conflict has been particularly visible in the former republics of Yugoslavia, particularly Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over 200,000 casualties and the creation of more than two million refugees have resulted from fighting between rival groups identifying themselves along nationalist lines in these republics.

¹ This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation through the Yugoslav-United States Joint Fund for Scientific and Technological Cooperation. We would like to thank the reviewers for the *American Journal of Sociology* for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Please address all correspondence to Randy Hodson, Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405.

The popular press typically attributes these conflicts to long-standing but politically suppressed ethnic hostilities. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was quoted in a July 20, 1992, Associated Press story as saying, "One of the things one learns from actually being here [Yugoslavia] is that the fears and hatreds which have been unleashed are absolutely formidable." Similarly, Elizabeth Drew (1992, p. 70) has written that "the disappearance of the Iron Curtain allowed long-suppressed—but no less bitter—ethnic hatreds to break out once more."

It is not surprising that, once armed conflict begins, many people develop feelings of fear, and in some cases hatred, toward other nationalities (Smith 1981). But it is not at all certain that ethnic hatred is the key operational factor in explaining current conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Nor is it clear that such animus has been fully present but unexpressed for several decades or centuries as is often implied in the popular press. The concept of "long-suppressed hatreds" carries with it assumptions about Communist party rule and recent political mobilization that may distort rather than illuminate the reasons for the ongoing conflict (see Glenny 1992, Magaš 1989, Suny 1990). The undocumented nature of the assumption that these hatreds were both widely held and a leading cause of current conflicts should encourage skepticism among social scientists. Arguments based on primordial hatreds should not be accepted without an examination of the possible structural underpinnings of current animosities. Sociological theories of modernization and ethnic competition suggest structural explanations for ethnic antagonisms without recourse to theories of primordial hatreds (Deutsch 1961, Hechter 1978).

The analysis presented below examines the factors contributing to variations in national tolerance immediately prior to the outbreak of civil and military hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. It explores structural explanations for tolerance that are derived from modernization and ethnic-competition perspectives on ethnicity and ethnic relations. The findings provide substantial support for the modernization theory of ethnic relations. Theories of ethnic competition also receive some support. It appears, however, that theories of ethnic competition are better suited to predicting the subsequent outbreak of violence than to predicting levels of intergroup tolerance. These findings suggest a dilemma for the modern world. Modernization leads to greater intergroup tolerance but also creates the preconditions for subsequent competition and conflict.

THE STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR TOLERANCE

Modernization Theories

Modernization theories see industrialization and its increasingly complex division of labor, enhanced communication and transportation, urbaniza-

tion, and rationalization of social institutions as leading to more universalistic principles and more cosmopolitan identities and allegiances (Schermerhorn 1970, Tadjman 1981) This perspective, derived from the American functionalist tradition of the 1950s, was developed against the backdrop of Third World modernization and development in the 1960s and 1970s

Modernization theory treats ethnic identification as premodern, provincial, traditional, and particularistic According to this theory, ethnic identification's structural basis is the village, its structural support is the persistence of a cultural, political, and economic way of life that reinforces ethnicity as part of a value system lending coherence and consensus to the community (Isaacs 1975, Seton-Watson 1977, chap 4) In the course of modernization the village ceases to be the focal point of social life, while more inclusive cultural, political, and economic systems come to dominate the social landscape This vision is also consistent with Marxist views that see class as superseding ethnic relations in the process of industrialization Where ethnic mobilization and ethnic nationalism occur with development, it is a prelude to class-based social organizations

Increased national diversity and mixing result from industrial development, urbanism, and population movements, and these are seen as important causes of increased tolerance in modernization theory Traditional ethnic boundaries are more easily maintained when there is little contact between groups (Allport 1958, Belanger and Pinard 1991), the greatest intolerance is expected where there is the least contact between persons of different nationalities (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967) Young urban residents, those people with greater occupational status and higher educational attainment, should express greater tolerance Persons involved in nontraditional organizations and associations should also be more tolerant, as should those most exposed to the wider world (e.g., consumers of printed and electronic media) Strong religious and traditional values are seen as providing support for intolerance and nationalist political agendas (Hannan 1979, p. 255, Ragin 1979)

Ethnic-Competition Theories

The ethnic-competition perspective emphasizes the elements of industrialization that foster and intensify ethnic identification and mobilization and encourage ethnic intolerance As Hannan argues, "The primordial identity view suggests that ethnic distinctions will disappear as processes of modernization increase in scope and intensity The reactive identity view suggests that this will not be the case as long as power and other institutional differences persist" (Hannan 1979, pp. 254–55) The predic-

tion that modernization will intensify ethnic identification and mobilization clearly differentiates the ethnic-competition model from the modernization perspective. Far from being an aberration, ethnic conflict is seen in the competition model as stimulated by the process of industrialization when diverse groups are thrown into conflict over scarce resources (Ahmad 1991, Barth 1969).

The ethnic-competition perspective has spawned several notions about how increased ethnic competition takes place, notions that highlight both labor-market and political processes (Belanger and Pinard 1991). A variety of mechanisms may facilitate the development of ethnic competition alongside modernization: racially split labor markets (Bonacich 1972), employment segregation (Bonacich and Modell 1980), the cultural division of labor (Hechter 1978), center-periphery conflicts (Hechter 1976), the replacement of local control with more inclusive domains of control and sovereignty (Hannan 1979), and the expansion of state systems (Nagel 1986, Nielsen 1985). All of these developments hold the possibility that ethnic competition for jobs, housing, and political power will intensify with modernization (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993).

In the ethnic-competition perspective, there is an underlying theme that heightened ethnic identity in ethnically diverse states is a reaction to the economic disruptions and political opportunities of industrialization and modernization (Meadwell 1989, Rogowski 1985). The ethnic-competition model is supported by studies of ethnic mobilization that show that conflict between ethnically distinct peoples may be impelled less by sentiments of intolerance rooted in ethnic or national culture than by the persuasive power of elites pursuing economic and political interests for themselves and their constituents (Ragin 1979). The state's role in promoting nationality as a basis for political mobilization is highlighted in Nagel's (1986, p. 102) proposition that "ethnic mobilization is most likely when political policies are implemented that recognize and institutionalize ethnic differences." Finally, Belanger and Pinard (1991, p. 450, see also Smith 1979) argue that the maintenance of ethnic identities provides an important basis for political action. Olzak (1983, p. 363) argues that "competition theories explain the causal link between modernization and ethnic mobilization," a link unanticipated in the modernization perspective.

The ethnic-competition perspective suggests several specific factors that may influence national tolerance. Olzak (1983, p. 358) specifies a rough equality of size among ethnic or national populations as important for fostering ethnic mobilization. Where there are multiple competing groups, intolerance should be greater and may be especially high among members of the dominant group because of the power base provided by numeric dominance (Barth 1969, p. 19, Belanger and Pinard 1991, p.

448, Korpı 1974, Kposowa and Jenkins 1993) This proposition directly contradicts the "contact hypothesis" of Allport (1958), which argues that tolerance will be fostered when different groups have contact under conditions of proximate equality and interdependent goals—an argument that has been at the core of the modernization perspective

The ethnic-competition model also suggests that population mobility and economic contraction will increase ethnic competition (Olzak 1992, p 37) Those most affected by economic contraction, such as the unemployed, should exhibit the least tolerance toward other nationalities Increasing urbanization is also expected to exacerbate nationalist sentiments (Olzak 1983, pp 367–68) In contrast, modernization theory suggests that urbanization will increase tolerance

To summarize, modernization theory predicts that national diversity and urbanism will lead to greater tolerance Additional factors modernization theory identifies as contributing to increased tolerance include nationally mixed family structures, participation in nontraditional social and political organizations, contact with the institutions of mass media, higher education, white-collar occupational positions, and youth Modernization theory predicts that religion will foster intolerance toward other groups In contrast to modernization theory, ethnic-competition theory predicts that national diversity and urbanism will foster competition and intolerance rather than greater tolerance Unemployment is also expected to contribute significantly to competition and intolerance Ethnic-competition theory also suggests that a numerically dominant group may develop intolerance toward other groups as part of a rationale for its aspirations for dominance (Brass 1985, Jackman 1978, Jenkins and Kposowa 1990)

FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALISM IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

The strategy of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC) was neither to abolish national identities nor to discourage participation in political life based on nationality (Ramet 1982, 1984a, Rusinow 1985) The LYC did, however, seek to elevate the Yugoslav state to a political status exceeding that of any nationality and sought to relegate national and cultural differences to the area of lifestyle rather than political economy (Demitch 1976, chap 6, McKay and Verdoodt 1975) Among the various ways the party and state leaders countered claims of nationalities over the state were the 1971 suppression of the Croatian nationalist movement, chastisement for expressions of national superiority (e g , Slovenia's rationale for opposing the poorer-region-development plans), and efforts to allay fears by some nationalities that they would be subsumed within a Greater Serbia (Ramet 1984a, Rusinow 1977, Stanovčić 1988)

Many in the Yugoslav regime, including Slovenian Edvard Kardelj (1960), were convinced that modernization and the growing importance of institutions of a more rational character would weaken the hold of nationalist identities. In this vision, an effective educational system, geographic mobility, and increased communication and commerce would undermine the particularistic sentiments of nationalism (see also Connor 1984, Shoup 1968). These political actors implicitly held a modernization view of the eventual demise of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia.

In the former Yugoslavia, economic development and per capita gross domestic product roughly followed a north-south trajectory, with Slovenia in the north being the most affluent republic, and Kosovo and Macedonia in the south the most impoverished (Schrenk, Ardalan, and el Tatawy 1979). The policies of decentralized planning and development (Bičanić 1988, Burg 1983, 1988) make it difficult, however, to apply a core-periphery scheme to the former Yugoslavia. An internal colonial model is equally inappropriate (Burkett 1983, Tyson 1980), especially in light of Yugoslavia's federal policy on underdeveloped regions, which since 1945 sought to shift resources from the wealthier areas (esp. Slovenia and Croatia) to the poorer areas of the country (Burg 1983, Ramet 1984a). High levels of intolerance in both Slovenia and Kosovo, revealed by the analysis below, indicate that economic disparities and relations between poorer and more prosperous regions by themselves are not an adequate explanation of national tolerance.

The Communist party implemented the principle of federation in Yugoslavia after taking power in 1945. At the beginning, the federal model was largely a subterfuge for real power concentrated in the Central Committee. Gradually, however, the central power within the party and the government structures was decentralized. More and more influence went not from the center to the republics but from the republican Communist parties to the center. The best example of this important change was the fact that in 1968 the congresses of the republican Communist parties were held for the first time *before* the federal congress. This step was important in reversing the tendency of the republican congresses to simply ratify and adopt the policies decided by the federal congress. Subsequent to 1968, the decisions of the federal congress increasingly came to be simply the negotiated sum of the decisions and platforms of the various republican congresses, taking into account, of course, the possibility of Tito exercising veto power over decisions at the federal level.

Changes similar to those taking place in the Communist party were also introduced in government structures. In 1953 the Chamber of Nationalities was abandoned as a separate parliamentary body and it became an almost indistinguishable part of the Federal Chamber (Savezno

Vijecce) With Amendment 8 of the constitution (April 18, 1967), however, the Chamber of Nationalities was reestablished as a visible structure of the federal congress with even greater power. In the same year, the principle of "national parity" in representation was introduced in leading party organs. This principle was extended to all organs of the federal government in 1971. With these amendments and changes, the presidency of Yugoslavia was constituted as a body reflecting the "multinational structure" of the Yugoslav federation.

The most significant element of dispersed republican power, introduced in 1971, was *de facto* veto power of every federal unit (including autonomous provinces) on any decision made on the federal level. From the mid-1960s forward, the national principle became deeply institutionalized. The process of institutionalization was finalized in the 1974 constitution, where the national principle became the primary dimension on which the political system was organized (Bilandžić 1985). The goal of the federal Communist party from the mid-1960s forward was to foster genuine decentralization (federalism in the government and in party structures) but without the mobilization of national groups. The fulfillment of national rights was to be satisfied by giving increased rights to the republican Communist parties to represent their respective nations.

In socialist Yugoslavia the economic and political policies of the League of Yugoslav Communists explicitly sought to diminish the cultural division of labor between nationalities (Denitch 1990, chap. 7, Massey, Hodson, and Sekulić 1992). The dynamics generated by state policies supporting a multinational state were quite complex and contained many contradictory elements. The expression of nationalist sentiments was allowed and even facilitated by these policies. Old national slogans and traditional national sentiments became openly expressed by intellectuals and other groups outside the Communist party. Traditional national goals also quickly became parts of republican Communist party ideologies and strategies. But the political center, dominated by Tito, was careful in distinguishing between decentralization under Communist party control and spontaneous national mobilization not controlled by the party. Federalism under party control was meant to satisfy aspirations for national autonomy and expressions of national identity. However, it was unacceptable for the republican Communist parties to seek alliances with traditional nationalist groups in pursuit of national goals (Warwick and Cohen 1985).

A good example of this unwillingness to allow traditional nationalist groups to enter the political arena was the strong federal reaction to the popular nationalist movement in Croatia in 1971. When Tito concluded that the Communist party of Croatia was making too many concessions to Croatian nationalists, he purged the higher ranks of the party in

Croatia The party elite in the republics were always in danger of being pressured by the center if they made movements to “democratize” and allowed nationalist movements to play an independent role in the political sphere Similarly, Tito’s policies of independence for the newly designated nations was always within the framework of the Communist party The decision to allow Muslims a separate official national identification was a decision negotiated within the federal party, not in Bosnia, where most Muslims lived Similarly, increased autonomy for Kosovo was based on a close collaboration of a new party elite of Albanians in Kosovo with the federal party

The central contradiction generated by the policies of the federal Communist party leadership was that decentralization through federalism produced a fragmented political structure with eight Communist parties, each having monopoly over its own territory and veto power over federal decisions Each republican party quickly came to rely on traditional national goals to articulate and legitimate its bargaining position relative to other republican Communist parties (Kourvetaris 1993, p 5) This tendency was checked during Tito’s life, because the center was still in a position to suppress such “nationalist deviations ” With Tito’s death, the political center lost the power to effectively check these centrifugal forces In addition, starting in the 1970s and accelerating in the 1980s, an economic crisis was eroding peoples’ standard of living, unemployment was increasing, and many people doubted the prospects for a reversal of economic fortunes (Lydall 1989) These political and economic forces combined to set the stage for the dissolution of the Yugoslav state in the 1990s (Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson 1994) ²

National Groups in Yugoslavia

Most of the people of the former Yugoslavia are ethnic Slavs While writers in the West often refer to them as if they were members of different ethnic groups, in fact most people have a common ancestry, speak the same language, and share in dress, food, and lifestyle a similar culture There are religious differences to be sure, but there is little evidence that religious differences per se provide a sufficient basis for differing nationalist claims (Ramet 1984*b*) In addition to Slavic peoples, there are non-Slavic peoples (e g , Gypsies and Jews) and other national groups within what were the borders of Yugoslavia These include Albanian Muslims in Kosovo and Macedonia, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Romani-

² Failed federalist strategies and economic crisis have similarly been identified as key precipitating factors in the eventual dissolution of the former Soviet Union (d’Encausse 1993)

ans in the Vojvodina, as well as several thousand Turks, Italians, Poles, Russians, Germans, and Ukrainians spread throughout the country (Petrović 1983)

The census in Yugoslavia asked persons to identify themselves with a particular nationality or group of national origin. The conventions followed by the census reflected the social consciousness of people in the former Yugoslavia. The vision of Yugoslavia as a multinational nation recognized foremost the historical experiences of groups of people who possessed distinct identities based only loosely on religious and other visible cultural manifestations but who saw themselves as having unique historical experiences that distinguished them from one another (Banac 1984, Cohen 1982, Warwick and Cohen 1985)

In the census, persons who indicated that they were "Yugoslavs" were described as having no nationality. The Communist party rejected the idea of the creation of a new Yugoslav nationality that would replace the historically formed nations of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The idea that these nations were just tribes that would provide the foundation of a new unified nationality had been preeminent during the period of the first Yugoslav state. During that period, however, such a vision was strongly discredited among non-Serbs as a cover for the formation of a Greater Serbia. The Communist party wanted to avoid repeating the instability of the first Yugoslavia, which was characterized by political conflict principally between Croats and Serbs. Tito and the communists were hoping that industrialization and modernization would erode old national divisions, but they had concrete historic evidence that any attempt to force Yugoslavism could provoke even greater instability. Their formula for the transition period was federalism, equal rights for all nations, and a vision that in the future, with the final ascension of communism and economic development, national affiliations would be eclipsed in importance.

In adopting a policy of legitimating national identifications, the Yugoslav communists were adopting a policy toward nationalities analogous to Stalin's famous slogan that in the first phase of socialism the class struggle should intensify in order to wither away later. The Yugoslav Communist party promoted the ideology that the national feelings should be allowed to develop to their full potential so that they would provide the foundation for later communist internationalism. The results of this policy were that Macedonians got full recognition of their nationhood only in communist Yugoslavia and that the national feelings of Bosnian Muslims were recognized for the first time in communist Yugoslavia.

The reluctance to recognize a Yugoslav national identification on an equal footing with other national identifications was reflected in the fact that in the census the Yugoslav national identification was subscribed

with the explanation, "having no identifiable nationality." In addition, an elaborate official vocabulary was introduced to describe nationality. *Narod* meant Slav nations having only Yugoslavia as their mother state. Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were such nations. *Narodnost* meant national minority. Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Italians, and others living in Yugoslavia but having some other mother state. Gypsies were included in this latter category. Commitment to the Yugoslav nation-state was identified through the concept of citizenship (*državljanstvo*). Thus, Croats, Serbs, other nations, and other national minorities were all Yugoslav citizens having separate national identities or belonging to some minority nationality but all having a commitment to the Yugoslav state.

Serbs made up 36.3% of the nearly 23 million people in Yugoslavia in 1981. The majority (59.8%) lived in Serbia proper, 16.2% lived in Bosnia, 6.5% lived in Croatia, and 16.2% lived in autonomous provinces that are now under Serbia's control: the Vojvodina (13.6%) and Kosovo (2.6%). Of the 1.3 million Muslims in Yugoslavia, 81.5% lived in Bosnia. Another 7.6% lived in Serbia proper. Slovenes were heavily concentrated in Slovenia: 97.7% of Yugoslavia's 1.7 million Slovenes lived in Slovenia in 1981. Of 4.5 million Croats, nearly four out of five (78%) lived in Croatia, 17.1% lived in Bosnia, and 3.4% lived in Serbia. Among the 1.3 million Albanians, 70.9% lived in Kosovo and 21.8% lived in Macedonia. Concentrated similarly to Slovenes in Slovenia, 95.5% of all Macedonians (1.2 million total) lived in Macedonia.

The Vojvodina and Bosnia were the most nationally heterogeneous regions of Yugoslavia, with no single nationality making up more than 54.4% (Serbs in the Vojvodina) and 39.5% (Muslims in Bosnia) of their populations, respectively. The most homogeneous regions were Slovenia, with Slovenes constituting more than 90% of the population, and Kosovo, where 90% of the population was estimated to be Albanian. Between these extremes were Montenegro, with 68.5% of the population identifying themselves as Montenegrin, Croatia, with three-fourths of the population being Croats, Macedonia, with two-thirds of the population being Macedonian, and Serbia proper, where 85% of the population identified themselves as Serbs (*Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije* 1987, p. 449).

The analysis below focuses on the structural factors that contributed to different levels of tolerance and intolerance among the many nationalities in the former Yugoslavia—many of which reflect the dramatic economic, social, and political transformations of socialist Yugoslavia in the post-World War II period. That people were willing and able to identify themselves in terms of nationality and the widespread belief that national intolerance was a significant factor precipitating the ongoing conflicts in

the former Yugoslavia makes an understanding of these factors doubly important

RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

In late 1989 and early 1990 the Consortium of Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia conducted door-to-door interviews in all the republics of Yugoslavia, utilizing a random sample of households. The completed sample was composed of 13,422 adults above the age of 18 and was distributed across republics in accord with their populations. The sampling design resulted in a disproportionate number of male respondents. The occupational, educational, and age distributions of the sample, however, closely approximate those reported in the 1981 census. To adjust the sample to be representative of the gender distribution of Yugoslavs above the age of 18, male respondents were weighted by a factor of 1.769133 and female respondents were weighted by a factor of 1.400747. This weighting is derived from the 1981 census of Yugoslavia and reproduces in the analysis sample the gender distribution reported in the census. The questionnaire asked over three hundred items, resulting in a wealth of data and allowing the construction of indices of national tolerance and religiosity.

National Tolerance

Respondents were asked their level of agreement on a five-point scale with six propositions concerning tolerance toward other nationalities: nationality should be a central factor in choosing a marriage partner, nationally mixed marriages are more unstable than other marriages, every nation should have its own state, people can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to their nation, among nations it is possible to create cooperation but not full trust, without leaders every nation is like a man without a head. All items had item-total correlations above .4 except the last item, which scaled badly (.61). 5% of respondents were grouped in the "strongly agree" category. Accordingly, this item was dropped from the scale. The remaining items were reverse scored so that high scores indicate greater tolerance. The resulting five-item scale has a reliability index of .72.

Explanatory Variables

Two ecological variables are utilized in the analysis: national diversity in each republic and percentage representation of national groups within

republics Modernization theory leads to the expectation that greater national diversity and national mixing in a republic will be associated with greater tolerance toward other groups National diversity is measured with the Index of Qualitative Variation (Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1988, p 76-77)

$$\text{Index of Qualitative Variation} = \frac{\left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^k p_i^2\right)}{(K - 1)/K},$$

where K = the number of categories and p = the proportion of cases in the i th category The index ranges from "1," indicating that the cases are spread evenly over the categories, to "0," indicating that all cases are in a single category The percentage representation of groups within republics taps the potential power base of each national group in a republic Group power is seen in the ethnic-competition model as a basis of group mobilization Each national group's power base in a republic is measured by the percentage representation of the group in the republic (Petrović 1983)

Four additional sets of characteristics are also expected to influence tolerance toward other nationalities demographic factors, social status, social participation, and religiosity Demographic factors include age, birth residence, current residence, and nationally mixed parentage and marriage Modernization theories of ethnic tolerance suggest that older people and rural residents are less tolerant, because young people and urban residents will be the ones most exposed to the forces of modernism (For a contrasting view based on the ethnic-competition model, see Olzak [1983], pp 367-68)

Respondents were asked if they had been born in a village, village center, town, town center, city, or regional center and were also asked a similar question about their current residence The modal birth residence was village with the median being between village center and town The modal current residence was also a village, but the percentage living in towns increased and the percentage living in cities increased dramatically, rivaling village as the modal category

Nationally mixed family structures are expected under modernization theory to lead to greater tolerance (Bonacich and Modell 1980) Nationally mixed parentage was ascertained by comparing the nationalities of respondents' parents Nationally mixed marriage was ascertained by comparing the nationality of a respondent with the nationality of his or her spouse Approximately 8% of respondents were the offspring of nationally mixed parentage and 8% were in nationally mixed marriages

Gender and marital status are included as controls, these are coded as binary variables (male = 1, married = 1)³ Approximately 71% of respondents were classified as married

Two aspects of social stratification, education and occupation, are central to modernization theory. More educated people and people in white-collar occupations are expected to be more tolerant under the modernization model. Education is coded as years of schooling completed and averages just over 10 years. Occupational position is coded as nine binary variables specifying the categories of professionals, managers, clerical workers, police, retail workers, industrial and construction workers, peasants, unemployed people, and retired people. According to ethnic-competition theory, people who are unemployed can be expected to have increased feelings of intolerance toward other national groups because of intensified competition for jobs. "Economic contraction in combination with high immigration flows raises levels of ethnic competition, which in turn increases rates of ethnic collective action" (Olzak 1992, p. 37)

Participation in political organizations and involvement in the broader society through reading the news are expected by modernization theory to increase the level of national tolerance and dilute allegiances built narrowly on ethnic solidarity. We use three sources of data on political involvement: membership in the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC), office holding in workplace organizations, and office holding in community organizations. Membership in the LYC was a widely dispersed status. Individuals who were members of the LYC did not necessarily hold elite positions and did not necessarily disproportionately enjoy the privileges such power might provide. Nevertheless, membership in the LYC can be expected to imply a greater commitment to explicitly articulated national goals, among which was tolerance for different nationalities and support for a pluralist, multinational state. The binary party membership variable is coded "yes = 1" for those who either report currently being members of the LYC or having been members in the past. About 34% of respondents reported either being in the LYC currently or having been members in the past.

The other two measures of political involvement are participation in political organizations in either the workplace or the community. Respondents were asked if they occupied an elected position at their workplace (yes = 1). Respondents were also asked if they held any elected positions in community organizations or if they were active in community organi-

³ Unmarried people currently cohabitating were also coded as married, under the assumption that their living arrangements would be more consequential for their attitudes of tolerance than the legal distinction between marriage and cohabitation.

zations (yes = 1) About 18% and 20% of respondents, respectively, reported active participation in work or community organizations

Literacy and newspaper reading provide greater contact with the world and are expected to increase national tolerance under the modernization theory of ethnic relations In addition, newspapers and television were directly under LYC control prior to 1989, and the explicit agenda of the party was to encourage tolerance among nationalities Other media such as radio and magazines were only slightly less controlled Regularly reading the news can thus be expected to increase national tolerance Respondents were asked whether they read the newspaper daily, weekly, monthly, or never (coded 4, 3, 2, or 1, respectively) Later in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify their three most common leisure activities Respondents could identify "reading news" as their most important leisure activity, their second most important, their third most important, or not at all important (coded 4, 3, 2, or 1, respectively) Responses to these two questions were summed to create a seven-point scale of reading the news with scores ranging from two to eight

Level of religiosity is seen as an important negative influence on tolerance by modernization theorists Five questions were asked about religiosity Respondents were asked to identify, on a three-point scale, their level of belief in God, in life after death, and in the idea that God created people Also, they were asked how often they attended religious services (never, monthly, weekly, or daily) and if their children attended religious schools All items scaled positively with item-total correlations above .4 The resulting five-item standardized scale has a reliability index of .86

RESULTS

Average tolerance levels are strongly differentiated between republics, ranging between 1.71 and 3.88 on a 5.00-point scale Republics and autonomous regions are listed in table 1 by descending order of tolerance People in Bosnia and the Vojvodina had the highest levels of tolerance The average level of tolerance in Serbia, the largest republic, was identical to the average for the country as a whole Croats were more tolerant than Serbs but less tolerant than those who live in the most tolerant republics of Bosnia and the Vojvodina Kosovo had the lowest average level of tolerance and is a true negative outlier in this regard

Average tolerance levels in the republics closely parallel the level of national diversity in each republic Bosnia and the Vojvodina, which have the highest average tolerance, also have the greatest national diversity Tolerance levels descend monotonically with declining diversity through the six most diverse republics Only Macedonia and Kosovo, the two least tolerant republics, deviate from this pattern In Macedonia

TABLE 1
TOLERANCE AND NATIONAL DIVERSITY BY REPUBLIC
YUGOSLAVIA, 1989

Republic	Tolerance	Diversity Index	N
Bosnia	3.88***	64	2,020
Vojvodina	3.83***	61	1,315
Croatia	3.63***	45	2,597
Montenegro	3.45***	45	909
Serbia	3.28	27	3,321
Slovenia	2.67***	19	1,299
Macedonia	2.53***	41	973
Kosovo	1.71***	39	988
Total			13,422
Average	3.28	42	

NOTE.—Statistical significance is measured by two-tailed *t*-tests, statistical tests for tolerance are based on contrasting the mean for each republic with the mean for all other republics

* $P \leq .05$

** $P \leq .01$

*** $P \leq .001$

and Kosovo diversity levels are only slightly below the average across republics. The strong association of diversity and tolerance supports a central tenet of modernization theory that argues that diversity and increased intergroup contact lead to greater tolerance.

Regression coefficients indicating the effects of the various structural variables on national tolerance are presented in table 2. Examination of these coefficients allows us to see which other structural variables beyond national diversity also have consequences for tolerance and the direction of their effects.

The two ecological variables measuring the national diversity of republics and the majority status of groups within republics are both significant determinants of tolerance. As noted above, national diversity leads to greater tolerance; this is the second largest standardized effect in the model. Majority status in a republic leads to less tolerance and this is the third largest standardized effect in the model. The finding that majority status increases intolerance provides support for the competition theory, which proposes that dominant groups may express more ethnic or national intolerance in order to legitimate their aspirations for dominance.

Age has a significant positive effect on tolerance. Older people are more tolerant than younger people. This finding is inconsistent with the view that the young are the carriers of the forces of modernization leading

TABLE 2

REGRESSION OF TOLERANCE ON NATIONAL COMPOSITION, DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL STATUS, PARTICIPATION, AND RELIGIOSITY VARIABLES YUGOSLAVIA, 1989

Independent Variable	Mean	SD	<i>b</i>	SE	β
National composition					
Diversity index	48	19	1 051***	050	19
Majority status	57 67	30 48	- 382***	034	- 11
Demographic variables					
Age	40 63	14 56	376***	085	05
Married	71	45	- 074***	020	- 03
Male	49	50	- 156***	018	- 07
Urbanism (origins)	2 30	1 62	- 004	006	- 01
Urbanism (current)	3 30	1 81	030***	006	05
Mixed parentage	08	28	102***	031	03
Mixed marriage	08	28	349***	033	09
Social status					
Education	10 07	3 96	008*	003	03
Professional	12	32	- 066	035	- 02
Manager	06	24	- 114**	043	- 03
Clerical	09	29	019	033	01
Police	01	11	076	073	01
Retail worker	10	29	108***	031	03
Industrial or construction worker	22	42	000		
Peasant	15	36	097**	031	03
Unemployed	12	32	- 285***	031	- 09
Retired	13	34	- 035	036	- 01
Social participation					
Communist party	34	45	025	022	01
Work organization	20	40	095***	024	04
Civic organization	18	38	058*	025	02
Reads news	4 56	1 30	- 027***	007	- 03
Religiosity					
Religiosity scale	00	1 00	- 309***	009	- 29
Constant			2 865***		
R^2			241***		

NOTE —Statistical significance is measured by two-tailed *t*-tests, industrial or construction worker serves as the reference category for estimating the regression coefficients for occupation, the regression coefficients and SEs for age and majority status have been multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation, *N* = 13,422

* $P \leq .05$

** $P \leq .01$

*** $P \leq .001$

to greater tolerance. Urban residents, however, are more tolerant than residents of villages and rural areas. There is no independent effect of rural or urban origins (as distinct from current residence). Nationally mixed parentage and marriages both tend to increase tolerance. Married people are less tolerant than unmarried people, and men are less tolerant than women.

The social status variables have fewer and weaker effects on tolerance than the national composition, demographic, social participation, or religiosity factors. Education increases tolerance, but it is significant at only the .05 level, which is not a strong finding in a sample of 13,422 cases. Industrial and construction workers serve as the baseline for evaluating occupational differences in tolerance, and many of the other occupations and positions cannot be statistically distinguished from industrial and construction workers. Retail workers and peasants are somewhat more tolerant than industrial and construction workers, but managers are less tolerant. The strongest contrast in average tolerance levels across social positions is for unemployed persons, who evidence high levels of intolerance for other national groups. The average tolerance level of unemployed persons is more than a quarter of a point lower than that of employed industrial and construction workers. This finding provides additional support for the ethnic-competition model.

Three of the four social participation variables have significant effects on tolerance. Participation in a civic or workplace organization increases tolerance, as suggested by modernization theory. Being in the Communist party, however, has no effect, either positive or negative, on tolerance. This finding contrasts strongly with official party rhetoric at the federal level and highlights the importance of nationalist sentiments and leaders in republic-level party politics in the period immediately prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Reading the news regularly has a negative effect on tolerance. This effect again suggests the extent to which the control of key institutions at the republican level was held by those sympathetic to nationalist sentiments prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Religiosity has the largest standardized effect on tolerance. Every standard deviation increase on the religiosity scale is associated with a decline of almost one-third of a point in tolerance. The powerful negative effect of religiosity on tolerance provides strong support for the modernization hypothesis that traditional religious beliefs provide a supportive ideological base for national and ethnic intolerance.

The patterns of tolerance between the major nationalities within republics are reported in table 3. These coefficients allow us to examine the patterns of tolerance and intolerance for the major national groups within each republic. The tolerance levels reported in table 3 are stan-

TABLE 3

ADJUSTED TOLERANCE LEVELS BY MAJORITY/MINORITY STATUS WITHIN REPUBLICS
YUGOSLAVIA, 1989

Republic	Majority Group	Principal Minority Group
Bosnia	3 88 (Muslims)	3 82 (Serbs)
Vojvodina	3 65* (Serbs)	3 86 (Hungarians)
Croatia	3 60*** (Croats)	3 93 (Serbs)
Montenegro	3 32 (Montenegrins)	3 40 (Muslims)
Serbia	3 24 (Serbs)	3 39 (Muslims)
Slovenia	2 71*** (Slovenes)	3 33 (Croats)
Macedonia	2 61*** (Macedonians)	1 84 (Albanians)
Kosovo	1 79* (Albanians)	1 99 (Serbs)

NOTE — Statistical significance is measured by two-tailed *t*-tests, tolerance levels are adjusted for the demographic, social status, social participation, and religiosity characteristics analyzed in table 2, tests for majority vs minority differences in tolerance contrast these groups within each republic, $N = 13,422$

* $P \leq .05$

** $P \leq .01$

*** $P \leq .001$

dardized on the variables presented in table 2 with the exception of the two national composition variables. In other words, the adjusted tolerance levels reported in table 3 represent the differences that would exist if respondents of different nationality from each republic were identical in terms of demographics, social status characteristics, level of political participation, and religiosity. Remaining republic-level differences in tolerance are manifest in table 3 as differences between rows. Differences in tolerance between the majority group and the principal minority group in a republic that remain after standardization are revealed by differences between the two columns. Republics are listed in the same order as in table 1, from highest to lowest based on unadjusted mean levels of tolerance. Tests of statistical significance reported in table 3 evaluate the differences in average tolerance level between the majority group and the principal minority group in each republic.

The pattern of tolerance levels in table 3 indicates that the majority group in a republic is generally less tolerant than the principal minority group even after standardizing on population characteristics. This pattern is significant for the Vojvodina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Kosovo. The minority group is significantly more intolerant than the majority national group only in Macedonia, where the principal minority group is Albanian. Albanians, whether in Kosovo, where they are the majority, or in Macedonia, where they are the principal minority, have the greatest intolerance toward other groups of any national group in the former Yugoslavia.

Consistent with the overall pattern, Serbs are more tolerant as a minority group in Bosnia and Croatia than they are in Serbia, where they are a strong majority. In Kosovo, however, the Serb minority is less tolerant than Serbs living as the majority group in Serbia. In Kosovo, it appears that the extremely high level of intolerance pulls all groups toward greater intolerance and overrides the general pattern of national groups being less tolerant as majorities than as minorities. In this highly volatile republic, the average tolerance level of Serbs, the largest minority group, drops more than a point below its level in Serbia and almost two points below its level in Croatia. A pattern similar to that in Kosovo exists for Croats in Croatia and Slovenia. Minority Croats in Slovenia are more tolerant than majority Slovenians, but less tolerant than Croats in their home republic of Croatia, which is more nationally diverse and tolerant. The most tolerant groups are Muslims in nationally diverse Bosnia and the Serb and Hungarian minorities in the ethnically diverse republics of Bosnia, the Vojvodina, and Croatia. Slovenia, Macedonia, and Kosovo, in which a single nationality composes more than 90% of the population, evidence the highest levels of intolerance even after standardization on population characteristics.

Tolerance is affected by the characteristics of individuals, as we have seen in table 2, but not to such an extent that the patterns of differences between republics or between majority and minority national groups in republics are erased. These patterns reaffirm the findings from table 2 that the national diversity of republics and the majority or minority status of national groups within republics are powerful influences on tolerance toward other nationalities. Even adjusted patterns of tolerance continue to be strongly differentiated by republic of residence and by nationality within republics, with average levels of tolerance sometimes differing by a point or more between republics or nationalities. Tolerance is greater in nationally diverse republics than in more homogeneous republics. The contrasts between majority and minority groups within republics are also substantial though not generally as large as those between republics.

Beyond the differences in tolerance levels evidenced in table 3 that are driven by republic-level differences in national diversity and majority or minority status differences, there are some notable differences between nationalities and republics that can only be explained by historical and cultural factors. High levels of intolerance in Kosovo are most notable in this regard and reflect a long history of unresolved rivalries between nationalities. Chronic low-level conflict between Serbs and Albanians has been the rule in Kosovo for decades, exacerbated by the emigration of several thousand Serbs in the 1980s and by Serbia's suspension of autonomous-region status in both Kosovo and the Vojvodina in 1989. The patterns in table 3 thus illustrate not only the powerful effects of national

diversity and majority or minority status in republics but also unique historical and cultural factors

DISCUSSION

Both the modernization and ethnic-competition models of ethnic relations receive support from the above analysis. Support for the role of modernization in generating greater national tolerance is provided by the powerful effects of national diversity, urbanism, nationally mixed family structures, and participation in formal organizations at the civic and workplace levels. The strong association of religiosity with intolerance also supports a key tenet of modernization theory that identifies religious traditionalism with ethnic intolerance.

The effects of social status characteristics provide less support for either modernization theory or ethnic-competition theory. Education has only a modest dampening effect on intolerance. And occupational differences in tolerance are remarkably flat. Intermarriage, urbanism, social participation, and the decline of religiosity are all more important for generating greater tolerance than the effects of industrialization on the mix of occupational positions. The prediction from modernization theory is that industrialization and its associated occupational transformations imparts greater universalism and acceptance of ethnic and national differences. It appears that the general effects of modernization on intermarriage and social participation are more important in generating increased tolerance than the effects of industrialization on education and the occupational structure. Investigators within the ethnic-competition perspective have also suggested that industrialization impels individuals into more rationally governed institutional contexts, which can enhance and generalize competition and, thus, increase intolerance (Dutch and Gibson 1992, Nielsen 1980, Olzak 1983, p. 362, 1992, Pinar and Hamilton 1978). The limited nature of occupational and educational effects thus fails to support either the modernization or ethnic-competition theories insofar as they envision a strong role of industrial transformation in determining levels of intergroup tolerance.

Two factors in our model of national tolerance have effects inconsistent with the modernization theory of ethnic relations. Young people and those who read the news more frequently are less tolerant toward other nationalities. These effects may be unique to Yugoslavia, where relatively autonomous Communist parties controlled the mass media in each republic and where the older generations carried the dream of a unified Yugoslav state.

The strong association of unemployment with intolerance provides support for that aspect of the ethnic-competition model that rests on a

vision of competition over scarce economic resources. The ethnic-competition theory of ethnic relations is also supported by the negative effect of majority status in a republic. The base of support provided by numeric dominance in a republic appears to have encouraged the growth of intolerance toward minority national groups (Enloe 1973, Roosens 1989, Young 1976). Numeric dominance may have been especially important in Yugoslavia, where political power was the chief resource over which groups struggled (Stanovčić 1988, Tudjman 1981). The association of newspaper reading with intolerance also supports the idea that intolerance toward other groups was fueled by local and regional political elites who controlled information and sought to cultivate and exploit sentiments of intolerance. These results raise questions about Belanger and Pinard's (1991, p. 447) conclusion that the accumulated "evidence for the presumed modernization/ethnic movement link is not strong."

CONCLUSIONS

Developments in Yugoslavia subsequent to the winter of 1989–90, when the survey data for our analysis were collected, allow some important questions to be asked about intolerance and the eventual outbreak of armed conflict. The implicit hypothesis underlying popular views of the fighting in the former Yugoslavia is that where nationalist intolerance is greatest conflict will be highest. This view would be supported if there was a close correspondence between these two phenomena. Such a correspondence would provide support for the theory that the resurgence of suppressed nationalist hatreds lies behind current conflicts. The above findings suggest, however, that there is little such correspondence. Intolerance was high in relatively homogeneous Slovenia, which seceded from Yugoslavia with a minimum of conflict. Ironically, in Croatia, where tolerance was greater, conflict was much more intense. And conflict has been most brutal and prolonged in Bosnia, where tolerance was at its highest level.

Tolerance and armed conflict appear to be quite distinct phenomena, and they appear to have distinct patterns of causation. What then is their relationship and what have we learned from the above analysis about their causes? One possible explanation for observed patterns of tolerance and conflict that is consistent with the data is that heterogeneity leads to *both* tolerance and conflict (cf. Hechter 1987, Olzak and Nagel 1986). Heterogeneity provides the conditions fostering increased tolerance among individuals of diverse nationality through increased contact, but it also creates the conditions under which different national groups engage in competition over scarce resources. In heterogeneous settings national groupings can provide an organizational basis for mobilization.

Elites may find such situations conducive to mobilizing efforts in pursuit of ends that come to be defined in national terms (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993, Ragin 1979). These mobilized national groups may pursue these ends through armed conflict, attacking even those against whom they initially bear only limited animosities. Conversely, homogeneity appears to lead to greater intolerance but a lower likelihood of open conflict. Minorities may suffer prejudice and discrimination in such settings—as is suggested by the high levels of intolerance observed in the more homogeneous republics of the former Yugoslavia. But the preconditions for armed conflict are less present in more homogeneous settings—one group is clearly dominant and armed conflict to adjudicate this situation is unlikely. It is a great irony that some of the factors that most foster tolerance—such as the national diversity of regions and national intermarriage—are objects of attack under policies of ethnic cleansing.

Yugoslavian state policies of modernization and controlled nationalism may have led to greater tolerance, but they also set the stage for the mobilization of groups around nationality, especially within nationally diverse and highly autonomous republics. The policy of multinationalism promoted by the LYC gave salience to national identities. The economic crisis of the 1980s and the decline of federal Communist party influence gave new life to political appeals based on nationality. In the absence of other forms of political cohesion, nationalism appears to be the most readily available unifying doctrine in much of Eastern Europe at the end of socialist formations.

The dilemma facing the citizens and leaders of the former socialist nations, as well as significant other parts of the world, is how to realize the benefits that modernization provides for increasing intergroup tolerance while avoiding the potential it creates for heightened ethnic and national conflict. Many of the changes associated with modernization lead to greater tolerance. Other aspects of modernism, however, create the potential for heightened intergroup competition and conflict over scarce economic and political resources. These contradictory consequences of modernism, rather than primordial hatreds, appear to be at the root of current conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Bosnia enjoyed the highest level of tolerance of any Yugoslav republic, but this increased tolerance proved insufficient to outweigh the political forces emanating from its extremely diverse social fabric.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, Syed Nesar. 1991. *Origins of Muslim Consciousness in India*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood.

- Allport, Gordon 1958 *The Nature of Prejudice* New York Doubleday
- Banac, Ivo 1984 *The National Question in Yugoslavia* Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press
- Barth, Fredrik 1969 Introduction to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, edited by Fredrik Barth Boston Little, Brown
- Belanger, Sarah, and Maurice Pinard 1991 "Ethnic Movements and the Competition Model Some Missing Links" *American Sociological Review* 56 (4) 446-57
- Bičanić, Ivo 1988 "The Fractured Economy" Pp 120-42 in *Yugoslavia A Fractured Federalism*, edited by Dennison Rusinow Washington, D C Wilson Center Press
- Bilandžić, Dušan 1985 *Historija Socijalističke Federativne Jugoslavije* (The history of the Yugoslav Socialist Federation) Zagreb Školska Knjiga
- Bohrnstedt, George W, and David Knoke 1988 *Statistics for Social Data Analysis*, 2d ed Itasca, Ill F E Peacock
- Bonacich, Edna 1972 "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism The Split Labor Market" *American Sociological Review* 37 547-59
- Bonacich, Edna, and J Modell 1980 *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity Small Business in the Japanese American Community* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Brass, Paul 1985 "Ethnic Groups and the State" Pp 1-57 in *Ethnic Groups and the State*, edited by Paul Brass Totowa, N J Barnes & Noble
- Burg, Steven L 1983 *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- 1988 "Political Structures" Pp 9-22 in *Yugoslavia A Fractured Federalism*, edited by Dennison Rusinow Washington, D C Wilson Center Press
- Burkett, John P 1983 *The Effects of Economic Reform in Yugoslavia* Berkeley Institute of International Studies, University of California
- Cohen, Lenard 1982 "Balkan Consociationalism Ethnic Representation and Ethnic Distance in Yugoslav Elites" Pp 29-62 in *At the Brink of War and Peace The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective*, edited by Wayne S Vucinich New York Brooklyn College Press
- Connor, Walter 1984 *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- d'Encausse, Helene Carrere 1993 *The End of the Soviet Empire*, translated by Franklin Philip New York Basic
- Denitch, Bogdan 1976 *Legitimation of a Revolution The Yugoslav Case* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- 1990 *Limits and Possibilities* Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press
- Deutsch, Karl W 1966 *Nationalism and Social Communication* Cambridge, Mass MIT Press
- Dobbs, Michael 1991 "The Eruption of Eastern Europe" *Washington Post* (November 18-24), national weekly edition, pp 6-9
- Drew, Elizabeth 1992 "Letter from Washington" *New Yorker* 68 (July 6) 70-75
- Dutch, Raymond M, and James L Gibson 1992 "'Putting up with' Fascists in Western Europe A Comparative Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance" *Western Political Quarterly* 45 (1) 237-74
- Enloe, Cynthia 1973 *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* Boston Little, Brown
- Glenny, Misha 1992 *The Fall of Yugoslavia* New York Penguin
- Hannan, Michael T 1979 "The Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries in Modern States" Pp 253-75 in *National Development and the World System*, edited by J W Meyer and Michael T Hannan Chicago University of Chicago Press
- Hechter, Michael 1976 "Ethnicity and Industrialization On the Proliferation of the Cultural Division of Labor" *Ethnicity* 3 214-24

- 1978 "Group Formation and the Cultural Division of Labor" *American Journal of Sociology* 84 (2) 293–318
- 1987 *Principles of Group Solidarity* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Isaacs, Harold 1975 "Basic Group Identity" Pp 29–52 in *Ethnicity Theory and Experience*, edited by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Nathan Glazer Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Jackman, Robert 1978 "The Predictability of Coups d'Etat" *American Political Science Review* 72 1262–75
- Jenkins, J Craig, and Augustine Kposowa 1990 "Explaining Military Coups d'Etat Black Africa, 1957–84" *American Sociological Review* 55 861–75
- Kardelj, Edvard 1960 *Razvoj Slovenačkog Nacionalnog Pitanga* Belgrade Kultura
- Korpi, Walter 1974 "Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation" *American Political Science Review* 68 1569–78
- Kourvetaris, George A 1993 "Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans Causes and Implications of the Disintegration of Yugoslavia" Paper presented at the American Sociological Association meeting, Miami
- Kposowa, Augustine J, and J Craig Jenkins 1993 "The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957–1984" *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1) 126–63
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan 1967 "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments" Pp 1–64 in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, edited by Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan New York Free Press
- Lydall, Harold 1989 *Yugoslavia in Crisis* London Clarendon Press
- Magaš, Branka 1989 "Yugoslavia The Spectre of Balkanization" *New Left Review* 174 3–31
- Massey, Garth, Randy Hodson, and Duško Sekulić 1992 "Political Affiliation and Social Mobility in Socialist Yugoslavia" Pp 223–58 in *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, vol 11 Edited by Robert Althausser and Michael Wallace Greenwich, Conn JAI Press
- McKay, William F, and Albert Verdoodt, eds 1975 *The Multinational Society* Rowley, Mass Newbury House
- Meadwell, Hudson 1989 "Ethnic Nationalism and Collective Choice Theory" *Comparative Political Studies* 22 (July) 139–54
- Nagel, Joane 1986 "The Political Construction of Ethnicity" Pp 93–112 in *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, edited by Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel Orlando, Fla Academic Press
- Nielsen, François 1980 "The Flemish Movement in Belgium after World War II A Dynamic Analysis" *American Sociological Review* 45 (1) 76–94
- 1985 "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies" *American Sociological Review* 50 (2) 133–49
- Olzak, Susan 1983 "Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization" Pp 355–74 in *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol 9 Edited by Ralph H Turner and James F Short Palo Alto, Calif Annual Reviews
- 1992 *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Olzak, Susan, and Joane Nagel 1986 Introduction to *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, edited by Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel Orlando, Fla Academic Press
- Petrović, Ruža 1983 "The National Composition of the Population" *Yugoslav Survey* 24 (August 3) 21–34
- Pfaff, William 1992 "The Absence of Empire" *New Yorker* 68 (August 10) 59–69
- Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton 1978 "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 11 (December) 739–75

- Ragin, Charles 1979 "Ethnic Political Mobilization The Welsh Case " *American Sociological Review* 44 (4) 619-35
- Ramet, Pedro 1982 "Self-Management, Titoism and the Apotheosis of Praxis " Pp 169-94 in *At the Brink of War and Peace The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective*, edited by Wayne S Vucinich New York Brooklyn College Press
- 1984a *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983* Bloomington Indiana University Press
- 1984b "Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslavia " Pp 144-69 in *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics*, edited by Pedro Ramet Durham, N C Duke University Press
- Rogowski, Ronald 1985 "Causes and Varieties of Nationalism A Rationalist Account " Pp 87-108 in *New Nationalism of the Developed West*, edited by Edward A Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski London Allen & Unwin
- Roosens, Eugene 1989 *Creating Ethnicity* Beverly Hills, Calif Sage
- Rusinow, Dennison 1977 *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1977* Berkeley University of California Press
- 1985 "Nationalities Policy and the 'National Question' " Pp 131-65 in *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, edited by Pedro Ramet Boulder, Colo Westview Press
- Schmerhorn, R A 1970 *Comparative Ethnic Relations* New York Random House
- Schrenk, Martin, Cyrus Ardalan, and Nawal A el Tatawy 1979 *Yugoslavia Self-management, Socialism, and the Challenges of Development* Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
- Sekulić, Duško, Garth Massey, and Randy Hodson 1994 "Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia " *American Sociological Review* 59 (February) 83-97
- Seton-Watson, Hugh 1977 *Nations and States* London Methuen
- Shoup, Paul 1968 *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* New York Columbia University Press
- Smith, Anthony D 1979 "Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separatism " *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (January) 21-37
- 1981 "War and Ethnicity The Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self-Images and Cohesion of Ethnic Communities " *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4 (October) 375-97
- Stanovčić, Vojislav 1988 "History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts " Pp 23-40 in *Yugoslavia A Fractured Federalism*, edited by Dennison Rusinow Washington, D C Wilson Center Press
- Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije* (Statistical yearbook of Yugoslavia) 1987 Belgrade Savezni Zavod za Statistiku
- Suny, Ronald 1990 "Revenge of the Past Socialism and Ethnic Conflict in Transcaucasia " *New Left Review* 184 (November-December) 5-34
- Tudjman, Franjo 1981 *Nationalism in Comparative Perspective* New York Columbia University Press
- Tyson, Laura D'Andrea 1980 *The Yugoslav Economic System and Its Performance in the 1970s* Berkeley Institute of International Studies, University of California
- Voirst, Milton 1991 "The Yugoslav Idea " *New Yorker* 67 (March 18) 58-79
- Warwick, Paul V , and Lenard J Cohen 1985 "The Institutional Management of Cultural Diversity An Analysis of the Yugoslav Experience " Pp 160-201 in *Ethnic Groups and the State*, edited by Paul Brass Totowa, N J Barnes & Noble
- Young, Crawford 1976 *The Politics of Political Pluralism* Madison University of Wisconsin Press

The Social Origins of Agrarian Change in Late Medieval England¹

Rosemary L. Hopcroft
Kent State University

Agrarian change in late medieval England (about 1300–1500) was an important precursor of the agricultural revolution of later centuries. Recent historical scholarship shows pronounced regional differences in agrarian change during this period. This article uses both historical evidence and the results of a multivariate analysis to criticize various explanations of regional differences in agrarian change. Neither population density, nor ecology, nor access to markets, nor class relations can adequately explain the regional pattern. A crucial factor shaping the regional pattern of agrarian change was the local social organization of production (or the “field system”).

The agricultural revolution in England was an important component of “the rise of the west.” The release of workers from agriculture and the rising standard of living created by an increasingly productive agricultural sector were crucial to both industrialization and the development of democracy (Marx 1906, Moore 1966, Jones 1968, 1988, Wrigley 1985, 1988, Beckett 1990, p. 67). The agricultural revolution occurred in the 17th and 18th centuries, yet it depended on changes in rural society that began in the late medieval period (i.e., the 14th–16th centuries). These changes included the use of new agricultural techniques, the consolidation and enclosure of farms, the emergence of contractual landholding arrangements, the change toward larger farms worked with wage labor, and the emergence of the “yeoman” or substantial small farmer. These

¹ Earlier versions of this article were presented at a colloquium of the Center for Comparative Research in History, Society, and Culture, University of California, Davis, 1992, and at the annual meetings of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, 1992. The research for this paper was supported in part by an Eileen Power Studentship from the London School of Economics and a University of Washington Graduate School Western Europe Travel grant. I would like to thank Pierre L. van den Bergh, Edgar Kiser, Robert Stacey, Joseph Whitmeyer, John R. Hall, Herbert Costner, Bruce Campbell, A. R. H. Baker, Margaret Levi, and the reviewers for helpful comments, Jack Goldstone, Victor Nee, and Elinor Ostrom for encouragement, Rodney Stark for providing the Microcase software, and the late George Homans, whose early work on medieval England inspired this research. Direct all correspondence to Rosemary L. Hopcroft, Department of Sociology, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio 44242.

changes paved the way for the later agricultural revolution and helped the English rural sector better respond to the developing commercial incentives and population growth of later centuries. There were no more famines in England after about 1600, and the crises of the 17th century were less severe in England than they were in continental countries such as France (Goubert 1986, Brenner 1989, p. 50).

The changes in rural society in the late medieval period in England are the focus of this article. Recent historical scholarship has revealed evidence of regional differences in agrarian change within England during this time. Some regions saw all the changes mentioned above at an early date, while other regions lagged conspicuously behind. In the east the counties at the forefront of change were Kent, Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, in the southwest they were the counties of Devon, Cornwall, and Somerset. Understanding why these regional differences existed can help us better understand why and how agrarian change occurred in England.

Previous scholars have explained regional differences in agrarian change in England in the following ways. Goldstone (1988) focuses on the early modern period, but as much the same regional differences existed in the earlier period, his argument should apply to them, too. He suggests that regional differences in agrarian change were a product of regional differences in modes of production that, in turn, could be explained by the local ecology. In particular, Goldstone suggests that the innovative areas were the less densely populated pastoral areas, fortuitously located near major markets. In this article I show how Goldstone's explanation is not correct. Regional differences in agrarian change in late medieval England were primarily due to regional differences in the social organization of production, not to differences in local ecology or agricultural specialization.

Brenner (1985*a*, 1985*b*, 1986) suggests that the most important factor determining agrarian change was the nature of rural class relations. According to Brenner, the transition to commercialized agriculture and associated agrarian change occurred in England and not in France because small peasant proprietors in England were in a relatively weak position vis-à-vis the manorial lords and had a less secure hold over the land than their counterparts in France. That is, while weak peasant property rights promoted the commercialization of agriculture and agrarian change in England, more secure peasant property rights served to maintain subsistence farming in France. Applied to regional differences within England itself, Brenner's argument suggests that agrarian change should have occurred first in regions where small peasant proprietors had the weakest property rights and were in a relatively powerless position compared to the manorial lords. In this article I use historical evidence to show that

within England the opposite was true. It was in regions where small peasant proprietors had the strongest hold over the land, and where the power of the local manorial officials over the peasantry was weakest, that commercial agriculture first developed and agrarian change first occurred.

In this article I present both qualitative and quantitative evidence that, rather than ecology or class relations (as Brenner specifies them), a crucial component of regional differences in agrarian change in late medieval England was regional differences in the social organization of production at the local level (often referred to as the "field system"). Regional variations in field systems played an important, but hitherto largely overlooked, role in English agrarian change. These regional differences in field systems cannot themselves be fully explained by factors such as population or ecology; rather, they emerged from historical processes hidden in the early Middle Ages of Europe.

In brief, I contend that the precocity of agricultural development and agrarian change in the east and southwest of late medieval England was a product of a fortuitous conjuncture of factors in those regions during that period. These factors included a social organization of agriculture, or the field system, that did not inhibit the private disposition of property and that was characterized by more private property in land, relatively weak manorial overlordship, and a lack of strong village communal traditions. Such field systems I refer to as "irregular open field systems" and "systems of enclosures." This social organization of agriculture, when combined with a somewhat favorable location, a reduced level of population density after the mid-14th century, and the development of markets for agricultural produce over the period from the 14th to the 16th centuries, helped create the necessary conditions for rapid agricultural development and agrarian change in those regions. Significantly, these same regions were at the forefront of the agricultural revolution of later centuries.²

In what follows I first discuss the recent historical evidence of regional differences in agricultural development and agrarian change in late medieval England. Next I discuss and critique previous explanations of re-

² This description of contributing factors does not approximate a complete model of agrarian change. Indeed, my evidence suggests that such a complete model may be unattainable, as a complex array of historically specific factors produced agrarian change in England. Instead of trying to compile an exhaustive list of all the relevant factors and the causal relationships among them, I use the regional analysis as a means of "holding constant" the various factors common to all England at that time—e.g., same historical time period, same central government, similar language, general culture and history, broadly similar climate and ecology, etc.—in order to demonstrate the crucial role played by different rural social arrangements in agrarian change.

gional differences in agrarian change. These include the ecology and class relations arguments as well as other arguments that stress the importance of market access and population density. Last, I show how differences in the social organization of agriculture at the local level shaped the regional pattern of agrarian change in late medieval England. I use both historical evidence and a multivariate quantitative analysis to make my case.

THE REGIONAL PATTERN OF AGRARIAN CHANGE IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

Recent historical scholarship clearly shows the regional path of agricultural development and agrarian change in late medieval England. Studies of late medieval Kent and East Anglia on the eastern seaboard, as well as studies examining the southwest, show the relative dynamism of the rural economy in these parts of the country in the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries. In the late 13th century, yields per acre in eastern and southeastern England were higher than in most other areas of the country, attaining 20 bushels per acre for wheat.³ Yields per seed were also exceptionally high by medieval standards and could reach 7:1 (and higher) for wheat (Campbell 1983, 1988, 1991, Stacey 1986, Mate 1986, Britnell 1991, p. 206, Mate 1991, p. 277). In the southwest yields per acre were less outstanding than in the east, but yield ratios were good by standards of other parts of the country. In addition, there is evidence of both progressive agricultural methods and general prosperity in this region by the 15th century (Finberg 1951, Fox 1991, pp. 308, 313).

These high levels of agricultural productivity were accomplished by many of the same methods that in later centuries helped produce the agricultural revolution. They included the extensive use of leguminous plants (mostly peas), multiple plowings, the use of the horse rather than the ox, intensive soil fertilization and liming, and complex crop rotations that left a smaller proportion of land fallow each year. All were in evidence as early as the 13th century in parts of East Anglia and Kent (Stone 1956, p. 347, Langdon 1986, Hallam 1981, Mate 1986, 1991, Stacey 1986, Britnell 1991). There is also evidence of the early use of convertible husbandry, which utilizes some of these methods, in Devon in the southwest by the early 15th century (Finberg 1951, Fox 1991, p. 313).

Many of these innovative methods went out of service in the demographic and economic depression of the late 14th century, yet most were

³ Such high yields were not attained again until the early 18th century in East Anglia (Campbell 1991, p. 179).

revived in the same regions in the 15th century. Other innovative methods were pioneered in these regions in later centuries, particularly in eastern England. For example, turnips were first introduced in East Anglia (i.e., Norfolk and Suffolk) in the 16th century (Chambers and Mingay 1966, Overton 1991), while clover appeared there first in the 17th century (Overton 1991, p. 320). Labor productivity was also high in East Anglia as early as the 16th century, where the custom was for laborers and plowmen to work two "journes" (half days) per day rather than one, as was customary elsewhere (Riches 1967). By the 18th century Norfolk was renowned for its agriculture and was described as the "model agricultural economy" in Diderot's *Encyclopedia* (Braudel 1982, p. 281, see also Turner 1982).

Associated with the introduction of these new agricultural practices were changes in tenurial arrangements in both the east and the southwest in the late medieval period. Wage labor was used on all the great estates in the east by the 13th century, while in other areas the use of customary labor services persisted (Campbell 1983). The use of wage labor was also in evidence in the southwest by the 15th century (Fox 1991). For customary tenants in the east, copyhold tenure was firmly established by 1450 (Britnell 1991).⁴ The establishment of copyhold tenure reflected a change toward a more contractual, rather than a customary, relationship between a lord and his tenants. In addition, true villenage (involving labor services in addition to customary dues and payments to the manorial lord) disappeared very early in most of the east and the southwest.

In both the east and southwest, enclosure of common and common land usually occurred at a very early date and with little complaint (Leonard 1962, p. 251, Thirsk 1967, Britnell 1991, p. 613, Fox 1991, p. 152). This regional difference in enclosure was noticed by a writer in 1549 (who also noted the relative wealth of the enclosed areas): "We se that countries where most Inclosures be, are most wealthie, as essex, kent, devenshire and such" (quoted in Homans [1941], p. 15). This author went on to further name counties of the east and west. All of these areas were little affected by the parliamentary enclosures of later centuries (Leonard 1962, Wordie 1983). In these regions enclosure of land was often accompanied by the consolidation of farms, that is, the putting together of many smaller pieces of land to create a larger, more compact farm (Campbell 1980, p. 190).

In fact, large farms grew quickly in both the southwest and the east after 1350. For example, in Devon and Cornwall in the southwest, tenant

⁴ Copyhold tenure means that the peasants have from the lord of the manor a written copy of the terms (as entered in the manorial court roll) on which their land is held.

farms increased in size during the 15th century until more than half of all tenant holdings were over 36 acres. Tenant farms of 150–200 acres have been documented in the area by the mid-15th century.⁵ In addition, figures from various manors in Devon and Cornwall consistently show a decline in the number of holdings of less than 15 acres (to as few as 10% of all holdings), and there were very few holdings of less than five acres (Fox 1991, pp. 724, 725). Likewise, tenant farms increased in size in Norfolk (Campbell 1984, p. 125) and Kent (Fourquin 1990) and could reach several hundred acres in size, although large numbers of very small farms of less than five acres remained in these areas. Other regions saw an increase in the size of tenant farms, but to a lesser extent. For example, tenant farms in the Midlands and in central England often increased in size to 30 or 60 acres, but they rarely exceeded 100 acres (Tawney 1912, pp. 64–65, Kerridge 1968, p. 289, Miller 1991, pp. 703, 706, 712). In addition, in these areas enclosure was less common, and tenant farms were rarely consolidated into compact units. Enclosure and consolidation were much more common in the east and southwest.

Partly because of their agricultural productivity, both the east and the southwest of England were very prosperous areas of 15th-century England. In addition to agriculture, this prosperity was sustained by flourishing textile industries, as well as a large variety of nonagricultural occupations, for example, brewing, salt making, fishing, shipping, tanning, baking, carpentry, and tiling (Campbell 1984, Mate 1991). In the southwestern counties of Devon and Cornwall there was also tin mining (Fox 1991). The existence of large numbers of people in such nonagricultural occupations demonstrates the ability of the agricultural sector in these areas to support them. These regions of the east and southwest saw the highest rates of growth of lay wealth over the period from the 14th to the 16th century, as figure 1 shows.

It should be noted that the agricultural innovations of the late medieval period were primarily changes in crops and cropping practices rather than labor-saving innovations. That is, during this period increased agricultural production was primarily due to the increasing productivity of land, rather than an increase in the productivity of labor. All the new practices required more labor input than more traditional agricultural practices required. For example, growing legumes or grasses on the fallow field required more effort than leaving the fallow with no crop at all. Thus, the increased agricultural productivity in some regions of England was primarily a result of increased effort and investment in agricul-

⁵ Tenants could be free peasants or otherwise. These tenant farms should not be confused with the home farms, or demesnes, of the manorial lords. Demesnes tended to shrink in size after 1350.




FIG 1 —Rates of growth of lay wealth, 1334–1515 (Schofield 1965)

ture by cultivators and landlords in these regions and was not a result of mechanical or labor-saving innovation

So we have two questions. First, why were cultivators and landlords in both the east and southwest of England motivated to increase their (relative) efforts and investments in order to increase the productivity of agriculture? Second, why did changes such as the use of wage labor and the consolidation and enclosure of farms occur so early and with little resistance in these regions but not in others?

EXPLAINING REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

Population Density

A high population density may have provided the motivation for increased effort and investment in agriculture in the east and the southwest (Boserup 1965). More mouths to feed means the land must produce more. Population density may also have stimulated the changes in the structure of landholding, as it may have provided incentives for farmers to find more efficient ways of farming the land.

This argument holds up best in the eastern parts of England. This region was the most densely populated in late medieval England and remained so throughout the period considered here (Russell 1948, Campbell 1984, Britnell 1991, p. 611).⁶ A dense population promoted the intensive agricultural methods noted in parts of eastern England as early as the 13th century. Population decline can also explain why many of the innovative methods documented in the late 13th century in these regions went out of service after the calamities of the middle of the 14th century.

However, the population density argument does not adequately explain the continuing regional differences in prosperity after the demographic crisis of the 14th century. The east continued to have the most prosperous rural economy in England, even after population pressure was greatly reduced in the late 14th and early 15th centuries (Mate 1991, Britnell 1991). Most of the tenurial and structural changes in rural society I have discussed—for example, the change toward contractual tenures and the emergence of large, consolidated and enclosed farms—occurred after the population decline of the 14th century. In fact, it was population decline that made these important changes possible, as it improved the bargaining power of workers and made more land available for enterprising farmers.

Nor can population levels explain the case of the southwest. The southwestern counties had comparatively low population densities throughout the late medieval period, yet still were home to a more prosperous economy than that found in some other more densely populated regions of England (such as the Midlands). As in the east, this comparative prosperity continued after the demographic decline of the mid-14th century. Also as in the east, the drop in population levels promoted rapid changes in the nature of landholding and the creation and consolidation of larger farms. Yet this effect of population decline was not the same across

⁶ This correlation of high population and agricultural productivity in the east also calls into question Goldstone's more recent argument (1991) that high population levels are the leading cause of agrarian distress. In late medieval England, the most prosperous agricultural regions were the most densely populated, and this association continued throughout the early modern period.

regions. In other regions, such as the Midlands and most of central England, these effects of low population density on farm sizes and the structure of landholding were muted, despite the severity of the population decline in those regions.

In sum, regional differences in the relationship between population density and rural prosperity in late medieval England serve to belie the hypothesis that agricultural development and agrarian change were primarily a function of population levels. Indeed, they serve to repudiate any simplistic association between population density and agrarian change.

Ecology

A commonsense explanation of regional differences in agricultural development and agrarian change is that they simply reflected regional differences in ecology, particularly type of soil and climate. This argument suggests that the more productive regions were the regions best endowed in terms of soil and climate. These conditions gave better returns to a farmer's efforts, and better returns promoted increased production.

Yet this explanation does not work in late medieval England, as many of the progressive areas were not particularly blessed with a favorable ecology. Norfolk is a case in point. Although it was a major cereal producer, much of the county has poor soil and is subject to drought in the summer (Riches 1967, Grigg 1989). In the winter the area is swept by cold winds coming off the North Sea. On the other hand, much of the best agricultural land in England is found in the Midlands. This region is well watered and is suitable for both pasture and arable farming (Grigg 1989). Yet this region conspicuously lagged behind both the east and the southwest in agricultural productivity. It has been argued that poor soil drainage and a lack of adequate drainage technology prevented early agricultural development in the Midlands (Chambers and Mingay 1966, p. 65, Grigg 1989). Yet this argument seems poor, given the feats of drainage which were being performed contemporaneously in the Netherlands.⁷ Certainly, the ingenuity of farmers in Norfolk allowed them to overcome the many natural problems they faced. Perhaps the question should be why Midland farmers did not successfully solve any drainage problems they had at an earlier date.

⁷ The case of the Netherlands would seem to contradict any ecologically determinist argument of the causes of agricultural development. A less promising agricultural environment than the northern Netherlands could not be found. The land in that region was marshy and perpetually threatened by the sea (de Vries 1974, p. 32), and it was only by dint of great effort that the land remained land at all. Yet from 1500 to about 1700 this region saw the rise of one of the most prosperous rural economies in Europe (de Vries [1974] gives a complete account).

The ecology argument can be turned around, as Goldstone (1988) does in his examination of the early modern period. This argument should be applicable to the earlier period as well, since most of the areas that Goldstone discusses as being at the forefront of agrarian change in the 16th and subsequent centuries were the same areas that were innovative and progressive in the late medieval period. Goldstone argues that a relatively poor ecology was actually an indirect cause of agricultural progress in these regions. He suggests that areas with a poor ecology tended to be more sparsely populated and pastoral, while the areas with better ecology tended to be more densely populated areas of arable agriculture (Goldstone 1988, pp. 296–97). Pastoral areas had more common and waste, ample grazing, and few communal rules governing grazing and agriculture. This lack of communal rules associated with pastoralism indirectly promoted agricultural progress by facilitating enclosure and the adoption of new agricultural techniques. Low population densities and plenty of vacant land facilitated the enlargement and consolidation of farms. Another advantage to pastoralism was that it involved large stocks of animals, more animals mean more manure and a more fertile soil, hence a more productive agriculture. For these reasons Goldstone suggests that it was the pastoral regions located close to urban markets that saw the most agricultural development and agrarian change in the early modern period.⁸

Although appealing, this argument has several problems when applied to regional differences in agricultural development in the late medieval period. Few areas of late medieval England were predominantly pastoral, as virtually all regions had some mixture of “corn and horn,” as befits a subsistence-oriented rural economy. The areas that best fit Goldstone’s description—that is, thinly populated, predominantly pastoral areas with large areas of common and waste—were mostly in the mountainous regions of the far north and west of England (Campbell and Power 1989). These regions were far from urban markets and remained relatively undeveloped. In eastern England there are few such regions, with the exception of the Norfolk Breckland, which, although a relatively

⁸ Goldstone (1991) has recently elaborated this argument that a dense population is a primary cause of agrarian distress (low agricultural productivity per capita), while a low population density promotes agrarian prosperity (high agricultural productivity per capita). The argument that lower population densities after the Black Death served to increase rural prosperity has a long pedigree (see Postan 1973, p. 12, Le Roy Ladurie and Goy 1982, p. 118). Certainly, lowered population densities allowed farm sizes to increase throughout much of England after the mid-14th century and probably facilitated many of the tenurial changes that occurred during this time. However, recent evidence, particularly drawn from eastern England, calls the so-called Postan thesis of agrarian distress before the Black Death into question (Mate 1986, Campbell 1983).

prosperous region, was never a major area for cereal production (Campbell and Power 1989, Bailey 1989)⁹

In the east, those areas of very productive arable agriculture were not areas that had a high ratio of livestock units to cereal acres (Campbell and Power 1989, Campbell 1991, pp 153, 163) Nor were they areas where there were large amounts of common and waste. The highly productive areas of eastern England (Kent, Essex, and East Anglia) in the late medieval period included some of the most densely populated areas of late medieval England, and there was little wasteland or common (Russell 1948). For example, much of eastern Norfolk, one of the more progressive areas of late medieval England, cannot be classified into the pasture farming category. This area was very densely populated and a major cereal exporter by the 13th century. Eastern Norfolk produced barley and malt for an international market (Campbell 1983, 1991, Britnell 1991, pp 59–65). This emphasis on cereal production continued in eastern Norfolk even after the population decline of the 14th century, which prompted a change to pasture farming in many other regions of England (Campbell 1991, Britnell 1991).

In addition, there was no necessary association between pastoralism and a productive agriculture, even with market access. For example, stock densities more than doubled after 1350 on the manors of the abbey of Winchester. These manors are located in the central area of England (mostly in Hampshire), an area with access to at least one major port (Southampton). Yet this post-1350 increase in stock density was not accompanied by a dramatic increase in mean yields of cereals (Campbell 1991, p 164, Thornton 1991). Goldstone does correctly point out that agricultural development and agrarian change were more likely where agricultural systems were more flexible and there was less communal control over agriculture. Yet these social factors were largely unrelated to population density or to a pastoral versus an arable focus. I will return to them shortly.

Commercial Incentives

As Goldstone's argument suggests, access to urban markets is another likely explanation of the regional differences in agricultural development. For example, the growth of the London market in the east and the Bristol

⁹ A major problem for Goldstone's argument is that it is entirely based on a division of England into pastoral and arable areas (for the period 1600–1640) that was provided by one source. Thirsk (1967). Yet this division is itself based on a qualitative and rather unhelpful categorization of farming regions in England, unlike the Campbell and Power (1989) categorization for the late medieval period cited here. Campbell and Power use samples of regional data on livestock and crops on manorial demesnes (provided by Langdon 1986) to create their maps of agricultural regions.

market in the southwest provided great incentives for increased agricultural production in those regions (Fisher 1954, Wrigley 1985). In addition, access to ports or another convenient transportation route via water may have been crucial. Agricultural commodities are bulky and heavy and, thus, expensive to transport overland, while water transportation is both relatively cheap and fast. Once again, both the eastern and southwestern counties had access to several ports that provided outlets to both domestic and international markets. It could be argued that this explains their general prosperity.

Without denying the importance of the market incentive and the importance of access to transportation, this argument alone is not adequate. A location close to a major urban market or to water transportation may have been necessary, but it was not a sufficient cause of agricultural development. For example, there were distinct divergences in economic growth between areas that were quite close to the London market—for instance, Cambridgeshire and Norfolk or Kent and Sussex. Both Kent and Norfolk were much more prosperous in the 15th century than their near neighbors Sussex and Cambridgeshire, respectively (see Campbell 1991, King 1991, p. 76, Mate 1991, p. 135). Norfolk was noted early for its productive agriculture, Cambridgeshire was not (Darby 1977, Britnell 1991). People were generally more prosperous and wages were much higher in late medieval Kent than they were in neighboring Sussex (Mate 1991). Locational factors cannot explain these anomalous cases.

Nor was access to a convenient transportation route by water the key. Oxfordshire (in central England) had access to the London market via the Thames yet was less developed than Norfolk, which was much further away from London by water. Southern England had access to the major port of Southampton (an important port since medieval times), yet the surrounding region (Hampshire) was not as economically or agriculturally developed as eastern England or parts of the southwest. In late medieval England, agricultural development and agrarian change were a product of more than just easy access to markets for agricultural commodities.

Class Relations

Brenner (1985a, 1985b) has given a social explanation for agrarian change. Applied to regional differences within England, his argument suggests that differences in agrarian change in different regions may be traced to regional differences in the nature of rural class relations between the property-owning lords and propertyless peasants.

Brenner has used a class relations argument to explain the divergence between England and France in agricultural development. He argues that small peasant proprietors in France received more royal support

for their property rights than did their counterparts in England. These differences may be traced back to the legal reforms of the 12th century in England (see Hyams 1980). These reforms meant that in England the king was unable to intervene in relations between a lord and his customary tenants. Consequently the English peasant was more powerless vis-à-vis his lord than was his French counterpart. As a result, it was relatively easy for enterprising landlords to dispossess their tenants in England, whereas this was not possible in France. Peasant dispossession in England paved the way for the development of large, commercialized farms, which served to increase agricultural productivity. Applied to regional differences within England, this class relations argument suggests that it would be in regions where peasant proprietors had weaker property rights vis-à-vis the manorial lord that large farms run with wage labor and commercialized agriculture would first appear. Brenner, in a more recent discussion (1986), suggests that these regions would be where peasants had individual property rights in land. Brenner reasons that individual rights in land would be more tenuous than rights to land that were held by the community as a whole and that this insecurity would promote production for the market as well as peasant dispossession and the development of large farms.

At first glance, the regional evidence would appear to support Brenner's hypothesis. There *was* a correspondence between areas of individual rights to land and the growth of large, commercially oriented farms as Brenner suggests, at least in the late medieval period. Although large farms developed in most regions of England after the population decline of the mid-14th century, I have already discussed how they developed more extensively in the southwest and east than in the Midlands or the central regions. These were regions of little common land and where many peasants had individual property rights in land (see fig. 2).

Although Brenner got the outcome right, evidence suggests that Brenner's account of the mechanism that produced that outcome is incorrect. There are three problems with Brenner's account. First, in the east and the southwest it was primarily the peasants who were building up large farms in the years following 1350, not the landlords (Campbell 1984). In fact, at this time the home farms of the great landlords were shrinking in size, as the age of direct farming of the great manorial estates was past and lords were dividing their home farms (demesnes) among several tenant farmers. Second, these regions were *not* regions where the power of the manorial lord was greatest relative to the peasants and peasant property rights were weak. Last, in these regions there is *no* evidence of forcible peasant dispossession.

I have already discussed the regional differences in the development of large tenant farms after 1350 and noted how they grew more quickly




FIG 2 —Land without common or common field at the end of the 16th century (Gonner [1912] 1966)

in both the southwest and the east than in other regions, so I will now deal with the second and third points in turn. The east and southwest were not regions where peasant proprietors had weak property rights vis-à-vis the manorial lord. The eastern counties of East Anglia, Essex, and Kent were regions of many freeholders in the late medieval period. In East Anglia, the free population reached 80% in some areas (including the poorer freemen or "sokemen"). Kent was also characterized by a majority of freeholders (Gray 1915, Douglas 1927, Dodwell 1939, Britnell

1991, p. 618) Freeholders had substantial legal rights and could appeal to the king's courts (Hyams 1980). These legal rights made their property rights in land stronger than those of the customary tenants, who formed the majority of farmers in the Midlands and central counties. Customary tenants could only take their cases to the manorial court, a court that was run by the lord of the manor and could be expected to pass decisions in his favor. By the 17th century almost all the former customary tenants in England had become "copyholders" and received some protection under the common law. Before this time, however, the property rights of customary tenants were subject to threat by powerful landlords (Fryde and Fryde 1991, p. 819).

In the east and the southwest, even the customary tenants were better off than their counterparts in the Midlands and central regions of England. Manorial dues and services tended to be proportionately lighter and less onerous. In these regions several manors could be represented in one village and territorial and other rights of lordship were often contested by the manorial lords, circumstances that the peasantry could use to their own advantage. For example, customary tenants could frequently take their legal cases to one of several manorial courts (Campbell 1981). Perhaps for these reasons, tenure by copy was well established in eastern England by 1450 (Britnell 1991, p. 621) and true villenage disappeared early in most of the eastern counties (e.g., Kent, see Homans 1941, p. 414). In the Midlands and the central regions there was typically only one manorial overlord for the entire village, which decreased the relative power of the peasantry.

Not only were peasant property rights more secure in the east and southwest than in many other regions, there is also no evidence from these regions of any forcible peasant dispossession. After the population decline of the mid-14th century, many large farms were put together by peasant tenants in these areas of the country, as I have discussed. It is true that these people were the more prosperous peasants (both free and otherwise), yet there is no evidence that the poorer peasants were ever *forcibly* dispossessed of their land. The security of the small peasant proprietor in the east and southwest is best demonstrated by the persistence of many small farms (alongside the large farms) in these areas in subsequent centuries. Especially in the east, there remained a large proportion of very small farms (Fourquin 1990, Britnell 1991, p. 617, Mate 1991, p. 702). There were still proportionately more small farmers (in the 5–100 acre range) in both the east and the southwest as late as the mid-19th century (see fig. 3).¹⁰

¹⁰ The persistence of many smallholders in the east and southwest into the 19th century also serves to refute the argument that Brenner's account of peasant dispossession simply applies to a later period of time in these regions.




FIG. 3 —Farms of 5–100 acres as a percentage of all farms 5 acres and above (Grigg 1989)

Far from being a factor inhibiting agricultural development, as Brenner's argument would suggest, these small farms may have played a crucial role in agricultural development and agrarian change in the east and southwest in the late medieval and subsequent periods. There is evidence that the larger farms of the region borrowed innovations that had proven their effectiveness on the many smaller farms. For example, innovative crops such as turnips and legumes, which were later to be

much heralded by English agronomists, were crops with long histories among the smallholders of eastern England (Allison 1957, Campbell 1983, Britnell 1991, p. 210)

The more prosperous smaller farmers also provided a pool of capable tenant farmers for the large farms of the great estates, which tended to grow in size over subsequent centuries (duBoulay 1965). Finding such capable tenant farmers was always a problem for owners of the large cereal-growing estates in northeastern France, for instance, where the increasing tendency during the same period was to further divide the great estates among many farmers (Fourquin 1990, p. 276). Prospective tenants had to have some of their own resources as well as the ability and motivation to undertake the running of a large farm and to turn a profit. The better-off small farmers of eastern and southwestern England frequently had these qualities. Historical research can follow certain families from their origins as small tenant farmers to their later status as major landowners and prominent local figures. Examples include families such as the Townshends in Norfolk and the Knatchbulls in Kent. These families first appear in historical records as tenant farmers in the 14th and 15th centuries, respectively, while several hundred years later the same families formed the local nobility (duBoulay 1965, Moreton 1992). Ironically, the existence of such an enterprising class of small farmers in the late medieval period was a condition for the further growth of large farms.¹¹

It is true that the southwest and, particularly, the east were home to a population of landless people who served as workers either on the larger farms or in the local industrial occupations. Customs of partible inheritance of land, which were common in the east, contributed to the number of land-poor people. The successive division of land among children over several generations left many with plots too small to sustain them (Campbell 1980, p. 187). These people were forced to find alternate occupations. In addition, no doubt many of the smaller farmers in these regions lost their land by some of the means that Brenner (1986) suggests,

¹¹ Thus, agrarian change did not depend on the eradication of the smallholder. Although large farms did become progressively more important in both the east and southwest, it appears that it was the existence of these large farms in *conjunction* with the more innovative and smaller farms that was important for agricultural development in these regions. Large farms have often been given the credit for England's agricultural productivity, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, when average farm size in England was substantially greater than that on the continent. However, comparative studies have shown that large farms are not necessarily associated with a productive agriculture (see Bates [1988, pp. 507–9], for a review). The regional evidence presented here may help resolve the issue, as it suggests that it was the conjuncture of large farms with smaller, more innovative free farms that promoted a productive agriculture in both eastern and southwestern England.

for example, inability to weather the crises of bad harvests, epidemics, market fluctuations, and so on. Yet there is no evidence that any of these people in these regions had ever been forcibly dispossessed of their land.

Perhaps the greatest refutation of Brenner's argument is that in the regions where there is clear evidence of peasant dispossession, in the Midlands and the central regions, there was little agricultural development and agrarian change was slow in happening. This evidence of peasant dispossession comes from the Midlands and the central regions in the 15th century. The economic depression of this period struck there with particular severity. Cereal prices fell and stayed low (Coleman 1977, Campbell 1991, Dyer 1991, pp. 80–87). Many farmers and landlords switched to producing the more profitable commodities of wool, meat, and milk. These activities also had the advantage of using less labor, which was in short supply in these regions at this time (Dyer 1991, p. 80, King 1991, p. 72). For these reasons the midland and central regions saw a severe contraction of the acreage under crops.

The change to pasture farming prompted farmers and landlords to attempt to enclose their fields in these regions. Unlike in the east and southwest, where enclosure occurred with little complaint, enclosure caused great social distress in the Midlands and the central regions. Many smallholders depended on common grazing rights for their livelihood, and enclosure often meant the end of communal grazing on the common fields or the commons proper. Enclosure thus met a great deal of resistance in these regions. Landlords not infrequently overcame this resistance with force, simply evicting the tenants who protested enclosure and incorporating their land into large sheep farms. The commission of 1517 revealed many cases of purposeful evictions of tenants in previous years—all in the midland or central regions (Dyer 1991, p. 88). As most of the tenantry in these regions were customary tenants, it was possible for a lord to legally (and illegally) evict his tenants (Kerridge 1969, p. 96). These evictions helped precipitate a series of enclosure riots and, finally, a serious rebellion in the Midlands revolt of 1607 (Johnson 1909, Wordie 1983, Dyer 1991, p. 637, Martin 1983). This has been called the last peasant revolt in England (Martin 1983).¹²

However, peasant dispossession did not automatically lead to the creation of productive arable farms in these regions at this time. The large sheep farms primarily produced wool for the market, and the proceeds mostly served to enrich the wool grower. By the 16th century, new meth-

¹² It is in these regions that Brenner's argument (1989) that landlords who created enclosures destroyed village solidarity is most appropriate. This argument particularly applies to later centuries, however, and not to the late medieval period.

ods of convertible husbandry began to diffuse throughout the midland region and these boosted cereal outputs. Yet increases in agricultural productivity in these regions had to wait until the 17th century (Kerridge 1968, p. 194). Throughout the 15th century (and long after) the breadbaskets of England remained in the east and southwest, particularly in eastern Norfolk, in parts of Kent, and the coastal southwest (Mate 1991, p. 135, Campbell 1991, Fox 1991).

For all these reasons, Brenner's class relations explanation is inadequate to the task of explaining regional differences in agrarian change within England.¹³ However, Brenner's insight that the social relations of production are important determinants of agrarian change should not be ignored. In what follows, I show how regional differences in agricultural production and agrarian change were in large part a result of regional differences in the local social organization of agriculture and associated class relations. The local social organization of agriculture shaped the responses of cultivators to the growing market incentives of the period and hence shaped the nature of agricultural development and agrarian change. Those regions with a suitable social organization of agriculture and a location where they had access to markets saw the most change and development over the late medieval period.¹⁴

THE LOCAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN CHANGE

Historiography provides the convenient term "field systems" to describe the differences in the social organization of production between regions in late medieval England. However, the term is somewhat misleading,

¹³ Space precludes any adequate treatment of Brenner's discussion of the French case, so the following discussion is brief. Brenner suggests that strong peasant property rights in France helped prevent agrarian change, rather than promoting it as was the case in eastern and southwestern England. It appears that French cultivators, across all field systems, received more royal support for their property rights than their English counterparts (Jacquart 1975, p. 265). Given the logic here, royal support for peasant property rights coupled with more flexible systems of irregular fields and enclosures (such as were found in Normandy, the far north, and parts of the south) should have promoted agricultural development and agrarian change in those regions (for the distribution of field systems in France see Bloch [1966]). There is some evidence that they did (Bloch 1966, Le Roy Ladurie and Goy 1982, Hopcroft 1992). Yet in France, the particular configuration of field systems, political factors, ecology, and market access helped prevent agrarian change to the extent of that seen in England (see Hopcroft [1992] for elaboration).

¹⁴ Given this argument, it was the development of markets for agricultural commodities in conjunction with lowered rural population densities over the period from the 14th to the 16th century that caused the specific timing of the agrarian change in the east and southwest that I document here.

as field systems corresponded to much more than the layout of the fields. In France, Bloch (1966) referred to the different field systems as different "agrarian civilizations," and indeed they were. They encompassed an entire social order, including class relations, rules of agricultural practice, land use, and the inheritance of land, as well as social norms, all of which had implications for the course of agrarian change. The origins of field systems go back to the early Middle Ages in Europe, and they are much disputed (see Campbell 1981, Homans 1987*a*, 1987*b*, Hopcroft 1994). Suffice it to say that they were not determined by ecology, as throughout Europe there was no necessary correspondence between ecology and type of field system.¹⁵

Regular Open Field System

Although there was some variation within types, the different field systems can be described in broad strokes as follows (see Gray 1915, Douglas 1927, Homans 1941, Baker 1973, Hallam 1981, Campbell 1981, Smith 1984). The first system was found in the midland and central regions of England (see fig. 4). This is the regular open field system, or the "champion" system (champion being the English version of the French *champagne*, meaning open country). Here the two or three great arable fields of the farming community surrounded a compact cluster of homes. Although villagers individually possessed the strips of land scattered through the two or three great fields of the village, their land was subject to communal regulation of cropping, and they had to allow the village herd to graze on their land at certain times of the year.

In addition to the two or three open arable fields, there was also the "commons" proper. The commons could include rough grazing land and wasteland as well as high quality hay meadow. Use of the great arable fields and the commons was regulated by a central body called the "byelaw." This body was responsible for coordinating cropping, harvesting, and grazing on the arable fields, as well as appointing village shepherds and fence keepers. The byelaw, in conjunction with the manorial court, also enforced customs of primogeniture (inheritance of all land by the

¹⁵ Agrarian structures similar to those described here for late medieval England could be found in many parts of Europe (see Bloch 1966, Chayanov 1986, Blum 1961). Often there was the same association between irregular or enclosed field systems and agricultural development as that proposed here for England (e.g., in the northern Netherlands and Normandy). However, other factors, particularly access to markets and political factors, were also important, and areas of irregular or enclosed field systems were not necessarily characterized by a productive agriculture (e.g., parts of northern England, the mountainous regions of southern France, and parts of Brittany).



FIG 4 —Regular open field systems in Britain (Gray 1915)

eldest son) This custom was widespread in champion regions and served to keep individual landholdings intact across the generations (Homans 1941, King 1973, p 170)

This communal regulation of agriculture and land use was accompanied by strong traditions of communitarianism in champion regions. The church, centrally located within the village, was the center of community life. As in the regular open field communities in northeastern France, these were regions where people “thought instinctively in terms of the community,” as Bloch puts it (1966). Homans writes of the attitudes of open field villagers, who “felt that they were bound to help their neighbors and do what they could, each man in his office, to further the common good of their village” (1941, p 308). Communal solidarity is further reflected in the custom of holding all the members of a village responsible for the debts of one member (Homans 1941, p 338). Wakes, large village

festivals only found in regular open field regions, were occasions when a village celebrated its collective identity (Homans 1941, p. 374)

Regions of regular open fields also tended to be heavily manorialized. In regular open field regions in England there was usually only one lord per village, and the strips of land of lord and peasant were typically intermingled in the open fields. Most of the villagers were customary tenants, who held their land by custom of the manor and were subject to the authority of the manorial court. There were few freeholders, who owned their lands outright. The domination of the village community by the lord of the manor is one reason why the regular open field system dominates our conception of medieval life in England, as the manorial authorities kept detailed records of various aspects of the manor and village. These records have survived to modern times and have been the basis of much scholarship on the medieval period. In areas where the manorial lords were weaker, fewer records were kept, so the details of life are less well known.

The social organization of agriculture in regular open field regions inhibited the commercialization of agriculture and agricultural development in the following ways. First, feudal dues and taxes tended to be heavy in regular open field regions. Therefore, cultivators had little reason to produce a surplus either on their own land, where it could be taxed away, or on the lord's land for the lord himself. Second, individual cultivators could not readily respond to market demands for particular crops, as the village community regulated the types of crops which could be planted (see Biddick 1985). Neither could cultivators easily change their agricultural techniques and methods, as these were determined by customs enforced by the village council. Last, cultivators could not dispose of their land as they wished, either through sale or inheritance, as there were strong customs prohibiting alienation of the patrimony (King 1973, p. 170).

In addition, village byelaws offer much evidence of the "free riding" problems often found in communal systems of agriculture. Piers Plowman was referring to some of these problems in the regular open field system when he said the following:

If I go to the plough I pinch so narrow
That a foot of land or furrow fetch I would
Of my next neighbour, take of his earth,
And if I reap, overreach, or give him advice that reap
To seize to me with their sickle what I never sowed

[Langland (1378) 1981]

Such problems of free riding may well have discouraged enterprising farmers from attempting to increase the output of their land. Communal

agricultural practices could spoil the efforts of individual farmers to improve their agricultural output or the quality of their stock animals in other ways, too (see Thornton 1991). For example, communal grazing meant that it was impossible for individual farmers to control either stock breeding or the spread of disease and so improve the quality of their livestock. The close proximity of farmers' strips of land meant that a neighbor's negligence in weeding or maintaining his land could bring to naught all of a farmer's efforts to rid his land of weeds and unwanted bugs.

Cultivators could not withdraw their land from the communal system, as there were village rules against the enclosure of land in the open arable fields. This rule was strictly enforced by the entire community and the manorial court, as, given the scattered nature of landholding, if one person enclosed their land then the whole system of agriculture would break down. For this reason, enclosure in these regions was difficult and was not fully accomplished until the parliamentary acts of enclosure in the 18th and 19th centuries. The scattered nature of landholding also inhibited the growth of large farms, as farms could not easily be consolidated into a single unit. The difficulty of farming many different plots of land served to destroy some of the economies of scale present in a large farm and so discouraged the accumulation of land.

The more tangible restrictions on cultivators and the disincentives for agricultural change that existed in regular open field regions, we know from manorial records and village byelaws. But there were also less tangible restrictions created by the solidarity of the village community. Village communitarianism was often beneficial for the poor and the needy of the community, and it discouraged the growth of economic inequality and the concentration of wealth in a few hands. Economic activities in regular open field communities were dominated by "what can only have been a desire to maintain the equality of the members of the community in economic opportunity" (Homans 1941, p. 337). One can surmise that the individual search for profit and the accumulation of private wealth were often antithetical to such sentiments, so communitarian sentiments may have served to deter production for the market.¹⁶

Irregular Open Fields and Enclosures

In contrast to the regular open field systems found in the midland and central regions, the eastern and southwestern regions were characterized

¹⁶ Brenner makes this point in another essay (1989, p. 45). Despite the strength of such sentiments, they did not prevent the emergence of a wealthy class of *laboureurs* in parts of northeastern France in the 16th and later centuries (Goubert 1986). However, these sentiments clearly exacerbated the social tensions created by these inequalities (Jacquart 1975, p. 298).

by systems of irregular open fields and enclosures. These systems embodied more individual property rights than the regular open field system, although some common rights were usually present.

Irregular open field systems were often similar in appearance to regular open field systems, but there was more land in enclosures and less communal regulation of cropping and grazing. Private grazing was often facilitated by the concentration of the strips of each landholding in one part of the village land. These systems were not regular open field systems in decay, as there is absolutely no evidence that irregular field systems had ever been in a regular state (Gray 1915, Hallam 1981). In these regions villages tended to be smaller and less compact than in regular open field regions. The village church often stood alone and isolated in some prominent natural location. Such irregular open field systems were found in both East Anglia and the southwestern counties. A modern day traveler going from Cambridge to Norwich can still observe the change from a region of compact villages and centrally located churches to a region of more scattered habitations and isolated churches.

In areas of enclosures, fields were fenced (either with hedges, trees, or stones) and little land was left open. These areas tended to be concentrated in mountainous areas in the west and north, although they also could be found in parts of East Anglia, Essex, and Kent, as well as in other parts of England. In the mountainous areas they were usually associated with a pastoral economy, although in the east and later in the southwest enclosed fields could just as easily be used for arable agriculture. In such enclosed regions homes were scattered across the landscape and most fields were entirely enclosed and private. Since many of the fences were live hedges or included many trees, the landscape had a wooded appearance that earned such regions the name of "woodland."

In regions of irregular field systems and enclosures, the village community tended to be relatively weak and a more individualistic or familistic ethic reigned. Visitors remarked on the different cultures present in the different regions. For example, Kentishmen (from a region of enclosed and irregular field systems) long had a reputation for clannishness and suspiciousness in their dealings with strangers. In fact, an individualist and often rationalist ethic prevailed over much of the east and parts of the southwest. This ethic could be observed in East Anglia as early as the 13th century (see the examples given in Macfarlane [1978]). This spirit of individualism was reflected in inheritance customs. In most areas of irregular open fields and enclosures, the custom of inheritance was partible, that is, land was divided among all the heirs equally and did not fall to one heir alone (Homans 1941, Dodwell 1967, Campbell 1980, p. 183). Thus each individual was entitled to some inheritance, however small.

These were also regions where the tyranny of the manor was somewhat less than in other regions. Demesne lands were often separate from the peasant holdings. There were fewer labor services, and they were commuted to money payments at an early date. Much of the peasantry was free of any kind of feudal obligations, as there was a large proportion of freeholding peasants. This situation was particularly common in the east, where Kent, Essex, and East Anglia had long histories of a numerous free peasantry. Here, any residual feudal obligations particularly rankled the populace. It was these prosperous and individualistic areas that produced the leaders of the great revolt of 1381 (and subsequent revolts, also, see Fryde and Fryde 1991) ¹⁷

This social organization promoted agricultural development and agrarian change in the following ways. Few communal practices meant that individual cultivators were freer to respond to market demands, as they could choose the crops they would grow, how they would grow them, and when they would harvest them. Private property rights also meant that cultivators did not have to be concerned that communal practices or the free riding of neighbors would ruin the results of their hard work. Manorial exactions were proportionately lower than in other regions. All of these factors encouraged production for the market, innovation in crops and techniques, and intensive labor input and capital investment in the land.

Farmers could usually dispose of their land through sale as they wished, and this promoted an active land market exchanging both small and large pieces of land. Partible inheritance customs also stimulated the land market. For instance, people who had inherited only a small piece of land could seek to buy land to enlarge their property, or they could sell the land and enter some nonagricultural occupation. This active land market made the enlargement and consolidation of farms easy, a process that was particularly notable in both the east and the southwest after the population decline of the mid-14th century. Since landholdings tended to be concentrated in one area of the village land anyway, consolidation of farms into a single unit was relatively uncomplicated. This ease encouraged the enlargement of farms, as a consolidated farm could more fully benefit from economies of scale than a farm made up of scattered plots of land. Private property rights also made it relatively easy for cultivators to enclose land if they so wished. In both the east and the

¹⁷ In later centuries these were regions where Puritanism flourished. In the 17th century, supporters of Parliament overwhelmingly came from these same regions (Homans 1988, p. 182). In the 18th century these were regions where the populace was most demanding of "citizenship rights," i.e., equality with respect to the common law, equal participation in the lawmaking process, and social justice (Somers 1993, p. 594).

southwest, the 15th century saw much enclosure for both arable and pastoral purposes. Unlike in the Midlands and the central regions, enclosure occurred early and with little complaint, as the whole community was not affected by it. Thus, our Tudor commentator (quoted above) noted the regional difference in enclosure, which was much apparent by the early 16th century.¹⁸

Moreover, there was no strong spirit of communitarianism to inhibit the pursuit of individual profit and wealth as in regular open field regions. The lack of a communitarian ethic may help explain why these regions (notably in the east) developed a much wider division between rich and poor peasants than existed in the champion, or regular open field, regions. In addition, partible inheritance customs encouraged not only the working of the land market but also the proliferation of many tiny farms and the class differentiation of the peasantry. The people who had to depend on very small pieces of land for their livelihood were forced to look for ways to supplement their incomes. They became a source of wage labor for the larger farms of the better-off peasants who began to emerge in the area in the late medieval period. They were also an important source of labor for the textile industries that flourished in these regions.

To sum up, the social organization of agriculture in various regions of late medieval England helped shape the choice set and incentives facing individual farmers, as well as their attitudes toward profit seeking. These conditions shaped their response to the developing market incentives of the years from the 14th to the 16th centuries, which in turn had implications for agricultural development and change. In the east and southwest the social organization of agriculture encouraged production for the market, agricultural development, and agrarian change by enabling individual farmers to make changes and to receive a good return for their efforts. In these regions there were also few social barriers in the way of the accumulation of private wealth. In the Midlands and the central regions the social organization of agriculture discouraged production for the market, agricultural development, and agrarian change by preventing individual farmers from making major changes or receiving a good return to their hard work. In these regions a strong communitarian ethic also helped discourage the pursuit of private gain.

¹⁸ The parallels between eastern and southwestern England and the Netherlands are numerous. Norfolk, especially in the fen and marshy areas, even bears a strong physical resemblance to parts of the Netherlands. In the prosperous and innovative areas of both England and the Netherlands, there existed a numerous free peasantry, a tradition of relatively weak or nonexistent manorialization, and a lack of communal property rights in land. However, in the Netherlands the necessity for communal collaboration in drainage meant that strong community institutions (the drainage boards or *waterschappen*) existed alongside a general spirit of individualism (de Vries 1974, p. 55). There is not space to fully elaborate the comparison here.

Such explanations of regional differences in agricultural development and agrarian change that refer to features of the social organization of agriculture have become common in the recent historical literature on the subject (see Campbell 1983, 1984, Britnell 1991, Thornton 1991). This emphasis on social organization marks a shift away from the ecological explanations that were favored until recently (Thirsk 1967). Yet whatever the trends in explanation among historical scholars might be, contemporaries knew what caused regional differences in agricultural development. The popular 16th-century poet Thomas Tusser noted the following:

More profit is quieter found
 (where pastures in severall be)
 Of one silly acre of ground,
 Than champion maketh of three
 Againe what a joye is it knowne
 When men may be bold of their owne

[[1573] 1965]

"Pastures in severall" refers to the private grazing arrangements found in regions of enclosures and irregular open fields, as opposed to the communal grazing arrangements found in regular open field ("champion") regions. The poet's meaning is clear: farming was most profitable in regions of individual ownership of land, where men could be "bold of their owne."¹⁹

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC GROWTH

So far I have suggested that the effects of the social organization of agriculture on agrarian change in late medieval England were independent of such factors as ecology, population density, and market access. I tested this conclusion in a multivariate analysis. Although this analysis has limitations, it does serve to buttress the central contention of this article.

The analysis is limited because it does not use direct measures of agricultural development or agrarian change. It cannot use direct measures, because comprehensive, comparable data on the productivity of all the factors of production—land, labor, and capital—for all the English coun-

¹⁹ Tusser's two books of poetry, *A Hundreth Good Points of Husbandry* (1557) and *Five Hundreth Points of Good Husbandry* (1573), were both best-sellers of the 16th century. Tusser was a farmer himself, and his audience was mostly made up of "yeomen who wished to be called 'Goodman' and who wanted their sons to become gentlemen and be called 'Master'" (quoted in Hill 1993, p. 132).

ties are not available for the late medieval period (see Overton and Campbell 1991). In lieu of this, I use economic growth, assuming that any wealth stemming from industrial production is itself indirect evidence of agricultural development (see above). Certainly, evidence of economic growth will capture any gains in the productivity of land, labor, and capital.

In this analysis I control some of the other important factors to assess the effect of the local social organization of production on economic growth for the period 1334–1515. I evaluate the effects of market access, industrial development, population density, agricultural organization, and technological change on economic growth over this period.

Data and Variables

In this analysis the unit of analysis is the (premodern) English county ($N = 44$). The dependent variable is the rate of growth in wealth of the county (GROWTHRATE), excluding clerical wealth. This is measured between 1334 and 1515, as these are the dates of the two closest comparable tax assessments (Schofield 1965). Wealth refers to the assessed wealth, a measure used to determine the tax rate. Unfortunately, as with all measures used to determine taxes, it is no doubt subject to considerable measurement error.

Most of the independent variables are measured for the late 14th century, the rationale for this being that these factors determine the course of future economic change. Market access is measured by indicators of the number of sea ports (PORTS) and the number of places with assessed wealth of over 225£ in 1334 (MARKETS). The latter are almost all market centers (Darby 1973). The presence of industry is measured by the number of cloths produced per year by the late 14th century (CLOTHS, Darby 1973) and the number of centers of the wool industry (WOOLS, Gilbert 1968). Population per square mile (POPULATION) is used to measure the influence of population density and comes from the poll tax returns of 1377 (Russell 1948).

The local social organization of agriculture is measured by a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the county is a regular open field county (OPENFIELD, Gray 1915). This variable also serves as a proxy for local class relations and types of tenure, as the regular open field regions were more manorialized and had a smaller free peasantry than regions of enclosures or irregular fields.

As a measure of agricultural innovation, I use the percentage of demesne traction animals that were horses (HORSES). The horse is a more efficient, if more expensive, work animal than the ox, and the use of horses is a sign of agricultural innovation (Langdon 1986). Such techno-

logical innovation was most common outside of the regular open field regions. Controlling for this variable helps determine if the primary influence of the social organization of agriculture was through technological change.

Results and Discussion

The results of this analysis suggest that the most important determinants of regional differences in economic development before 1600 were the degree of industrial development, the population density, and the local social organization of agriculture. In what follows I describe these findings in more detail.

Preliminary analysis of the data showed that both the variables MARKETS and WOOLS had little direct influence on economic growth. Therefore, these variables were omitted in the final analysis presented in table 1. Any effects of these variables are captured by other variables in the analysis. These results imply that access to market centers alone was not the crucial determinant of economic growth.

Table 1 gives the results of the final regression analysis. Population density is a strong predictor of later economic development, as expected, thus supporting the hypothesis that population density is an important factor fueling economic development. Industrial development is also important in explaining later economic development, as demonstrated by the positive effect of CLOTHS on GROWTHRATE.

TABLE 1
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE RATE OF GROWTH
OF LAY WEALTH IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND,
1334-1515

Variable	B	β
POPULATION	2.45** (6.23)	.46**
OPENFIELD	-3.31** (4.94)	-.84**
HORSES	-4.17* (1.56)	-.35*
PORTS	-1.11** (3.93)	-.32**
CLOTHS	.746* (2.77)	.29*

NOTE.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs. $N = 35$. $R^2 = .70$.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

The variable OPENFIELD, which is a proxy for the regular open field system, is strongly negatively associated with later economic development. This result supports the hypothesis that the social organization of agriculture was an important factor in economic growth. It is also evidence of the role of class relations in shaping economic change. The regular open field regions were all heavily manorialized with a small free peasantry, and it was these regions that saw the least economic growth over the late medieval period. This finding contradicts Brenner's specific class relations argument, which implies that rural economic development would most likely occur where lords were strongest vis-à-vis their tenants and tenant property rights were weakest.

The variables PORTS and HORSES were significantly associated with economic growth but in the opposite direction than predicted. A look at maps of the distribution of both the use of the horse and ports explains this apparent anomaly. First, horses were concentrated outside the regular open field regions, but mostly in the southeastern corner of England. The use of the horse was less common in the southwest, yet this area was characterized by high rates of economic growth over the next two centuries—thus, the apparent anomaly of a negative relationship between HORSES and GROWTHRATE once OPENFIELD was controlled. A similar argument may be made for the anomalous results for the variable PORTS. Ports were also found outside the regular open field regions, yet mostly on the eastern and northeastern parts of England. Thus, the fast growth rate in southwestern England, which was not associated with either the use of the horse or the availability of ports, explains these two anomalous findings. These findings imply that the effects of the social organization of agriculture on economic growth were not mediated by just one important technological innovation: the use of the horse. Also, these findings suggest that ports, and the access to international markets these provided, were not essential to economic growth.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, recent historical scholarship offers evidence of substantial regional differences in important rural developments in late medieval England. The use of new agricultural techniques, improved agricultural productivity, the growth in farm sizes, the consolidation and enclosure of farms, and the adoption of contractual and nonfeudal landholding arrangements occurred first in the east and southwest of England.

In this article I have shown that these regional differences were not simply a result of regional differences in market access, population density, or ecology (contra Goldstone 1988), but were greatly determined by

differences in the local social organization of agriculture, or the field system. In the east and southwest of England, a social organization of agriculture that embodied individualistic property rights, a large free peasantry, a more flexible system of agriculture, and a spirit of individualism promoted early agricultural development and agrarian change. Farmers (both large and small) in these regions were both willing and able to take advantage of the availability of land and the growth of market incentives from the 14th to the 16th centuries to enlarge, enclose, and consolidate their farms and to produce for the market. They were also the first to throw off the last vestiges of feudal tenure. These were the regions that saw the most rapid economic development over the period. In the midland and central regions, on the other hand, communal property rights, a much smaller free peasantry, a more inflexible system of agriculture, and a strong communitarian ethic inhibited both agricultural development and the process of agrarian change. These regions trailed the southwest and east in economic development over the period from the 14th to the 16th centuries.

Class relations did influence the regional pattern of change, but not in the way Brenner (1985*a*, 1986) suggests. The regions where manorial lords were most powerful and able to dispossess their tenants were not the regions that were agriculturally developed at an early date. Rather, in the agriculturally progressive regions of the east and southwest there is no evidence of forcible peasant dispossession, peasant property rights were strong, and a large proportion of small farms persisted (alongside the larger farms) for centuries. In fact, these small farms may have been the key to agricultural development in these regions. They produced for the market and experimented with various agricultural techniques that only later found their way onto the large farms. They also provided experienced managers and tenant farmers for the large farms of the great estates, which in turn made the further growth of large farms in these areas possible.

Thus, purely materialist and Marxist arguments cannot explain the regional path of agrarian change in late medieval England. The social organization of agriculture was a crucial and independent factor influencing the nature and path of agrarian change in each region. Exactly what did cause these regional differences in the social organization of agriculture is another discussion (see Hopcroft 1994). Yet however they originated, like many human arrangements they were sustained by embedded interests and persisted for centuries. Eventually the more inefficient of them, the regular open field system of the Midlands and the central regions, did disappear. Yet this required sustained political force in the form of the Enclosure Acts of Parliament in the 18th and 19th centuries. The last functioning regular open field system in England per-

sists today in Laxton, maintained and supported by the English government as a sort of living museum piece (Beckett 1989)

The effects of the local social organization of agriculture in England, which I have documented here for the late medieval period, were thus enduring. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to detail the course of agrarian change and the role played by regional agricultural institutions in England through the early modern period.²⁰ Suffice it to say that agrarian change in eastern and southwestern England in the late medieval period led the way for the rest of England. These regions were still the most innovative and highly productive areas in England in the 17th and 18th centuries, and this was not a coincidence.²¹ The social organization of production that promoted innovative agriculture in these areas in the 18th century was derived from the social organization of production that had fostered innovative agriculture in the same areas in the 14th century. Moreover, the prosperity of farmers in the east and southwest served to catalyze change in other regions. It encouraged some farmers and landlords in the Midlands and the central regions, beginning (as noted above) in the early 16th century, to adopt the new techniques, to specialize, and to make the changes pioneered in the more prosperous regions. Widespread changes in agricultural practices in turn contributed to the increase in national agricultural productivity, so that up until about 1800 (and despite a rapidly growing population) England was able to feed itself (Wrigley 1988, Beckett 1990). A highly productive rural sector, although not the cause of the English industrial revolution, was an important precondition for it.²² The point is that the local social arrangements and processes described here helped set into motion more far-reaching processes of agrarian change, with results of world historical significance.

²⁰ I have done this elsewhere (Hopcroft 1992)

²¹ Agriculture in Norfolk in eastern England was particularly praised (see reference to Diderot's *Encyclopedia* above)

²² In turn, the emergence of an increasingly prosperous rural sector in England had political implications. Many have noted that the representatives of a wealthy and commercially oriented landed interest in Parliament helped pass laws favoring commercial interests in general during the early modern period.

APPENDIX

Correlations

TABLE A1

	MARKETS	WOOLS	GROWTHRATE	PORTS	HORSES	OPENFIELD	POPULATION	CLOTHS
MARKETS	1 000 (42)							
WOOLS	- 026 (42)	1 000 (44)						
GROWTHRATE	143 (37)	104 (37)	1 000 (37)					
PORTS	336* (42)	- 126 (44)	098 (37)	1 000 (44)				
HORSES	386* (40)	137 (40)	234 (36)	106 (40)	1 000 (40)			
OPENFIELD	151 (42)	- 024 (42)	181 (37)	- 207 (42)	- 325* (40)	1 000 (42)		
POPULATION	632** (39)	- 068 (39)	224 (37)	274 (39)	442** (38)	- 060 (39)	1 000 (39)	
CLOTHS	- 154 (37)	501** (37)	129 (36)	174 (37)	- 209 (36)	101 (37)	- 091 (37)	1 000 (37)

NOTE — Correlations are calculated using pairwise deletion, nos in parentheses are the number of cases used to calculate each correlation $N = 44$

* $P < 05$

** $P < 01$

REFERENCES

- Allison, K J 1957 "The Sheep-corn Husbandry of Norfolk in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" *Agricultural History Review* 5 (1) 12-30
- Bailey, Mark 1989 *A Marginal Economy?* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Baker, A R H 1973 *Studies of Field Systems in the British Isles* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Bates, Robert H 1988 "Lessons from History, or The Perfidy of English Exceptionalism and the Significance of Historical France" *World Politics* 40 (4) 499-516
- Beckett, J V 1989 *A History of Laxton England's Last Open-Field Village* Oxford Basil Blackwell
- 1990 *The Agricultural Revolution* Oxford Basil Blackwell
- Biddick, Kathleen 1985 "Medieval Peasants and Market Involvement" *Journal of Economic History* 4 823-31
- Bloch, Marc 1966 *French Rural History* Berkeley University of California Press
- Blum, Jerome 1961 *Lord and Peasant in Russia From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Boserup, Ester 1965 *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth* London Allen & Unwin
- Braudel, Fernand 1982 *The Wheels of Commerce* New York Harper & Row
- Brenner, Robert 1985a "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe" Pp 10-63 in *The Brenner Debate Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe*, edited by T H Aston and C H E Philpin Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1985b "The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism" Pp 213-327 in *The Brenner Debate Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe*, edited by T H Aston and C H E Philpin Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1986 "The Social Basis of Economic Development" Pp 23-53 in *Analytical Marxism*, edited by John Roemer Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1989 "Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe in Light of Developments in the West" Pp 15-52 in *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe*, edited by Daniel Chiot Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Britnell, R H 1991 "Eastern England" Pp 53-67, 194-210, 611-24 in *The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol 3, 1348-1500*, edited by Edward Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Campbell, B M S 1980 "Population Change and the Genesis of Commonfields on a Norfolk Manor" *Economic History Review*, 2d ser , 33 174-92
- 1981 "Commonfield Origins The Regional Dimension" In *The Origins of Open-Field Agriculture*, edited by Trevor Rowley London Barnes & Noble
- 1983 "Arable Productivity in Medieval England Some Evidence from Norfolk" *Journal of Economic History* 43 379-404
- 1984 "Population Pressure, Inheritance and the Land Market in a Fourteenth Century Peasant Community" In *Land, Kinship and Life-cycle*, edited by R M Smith Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1988 "The Diffusion of Vetches in Medieval England" *Economic History Review*, 2d ser , 41 (2) 193-208
- 1991 "English Seigneurial Agriculture" Pp 144-82 in *Land, Labour and Livestock*, edited by B M S Campbell and Mark Overton Manchester Manchester University Press
- Campbell, B M S , and John P Power 1989 "Mapping the Agricultural Geography of Medieval England" *Journal of Historical Geography* 15 (1) 24-39
- Chambers, J D , and G E Mingay 1966 *The Agricultural Revolution, 1750-1880* London B T Batsford

- Chayanov, A V 1986 *The Theory of Peasant Economy* Madison University of Wisconsin Press
- Coleman, D C 1977 *The Economy of England, 1450–1750* London Oxford University Press
- Darby, H C 1973 *A New Historical Geography of England* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1977 *Medieval Cambridgeshire* Cambridge Oleander Press
- de Vries, Jan 1974 *The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500–1700* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Dodwell, Barbara 1939 "The Free Peasantry of East Anglia" *Norfolk Archaeology* 27 145–57
- 1967 "Holdings and Inheritance in Medieval East Anglia" *Economic History Review*, 2d ser, 20 53–66
- Douglas, David C 1927 *The Social Structure of Medieval East Anglia* Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol 9 Oxford Clarendon
- duBoulay, F R H 1965 "Who Were Farming the English Domesnes at the End of the Middle Ages?" *Economic History Review*, 2d ser, 17 (3) 443–55
- Dyer, C C 1991 "The West Midlands" Pp 77–92, 222–38, 636–48 in *The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol 3, 1348–1500*, edited by Edward Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Finberg, H P R 1951 *Tavistock Abbey A Study in the Social and Economic History of Devon* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Fisher, F J 1954 "The Development of the London Food Market, 1540–1640" Pp 135–52 in *Essays in Economic History*, vol 1 Edited by E M Carus-Wilson London Edward Arnold
- Fourquin, Guy 1990 *Histoire économique de l'Occident médiéval* Paris Armand Colin
- Fox, H S A 1991 "Devon and Cornwall" Pp 152–75, 303–24 in *The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol 3, 1348–1500*, edited by Edward Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Fryde, E B, and Natalie Fryde 1991 "Peasant Rebellion and Peasant Discontents" Pp 746–819 in *The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol 3, 1348–1500*, edited by Edward Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Gilbert, Martin 1968 *British History Atlas* London Weidenfeld & Nicolson
- Goldstone, Jack 1988 "Regional Ecology and Agrarian Change in England and France, 1500–1700" *Politics and Society* 16 (2–3) 265–86
- 1991 *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Goubert, Pierre 1986 *The French Peasantry in the Seventeenth Century* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Gray, H L 1915 *English Field Systems* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Grigg, David 1989 *English Agriculture An Historical Perspective* Oxford Basil Blackwell
- Hallam, H E 1981 *Rural England, 1066–1348* Sussex Harvester Press
- Hill, Ordelle G 1993 *The Manor, the Plowman and the Shepherd Agrarian Themes and Imagery in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance English Literature* London & Toronto Associated University Presses
- Homans, G C 1941 *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- 1987a "The Anglo-Saxon Invasions Reconsidered" Pp 145–59 in *Certainties and Doubts Collected Papers, 1962–1985* New Brunswick, N J Transaction Books
- 1987b "The Explanation of English Regional Differences" Pp 159–75 in

- Certainties and Doubts Collected Papers, 1962-1985* New Brunswick, N J Transaction Books
- 1988 "The Puritans and the Clothing Industry in England " Pp 182-92 in *Sentiments and Activities* New Brunswick, N J Transaction Books
- Hopcroft, Rosemary L 1992 "Rural Institutions and Agricultural Development in Pre-industrial England and France " Ph D dissertation University of Washington, Department of Sociology
- 1994 "The Origins of Regular Open Field Systems in Pre-industrial Europe " *Journal of European Economic History* In press
- Hyams, P R 1980 *King, Lords and Peasants in Medieval England* New York Oxford University Press
- Jacquart, Jean 1975 "Immobilisme et catastrophes " Pp 159-314 in *Histoire de la France rurale*, edited by Georges Duby and Armand Wallon Paris Seuil
- Johnson, Arthur H 1909 *The Disappearance of the Small Landowner* Oxford Clarendon
- Jones, E L 1968 "Agricultural Origins of Industry " *Past and Present* 40 58-71
- 1988 *Growth Recurring* Oxford Clarendon
- Kerridge, Eric 1968 *The Agricultural Revolution* New York A M Kelley
- 1969 *Agrarian Problems in the Sixteenth Century and After* New York Barnes & Noble
- King, Edmund 1973 *Peterborough Abbey, 1086-1310* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- 1991 "The East Midlands " Pp 67-77, 210-22, 624-36 in *The Agrarian History of England and Wales* Vol 3, 1348-1500, edited by Edward Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Langdon, John 1986 *Horses, Oxen and Technological Innovation* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Langland, William [1378] 1981 *The Vision of Piers Plowman* London British Broadcasting Commission
- Leonard, E M 1962 "The Inclosure of Common Fields in the Seventeenth Century " Pp 227-57 in *Essays in Economic History*, vol 2 Edited by E M Carus-Wilson London Edward Arnold
- Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel, and Joseph Goy 1982 *Tithe and Agrarian History from the Fourteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries*, translated by Susan Burke Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Macfarlane, Alan 1978 *The Origins of English Individualism* Oxford Blackwell
- Martin, John E 1983 *Feudalism to Capitalism Peasant and Landlord in English Agrarian Development* London Macmillan
- Marx, Karl 1906 *Capital* New York Modern Library
- Mate, Mavis 1986 "The Estates of Canterbury Cathedral Priory before the Black Death, 1315-1348 " *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 8 1-26
- 1991 "Kent and Sussex " Pp 119-36, 268-85 in *The Agrarian History of England and Wales* Vol 3, 1348-1500, edited by Edward Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Miller, Edward 1991 "The Southern Counties " Pp 136-52, 285-303 in *The Agrarian History of England and Wales* Vol 3, 1348-1500, edited by Edward Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Moore, Barrington 1966 *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Boston Beacon
- Moreton, C E 1992 *The Townshends and Their World Gentry, Law and Land in Norfolk, c 1450-1551* Oxford Clarendon
- Overton, Mark 1991 "The Determinants of Crop Yields in Early Modern England " Pp 284-322 in *Land, Labour and Livestock Historical Studies in European Ag-*

- rcultural Productivity*, edited by B M S Campbell and Mark Overton Manchester Manchester University Press
- Overton, Mark, and Bruce M S Campbell 1991 "Productivity Change in European Agricultural Development" Pp 1–50 in *Land, Labour and Livestock Historical Studies in European Agricultural Productivity*, edited by B M S Campbell and Mark Overton Manchester Manchester University Press
- Postan, M M 1973 *Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Riches, Naomi 1967 *The Agricultural Revolution in Norfolk* London Frank Cass
- Russell, J C 1948 *British Medieval Population* Albuquerque University of New Mexico Press
- Schofield, R S 1965 "The Geographical Distribution of Wealth in England, 1334–1649" *Economic History Review*, 2d ser, 18 (3) 483–510
- Smith, R M 1984 *Land, Kinship and Life-Cycle* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Somers, Margaret R 1993 "Law, Community and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy" *American Sociological Review* 58 (5) 587–620
- Stacey, Robert C 1986 "Agricultural Investment and the Management of the Royal Demesne Manors, 1236–1240" *Journal of Economic History* 46 919–34
- Stone, E 1956 "The Estates of Norwich Cathedral Priory, 1100–1300" Ph D thesis Oxford University
- Tawney, R H 1912 *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* London Longmans & Green
- Thirsk, J 1967 "The Farming Regions of England" In *The Agrarian History of England and Wales* Vol 4, 1500–1640, edited by Joan Thirsk Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Thornton, Christopher 1991 "The Determinants of Land Productivity on the Bishop of Winchester's Demesne of Rimpton, 1208–1403" In *Land, Labour and Livestock*, edited by B M S Campbell and Mark Overton Manchester Manchester University Press
- Turner, Michael 1982 "Agricultural Productivity in England in the Eighteenth Century Evidence from Crop Yields" *Economic History Review*, 2d ser, 35 489–505
- Tusser, Thomas [1573] 1965 *Five Hundreth Points of Good Husbandry Vnited to as Many of Good Huswiferie* Early English Books Series, STC 24375 Ann Arbor, Mich University Microfilms
- Wordie, J R 1983 "The Chronology of English Enclosure, 1500–1914" *Economic History Review*, 2d ser, 36 (4) 483–505
- Wrigley, E A 1985 "Urban Growth and Agricultural Change England and the Continent in the Early Modern Period" *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 15 (4) 683–728
- 1988 *Continuity, Chance and Change* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946¹

Gi-Wook Shin
University of Iowa

This article presents a historical view of collective action with special attention to the role of protest experience. It argues that prior action develops a consciousness that becomes a resource in future action. However, this enhanced consciousness must be mobilized through a protest organization for action to occur. Data on 123 counties in South Korea show that peasant uprisings in 1946 were functions of the degree of peasant experience in protest—particularly tenancy disputes in the 1930s—and the effectiveness of mobilization by people's committees. These findings demonstrate the relevance of resource mobilization theory in an authoritarian Third World context.

In *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Charles Tilly proposes that the next agenda for theories of collective action and social movement, particularly resource mobilization theory, is to build a historical model. According to Tilly, the agenda should show “how a contender's collective action at one point in time changes the conditions which are relevant to the next round of action,” or more specifically, “how the form, intensity, and outcome of the action affect the contender's interests, organization, and mobilization” (1978, pp. 229–30). Scholars of social movements have since responded to his call. His own (1979) concept of “repertoires of contention,” Tarrow's (1988, 1989) “cycles of protest,” Golden's (1988) role of “historical memory,” and Taylor's (1989) argument for “social movement continuity” exemplify efforts to provide a historical perspective on collective action and social movement.

¹ Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (August 1992, Pittsburgh) and at the semiannual meeting of the Korean Sociological Association (June 1993, Ch'unch'ŏn, Korea). I am very grateful to Daniel Chrot, Bruce Cummings, Herbert L. Costner, Jae-On Kim, Charles W. Mueller, Stephen G. Wieting, Scott Elason, Edward Lawler, and the *AJS* reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions. I also thank Ko Jong-Wook for his assistance. A professional development fund from the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at the University of Iowa aided this project. Direct all correspondence to Gi-Wook Shin, Department of Sociology, University of Iowa, W140 SSH, Iowa City, IA 52242.

© 1994 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/94/9906-0006\$01.50

This article further elaborates the role of prior protest experience in later action. While generally agreeing with resource mobilization theory that protest movements require organization and mobilization of resources, I emphasize how prior collective action contributes to movements by developing consciousness (whether class, political, or collective). Legitimate critiques charge the theory "went too far in nearly abandoning the social-psychological analyses" (Klandermans 1984, p. 584) and that it tends to confine the range of resources to external ones such as "money, access to the media, and support from powerful organizations" (Turner and Killian 1987, p. 235). Emphasizing the historical process of developing consciousness and the key role this consciousness plays in collective action mitigates such weaknesses without retreating into earlier psychological approaches such as mass-society theory (Arendt 1951, Kornhauser 1959), collective behavior theory (Smelser 1963), and relative deprivation theory (Davies 1962, Gurr 1970). The recently published book *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (Morris and Mueller 1992) strongly suggests a similar direction in future studies of collective action and social movement.

I use county-level data on the 1946 Korean peasant uprisings to empirically test this historical view. Statistical analysis shows that outbreaks across the region were indeed functions of peasants' degree of experience in protest and resistance movements during the colonial period, suggesting a great continuity in peasant activism. Yet peasant consciousness raised through colonial protest experience still needed to be mobilized by a protest organization to inflame uprisings, bearing out the usefulness of resource mobilization theory—heretofore "largely confined to liberal democratic regimes" (Jenkins 1983, p. 549)—in a Third World authoritarian polity. My study demonstrates that any comprehensive analytical framework of collective action and social movement must include both the historical formation of consciousness and its organization and mobilization for protest action.

THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Resource mobilization theory has been criticized for positing that discontent and collective interests hold fairly constant over time (McAdam 1982, Mueller 1987, Jenkins 1983). McCarthy and Zald state that resource mobilization theorists "assume that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement" (1977, p. 1215) and then focus on the importance of resources or outside help to organize discontent for development of collective action. For instance, Jenkins and Perrow claim that "discontent is ever-present for deprived groups, but . . . collective action is rarely a viable option because of lack

of resources When deprived groups do mobilize, it is due to the interjection of external resources" (1977, p. 251). Because resource mobilization theorists take collective interests and discontent for granted, the process by which collective interests and discontent are defined or constructed appears nonproblematic and thus goes unexamined. The theory helps correct earlier theories' (e.g., Davies 1962, Smelser 1963) overemphasis on psychological motivations but fails to recognize that collective interests are defined collectively and that the subjective meanings people attach to their situations can vary. As McAdam points out, "The problem would seem to stem from the failure to distinguish *objective* social conditions from their *subjective* perception." Segments of society may very well submit to oppressive conditions unless that oppression is collectively defined as both unjust and *subject to change*. In the absence of these necessary attributions, oppressive conditions are likely, even in the face of increased resources, to go unchallenged" (1982, p. 34, McAdam's emphasis). Marx called the transformation of objective to subjective interests the process of becoming a real class or "class-for-itself" (Balbus 1971), this transformation must predate any collective action. In Klandermans's (1984) words, "consensus mobilization" should precede "action mobilization" (p. 586). Piven and Cloward's (1977) study of "poor people's movements" in the 20th-century United States, McAdam's (1982) of black insurgency from 1930 to 1970, Klein's (1984, 1987) of U.S. and West European women's movements, and Hirsch's (1990) of the 1985 Columbia University protest for divestment from South Africa all show the importance of consciousness in fomenting social protest movements.

The crucial question, then, is: What set of conditions best facilitates the development of consciousness? Answering this does not require recourse to earlier theories (e.g., Smelser 1963) that focus on irrational, magical beliefs to study the role of consciousness. Instead, the historical processes that shape consciousness are critical. E. P. Thompson, a British social historian, cites past political experience as a key factor: "People experience exploitation, identify points of antagonistic interest, [and] commence to struggle around these issues." *In the process of struggling they discover themselves as classes, they come to know this discovery as class-consciousness.* Class and class-consciousness are always the last, not the first, stage in the real historical process" (1978, p. 149, emphasis added). For Thompson, class consciousness is not structurally determined by class position, as structural Marxists such as Althusser argue, or to be raised by the elite, as Leninists claim, but historically and collectively constructed through political experience. Sewell's (1980) study of the emergence of a French working-class consciousness and Bonnell's (1983) comparable study of the Russian working class support

Thompson's conception of class and class consciousness Morris (1992), criticizing previous studies of class consciousness in America as being "ahistorical and divorced from real group struggle," urges us to examine it as emerging as a social historical process in the context of class confrontations

Golden (1988) similarly argues that Italian workers have been able to mobilize continually on the basis of a radical socialist tradition over a period of time, as "historical memory" of protest kept radical aims alive Drawing on an analysis of various forms of protest in Owens Valley, California, Walton says that "historical experience, particularly when it is about previous struggles, is elaborated in legend and historical memory and can become an important resource in its own right for mobilizing participation" (1992, p. 326) Mueller's analysis of women's rise to public office also shows that previous social movements provide resources for future mobilization, one of the most important resources being "development of collective consciousness" (1987, p. 90) Taylor (1989) says that an important consequence of postwar women's activism, though not then successful due to "nonreceptive political environments," was to provide the contemporary women's movement with a resource of movement continuity, "collective identity" Similarly, McAdam's examination of the "biographical consequences" of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project reveals that experience in it "initiated an important process of personal change and political resocialization" that "in turn is a strong predictor of the subject's activism between 1964 and 1970" (1989, pp. 753-54) Although Gurr's (1968) now classic cross-national study of civil strife is largely based on relative deprivation theory, it too agrees that past strife facilitates attitudes that result in subsequent political conflict As these studies evince, attention to the historical formation of consciousness through protest experience promises to correct a weakness of resource mobilization theory (i.e., neglect of the role of consciousness) without retreating into classical theories of collective behavior²

This historically constructed consciousness can help a subordinate group define its situation as unjust or oppressive Yet attention to the historical formation of consciousness does not contradict but supplements the central argument of resource mobilization theory As discussed above, the key explanatory variable for the theory is the organization of discon-

² I am not claiming that development of consciousness is the only possible outcome of previous political action Such experience may influence future collective action by changing political opportunity structures (McAdam 1982) or by providing "activist networks" (McAdam 1989, Taylor 1989) or "repertoires of collective action" (Tilly 1979) Some scholars conceptualize the relationship of past protest to future action as "cycles of protest" (Tarrow 1988, 1989) Also, experiences in the workplace and family can raise the (gender) consciousness needed for mobilization (Buechler 1990)

tent, that is, the extent to which a subordinate group is able to develop protest organization (Gamson 1975, McAdam 1982, McCarthy and Zald, 1977, Tilly 1978). Accordingly, even enhanced consciousness, if not effectively organized and mobilized, does not necessarily lead to collective action. Studies of peasant protest and rebellion also prove the importance of organization and mobilization of peasant consciousness (Paige 1975, Popkin 1979). Klandermans points out that "consensus mobilization does not necessarily go together with action mobilization, [though] action mobilization cannot do without consensus mobilization" (1984, p. 586). At issue is not which is more relevant but how historically constructed consciousness combines with mobilization efforts of social movement organizations to produce collective action. Neither consciousness nor organization alone suffices for collective action, rather their combination. What earlier cross-national studies of political violence (e.g., Gurr 1968, 1970, Gurr and Duvall 1973) failed to specify is the way consciousness and organization interact to produce collective action. As Morris argues, consideration of both factors is necessary for "a comprehensive explanatory framework of collective action" (1992, p. 372).

In summary, I propose that protest experience can facilitate future collective action by providing a crucial resource, raised consciousness, be it class, political, or collective. Yet raised consciousness alone does not suffice for actual action, it must be mobilized through protest organization. Before empirically testing this proposition with the Korean data, I will briefly discuss Korean peasant activism in the first half of the 20th century.

PEASANT PROTEST AND RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL KOREA

Although not rare in Korean history, peasant protests and uprisings were sporadic and short-lived in traditional Korea (see Song et al. [1988] for the 1862 peasant rebellions and Lew [1990] for the 1894 peasant wars). However, the first half of the 20th century, especially after 1920, witnessed more frequent and sustained rural conflict and protest that affected more of the rural population, peasants and landlords alike. Of particular importance were tenancy disputes between 1920 and 1939, the 1930s red peasant union movement, and "everyday forms of resistance" during the war years, 1940-44.³

First, tenant protests against landlords in the 1920s and 1930s prevailed in southern commercialized areas, becoming "constant phenomena" in rural society, in the words of the colonial government. Colonial

³ I confine my discussion of colonial peasant protest and resistance to the South.

government records report a total of 140,969 disputes, involving 397,281 tenants and landlords from 1920 to 1939, more than 85% occurring in the South (Chōsen sōtokufu 1934, 1940a). Rent reduction and secure tenancy rights were the major tenant demands. Forms of disputation varied from simple verbal arguments to individual law suits to radical protests involving violence and arrest. While the character of the disputes changed over time (e.g., more offensive in the early 1920s and after the early 1930s, more defensive in the intervening depression years, see Shin 1990, 1993), they primarily sprang from tenants' growing consciousness of their interests, especially after 1933 (see Chōsen sōtokufu 1940a, pp. 6–7), and often lowered rental rates and secured tenancy rights. A colonial government survey shows that from 1933 to 1938 rental rates decreased an average of 2% in the South, with the disputes a major impetus, signifying a change in authority relations in rural Korea (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940b, Shin 1993). Furthermore, as Mueller (1987) argues, protest movement outcomes should be evaluated in terms of their relationship to future movements, in that sense, as is now well recognized, one important outcome of 1920s and 1930s tenant protest movements was the development of participants' political consciousness (Kang 1989, Shin 1993).

The red peasant union protest movement from 1930 to 1939 differed from tenant protests in character, regional and class base, and demands. It involved small landowners so heavily burdened with taxes and public dues that they were on the verge of becoming landless tenants, especially during the depression years of the early 1930s. They confronted local government officials directly, demanding changes in tax policy and protesting police interference in village affairs, such as raids on night schools (Shin 1991, Yoo 1974). Protests organized by red peasant unions were more radical, often entailing violence and arrest. For instance, when in March 1932 about 300 union members in Yangsan county of South Kyōngsang attacked the police station, one member was killed and 200 arrested. Radicalization of the red union movement invited severe repression by the colonial government, particularly of unions in southern commercialized areas, considered the "front line of communist thought" by the government (Yoo 1974, p. 270). Unions were commonly destroyed by the police in an early stage of formation. Among the 123 southern counties considered here, 32 organized red unions. While most red unions met colonial police repression and their protest movements were forced underground during the war years, many union leaders came to figure prominently in the organization of postwar peasant unions (*nongmin cho-hap*) and people's committees (*inmin wŏnhoe* or PCs, see An 1990, Chōng 1988, Cumings 1981).

During the war years (1940–44) overt and collective protest became

difficult. In efforts to mobilize resources (human and material) for "total war," the colonial government adopted very repressive policies and outlawed collective protest (Eckert 1994). It also attempted to exact crops from the peasants to supplement the army food supply. Faced with the militarist colonial regime, Korean peasants resorted to "everyday forms of resistance," to use Scott's (1985) term, such as hiding crops, changing crops into nonextractable ones, or expressing their discontent through folk songs. In 1944, for instance, 70% of households in a village of Hae-nam county of South Chölla province successfully hid half of their crops in collection avoidance (Kim 1981). Although these kinds of covert and noncollective resistance went largely unrecorded in written documents, a 1942 report by the U.S. consul general in Seoul supports claims that rice collection resistance was widespread in the country (Quarton 1942). The report also indicates these everyday forms of resistance nurtured Korean peasants' "spirit of resistance." Furthermore, peasants' experience of landlord collaboration with Japanese war mobilization efforts provoked strong nationalist feeling, which emerged as a prime factor in postwar radicalism. Thus, peasant resistance during the war years offers a critical bridge between colonial activism and postwar radicalism. In Taylor's usage, the war years were a period of "abeyance," a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another" (1989, p. 761).

Peasants' experience in various forms of protest and resistance during the colonial period influenced the course of peasant organization and subsequent mobilization into postwar uprisings. In particular, tenant protests and the red peasant union movement in the 1930s increased participants' political consciousness, which was kept alive through passive forms of resistance during the war years and then contributed to postwar activism. It is no coincidence that issues and targets of colonial period protest and resistance reemerged, though in more radical and violent forms, in postwar peasant uprisings.

DECOLONIZATION AND KOREAN PEASANTS IN POLITICS

With the Japanese defeat in August 1945, Korean peasants, like peasants in most other postcolonial societies (e.g., Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991), sought a part in forming a new social and political order. They organized peasant unions and PCs from the county and district levels down to the village level and dominated local politics in many regions. One report counts peasant unions in 188 counties, 1,745 districts, and 25,288 villages, with a total membership of 3,322,937 by November 1945, less than three months after liberation (Pak 1987, p. 382). Although perhaps

exaggerated, these figures suggest that an average of one person per peasant household joined the unions. Yet no national organization fomented this rapid growth, peasant unions were localized and their organizational strength and radicalism varied greatly. Radical unions quickly tried to dispossess Japanese and Korean landlords. Some members even beat and then jailed landlords, former policemen, and government officials who had collaborated with the Japanese. Moderates worked to reform tenancy relations, rents, and the like.

Peasants also became active in PCs, a major grass-roots political organization in liberated Korea. Immediately after liberation, nationalist and communist leaders headed by Yŏ Unhyŏng organized the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (Chosŏn kŏn'guk chunbi wiwŏnhoe) to preserve "peace and order" and "prepare for independence" (Cumings 1981, chap. 3). In September the committee transformed into the Korean People's Republic (Chosŏn inmin kongwhaguk), with PCs an important suborganization that dominated local politics in many parts of the country in the fall of 1945. PC class composition was eclectic, though most members were peasants, workers and even a few landlords belonged (An 1990). PCs and peasant unions collaborated, often sharing members or even offices in common. Most PC leaders were of local origin, with colonial period experiences in social and political movements such as the March First Independence movement, peasant protest movements, labor movements, student and youth movements, and the Sin'ganhoe (An 1990, pp. 102–5, Chŏng 1988, pp. 37–44). Autumn 1945 saw PCs organized in all but seven counties in the South. Yet, as with unions, organizational strength varied greatly, which closely related to outbreaks of uprisings a year later, as shown below. According to Cumings (1981), among the 123 counties considered here, seven had no PC, 55 a nongoverning committee (NGPC), and 61 a governing one (GPC).⁴ In counties without a PC or with a NGPC, former government officials and landed elites still strongly influenced local policies. For instance, in Chŏngŭp of North Chŏlla province and Miryang of South Kyŏngsang province "landed elements" remained powerful enough to prevent the emergence of strong GPCs (see Cumings [1981], chap. 9 for details on the committees).

In sharp contrast, in counties with a GPC, the PC functioned as a *de facto* government collecting taxes and maintaining social order. For instance, a South Chŏlla province peasant union representative at the opening convention of the National League of Peasant Unions (Chŏn'guk

⁴ Figure 5 in Cumings (1981) lists the counties in which PCs assumed governmental functions. Cumings also details the fate of PCs in the South (see chap. 9). Regarding such committees in the North, see Kim (1989).

nongmin chohap ch'ong yŏnmaeng) in Seoul, December 8, 1945, reported that province peasants refused district officials' orders and obeyed only the PC's (Kim 1974, 2 158–59). He also said peasants controlled most police stations. An American military government official in the province agreed that "all governmental agencies became powerless," and that PCs "preserved the peace and collected necessary taxes," preventing "looting, bloodshed, and rioting" (Meade 1951, pp 56–71). Some PCs even "took a census," "assembled other vital statistics," and had armed defense units, posing a "threat to military government" (U S Army [1948] 1988, 3 250). These observations of local politics in liberated Korea limn Charles Tilly's conception of a "revolutionary situation" "previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government and form an alternative body claiming control over or to be the government. Those previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body" (1978, p 192). Again, this describes well the political scene of the areas PCs governed.

But upon American occupation, local politics changed. The American military government in Korea suppressed these political groups, accusing them of Soviet-backed North Korean manipulation. It declared all political organizations, including PCs, dissolved and required them to obtain new legal permission from the military government. Often PC members were fired from government positions and even arrested, for instance, on November 15, 1945, in Namwŏn county of North Chŏlla province five PC leaders were arrested, and in March 1946, the county executive of Haenam county in South Chŏlla province, a PC member, was fired by the military government. Such suppression provoked strong reaction from committee members, as in Namwŏn where 14–15 thousand people demonstrated against the arrest of their leaders, with three killed by police fire. Yet such protest was just a foretaste of coming uprisings.

While suppressing popular organizations such as PCs, the military government kept the Japanese governmental framework and even restored government officials who had served under the Japanese. The Japanese economic agencies the Oriental Development Company and Chosen Food Distributing Company were revived as the New Korea Company (NKC) and Korean Commodity Company, respectively (U S Army 1988, 3 142–43). About 85% of the notorious Korean policemen who had "records of brutality in arresting and torturing their fellow countrymen" were retained and continued to abuse their power under American auspices (Henderson 1968, p 85). Korean peasants, of course, regarded restoration of the colonial system and reappointment of collaborators to key positions as unjust and illegitimate. By the fall of 1946, just before the October uprisings, the South alone saw 81 police stations and

23 government agencies raided. These were also the main targets during the uprisings.

Furthermore, the military government ignored peasant demands for land reform and instead reestablished the hated Japanese rice collection policy, supposedly to support the urban population. This collection policy deepened peasant grievances. As a peasant in Kangwŏn province said, "Since we went through the terrible years under the Japs, we have been trying to be patient with the current situation. But how long should we stand this poverty?" (*Hansŏng ulbo*, June 24, 1946). Police involvement in rice collection further exacerbated peasant discontent, as peasants complained rice was exacted "much in the same [way] as under the Japanese," but "treatment received was much worse." Many peasants believed that their rice quota was unfair and that rice collection was controlled and manipulated by reactionary landlords and collaborators with police support. Peasants often refused to yield rice to collection officials and police: in 1946 only 12.6% of the scheduled rice was collected (Hwang 1987).

Clearly Koreans in general and peasants in particular had much about which to complain: reestablishment of the old Japanese system, delay in social and land reform, continued abuse of police power, rice collection, rice rationing, and so on. Peasants expressed their discontent and grievances in disputes with landlords, opposition to rice collection, and raids on government agencies, all familiar forms of contention throughout the colonial period. Then in the fall of 1946 they exploded into the major uprisings of 20th-century Korea.

THE 1946 UPRISINGS

The uprisings began on October 1, 1946, when about 300 railroad workers in Taegu, a major city in central South Korea, went on strike, demanding increased rice rations.⁵ Sometime that day the police killed a striker. On the morning of October 2, a crowd of more than 1,000 carried the body of the slain striker through the city and raided the city police station, capturing 50 policemen. By October 6, 38 Taegu policemen had been killed, martial law was declared and American tanks patrolled the streets.

The sparks from Taegu ignited elsewhere, particularly in the countryside. In Yŏngch'ŏn county, near Taegu, for instance, an estimated 10,000 protesters attacked the county police station, killing the county executive

⁵ Although sporadic food protests in the spring and summer and a general strike by railroad workers at the end of September erupted in Pusan, convention places the onset of uprisings at Taegu in October as described here.

and many other officials and policemen who had served under Japanese rule but retained their positions due to the Americans. They also killed some 20 "reactionaries and evil landlords" (Cumings 1981, p. 358). As discussed above, most Koreans deemed these former officials and collaborative landlords unjust and illegitimate. Accordingly, the major targets of attack were big landlords, police stations, local government offices, and rice collection agencies such as the NKC. About 5,000 protesters seized county government control at *Ŭisŏng*, another 2,000 raided the Waegwan police station, killing the police chief and wrecking the homes of 50 police and county officials. Also, 400 protesters at Hwanjung overran the NKC warehouse, burning all records of rice and grain collections.

The protesters were primarily local peasants, most of them affiliated with peasant unions and PCs. For instance, the *Ŭisŏng* police chief reported that of the nine leaders in the *Ŭisŏng* protest, five belonged to the local PC, two to the People's Party branch, one to the county peasant union, and one was an unaffiliated school teacher (Cumings 1981, p. 358). Peasants often brandished sticks, farming implements, and clubs, as well as rifles and pistols confiscated from raided police stations (U.S. Army 1988, 3:347-64).

Although the urban strike in Taegu initiated the action, peasants transformed the strike into a major uprising.⁶ Revolt spread into the countryside in North Kyŏngsang province, then in South Kyŏngsang, South and North Ch'ungch'ŏng, Kyŏnggŭ, and South and North Ch'ŏlla provinces. By the end of 1946 some 40 counties, or about 30% of South Korean counties, witnessed peasant uprisings. There was little indication of national organization behind the disturbances, except perhaps in the early stages of the Taegu outbreak (Ch'ŏng 1988, Cumings 1981). Major demands and issues stressed local problems, such as "the authority of colonial police, brutal grain collection policies, hoarding of grain by landlords and rich peasants, and the systematic suppression of the local people's committee structure" (Cumings 1981, p. 367). No accurate count of participants or casualties exists, but estimates suggest about 2-3 million (most of them peasants) engaged in the uprisings, about 1,000 protesters and 200 policemen were killed, and another 30,000 protesters were arrested. The 1946 uprisings were the largest and most significant protest movement of Korean peasants since the 1894 Tonghak peasant wars; they clearly showed the urgent need for social and political reform, especially land reform.

⁶ To be sure, the uprising involved a mass of workers and students in a general population revolt against procolonial forces thriving in postcolonial Korea. However, because the majority of protesters were peasants and because much of the data for cities are unavailable or incompatible with rural data, this study analyzes only rural uprisings.

How can we explain such massive and violent mobilization of Korean peasants into the uprisings? How were their discontent and grievances organized and mobilized into political protest movements? In line with the historical view of collective action advanced above, I hypothesize that the aforementioned colonial experience in protest and resistance provided postwar activism a crucial resource, that is, enhanced consciousness, which PCs then mobilized for the uprisings by organizing protests. To be sure, some previous works on postwar Korean peasant radicalism (e.g., Chōng 1988, Cumings 1981, Kang 1989) make similar points, but no rigorous empirical test has been done. For instance, Cumings (1981), still the best work on this issue, simply presents a bivariate correlation between red peasant union presence in the 1930s and postwar PC strength, with some supporting instances. Such a crude method is not only liable to produce a spurious relationship but omits another crucial protest experience: tenancy disputes. In the rest of this article I employ a multivariate statistical analysis of county-level data on peasant activism and related socioeconomic variables in colonial and postwar Korea to test the historical proposition detailed above.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

The analysis draws upon county-level data collected by the Japanese colonial government (Chōsen sōtokufu) and American military intelligence (primarily compiled by Cumings [1981]). County-level data is significant because the county (*kun*) in Korea has historically been an important administrative unit and even today remains an “economic, socio-cultural, and political unit” (Kim 1990, p. 63). Also, red peasant unions of the 1930s and peasant unions and PCs in the postwar era were organized at the county level. Furthermore, the county is a much more homogeneous unit (with an average population of 138,000 people per county in 1945, excluding Seoul) than the nation-state, a unit frequently used in comparative studies of rebellions and revolutions (Boswell and Dixon 1990, Gurr 1968, Muller 1985, Russett 1964, Walton and Ragin 1990), and thus mitigates a common problem with aggregate data: spurious ecological correlation. I analyze 123 counties in the South, omitting only a few without relevant data available; cities are also excluded since my analysis is confined to rural uprisings (the appendix lists included counties).

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, UPRISE, measures whether a county had a 1946 peasant uprising. Cumings assesses peasant radicalism by giving

"2 units for a non-governing people's committee, 3 for a red peasant union in the 1930s, 6 for a GPC, 8 for evidence of uprising in the autumn uprisings in 1946, and 10 for counties judged particularly rebellious" (1981, p. 453). Besides its arbitrary and subjective scale for particular political activities (e.g., Why six units for a GPC and eight for occurrence of uprising?), existence of a red peasant union in the 1930s and a PC in 1945 should be conceptually and empirically separated from uprisings in 1946 (see also n. 13). Accordingly, I treat red union experience as a separate predictor and a PC as a variable affecting the impact of past political experience (in either tenancy disputes or red peasant union movements) on uprising. I decompose Cumings's radicalism index and assign values to the variable UPRISE by giving "1" for evidence of a 1946 uprising and "0" for no uprising in a given county, since no other precise county-level information on the uprisings, such as the number of casualties, is available.

Independent Variables

Two indicators measure the degree of past experience in protest: (1) DISPUTE, the number of tenancy disputes from 1933 to 1939 recorded by the Japanese colonial government (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940a) and (2) RADICAL, a radicalism index of red peasant unions in the 1930s.⁷ Since no quantitative data exist to measure the scale of red peasant union protest (e.g., number of casualties), I created the radicalism index by assigning a value of "0" for no union existence, "1" for mere existence of a red peasant union, "2" for evidence of protest, and "3" for protest with violence.⁸ This information comes from Japanese court and police documents (such as *Shisō ihō* and *Shisō geppō*) as well as newspapers (for the index see Shin [1991], app. 1). A large number of disputes and a high value on the radicalism index indicate a high proportion of peasants with protest experience during the colonial period. A low correlation coefficient between the two measures ($r = -.01$, NS) indicates they represent two distinct types of colonial protest experience of Korean peasants. Due

⁷ Tenancy disputes occurred from 1920 to 1939, but data on the number prior to 1933 exist only at the provincial level. Since a similar geographic distribution of tenancy disputes appeared throughout the 1920s and 1930s, however, my measure should not distort the overall pattern (Shin 1990). Other measures of the disputes, such as scale or intensity, are also unavailable at the county level. In addition, because few written records depict the degree of "everyday forms of resistance" during the war years, these years must be omitted from analysis. This omission does not seem to distort the findings presented below.

⁸ An analysis not reported here that used an index based solely on the existence of a red peasant union in the 1930s yielded similar results.

to its nonlinear relationship with the dependent variable, I convert DISPUTE into a logarithmic scale

Intervening Variable

As the PC was the main form of protest organization to mobilize peasants for the 1946 uprisings, I use its strength as a variable affecting the impact of dispute and protest experience on uprisings.⁹ As discussed above, counties fall into three categories: those with no PC ($N = 7$), with a NGPC ($N = 55$), and with a GPC ($N = 61$). In counties with a NGPC, landed elites strongly influenced local politics, rendering the PC powerless as a protest organization. Only in counties with a GPC could the PC be a force in the uprisings. Also, no significant difference obtains between the first two types in terms of other variables included in this analysis. For these reasons, I collapse the first two categories, separating them from the third.¹⁰ Thus, the variable GPC has the value "1" for a county with a GPC and "0" otherwise (for the data on PCs as well as population change, tenancy rates, and paddy fields, see Cumings [1981, app. D]).

Control Variables

I introduce postwar era population change as a control variable (POPCHG), since some claim its positive effect on the 1946 uprisings. Using Karl Deutsch's (1961) theory of social mobilization, for instance, Cumings (1981) argues that Korean peasants who migrated to Japan, Manchuria, and northern industrial areas were exposed to "leftist ideologies" and experienced a process of "social mobilization." These migrants, upon return to home villages after liberation, agitated the uprisings. Revising Cumings's measure (i.e., population change from 1944 to 1946), I assess the impact of social mobilization by subtracting population change in the 1930–40 period from population change in the postwar era (1944–46). Population change seems a good measure of social mobilization since the nearly 20% increase in population within one year after liberation is well above a natural increase.

Tenancy rate (TENANCY) is controlled since it allegedly influences

⁹ To include peasant union strength in the analysis would be interesting. Unfortunately, detailed information on county-level peasant unions is lacking, though we can safely assume, as discussed above, that PC strength in general reflected peasant union power in a given county (see Cumings 1981).

¹⁰ Were there sufficient counties without a PC, comparison to counties with an NGPC and with a GPC would be useful. The small number of cases ($N = 7$) makes such comparison of little meaning.

peasant activism. Some argue that a tenancy system provokes revolutionary peasant movements (Paige 1975, Stinchcombe 1961, Zagoria 1974). According to Paige (1975), the sharecropper or tenant possesses characteristics conducive to class conflict that are similar to those of the working class: weak ties to the land, occupational homogeneity, and work group interdependence. In contrast, Alavi (1965), Wolf (1969), and Hofheinz (1977) view middle peasants as revolutionary, because the existence of a tenancy system indicates a strong landed power that might hinder the organization and mobilization of the tenant class into a protest movement. The extent of the tenancy system is measured by the percentage of arable land leased in both paddy and dry fields in 1945.

Market incursion into peasant villages is also often considered to be partly responsible for peasant uprisings (Hobsbawm 1959, Migdal 1974, Scott 1976, Wolf 1969). Thus, I include in my analysis the spread of capitalist market forces into agriculture, as denoted by the percentage of total arable land used in 1945 as paddy fields (PADDY)—site of the main commercial crop in colonial Korea, rice (from 1931 to 1940, 37.2% of its yield was exported to Japan), most subsistence crops such as beans and wheat were cultivated in dry fields (Suh 1978)¹¹

Modernization theorists argue that rising literacy promotes political participation by breaking down traditional worldviews (Levy 1966), whereas Scott (1976) and Wolf (1969) claim that peasants with such "entrenched precapitalist values" (i.e., low literacy) become rebellious. Chiot and Ragin (1975) argue that neither low literacy nor commercialization but their combined effect fosters rebellion: only where market forces are strong but peasants remain traditional is rural unrest high. The literacy rate (LITERACY) is measured by the percentage of peasant household members who can read Korean. Since no literacy rate data are available for 1945, Japanese colonial government 1938 data are used (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940b), I assume no significant change from 1938 to 1945.

The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (uprising vs. no uprising) violates the assumptions of ordinary least squares regression, thus requiring use of logistic regression analysis (Hanushek and Jackson 1977). Table 1 presents the variables' means and standard deviations.

ANALYSIS RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression of the variables. Model 1 shows the logistic regression coefficients of UPRISE on the structural

¹¹ Since few crops were commercialized in 1945 and 1946, this measure better reflects the degree of commercialization in the prewar period.

TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD
DISPUTE	Number of tenancy disputes, 1933-39	864	714
POPCHG (%)	Population change 1944-46 - population change 1930-40	15.5	8.8
TENANCY	Percentage of arable land leased, 1945	68.5	9.6
PADDY	Percentage of arable land used as paddy fields, 1945	59.3	11.5
LITERACY (%)	Literacy rate, 1938	30.9	10.8
RADICAL	Index of red union movement in 1930s	37	72
GPC	Governing people's committee in 1945	50	50
UPRISE	Peasant uprising in 1946	33	47

NOTE — $N = 123$

variables (i.e., POPCHG, TENANCY, PADDY, and LITERACY) without the two earlier experience measures (i.e., DISPUTE and RADICAL). This step shows whether the variables measuring experience are independent of the conditions identified in other theories of peasant protest and rebellion. Model 1 shows that TENANCY has a highly negative effect on UPRISE, being statistically significant at $\alpha = .01$, and the effect of PADDY is positive and significant at $\alpha = .10$. These findings alone seem to support the middle peasant thesis and commercialization theory: the existence of a strong landed class hindered mobilization of peasants for uprising whereas commercialization promoted it.

Model 2 introduces two major independent variables, DISPUTE and RADICAL, into model 1. This model shows the effects of these two experience measures on UPRISE, controlling for POPCHG, TENANCY, PADDY, and LITERACY. Both measures, DISPUTE and RADICAL, have weak positive effects on UPRISE, the former impact is significant at $\alpha = .10$, the latter at $\alpha = .15$. Also, model chi-square significantly improves after adding these two experience measures, the difference in model chi-square is 5.4 ($df = 2$) and statistically significant at $\alpha = .10$. The effect of TENANCY on UPRISE remains highly negative in model 2 but the commercialization effect becomes statistically nonsignificant.

To see whether the strength of a protest organization as measured by a GPC mediates any, even if weak, effects of past experience on uprising, this factor is introduced into the third model. If the relationship between past experience measures and uprising is entirely mediated through existence of a GPC, logistic coefficients of both measures would reduce to nearly zero after introducing GPC as an additional predictor variable.

Also, coefficients of past experience measures on GPC would be expected to be significant and the coefficient of GPC on UPRISE to be significantly positive. Model 3 and table 3 present the results.

Existence of a GPC does not seem to mediate the effects of past experience measures on uprising. First, logistic coefficients of both measures (DISPUTE and RADICAL) become statistically nonsignificant at $\alpha = .10$ and $\alpha = .20$, respectively, after introducing the organization variable. As expected, GPC also shows a significant positive effect on UPRISE. However, measures of past protest experience have no significant effects on GPC, as table 3 shows. These findings suggest that effects of past political experience on uprising are at best accounted for but not mediated by a GPC.

TABLE 2
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS DESCRIBING PREDICTORS' EFFECTS ON UPRISE

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	3.668 (1.667)	.704 (2.192)	.838 (2.249)	.6103 (5.052)
DISPUTE (log)		1.371* (.804)	1.322 (.840)	— .471 (1.328)
RADICAL		.446 (.294)	.383 (.307)	.024 (.737)
POPCHG	.013 (.013)	.014 (.014)	.019 (.015)	.077*** (.029)
TENANCY	— .097*** (.032)	— .099*** (.034)	— .100*** (.036)	— .124*** (.040)
PADDY	.042* (.023)	.027 (.025)	.019 (.027)	.016 (.071)
LITERACY	— .020 (.021)	— .024 (.022)	— .024 (.022)	— .041 (.133)
GPC			.972** (.473)	— .7801 (4.759)
DISPUTE (log) \times GPC				.3720** (1.703)
RADICAL \times GPC				.586 (.832)
POPCHG \times GPC				— .093*** (.034)
PADDY \times LITERACY				.001 (.002)
χ^2	24.3***	29.7***	34.1***	48.6***

NOTE.—SEs in parentheses, $N = 123$.

* $P < .10$.

** $P < .05$.

*** $P < .01$ —all one-tailed.

My foregoing theoretical reasoning holds that although protest experiences raise participants' consciousness, such consciousness alone may not foment uprising. The contribution of consciousness turns upon whether it is effectively organized and mobilized by a protest organization. Thus, we should find effects of interaction between past experience measures and the existence of a GPC, only when protest experience is mobilized through a protest organization would it contribute to collective action.

Model 4 in table 2 presents the results of a logistic regression of UPRISE with possible interaction terms. I include four interaction terms in the equation: $\text{DISPUTE} \times \text{GPC}$, $\text{RADICAL} \times \text{GPC}$, $\text{POPCHG} \times \text{GPC}$, and $\text{PADDY} \times \text{LITERACY}$.¹² This nonadditive model offers better specification than the additive one (model 3), the difference in model chi-square is statistically significant at $\alpha = .01$ ($\chi^2 = 14.5$, $df = 4$). Also, if we examine individual interaction terms (model 4), of the two protest experience measures, DISPUTE has a statistically significant positive interaction effect with GPC on UPRISE (coefficient of 3.72, $P < .05$) but RADICAL does not. Also, POPCHG has a statistically significant interaction effect with GPC, though it is negative (coefficient of $-.093$, $P < .01$). No interaction effect obtains between PADDY and LITERACY.

These results support the claim that tenancy dispute experience in the 1930s contributed to the 1946 uprising when mobilized by a protest organization, a GPC. Red peasant union movement experience does not show the same result. Such an insignificant effect of red peasant union movement is not too surprising, however, given that this movement prevailed in the North (see Yoo 1974). It is also perhaps related to the fact that red peasant union movements suffered severe colonial government repression, this chilly memory of repression may have impeded postwar peasant organization and mobilization. As Scott's study of peasant rebellion in Southeast Asia of the 1930s points out: "The tangible and painful memories of repression must have a chilling effect on peasants who contemplate even minor acts of resistance. It may well be that the experience of defeat for one generation of peasants precludes another rebellion until a new generation has replaced it. The memory of repression is one of the principal explanations for the absence of resistance and revolt" (1976, pp. 226–27). Similar memories of suppression among Korean peasants may be responsible for the insignificant effect of the red peasant union movement on the uprisings (see Muller [1985], Muller and Seligson [1987], and Gurr [1968] for a general explanation of repression's inhibiting effect on political violence).

¹² The rationale to include $\text{POPCHG} \times \text{GPC}$ is discussed below.

TABLE 3

LOGIT COEFFICIENTS DESCRIBING
PREDICTORS' EFFECTS ON GPC

Variable	Coefficient	SE
Constant	-2.622	1.951
DISPUTE (log)	.887	.637
RADICAL	.297	.276
POPCHG	-.014	.012
TENANCY	-.025	.027
PADDY	.037*	.022
LITERACY	-.009	.019
χ^2	9.0	

NOTE.— $N = 123$ * $P < .10$

Other features of the findings relate to previous studies. First, population change exerts no significant effect on either uprisings (see models 1–3 in table 2) or PC strength (see table 3), contradicting Cumings's (1981) argument.¹³ Yet it has a strong negative interaction effect with GPC on uprisings (see model 4 in table 2); this indicates that the effect of population change is weaker for counties with a GPC than for counties without. Specifically, examination of the POPCHG coefficients for separate subsamples of counties with and without a GPC shows that the effect of population change is positive and significant for counties without a GPC but is negative and nonsignificant for counties with a GPC (this is also seen by deviating the interaction coefficient from the POPCHG coefficient in table 4).

A basic assumption of social mobilization theory suggests why this is so: social mobilization can influence the political behavior of people "who live in areas in which the mass of population are largely excluded from political participation," by bringing with it "an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population" (Deutsch 1961, p. 499). The data confirm this effect. Observe that counties with a GPC in 1945 had peasants much more active in politics in the 1930s than those without. For instance, counties with a GPC averaged 960 tenancy disputes per county from 1933 to 1939, whereas counties without averaged 770 disputes; the difference is statistically significant ($t = 1.48$, $P < .10$). Similarly, the

¹³ This is not surprising, as almost all PCs were organized before most migrants began to return to their home villages (Trewartha and Zelinsky 1955). Cumings (1981), combining PC strength with the occurrence of rebellion to create an index of peasant radicalism, cannot separate the effect of population change on each. This flaw also recommends my dependent variable measure above Cumings's.

TABLE 4
COMPARISON BETWEEN KYŎNGSANG AND CHŎLLA PROVINCES

Province	N	Uprising Started	Tenancy Rate (%)	Counties with Uprising (%)
North Kyŏngsang	22	Early October	57.9	82
South Kyŏngsang	17	Mid-October	61.8	35
South Chŏlla	20	Late October	72.2	30
North Chŏlla	13	Mid-December	81.1	15
All counties analyzed	123		68.5	33

NOTE.—N indicates number of counties analyzed, bottom row includes data not just for Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces but for all counties included in this study (see appendix for list)

difference in the radicalism index of the red peasant union movement of the 1930s between counties with and without a GPC is statistically significant at $\alpha = .10$ ($t = 1.43$). Going one step further, it seems plausible that, in counties without a GPC and where peasants had relatively little political experience during the colonial period, returning migrants who had experienced "social mobilization" provided "politically relevant" strata for the uprisings. In this manner the existence of a significant effect of social mobilization (measured by relative population change) only in counties without a GPC makes sense. (Model 4 in table 2 shows a logistic regression coefficient of .077 [$P < .01$] for counties without a GPC [$i.e., GPC = 0$])¹⁴

In a second finding that bears on previous studies, tenancy rate consistently exerts a highly negative effect on uprising, statistically significant in both additive and nonadditive models (see table 2). This finding contradicts the class conflict model prediction that a tenancy system is more likely to provoke revolutionary movements (Paige 1975, Stinchcombe 1961) and instead supports the middle peasant thesis (Alavi 1965, Wolf 1969). Given that in Korea the tenancy rate was high in areas with big landlords who controlled a substantial amount of land, a high rate probably indicates a strong landed class. One can suppose that in such areas the landed class could hinder the organization and mobilization of peasants for uprisings (Cumings 1981).

Yet the persistence of a highly negative effect of tenancy rate on uprising cannot merely be attributed to strong landed power. For, if so, it should have wielded a similarly significant negative effect on PC strength. That is, existence of strong landed class should have hindered

¹⁴ This also illuminates Cumings's insufficiently explained finding that population change is responsible for rebellions only in 41 counties. See Cumings (1981), table 12.

PCs from obtaining governing positions, although negative, its effect is not statistically significant (see table 3). The highly negative effect of tenancy rate on uprising but not on PC strength suggests that the effect on uprising may simply indicate a regional difference between the Kyöngsang and the Chölla provinces.¹⁵ Uprisings did not erupt nationwide simultaneously, igniting in Taegu in North Kyöngsang province, they spread into other areas such as the Chölla provinces over approximately three months. Because the 1946 uprisings started in Taegu, they spread most widely in North Kyöngsang and only weakly in Chölla.

To examine the effect of this differential spread, I compare the extent of uprising participation and tenancy rate among Kyöngsang and Chölla (both North and South) provinces. As table 4 shows, as uprisings spread from North Kyöngsang in early October to South Kyöngsang in mid-October, to South Chölla in late October, and finally to North Chölla in mid-December, uprising participation substantially declined (from 82% to 35% to 30% to 15%). Tenancy was historically much higher in the Chölla provinces than in the Kyöngsang provinces. Thus, the decreasing uprising participation may have coincidentally joined with an increasing tenancy rate to produce a highly negative correlation between the two (see table 4). The present data cannot determine whether the persistently strong negative effect of tenancy rate on uprising reflects the existence of a strong landed class or simply a differential spread effect; findings presented above indicate that perhaps both factors operate.

Finally, neither commercialization, nor literacy rate, nor any interaction effect of the two shows a significant effect on uprising (see table 2). This result is not unexpected, however, since penetration of market forces into the villages was not a major issue in the 1946 peasant uprisings. Were the uprisings a response to market forces that undermined peasant interests, we would expect a significant commercialization effect. They were, rather, political protests against the military government, local government officials who also served during Japanese rule, and collaborative local elites such as landlords. That the commercialization measure had no direct significant effect on uprising, however, should not be interpreted as invalidating the commercialization thesis altogether. Commercialization had a significant positive effect on uprising in model 1 before introducing protest experience measures (see table 2) and a significant effect on the strength of PCs (see table 3), and thus had an indirect effect on uprising through GPC.

There are a number of reasons for this indirect effect. First, disappearance of a significant effect of PADDY on UPRISE in the second model

¹⁵ I am grateful to an *AJS* reviewer for suggesting this possibility.

in table 2 seems due to its high correlation with DISPUTE ($r = .37$). Although no causal claim about the effect of commercialization on tenancy disputes can be made since the former is a postwar measure and the latter a prewar one, if we assume that the percentage of arable land used for paddy fields reflects the extent of commercialization in the prewar period, especially the 1930s, we can state that commercialization was related to tenant activism. In fact, previous studies show that commercialization was highly responsible for tenancy disputes in the 1920s and 1930s (see Shin 1990, 1993). Accordingly, the tenancy dispute number perhaps mediates the commercialization effect.

Also, the indirect effect of commercialization on uprising through GPC suggests its effect on peasant activism is more complex than argued in previous theories of peasant protest and rebellion. Most previous theories tend to target the disruptive (Scott 1976, Wolf 1969) or opportunistic (Popkin 1979) effect of commercialization on the peasant economy as provoking protest action. Yet in Korean uprisings, as shown above, market forces were not a major issue. Nevertheless, market forces may have influenced uprisings by changing the rural occupational structure, especially after they became a major factor in the rural economy and society (in Korea they were in full force by the 1920s and 1930s). In other words, increasing commercialization could increase differentiation among peasants that would in turn "break their ties to tradition and to longstanding work patterns and make them available for new forms of activity, including political participation" (Cumings 1981, p. 347, see also Paige 1975). In fact, Cumings's (1981) analysis of 15 counties with relevant data shows a significant positive relationship between PC strength and a more differentiated occupational distribution. That is, PCs were strong in counties with "a low percentage in agriculture and high percentage in skilled and unskilled occupations, students and professionals, and school graduates" (p. 348). Also, of the 14 counties (excluding Puk Cheju with no data available), the seven with high occupational differentiation showed higher commercialization than the seven others (64% of land in paddy fields vs 52%). These data suggest commercialization contributed to uprising by producing a differentiated occupational structure with workers, students, and intellectuals who would play a key role in protest organizations like GPCs in postwar Korea. Also, that peasants' protest experience had no significant effect on the existence of a GPC (see table 3) but needed to be mobilized for uprising by the GPC suggests that a substantial part of GPC leadership perhaps came from other than the peasantry, as is the case in most other peasant uprisings and revolutions (Migdal 1974, Wolf 1969).¹⁶

¹⁶ Overall poor model specification of PC strength in table 3 also suggests a need to include nonagrarian variables in the model to reflect the role of workers, students, and intellectuals in organizing and mobilizing peasants into an uprising.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of peasant protest movements in the first half of 20th-century Korea that culminated in the 1946 uprisings shows the importance of a historical perspective in explaining social protest movements. The widespread peasant radicalism in liberated Korea did not flare up overnight simply upon removal of Japanese rule. Nor was it either the result of agitation by the North Korean communists as the official account of the uprisings claims (see U S Army 1988, 3 365–71), or as Henderson argues (1968), merely an “anomic” and “pathological” expression of the “rootless” mass. It had much deeper historical origins. Postwar radicalism built on peasant consciousness enhanced through participation in colonial protest and resistance. Particularly, political and national consciousness raised through participation in tenancy disputes in the 1930s and nurtured during the war years through passive forms of resistance provided a crucial resource for postwar activism. While destruction of colonial power no doubt provided structural conditions for the uprisings (see Skocpol 1979), that Korean peasants could have been mobilized into uprisings in the same way without such political experience is doubtful. A protest “frame” (to use Snow and Benford’s [1988] term) created by colonial protest and resistance shaped the issues and targets of the 1946 uprisings, and these experienced peasants provided a crucial resource for the uprisings, that is, a potentially mobilizable body of participants.

Yet, while one cannot deny the role of some key leaders of colonial period red union movement in postwar activism, at the aggregate level red union experience did not prove as crucial a resource as tenancy dispute experience. This insignificance appears primarily to result from the fact that the movements invited severe government repression that may also have impeded postwar organization and mobilization of peasants. Although no direct test can be done with the Korean case, it would seem that a chilly memory of repression or the presence of repression would inhibit protest action (see Muller 1985, Muller and Seligson 1987).

Such varying effects of different colonial protest experiences compel rethinking previous studies that link postwar peasant activism to colonial protest experiences without specifying the kind of experience. As mentioned above, most previous studies link postwar activism to red union experience by examining isolated cases (An 1990, Chŏng 1988, Cumings 1981). Unfortunately they do not consider tenant protest experience or mount any rigorous empirical test. The statistical analysis of colonial and postwar peasant activism advanced here clearly shows that dispute experience was more crucial to the occurrence of the 1946 uprisings.

While colonial experience in tenancy disputes contributed to the 1946 uprisings, this analysis also shows that this contribution turned upon

mobilization by GPCs. That is, peasant consciousness enhanced through protest participation proved crucial to the occurrence of uprising only when mobilized through a protest organization. The detection of this interaction of past protest with an organization variable is a substantial advance over earlier cross-national studies (e.g., Gurr 1968) that largely failed to specify the impact of past conflict on present conflict. Furthermore, the political opportunity structure such as the power of the local landed class, measured by tenancy rate, was crucial for outbreaks. These findings attest to the usefulness of resource mobilization theory in explaining social protest movements even in an authoritarian Third World country and suggest that we should view with caution works that stress the spontaneous character of uprising (see Cumings 1981). They also strongly suggest uprisings were not anomic symptoms of social disorganization produced by decolonization (Henderson 1968, pp. 136–47) or simply agitated by Soviet-backed North Korea (U.S. Army 1988, 3:347–98). Rather, statistical analysis supports Cumings's (1981) claim that uprisings were the result of effective mobilization of peasants affiliated with local GPCs. Thus, the Korean case clearly shows that both the historical formation of consciousness through protest experience and its organization and mobilization for protest action must be considered in any comprehensive analytical treatment of collective action and social protest movements.

Future research on social movements should focus on the interaction between internal and external resources in explaining protests. Neither consciousness nor collective interests should be assumed to be constant over time; analyses of collective actions must include the historical processes in which they are formulated and reformulated. Also to be further specified is how historical experience influences subsequent action other than by raising consciousness, such as by developing "activist networks" (McAdam 1989, Taylor 1989) or by producing "repertoires of collective action" (Tilly 1978). In addition, experience other than political, such as in the workplace or the family, needs consideration as a means of raising collective consciousness or developing such networks or repertoires (Bourdieu 1985, Buechler 1990). In any case, history is not to be taken simply as a background for but as an integral part of collective action.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1

GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS ANALYZED

Province	Counties
North Chölla	Chün'an, Kūmsan, Muju, Changsu, Imsil, Namwōn, Sunch'ang, Chōng'ūp, Koch'ang, Puan, Kimje, Okku, Iksan
South Chölla	Kwangsan, Tamyang, Koksōng, Kurye, Kwangyang, Yōsu, Sunch'ōn, Kohūng, Posōng, Hwasun, Changhūng, Kangjū, Haenam, Yong'am, Muan, Naju, Hamp'yōng, Changsōng, Wando, Chindo
North Kyōngsang	Talsōng, Kunwhi, Ŭisōng, Andong, Ch'ōngsong, Yōngyang, Yōngdōk, Yōng'il, Kyōngju, Yōngch'ōn, Kyōngsan, Ch'ōngdo, Koryōng, Sōngju, Ch'ilgok, Kūmch'ōn, Sōnsan, Sangju, Mun'gyōng, Yech'ōn, Yōngju, Ponghwa
South Kyōngsang	Ŭiryōng, Ham'an, Ch'angnyōng, Miryang, Yangsan, Ulsan, Tongnae, Kimhae, T'ongyōng, Kosōng, Sach'ōn, Namhae, Hadong, Sanch'ōng, Hamyang, Kōch'ang, Hyōpch'ōn
Kyōnggi	Koyang, Yangju, P'och'ōn, Kap'yōng, Yangp'yōng, Yōju, Ich'ōn, Yong'in, Ansōng, P'yōngt'aek, Suwōn, Sihūng, Puch'ōn, Kimp'o, Kangwha, P'aju, Changdan, Kaep'ung
North Ch'ungch'ōng	Ch'ōngju, Poūn, Okch'ōn, Yōngdong, Chinch'ōn, Koesan, Ŭmsōng, Ch'ungju, Chech'ōn, Tanyang
South Ch'ungch'ōng	Taedōk, Yōn'gi, Kongju, Nonsan, Puyō, Sōch'ōn, Poryōng, Ch'ōngyang, Hongsōng, Yesan, Sōsan, Tangjū, Asan, Ch'ōnan
Kangwōn	Kangnūng, Samch'ōk, Uljū, Chōngsōn, P'yōngch'ang, Yōngwōl, Wōnju, Hoengsōng, Hongch'ōn

NOTE —N = 123

REFERENCES

- Alavi, Hamza 1965 "Peasants and Revolution " Pp 241-77 in *The Socialist Register* New York Monthly Review Press
- An, Chongch'öl 1990 "Haebang chikhu kōnguk chunbi wiwōnhoe chibang chojik kwa chibang inmin wiwōnhoe e kwanhan yōn'gu—Chōnam chibang ŭl chungsim ūro" (A study on local organizations of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence and on people's committees in South Chölla) Ph D dissertation Chōnam University, Political Science Department
- Arendt, Hannah 1951 *The Origins of Totalitarianism* New York Harcourt Brace
- Balbus, Isaac 1971 "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis " *Politics and Society* 1 151-77

- Bonnell, Victoria 1983 *Roots of Rebellion* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Boswell, Terry, and William Dixon 1990 "Dependency and Rebellion A Cross-National Analysis" *American Sociological Review* 55 540-59
- Bourdieu, Pierre 1985 "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups" *Theory and Society* 14 723-44
- Buechler, Steven 1990 *Women's Movements in the United States* New Brunswick, N J Rutgers University Press
- Chiot, Daniel, and Charles Ragin 1975 "The Market, Tradition and Peasant Rebellion The Case of Romania in 1907" *American Sociological Review* 40 428-44
- Chōng, Haegu 1988 *10wŏl inmin hangjaeng yŏn'gu* (A study of the October people's uprisings) Seoul Yŏrŭmsa
- Chōsen sŏtokufu (Government-General of Korea) 1934 *Chōsen ni okeru kosaku ni kansuru sankō jikō tekiryō* (A briefing on tenancy-related issues in Korea) Keijō Chōsen sŏtokufu
- 1940a *Chōsen nochi nenpō* (Annual report of Korean agricultural lands), vol 1 Keijō Chōsen sŏtokufu
- 1940b *Noka keizai gaikyo chōsa—kosaku nouka 1933-1938* (Survey of peasant economy—tenant households) Keijō Chōsen sŏtokufu
- Cummings, Bruce 1981 *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol 1 Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Davies, James 1962 "Toward a Theory of Revolution" *American Sociological Review* 27 5-18
- Deutsch, Karl 1961 "Social Mobilization and Political Development" *American Political Science Review* 55 (3) 493-514
- Eckert, Carter 1994 "Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea" In *The Japanese Wartime Empire*, edited by Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie Princeton, N J Princeton University Press In press
- Gamson, William 1975 *The Strategy of Social Protest* Homewood, Ill Dorsey
- Golden, Miriam 1988 "Historical Memory and Ideological Orientations in the Italian Workers' Movement" *Politics and Society* 16 1-34
- Gurr, Ted 1968 "A Causal Model of Civil Strife A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices" *American Political Science Review* 62 1104-24
- 1970 *Why Men Rebel* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Gurr, Ted, and Raymond Duvall 1973 "Civil Conflict in the 1960s A Reciprocal Theoretical System with Parameter Estimates" *Comparative Political Studies* 6 (2) 135-69
- Hanushek, Eric, and John Jackson 1977 *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists* New York Academic Press
- Henderson, Gregory 1968 *Korea The Politics of the Vortex* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Hirsch, Eric 1990 "Sacrifice for the Cause Group Processes, Recruitment, and Commitment in a Student Social Movement" *American Sociological Review* 55 243-54
- Hobsbawm, Eric 1959 *Primitive Rebels* New York Norton
- Hofheinz, Roy, Jr 1977 *The Broken Wave The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922-1928* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Hwang, Namjun 1987 "Chōnnam chibang chōngch'i wa yŏ-sun sagŏn" (Local politics in South Chōlla province and the Yŏ-Sun incident) Pp 413-96 in *Haebang Chōnhusa ūi insik* 3 (Perspectives on Korean history in the pre- and postwar eras, vol 3) Seoul Han'gilsa
- Jenkins, J Craig 1983 "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements" *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 527-53
- Jenkins, J Craig, and Charles Perrow 1977 "Insurgency of the Powerless Farm Workers Movement (1946-1972)" *American Sociological Review* 42 249-68

- Kang, Jeong-Koo 1989 "Rethinking South Korean Land Reform Focusing on U S Occupation as a Struggle against History " Ph D dissertation University of Wisconsin—Madison, Department of Sociology
- Kim, Namsik 1974 *Namnodang yŏn'gu charyojip* (Materials on the South Korean Workers Party), vols 1 and 2 Seoul Kotae asea munje yŏn'guso
- Kim, Sango 1981 "Nongmin 1 ssaun ilchemal" (Peasant resistance in the last years of Japanese colonialism) *Sindonga* 4 (10) 99–104
- Kim, T'aeil 1990 "Kun tanw1 chiyŏk sahoe wa nongmin t'ongge" (County-level local society and peasant control) Pp 63–82 in *Chiyŏk sahoe chibae kujowa nongmin* (Power structure of local society and peasants), edited by Han'guk nong'ŏch'on sahoe yŏn'guso Seoul Yŏn'gusa
- Kim, Yongbok 1989 "Haebang chikhu pukhan inmin wiwŏnhoe ūi chojik kwa hwaldong" (The organization and activities of people's committees in the North after liberation) Pp 180–240 in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* 5 (Perspectives on Korean history in the pre- and postwar eras, vol 5) Seoul Han'gilsa
- Klandermans, Bert 1984 "Mobilization and Participation Social-Psychological Explanations of Resource Mobilization Theory " *American Sociological Review* 49 583–600
- Klein, Ethel 1984 *Gender Politics* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- 1987 "The Diffusion of Consciousness in the United States and Western Europe " Pp 23–43 in *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe*, edited by Mary Katzenstein and Carol Mueller Philadelphia Temple University Press
- Kornhauser, W 1959 *The Politics of Mass Society* New York Free Press
- Lai, Tse-han, Ramon Myers, and Wei Wou 1991 *A Tragic Beginning The Taiwan Uprisings of February 28, 1947* Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press
- Levy, Marion 1966 *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Lew, Young Ick 1990 "The Conservative Character of the 1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising " *Journal of Korean Studies* 7 149–80
- McAdam, Doug 1982 *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* Chicago University of Chicago Press
- 1989 "The Biographical Consequences of Activism " *American Sociological Review* 54 744–60
- McCarthy, John, and Mayer Zald 1977 "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements " *American Journal of Sociology* 82 1212–41
- Meade, E Grant 1951 *American Military Government in Korea* New York King's Crown Press at Columbia University
- Migdal, Joel S 1974 *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution* Princeton, N J Princeton University Press
- Morris, Aldon 1992 "Political Consciousness and Collective Action " Pp 351–73 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Morris, Aldon, and Carol Mueller, eds 1992 *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Mueller, Carol 1987 "Collective Consciousness, Identity Transformation, and the Rise of Women in Public Office in the United States " Pp 89–108 in *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe*, edited by Mary Katzenstein and Carol Mueller Philadelphia Temple University Press
- Muller, Edward 1985 "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence " *American Sociological Review* 50 47–61
- Muller, Edward, and Mitchell Seligson 1987 "Inequality and Insurgency " *American Political Science Review* 81 425–49
- Paige, Jeffery 1975 *Agrarian Revolution* New York Free Press

- Pak, Hyesuk 1987 "Mi kunjǒnggi nongmin undong kwa chǒnnong ū undong nosŏn" (Peasant movements and the policy line of the National League of Peasant Union during American military rule in Korea) Pp 353-412 in *Haebang chǒnhusa ū insik 3* (Perspectives on Korean history in the pre- and postwar eras, vol 3) Seoul Han'gilsa
- Piven, Frances, and Richard Cloward 1977 *Poor People's Movements* New York Vintage
- Popkin, Samuel 1979 *The Rational Peasant* Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press
- Quarton, Harold 1942 "Survey of Current Political Thought and Temper of the Korean People" *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Korea (1940-44)* Washington, D C National Archives Microfilm, reel 1
- Russett, Bruce 1964 "Inequality and Instability The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics" *World Politics* 16 442-54
- Scott, James 1976 *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- 1985 *Weapons of the Weak* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press
- Sewell, William 1980 *Work and Revolution in France* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Shin, Gi-Wook 1990 "Defensive Struggles or Forward-Looking Efforts? Tenancy Disputes in Colonial Korea" *Journal of Korean Studies* 7 3-33
- 1991 *Social Change and Peasant Protest in Colonial Korea* Ph D dissertation University of Washington, Seattle, Department of Sociology
- 1993 "Class and Nation Tenant-Landlord Conflict in Colonial Korea, 1933-39" Paper presented at the 45th annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Los Angeles
- Skocpol, Theda 1979 *States and Social Revolutions* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Smelser, Neil 1963 *The Theory of Collective Behavior* New York Free Press
- Snow, David, and Robert Benford 1988 "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization" *International Social Movement Research* 1 197-217
- Song, Ch'ansŏp, et al 1988 *1862 nyŏn nongmin hangjaeng* (The 1862 peasant uprisings) Seoul Mang'wŏn han'guksa yŏn'gusil
- Stinchcombe, Arthur 1961 "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations" *American Journal of Sociology* 67 165-76
- Suh, Sang-Chul 1978 *Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean Economy, 1910-1940* Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press
- Tarrow, Sidney 1988 "National Politics and Collective Action Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States" *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 421-40
- 1989 *Democracy and Disorder* Oxford Oxford University Press
- Taylor, Verta 1989 "Social Movement Continuity The Women's Movement in Abeyance" *American Sociological Review* 54 761-75
- Thompson, E P 1978 "Eighteenth-Century English Society Class Struggle without Class?" *Social History* 3 (2) 133-65
- Tilly, Charles 1978 *From Mobilization to Revolution* Reading, Mass Addison-Wesley
- 1979 "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750-1830" Pp 126-55 in *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, edited by Mayer Zald and John McCarthy Cambridge, Mass Winthrop
- Trewartha, Glenn, and Wilbur Zelinsky 1955 "Population Distribution and Change in Korea, 1925-49" *Geographical Review* 45 1-26
- Turner, Ralph, and Lewis Killian 1987 *Collective Behavior*, 3d ed Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice-Hall

American Journal of Sociology

- U S Army [1948] 1988 *History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea*, 4 vols
Seoul Tolbege
- Walton, John 1992 *Western Times and Water Wars* Berkeley and Los Angeles
University of California Press
- Walton, John, and Charles Ragin 1990 "Global and National Sources of Political
Protest Third World Responses to the Debt Crisis " *American Sociological Review*
55 876-90
- Wolf, Eric 1969 *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* New York Harper & Row
- Yoo, Sehee 1974 "The Korean Communist Movement and the Peasantry under
Japanese Rule " Ph D dissertation Columbia University, Department of Political
Science
- Zagoria, Donald 1974 "Asian Tenancy Systems and Communist Mobilization of the
Peasantry " Pp 29-60 in *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia*,
edited by John Lewis Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press

Book Reviews

Potter Addition Poverty, Family, and Kinship in a Heartland Community By David L. Harvey New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993 Pp 326 \$43.95

Ann R. Tickamyer
University of Kentucky

Potter Addition joins the small but growing collection of community case studies exploring cultural dimensions of poverty and social marginality. It augments these studies by scrutinizing a Midwestern community rather than a region more typically associated with economic hardship such as Appalachia or the Deep South. Similarly, its subjects—poor, nonethnic whites located in the gray area of the rural-urban fringe—set it apart from studies of either urban inner-city poverty or remote rural pockets of deprivation. The book recounts fieldwork initiated in the late 1960s at the height of the War on Poverty, but the subsequent analysis builds on the original research to span the intervening years. Its purpose is to depict the “lived, everyday experience” of poverty from the bottom up, both to honor the resourcefulness of this segment of the population and to serve as a vehicle for theoretical analysis and critical reevaluation of theories of poverty. These goals intersect in the pursuit of empirical and conceptual meaning for the much maligned concept of the “culture of poverty.”

This project is ambitious and subject to numerous pitfalls. Harvey charts a risky course in his attempt to reclaim core value from Oscar Lewis’s original formulation by conducting a cultural study of poverty along the lines of the revived interest in the sociology of culture. He both spectacularly succeeds and falls short in this effort.

At a theoretical level, he provides a thoughtful exploration of Lewis’s work, reclaiming the culture of poverty by constructing a “reproductive model of poverty” that avoids both the victim-blaming caricature of a lower-class pathological subculture familiar from conservative circles and the wholesale rejection of cultural formulations by many liberals. Equally intriguing is the effort to combine an emphasis on environmental exigencies culled from ecological theory with the cultural analysis to show how many of the traits attributed to the poor are actually linked to the “variable social and economic environments” (p. 24) that defy subjects’ ability and desires for control. The result is Harvey’s identification of a culture of poverty consisting of both the concrete reality of material deprivation and the structures and mechanisms constructed by the poor to respond to economic uncertainty. The lives of the poor enact the struggle to gain control over what is fundamentally beyond their control. Thus, the repro-

Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from the author.

ductive model of poverty adds to a growing effort to avoid the ideological pitfalls of much debate over the last decade while retaining what is valuable from a variety of approaches

Somewhat less informative, although too closely intertwined to completely separate, is Harvey's exposition of Marxist theory. While usefully providing a structural context in which to view the economic travails of this community and though augmented by insights from neo-Marxist cultural critique, it adds little to what is largely an intraclass analysis.

Finally, the extensive theoretical discussion of lower-class families is both overly dense and too entrenched in the family theory dominant at the time of the original field research. In the interim, the study of the family and of poverty has expanded rapidly. Theoretical developments such as gender and life-course analyses could have contributed to unraveling the social logic of living poor.

Any shortcomings in the theoretical framework are compensated for by the richness of the empirical analysis. This book is a fascinating account of the exigencies of lower-class life, and the conceptual tools Harvey uses to find meaning and understanding of the poor's individual trials, family and community life, and economic struggles are more than adequate for accomplishing his goal to "penetrate the gritty empirical details of living poor and expose the real structures that generate the everyday life of poverty" (p. 9). From the initial description of the community, drawn from Harvey's first encounter with Potter Addition, to the vivid portraits of key informants and subjects, the setting and its residents aptly illustrate the author's lessons on the way the poor are at once the subject and object of their social and economic life. The book ends with an updated view of this community and its residents as well as a provocative analysis of the shortcomings of current poverty policy and analysis.

This book is a lively and thought-provoking account of a much maligned social group, and there is much to engage scholars from a variety of areas and perspectives. It is an impressive undertaking which is to be commended for both the breadth and the depth of its analysis. It can be read at a number of levels and should prove useful for both upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses as well as for scholars of poverty, community, the family, and stratification.

American Dreams, Rural Realities: Family Farms in Crisis. By Peggy F. Barlett. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Pp. 305. \$45.00 (cloth), \$18.95 (paper).

Sonya Salamon

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Midwestern Corn Belt farms dominate images of American agriculture. Peggy Barlett expands our vision, through her comprehensive study of

Dodge County in central Georgia, with a Southern pattern of working the nation's land. Her research was carried out in the 1980s, when years of drought and the national "farm crisis" combined to shape an environment in which survival was a cruel struggle for Dodge County families. Barlett, an economic anthropologist, assumes that farmers make rational choices to maximize chances at achieving particular goals. Accordingly, Barlett poses a question about the 1980s financial shakeout in Dodge County: Why among similar farms (in size and soils) were some in healthy financial shape and others highly indebted or driven out of business? In answering this question Barlett cogently uses her field study to explore key theoretical debates regarding the stability of the midsized family farm, the impact of changing gender roles on families, and how the societal "realities" of consumerism, individualism, and short-term goals are played out in an agricultural context.

Barlett regards cultural and familial factors to be as critical to farm survival as factors of conventional wisdom: soils, markets, social structure, and the economy. Her thesis is that families differ according to whether their vision of "success" or the "good life" incorporates either agrarian or industrial ideals for family and farm. An industrial value orientation, according to Barlett, reflects penetration of an affluent middle-class urban lifestyle into the rural South. Industrial-model families value a schedule freed from the constraints of the agricultural cycle, are dedicated to social mobility, measure progress in goods obtained, and encourage children to find a better life by leaving farming. Alternatively, for families with an agrarian value orientation, hard work, frugality, and nonfinancial measures of success are dominant. For such families an organic relationship maintains among farm, family, and work. Pursuing an industrial family model means that individual goals and consumption cause farming to lose its centrality as the source of family meaning or preoccupations. Farming, for industrial-model families, is a job rather than a way of life, a means to gain upward mobility and financial security. The book explores how the industrial model undermined the modest lifestyle, multigenerational cooperation, and work ethic that, Barlett demonstrates with financial and other data, was the surest means to survival during the 1980s.

Barlett shows that the clash of agrarian values with industrial ideals is a conflict that has long permeated Southern rural society. Dodge County is predominantly white and historically made up of hard-scrabble sharecropping and small farms, in which even the wealthier had a hard life. Barlett convincingly shows that many poor farmers longed for an elite way of life and when technological and market mechanisms provided the means, they grasped for the change. Barlett argues that those with an industrial worldview buy into the consumer society where success is measured by income and lifestyle and where rampant individualism pushes families toward materialistic accumulation. For these families, taking an off-farm job makes great sense, as Barlett cogently demonstrates. Off-farm work has meant increased income in the past 40 years.

During a time of drought and financial crisis, selling their labor seems more secure to farmers than the long-term strategy of gaining ownership of the means of production. Barlett has more difficulty pinpointing why some families resisted the industrial model. Unlike the Midwest, where I identified ethnicity as the wellspring for similar farming patterns, Dodge County lacks distinct ethnic enclaves. Barlett seems to argue that families with a more cautious management style, who value self-sufficiency, land ownership, and the nonfinancial benefits of farming, represent a model that recalls the poor, cooperative, and egalitarian past. Perhaps some were indelibly marked by the "Hoover Days" of the Great Depression. These cautious managers, according to Barlett, ultimately provided a model for retrenchment by those whose ambitious management brought them to the brink of disaster.

Barlett identifies particular features that characterize Southern family farming in rich ethnographic detail. Because Dodge County lacks a good educational system, farmers are not well-read and rely on information sources favoring the industrial model: agricultural journals and the mass media. Little commitment to soil stewardship is evident. Class differences in the historic South favored striving for upward mobility via financial success. Community solidarity and volunteerism seem not to motivate joint actions. Perhaps in this Bible Belt region the new, evangelical religions that endorse consumerism reinforce the industrial model more so than the traditional mainstream churches. Unfortunately, religion as the potential source of differing values is overlooked. Barlett, in a particularly strong and creative chapter on gender roles, shows how Southern women are pivotal in determining which management style is adopted. Their ambivalence toward farming, in particular, turned out to be critical to farm survival. Overall this book is an excellent, well-written study that substantially expands our understanding of connections between the micro level of households and the macro level of cultural trends.

Welfare States and Working Mothers: The Scandinavian Experience
By Arnlaug Leira. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp
xiv + 200.

Kimberly A. Reed
Fairleigh Dickinson University

In the "legend of the interventionist welfare state," social policy was used after World War II in Scandinavia to better the lives of women and children by providing state-sponsored child care and economic policies that offered new employment opportunities. It is a popular legend that deserves to be studied and tested with respect to real and changing definitions and practices in particular countries. Arnlaug Leira finds many contradictions in the relationship between how state policies in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway conceptualized motherhood, and thus made gen-

der salient to the construction of citizenship, and the everyday lives of working mothers

First, Leira finds that there is no shared model of child-care policies and women's work in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. The notion of a common Scandinavian model of reproduction policies has been exaggerated in theoretical discussions. The universalist ambition to provide day care for everyone who needs it has never been fully achieved, and the availability of child care has remained stratified by class and local incentives for investment in care programs. Nowhere in Scandinavia has supply met demand.

In Denmark and Sweden the need for women's labor was integrated into policies that produced more state-sponsored day care, good day care was seen in terms of the labor market. In Norway day care was defined in terms of a better socialization for children through early activities and education, there was resistance to the state usurping the definition of the traditional family. Local authorities were given responsibility for the structure and provision of public day care, but it was not mandatory for them to provide it. Child care in Norway remains rooted for many women in the informal, extrafamilial arrangements that are outside the state's sphere of responsibility. Social networks and informal care markets are larger than the public provision system.

A second compelling claim in Leira's work is that political institutionalization has lagged behind everyday practices of working mothers because policies were not developed to promote the combination of caring and earning that the majority of women practiced in their lives. The state making of motherhood was never done from the perspective of women who were adapting their lives to social changes. Women's definition as earners was never given equal weight to their definition as caregivers.

This brief but careful review of the history and implementation of policies that vary from state to state supports a critique of social research and theory that conceptualizes the state as taking over social reproduction, replacing the patriarchal family with new structures, or making a partnership with women. Mothers made different sets of alliances with a range of other parties: the state, their familial and extrafamilial networks, and their employers. Collective provisions alone have never met their needs or matched their everyday practices. The discussion of theories and research on women's relationship to the welfare states in Scandinavia is extensive and well informed. It calls us back to the level of everyday practices that theory purports to represent.

The development of welfare-state policies maintained a differentiation of access to entitlements and benefits that made gender salient in welfare-state citizenship through a hierarchy of work forms that accorded primacy to wage work, a presumption that caring remain a private responsibility, and a gendered division of labor. A dual concept of citizenship developed around the concept of the nuclear family, with the citizen as wage worker interdependent with the citizen as caregiver. Caring, paid

or unpaid, has never been integrated with the welfare-state system of entitlement to the same degree as employment. The employed-mother family challenges these assumptions and forms. Leira calls for a concept of citizenship that embraces employment and caregiving commitments. The model of the citizen as wage worker has discriminated against the citizen as caregiver. Changes in the way people live and practice their lives have made the old assumptions untenable. The contradictions rise to be addressed.

Sections of the book are interesting independent studies that are brought together under the common theme of tracing the relationship between how women practice their responsibilities as caregivers and the effects of welfare-state policies on their management of child-care and earning activities. There are more than enough ideas and issues in this complex study of structures and practices in relation to policy to sustain several books, but from chapter to chapter different levels of generalization are tied together skillfully. Anyone who wishes to understand the structures of child care in Scandinavia and how they have been shaped by different state policies in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark will profit from Leira's stimulating account.

Every Child a Lion. The Origins of Maternal and Infant Policy in the United States and France, 1890-1920. By Alisa Klaus. Ithaca, N Y: Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. viii + 298.

Barbara R. Bergmann
American University

At the start of the 20th century, campaigns to reduce infant mortality were going on in both France and the United States. By 1927 the American movement was past its prime, and federal government financial support had been terminated. By contrast, the French movement continued, blossoming into a set of generous and expensive programs that endure to this day. They include a health service that registers each pregnancy and birth, pays all of the medical costs, and sends out midwives and pediatric nurses to make home visits to pregnant women and to infants deemed at greater than normal risk. They also include government-paid maternity leave, government-subsidized day care for the infants of job-holding mothers, and income supplements to families with children.

Klaus's book describes the motives for the campaigns in both countries, describes the forms they took, and delineates the casts of characters. In France a low and falling birthrate produced fears that there would not be enough young men for the army that was needed to confront the Germans. The policymakers did not flatter themselves that they could get the women of France to raise the birthrate, so they decided to try to lower infant mortality. Regulation and eventual elimination of the

widespread practice of sending newborns to rural areas to be nursed by peasant women was one of the first aims. Getting better care for the infants of job-holding mothers was another.

A convincing account of the genesis of the U S movement is harder to convey, and Klaus is not as successful here. She evokes the rhetoric of the Progressive movement, which viewed child health as conducive to economic productivity and the avoidance of deviance. She reviews the fears that undesirable immigrant stocks were outbreeding the native born, whose survival rate needed to be bolstered. Perhaps the women's organizations and the women physicians needed a "womanly" cause that allowed them entry into the policy arena.

The forms the campaigns took in the two countries were quite different. Except for a short period in the 1920s, the U S federal government did little but foment activities by localities and citizen groups. By contrast, the French central government took a direct part in the provision and organization of services. Considerations of family privacy were not allowed to inhibit French government inspections or interventions.

The U S campaign featured attention-catching baby health contests, modeled after the state fairs, livestock contests, and baby parades. It had some worthwhile features: the establishment of sanitary milk dispensaries, the setting up of child health centers, and the popularization of medical examinations for well babies.

In France an all-male government bureaucracy controlled the action. In the United States the campaign was orchestrated by the Children's Bureau, the one government agency dominated by women. Klaus celebrates this organization by women as a point in favor of the U S effort. But the often paltry nature of the U S campaign and its demise under attack by the American Medical Association hardly come off as triumphs of female achievement.

Given the nativism of some of the U S campaign's backers, it is not surprising that it concentrated on white people in small towns and rural areas, people who were of the "right" ethnicity. Blacks badly needed help, but the Children's Bureau allowed women's organizations that excluded blacks to play the leading part in the campaign.

In France, ethnically more uniform, the children of the lower strata of society were quite acceptable as army recruits, so the baby-saving campaigns did reach them. There was considerable debate as to whether women who had babies out of wedlock should benefit from such programs. Despite conservative and Catholic opposition, it was decided that they should.

In the United States, government programs to help the poor were attacked as degrading. Right-wing opponents to government action to reduce infant mortality denounced such programs as "socialism, bolshevism, and sovietism," and recommended instead "more religion, better morals, better habits" (p. 272). This valuable book thus lends historical perspective to current controversies about how to rescue America's least-favored children.

World Changes in Divorce Patterns By William J. Goode New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1993 Pp. xiii + 354

Annemette Sørensen

Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung

In his latest book, William J. Goode takes us on another breathtaking tour of the world in his examination of changes in divorce patterns during the period 1950–90. As in his influential book on industrialization and family change (*World Revolution and Family Patterns* [New York: Free Press, 1963]), Goode dazzles the reader with an unbelievable amount of information about divorce trends and family systems in all corners of the world. The book is a treasure trove of hard-to-find data, and it will be a valuable source of reference for years to come, even though Yale University Press did not see fit to include a bibliography. The purpose of the book is to describe changes in divorce during a period when divorce rates have increased dramatically in many parts of the world and when speculation about the decline of the family abounds. Goode does not subscribe to pessimistic predictions, although he clearly sees the high divorce rates in some countries as worrisome because most societies have not worked out “social customs which define postdivorce care as both an individual and a collective responsibility” (p. 17).

The first six chapters of the book analyze patterns of change in divorce in regions that differ vastly in levels of divorce but share the experience of a rapid increase in divorce rates since 1950. Four chapters deal with northern Europe, southern European Catholic countries, the Nordic countries, and Eastern Europe before the collapse of state socialism. The commonalities of the Anglo-Saxon countries are the focus of a separate chapter, as is the situation in Latin America. The chapters on Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries describe patterns that are well known to most North American specialists in the family, but Goode provides a hard-to-find synthesis for each region, and the comparison of different regions in Europe, for example, makes clear how much the level of divorce varies within this fairly homogeneous set of countries. Divorce in Latin American countries presents a special challenge. Because consensual unions are such an important part of the family system there, official divorce rates provide poor estimates of the actual level of union dissolution. Dissolution rates of consensual unions are higher than of marriages, and since the proportion of unions that are consensual has been increasing over time, Goode concludes that there must also have been an increase in the dissolution rates of unions in Latin America.

The importance of the family system for our understanding of divorce and changes in divorce rates is made even more clear in the last three chapters of the book. Here Goode draws our attention to societies where divorce rates *declined*, largely because of industrialization. Countries such as Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia, as well as countries in the Arab world, have had a tradition of extremely high divorce rates

compared to the rest of the world, and in these countries, there has been a sustained decline in divorce until quite recently. As Goode's analysis makes clear, the traditional high-divorce family system differs in important ways from the modern Western high-divorce society. In the former, women were a valuable resource for families, and for that reason, remarriage rates were high, so very few women ended up as single heads of households. Most divorces occurred among young people very early in their first marriage, and later marriages typically were much more stable than first marriages, again contrary to the pattern observed in modern Western societies. The high divorce rates reflected a family system where marriage was used in the mate selection process (usually directed by the family of the young man): prospective wives were tested out and, if found unfit, sent back to their parents. Declines in divorce rates occurred when industrialization began to undermine the traditional family system. Here it is interesting to note that divorce in these societies, because of its acceptance under the traditional family system, began to be considered "rather uncouth" when these systems began to break down (p. 316). Nonetheless, once a modern family system has replaced the traditional, divorce will begin to increase again, and in some countries this trend has already begun.

Although Goode is somewhat hesitant about making predictions of future trends in divorce, he does conclude that most developed countries are or will become high-divorce-rate systems, because individuals are relatively independent of the family in these societies. Divorce will be common in modern and postmodern society. The lesson from the traditional high-divorce societies is clear: "We should institutionalize divorce—accept it as we do other institutions, and build adequate safeguards as well as social understandings and pressures to make it work reasonably well" (p. 345). Only in that way can the negative consequences of divorce be minimized.

Familiar Exploitation: A New Analysis of Marriage in Contemporary Western Societies. By Christine Delphy and Diana Leonard. Oxford: Polity Press, 1992. Pp. 301.

Denise D. Bielby
University of California, Santa Barbara

Delphy and Leonard modify Marxist-feminist analyses of the subordination of women in Western societies by focusing upon the relations of exchange within the institution of marriage. They target "relationships based on love," and focus their exploration upon the practical, sexual, procreative, and symbolic work done by women for men within family relationships. The credibility of this modified approach resides in the authors' reconceptualization of household labor and its ties to family relationships, and in that regard they offer some insights that

extend the human capital model of family behavior and decision making

Like others before them, they observe how marriage per se transforms the household into a unit of unpaid, unowned, and "unproductive" labor (by noting how, in contrast, the same labor of a housekeeper or a prostitute is considered productive because their labor occurs outside the context of marriage). They clarify how the line between production and consumption in the household is obscured, making difficult the assessment of household productivity, and how the value added by women to goods purchased with husbands' outside wages for consumption within the household is an unrecognized but essential contribution to a family's standard of living. Furthermore, they clarify that what is produced within the household has both use value and exchange value and that the two are not mutually exclusive as presumed by other scholars. They observe that exchange value can extend beyond the household unit, but because families see household labor as satisfying their own perceived needs, household labor is widely regarded as having no exchange value. This point complements England and Kilbourne's arguments (see "Markets, Marriages and Other Mates: The Problem of Power," in *Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society*, edited by R. Friedland and A. Robertson [New York: Aldine, 1990]) about the non-transferability of women's relationship-specific investments in marriage. The authors' theoretical analysis may provide insights for scholars particularly interested in further examination of Becker's tenets about the family (in *A Treatise on the Family* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981]).

Delphy and Leonard link these insights to the structural and patriarchal determinants that affect behavior within the institution of marriage. While familial relationships are organized by the family to suit itself and to maximize its own resources, Delphy and Leonard argue the family cannot be treated as an economic unit (in contrast to Becker's thesis), primarily because it is not comprised of equals. Age and gender are not just differences among family members, they are the basis for inequalities among them in the production, consumption, and intra- and interfamily transmission of household labor and its products. While this point is largely overlooked by economists interested in family decision making, its conceptual and empirical significance remains largely undeveloped by Delphy and Leonard.

The limitations of their framework are especially evident in the final chapter, which is devoted to an examination of some of the work done by wives within the context of marriage (e.g., direct contributions to husband's waged labor, moral support, domestic labor) compared to that done by husbands. Delphy and Leonard's unwavering commitment to a Marxist perspective generates some interesting theoretical insights into household labor, but that paradigm alone is insufficient for explaining the intersection of culture, affect, rationality, and power in the institution of marriage. Works such as DeVault's on the hiddenness of women's

caring work within families (*Feeding the Family* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991]), Fenstermaker's on household work as a gendered accomplishment (*The Gender Factory* [New York: Plenum, 1985]), and Brines's on gender beliefs as the currency of a symbolic exchange within social relationships ("The Exchange Value of Housework," *Rationality and Society*, 5, no. 3 [1993]) are more empirically grounded and conceptually richer because they draw upon multiple theoretical perspectives. In sum, while *Familial Exploitation* might remind sociologists about the relevance of Marxist theory to debates about the institution of marriage, the book is incomplete as either a theoretical explanation or a program for empirical research.

Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody. By Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. Pp. xi + 369.

Marygold S. Meli
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Dividing the Child is a major addition to the literature on an important social issue: child custody and support after divorce. It examines the roles of gender and conflict in the process by which parents make arrangements for the care and support of their children during and after divorce and the impact of public policy on that process. The authors studied 1,124 families who filed for divorce in two California counties and who were interviewed three times over a period of about three and one-half years. In this review I discuss the three most important issues explored in the study.

The role of gender—Regarding the role that gender plays in the parental arrangements, the researchers found, as might be expected, that before divorce both parents shared in the care of their children and contributed to family support. However, their primary roles were clearly gendered. In the majority of cases mothers were the primary caretakers, even when they worked full time, and fathers were the primary supporters, earning about twice as much as mothers. After divorce, mothers continued to be the primary child-care givers, but fathers were no longer the primary supporters of their children. Although 88% of the noncustodial fathers were ordered to pay child support, noncustodial financial support made up only about 15% of the custodial parent's postdivorce household income. Furthermore, as other studies have shown, compliance was a problem. By the end of the study those who paid in full had fallen to 57%.

Fathers in this study were much more involved than those in other studies. After three and one-half years only 14% of the children in sole mother custody had not seen their fathers within the last year. Fathers were also more apt to be involved in custody arrangements. For example,

75% of the cases involved joint legal custody, in other words, shared decision making. In these cases, the researchers found that changes in California law to allow joint legal custody and thus encourage both parents to remain involved with their children had been effective. However, in almost half of these cases, the children lived with their mothers and their fathers' involvement seemed to be no more than in cases of sole mother custody, joint legal custody was more symbolic than real.

In about 20% of the cases, the divorce decree provided for joint physical custody, meaning that the children would live with both parents. There was a downside to this dual residence, however. It appeared to be used as a settlement mechanism in high conflict cases. Although 20% of all cases resulted in joint physical custody, that was the outcome in 40% of the 166 cases classified as being high conflict cases. The researchers expressed concern about some of these cases because they exposed the children to continuous parental conflict. In addition, in a significant number of these cases the child actually lived with the mother, who then received reduced support based on shared time but provided full-time care.

Conflict in the divorce process —The findings in *Dividing the Child* offer new perspectives on issues of conflict in the divorce process. For example, the public perception is that the legal process of custody and support is characterized by strategic demands and high conflict. Maccoby and Mnookin systematically investigated these claims and found little foundation for that view. The great majority (75%) of the families reported little legal conflict over custody and support. In fact, only 1.5% of the cases required a judicial decision. The authors suggest that the low number of cases requiring judicial resolution may reflect the fact that California law mandates court-annexed mediation.

On another issue, the widely discussed fear that because mothers value custody so highly they trade it for child support, the study found no statistically persuasive evidence that mothers who were involved in high legal conflict had to give up support to win custody. The authors suggest that the certainty provided in California by child support guidelines and equal division of property may provide protection for mothers, important information from a public policy perspective.

Coparenting after divorce —*Dividing the Child* paints the most complete picture we have of how parents continue parenting functions after divorce. In the majority of the families studied, both parents continued contact with their children, making the quality of the coparenting relationship important. However, after three and one-half years only a minority of families cooperated in parenting and 25% of the parents still were judged to be highly conflicted. The most common approach was what the authors called parallel parenting with little communication between parents. Conflicted and cooperative parents were to be found in equal numbers in all residential arrangements—sole mother custody, sole father custody, and dual residence.

In sum, *Dividing the Child* is a significant addition to our knowledge

about the effects of conflict and the role of gender in postdivorce parenting. It provides one of the most complete pictures available in the current literature on how parents arrange and continue parenting functions during and after divorce, and should be read by all who are interested in the evolution of modern postdivorce living for children. This audience includes anyone interested in the social dimensions of parent-child postdivorce relationships, such as sociologists, psychologists, and child and family specialists, divorce-related social-service providers, such as social workers and mediators, lawyers involved in negotiating the terms of divorce settlements, and, of course, makers of public policy.

Lives on the Edge: Single Mothers and Their Children in the Other America. By Valerie Polakow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Pp. ix+222. \$22.50.

Kathryn M. Neckerman
Columbia University

Valerie Polakow's *Lives on the Edge* critiques the way American institutions marginalize single mothers and their children. Single mothers are by turns stigmatized and ignored by mainstream society, she writes, their poverty legitimized by a discourse about inequality that blames and isolates poor women. Polakow traces the roots of this discourse in European and American social history and outlines some public-policy remedies for poor families' financial troubles but devotes most of her book to the encounters of poor women and children with the public institutions that mark them as deviant and undeserving—welfare agencies and schools.

Polakow bases her work mostly on interviews with single mothers and on classroom observations in preschool programs. These ethnographic materials are engrossing and include vivid illustrations of how badly schools and social welfare agencies can treat the poor. The mothers' narratives provide yet more evidence of the failures of the U.S. welfare system. Like others, Polakow points to the perverse financial incentives of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, but she also criticizes the inefficiency, restrictive rules, and demeaning treatment that welfare recipients face. Her discussion shows how welfare agencies frustrate single mothers' efforts to become self-supporting. Incidentally, the mothers' interviews also qualify the optimistic view, conventional among social scientists, of kin support in poor families. Most of the women had been abandoned by the fathers of their children and sometimes by their own kin. A few had suffered family violence or sexual abuse. For some women, kin networks were invaluable, but others found their families unable or unwilling to help.

Polakow's discussion of preschool programs extends her earlier work, which criticized the regimented character of early childhood education (*The Erosion of Childhood* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982]).

The classrooms she studied for *Lives on the Edge*, most in Head Start or other remedial preschool programs, were characterized by rigid rules, punitive discipline, and developmentally inappropriate training. This "pedagogy of the poor" is grounded, she writes, in the view that low-income or "high-risk" children need more structure to compensate for deficits in their home environments. Polakow's observations suggest that this approach does more harm than good, stifling poor children's natural creativity and curiosity and failing to attend to their particular emotional and physical needs.

Unfortunately, Polakow's inquiry into the historical roots of these patterns is too brief to yield much insight. Based on a selective reading of European and American history, she argues that Anglo-American societies have traditionally defined poor or single-parent families as pathological, while ignoring pathological aspects of "normal" two-parent families: infanticide, child abandonment, physical and sexual abuse, slavery and indentured servitude, child labor, and harsh school discipline have affected children of both one- and two-parent families. The demeaning treatment and unfair labeling of the poor represent for Polakow a pervasive oppression of which bad preschools are simply the most recent manifestation. As historical explanation, this account is unsatisfying.

More frustrating is Polakow's reluctance to engage current questions in scholarly and public debate. For instance, many scholars now argue that single-parent families suffer social as well as economic disadvantages, a point with which some of Polakow's harried young mothers might concur. Polakow slights this issue, proposing simply to alleviate the financial burdens of poor families.

An engagement with current debates would have been particularly useful in the material on education, given the vitality of recent academic research on school organization and reform. Understanding the hazards of labeling students, educators are torn between their wish to acknowledge the special needs of poor children and a fear of stigmatizing those children. Polakow's work draws attention to this dilemma without showing how to resolve it. Scholars have often criticized the emphasis on order and compliance in the schooling of poor children; Polakow repeats that criticism but does not explore why the belief in structured schooling for "disadvantaged" children has persisted so remarkably. Like the inner-city schools that thrive under charismatic principals, the book's one good preschool class is portrayed as a function of talented and caring teachers, begging the question of how to foster such talent. Polakow gives us easy villains—bigoted teachers, heartless administrators, and stingy legislators—instead of an account of the organizations in which these individuals are embedded. The book reiterates some of the most difficult issues in education today but fails to move beyond them.

In the end the parts of Polakow's book are at war with each other. It is difficult to reconcile her bleak vision of family life with her inspiring portraits of resilient single mothers. Her almost fatalistic history of the oppression of women and children seems at odds with the modest policy

proposals that close the book. And although Polakow wants to break down barriers between the affluent "us" and the impoverished "them," singling out the poor for study reinforces their otherness. *Lives on the Edge* is poignant and stirring but is ultimately unsatisfying.

The Habit of Surviving: Black Women's Strategies for Life By Kesho Yvonne Scott. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991. Pp. xii + 208.

Yvonne D. Newsome
Vanderbilt University

What African-American woman has not patted herself on the back occasionally and congratulated herself for surviving racism, classism, and sexism? I confess that I have, and now a book has come along that tells me other black women share these sentiments. In *The Habit of Surviving*, mere survival as life achievement runs like a motif throughout the life histories of the four African-American women highlighted by Kesho Yvonne Scott. Scott agrees with the women's description of themselves as survivors, but she insists that survival without liberation is not enough. Scott brilliantly points out that by focusing only on the glory of their survival these women present an unrealistic superwoman image to the world, an image that denies the personal costs entailed as the price for their survival. Scott believes it is more accurate to say that black women are in the "habit of surviving" than it is to say that black women are survivors. This habit of surviving includes various strategies—some invented to adjust to external pressures and others passed on intergenerationally—that black women use to resist or adapt to oppression.

The four women in the book are part of a generation that was "born in the thirties, raised in the forties, and married in the fifties" (p. 9). As children, they learned that the ideal black woman centers her life around men and marriage, motherhood, and service to the church and community. Complying with the social norms of the time, all became wives and mothers. As adults, most of these women regularly suppressed their personal happiness, needs, and wants to satisfy those of their families of origin, partners, children, communities, and a racist society. Thus, they sometimes put up with racism, sexism, male infidelity, physical abuse, and other forms of exploitation simply because they had been taught that their oppression was inevitable.

Ironically, these very women who sometimes seemed to comply with their oppressors are themselves personally committed to nonsexist and antiracist human relationships. Scott interprets this glaring anomaly as one of the negative aspects of the habit of surviving. She argues that when oppressed people internalize their oppression, they may unknowingly engage in behaviors or think in ways that help to perpetuate oppressive systems. Therefore, when black women, as part of the habit of

surviving, comply with oppressive systems so as not to be crushed by them, they reinforce the very systems that keep them down

Scott proposes that the habit of surviving initially develops in response to the pain and suffering that oppressed people experience. For example, the habit helps the oppressed to alleviate their anger, and it gives them some sense of control over their lives. Over time, however, habits of surviving can become so routinized and so taken for granted that people sometimes come to believe they are part of a cultural tradition that should be maintained. Routinized, unquestioned habits can control oppressed people's lives and thus inhibit their personal growth and liberation. Ideally, the oppressed should control their habits by actively deciding when it is productive or counterproductive to use them. Scott suggests that true liberation can only be achieved when people are open to change, willing to reexamine and discuss habits of surviving and oppression, and aware that oppressed people can and must actively change the world rather than merely adapt to it.

The book has two other assets that make it worth reading. In the final pages, Scott shares her own life history and interviews her two young daughters, ages ten and eight. First, Scott tells us that her interviews of the four women raised her consciousness and led her to reexamine her own life. What she finds shocks her. Because she was born in the late 1950s, Scott benefited from occupational and educational opportunities that were closed to the older women, yet she discovers that her life mirrors theirs. It is moving to see how she comes to this realization and how she chooses to deal with the knowledge that she, too, is in the habit of surviving. Second, upon interviewing her daughters, Scott is equally dismayed to learn that she has already begun to pass on the habit of surviving to them. This revelation forces Scott to think of ways to help them and other black females avoid this nonliberating path.

I strongly recommend this highly readable book to anyone who is interested in the experiences of African-Americans and women. The book is excellent for courses that explore race, class, and gender. Also, its use of oral histories makes it adaptable to courses in a variety of disciplines.

Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society By Martin Sanchez Jankowski. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. Pp. xi + 382.

Mercer L. Sullivan
New School for Social Research

This book reports unprecedented accomplishments in ethnographic fieldwork. Where previous ethnographers, even working in teams, have documented at most a small handful of gangs, this study discusses 37 gangs in three cities—Boston, Los Angeles, and New York City—studied over a 10-year period by a single investigator. As part of gaining

access to most of these gangs, the author reports that he went through initiations that involved fighting with them to demonstrate "heart." Afterward, he continued to encounter extraordinary amounts of violence, including direct observation of 267 fights between gangs. He also reports wide-ranging contacts with other residents of these neighborhoods and with police officials and local politicians who interacted with the gangs.

The potential of such data for advancing knowledge of one of the most venerable topics in sociology is clearly extraordinary. With such data, one should be able to construct and test a powerful theory of varieties of gang behavior. The results, however, are quite different. Despite repeated assertions that this work invalidates or improves upon past studies, the author gives us few specifics about variation in gang behavior over time or between places, besides the repeated observation that Chicano gangs in Los Angeles are unique in persisting across several generations, a fact well established by previous studies. The sources of quotes and stories are identified haphazardly, sometimes by pseudonymous gang name, ethnicity of gang, and city, but frequently only by city. The only complete inventory of the gangs fails to identify them by city.

Rather than analyzing variation, this study employs a curiously static set of central analytic categories. First we are told that people who become members of gangs all have "defiant individualist" characters, a shared trait that is repeatedly invoked to explain almost all gang-related behavior. No less static is the invocation of "the community," here conceived and portrayed with only minor qualifications as undifferentiated either internally or among places. All variation in gang behavior is related to the internal governance structure of the gangs, which varies neatly among three ideal types, "vertical," "horizontal," and "influential."

Most of the data presented either restate what is already known from prior studies or are wildly at odds with those studies. The most surprising assertions concern the stability and rational organization of gangs and their remarkable degree of integration into their neighborhoods and cities. These gangs have established clubhouses with entertainment facilities. They are strongly supported by local residents, who apparently welcome extortion rackets, and the gangs return the favor in myriad ways, such as providing escort services for the elderly. The gangs maintain regular though clandestine contacts with local elected officials, with whom they exchange favors. These gangs are also business organizations. We are told little about their business enterprises, however, except that they are primarily illegal.

Past studies have shown that gangs sometimes play some positive roles in their neighborhoods, but these studies have also recorded profound local ambivalence toward gangs. Nothing of this level of untroubled integration of gangs into neighborhoods and cities has ever been documented previously. One wonders how these well-established criminal organizations with their highly visible clubhouses have managed to escape the police surveillance that has penetrated even John Gotti's inner

sanctum Lacking consistent or even rudimentary data on what these neighborhoods are like, it is impossible to explain these apparent contradictions

While the unexplained discrepancies between this study and others on the question of how gangs are integrated into neighborhoods are puzzling, the contradictions to the existing record on differences among cities severely undermine the book Los Angeles has been known for its visible and persistent gangs over the past generation and more Gangs in New York during the reported research period were a minor phenomenon, popping up here and there, mostly in Latino neighborhoods Irish and African-American gangs were not prominent, certainly not on a scale comparable to that described in the book Gangs do vary in many ways other than organizational structure and not least in their permanence and salience within local areas I am surprised that such a sweeping treatment based on such extensive fieldwork would fail to show this fact

Another curiosity is that most of the gang members are portrayed almost as if they were trained sociologists, since their quotes often use the terminology of the author's theories, except for differences in grammar The dialogue lacks the tension between actors' and analysts' models that is present in most contemporary ethnographic studies

Theoretically and methodologically, this study falls short of its claims The unvarying character of gang members, the ill-defined sense of neighborhood, and the highly organized gang structure do not accord with existing literature nor are they documented so that the reader can evaluate the claims advanced Several less ambitious but far more informative and convincing recent gang ethnographies are available Finally, it is my opinion that engaging in violent confrontations with research subjects in order to gain access to research data is not an ethically acceptable way of doing research, even if the results had proved interesting

The "Underclass" Debate Views from History Edited by Michael B Katz Princeton, N J Princeton University Press, 1993 Pp 507

Philip Kasinitz

Hunter College, City University of New York

The current debate over the changing nature of American poverty is clearly grounded in historical assumptions Yet those engaged in this debate have often paid more attention to the characteristics of the poor and their communities than to the historical, structural, and political transitions that created the ghetto In an effort to reframe this debate around historical themes, Michael Katz has brought together the work of 12 historians plus two historically minded sociologists to create what is certainly one of the most important books on poverty to appear in recent years Despite its origins as a conference volume, *The "Underclass" Debate* is an editorially focused and unified work, whose authors speak

to rather than past each other. Substantively, it presents an overview of the many trends leading to the concentration of poverty in American inner cities (the authors sidestep the controversy over the term "underclass" by using it in quotes). Methodologically, it makes the case for the importance of historical work on the topic.

The book is most successful in the first of these tasks, and it is unfortunate that space will not permit a thorough discussion of the individual essays. Tracing out the roles of migration, deindustrialization, changes in housing and family patterns, as well as the history of social policies towards the poor, the authors present rich, detailed studies that could all stand on their own. Read as a unified work, however, several larger themes emerge. One is what might be termed "African-American exceptionalism." The authors show how the timing of migration, the inability to create sustainable "ethnic niches" in the economy (which Suzanne Modell argues were central in the success of other groups), and racism made the African-American experience of urban poverty fundamentally different from that of white immigrants or, as Jacqueline Jones documents, Appalachian white migrants to the north.

A second major theme is an attempt to debunk the notion that the ghetto had a "golden age" in which a multiclass black community provided its members with a strong source of institutional support. The authors concede that the early northern ghetto was far richer in institutions than such neighborhoods are today, but they deny there ever was a period of interclass harmony. The large majority of ghetto dwellers, they remind us, have always been poor. Prior to the 1960s the tiny northern, black middle class often sought to separate itself from the masses. When segregation prevented them from doing so physically, they did so socially. The important change in the ghettos, the authors assert, was not a middle-class exodus but the "deproletarianization" of the poor. The social isolation of poor communities played a part in this process, although the physical distance from jobs may not have been as central as some sociologists and economists have suggested. Thomas Surgue notes that even when blacks were more likely than other ethnic groups to live near industrial jobs, they were less likely to hold them.

A theme that emerges less clearly, in part because the authors seem less in agreement, is a debate over the degree to which the contemporary ghetto represents continuity with the past. While several authors start their essays by stating the importance of placing ghetto poverty in historical context, virtually all arrive at the conclusion that the current situation is "without precedent in America's history" (Katz, p. 449). However, many insist that the features of the contemporary ghetto that most alarm journalists are (in the words of Joe William Trotter, Jr.) "not entirely new" (p. 57). Kathryn Neckerman, for example, finds "contemporary ghetto family patterns" among "a minority of the urban poor before 1940" (p. 219), and while Trotter notes that the "magnitude" of ghetto problems has clearly changed over the last two decades, he insists that "a historical examination of these issues reveals more connections be-

tween past and present than the current literature on the urban underclass suggests." Yet, while one must agree that without historical analysis one cannot "fully understand the changing dimensions of urban poverty" (Trotter, p. 57, my emphasis), overall it is the discontinuities with the past that emerge most strikingly from *The "Underclass" Debate*.

Further, "magnitude" counts William Julius Wilson's account (see *The Truly Disadvantaged* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987]) of the formation of the underclass and the debate over "concentration effects" that it inspired, is largely about what happens when a "minority" pattern becomes dominant throughout a community. This brings me to one of the few weaknesses in *The "Underclass" Debate*. Several of the authors exaggerate the differences between their work and "social scientific" analyses of poverty. In some cases the "social scientists" they attack are in fact journalists. At other times authors insist that their approach serves to shift attention "away from individual and family behavior" and puts the emphasis on the "marginalization, exclusion and isolation" of the poor (Katz, p. 443). It is true that a lot of research funding has gone into investigating the behavior of the poor. Yet to imply that Wilson and his collaborators ignore structural issues, such as deindustrialization, or political decisions, such as public-housing policy, is a highly selective reading.

The concluding section of *The "Underclass" Debate* examines the social policies that created the current configuration of poverty and the politics that resulted from it. Several of the authors offer excellent accounts of the war on poverty. In answer to the continuing conservative insistence that the antipoverty programs are to blame for the crises of the inner cities, Katz insists that the War on Poverty was, in fact, too small for the job. It suffered from insufficient numbers of programs, insufficient funds, and ultimately from insufficient political will. Thomas Jackson offers a balanced account of the successes and limitations of the "movement" and its impact on urban ghettos. Jackson is generally sympathetic to the participatory thrust of the War on Poverty programs and dismisses as fantasy the image of "radical sociologists stirring up the poor" that stands at the center of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*. But he recognizes that mobilizing people without resources leads, almost by definition, to reliance on foundations and other "third parties," whose support was "unreliable at best" (p. 429). More centrally, Jackson notes that the localism of many 1960s antipoverty programs was both a strength and a limitation. As we now know, the institutions that most directly impinge on the daily lives of the poor, and over which mobilized poor people can exert the most influence—schools, welfare offices, police departments—had little influence over the long-term trends that reshaped the inner city.

Perhaps the book's most politically important critique of "underclass" research is offered by Katz, who notes that while underclass theorists speak the language of class, they often study the poor in isolation and ignore the relational side of class analysis. "Social Science," he writes,

"misses a very important point the processes creating an underclass degrade all our lives The degradation of civic experience, democracy and the public sphere in contemporary urban America are the result of the same forces that produced the underclass We flourish or sink together" (p 442) This is terrific rhetoric and when I first read it I felt like applauding Yet upon reflection I think that, sadly, Katz overestimates our interconnectedness While middle-class Americans may be spiritually poorer for the degradation of civic experience, they are often able to compensate through the marketplace With the growth of private schools and gated communities, as automobiles replace mass transportation and the suburbs become places of work as well as residence, it has become easy for the middle class to turn its back on the ghetto The degradation of the public sphere may hurt us all, but the costs are borne mainly by the poor

Finally, it should be noted that *The "Underclass" Debate*, perhaps unintentionally, points out an interesting difference between historians and sociologists Its authors repeatedly make the case for the centrality of historical research in understanding poverty The point is valid Yet it is made so often that at times it sounds like disciplinary cheerleading It may be that this particular debate has been so much the turf of sociologists that other scholars feel the need to establish their right to be there, but I think there is more to it than that In the 1950s it would have been easy to imagine editing a book on an important social issue in which various sociologists contributed articles demonstrating how "views from sociology" were essential to understanding the topic It is hard to imagine anyone doing this today (except perhaps in a book intended for undergraduates) I am not sure that this is an altogether bad thing, in many ways our current humility is well deserved Yet the debate over the underclass, and this fine collection, should remind us that despite sociology's current low repute at least some sociologists are doing work considered important enough to read, critique, and challenge by scholars in other disciplines as well as by intellectuals and policymakers outside the academy

The Lenses of Gender Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality
By Sandra Lipsitz Bem New Haven, Conn Yale University Press,
1993 Pp xii + 244

Christine L Williams
University of Texas at Austin

Sandra Lipsitz Bem is a psychologist best known for inventing the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), a scale designed to measure how closely men and women conform to masculine and feminine stereotypes Since its introduction 20 years ago, the BSRI has been enormously popular among social psychologists Recently, however, Bem's original work has fallen

out of favor among gender scholars for a variety of reasons. In particular, the BSRI and the related concept of androgyny have been criticized for reifying the very cultural categories they seek to explain and for ignoring the problems of gender inequality and men's institutionalized power over women in society. In *The Lenses of Gender* Bem explicitly addresses these problems by situating her research in an overarching "theory of how biology, culture, and the individual psyche interact in historical context to systematically reproduce male power" (p. viii).

Bem contends that three dominant beliefs are embedded in culture, social structure, and personality: androcentrism (the belief in male superiority), gender polarization (the belief that men and women have fundamentally different natures), and biological essentialism (the belief that gender difference and male domination are natural). In her view, most men and women internalize these beliefs so deeply that they become like "lenses" or frameworks that organize all information and experience about the world, thus reproducing male power and privilege in society.

Bem devotes three chapters to documenting and describing the three gender lenses. She examines several mainstream discourses in Western culture to demonstrate the existence of these frameworks, including socio-biology, prenatal hormone theory, Judeo-Christian theology, ancient Greek philosophy, Freudian psychoanalysis, American equal-rights law, sexology, and feminist theory. Her overviews of these perspectives are superficial and rely heavily on secondary sources; they are apparently intended for an audience unfamiliar with the gender scholarship of the past 20 years (p. ix). Following these overviews, Bem presents her own "gender schema theory," which describes how individuals internalize the gender lenses, then use them to process information and, ultimately, to reproduce male dominance.

In my view, the most interesting and valuable part of this book is Bem's defense of her earlier work in the chapter on gender polarization. In the 1970s Bem used the BSRI to demonstrate that many people are "androgynous," meaning that they possess both masculine and feminine traits. This research represented a clear advance over other perspectives in psychology that posited a direct link between biology and gender identity and pathologized any deviation from "normal" masculinity or femininity. However, Bem now acknowledges that androgyny itself is a gender-polarizing concept that has been used to promote male dominance. Nevertheless, she continues to defend it, arguing that "for many people confused about how to behave as a man or a woman, androgyny provides both a vision of utopia and a model of mental health that does not require the individual to banish from the self whatever attributes and behaviors the culture may have stereotypically defined as inappropriate for his or her sex" (p. 124).

But it is precisely this utopian aspect of the concept of androgyny that renders it problematic for sociologists. Bem's theory does not explain what enables the "androgynous" individuals to escape the overwhelming forces of gender acculturation in our society. Missing from this analysis

is the social and historical context of resistance and support for hegemonic cultural beliefs about gender

The lack of social context is also evident in her final chapter, which makes a case for eliminating the gender lenses. Bem calls herself a gender "minimizer," committed to the principle that men and women are basically the same. She encourages parents to teach their children that anatomical differences between the sexes are all that matter—and then only for the purposes of reproduction. She writes that ideally we should "view our sex as so completely given by nature, so capable of exerting its influence automatically, and so limited in its sphere of influence to those domains where it really does matter biologically, that it could be safely tucked away in the backs of our minds and left to its own devices" (p. 192). Given that the gender lenses are internalized early in life and continually reinforced by society throughout adulthood, however, it is not clear how anyone could ignore gender or keep it "safely tucked away."

Bem is to be applauded for addressing the critical questions that have been raised about her previous work and for attempting to include culture and social structure in an analysis of gender inequality. Still, the theoretical synthesis offered by *The Lenses of Gender* leaves many important questions unanswered.

Women's Paid and Unpaid Labor: The Work Transfer in Health Care and Retailing. By Nona Y. Glazer. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993. Pp. xv + 273.

John P. Walsh
University of Illinois at Chicago

Work transfer is the process of decommodifying service labor and replacing it with the unpaid work of householders, usually women. Glazer uses the concept of work transfer to help bridge the gap between studies of the labor process and studies of household production. She argues for explicitly linking the public sphere of markets and the private sphere of households. In particular she argues that this concept is central to an understanding of how changes in the delivery of services have affected women. For Glazer, "Paid and unpaid work form a seamless web of activities that provide services. The reorganization by managers of the labor process eliminates, consolidates and develops new work for paid workers. What work is no longer done by paid workers is shifted to those who buy or use services and to their relatives and friends" (p. 177).

Based on archival data from trade journals and women's magazines and on interviews with health-care workers and administrators, Glazer argues that despite trends toward commodification, capitalism also has a countertendency toward work transfer. For example, health care trans-

formed from a primarily in-home activity to one centered in hospitals during most of this century, and then, during the last two decades, began shifting back toward home care. Glazer attributes these changes to the power of capitalists to determine the labor process, to control state policy, and to manipulate ideology so as to facilitate accumulation. She also argues that the invisible nature of many of these changes (due to their location in individual households and the low statuses of those most affected) results in little effective resistance to powerful corporations and state policies that favor corporate interests over those of women and low-status workers. Glazer also emphasizes the complexity of changes in the labor process. Her analysis of nursing and related occupations shows that these changes led to some job enlargement, polarization of status and pay, and site specialization. In addition, Glazer argues that attempts to "professionalize" nursing led to conflict among categories of low-status health workers, conflicts which hospital administrators exploited.

Glazer argues that work transfer increases the burden on women as workers and as family members. Furthermore, these changes differentially affect women of different statuses. Her analyses of the interactions of the various status systems as they relate to work transfer is one of the book's strengths. She notes how changes in federal policies, combined with health care corporatization, resulted in sending patients home "quicker and sicker," in most cases to be cared for by female family members. The tasks eliminated from hospital care were those done mainly by poor women or minorities. Further, wealthy women were better able to buffer themselves from the effects of these changes by hiring poor or minority women to assist in home care, while these same poor or minority women were more likely to have to quit their jobs or adjust their work schedules to care for sick relatives.

This book has several strong points. First, it highlights the often invisible work of women who integrate the market and the home and who are forced to adjust to the labor process changes and work transfer that firms have adopted to reduce labor costs. This book should form the basis for more serious theorizing by Marxist and feminist scholars about the relations among the market, the household, and various status hierarchies. Second, the book emphasizes the way public policies lead to (perhaps intended) consequences that get hidden due to the low status of those most affected. These hidden consequences should be a central focus of debate during discussions of health-care reform.

The book's weakness is its overly simplistic model of the workings of capitalism and the relations between the labor process and ideology. In particular the role of conflict gets slighted. There needs to be more discussion of the ways in which women workers or customers have resisted work transfer or the related labor process changes. For example, unions and consumer groups resisted, with some success, the elimination of item pricing that accompanied checkout scanners—a form of work transfer that eliminated clerk labor and required customers to exert more effort to keep track of prices. Similarly, Glazer deals only briefly with the recent

rise in services in retailing. A more extensive treatment of this reversal would help to specify the causes of work transfer.

While Glazer undertheorizes the capitalist relations that cause work transfer, her analysis of its effects helps make up for this shortcoming. Overall, the book is well suited for a class on gender, work, or family. Glazer's focus on work transfer helps bridge the often separated domains of work and family and shows how changes in work are intricately tied to changes in family. Glazer's discussion of the effects of federal policies on hospital workers and patients would also be instructive background for analyses of new ways of funding health care in the United States.

Two Faces of Protest: Contrasting Modes of Women's Activism in India
By Amrita Basu. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992. Pp. 308.

Patricia Craig
Ohio State University

Discussions and theories about contemporary political movements often tend toward the parochial with the result that the approaches developed in different parts of the world reflect the particular experiences of struggles in those regions. One aim of Amrita Basu's study of political activism in India, *Two Faces of Protest*, is to correct this problem by highlighting how the insights derived from studies of new social movements can be successfully applied to peasant protest which, in turn, demands a rethinking of the "postindustrial" character of the new politics in the developed West. This argument is developed in the first part of the book, which looks at a broad range of social, political, and economic conditions that affect peasant movements, and which tries to show how previous work has sometimes erred in assuming that the dynamics of peasant politics follow a different logic from politics elsewhere.

Primarily, however, her concern is how gender can be incorporated into the analysis of political movements, particularly those that have increased democratization as a goal. Not only is gender often simply omitted in such discussions, but as she argues, including it may complicate the evaluation of the outcomes of political struggles. One of the book's most compelling examples is that of land reform. While this, when successful, may mean a more equitable distribution of ownership in one sense, when titles are extended only to men, women's landlessness and their inability to inherit may increase their economic dependence and inequality, hardly a more egalitarian result.

Women's political activism is examined in two organizational and geographic contexts. Their participation and treatment in a large, Social Democratic-style, centralized communist party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] is contrasted with their participation and treatment in a more grassroots, decentralized peasant organization, the

Shramik Sangathana (SS) The two regions that form the backdrop for their activity, West Bengal and Maharashtra, seem particularly well chosen because in addition to exhibiting different levels of capitalist development they represent, respectively, areas of electoral success and failure for the CPI(M) and weakness and strength for the SS

The two regions also have strikingly different caste structures, which, along with class considerations, shape the ability of the organizations to address women's concerns and mobilize them The implications of the work here are especially important caste and class divisions help explain the likelihood of protest, but they do so in ways that differ, or differ in intensity, for men and women Where caste and class largely overlap, protest is less likely in general but more so for women when their caste reinforces notions of female submission In contrast, polarization of caste and class generally suggests a higher level of militancy, and it is highest among women where poor, tribal (non-Hindu, pre-Aryan peoples) groups are strong These women are less likely to subscribe to upper-caste Hindu concepts of female propriety that include avoidance of employment and manual labor and thus are less likely to "internalize their oppression" (p 226), which leads to a greater willingness to engage in public protest

In part 2 protest is examined through retelling the events of six villages The author attempts to use these stories to highlight the interconnections among the background conditions to protest set out in part 1

However, this attempt tends to underscore the weakness of the first part of the book, where the broad claims and the analyses of theory are often cursory or misplaced Despite the author's attempts, these claims and analyses seem unconnected to the rest of the book For example, the discussion of social democrats in power is very odd Even accepting that the regional governmental experience of the CPI(M) is comparable to parties in Western Europe (a premise that is not well argued), the choice to compare it with only the northern European Social Democratic parties is idiosyncratic at best The obvious correlate would be the Italian communists, another regionally strong party committed to parliamentary rules, but they are never mentioned In addition, an examination of the extremely reformist or conservative policies of southern Europe's governing Social Democratic parties would have made the comparisons used seem less strained and the analysis of contemporary social democracy less superficial

At another level, the author's telling of stories is very successful The judicious use of interviews and the author's ability to draw a vivid picture of village life are fascinating In addition, the stories provide a specific basis upon which the author builds her conclusions in the final chapter, where the reasons given for the differences in militancy in each village and region are convincingly argued While Basu's theoretical analysis may be insufficient, this weakness can be disregarded by the reader in favor of what the author does best illuminating and explaining the complexity of protest

Women and the Economic Miracle Gender and Work in Postwar Japan
By Mary C Brinton Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California
Press, 1993 Pp xvii + 299

James R Lincoln
University of California, Berkeley

The role of women in the Japanese economy is a topic of obvious contemporary importance and one commanding broad interest Yet the English-language literature on the part women play in Japanese labor markets and work organization is surprisingly thin Mary Brinton's comprehensive new book is therefore a most welcome contribution It will likely be a definitive reference work in this area for some years to come It combines a thoroughgoing analysis of government and other available data on the labor-market behavior of Japanese women with results from the author's own household-sample survey conducted in three Japanese cities It contains thoughtful historical inquiries on the evolution of the modern Japanese system of gender-segmented employment and work roles And throughout it brings to bear Brinton's firm command of the relevant sociological and economic theory in making conceptual sense of the empirical record

Much of Brinton's inquiry is devoted to showing that, despite levels of labor force participation comparable to the United States and Europe, the structural position of women in the Japanese economy is strikingly different and generally inferior to that of women in the rest of the industrial world Yet her introduction argues strongly against the long-established custom of labeling Japan as somehow unique She also criticizes the empirical literature on American women's work roles and labor market behavior, which by and large ignores the institutional peculiarities of the United States In the revisionist tradition of Japan sociology begun by Robert Cole and Ronald Dore, she focuses on the evolution of institutions from a mix of cultural traditions and rational innovations whose routine operation produces the highly distinctive Japanese gender-based division of labor

Chapter 2 presents a variety of data on differences in the occupational, wage, and career patterns of men and women in Japan and the United States Though some of her evidence runs counter to the presumption of greater female exclusion and segregation in Japan (an overall index of occupational sex segregation reveals no difference between the two countries), the bulk of it underscores the far more severe obstacles faced by Japanese women Moreover, the picture that emerges is one consistent with her fundamental argument that established institutions for training, recruiting, placing, and rewarding labor function inexorably to the disadvantage of women

Chapter 3 focuses first on human capital development systems in Japan—specifically, the education process and gender roles within the family—then on prevailing cultural norms that differentiate the work roles

and experiences of men and women. In attempting to cover at once Marxist-feminist theories, the structure and functioning of Japanese schooling, survey data from five countries, and personal testimonials obtained in face-to-face interviews, the chapter borders on unwieldy. But in large measure because the interview accounts enliven the issues documented by the harder data, it remains readable and compelling.

Chapter 4 is historical, dealing with such institutional forces as the *oyakata* system of indirect labor contracting and the prewar government's program to plant the seeds of a paternalistic employment system. From these origins appeared the modern dualistic pattern of a large-firm core of permanently employed males and a periphery of small, family-owned businesses and heavily female part-time and temporary labor.

Chapters 5 and 6 are based on Brinton's own 1984 survey of 1,200 men and women in three urban settings. In line with earlier themes, Brinton finds significant gender differences in participation in the internal labor-market structures typical of the Japanese economic core. Women and men are equally likely to take first jobs in large firms, and human capital assets (e.g., education) operate similarly in placing both sexes in jobs of varying quality. Moreover, initial wages do not differ greatly by sex. But with time the wage gap grows as men secure returns to age, education, and experience that elude women. Part of the reason is that within large firms women are denied access to the internal labor market channels—on-the-job training, job rotation, career ladders—that propel men upward in income, status, and power.

The last empirical chapter reverts to the theme of education, discussing pre- and postwar forms and the contemporary tight coupling of educational success with employment and career opportunity. Like the organization of work, higher education in Japan is gender structured to an extraordinary degree by United States and European standards. Junior colleges are disproportionately female and four-year universities male. Moreover, among universities, the higher the prestige of the institution, the greater the exclusion of women. Even within the same universities, women are concentrated in traditional female majors (home economics, humanities), while men dominate the technical, social science, and law fields where corporate recruiting is targeted.

These are not new facts, and the book contains few surprises for anyone familiar with Japan. But Brinton has marshaled so much evidence of such variety, and sifted it in accordance with such nuanced and credible ideas, that even long-term students of Japanese social and economic structure will get much value from these pages. Relative newcomers will find the book far and away the most careful and complete introduction to the study of women in the contemporary Japanese economy.

Women and Japanese Management Discrimination and Reform By Alice C L Lam London Routledge, 1992 Pp xv+281

Sawako Shirahase
Columbia University

Only 1% of Japanese working women are engaged in managerial occupations. This low involvement is one indication of the position of Japanese women in the labor market. Japan's high level of economic performance has been made possible by the shadow work done by women, and women continue to occupy an unfavorable place in the labor market. Why do women's disadvantage and employers' discriminatory practices at the workplace continue in Japan?

Alice Lam's *Women and Japanese Management* ambitiously seeks to explain pervasive discrimination against women in the Japanese labor market. This book consists of three main parts: (1) a discussion of the theoretical framework, (2) an analysis of the impact of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEO law), and (3) a case study of women workers in a department store chain. Lam finds her theoretical orientation in the internal labor market theory originally advocated by Doeringer and Piore. The segmentation between the core and secondary sectors takes place along gender lines and produces sexual differentiation in the form of wages, promotion chances, and full-time/part-time status. Women tend to be concentrated in the peripheral group, where career ladders are short and job security is unstable.

The EEO law, enacted in 1985, is examined as an example of reaction to external pressure to improve the treatment of women by Japanese companies. The EEO law prohibits discrimination against women in employment practices such as recruitment, vocational training, and fringe benefits. This law implements two different types of sanctions, prohibitory provisions and hortatory provisions, but it does not have any legislative power to inflict punishment on companies that violate these laws. It appeals to the "moral" or the "spirit" of the firms rather than exercising legal force. According to Lam, the law has had limited impact on alleviating sexual inequality in the workplace.

In the third part of the book, Lam presents a case study of Seibu department stores and examines the effect of the EEO law on employment practices. The Seibu department store chain employs about 20,000 workers and is one of the six biggest department stores in Japan. 60% of its workers are full-time regular employees and 43% of them are women. In examining the changes after the EEO law, Lam finds a controversial consequence of the legislative reform on Seibu personnel practices. Although Seibu tried to encourage women to enter a career track, only a small minority of "elite" women were allowed to join the core employment group. This approach to the female workers made them aware of "the price of equity" (p. 213): they had to put their priority on pursuing a career similarly to men by setting aside family responsibilities, and they

encountered great difficulty in breaking through the barriers to equal employment opportunities. In fact, an increasing number of well-educated women became more "family-oriented" and showed a preference for leaving the work force during the period of family formation, rather than choosing a career track. Further, more and more women were employed as nonregular (part-time and contract) workers after the EEO law was implemented in 1986. In the end, although Seibu is said to be on the leading edge in utilizing women, the EEO law had only limited impact on achieving equal opportunities at the workplace and Seibu's management practices are still very much male dominated.

Lam presents three possible explanations for this "Japanese-style management." First, the labor market itself is structured along gender lines, and persistent discrimination against women is a by-product of sexually biased labor practices. Second, the dualistic segmentation of the labor market survives on the basis of the relationship between the core and peripheral groups. This relationship means that low-cost secondary labor (such as nonregular female workers in department stores) is necessary and inevitable to maintain the well-structured and high-priced internal labor market. Finally, the rules of the internal labor market are not static but change (such as incorporating a small number of "elite" women into the managerial track) only to the extent that overall stability can be guaranteed. The Japanese way of management continues to give a rationale to providing unfavorable chances to women in the internal labor market because employers believe that the segmented labor market is unavoidable in keeping the Japanese economy efficient and prosperous.

Lam's book is a thoughtful attempt to understand gender inequality in the Japanese labor market within the context of internal labor market theory. The book would have been more interesting if it included a detailed analysis of nonregular female workers and compared them with full-time regular workers. Nonetheless, the book deserves the attention of not only scholars interested in Japan but also social scientists who study gender and social inequality.

Japan's Political Marketplace By J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. Pp. 261.

Steven R. Reed
Chuo University

I doubt anyone will top John Campbell's one-liner concerning this book: "It is an irritating book in the best sense of the term" (personal communication, rephrased for the book jacket). The book will irritate some because it uses a rational choice approach without the slightest nod toward Japanese cultural uniqueness. Some scholars claim that such individualistic theories do not apply to the group-oriented Japanese. This book will

irritate others because it makes an excellent case for the proposition that neither big business nor the bureaucracy but the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) really runs Japan. The idea that Japanese democracy is just a facade put up to fool foreigners dies hard. In both of these cases, irritation should stimulate some serious thinking about Japanese politics. These are cases of irritation in the best sense of the term. Unfortunately, the book is also irritating in two less praiseworthy senses. The bibliography is irritating because it is incomplete and often inaccurate. The book is also uneven, chapters 6–10 being much stronger than 1–5.

In a more ambiguous criticism, I find much about the rational choice approach irritating, wherever applied. In particular, I am irritated by the tendency to impute intentionality to everything and the propensity to prefer deduction over data. For example, the authors state that LDP leaders “maintain within the most important ministries bureaucrats who intend to join the Diet” (p. 107). On the one hand, that the political ambitions of bureaucrats serve to enhance the LDP’s control over the bureaucracy is an excellent point. On the other hand, the idea that the LDP purposefully “maintains” such “moles” is difficult to reconcile with the historical record. The authors may well have meant this statement merely as a metaphor, but such metaphors can easily be misinterpreted.

The tendency to value deduction over data is illustrated by the authors’ claim that “discipline is imposed on nonconformist LDP members primarily through factions” (p. 70). This hypothesis is fascinating and makes good sense, but it is supported by a single example. The list of exceptions provided later (pp. 93–94) is far longer. Based on the data, rather than the argument, I conclude that very little discipline is imposed on nonconformist LDP members at all.

Similarly, chapters 8 and 9 argue that the judiciary is not independent but is an agent of the LDP. On the one hand, these two chapters are extremely welcome. Arguments about LDP influence on the judiciary belong to the left, which means that “serious” scholars have avoided thinking about the issue at all. These two chapters give Western readers the first balanced accounts. On the other hand, based on the data presented, I conclude that the LDP does not systematically discriminate against judges who rule against conservative policy preferences, though egregious violations of judicial independence do occur. The only cardinal sin for a judge is to directly criticize the Supreme Court Secretariat, their immediate superiors. Japan thus looks much like other democracies.

Though I find the rational choice approach irritating, this book provides ample evidence that the approach is a powerful generator of interesting hypotheses. Such hypotheses are scattered throughout the book and will provide fodder for scholarly research for years to come. As long as we remember that, no matter how much sense a proposition makes, it must still be checked against the data, my irritation will count for little.

Overall, this book is ideal reading for graduate courses on Japanese

politics Chapters 6 and 7, which contain the arguments about LDP control over the bureaucracy, should be read whenever the issue of who rules Japan is discussed In the end I am convinced that, if forced to choose from among the traditional "three pillars of power" in Japan, big business, the bureaucracy, and the LDP, the latter is the best bet

Finally, the authors deserve great praise for having the courage of their convictions The authors boldly predict changes in Japanese politics if, as seems likely, the electoral system is changed (pp 194 ff) It is safer to predict that nothing will ever change although you will be wrong sooner or later, you will always be in the majority Japan has more than its share of scholars who are able to deny any changes resulting from the recent end of 39 years of LDP one-party rule, defeat in World War II, or the introduction of Western technology in the 1870s It is extremely refreshing to see someone predicting change based on events that are likely to occur within our lifetimes The authors could actually be proved wrong Even more interesting is the possibility that they could be proved right

Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy, 1850–1990 By Bill Ong Hing Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press, 1993 Pp xiv + 340

Zai Liang

Brown University and Queens College, City University of New York

The decade of the 1980s witnessed significant growth in the Asian American population in the United States Though only about 3% of the national population, Asian Americans are the fastest-growing population in the United States due largely to the increase in immigration from Asian countries The studies of Asian Americans lag behind the increasing research attention paid to other minority groups such as blacks and Hispanics As a result, we lack clear understanding of many issues related to Asian Americans Bill Ong Hing's book summarizes systematically and critically the most recent findings of Asian American studies, always with an eye on the role played by U S immigration policy

The major argument of the book is that immigration laws and policies shaped many dimensions of Asian American life such as community size, gender ratio, employment profiles, and residential patterns Moreover, immigration policies also have long-lasting consequences for the academic performance, political participation, and identity of Asian Americans

The first three chapters of the book document the extent to which immigration policies affect Asian American lives, with a focus on six Asian American groups (Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, Vietnamese, and Asian Indians) before and after 1965 In doing so, the author provides us with an overview of major elements of U S immigration

policies before and after 1965. The legacy of restrictive immigration policy began with the Chinese when Congress passed the China Exclusion Act of 1882. One of the significant impacts of this law on Chinese Americans is the imbalance of the sex ratio. Chinese men who were already here found they could not bring in their wives. As a result, "By 1890 men outnumbered women among Chinese Americans almost 27 to 1" (p. 46). Although other Asian groups did not necessarily share exactly the same path as the Chinese, the history of other Asian groups before 1965 is equally sad and immigration policies left permanent marks on other Asian groups as well.

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act introduced a race-blind immigration policy whereby each country is given a 20,000-person yearly immigration quota with emphasis both on family reunification and occupational skills. The author shows us that the unintended consequence of this act is the dramatic growth of the Asian American population. The immigration laws since 1965 (including the refugee policies in the case of Vietnamese immigrants) have changed and continue to change the demography of Asian Americans not only in gender ratio and employment profile but also in geographic location and residential patterns.

Another consequence of immigration laws since 1965 is the emergence of the diversity of the Asian American population. The group ranges from Chinese who began immigrating to the United States in the middle of the 19th century to Vietnamese who came to America mainly as a result of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Hing argues that diversity among and within Asian American groups has to do with many of the misperceptions about Asian Americans on educational performance, political participation, and identity.

In the final chapter, Hing challenges the popular image of Asian Americans in three aspects: the image of Asian American educational achievement, the apolitical character of Asian Americans, and Asian American identity. He reminds us that anybody who complains about the apolitical character of Asian Americans should recall that it was only in 1952 that Asian immigrants began to be eligible to become U.S. citizens. He also points out that electoral politics is not the only way that people voice their views; the measures of political participation must be broadened to account for the high proportion of immigrants among Asian Americans, because immigrants must naturalize, normally a five-year process, before they can vote. Moreover, Asian Americans have established enduring organizations such as the Japanese American Citizens League to assert their interests and fight discrimination. Therefore, the image of apolitical Asian Americans must be reexamined.

Hing further demonstrates that the concept of Asian American identity is an elusive concept and the traditional concept of ethnicity for Asian Americans has limitations. He discusses the diversity in immigration history and culture among groups and the diversity in foreign-born status and class within groups. This diversity prevents the formation of a unified Asian American identity. Indeed, among Asian Americans that Hing

interviewed for the study, many of them "switch identities from situation to situation" and tell the researchers that "Asian American is not an identity for all times and all purposes" (p. 181). Although Hing's point is well taken, in that we need to understand the sophisticated meaning and evolution of Asian American identity, my understanding of the formation of Asian American identity is that it is quite consistent with Yancy et al.'s notion of "emergent ethnicity" ("Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation," *American Sociological Review* 41 [1976]: 391-403).

I find Hing's argument on Asian Americans and education confusing. It is incorrect to believe that all Asian American kids are whiz kids in science and math, and we have to recognize the diversity among and within Asian American groups. But one cannot simply downplay the achievement of Asian Americans in education by pointing out the other part of the story. There is diversity in every other ethnic group. Asian Americans have truancies and dropouts and so do other groups. The objective statistics are that "Asian American high school students get A's more often and fail less than whites or any other racial group and they are 9 to 25 percent of the entering classes at Harvard, Stanford, MIT, UC at Berkeley, Princeton, and Cal Tech" (pp. 141-42). Other things being equal, the educational achievement of Asian Americans is unmistakable.

The strength of the book lies in its reliance on carefully selected and researched sources from many disciplines, such as history, law, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. One gets a much broader view of the Asian American experience from this book than from reading a sociology or history book on Asian America. It discusses the experience of Asian Americans from 1850 to 1990 for six major Asian American groups and provides a balanced overview of the impact of immigration policies before and after 1965. It touches upon major controversial topics that are still being debated. For scholars who are concerned with Asian America and ethnicity, this book is a valuable resource.

The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict By Susan Olzak
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv + 271. \$32.50.

John D. McCarthy
Catholic University of America

Susan Olzak promises a great deal in *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* and delivers even more. She makes strong hypothetical claims derived from rich theoretical arguments, develops elegant empirical tests of them, and quite cautiously fashions conclusions out of the pattern of results. The book provides a remarkably coherent model for studying ethnic conflict.

Building on the ideas of the human ecologists and the anthropologist

Fredrik Barth and echoing the lately neglected concerns of Robert E. Park, Olzak crafts an argument in the first three chapters that specifies the dynamics of ethnic-group competition. It depends most centrally upon the stability of ethnic-group boundaries and niche overlap—the extent to which groups occupy common social spaces (e.g., occupational). Levels of ethnic group solidarity and niche overlap are thought to affect levels of group competition, which in turn may affect levels of solidarity. “The key argument is that *competition intensifies the salience of ethnic boundaries and promotes spontaneous forms of ethnic collective action*” (p. 209, Olzak’s emphasis). Shifting levels of niche overlap are, in her argument, mostly the result of factors exogenous to the ethnic competition itself, such as immigration waves, labor market processes, and economic cycles. Her conception of ethnic group competition is highly dynamic—for a variety of reasons competition may be expected to escalate or subside.

Ethnic collective action (i.e., conflict, protest, institution building) can be, Olzak says, under certain conditions, the result of ethnic competition. High levels of competition, however, are not expected to automatically produce high rates of collective action. Competition is mediated by variable levels of ethnic group identification, resources, and social organization. In her most general summary of the theoretical consequences of these arguments she says, “*Ethnic conflicts and protests erupt when ethnic inequalities and racially ordered systems begin to break down*” (p. 3, Olzak’s emphasis). More specifically, “*Desegregation of labor markets intensifies ethnic competition, which in turn raises the rate of ethnic collective action*” (p. 3). The construction of this elaborate argument is motivated by the “paradox suggested by prior research on race relations [that] while rates of collective action rise with economic contraction, the expansion of resources under some conditions also causes these rates to increase” (p. 11).

Olzak then proceeds to successively unfold for the reader several diverse, but interlinked, data sets that, in various combinations, allow her to test many of the more specific dynamic hypotheses implicit in the theory. The empirical hinge of the analyses consists of evidence she coded from the *New York Times* of reported ethnic collective action events in the 77 largest U.S. cities between 1877 and 1914, but lynchings, strikes, and ethnic newspaper foundings serve in ensuing analyses as complements to these primary measures. Establishing legitimacy for the analyses that follow, she provides a definitive discussion of the conceptualization and measurement of collective action events drawn from newspaper records that extends her earlier *Annual Review of Sociology* (15:119–41) treatment of the issues.

The several decades preceding and following the turn of the 20th century were a time of great ethnic strife in the United States. Olzak locates 106 traces of ethnic protest—“collective actions that articulate claims for civil rights or grievances” (p. 70)—and 156 instances of ethnic conflict—“confrontations between members of two or more racial/ethnic

groups" (p. 70)—in the 38-year newspaper record (The reader would benefit from more demographic detail about the events.) Those decades were also a time of mass immigration and successive economic dislocation, and indicators of the factors theoretically implicated in facilitating ethnic competition are drawn from historical records (e.g., immigration rates, laborer wage rates, business failure rates, and economic depressions).

In six separate chapters (5–10) Olzak tests different portions of her argument. Relying upon a variety of time series and event history analysis techniques, the tests vary in their key geographical unit of analysis (national/local, urban/rural, Chicago and New York), for mostly theoretical but sometimes practical reasons, and in their measures of competition and conflict and their level of disaggregation of the dependent variable (e.g., violent vs. nonviolent conflict).

While it is impossible to summarize briefly its range and subtlety, chapter 5, "Immigration, Economic Contraction, and Ethnic Events," can serve to illustrate both the form and potential of Olzak's project. Modeling the *timing* of events (the duration between events) in the set of 77 cities, she demonstrates that at the national level increases in immigration rates and increases in business failure rates sharply increased rates of ethnic conflict. In doing so, she generates strong results that pertain to key questions that have long occupied scholars of ethnic conflict and collective action. These issues include (1) African-American exceptionalism (she finds that competition particularly exacerbated conflict between blacks and whites), (2) the interaction between the more spontaneous and the more organized forms of group conflict (she finds that conflict and protest result from somewhat different competitive processes), and (3) the role of contagion in collective action (she finds convincing evidence for rapid diffusion across cities, even before the immediacy of the modern media—"bursts of *either* protests and conflicts raise rates of both kinds of ethnic collective action" (p. 82, Olzak's emphasis)).

Each of these patterns is shown to be more complex in subsequent analyses, either more general (e.g., ethnic violence curtails the creation of black newspapers, while it spurs the creation of newspapers among other ethnic groups), pointing in new research directions (e.g., "the strike rate significantly *increases* the rate of violent events but significantly *decreases* the rate of nonviolent ones" [p. 105, Olzak's emphasis]), or requiring ever more nuanced interpretation (e.g., "Diffusion processes also explain why the black/white color boundary became the dominant one in the early twentieth century" [p. 216]).

With this superb monograph Susan Olzak establishes a niche for herself among the best scholars of ethnic conflict and collective action. The research template she has so carefully crafted will be emulated widely, in my judgment, because it provides an easily imitated methodology for seeking to understand the dynamics of epidemic ethnic conflict. Her work has already made an important contribution to that understanding.

New Immigrants, Old Unions Organizing Undocumented Workers in Los Angeles By Hector L. Delgado Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993 Pp. x + 186

David P. Lindstrom
University of Chicago

Lack of legal documentation has often been used as a partial explanation for low levels of unionization in sectors of the economy where undocumented immigrant labor is concentrated. The standard argument is that fear of apprehension and deportation disposes undocumented workers to accept wage and work conditions that native-born and legal-immigrant workers would not accept or at least would protest. In *New Immigrants, Old Unions*, Hector Delgado challenges this conventional wisdom with a case study of a successful unionization campaign at a Los Angeles waterbed manufacturer where the vast majority of the workforce were undocumented Mexicans and Salvadorans. Based primarily on interviews with workers, union organizers, and management, Delgado concludes that the organizability of undocumented workers depends less on legal status and more on the same factors that determine the organizability of other workers similarly located in the labor market.

One of the major obstacles to unionization is workers' fear of reprisals. In the case of undocumented workers, fear of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) can be added to that of losing one's job. Delgado, however, found that fear of the INS did not loom large in the lives of the undocumented workers he studied, nor in their decision to fight for a union. Concentrated along the border with Mexico, the INS has no visible presence in Los Angeles. Raids on employers by immigration authorities, while dominant in popular images of undocumented employment, are relatively rare events. Even in the case of apprehension at the place of work and subsequent deportation, undocumented workers frequently reenter the United States within days or even hours to return to the same job. As with other workers, it is fear of losing one's job, irrespective of the worker's legal status, that makes unionizing undocumented workers so difficult.

Delgado views the settlement process and the presence of networks of family and friends as important factors in mitigating undocumented workers' fear of reprisal and in creating some of the conditions necessary for a successful unionization campaign. At the time of the union vote in January 1985, most of the workers at Camagua, the plant Delgado studied, had been in the United States for eight or more years and with the company for at least five. With increasing duration in the United States and tenure at a job comes a change in orientation, expectations, and commitment. Many of the workers Delgado interviewed were committed to staying in the United States and sought a secure foundation upon which they could construct a future for themselves and their children.

Los Angeles, and not Mexico or El Salvador, had become the workers' point of reference, and the wages and work conditions that at one time seemed acceptable no longer were so

Over the past decade a substantial body of research on international migration has drawn attention to the important role that social networks play in the migration and settlement process. Cognizant of this work, Delgado makes his own contribution with his observations on how migrant networks also can come into play in unionizing undocumented workers. In an ironic twist, the same networks that Camagua management had used to recruit new workers became instrumental in the union's organizing efforts at Camagua.

Not only did the undocumented workers at Camagua change but so too did Camagua. Started by a Puerto Rican immigrant with personal savings and loans from family and friends, Camagua had grown in the space of 18 years from a small company of three workers to a major waterbed manufacturer with over 250 workers spread across four facilities. In a sense what happened at Camagua is that the increasing assimilation of its immigrant workforce and the firm's own phenomenal growth made both over time less a part of the periphery in which Delgado locates them. Viewing the developments at Camagua from this perspective makes the unionization of Camagua's workforce less of the enigma that it initially appears to be. Given Camagua's size and its success, it became a target of unionization because union organizers knew Camagua could afford a union. This point is a key in understanding what transpired at Camagua and deserves considerably more attention than the note at the back of the book that Delgado gives it. Clearly, as Delgado points out, the union's commitment to organizing Camagua's workers was critical to the campaign's success, but unions also consider the chances of success when investing their resources.

Delgado describes his work as a deviant case analysis but does not provide the kind of information on the furniture and bedding industry in Los Angeles that is so important for placing his case study in proper context. Rather than telling us something about industry-wide production systems, workforce composition, unionization levels, wage rates, and so forth, Delgado digresses into a review of the legal history of labor law as it relates to undocumented workers. Another unfortunate omission from the book is a methodology section describing how the study was designed and conducted.

The strength of *New Immigrants, Old Unions* is that it qualifies the conditions under which illegal status is an important characteristic for understanding and predicting undocumented workers' behavior, in this case willingness to struggle for union representation. I hope this book will encourage further work on how the process of settlement and assimilation influences the way in which undocumented migrants cope with and react to the changing dynamics of their work environments and, more generally, the changing structure of economic opportunities.

Fast Food, Fast Talk Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday Life By Robin Leidner Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1993 Pp 278

Chloe E Bird
Harvard School of Public Health

In this thought-provoking book, Robin Leidner examines sales work by two major U S corporations that incorporate an extreme degree of task routinization McDonald's and Combined Insurance Her results are based on participant observation of jobs and corporate training programs and on extensive interviews with workers, managers, and executives Leidner argues that models developed from research on the psychological stresses of routinization for manufacturing workers cannot be assumed to apply to the experience of service workers whose jobs require them to interact with customers Although both the jobs she studied had high turnover, Leidner found that workers were not uniformly hostile to routinization, because even strict routinization can serve some interests of the workers However, compared to routinized manufacturing work, employers attempt to impose authority over more aspects of interactive service workers' lives

Leidner found that McDonald's and Combined Insurance used different approaches to routinizing interactive service work McDonald's eliminated virtually all decision-making authority from the jobs of window workers who take customers' orders at either the counter or drive-through window Because customers have already chosen to do business with McDonald's and have already learned how to give their orders, the encounters with customers are primarily predictable and require only limited prompting Consequently, routinization is designed to give workers control over exchanges with customers In contrast, Combined Insurance attempted to change the way its agents thought about themselves both on and off the job Combined Insurance retained some decision-making authority for its sales agents while providing extensive scripts for various possible encounters Because Combined Insurance agents sell door-to-door to people who have not elected to do business with them, agents are taught to perform a variety of scripted conversations designed to overcome customer resistance Whereas McDonald's standardized the work by limiting workers' actions, Combined Insurance did so both by scripting dialogues and by making a concerted effort to socialize agents to make the kinds of decisions managers would make Leidner argues that organizations routinize service work to decrease their reliance on workers' interpersonal sales skills Thus, they are most likely to attempt extensive socialization of workers when workers' discretion can influence outcomes

Leidner argues that while both jobs require workers to do substantial emotional work, the insurance agents also had to attempt to hide the routinization and make their interactions appear genuine rather than mechanistic As a result of the artificial and sometimes manipulative

scripted interactions, routinization creates problems of identity and authenticity for workers. Despite these consequences, she concludes that Combined Insurance agents were not hostile to the routinization of their work or the shaping of their attitudes, because they believed that they needed the routines to succeed at sales and they recognized that the routines increased their control over prospective customers.

To evaluate the possibility that routinization affects workers' gender identities, Leidner examines the use of gender by employers and workers. Although in the organizations she studied window workers were primarily women and insurance agents primarily men, workers and managers emphasized selected attributes of the jobs in order to characterize them as gender appropriate. She found that cultural definitions of male and female work are elastic enough to allow workers to interpret their jobs as expressive of their own gender regardless of the attributes of the job.

In a final chapter, Leidner discusses the possible consequences of the routinization of interactive service work for customers and more generally for American society. She assesses the pros and cons of scripted service interactions for customers as well as for service workers. Drawing on concepts from both the sociology of work and the sociology of culture, Leidner demonstrates that employers who routinize interactive service work are able not only to transfer work to the customer but also to routinize the behavior of customers to varying degrees. By changing the norms of interaction, service organizations may influence people's judgment as to when it is necessary to follow normal rules of ceremony or common courtesy. She argues that participation in scripted service interactions provides training in cynicism and defensiveness, which, in turn, affects people's disposition toward social relations.

Fast Food, Fast Talk makes an important contribution to the literature on the routinization of work. Because her work contrasts the experiences of service workers at Combined Insurance and McDonald's, an organization that pioneered the routinization of service work and another we are all familiar with, Leidner's book should prove useful and interesting for researchers as well as being a teaching tool for undergraduate and graduate courses in the sociology of work and in social psychology. Her descriptive chapters are particularly engaging, providing compelling examples of the effects of routinizing service work for workers and for customers.

Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States. By Victoria C. Hattam. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Pp. xi+266.

Rick Fantasia
Smith College

The author, a political scientist, has written a sophisticated book that conjoins the concerns and insights of the new labor and social histories.

with more traditional political and institutional approaches to produce a remarkably original understanding of working class formation in the 19th century. The argument she makes is complex but well worth following.

Her book begins its analysis of the legal basis of labor regulation by tracing the use of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy in regulating labor's right to organize and to strike. While all industrializing nations sought to regulate trade unionism and collective action, only in the United States were the courts (rather than the legislature) the primary means by which this was done. Because most accounts of the conspiracy doctrine have viewed it as solely an antebellum phenomenon, the postbellum struggle to repeal it, the main focus of this book, has been left unattended by previous scholars. The author notes that, because previous analyses have tended to focus only on the bias and the hostility of the courts toward the labor movement, the very nature and influence of judicial regulation on working-class formation and trade-union politics has been neglected. She aims to rectify these problems by considering the consequences of judicial regulation on working-class formation by comparing the reactions of different labor organizations to two waves of conspiracy convictions before and after the Civil War.

Hattam finds the reaction to conspiracy convictions in the antebellum period dominated by a conception of class that rested on a coalition of skilled workers and small manufacturers and that manifested an ideology of antimonopoly republicanism that differentiated producers from non-producers (large industrialists, day laborers, and the unemployed). Embodied in organizations like the Working Men's parties, the General Trades' Unions, the Locofocos, and the Knights of Labor, the "producers' vision" sought to shape economic change through electoral politics, while responding only weakly to the antebellum conspiracy convictions.

She argues that as the Civil War ended, an emergent conception of class was forming as the leaders of other labor organizations (the early AFL, the New York Workingmen's Assembly) called for the breakup of the producers' alliance, which bound wage earners to their employers. A trade unionist perspective had developed, representing a competing version of unionism, and this provides the author with a way to contrast, through the two groups' responses to the postbellum conspiracy trials, their competing "labor visions."

By the last two decades of the 19th century, the old alliance had disintegrated and the labor movement that had become dominant was ready to protect, through political reform and direct state intervention, the interests of workers as workers, a situation not unlike that of labor movements in other industrialized societies. What is important here is that Hattam historicizes the concept of class by focusing on the distinctive narratives that labor leaders used to mobilize their members, narratives that served as the frameworks through which industrialization was apprehended and interests were formulated. By tracing the reactions to conspiracy cases, she is able to view the evolution of class in changing organizations and ideological formulations, as union leaders responded

to the exceptional power of the judiciary in the American context (a context in which the separation of powers is a key aspect of the political culture)

Ultimately, she argues, it was the power of the judiciary that forced the AFL, in the latter decades of the 19th century, to adopt voluntarism as a strategy of advancing the interests of workers. Had political reforms not been frustrated by the power and centrality of the courts, the AFL would most likely have stuck with their early social unionism rather than adopt the business unionism that has so characterized a large segment of the labor movement in the United States.

In addition to the value of the historical argument itself, what makes this book important is that it takes seriously the interpenetration of culture and social structure in historical analysis and brings both class- and state-centered approaches together (by rejecting ethnocultural explanations that have misunderstood class, while rejecting cultural analyses that ignore politics and the state) to provide a novel interpretation of the politics of working-class formation in the 19th century. Its analysis is buttressed by comparative inquiry along several dimensions, including comparisons of class formation and legal history with the British case, of antebellum and postbellum conspiracy cases in the United States, and comparisons across various labor organizations. It is a complex argument but one that the author summarizes clearly as she proceeds through it.

A potential problem with Hattam's argument, as the author acknowledges, is that the views of rank-and-file workers may not have been identical to the narratives offered by trade union leaders. Though important, this issue is really beyond the scope of this book. When others take it up in future research, however, they will find that this book has lit much of their way.

Executive Defense: Shareholder Power and Corporate Reorganization
By Michael Useem. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Pp. xi+289.

Neil Fligstein
University of California, Berkeley

Scholars have been struggling to understand the motivation for the 1980s merger movement (the fourth merger movement of this century). Several facts are clear. The 1980s merger movement was propelled by a financial conception of the firm that focused on the market price of assets instead of the book value of assets. It was instigated by persons who were outsiders to the corporate world, people who were not managers of large industrial corporations, but investment bankers. More important from a sociological point of view, this conception of firms was forced on all firms that were publicly traded. Thus, if managers did not pay attention to the

forces motivating the market for corporate control, they were likely to be targets of that market

Michael Useem's book fills an important gap in our knowledge about this process by studying how top managers in seven firms decided to deal with these issues. The core of this book is the observational studies of those managers, and this material is the most interesting and important. Useem's basic thesis is that in the 1980s managers were forced to pay closer attention to the interests of stockholders. The cultural framing of this issue was around "aligning the interests of managers and stockholders." The major implication of this attention to stockholders is that corporate actions were likely to focus on issues such as "creating stockholder value" by boosting the stock price, making higher profits, and generally shortening time horizons to maximize profits in the next quarter. Further, management autonomy and control could be undermined by the actions of aggressive stockholders.

The interesting question, and one about which Useem has quite a bit to say, is How did managers deal with this threat to their control? The answer, it turns out, is that some resisted it and others embraced it wholeheartedly.

The book begins by documenting the increase in institutional ownership of stock and the increase in shareholder activism. Then it turns to how managers either resisted or embraced this activism. Useem identifies four major organizational changes for those who accepted these views: (1) authority was pushed down into the organization, (2) information about firm performance was more widely distributed and the ideology of maximizing stockholder value was spread, (3) decisions were explicitly framed in terms of this ideology, and (4) central headquarters were reduced in size as decision making was pushed to a lower level.

Useem also documents how executive compensation was tied more closely to performance defined in financial terms. The result that seems to surprise Useem the most is that many managers experienced the changes not as stressful but as a challenge and an opportunity. In particular, the empowering of lower-order participants seems to have worked in the firms he studied.

There were those who resisted such views and they did so with a great deal of energy. They engaged in actions to inform and co-opt stockholders and undertook actions to preserve managerial control by using captive stockholders to their advantage. In the extreme, managers got boards of directors to pass resolutions making takeovers less likely (i.e., poison pills) and granting themselves golden parachutes.

There are several problems with the story as Useem tells it. First, much of what is said here is descriptive. He accepts the language of stockholder dominance with little reflection about whose interests it reflects. Such an ideology is interesting and the spread of it, which is described in some detail in the case studies, is a fascinating process in its own right. Given the existence of such an ideology, one is left wonder-

ing which firms resisted and which cooperated and which groups were its proponents Useem fails to explain why, in several of his cases, managers embraced the ideology of stockholder dominance with no impetus from stockholders or the financial markets

Second, one wonders how deep the changes he describes really were Managers are adept at picking up the language of the latest management fad and using it to their advantage Top managers, many of whom were trained MBAs, could easily mimic the 1980s agency- and finance-theory-driven ideology Third, Useem is ambivalent about the results of this corporate reorganization, which he discusses as "paradoxes " The deep irony of these changes is that American corporations continue to be the most profitable in the world Yet the ideology of stockholder value brings managers to lay additional workers off, even as business picks up, in order to give a boost to the bottom line

Useem has produced a provocative, well-written book that opens up these debates in an important way This book will be of great interest to students of corporations and organizations and anyone interested in how the 1980s changed the labor process of managers

The Impact of Ownership Structure and Executive Team Composition on Firm Performance The Resolution of a Leadership Paradox By Eva M Meyerson Stockholm Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research, 1992 Pp x+166

David W Allison
University of Michigan

This volume is an attempt to develop and test a theory of firm performance drawn from economic and sociological theory Focusing on 29 publicly held Swedish companies, Meyerson develops a series of hypotheses on the relations among firm ownership, leadership recruitment, and firm performance Her primary goal is to explain how the social capital of a firm's executive team, operationalized as the team's external social network, is determined by the firm's ownership structure and how this capital affects the firm's performance

The nature of group organization presents a paradox On the one hand, homogeneity creates the unity necessary for effective decision making On the other hand, heterogeneity provides access to a wide range of ideas and information Meyerson is concerned with how corporate CEOs navigate between these two poles when assembling their management teams This leadership paradox, she argues, is rooted in the social networks of the team members A team composed of homogeneous, densely tied actors will be effective in maintaining internal consensus but, because their members tend to have similar external ties, such groups will be ineffective at securing a wide variety of information Conversely, a team with heterogeneous, sparsely tied actors will tend to have different

sets of external ties and will therefore be effective at the accumulation of information but less effective at reaching consensus

The solution to this paradox, Meyerson believes, is for the firm to be closely monitored by an entrepreneur with a large shareholding. She argues that these large shareholdings by entrepreneurs allow the formation between entrepreneurs and CEOs of partnerships that provide the firm with both guaranteed access to capital and decisive leadership. This "supra-team" also allows the CEO to select an executive team for its information accrual ability, without regard for its decision-making or resource-acquisition ability. This division of labor in turn facilitates the creation of a heterogeneous executive team, which increases the number of weak ties and leads to higher firm performance. Overall, Meyerson's findings support these hypotheses.

The author's most important contribution is her analysis based on interviews with 159 executives of her 29 firms. This exploration supports Meyerson's theory that the more integrated the executive team, the fewer the external ties to whom the team has access and thus the less the social capital on which it can draw. In addition, nonredundant external ties are shown to be seldom strong, which supports Granovetter's view that bridging ties between social networks are more likely to be weak and nonredundant.

This study contains several problems, however. The 29 companies were chosen because they had experienced a "crisis" (a sharp drop in share prices on the stock exchange) between 1980 and 1988. Meyerson's indicator of firm performance is the length of time that firms take to recover from these crises. Although this is a creative measure, the focus on firms in crisis appears to have prevented her from employing more conventional measures as well as from drawing more general conclusions. Perhaps because of the small sample size (and the extreme skew of her variables), Meyerson's analyses, with one exception, are confined almost entirely to bivariate correlations and contingency tables. The correlations are typically in the expected direction but weak.

A further problem involves the concentration of stock ownership among the firms in the study. All 29 firms have an individual stockholding of 15% or more, which under the criteria normally used in this area would render all of them "owner controlled." But Meyerson breaks her population into two groups, "entrepreneurial" controlled firms (those with individual stockholdings of 44% or more, the mean value) and "investor" controlled firms (those whose largest stockholdings are under 44%). It is possible that in Sweden stockowners require 44% or more of the firm to exercise control, but the stockholding necessary to establish control employed by North American researchers has ranged from a high of 20% (Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* [New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1968]) to as low as 5% (David Kotz, *Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978]) and Philip Burch, Jr., *The Managerial Revolution Reassessed* [Lexington, Mass.: Lexington

Books, 1972]) Meyerson provides no substantive justification for her classification scheme

Perhaps most important, especially given her emphasis on the acquisition of capital, is the author's neglect of relations between the firms and their bankers. Meyerson acknowledges the potential importance of these relations, but she ignores them, despite the fact that "banks in Sweden are an important device for corporate control" (p. 7)

By the author's own admission, this text is primarily exploratory. As such it raises interesting questions while answering few of them conclusively.

Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain. By Bernard S. Silberman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. xii + 487. \$19.95.

Charles Tilly

New School for Social Research

Bernard Silberman wonders why state administrations of rich countries differ from each other, in particular why, despite similar degrees of industrialization, Japan and France feature hierarchical autonomous bureaucracies while Britain and the United States often fill visibly vital posts with outsiders. A specialist in Japanese political and administrative history, he satisfies that curiosity by means of sustained comparisons among the four countries. Although much of the text actually flows in the opposite direction, from effects to causes, Silberman's causal reasoning runs like this: after 1850 or so, officials of major states faced dramatic shifts in the means of selecting political leaders. The weaker the system of contract in a given country, the more uncertain its leadership succession. The Meiji Restoration, the establishment of France's Third Republic, adjustment after the American Civil War, and the rise of party politics in 19th-century Britain therefore defined a continuum from high to low uncertainty. Uncertainty about succession encouraged Japanese and French administrators to create unitary, autonomous organizations to run state business, while low uncertainty permitted American and British administrators to rely on bargaining among multiple actors. Autonomous, hierarchical bureaucracies (as in France and Japan) serve their own purposes by recruiting generally trained people early, teaching them plenty on the job, and marching them through well-ordered careers. Consensual, multiple bureaucracies (as in Great Britain and the United States) draw on professionals who have trained in their specialties outside the bureaucracy and who retain their orientation to the larger profession instead of subjecting themselves entirely to bureaucratic discipline. The apparent negative relationship between hierarchical bureaucracy and industrialization (Britain and the United States early, France and Japan late) is spurious, since late industrialization and hierarchical bu-

reaucracy both spring from the weakness of contract, hence of civil society

The book's theoretical section also features a four-fold table deriving bureaucratic structures from high uncertainty versus low uncertainty and social-network leadership structure versus party leadership structure, but it articulates badly with the generally developmental arguments just outlined and does no serious work in the case studies or the final synthesis. Labored prose, effect-to-cause presentation of the argument, and construction of eight of the book's 12 chapters as separate narratives (two chapters per country) of administrative transformation in the four countries make the argument difficult to follow, much less to evaluate. They also blind Silberman to obvious objections that whatever they said later, neither British leaders in 1795, 1831, or 1848 nor American leaders in 1783, 1863, or 1886 recognized themselves as living in times of low uncertainty about contract or succession, that for a generation economic historians have been undermining the characterization of France as a "late" industrializer, that the alleged correlation of hierarchical bureaucracy with state control over professional education breaks down when we move outside the quartet of such countries to examine such cases as Switzerland and Italy, and so on.

The causal account blurs, furthermore, at crucial moments—notably when high officials are supposed to have recognized organizational problems (such as how to exhibit the "public character of the state" when the issues of equality and publicness coincided) and to have adopted administrative expedients in response to those problems, administrative expedients that hardened into durable structure, the book contains too few descriptions of how that recognition, response, and hardening occurred to carry much conviction. What does it mean to say, for example, "No less than the Directory, Napoleon faced the problems of equality and community" (p. 103)? Over and over we read about such abstract problems but not about such concrete ones as winning wars, supplying armies, collecting taxes, quelling rebellions, and administering conquered territory. Given Silberman's emphasis on organizational processes, it is stunning to see whose analyses he manages to ignore: Andrew Abbott and Paul Starr on professionalization, Michael Mann and Richard Bensen on military activity in the transformation of states, Rogers Brubaker and Susan Pharr on citizenship, John Stephens and Barrington Moore on democracy. All are absent from Silberman's bibliography.

On the other hand, Silberman makes astute contributions to the analysis of bureaucracy, attacking the conceit that the general complexity of social life caused, or at least predicted, the extent of hierarchical bureaucratization, establishing that it takes several distinctive forms instead of falling into the single continuum of bureaucratic perfection implied by Max Weber, recognizing that officials built their organizations strategically, without coherent master plans, then created theories about them after the fact, noticing the interdependence between the forms of educational institutions and the character of bureaucratic careers. If the book

I read falls short of the "riveting and disciplined social science epic" Ira Katznelson's blurb reports he found between the same covers, it does offer convenient, reflective summaries of four important administrative histories and a reasoned challenge to unilinear views of bureaucratization and state formation

Complex Epistemological Advice about Complex Objects The Logics of Social Structure By Kyriakos M Kontopoulos Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1993 Pp x+481

Arthur L Stinchcombe
Northwestern University

Kontopoulos tries to advise theorists on epistemological strategies of thinking about structures, conceived of as emergent macroproperties I'll introduce his argument by extending an example mentioned in the book Before the atomic-molecular theory in chemistry, we had a theory that tied chemical behavior of metals to their shininess With the atomic theory, chemists and physicists gave up explaining shininess, while at the same time the craft of mirror making became orders of magnitude more efficient than in Lavoisier's time Jean Fourastié (*Causes of Wealth*, trans Theodore Caplow [Glencoe, Ill Free Press, 1960], pp 129-31) uses mirrors to illustrate the impact of industrialism because there is a long price series for them Only after quantum mechanics was applied to surfaces in materials science could we explain why metals were mostly shiny, why fools gold was an exception among nonmetals, and why depositing silver on a very smooth surface might change the character of its shine

Mirror craftsmen worked entirely at the level of the emergent property, while chemists gave up on the emergent property entirely It is a caricature of Kontopoulos's argument to say that he would advise a century and a half of chemists not to be atomic reductionists, because they could not explain the shininess of metals or the improvement of mirrors that way He sometimes seems to imagine that it was their epistemological dogmatism that explained their neglect of shininess But the caricature has verisimilitude

The structure of his argument is to show that very useful intellectual strategies sometimes fail and then to imagine that one therefore needs to reject them The inability of atomic theory without quantum mechanics to help improve mirror production seems to me to be a very weak argument against all its successes But we can say, "Do not be dogmatic about reductionism "

Besides this rejection of fruitful simplicity to get on with interesting complexity, Kontopoulos undertakes a positive task of classifying strategies of building complex theories of emergent phenomena I think eagerness to classify often causes him to misread theorists For example,

"reduction" to microscopic rituals is classified as "methodological individualism" in Randall Collins but not in Durkheim's *Elementary Forms* (pp 93–97)

Let me give some empirical conditions that suggest emergent structures exist. Theorists explaining them ought to read Kontopoulos to get category labels and analogies from other sciences to straighten out their epistemologies: (1) boundaries, in the sense of special areas within which some causal processes are confined but other processes specialize in shaping, preserving, or penetrating the boundaries (e.g., cell walls, skins, walls, legal personality), (2) information-rich structures that (a) take in much information and use their structure to simplify it to one response, (b) take simple information and add information to it to make multiple responses, or (c) control the growth, shape, or connections of the structure itself by using information from outside (e.g., accounting systems, production plans, genomes, neural nets), (3) networks where variable behavior in links is determined by changeable characteristics of multiple nodes (e.g., formal organizations, conversations, neural nets again, proteins and other polymers), (4) sharp temporal boundaries in system behavior (as when government behavior changes with the start of a war, or family interaction changes at bedtime), (5) experiences of chaos by normally sane elements of the system (e.g., nationality leaders in the former USSR, children of exceptionally ambivalent parents), (6) externalities of varying strength, (e.g., because of distance between units, or behaviors of components of larger systems) so that the "potentials" of the environment of any component react to variations in the strengths and geography of externalities (e.g., moving frontiers in land or in science, environmental degradation, urbanization)

All these are evidence that emergent structures may have dynamics of their own. Though there has to be an adequate explanation of the behavior of every atom in a neural net, simple aggregation of what we know about atoms does not explain vision. Kontopoulos explores what kind of aggregation of atoms *does* explain vision, or shininess of surfaces, or the improvement of mirrors with industrialization.

For my taste his exploration is too abstract, too nonintuitive. There are too few explanations of facts, too many forms of explanation hanging in the epistemological air that were not hanging fact free in the original science. After reading the book, I am not sure which intellectual strategy the craftsmen were using, why reductionist molecular chemistry suppressed the problem of shininess, or whether any Kontopoulos advice to chemists about emergent properties would have enabled them to jump over quantum mechanics directly to materials science.

Weathering the Storm Working-Class Families from the Industrial Revolution to the Fertility Decline By Wally Seccombe London Verso, 1993 Pp 286

David I. Kertzer
Brown University

A sequel to his *Millennium of Family Change Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe* (London Verso, 1992), *Weathering the Storm* completes Wally Seccombe's attempt to rejuvenate Marxist analysis while providing a new synthesis of the evolution of the working-class family. The broad temporal sweep of this work bespeaks its ambition and is reflected in its heavy reliance on secondary sources. Although the title refers to "northwestern Europe" and statements are made about "western" family evolution, the evidence is heavily British and the sources are virtually all English language.

Weathering the Storm considers a broad range of hotly debated issues concerning the rise of modern capitalism and its impact on working-class family life. It is written in lucid and largely nonpolemical style (not the case with most such self-consciously Marxist theoretical work), while showing no reluctance to carry the banner of Marxist analysis at a time when such work has become less than fashionable.

Indeed, Seccombe aims to overturn traditional Marxist theory by moving family forms to a position as basic to the model as mode of production. Most provocatively, he argues that the family should not be conceptualized as a site of consumption, as in the traditional Marxist view, but rather as a site of production, that is, the production of labor. In this key aspect his work recalls that of Marvin Harris (*Cultural Materialism* [New York: Random House, 1979]), which, however, Seccombe does not cite.

Seccombe argues that capitalism as a mode of production deterred formation of stem or joint family households. He details the evolution of forms of working-class labor through the 19th and into the 20th century, linking these to developments in spousal and parent-child relations. Here he is especially concerned with the origins of the male breadwinner and female housekeeper family model.

He is also eager to counter what he takes to be the new revisionist orthodoxy regarding the lack of change in family structure that accompanied industrialization in northwestern Europe. Associated with Peter Laslett, Michael Anderson, and others (though often interpreted in ways that the original authors would reject), the revisionists see no basic change in a family that had been nuclear in structure for centuries before industrialization. Seccombe argues that, regardless of coresidential configurations, this revisionist view is misleading, for the key change in family relations was caused by a switch from the family as site and unit of economic production to a separation of such productive work from the family.

Seccombe puts considerable emphasis here on the rise of factory employment of children, which took them out of their parental household, with the result that children were no longer being primarily socialized by their own parents. This view, however, is open to question, for it is by no means clear that children of the laboring classes in older, rural England typically were brought up in their parents' homes. By the same age as they would later enter factory labor, such children left their peasant households to work as agricultural servants in the homes of others. Industrialization, indeed, may have resulted in an increasing ability of children to live at home and be raised by their own parents.

Perhaps the most valuable and original part of the book is the extended discussion of the fertility decline. Again Seccombe criticizes the prevailing theoretical literature, castigating demographic theorists for ignoring the importance of both sexual desire and conjugal power relations. He employs documentary evidence from the testimony left behind by working-class women in Britain, Germany, and Norway to argue that "women were the driving force behind family limitation" (p. 168), as they felt oppressed by the burden of continually giving birth and caring for large numbers of children. However, it was only some decades after women began to want to limit their births that their husbands came to similar conclusions and, in good part through *coitus interruptus*, working-class fertility began to drop.

What convinced the men to exercise the control necessary to limit fertility, according to Seccombe, was the recognition that children were becoming a drain on the family economy. With mandatory schooling being enforced by the 1890s, the flow of wealth between generations was reversing. Moreover, declining child mortality began to lead to the recognition that fewer births were needed. Seccombe has much of interest to say about demographic theory here, and his injection of both sexuality and spousal relations is welcome, as are his criticisms of the rational choice view of fertility (at least in the context of the absence of contraceptive devices and reliance on such methods as *coitus interruptus* and abstinence).

This book is, in short, a valuable addition to the ongoing debates on the impact of industrialization on family life and the origins of the working-class fertility decline. While calling for a form of Marxist analysis that gives as much emphasis to family as to mode of production, it in fact is well within a more traditional Marxist framework, for in all cases it seems that what is most basic are changes in modes and relations of production. Written in lively and accessible style, it is not only valuable to scholars but would also make a good choice for family sociology courses.

Peasants in the Middle Ages By Werner Rosener Translated by Alexander Stutzer Urbana University of Illinois Press, 1992 Pp xi + 337

Mavis Mate
University of Oregon

This book is a translation of a German text that first appeared in 1985. Rosener begins by outlining his picture of economic developments. In the 9th and 10th centuries, as previously free peasants were reduced to dependence, the manorial system came into existence. Then in the 12th and 13th centuries the system broke up. When former demesne lands were divided up and rented or leased to peasants, there was less demand for labor services and they were commuted into money rents. The peasants thus became more independent and had more time for collective farming and their life in the village. As a result, social solidarity and a sense of community developed within the peasantry and the center of economic and social life shifted away from the manor to the village community.

In the middle sections of the book Rosener develops these ideas in the process of looking at discrete aspects of peasant life—patterns of settlement, dwellings, clothing, food, work, and family life. He constantly attacks the idyllic and nostalgic picture of peasant life depicted by 19th-century German historians and sociologists and, in contrast, stresses the uncomfortable nature of much of the housing, the drabness of the clothing, and the meagerness of the diet. Yet having mentioned the uncomfortable housing, with no qualification, he goes on to talk about the development of the *Stube*, a heated, smoke-free parlor, which according to a contemporary village poet provided a “genuine refuge” in the winter months (p. 79) and surely made the housing more comfortable. Likewise, though he is obviously aware of the social stratification within the village community and spends some time talking about the reasons for the increase in the number of cottagers, he does not clearly bring out this stratification in the individual chapters. In discussing diet, he treats peasants as a homogeneous group: “peasants had to be content with gruel and vegetable stews,” or “peasants seem to have been particularly fond of fatty pork” (p. 97), with no attempt to differentiate between eating habits of cottagers and those of the village elite with substantial landholdings. So too he discusses peasant resistance to their lords at length but does not consider the tensions and hostilities that existed within peasant society.

Finally, at the end of the book, there is a brief section (20 pages) on how peasants and lords reacted to the agrarian crisis in the period after the outbreak of the Black Death. On the vexed question of whether the social and economic conditions of the peasantry improved or worsened during that time, he cites the various viewpoints but does not come to

any definitive answer beyond stating that "the overall condition of the peasantry in the late middle ages was far from enviable" (p 272)

Although Rosener does occasionally mention peasant conditions in England, France, and the Low Countries, there is no systematic comparison between developments there and those in central Europe, which are the main focus of the book. Within the overall area of central Europe, however, he does clearly point out regional differences. For example, peasants began to use horses as draught animals in north Germany, whereas in south Germany they continued to use cattle. Thus readers who are unfamiliar with recent work on peasant life may find much of interest and value in the book. Others may discover that the book poses more questions than it provides answers.

Sacrificed for Honor Italian Infant Abandonment and the Politics of Reproductive Control By David I. Kertzer Boston: Beacon Press, 1993
Pp. xiii + 252

Etienne van de Walle
University of Pennsylvania

Child abandonment has ancient roots in Italy. Kertzer focuses on the 19th century, when statistics are better than in earlier periods. Even then, the exact dimensions of the problem are not easy to measure. Data for 1863 suggest that close to 4% of all births, or 35,000 babies, were abandoned in Italy. Most were probably illegitimate, although the identity of the child at the time of abandonment was often not ascertained. The wheels (rotating cylinders in which the child could be left to be retrieved inside a church or hospital) ensured the anonymity of parents. It is known that in Milan and Florence, however, the majority of abandoned children were legitimate. "From the 1840s to the 1860s, a third of all legitimate children born in Milan were being left at the foundling home, along with virtually all of the illegitimate children" (p. 80). In Florence, the ratio of abandonments to baptisms was 43%, but the numerator includes large numbers of children from the surrounding countryside. Some parents retrieved their children later, but the chances of survival were low. The problem of keeping children alive hinged on supplies of human milk, and foundling homes were desperately short of nurses.

There are no good explanations for the large number of legitimate abandonments in some cities, beyond the availability of an institution that would accept them. The story that Kertzer tells, however, is mostly concerned with a system that compelled mothers to abandon illegitimate children and doomed most of them to die. A number of principles were considered more important than the child's life: that it would be baptized and that the mother would not commit infanticide or abortion to hide

her shame, that familial honor would be protected, that young women who had sinned might give birth in institutions where their fault would be unknown to society, and finally, that men who could not be convinced to marry the women they had seduced would be protected from the consequences of unlawful sexuality. In order to realize these goals, the system mobilized a network of informers, including neighbors, parish priests, and even midwives, the traditional allies of pregnant women. Unwed pregnant women were arrested and confined in foundling homes to deliver a baby from whom they were separated at birth. If they were unable to pay a fee, they were forced to stay on as wet nurses to other children in the institution.

Kertzer uses a mix of secondary sources and case studies to tell this dramatic story. His cases are drawn mainly from the archives of Bologna's House of Correction, a prison that served as a center for unwed pregnant women. The point of view is largely that of victims caught in a dehumanizing system, and he infuses the story with a sense of moral indignation. The villain of the piece is the Catholic Church, which, according to the author, organized a drive to control women's sexuality and co-opted the state's resources to enforce it. The Council of Trent in the mid-16th century is presented as the turning point from which the politics of reproductive controls emanated that eventually led to "human tragedy on a vast scale, the result of good intentions gone wrong" (p. 7). The system spread to other Catholic countries. "The mass abandonment of babies, administered by a well-developed bureaucracy, becomes a distinguishing feature of Catholic Europe" (p. 10). Protestantism encouraged personal responsibility, while Catholicism stressed forgiveness of past sins and saving the honor of unwed mothers.

This is a serious indictment and one wishes that the author had documented it better. It is possible that the church's action reflected prevailing moral codes based on honor and shame, rather than creating them wholesale. A chronology that links foundling homes and the Council of Trent is misleading. John Boswell thought they evolved in the early 13th century in Italy as an avatar in a long tradition and that most large European cities had such hospices within a century or two (*The Kindness of Strangers* [New York: Pantheon Books, 1988], p. 431). Catholic countries had no monopoly: there were between three and four thousand foundlings per year in New York in the 1870s (S. A. Halpern, *American Pediatrics* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988], p. 45). A common version of the story of the creation of foundling hospitals (e.g., by Vincent de Paul in Paris, or Thomas Coram in London) involves a well-intentioned philanthropist trying to remedy the scandal of child exposition in the streets, a master plan aiming at "policing women" belongs to the realm of conspiracy theories.

Infant abandonment in Italy remains an unexplained cultural oddity, a fascinating aberration. Despite the value of this pioneering contribution, much remains to be done to connect the phenomenon in Italy to the history of Western infanticide and, more generally, fertility control.

Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution By Mansoor Moaddel New York Columbia University Press, 1993 Pp x+346

John Foran

University of California, Santa Barbara

Mansoor Moaddel has raised an important and forward-looking set of issues. At the heart of his argument lies an emphasis on the indispensable role played by ideology in the origins and outcome of the Iranian revolution. He conceptualizes ideology as a discourse people use to express interests and formulate strategies of action. Discourse is "episodic" — an episode refers to "a sequence of historically significant events that stand out as constituting an era in the history of the society in question" (p. 17). Economic, political, and cultural conditions shape ideology, but an ideology, once dominant, imposes itself on society to some degree. Finally, drawing on Furet's work on France (*Interpreting the French Revolution* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981]), there is a distinction between revolution as content (the changes brought about) and as mode (an unprecedented time in which actors behave differently).

The first part of the book explores the nature of the post-1953 Iranian state, the dependent development of agriculture, industry, and finance, and class alliances and conflicts across Iranian history. The argument culminates in chapter 5 on the rise of revolutionary Islam in the 1960s and 1970s. With liberal and socialist ideas attacked and discredited after the fall of Mossadegh and the shah appropriating elements of both discourses, Moaddel argues that revolutionary Islam was free to present itself as the only credible opposition. Once Khomeini succeeded in radicalizing a significant number of the *ulama*, this discourse also provided the movement with peculiarly effective means of communication and a calendar for revolutionary mobilization through its mourning rituals and holy months (p. 157).

There are various weaknesses in this argument. The focus on discourse means that social forces are largely left out of the account and only a handful of pages are devoted to the actual events of 1977–79 (pp. 155–62). Equally problematic is the insistence on one revolutionary Shi'i discourse, when there were in fact *diverse* oppositional ideologies, including liberal and socialist variants of Islam, and still potent secular currents drawing on nationalism, democracy, and socialism. Moaddel assumes that revolutionary Islam was needed to bind diverse classes together to make the revolution. An alternative view would be that the shah and the United States constituted sufficient common targets of classes with diverse but real economic and political grievances, expressed through diverse ideological orientations. This view shifts the focus from one dominant oppositional ideology to a more contested terrain where various currents compete with, crisscross, and contradict one another.

A final chapter in part 1 provides a nice comparative angle by looking at Islam and politics in Egypt and Syria. Here Moaddel concisely dis-

cusses how economy, society, polity, and culture interacted in Egypt from the 18th century to the 1940s and in Syria from the 19th century to the 1970s. In Egypt rival variants of Islam served both the elite and its opponents, splitting the merchants off from the artisans and thereby weakening the opposition. In Syria the Baath regime's socialism crystallized the emergence of Islamic opposition among merchants, artisans, and landlords but its strong ties to peasants and workers helped ward off the challenge. These short comparisons actually seem more nuanced than the larger discussion of the causes of the Iranian revolution because here Moaddel sees diverse discourses in each society. This diversity seems to blind him to that of Iran, whose opposition he reasons had to be more unified to succeed.

The second half of the book takes up the outcome of the Iranian revolution, with a focus again on the strength of Islamic discourse in shaping it. Moaddel takes us clearly through the turmoil of the aftermath, showing how movements for land reform, workers' control, and nationalization all briefly flourished, only to self-destruct as conservative views on all these issues gained the upper hand. The hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war also helped the government consolidate its hold. Here Moaddel takes a more nuanced view of struggles among variants of Islam and the left and liberal secular contenders, class capacity and ideological context are more artfully blended. Resource mobilization (criticized earlier) makes an appearance. Still, the apparent shift from a "revolutionary" Shi'ism and the many innovations of Khomeini to a conservative vision upholding the property rights of merchants and landlords calls for further explanation. The logic of this counterrevolutionary process is glossed too quickly: revolutionary Shi'ism somehow became conservative once the state embraced it. The result was not a social revolution marked by economic transformation but "a third world variant of fascism" (pp 262, 200). In addition to the problem of explaining how Islamic discourse was transformed, Moaddel tends to reify discourse, at least semantically. Extremism "emanated from the internal logic of the Shi'i discourse itself" (p 204), "Indeed the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran was dictated by the revolutionary ideology itself" (p 209), "The dominant Shi'i discourse had managed to exclude the social revolutionary solutions to the economic problems of the postrevolutionary period" (p 251), "The revolutionary crisis began when Shi'i discourse took over the protest movement" (p 255).

This book is a valiant attempt at interpreting the Iranian revolution in theoretical terms. Mansoor Moaddel deserves credit for his effort. His book, despite its flaws, is a serious, well-researched, and provocative account of an event of world-historical importance.

The Frontiers of Catholicism: The Politics of Ideology in a Liberal World
By Gene Burns Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California
Press, 1992 Pp vii + 304

Katherine Meyer
Ohio State University

The Frontiers of Catholicism presents the reconstruction of Catholic ideology from its origins in 19th-century Europe through Vatican Council II to the present, particularly in the United States and Latin America. Burns's intent is to demonstrate how the reconstruction was shaped by an interplay among diverse ideologies and politics both within and outside the church. Drawing on historical materials, Burns traces the development of ideas about church-state relations and about the place of faith and moral issues in overall church ideology. He also examines how diverse ideologies developed among women religious in the United States, Vatican leaders, and North and South American bishops because of their unique positions within overall systems of power in the church and in the state. As noted on the book's jacket, "*The Frontiers of Catholicism* is as much a political study of ideological dynamics as it is an institutional study of religious change."

Burns points out that church-state conflicts of the late 19th century initiated the reconstruction of Catholic ideology. Unable to reestablish the central role of the church hierarchy in secular politics, the papacy ultimately acceded to the liberal position of separation of church and state. At the same time, it centralized its control over faith and morals and retained a neofeudal distrust of capitalism and modern state policy. Vatican Council II in 1963 furthered that reconstruction. Separation of church and state authority was formally acknowledged, the extreme centralization of power in the papacy was attacked, and the rejection of the modern world that had characterized papacies since the end of the 19th century was brushed aside.

However, the reforms of Vatican II clarified tensions and ambiguities in church ideology. The church's acceptance of liberalism was partial. Liberal democracy was an accepted and preferred form of government, ensuring religious freedom, but economic and moral liberalism were not sanctioned. The church's distribution of organizational resources to important groups within the church, such as bishops and women religious, was an effort to decentralize. Yet, such groups were not granted authority comparable to their other resources. The church's call for social reform in the modern world was a move to extend church ideology to include social issues. In the concrete, boundaries between social, moral, and political proscriptions were ill defined. With a recent history of attention to matters affecting faith and morals, the ideological hierarchy was unclear about the status of social issues. Burns contends that these ambiguities in church ideology became the centers for political conflict within the church and in church-state relations since Vatican II.

Burns examines how church ideological ambiguity manifests itself within three groups who have experienced the power of church and of state in diverse ways. U.S. bishops, U.S. women religious, and the Latin American church treat the relative importance of social issues and faith and morals differently. The bishops' marginal positions in U.S. society in the 1900s and their ambiguous relationship with Rome were reflected as they increased their attention to social issues in the 1960s and developed their pastoral letters on economics and peace in the 1980s. The marginal position of women religious in the church formed a basis for their critiques of authority within the church and their views toward social change in U.S. society. The political history of the Latin American church furthered the development of liberation theory within that history and incorporated the experience of base communities into a reconstruction of ideology.

In this book, Burns tackles a specific case of ideological change within an organization. He is carefully attuned to the complexities of interaction within social structures. And he advances a provocative thesis: the interaction of power and ideology within the Catholic Church produced a reconstructed ideology that contains traditional ideas on issues of faith and morals and both neofeudal and liberal ideas on issues pertaining to society. Manifested in different groups within the church, this moderately integrated collection of ideas has yielded a pluralism of ideologies that are somewhat akin to each other in content but notably different in application. Each group that Burns centers on—U.S. bishops, women religious, and the Latin American church—merits more extensive analysis, but Burns's intent is to use them in an illustrative way. In so doing, he adds an important piece to a growing body of literature studying the departures of 20th-century Catholicism from its 19th-century roots with an emphasis on political, ideological, and structural conflict (e.g., Lester Kurtz in "The Politics of Heresy," *American Journal of Sociology* 88 [1983]: 1085–115; John Seidler and Katherine Meyer, *Conflict and Change in the Catholic Church* [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989]). Burns's historical analysis is first-rate and is certain to provoke empirical testing in the work of others interested in the politics of ideologies in institutions.

A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity. By Peter L. Berger. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pp. x+218.

Guy E. Swenson
University of California, Berkeley

What are the prospects for religion in the most complex societies? Peter Berger's answer is based on fragments of derivation, on informal extrapolations, and, at all points, on comparative-historical analyses. It includes a fresh, though debatable, interpretation of religion, an interpretation

that many sociologists tacitly employ and that owes more to Dewey, Mead, and Parsons than to such sociological structuralists as Marx or Durkheim

Berger thinks that religion will always be important to the great majority of people. In his view, people never experience reality merely as dead dust hung in space. He says that people always encounter a "transcendent" order in reality, one in which human existence as a self is meaningful and in which people as selves can find fulfillment. (As he develops these points, Berger unaccountably associates G. H. Mead with a "disaggregated" view of the self [p. 116].)

For Berger, the existence of a transcendent order implies the presence of divinity. His reasoning here is largely implicit but seems something as follows: (1) If people can have meaningful and fulfilling experiences as selves—experiences that are not delusional and that seem to occur under all circumstances (and are in that sense transcendent), then (2) the nature of human nature and of extrahuman reality must be consistent with the having of such experiences. (3) Because experiences as selves entail people's seeing what is on their own minds from the perspective of others, (4) transcendent experiences as selves must entail relations with a transcendent Other—an Other that is involved in all situations and is, in all of them, constant in those of its characteristics essential for social relations. Such an Other is divine.

Berger points to several experiences of transcendent order. He concedes that each of them might have an extradivine significance, but he urges that, taken together, they constitute powerful circumstantial evidence for the presence and character of the divine, empirical grounds on which "rational" discussions can center. Among the possibly transcendent experiences he lists (pp. 956–140) are ecstasies of physical violence or sexuality or mysticism, the experience of untrammelled creativity, and the sense of living in a facade behind which lie the forces that "really" shape experience. He also includes the transcendence involved in a sense of humor or the absurd, the sense that reality is sacred, that the universe is ultimately benign, or that some acts deserve unequivocal condemnation whereas others should be wholeheartedly affirmed or appreciated as good or beautiful. He makes much of the redemptiveness of play and of what seems the ineradicability of people's capacity for hope.

How do the "quest for faith" and the "credulity" in his title enter this discussion? If he is right in calling ours an age of credulity, must not people already have faith? Berger thinks otherwise. He sees faith as at least a "working" commitment to a religious position that one has chosen from an array of contending views (p. 126). So described, faith is in short supply whereas less considered religious outlooks (he calls them "credulous") are easy to find.

This brings us to his principal conclusions. The most advanced levels of societal complexity entail pluralism. Pluralism undermines credulous religious positions and forces the kind of quest from which a religion of faith can arise. To Berger, great societal complexity entails great social

differentiation and also the development of pluralism. Pluralism is tolerance for divergent viewpoints in civic relations, a tolerance that accepts the possibility that more than one viewpoint has merit. In these circumstances, people increasingly acknowledge that values they acquired unwittingly (i.e., credulously) may need to be evaluated. They come to question their beliefs and they try to replace them with commitments that can withstand new appraisals. Berger reviews the basic statistics on religious belief, affiliation, and practice and concludes that he can safely reject other explanations for a weakened religiosity: for example, the growth of urbanism and of scientific knowledge, the presence of most varieties of cultural difference, and the spread of individualism. As in some of his earlier books, he sketches likely and less likely outcomes when adherents of major world religions engage in "reasoned" debate (pp. 154-66).

We have, then, a wide-ranging interpretation, normative in inspiration and a challenge to many others. Whatever the validity of its several parts, we can be certain that it is incomplete. Berger needs to tell us why only a few people seem to find belief a problem, why, for many, religious differences are a matter of indifference. He has yet to consider whether other major rethinkings of religious beliefs (e.g., those connected with Renaissance neoplatonism, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, or Romanticism) also involved a growth of faith (i.e., of considered belief), this in the absence of the societal complexity that exists today. He needs to identify the conditions under which people will conclude that various intimations of divinity are sufficiently conclusive to be the basis for conducting their lives. But he does remind us, page by page, that the sociology of religion continues to pose problems central for all of social science.

The Research Foundations of Graduate Education: Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan. Edited by Burton R. Clark. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Pp. xxi + 390.

A. H. Halsey
Nuffield College, Oxford

Burton Clark's latest book confirms his mastery of the comparative study of higher education. No one is better able than he to handle the slippery lexicon of names used by different nations to describe their arrangements for the formal education of their young beyond school.

Classification and measurement are essential in comparative social science. Thus, the paucity of data regarding higher education in various countries deeply afflicts international scholarship. Not until 1992 did the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produce anything approaching reliable numerical comparisons (*Education at a Glance* [Paris, 1992]) and the indicators refer to the single year

1988 An updating and refinement based on 1991 figures is promised for 1994 Apparently Clark and his colleagues were too early to take advantage of the OECD first edition and so we must be content with Clark's use of earlier statistics Ordinarily in social science out-of-date numbers make trivial differences, but higher education is an expanding structure that rivals any recognized social phenomenon in its rate of growth

Another difficulty Clark faced was that provision in education varies more than in all other major social institutions Schooling is an area of human association in which history does matter, traditions and past events have decisive and persistent effects on present structures Hence Clark had to balance an explanation of continuity and difference Graduate education in Germany, Britain, France, the United States, and Japan, because of their distinctive histories of modernization and war, present a baffling array of dissimilarity Clark, on the basis of description by expert natives, succeeds in giving us an explanatory synthesis

In terms of scale the rate of higher education in the United States stands out so much that Clark classifies it as *mass* education While a million bachelors are annually capped and gowned in the United States, some 40% of all U S degrees are advanced Japan, economically a near competitor, is in stark contrast In 1984 it had only 0.5 graduate students per 1,000 inhabitants compared with 4.9 in the United States, 2.8 in France, and 0.9 in Britain Comparing proportions of graduate to undergraduate enrollment, Japan registered 4.0% against 20.2% in France

So what is to be made of it all? I believe that we need a more sophisticated notion of education and training, a notion that includes not only formal schooling but also the exchanges in kitchens and workplaces, this redefinition could then be translated into more helpful statistics Of course, all advanced industrial countries appear to be on a trajectory from elite through mass to universal education, but they also scatter significantly at comparable levels of GNP per capita Indeed it may be doubted whether the evolutionist/functional language in which this elite/mass terminology is rooted tells us much about history This language needs, for example, to be refined in terms of merit as a selective criterion Britain has been much more open in terms of selection by merit than either France or communist Hungary Similarly, the funding of research and the recruitment of researchers has been much obscured by the particularities of national organization Despite the differences, Clark rightly stresses the underlying trend in all countries for an expanding higher education system to displace secondary schooling in lycée or gymnasium as the mechanism of selection for advanced work

Clark also points out other revolutionary trends The rise of the professions to over 30% of the modern labor force reinforces the separation of research from teaching The expansion, even explosion, of knowledge contributes to the same effect and moves research increasingly off the campus And governments, which have emerged as *the* patrons of mod-

ern higher education, are forces seeking all the time to limit costs, to enhance the competitiveness of their nation, and to get results in the short term so as to fit political and bureaucratic time tables

So a new worldwide balance has developed. There are struggles everywhere to balance undergraduate and graduate studies, to concentrate research in specialized and controlled institutions, and to create a level playing field of competition for funds between universities, research organizations, faculties, and disciplines. In this study Clark paints the outline sketch of the new situation of higher education and promises more in his next book.

Catholic Schools and the Common Good By Anthony S. Bryk, Valerie E. Lee, and Peter B. Holland. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. Pp. 402.

Maureen T. Hallinan
University of Notre Dame

Until recently, little research has focused on the contribution of the American Catholic school system to the education of American youth. Catholic schools have been viewed either as similar to public schools with the exception of their religious philosophy and curriculum or as elitist or isolationist institutions that separate rather than integrate students into American society.

With the recent availability of national data sets, a number of studies have been conducted that compare student outcomes across school sectors. The most significant findings to emerge from these studies, based on analyses of the *High School and Beyond* (HSB, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, NCES, 1980–82) survey, are that Catholic schools are more successful than public schools in promoting the academic achievement of students and that Catholic schools are particularly successful in raising the academic achievement of minority and disadvantaged students.

By reducing the range of achievement across students, Catholic schools weaken the effects of family background on student performance and create a more equitable social distribution of achievement. Thus, Catholic schools better approximate the common-school ideal than public schools. While the initial rationale for the establishment of the public-school system was to prepare all students to contribute to society, this goal was replaced over time by a focus on the benefits of schooling to the individual, with little regard for community. In contrast, Catholic schools, in response to Catholic social teaching, strengthened their emphasis on community and made explicit their mission of training students to a sense of social responsibility.

It is this relationship between Catholic schools and the common good that motivates Bryk, Lee, and Holland's comprehensive examination of

Catholic secondary schools in America, *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*. Their aim is not only to document the success of Catholic schools in promoting student learning, but to identify the processes that account for the Catholic school success story. Using a multimethod approach consisting of historical exegeses, field studies, and multivariate analyses of the *HSB* data, they examine in depth the instructional and social processes that lead to student achievement in Catholic schools.

Their study includes a historical analysis of the development of the Catholic school system in America, as well as an empirical analysis of data from a field study of seven Catholic schools and the *HSB* survey data. The historical material demonstrates well that a historical perspective is critical to an appreciation of Catholic schools' place in contemporary society. The authors explain how the Catholic school system was shaped both by Catholic Church teachings and by societal factors. Heavily influenced by the directives of the first Vatican Council, Catholic schools in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries placed heavy emphasis on academic achievement and rigid adherence to church doctrine.

Catholic schools that survived the financial crisis created by the exodus of religious teachers and smaller student enrollments of the 1960s and 1970s responded to the call to renewal of Vatican II in 1962–65. The new mission of the schools, reflecting the church's focus on social justice, was to teach, build community, and provide service to all humankind.

Based on their analyses, the authors concluded that the success of Catholic schools is attributable primarily to the strong academic program to which students are exposed and to the sense of community that characterizes Catholic schools. Few Catholic schools offer general or vocational tracks or programs, consequently, nearly all students are exposed to a comprehensive academic program that seems to have a direct positive effect on their achievement. Moreover, as a result of the sense of community purposefully developed in the schools, Catholic school administrators, faculty, and students tend to be deeply committed to their schools and to their academic and social activities.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the success of Catholic schools is that a large number currently serve an underprivileged urban population. Apparently, strong academic programs and a deep level of faculty and student commitment to school are powerful factors that offset the background disadvantages that typically hinder school achievement. This finding provides a ray of hope to educators and parents at a time when the American public is despairing about the future of American schools.

The significance of Bryk, Lee, and Holland's research cannot be overestimated. Its single-minded focus on school processes raises it above much outcome oriented research and gives the study considerable heuristic value. The empirical results have immediate implications for policy and practice. My only complaint about the work might be that the authors seem so enamored by the strengths of Catholic schools that they fail to stress some of their more obvious weaknesses, such as generally

low teacher salaries, and, in some schools, rigid religious educational programs, selectivity in admissions, and inadequate resources, especially in the sciences. While some of these weaknesses are compensated for by the schools' strengths, others involve justice issues—a central concern of Catholic education. Aside from these omissions, the book is one of the few that successfully detail the mechanisms that link school structure, organization, and climate to student outcomes.

Talented Teenagers: The Roots of Success and Failure By Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Kevin Rathunde, and Samuel Whalen, with contributions by Maria Wong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. x + 307.

Anthony Maier
Northwestern University

This book presents the results of a two-year longitudinal study of approximately 200 ninth and tenth graders who have been recognized by their teachers as having "career potential" in art, athletics, mathematics, music, or natural science. Many of the ideas and measures used in the book derive from previous work by Csikszentmihalyi and his associates. The authors' central hypothesis is that the "sum of momentary experiences" people have while working in their own field of talent is an important force determining whether they stay engaged in that field over time and that the joint presence of seemingly opposite experiences—short-term absorption with long-term utility, or familiar mastery with anxiety-provoking challenge—makes their overall experience most compelling. The empirical study is undertaken to test these ideas in that crucial period in the lives of adolescents when they pass increasingly beyond their parents' control. However, many hypotheses the authors offer are not carefully translated into empirical propositions, and no specific plan of analysis is given to readers. On this reader's reconstruction of the authors' intentions, many of the statistical analyses presented are inadequate, and the results of those analyses inconclusive.

Although there is some overlap in the goals of this study and the many longitudinal studies of high school students to which sociologists are exposed, there are some important dissimilarities. First, the variables of greatest importance to the authors are measured mainly at a phenomenological level, or the level of subjective experience. The authors acknowledge the power of economic circumstances in teenagers' lives and cite other work by Csikszentmihalyi on the role of institutional arrangements that recognize and reward talent. But they believe that the ways economic variables link to the momentary experiences of subjects are not well understood and that research on this can be usefully conducted among populations that are sociologically homogenous. Their sample of honors students from two suburban Chicago high schools was not de-

signed to be socioeconomically diverse 80% of the parents held bachelor's degrees, and two-thirds of the families reported incomes above \$40,000 Also, the authors are skeptical of explanations based in cognitive measures For them the issue is motivational, since "in the last analysis it is the people involved who must enact the superior performance we call talent" (p 31)

The tools the authors use for research give them access to variables affecting individual motivation in a way that most surveys do not They use the "Experience Sampling Method" (ESM), a formal name for the "beeper" method that the senior author has pioneered over the last 15 years Participants in a study agree to carry beepers and, when paged, to fill out two-page forms identifying their activity and its setting, and rating their mood, concentration, motivation, and performance through scales next to a series of words and phrases Here, students carried the beepers for seven days in the first phase of data collection The authors augmented these data with three interviews and two "personality inventories" Data collected in the second phase included a one-time questionnaire to students, an instrument filled out by their teachers, and school records

Even complex longitudinal research can probably be done in an orderly way without a structural model, but here neither a model nor a thorough plan of the analysis is given to readers The authors spend much of the first three-quarters of the book (1) developing the case for theoretically based predictor variables that combine measures from the ESM forms (technically, interaction terms) and (2) comparing means for their entire sample on the initial measures with means from a variety of groups of "average" teenagers from whom similar measures were taken in other studies They do not clearly set out the way that the kinds of experiences in which they are interested will affect current or future conduct, and the task of predicting persistence in a domain of talent after two years, using information gathered through ESM and other means, is taken up only toward the end of the book

The authors do show that several combinations of ESM measures that theory tells them are important to talent development occur more frequently among groups of students who are rated as committed to the development of their talent two years later (The authors use several different criteria to measure commitment) They also show that several individual ESM measures are significantly correlated with commitment ratings, even when test scores and a measure of general work orientation gathered at the same time as the ESM are controlled However, no further multivariate techniques of analysis, such as logits or other methods for analyzing factors contributing to the probability of categorical outcomes, are used

Overall, the authors are more convincing in arguing the logic of complex hypotheses about the incentives that keep adolescents committed to developing talent than in demonstrating the empirical support of these hypotheses But potential readers with interests in adolescence or

achievement may benefit from this work. The authors write well about their subjects and offer a rich and plausible set of insights about the motivations of real teenagers in real settings. Broader social theories are likely to treat motivation in a more cursory fashion.

Secondary School Examinations: International Perspectives on Policies and Practice. By Max A. Eckstein and Harold J. Noah. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. xi + 283.

David P. Baker
Catholic University of America

The current round of national obsession with a perceived crisis in American education has seized upon some quick fixes modeled after what were once thought of as quaint educational practices of other countries. What was exotic and peripheral is now prescriptive. One of the first such foreign fixes to be nominated for import was a high-stakes national examination. Paired with the notion of national education standards, the idea is that evaluating and maintaining (i.e., enforcing) high standards in the locally controlled American schools could be accomplished through the mechanisms of a national examination linked to student certification and selection for additional educational opportunities. While many, even most, other nations have some such examination, this practice is alien to American education. Of course we have our SAT, ACT, and related college achievement tests, born out of the College Board and now the backbone of private testing firms, but these are neither national nor certifying—they were add-ons to burgeoning secondary and tertiary education developed without the logic of a national examination. Historically, American education never produced an organizational or institutional need for a national certifying examination. But the past decade has witnessed more debate and prescription about national examinations as a technical solution to America's educational problems than ever before.

One problem with this public discourse has been that for most Americans, scholars of education included, the use of national examinations in other countries is a murky area. Even the basics about famous exams like the *baccalauréat*, the *Abitur*, and the A-levels are not commonly known here. While some things are familiar, much is not, to many Americans these examinations appear as chess matches played with familiar pieces but under foreign rules.

This book, by two professors emeritus of education, sheds light on the actual practices of high-stakes national examinations in seven countries (plus the United States). The book is not a sociological treatise on examinations, rather it is a cross-national description in the grand, comparative tradition of clear, splendidly written detail. The compared countries—England and Wales, Germany, France, Japan, China, Sweden, the So-

viet Union, and the United States—are well chosen. The former three represent the traditional model of national examinations perhaps most familiar to American scholars, Japan's examination is largely responsible for Americans' current policy fascination with examinations, and China and Sweden demonstrate some interesting recent trends in political control of examinations. Only the Soviet Union, which, as the authors note, was dissolving as the book was being completed, lacks equal comparative interest. The United States seems to be included for two reasons. First, it serves as an almost orthogonal comparison to the other systems, and second, as is hinted throughout and finally openly discussed in the final chapter of the book, the authors are sympathetic toward a high-stakes examination for the American secondary system.

Eckstein and Noah describe the national context of examinations in great deal. There are useful vignettes on how fictitious students approach the exam, what the exam means for students, and how the exam influences adolescents. The complicated areas of success rates and entitlement linked to certain performances are covered very clearly. Examination content, political control, and an actual sampling of items round out the descriptive sections. In each, the level of detail and general comparative approach is exemplary.

In many ways this book sets the stage for another, a thorough sociological treatment of the origins, functions, and politics of national examinations. The material that Eckstein and Noah present lead to potential hypotheses, in areas such as the growing disconnection between actual school curricula and what is tested, the political tension among national interest groups over examinations, or tension between schooling for formal socialization versus for manpower placement, and so forth. Perhaps a second volume from these authors will address the sociology of examinations.

The book is well worth reading for any sociologist concerned with education or stratification. It is especially complementary to crossnational assessments of education and social stratification, not to mention as background for forming an opinion about a national examination for the United States.

Growing Up in a Classless Society? School to Work Transitions By Andy Furlong. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992. Pp. x + 193.

Alan C. Kerckhoff
Duke University

I wish that Andy Furlong had chosen a different main title for this book. The subtitle, "School to Work Transitions," points to what makes this book interesting, and using the term "classless" has led Furlong to attack that term much too persistently. He refers to "John Major's 'classless society,'" but it is hard to believe that John Major thinks his (or any

other) society is actually classless. Certainly, sociologists do not have to be shown (again) that social origins affect educational attainments that, in turn, affect occupational position. But Furlong devotes many pages of this book to showing those effects.

The material offered about the transition from school to work is based on surveys of young people conducted in Scotland in the 1980s by the Centre for Educational Sociology, University of Edinburgh. The book also reviews an extensive body of related British research. I have reservations about some of Furlong's analyses and interpretations (which I summarize below), but there is much of interest here.

During the 1980s, Great Britain, especially Scotland, had serious economic difficulties. Youth unemployment rates in Scotland were worse than in even many of our blighted central city areas, and the economy was generally in very poor shape. In an attempt to cope with the youth unemployment problem, a series of "schemes" were introduced to assist employers to hire young people and to provide them with training. The "Youth Training Scheme" (YTS) was the primary program during this period. By the late 1980s, two-fifths of Scottish students who had left school at the minimum age of 16 were enrolled in such a program. Furlong's observations about this program and its effects on Scottish youth will interest those considering similar programs in the United States.

Furlong emphasizes the effect of such programs in extending the period of transition from school to work by introducing a period (often two years or more) of indeterminate status, and he examines the effects on unemployment, attitudes and values, and the process of leaving the parental home. He also recognizes the importance of the kinds of training received. Preparation for sales and service jobs less often led to employment afterward than did preparation for craft and skilled manual jobs.

Furlong believes that YTS served to increase the inequalities already found in the Scottish educational system. Those who had done least well in school less often found regular employment, and thus they more often entered YTS. Among those in YTS, the most disadvantaged were most often in the kinds of programs that were least likely to lead to employment afterwards. Many employers simply used the program trainees so long as the government was paying the bill but did not keep the trainees on as regular employees afterward. Furlong argues that such trainees thus became "double failures" and were put at an even greater disadvantage than before they entered the program. Rather than "narrowing the gap," the program served to increase it.

Unfortunately, the analyses presented are not always adequate to make the case Furlong wants to make. He actually has no way to show that "the gap" was increased by YTS participation. It takes detailed longitudinal data to tease apart earlier selection effects from later "treatment" effects. Those who entered YTS were not the same kinds of people as those who did not. Those who entered one kind of YTS program were not the same as those who entered another kind of program. Having a lengthy unemployment spell before entering YTS or getting a job is not

the same as being unemployed later. The data Furlong uses are cross-sectional, and he thus must make some questionable assumptions about the order of events and effects in order to interpret his analyses in processual terms.

The book also gives the impression that processes can be observed through simple data presentations. The body of the book presents only simple bivariate tables and figures, the limited multivariate analyses are tucked away in an appendix. Thus, the impression is left that these are less important analyses than those presented in the body of the book, whereas only multivariate analyses can control for antecedents while observing consequents. Although Furlong's multivariate analyses have the limitation just noted, they are a stronger basis for his discussion than those in the body of the book.

I was also disappointed in Furlong's tendency to attack "straw men." Not only does he repeatedly point out that social origins really do make a difference, but he implies that others (not always clearly identified) have made claims his analyses disprove. This method of argument is distracting and lessens the value of the discussion. For instance, I know no one who has claimed (1) that the transition from adolescence to adulthood is not stressful, (2) that family and school perfectly socialize young people to want the outcomes they obtain, or (3) that programs like YTS compensate for the prior achievement differences among young people. Yet, disproving these claims is what Furlong lists as a major contribution of his work.

These are not what I see as the book's contribution. Rather, I see it as a valuable account of one society's attempts to cope with a massive problem of youth unemployment and poor labor-force preparation. Both his own analyses and the rich literature he reviews (largely unknown in this country) provide useful insights into the potential positive and negative effects of such attempts. For that, I can recommend this book to U.S. readers who are concerned about these issues in our own society.

America Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940. By Claude S. Fischer. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992. Pp. 424.

Lana Rakow
University of Wisconsin—Parkside

Claude Fischer casts a wide net in his ambitious effort to document the social role of domestic telephone service. Working with an enviably large research staff over a period of several years, he has collected and analyzed a wealth of material related to telephone adoption and usage in the United States. In addition, he and his researchers have added some original research, most notably interviews with elderly people in the three California towns of Palo Alto, San Rafael, and Antioch.

The value of Fischer's book is twofold. First, having this material collected in one place is a great service for those interested in the development of telephone service or the role of technology in the development of modern life. The book includes material about other technologies—especially the automobile in its contrasting and parallel developments with the telephone—and research on related issues of social life—such as how people spent their time and their preferences for certain forms of communication—making the volume a rich mine for sociologists, historians, and communication theorists. The difficulty of getting at the question of how people used and responded to the telephone led Fischer and his researchers to some imaginative, if indirect, research. For example, they surveyed women's etiquette books to discover the social acceptability of certain telephone practices across time.

Second, his approach to understanding technology is more sophisticated than most. He argues that technologies can have multiple and contradictory consequences because they are put to use by purposeful actors who choose to use the technology within such constraints as personal income, marketing strategies, availability, and government regulation. This user-centered approach to studying technology moves us beyond more deterministic approaches.

Where this volume, useful as it is in gathering together evidence, does not go far enough or deep enough is in its interpretations of the material. The main interpretive theme of the book is that Americans used the telephone for "sociability," which extended and enhanced their way of life rather than altered its essential contours or character. Fischer concludes that the telephone did not disrupt community, at least when community is defined simply as local personal relationships. And with a few nods in the direction of the importance of gender to understanding the social role of the telephone, he concludes that it was a technology that "women aggressively turned to their own ends" (p. 236).

If we are to understand better how and why people used the telephone and within what constraints, we need to give serious attention to relationships of power. We must add the political and economic dimensions of power at a macro level that shaped the story of the telephone in its nondomestic setting, considering how government and business decision making altered the contours of American life. Mass production and mass distribution and resulting changes in employment patterns, as well as the rise in the role of the state and federal governments, changed profoundly the role of community life in public affairs. Fischer hints at this change when he notes what seemed to be a shift from public to private life in communities (p. 215). The declining authority of the community as a place for public life and the role of the telephone in this shifting configuration (not as a *cause*, but at least as a symptom) is not addressed.

We also must look at the dimensions of power that are embedded in our system of gender relations. Oddly, though the book's cover shows pictures of smiling women using the telephone and though in his preface Fischer reports that "I, like many men, tend to be telephone-averse,"

Fischer does not seem to appreciate the depth to which one must understand gender to understand the telephone. In the five pages of the book specifically devoted to gender and the telephone Fischer says, "Research shows that, discounting their fewer opportunities for social contact, women are more socially adept and intimate than men, for whatever reasons—psychological constitution, social structure, childhood experiences, or cultural norms. The telephone therefore fits the typical female style of personal interaction more closely than it does the typical male style" (p. 235). This casual remark is precisely what needs to be investigated and understood if we are to understand the role of the telephone. By venturing further into feminist research in communication, Fischer would have found the "whatever reasons" to be explainable. And "their fewer opportunities for social contact" should not be discounted in a book that purports to understand how and why people use the telephone and the constraints under which they use it. The power relations within the American family, among other gender issues, would have to be accounted for.

While Fischer has provided for us much grist for understanding the telephone in the first part of the 20th century, it will take the deeper and more complex interpretations of other scholars to make the story as rich and illuminating as it should be.

Behind the Postmodern Facade: Architectural Change in Late Twentieth-Century America. By Magali Sarfatti Larson. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Pp. xv + 319.

Mitchell Stevens
Northwestern University

Over the last 25 years American architects rebuilt their profession. As the postwar building boom met its end in the early 1970s, growing cohorts of young architects faced narrower markets for the large-scale building projects long central to the swaggering telos of architectural practice. In tandem with the building industry's decline, they set out to expand their profession's field of legitimate work to include smaller jobs: houses, community centers, campgrounds, and renovations became the bread and butter of many architectural practices and, in time, helped to reframe the terms with which architectural progress was judged by the profession's gatekeepers.

In *Behind the Postmodern Facade*, Magali Sarfatti Larson maps the external economic forces and the internal ideological turmoil that together drafted the transformation of American architecture. Bounding her subject with the years 1966 and 1985, Larson takes as data a wide body of professional writing as well as interviews with some 35 architects. She also examines fluctuations in the profession's gatekeeping practices with a rather ingenious analysis of the influential awards program sponsored

annually by *Progressive Architecture*. Her central claim is that the profession's current tolerance of stylistic plurality is the consequence of a growing profession faced with a diminishing number of jobs. In architecture as elsewhere, competition breeds innovation. Her subsidiary claim—that architecture is unique among high-status professions because of its peculiar dependence upon builders, patrons, and the broader economic climate—is more problematic. Because architects cannot build without building contracts and because architects are hired to fill *patrons'* agendas, Larson argues, these professionals have been unable to carve out “the ideological autonomy that our society accords to professionals and, even more so, to artists” (p. 12). Larson calls the structural dependence of architectural practice “*heteronomy*, because it contrasts radically with the autonomy that is always considered a defining attribute of professional work” (p. 5, Larson's emphasis).

The trouble with this claim—one that makes her study much less useful than it could be to the study of the professions more broadly—is that making clients out of patrons is any professionalization project's defining task. Architecture is distinctive primarily in its failure to accomplish it. Though it is never free, architectural knowledge is widely available and easily reproduced. Suburban home developers, for instance, often build off standard plans hundreds or even thousands of times. Computerization enables developers (and architects) to pump out nearly identical floor plans to fill the stories of high-rise office buildings, whose overall engineering is often similarly formulaic. As Larson makes clear, architecture's tepid bid for autonomy is in large part explained by the profession's inability to defend the need for costly, labor-intensive unique plans when this or that prefabricated scheme will do.

Larson's theoretical assumption about professional autonomy—the production of which she analyzed so effectively in *The Rise of Professionalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)—prevents her from seeing architecture's quandary as a newly generic problem for the professions. Widespread public dismay about the soaring costs of health care, for example, currently threatens to pull the rug out from under the medical establishment's control over the terms and charges of providing service. The rapid growth of the legal profession over the past two decades has forced bar elites to accept that many of their colleagues will advertise on television, serve up explicitly competitive fee menus, and otherwise gamble with the hard-won mystique of legal work. It seems that the knowledge cartels that have been considered defining attributes of professional work are eroding everywhere, as even the most powerful professions accommodate economic change, their own rapid growth, and related shifts in client expectations.

Though Larson does very little to link her account of architectural change with study of the professions more generally, her work keenly portrays how architects rebuilt the ideological edifice of their work in accord with the changing times. As the profession experienced steady growth in personnel over the last three decades despite big fluctuations

in the market for its services, professional elites were forced to rethink the terms of their practice. They had to devise innovative career paths, take smaller jobs more seriously, dispense with the sacralization of monumental construction as the guiding light of architectural progress, and lend legitimacy to a cacophony of styles and scales. The discursive focus of her study demonstrates that structural change inevitably requires renovations of meaning. When actors feel the foundations of their work shifting beneath them, they are forced to rethink their conceptions of what they do, formulating new roles for themselves and their labor that make sense in a changing environment.

Writing Chicago: Modernism, Ethnography, and the Novel By Carla Cappetti. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Pp. x + 274.

John A. Hall
McGill University

Carla Cappetti's high-powered analysis of the Chicago writers J. T. Farrell, Nelson Algren, and Richard Wright deserves to be widely read by sociologists, even though it is formally directed to her colleagues in literary studies. The minor purpose of the book is to demonstrate to literary critics that the work of these writers is incomprehensible without an appreciation of the impact upon them of classical Chicago school sociology. Cappetti succeeds triumphantly here, pointing to many instances of direct contact and influence. The major purpose of the book, however, is advocacy—to rewrite the literary canon so as to include writers currently out of fashion. Before considering the extent of Cappetti's success here, it makes sense to examine the contents of the book.

The first three chapters offer a clear account of the basic views of Park, Burgess, Redfield, Thrasher, and White. This presentation is well done, but it is familiar ground for sociologists. The fourth chapter is something entirely different. Cappetti uses her literary skills to present a superb analysis of W. I. Thomas's *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923). This book offers a "double-edged gospel": on the one hand, rebellion against stifling norms is seen to be acceptable, even desirable, for middle-class women; on the other hand, the deviance of young women of more lowly position is adjudged a social problem, fit to be handled by those scientific agents of social control, the social workers and the psychologists. It is against this sort of morally loaded position that Farrell, Algren, and Wright are held to make most sense.

The trilogy of novels that makes up Farrell's *Studs Lonigan* (1935) has particular interest for Cappetti in that it tries to break through the confining moral categories of the Chicago school despite its obvious indebtedness to Thrasher's *The Gang*. Studs Lonigan is *not* a member of a marginal group, nor does he come from any interstitial or transitional zone. Farrell's critique is rather of a respectable world of recently achieved

success the lack of imagination in this world is judged to be as capable of causing delinquency as is more obvious social breakdown. That there may be something wrong with American ideals per se suggests at the very least that one should always be hesitant in providing social medicine for others.

Nelson Algren's *Never Come Morning* (1942) allows a similar point to be made. Whores and hobos, racketeers and delinquents are seen by the Chicago School, at least according to Cappetti, as essentially passive—vivid human beings, certainly, but more acted upon than actors in their own right. Bruno Bicek is not like this at all. The novel is powerful because we enter into Bicek's nagging conscience and see the disaster into which his conscience leads him. Cappetti rightly makes much of the way in which Algren produced an idiosyncratic amalgam of Dickens and Dostoyevsky.

Cappetti prefaces her analysis of Richard Wright with a careful account of the treatment of his work within critical theory. She claims that attacks upon him for ignoring black culture and for sexism are excessively abstract, though the critics' judgments may be veridical, the spirit in which they are made risks denying his powerfully expressed experience. Her brilliant reading of his autobiography, written in the early 1940s and later published as *Black Boy* (1966) and *American Hunger* (1983), restores to us a human being driven by a visceral desire to disentangle himself from any social mooring.

G. K. Chesterton once insisted that the social problem novels of Edwardian England were less a record of poverty than of the psychology of middle-class people in contact with poverty. Differently put, while sociologists of literature need to accept Durkheim's injunction that there is truth in every social representation, it is vital that they replace naive "reflectionism" with the precise location of the particularity of experience. Cappetti's practice in this regard is exemplary. Nonetheless, I would like more. Her analysis is *pointilliste*, the detailed analysis of particular cases. This method does not confront head-on the question of the differential merit of her authors. If all these writers have a claim on our attention, it still seems to me that Wright's work places him in a different category where he successfully captured experience from the inside, Farrell and Algren at times fail to do so, remaining outsiders looking in. Much could be learned—and advocacy improved—were the author to write more systematically on this point. If to do so would require analysis of more texts by these authors, let us hope quite as much—for this book gives as much pleasure as insight—that she casts her net wider so as to consider earlier and later manifestations of the Chicago novel.

AJS

American Journal of Sociology

Volume 99 Bimonthly July 1993–May 1994

MARTA TIENDA, Editor

WILLIAM G AXINN, IVAN ERMAKOFF, ROGER V GOULD, MARTIN
RIESEBRODT, ROBERT J SAMPSON, and KAZUO YAMAGUCHI, Asso-
ciate Editors

MARY C BRINTON, Associate Editor, Book Review

DAVID LINDSTROM, Assistant Book Review Editor

MARY BLAIR-LOY, GRACE KAO, CHAN-UNG PARK, and ALFORD A
YOUNG, JR, Book Review Editorial Board

SUSAN ALLAN, Managing Editor

LAUREN FORD-TAGGART and CLAIR JAMES, Editorial Assistants

Consulting Editors PAUL D ALLISON • PETER BEARMAN • ROBERT J BURSİK,
JR • GLENN R CARROLL • JOHN CASTERLINE • MARK CHAVES • KAREN COOK
• NANCY DAVIS • NANCY DENTON • LAUREN EDELMAN • ROBERT R FAULK-
NER • SCOTT FELD • CLAUDE FISCHER • ROBERTO FRANZOSI • NOAH FRIEDKIN
• MARK GRANOVETTER • LARRY GRIFFIN • DOUGLAS HECKATHORN • BARBARA
HEYNS • FRED KNISS • GARY LAFREE • MARGARET MOONEY MARINI • J
MILLER MCPHERSON • JAMES MONTGOMERY • DANIEL MONTI • JOEL PO-
DOLNY • DUDLEY POSTON • CHARLES RAGIN • CECILIA RIDGEWAY • JOACHIM
SINGELMANN • C MATTHEW SNIPP • GILLIAN STEVENS

International Consulting Editors JEAN-FRANCOIS AMADIEU (France) • NORMAN
BRAUN (Switzerland) • ANDREAS DIEKMANN (Switzerland) • ULF HANNERZ (Sweden)
• PETER HEDSTROM (Sweden) • JOHANNES HUININK (Germany) • NOAH LEWIN-
EPSTEIN (Israel) • TOM A B SNIJDERS (The Netherlands) • HAYA STIER (Israel) •
THOMAS VOSS (Germany) • JEROEN WEESIE (The Netherlands)

Editorial Board ANDREW D ABBOTT • GARY S BECKER • CHARLES E BIDWELL • DONALD
J BOGUE • TERRY N CLARK • JAMES S COLEMAN • JOHN L COMAROFF • WENDY GRIS-
WOLD • PHILIP M HAUSER • EVELYN KITAGAWA • EDWARD O LAUMANN • DONALD N
LEVINE • DOUGLAS S MASSEY • WILLIAM L PARISH • MOISHE POSTONE • EDWARD SHILS
• GEORGE P STEINMETZ • ROSS M STOLZENBERG • FRED L STRODTBECK • GERALD D
SUTTLES • LINDA J WAITE • WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

© 1993, 1994, by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved
Published July, September, November 1993
January, March, May 1994
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U S A
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

•

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS TO REFEREES

The editors are indebted to their many colleagues across the country who assist them in the assessment of manuscripts. The work of these referees cannot be overestimated, it is a continuous service to the profession. The following is a list of the people who read at least one manuscript in 1993. We take this opportunity at the end of volume 99 to thank them.

JULIA P. ADAMS	NICOLE W. BIGGART	ALFRED D. CHANDLER
CELESTA ALBONETTI	PETER BIRKELAND	ANDREW J. CHERLIN
JOAN ALDOUS	JUDITH R. BLAU	DANIEL CHIROT
JEFFREY C. ALEX- ANDER	FRED L. BLOCK	DALE CHITWOOD
JUTTA ALLMENDINGER	JACK M. BLOOM	HARVEY M. CHOLDIN
DUANE ALWIN	KENNETH BOLLEN	KEVIN J. CHRISTIANO
EDWIN AMENTA	PHILLIP BONACICH	AARON V. CICOUREL
DOUGLAS L. ANDERTON	ALAN BOOTH	CANDACE CLARK
ARJUN APPADURAI	CHRISTINE BOSE	PAUL DAVID CLEARY
NATSUMI ARATAME	TERRY BOSWELL	ELISABETH CLEMENS
ANDREW ARATO	ROBERT BOYD	CLIFFORD C. CLOGG
MARGARET ARCHER	KEVIN D. BREAUULT	IRA COHEN
SAID A. ARJOMAND	GEORGE S. BRIDGES	LAWRENCE COHEN
KAREN E. ASCHAF- FENBURG	JULIE BRINES	YINON COHEN
WILLIAM BAILEY	MENACHEM BRINKER	BERTRAM COHLER
THOMAS BAILEY	STEVEN G. BRINT	SAMUEL COHN
WAYNE E. BAKER	JEFFREY BROADBENT	SHARON M. COLLINS
JAMES W. BALKWELL	JEANNE BROOKS-GUNN	RANDALL COLLINS
WILLIAM P. BARNETT	LEONARD BROOM	JOHN L. COMAROFF
JAMES N. BARON	KEVIN BROWN	ROBERT WILLIAM CONNELL
RICHARD BARRETT	ROGERS BRUBAKER	KAREN COOK
DAVID BARRON	JOSEF BRUEDERL	LEWIS A. COSER
WILLIAM BATCHELDER	ANTHONY BRYK	TAYLOR COX
JOEL A. C. BAUM	WALTER BUHL	JONATHAN CRANE
FRANK D. BEAN	MARTIN BULMER	KATHLEEN DALY
E. M. BECK	STEPHEN G. BUNKER	KERMIT DANIEL
PENNY EDGELL	JAMES BURK	SANDRA DANZIGER
BECKER	ANNE-MARIE BURLEY	LYNN DAVIDMAN
HOWARD S. BECKER	LEE BURSTEIN	DEBORAH DAVIS
NICOLE BEISEL	PAUL BURSTEIN	CARL N. DEGLER
ELEANOR BELL	CAMILLE BUSETTE	GORDON F. DEJONG
ROBERT D. BENFORD	RITA BUTZER	JACQUES DELACROIX
NACHMAN BEN- YEHUDA	GLEN CAIN	NORMAN K. DENZIN
MABEL BEREZIN	CRAIG CALHOUN	SONALDE DESAI
DAVID G. BERGER	COLIN CAMERER	JOEL DEVINE
THOMAS J. BERNARD	CHARLES CAMIC	PAUL DiMAGGIO
ANNETTE BERNHARDT	KAREN E. CAMPBELL	THOMAS A. DiPRETE
TIMOTHY BIBLARZ	CAMERON CAMPBELL	FRANK DOBBIN
DENISE BIELBY	PENELOPE CANAN	G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF
WILLIAM T. BIELBY	THEODORE CAPLOW	KATHERINE DONATO
	BRUCE CARRUTHERS	GREG J. DUNCAN
	JOHN B. CASTERLINE	THOMAS DURKIN
	WILLIAM R. CATTON, JR.	

American Journal of Sociology

GARY A DWORKIN	RICHARD B FRITZ	MICHAEL HECHTER
GARY L EBERSOLE	JOHN GAGNON	DOUGLAS D HECKA-
ISAAC EBERSTEIN	JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ	THORN
KLAUS EDER	JOHN F GALLIHER	SAMUEL HEILMAN
KATHRYN EDIN	ADAM GAMORAN	JOHN P HEINZ
MITCHELL L EGGERS	S GARASKY	DAVID R HEISE
S N EISENSTADT	MAURICE A GARNIER	MICHAEL HEISE
CHARLES ELDER	ROSEMARY GARTNER	SUSAN HELPER
SCOTT R ELIASON	RICHARD J GELLES	JOHN L HENRETTA
STEPHEN J ELLINGSON	GARY GEREFFI	CEDRIC HERRING
LEE ELLIS	NAOMI GERSTEL	WOLF V HEYDEBRAND
CHRISTOPHER G	JAMES A	BARBARA HEYNS
ELLISON	GESCHWENDER	ALEXANDER HICKS
MUSTAFA EMIRBAYER	MICHAEL GEYER	JOHN HIGLEY
PAULA ENGLAND	BERNHARD GIESEN	ERIC L HIRSCH
RUTH C ENGS	JESS C GILBERT	TRAVIS HIRSCHI
JAMES G ENNIS	FAYE GINSBURG	CHARLES HIRSCHMAN
DORIS R ENTWISLE	LINDA GINZEL	FRANK HIRTZ
JOYCE L EPSTEIN	JENNIFER GLASS	THOMAS HOFFER
VICTORIA L ERICKSON	NORVAL D GLENN	DENNIS P HOGAN
GOSTA ESPING-	FATMA MUGE GOCEK	RICHARD HOLLINGER
ANDERSEN	LUIN GOLDRING	DOO-SEUNG HONG
WENDY ESPELAND	LAURA GOMEZ	GREGORY HOOKS
AMITAI ETZIONI	AVERY GORDON	PATRICK M HORAN
PETER B EVANS	PHILIP S GORSKI	ALLAN V HORWITZ
JEAN-LOUIS FABIANI	MICHAEL R	JAMES S HOUSE
THOMAS J FARARO	GOTTFREDSON	MICHAEL HOUT
GEORGE FARKAS	WALTER GOVE	CAROLYN HOWE
REYNOLDS FARLEY	FRANKLIN GOZA	WILLIAM HOYNES
JUDITH B FARQUHAR	VICTORIA DE GRAZIA	JOAN HUBER
MARCUS FELSON	ANDREW M GREELEY	TOBY E HUFF
JAMES MAX FENDRICH	DAVID F GREENBERG	CHESTER L HUNT
ROBERTO M	MICHAEL GREENWOOD	SCOTT A HUNT
FERNANDEZ	SHOSHAMA GROSSBARD	LAURENCE R IAN-
MYRA MARX FERREE	DAVID B GRUSKY	NACCONE
SALLY FINDLEY	GUO GUANG	HIROSHI ISHIDA
GARY A FINE	AVERY M GUEST	DAVID JACOBS
ROGER FINKE	JOSEPH GUSFIELD	MARK D JACOBS
GLENN FIREBAUGH	JOHN HAGAN	JERRY A JACOBS
NEIL FLIGSTEIN	JOHN R HALL	DAVID R JAMES
RICHARD FLORIDA	ARCHIBALD O HALLER	PAUL JARGOWSKY
WILLIAM H FORM	TERENCE C HALLIDAY	GUILLERMINA JASSO
RENATA FORSTE	MAUREEN T HAL-	ROBERT M JENKINS
ROBERTO FRANZOSI	LINAN	J CRAIG JENKINS
ROBERT F FREELAND	SYDNEY HALPERN	GARY F JENSEN
R SCOTT FREY	MICHAEL T HANNAN	LEIF JENSEN
ROGER O FRIEDLAND	KATHLEEN MULLAN	RICHARD JESSOR
DEBRA FRIEDMAN	HARRIS	JASON B JIMERSON
RAYMOND A	STEPHANIE WILSON	DIANE JOHNSON
FRIEDMAN	HARTWELL	PAUL JOHNSTON
W PARKER FRISBIE	HEATHER HAVEMAN	

Acknowledgments

ROBERT ALUN JONES	KENNETH C LAND	DOUGLAS W MAYNARD
KARA JOYNER	NANCY LANDALE	DOUGLAS J MCADAM
JOAN R KAHN	JOHN LAUB	HOLLY J MCCAMMON
ARNE L KALLEBERG	JANET LAURITSEN	BILL MCCARTHY
MATTHIJS KALMIJN	FRANK J LECHNER	DAVID MCFARLAND
LINDA KALOF	SHARON M LEE	JOHN H MCGRATH
GRAHAM KALTON	ERIC M LEIFER	KATHLEEN MCKINNEY
SHAWN KANAIAUPUNI	JEFFREY LEITER	SARA MCLANAHAN
EMILY KANE	CHARLES LEMERT	JAMES MCPARTLAND
GRACE KAO	RICHARD LEMPERT	CLARK MCPHAIL
HOWARD B KAPLAN	ROBERT LERNER	DAVID MECHANIC
NANCY L KARWEIT	ROBERT E LERNER	JUAN DIEZ MEDRANO
JACK KATZ	DONALD N LEVINE	ELIZABETH MENAGHAN
ROBERT L KAUFMAN	NOAH LEWIN-EPSTEIN	SALLY MERRY
VERNA M KEITH	ZAI LIANG	STEVEN F MESSNER
THEODORE D KEMPER	DANIEL T LICHTER	STJEPAN G MESTROVIC
RONALD C KESSLER	STANLEY LIEBERSON	JOHN W MEYER
BARBARA STANEK KIL-	ROBERT LIEBMAN	STEPHEN J MEZIAS
BOURNE	IVAN LIGHT	TERANCE D MIETHE
SALLY B KILGORE	NAN LIN	DEBRA C MINKOFF
MICHAEL S KIMMEL	JAMES R LINCOLN	BETH A MINTZ
MARTIN KINNEY	BRUCE LINCOLN	JOHN MIROWSKY
EDGAR KISER	BRUCE G LINK	MARK S MIZRUCHI
EVELYN M KITAGAWA	ALLEN E LISKA	PHYLLIS MOEN
BERT KLANDERMANS	EUGENE LITWAK	LINDA D MOLM
STEVEN KLEPPER	RICHARD D LLOYD	HARVEY MOLOTCH
GAIL KLIGMAN	CLARENCE LO	JEFFREY MORENOFF
JAMES R KLUEGEL	JOHN R LOGAN	S PHILIP MORGAN
DAVID KNOKE	PAUL LOPES	CALVIN MORRILL
KARIN D	JOSEPH LOPREATO	JEYLAN T MORTIMER
KNORR-CETINA	KARYN LOSCOCO	HANS-PETER MUELLER
MELVIN KOHN	MARY BLAIR-LOY	CHANDRA MULLER
HAGEN KOO	J LARRY LYON	HANS-PETER MULLER
KENNETH KOPUT	JOHN VAN MAANEN	RICHARD MÜNC
MATTHEW KRAATZ	PATRICIA MAC-	MARTHA A MYERS
DAVID KRACKHARDT	CORQUODALE	JOANE P NAGEL
ELLEN PERCY KRALY	RICHARD S MACHALEK	KATHY NECKERMAN
MARTIN KRETZMANN	CATHARINE A MAC-	VICTOR G NEE
HANSPETER KRIESI	KINNON	LISA J NEIDERT
MARVIN D KROHN	ROBERT MANNING	ROBERT L NELSON
CANDACE	PETER K MANNING	W LAWRENCE
KRUTTSCHNITT	PHILIP MANNING	NEUMAN
DANIEL H	JAMES G MARCH	HOWARD NEWBY
KRYMKOWSKI	PETER MARSDEN	MICHAEL NEWCOMB
WARREN N	ROBERT M MARSH	FRANÇOIS NIELSEN
KUBITSCHKE	DAVID A MARTIN	PHILIPPE NONET
RICHARD A KULKA	EMILY MARTIN	JAMES O'CONNOR
RICHARD W	LINDA MARTIN	ALICE O'CONNOR
LACHMANN	MARTIN E MARTY	DENIS O'HEARN
GARY LAFREE	KAREN O MASON	PATRICK O'MALLEY
DAVID LAITIN	ROSS L MATSUEDA	ANTHONY OBERSCHALL

American Journal of Sociology

PAMELA OLIVER	PATRICIA A ROOS	DORIS P SLESINGER
SUSAN OLZAK	JAMES E ROSENBAUM	BARRY SMART
VALERIE K OPPEN- HEIMER	RACHEL A ROSENFELD	NEIL SMELSER
ANN S ORLOFF	CATHERINE E ROSS	SHELLEY A SMITH
SUSAN OSTRANDER	PETER H ROSSI	A WADE SMITH
JOHN PADGETT	BRIAN ROWAN	KENNETH J SMITH
ALBERTO PALLONI	DIETRICH	DAN SMITH
DONALD A PALMER	RUESCHEMEYER	TOM SMITH
FRANZ URBAN PAPPI	MARY RUGGIE	HERBERT L SMITH
TOBY PARCEL	JAMES B RULE	DAVID A SNOW
EMILIO PARRADO	RUBÉN G RUMBAUT	MICHAEL E SOBEL
RONNELLE PAULSEN	STEVE L RYTINA	ROBERT SOKOL
LEONARD PEARLIN	ARTHUR SAKAMOTO	ANNEMETTE SØRENSEN
CHARLES PERROW	GARY D SANDEFUR	AAGE SORENSEN
BERNICE A PESCO- SOLIDO	JIMY M SANDERS	MICHAEL SOSIN
TROND PETERSEN	ANNA M SANTIAGO	SCOTT J SOUTH
RICHARD A PETERSON	JOACHIM J	GLENNA SPITZE
MICHAEL PHILLIPS	SAVELSBERG	STEVEN STACK
ANDREW PICKERING	THOMAS J SCHEFF	RODNEY STARK
ROBERT B PIPPIN	KATHERINE SCHILLER	CHARLOTTE STEEH
GIANFRANCO POGGI	RAYMOND SCHMITT	NICO STEHR
MELVIN POLLNER	ALLAN SCHNAIBERG	RONNIE STEINBERG
WHITNEY POPE	ROBERT SCHOEN	COOKIE W STEPHAN
ALEJANDRO PORTES	CARMi SCHOOLER	ELIZABETH H
MOISHE POSTONE	MICHAEL SCHUDSON	STEPHEN
JOSEPH E POTTER	JAMES T SCHULMAN	JOHN D STEPHENS
HARLAND PRECHEL	HOWARD SCHUMAN	GILLIAN STEVENS
SAMUEL PRESTON	L PHILIP SCHUMM	ARTHUR STINCHCOMBE
ADAM PRZEWORSKI	MICHAEL SCHWARTZ	GREG STINSON
THOMAS PULLUM	BARRY SCHWARTZ	ROSS M STOLZENBERG
JILL QUADAGNO	WILLIAM SCHWEIKER	DAVID STRANG
ENRICO QUARANTELLI	MELVIN SEEMAN	SHELDON STRYKER
PAUL RABINOW	STEVEN SEIDMAN	GENE F SUMMERS
ADRIAN RAFTERY	MOSHE SEMYONOV	JOHN R SUTTON
FRANCISCO O RAMIREZ	WILLIAM H SEWELL, JR	MICHAEL S SWAFFORD
JAMES RANGER-MOORE	MICHAEL J SHANAHAN	RICHARD SWEDBERG
MARK R RANK	MARK SHANLEY	C GRAY SWICEGOOD
WERNER RAUB	RICHARD SHAVELSON	ANN SWIDLER
STEVE RAUDENBUSH	YOSSI SHAVIT	ALAN SWINGWOOD
MICHAEL J REAY	NORMA J SHEPELAK	ANDREW SZASZ
KENT REDDING	JUDITH SHEPS	IVAN SZELENYI
JOHN SHELTON REED	WESLEY SHRUM	SZONJA SZELENYI
BARBARA RESKIN	ALAN SICA	IRVING TALLMAN
RONALD R RINDFUSS	ALLAN SILVER	ILAN TALMUD
GEORGE RITZER	RONALD SIMONS	TONY H TAM
ROLAND ROBERTSON	JUDITH SINGER	JAY D TEACHMAN
ROBERT V ROBINSON	JITENDRA V SINGH	EDWARD E TELLES
MARY ROMERO	EMMANUEL SIVAN	WARREN D
WADE CLARK ROOF	THEDA SKOCPOL	TENHOUTEN
	JOHN SKVORETZ	MARK TESTA
		PEGGY THOITS

Acknowledgments

ELIZABETH THOMSON	ETIENNE VAN DE	ROBIN M WILLIAMS
BARRIE THORNE	WALLE	FRANKLIN D WILSON
LIONEL TIGER	IMMANUEL	CHRISTOPHER WINSHIP
CHARLES TILLY	WALLERSTEIN	DOUGLAS WISSOKER
LOUISE TILLY	JOHN P WALSH	ALAN WOLFE
STEVEN M TIPTON	EDWARD J WALSH	RAYMOND SIN-KWOK
EDWARD A TIRYAKIAN	R STEPHEN WARNER	WONG
NANCY TUMA	MARK E WARR	MORRISON G WONG
INSAN TUNALI	MARY WATERS	CHARLES H WOOD
BRYAN S TURNER	SUSAN C WATKINS	ERIK OLIN WRIGHT
RALPH H TURNER	JOHN K WATTERS	LAWRENCE L WU
STEPHEN TURNER	DAVID L WEAKLIEM	YU XIE
J RICHARD UDRY	MARY JO WEAVER	TOSHIO YAMAGISHI
GREGORY ULMER	JEROEN WEESIE	KAZUO YAMAGUCHI
SAMUEL VALENZUELA	DAVID WEISBURD	NITZA YANAY
BRYAN J VILA	SUSAN WELCH	J MILTON YINGER
WAYNE VILLEMEZ	BARRY WELLMAN	IN-JIN YOON
MARY E VOGEL	BRUCE WESTERN	EPHRAIM
ANDREW WALDER	HARRISON C WHITE	YUCHTMAN-YAAR
ROGER WALDINGER	MICHAEL J WHITE	MAYER N ZALD
MICHAEL WALLACE	LYNN WHITE	DAVID ZARET
PIERRE VAN DEN	DOUGLAS R WHOLEY	VIVIANA A ZELIZER
BERGHE	MARTIN K WHYTE	EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL
AXEL P M VAN DEN	AARON WILDAVSKY	MIN ZHOU
BERG	HAROLD L WILENSKY	ROLF ZIEGLER
ROBIN WAGNER-	RICHARD WILLIAMS	VERA ZOLBERG
PACIFICI		

CONTENTS OF VOLUME 99

Articles

- 750 AMENTA, EDWIN Symposium Comment The State of the Art in Welfare State Research on Social Spending Efforts in Capitalist Democracies since 1960 See HICKS, HUBER
- 1237 BEREZIN, MABEL Cultural Form and Political Meaning State-subsidized Theater, Ideology, and the Language of Style in Fascist Italy
- 1287 BIELBY, DENISE D See BIELBY, W
- 1287 BIELBY, WILLIAM T , and DENISE D BIELBY "All Hits Are Flukes" Institutionalized Decision Making and the Rhetoric of Network Prime-Time Program Development
- 428 BOSWORTH, SUSAN LOVEGREN See KREPS
- 353 BROOKS-GUNN, JEANNE, GREG J DUNCAN, PAMELA KATO KLEBANOV, and NAOMI SEALAND Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development?
- 1 CHAVEZ, MARK Intraorganizational Power and Internal Secularization in Protestant Denominations
- 164 CHRISTIANSON, JON B See WHOLEY
- 396 DOBBIN, FRANK, JOHN R SUTTON, JOHN W MEYER, W RICHARD SCOTT Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal Labor Markets
- 944 DOBBIN, FRANK See SUTTON
- 252 DUNCAN, GREG J See BROOKS-GUNN
- 1492 DURAND, JORGE See MASSEY, D
- 1411 EMIRBAYER, MUSTAFA, and JEFF GOODWIN Network Analysis and the Problem of Agency
- 75 EVANS, M D R See KELLEY
- 590 FAVELL, ADRIAN James Coleman Social Theorist and Moral Philosopher?
- 1455 FERNANDEZ, ROBERTO, and ROGER GOULD A Dilemma of State Power Brokerage and Influence in the National Health Policy Domain
- 1492 GOLDRING, LUIN See MASSEY, D
- 1411 GOODWIN, JEFF See EMIRBAYER

American Journal of Sociology

- 265 GORSKI, PHILIP S The Protestant Ethic Revisited Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia
- 1455 GOULD, ROGER See FERNANDEZ
- 317 HARRIS, KATHLEEN MULLAN Work and Welfare among Single Mothers in Poverty
- 1157 HEDSTROM, PETER Contagious Collectivities On the Spatial Diffusion of Swedish Trade Unions, 1890–1940
- 668 HICKS, ALEXANDER, and JOYA MISRA Political Resources and the Growth of Welfare in Affluent Capitalist Democracies, 1960–1982 See HUBER, AMENTA
- 1534 HODSON, RANDY, DUŠKO SEKULIĆ, and GARTH MASSEY National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia
- 1559 HOPCROFT, ROSEMARY L The Social Origins of Agrarian Change in Late Medieval England
- 711 HUBER, EVELYNE, CHARLES RAGIN, and JOHN D STEPHENS Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State See HICKS, AMENTA
- 1180 IANNACONE, LAURENCE R Why Strict Churches Are Strong
- 126 JENKINS, J CRAIG See KPOSOWA
- 75 KELLEY, JONATHAN, and M D R EVANS The Legitimation of Inequality Occupational Earnings in Nine Nations
- 353 KLEBANOV, PAMELA KATO See BROOKS-GUNN
- 126 KPOSOWA, AUGUSTINE J , and J CRAIG JENKINS The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957–1984
- 428 KREPS, GARY A , and SUSAN LOVEGREN BOSWORTH Disaster, Organizing, and Role Enactment A Structural Approach
- 1010 LEE YEAN-JU, WILLIAM L PARISH, and ROBERT J WILLIS Sons, Daughters, and Intergenerational Support in Taiwan
- 1492 MASSEY, DOUGLAS S , LUIN GOLDRING, and JORGE DURAND Continuities in Transnational Migration An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities
- 1534 MASSEY, GARTH See HODSON
- 640 MCADAM, DOUG, and RONNELLE PAULSEN Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism
- 396 MEYER, JOHN W See DOBBIN
- 944 MEYER, JOHN W See SUTTON

- 668 MISRA, JOYA See HICKS
- 1212 MONTGOMERY, JAMES D Weak Ties, Employment, and Inequality An Equilibrium Analysis
- 972 PARCEL, TOBY L , and ELIZABETH G MENAGHAN Early Parental Work, Family Social Capital, and Early Childhood Outcomes
- 559 PICKERING, ANDREW The Mangle of Practice Agency and Emergence in the Sociology of Science
- 711 RAGIN, CHARLES See HUBER
- 49 ROBINSON, ROBERT V Economic Necessity and the Life Cycle in the Family Economy of Nineteenth-Century Indianapolis
- 164 SANCHEZ, SUSAN M See WHOLEY
- 911 SAVELSBERG, JOACHIM J Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment
- 396 SCOTT, W RICHARD See DOBBIN
- 944 SCOTT, W RICHARD See SUTTON
- 353 SEALAND, NAOMI See BROOKS-GUNN
- 1534 SEKULIĆ, DUŠKO See HODSON
- 1596 SHIN GI-WOOK The Historical Making of Collective Action The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946
- 711 STEPHENS, JOHN D See HUBER
- 1042 STOLZENBERG, ROSS M Educational Continuation by College Graduates
- 614 STRANG, DAVID, and NANCY BRANDON TUMA Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity in Diffusion
- 847 STRYKER, ROBIN Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes Some Implications for Social Conflict, Order, and Change
- 396 SUTTON, JOHN R See DOBBIN
- 944 SUTTON, JOHN R , FRANK DOBBIN, JOHN W MEYER, and W RICHARD SCOTT The Legalization of the Workplace
- 614 TUMA, NANCY BRANDON See STRANG
- 1314 WESTERN, BRUCE Unionization and Labor Market Institutions in Advanced Capitalism, 1950–1985
- 164 WHOLEY, DOUGLAS R , JON B CHRISTIANSON, and SUSAN M SANCHEZ The Effect of Physician and Corporate Interests in the Formation of Health Maintenance Organizations

Review Essays

- 1078 GAGNON, JOHN *The Dismal Science and Sex* (*Sex and Reason* by Richard Posner)
- 464 SINGH, JITENDRA V *Density Dependence Theory—Current Issues, Future Promise* (*Dynamics of Organizational Populations* by Michael T. Hannan and Glenn R. Carroll)

Book Reviews

- 820 ABRAHAM, GARY A *Max Weber and the Jewish Question: A Study of the Social Outlook of His Sociology* Lawrence A. Scaff
- 488 ALBRECHT, GARY L *The Disability Business: Rehabilitation in America* Gary Kiger
- 213 AMBERT, ALBA N., and MARIA D. ALVAREZ, eds *Puerto Rican Children on the Mainland: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* William Vélez, Tom Griego-Jones, and Maria Vidal de Haymes
- 793 BAER, HANS A., and MERRILL SINGER *African-American Religion in the Twentieth Century: Varieties of Protest and Accommodation* Kevin E. Early
- 1134 BAKALIAN, ANNY *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* Jean Bacon
- 844 BARKAN, ELAZAR *The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States between the World Wars* Ullica Segerstråle
- 1626 BARLETT, PEGGY F *American Dreams, Rural Realities: Family Farms in Crisis* Sonya Salamon
- 1649 BASU, AMRITA *Two Faces of Protest: Contrasting Modes of Women's Activism in India* Patricia Craig
- 1381 BEER, WILLIAM R *American Stepfamilies* Chandra Muller
- 794 BEIT-HALLAHMI, BENJAMIN *Despair and Deliverance: Private Salvation in Contemporary Israel* Eileen Barker
- 1645 BEM, SANDRA LIPSITZ *The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality* Christine L. Williams
- 1136 BEN-RAPHAEL, ELIEZER, and STEPHEN SHAROT *Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in Israeli Society* Mervin F. Verbit
- 1682 BERGER, PETER L *A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity* Guy E. Swanson

- 1366 BERGGREN, CHRISTIAN *Alternatives to Lean Production Work Organization in the Swedish Auto Industry* Paul S Adler
- 1139 BERRY, BRIAN J L *America's Utopian Experiments Communal Havens from Long-Wave Crises* Fred Kniss
- 525 BILLING, MICHAEL *Talking of the Royal Family* Mary F Rogers
- 782 BIOLSI, THOMAS *Organizing the Lakota The Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations* Thomas D Hall
- 477 BLALOCK, HUBERT M , JR *Understanding Social Inequality Modeling Allocation Processes* John Allen Logan
- 1355 BORNEMAN, JOHN *Belonging in the Two Berlins Kin, State, Nation* Daniel S Mattern
- 1112 BOSK, CHARLES L *All God's Mistakes Genetic Counseling in a Pediatric Hospital* Carol A Heimer
- 809 BRENNER, SUSAN W *Precedent Inflation* Catherine West-Newman
- 487 BRILLIANT, ELEANOR L *The United Way Dilemmas of Organized Charity* Wolfgang Bielefeld
- 554 BRIM, GILBERT *Ambition How We Manage Success and Failure throughout our Lives* Joanne M Gold
- 1651 BRINTON, MARY C *Women and the Economic Miracle Gender and Work in Postwar Japan* James R Lincoln
- 764 BRUBAKER, ROGERS *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* Geoff Eley
- 1686 BRYK, ANTHONY S , VALERIE E LEE, and PETER B HOLLAND *Catholic Schools and the Common Good* Maureen T Hallinan
- 1405 BRYK, ANTHONY S , and STEPHEN W RAUDENBUSH *Hierarchical Linear Models Applications and Data Analysis Methods* Henriette Engelhardt
- 770 BURAWOY, MICHAEL, and JÁNOS LUKÁCS *The Radiant Past Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to Capitalism* Ákos Róna-Tas
- 1681 BURNS, GENE *The Frontiers of Catholicism Politics of Ideology in a Liberal World* Katherine Meyer
- 1387 BURSIK, ROBERT J , JR , and HAROLD G GRASMICK *Neighborhoods and Crime The Dimensions of Effective Community Control* Richard Rosenfeld

- 776 BURT, MARTHA R *Over the Edge The Growth of Homelessness in the 1980s* Benedict Giamo
- 1085 BURT, RONALD S *Structural Holes The Social Structure of Competition* Mark Shanley
- 517 CAMPBELL, JOHN CREIGHTON *How Policies Change The Japanese Government and the Aging Society* Fred C Pampel
- 1697 CAPPETTI, CARLA *Writing Chicago Modernism, Ethnography, and the Novel* John A Hall
- 201 CARLING, ALAN H *Social Division* Henry Lee Allen
- 242 CARROLL, MICHAEL P *Madonnas That Maim Popular Catholicism in Italy since the Fifteenth Century* Sandra L Zimdars-Swartz
- 1350 CHAMPAGNE, DUANE *Social Order and Political Change Constitutional Governments among the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek* Alfred Darnell
- 1684 CLARK, BURTON R , ed *The Research Foundations of Graduate Education Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan* A H Halsey
- 841 CLARKE, ADELE E , and JOAN H FUJIMURA, eds *The Right Tools for the Job At Work in Twentieth-Century Life Sciences* Vicki Lundmark
- 485 CLAWSON, DAN, ALAN NEUSTADTL, and DENISE SCOTT *Money Talks Corporate PACs and Political Influence* David Knoke
- 806 CLOTFELTER, CHARLES T , ed *Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?* Helmut K Anheier
- 1120 COHEN, SHERRILL *The Evolution of Women's Asylums since 1500 From Refuges for Ex-Prostitutes to Shelters for Battered Women* Craig McEwen
- 839 COLE, STEPHEN *Making Science Between Nature and Society* David L Hull
- 1087 COLEMAN, JAMES S , and THOMAS J FARARO, eds *Rational Choice Theory Advocacy and Critique* Victor Nee
- 802 COLVIN, MARK *The Penitentiary in Crisis From Accommodation to Riot in New Mexico* Patrick Jackson
- 510 COSER, LEWIS A *Maurice Halbwachs on Collective Memory* Suzanne Vromen
- 233 COSTELLO, CYNTHIA B *We're Worth It! Women and Collective Action in the Insurance Workplace* Michele Micheletti

- 237 COWAN, CAROLYN PAPE, and PHILIP A COWAN *When Partners Become Parents The Big Life Change for Couples* Margaret L Griffin
- 1688 CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, MIHALY, KEVIN RATHUNDE, and SAMUEL WHALEN, WITH MARIA WONG *Talented Teenagers The Roots of Success and Failure* Anthony Maier
- 1397 CUMINGS, BRUCE *War and Television* Lewis A Friedland
- 1661 DELGADO, HECTOR L *New Immigrants, Old Unions Organizing Undocumented Workers in Los Angeles* David P Lindstrom
- 1633 DELPHY, CHRISTINE, and DIANA LEONARD *Familiar Exploitation A New Analysis of Marriage in Contemporary Western Societies* Denise D Bielby
- 1128 DEMERATH, N J , III, and RHYS H WILLIAMS *A Bridging of Faiths Religion and Politics in a New England City* Howard M Bahr
- 816 DIAMOND, ALAN, ed *The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine A Centennial Reappraisal* George W Stocking, Jr
- 1380 DIAMOND, TIMOTHY *Making Gray Gold Narratives of Nursing Home Care* Gunnar Almgren
- 522 DILGER, ROBERT JAY *Neighborhood Politics Residential Community Associations in American Governance* Eleanor Townsley
- 835 DRAPER, ELAINE *Risky Business Genetic Testing and Exclusionary Practices in the Hazardous Workplace* William Freudenburg
- 826 DUBIN, STEPHEN C *Arresting Images Impolitic Art and Uncivil Actions* Helen A Beckstrom
- 1391 DUNEIER, MITCHELL *Slim's Table Race, Respectability, and Masculinity* Penny Edgell Becker
- 1145 DUTTON, MICHAEL R *Policing and Punishment in China From Patriarchy to "the People "* Arif Dirlik
- 1690 ECKSTEIN, MAX A , and HAROLD J NOAH *Secondary School Examinations International Perspectives on Policies and Practice* David P Baker
- 788 ELSASS, PETER *Strategies for Survival The Psychology of Cultural Resilience in Ethnic Minorities* Stephen Cornell
- 492 ELSTER, JON *Local Justice How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens* Carol A Heimer

- 476 ENGLAND, PAULA *Comparable Worth Theories and Evidence* Jennifer Glass
- 796 ESPIRITU, YEN LE *Asian American Panethnicity Bridging Institutions and Identities* Joane Nagel
- 1116 EYER, DIANA E *Mother-Infant Bonding A Scientific Fiction* Kristin K Barker
- 824 FALUDI, SUSAN *Backlash The Undeclared War against American Women* Virginia S Fink
- 1344 FENDRICH, JAMES MAX *Ideal Citizens The Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement* Ronnelle Paulsen
- 1352 FERGE, ZSUZSA, and JON EIVIND KOLBERG, eds *Social Policy in a Changing Europe* Jill Quadagno
- 1130 FINKE, ROGER, and RODNEY STARK *The Churching of America, 1776-1990 Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy* Kent Redding
- 1693 FISCHER, CLAUDE S *America Calling A Social History of the Telephone to 1940* Lana Rakow
- 529 FISHMAN, ARYEI *Judaism and Modernization on the Religious Kibbutz* Donald A Nielsen
- 534 FLANAGAN, KIERAN *Sociology and Liturgy Re-presentations of the Holy* Janet L Jacobs
- 804 FLYNN, ROB *Structures of Control in Health Management* Ann Barry Flood
- 254 FRANKENBERG, RON, ed *Time, Health, and Medicine* Kathy Charmaz
- 495 FROHLICH, NORMAN, and JOE A OPPENHEIMER *Choosing Justice An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory* Fredrik Eng-
elstad
- 811 FRYE, JOHN H *The Vision of the Public Junior College, 1900-1940 Professional Goals and Popular Aspirations* J Farley Ordo-
vensky
- 1691 FURLONG, ANDY *Growing Up in a Classless Society? School to Work Transitions* Alan C Kerckhoff
- 1103 GAMSON, WILLIAM A *Talking Politics* Robert D Benford
- 1359 GERHARDT, UTA, ed *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism* Mike Forrest Keen
- 1372 GERLACH, MICHAEL L *Alliance Capitalism The Social Organiza-
tion of Japanese Business* Gary G Hamilton

- 822 GIDDENS, ANTHONY *The Transformation of Intimacy Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies* Carolyn J Dean
- 521 GIFFEN, P J , SHIRLEY ENDICOTT, and SYLVIA LAMBERT *Panic and Indifference The Politics of Canada's Drug Laws* Dean G Rojek
- 514 GILLIS, JOHN R , LOUISE A TILLY, and DAVID LEVINE, eds *The European Experience of Declining Fertility, 1850–1970 The Quiet Revolution* Richard Lachmann
- 1647 GLAZER, NONA Y *Women's Paid and Unpaid Labor The Work Transfer in Health Care and Retailing* John P Walsh
- 1632 GOODE, WILLIAM J *World Changes in Divorce Patterns* Annette Sørensen
- 501 GRAFSTEIN, ROBERT *Institutional Realism Social and Political Constraints on Rational Actors* Alan Carling
- 774 GRAHAM, OTIS L , JR *Losing Time The Industrial Policy Debate* Kevin J Dougherty
- 790 GRAY, IAN *Politics in Place Social Power Relations in an Australian Country Town* Andrew Parkin
- 1143 GREENFELD, LIAH *Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity* Juan Diez Medrano
- 791 GRIMSHAW, WILLIAM J *Bitter Fruit Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931–1991* Judith Birgen
- 227 GULDIN, GREGORY ELIYU, ed *Urbanizing China* William F Stinner
- 508 HABERMAS, JÜRGEN *Postmetaphysical Thinking Philosophical Essays* Garry M Brodsky
- 1370 HAGE, JERALD, and CHARLES H POWERS *Post-Industrial Lives Roles and Relationships in the 21st Century* Harald Wenzel
- 813 HALSEY, A H *Decline of Donnish Dominion The British Academic Professions in the Twentieth Century* Sarah V Barnes
- 245 HAMMOND, PHILLIP E *Religion and Personal Autonomy The Third Disestablishment in America* Kevin J Christiano
- 1402 HANSON, F ALLAN *Testing Testing Social Consequences of the Examined Life* Steven Brint
- 249 HART, STEPHEN *What Does the Lord Require? How American Christians Think about Economic Justice* Laura L Nash
- 1625 HARVEY, DAVID L *Potter Addition Poverty, Family, and Kinship in a Heartland Community* Ann R Tickamyer

- 229 HATCH, ELVIN *Respectable Lives Social Standing in Rural New Zealand* Carolyn Steedman
- 1664 HATTAM, VICTORIA C *Labor Visions and State Power The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States* Rick Fantasia
- 505 HAWKINS, HUGH *Banding Together The Rise of National Associations in American Higher Education* James C Hearn
- 1385 HEIDENSOHN, FRANCES *Women in Control? The Role of Women in Law Enforcement* Peter K Manning
- 536 HESTER, MARIANNE *Lewd Women and Wicked Witches A Study of the Dynamics of Male Domination* Mary Jo Neitz
- 1656 HING, BILL ONG *Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy, 1850-1990* Zai Liang
- 502 HIXSON, WILLIAM B , JR *Search for the American Right Wing An Analysis of the Social Science Record, 1955-1987* James L Nolan, Jr
- 768 HOLLIFIELD, JAMES F *Immigrants, Markets, and States The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* Barry R Chiswick
- 251 HOLY, LADISLAV *Religion and Custom in a Muslim Society The Berti of Sudan* Alan S Miller
- 1125 HUNTER, JAMES DAVISON *Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America* Lester R Kurtz
- 1110 IMMERGUT, ELLEN M *Health Politics Interests and Institutions in Western Europe* Ted Marmor
- 1374 ISHIDA HIROSHI *Social Mobility in Contemporary Japan Educational Credentials, Class, and the Labour Market in a Cross-National Perspective* Takehiko Kariya
- 1122 IWAO SUMIKO *The Japanese Woman Traditional Image and Changing Reality* Glenda S Roberts
- 211 JACOBS, MARK D *Screwing the System and Making It Work Juvenile Justice in the No-Fault Society* Thomas J Bernard
- 1640 JANKOWSKI, MARTIN SANCHEZ *Islands in the Street Gangs and American Urban Society* Mercer L Sullivan
- 244 JAY, NANCY *Throughout Your Generations Forever Sacrifice, Religion, and Paternity* Hans Sebald
- 223 JELLINEK, LEA *The Wheel of Fortune The History of a Poor Community in Jakarta* Ann Hawkins
- 778 JENCKS, CHRISTOPHER *Rethinking Social Policy Race, Poverty, and the Underclass* Jeffrey S Lehman

- 830 JENKINS, PHILIP *Intimate Enemies Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain* Karen Glumm
- 550 JESSOR, RICHARD, JOHN EDWARD DONOVAN, and FRANCES MARIE COSTA *Beyond Adolescence Problem Behavior and Young Adult Development* Michael D Newcomb
- 219 JHALLY, SUT, and JUSTIN LEWIS *Enlightened Racism The Cosby Show, Audiences, and the Myth of the American Dream* Andrea L Press
- 252 JODELET, DENISE *Madness and Social Representations Living with the Mad in One French Community* Bruce Luske
- 221 JONES, JACQUELINE *The Dispossessed America's Underclasses from the Civil War to the Present* Alice O'Connor
- 217 KASINITZ, PHILIP *Caribbean New York Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race* Mary C Waters
- 1642 KATZ, MICHAEL B , ed *The "Underclass" Debate Views from History* Philip Kasinitz
- 1407 KELLEY, DEIRDRE M *Last Chance High How Girls and Boys Drop In and Out of Alternative Schools* Nilda Flores-Gonzalez
- 1677 KERTZER, DAVID I *Sacrificed for Honor Italian Infant Abandonment and the Politics of Reproductive Control* Etienne van de Walle
- 1378 KINOSHITA YASUHIRO and CHRISTIE W KIEFER *Refuge of the Honored Social Organization in a Japanese Retirement Community* Diana Lynn Bethel
- 831 KITSON, GAY C , with WILLIAM M HOLMES *Portrait of Divorce Adjustment to Marital Breakdown* Karen Carver
- 1630 KLAUS, ALISA *Every Child a Lion The Origins of Maternal and Infant Policy in the United States and France, 1890-1920* Barbara R Bergmann
- 1090 KNIGHT, JACK *Institutions and Social Conflict* Satoshi Kanazawa
- 205 KOLBERG, JON EIVIND, ed *The Study of Welfare State Regimes* Alexander Hicks
- 1672 KONTOPOULOS, KYRIAKOS M *Complex Epistemological Advice about Complex Objects The Logics of Social Structure* Arthur L Stinchcombe
- 1653 LAM, ALICE C L *Women and Japanese Management Discrimination and Reform* Sawako Shirahase

- 766 LAMONT, MICHÈLE *Money, Morals, and Manners The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class* David Gartman
- 1393 LANCASTER, ROGER N *Life Is Hard Machismo, Danger and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua* Paola Pérez-Alemán
- 1695 LARSON, MAGALI SARFATTI *Behind the Postmodern Facade Architectural Change in Late Twentieth-Century America* Mitchell Stevens
- 780 LAWSON, BILL E , ed *The Underclass Question* Susan E Mayer
- 1663 LEIDNER, ROBIN *Fast Food, Fast Talk Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday Life* Chloe E Bird
- 1628 LEIRA, ARNLAUG *Welfare States and Working Mothers The Scandinavian Experience* Kimberly A Reed
- 526 LEVINE, DANIEL H *Popular Voices in Latin American Catholicism* Kevin Neuhauser
- 474 LICHT, WALTER *Getting Work Philadelphia, 1840–1950* William Finlay
- 1099 LINDER, MARC *Farewell to the Self-Employed Deconstructing a Socioeconomic and Legal Solipsism* Kevin Henson
- 1635 MACCOBY, ELEANOR E , and ROBERT H MNOOKIN *Dividing the Child Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody* Marygold S Melli
- 819 MACGREGOR, DAVID *Hegel, Marx, and the English State* Keith Doubt
- 772 MARKUSEN, ANN, and JOEL YUDKEN *Dismantling the Cold War Economy* Gregory McLauchlan
- 1147 MARX, ANTHONY W *Lessons of Struggle South African Internal Opposition, 1960–1990* Aldon Morris
- 1114 MARYANSKI, ALEXANDRA, and JONATHAN H TURNER *The Social Cage Human Nature and the Evolution of Society* J Richard Udry
- 1342 MASSEY, DOUGLAS S , and NANCY A DENTON *American Apartheid Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* Lawrence H Fuchs
- 800 MCCONVILLE, MIKE, and DAN SHEPHERD *Watching Police, Watching Communities* Robert J Bursik, Jr
- 1668 MEYERSON, EVA M *The Impact of Ownership Structure and Executive Team Composition on Firm Performance The Resolution of a Leadership Paradox* David W Allison

- 256 MILLER, DAVID J , and MICHAEL HERSEN, eds *Research Fraud in the Behavioral and Biomedical Sciences* Mark A Schneider
- 481 MILLER, GARY J *Managerial Dilemmas The Political Economy of Hierarchy* Nicole Woolsey Biggart
- 1353 MISGELD, KLAUS, KARL MOLIN, and KLAS ÅMARK, eds *Creating Social Democracy A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden* John D Stephens
- 209 MIYAZAWA SETSUO *Policing in Japan A Study on Making Crime* David T Johnson
- 1679 MOADDEL, MANSOOR *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution* John Foran
- 225 MOBERG, MARK *Citrus, Strategy, and Class The Politics of Development in Southern Belize* Michael D Phillips
- 552 MORRIS, DAVID B *The Culture of Pain* Ruth Zambrana
- 1346 MULLER, THOMAS *Immigrants and the American City* Douglas S Massey
- 808 NELSON, ROBERT L , DAVID M TRUBEK, and RAYMAN L SOLOMON, eds *Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices Transformations in the American Legal Profession* Thomas Koenig
- 1361 OBERSCHALL, ANTHONY *Social Movements Ideologies, Interests, and Identities* Pamela Oliver
- 547 O'CONNOR, PAT *Friendships between Women A Critical Review* Sara Delamont
- 1658 OLZAK, SUSAN *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* John D McCarthy
- 231 PETRACCA, MARK P *The Politics of Interests Interest Groups Transformed* Walter Diaz
- 483 PFEFFER, JEFFREY *Managing with Power Politics and Influence in Organizations* Mark S Mizruchi
- 1637 POLAKOW, VALERIE *Lives on the Edge Single Mothers and Their Children in the Other America* Kathryn M Neckerman
- 1095 POSTONE, MOISHE *Time, Labor, and Social Domination A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* Bob Jessop
- 1118 POWERS, JANE BERNARD *The "Girl Question" in Education Vocational Education for Young Women in the Progressive Era* Regina Werum
- 1107 PUETTE, WILLIAM J *Through Jaundiced Eyes How the Media View Organized Labor* William DiFazio

- 1348 PUTNAM, ROBERT D , with ROBERT LEONARDI and RAFFAELLA Y NANETTI *Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* Marco Maraffi
- 1409 RAFTERY, JUDITH ROSENBERG *Land of Fair Promise Politics and Reform in Los Angeles Schools, 1885-1941* Amy Stuart Wells
- 1404 RAGIN, CHARLES C , and HOWARD S BECKER, eds *What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry* Alan Sica
- 1383 RAKOW, LANA F *Gender on the Line Women, the Telephone, and Community Life* Daphne Spain
- 1654 RAMSEYER, J MARK, and FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH *Japan's Political Marketplace* Steven R Reed
- 203 RANDALL, ADRIAN *Before the Luddites* Raymond Markey
- 1365 REGINI, MARINO, ed *The Future of Labour Movements* Arthur Shostak
- 786 RIGBY, PETER *Cattle, Capitalism, and Class Ilparakuyo Maasai Transformations* John Foran
- 506 RINGER, FRITZ *Fields of Knowledge French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890-1920* David Swartz
- 1676 RÖSENER, WERNER *Peasants in the Middle Ages* Mavis Mate
- 260 ROSENTHAL, MARILYNN M , and MARCEL FRENKEL, eds *Health Care Systems and Their Patients An International Perspective* Mary Ruggie
- 556 ROSS, H LAURENCE *Confronting Drunk Driving Social Policy for Saving Lives* Allen E Liska
- 542 ROSSI, PETER H , and ALICE S ROSSI *Of Human Bonding Parent-Child Relations across the Life Course* Duane F Alwin
- 1105 ROTHENBERG, LAWRENCE A *Linking Citizens to Government Interest Group Politics at Common Cause* Anne Costain
- 833 ROWLAND, ROBYN *Living Laboratories Women and Reproductive Technologies* Barbara Gail Hanson
- 532 ROZARIO, SANTI *Purity and Communal Boundaries Women and Social Change in a Bangladeshi Village* Raka Ray
- 815 SADRI, AHMAD *Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals* Guy Oakes
- 784 SALAMON, SONYA *Prairie Patrimony Family, Farming, and Community in the Midwest* Linda Lobao

- 1389 SAMPSON, ROBERT J , and JOHN H LAUB *Crime in the Making Pathways and Turning Points through Life* John Modell
- 207 SAUTTER, UDO *Three Cheers for the Unemployed Government and Unemployment before the New Deal* Walter I Trattner
- 1093 SAVAGE, MIKE, JAMES BARLOW, PETER DICKENS, and TONY FIELDING *Property, Bureaucracy, and Culture Middle-Class Formation in Contemporary Britain* Alan Dahl
- 1097 SAYER, ANDREW, and RICHARD WALKER *The New Social Economy Reworking the Division of Labor* Vicki Smith
- 798 SCHERZER, KENNETH A *The Unbounded Community Neighborhood Life and Social Structure in New York City, 1830-1875* Barry Wellman
- 1639 SCOTT, KESHO YVONNE *The Habit of Surviving Black Women's Strategies for Life* Yvonne D Newsome
- 1674 SECCOMBE, WALLY *Weathering the Storm Working-Class Families from the Industrial Revolution to the Fertility Decline* David I Kertzer
- 1092 SEN, AMARTYA *Inequality Reexamined* Stein Ringen
- 1363 SHORE, ELLIOTT, KEN FONES-WOLF, and JAMES P DANKY, eds *The German-American Radical Press The Shaping of a Left Political Culture, 1850-1940* William S Solomon
- 490 SHOSTAK, ARTHUR B *Robust Unionism Innovations in the Labor Movement* Stanley Aronowitz
- 1670 SILBERMAN, BERNARD S *Cages of Reason The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain* Charles Tilly
- 258 SILVERMAN, MILTON, MIA LYDECKER, and PHILIP R LEE *Bad Medicine The Prescription Drug Industry in the Third World* Stephen Hilgartner
- 238 SIMONDS, WENDY, and BARBARA KATZ *Centuries of Solace Expressions of Maternal Grief in Popular Literature* Verta Taylor
- 538 SMART, CAROL, ed *Regulating Womanhood Historical Essays on Marriage, Motherhood and Sexuality* Anna Yeatman
- 497 SMITH, MICHAEL R *Power, Norms, and Inflation A Skeptical Treatment* David A Latzko
- 499 SNIDERMAN, PAUL M *Reasoning and Choice Explorations in Political Psychology* Neil J Kressel

- 1101 SNOW, DAVID A , and LEON ANDERSON *Down on Their Luck
A Study of Homeless Street People* Peter H Rossi
- 843 STEPHAN, PAULA E , and SHARON G LEVIN *Striking the Mother
Lode in Science The Importance of Age, Place, and Time* Ste-
phan Fuchs
- 1142 SUTER, CHRISTIAN *Debt Cycles in the World Economy Foreign
Loans, Financial Crises, and Debt Settlements, 1820-1990* Her-
man M Schwartz
- 247 SWEENEY, TERRANCE *A Church Divided The Vatican versus
American Catholics* Katherine Meyer
- 531 TAMBIAH, STANLEY JEYARAJA *Buddhism Betrayed? Religion,
Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* James G Williams
- 1124 TATE, CLAUDIA *Domestic Allegories of Political Desire The
Black Heroine's Text at the Turn of the Century* Kathryn
Ragsdale
- 1357 'T HART, MARJOLEIN C *The Making of a Bourgeois State War,
Politics, and Finance during the Dutch Revolt* Bruce G Car-
ruthers
- 512 TILMAN, RICK *Thorstein Veblen and His Critics, 1891-1963
Conservative, Liberal, and Radical Perspectives* Sidney Plotkin
- 1376 TOBIN, JOSEPH J , ed *Re-Made in Japan Everyday Life and
Consumer Taste in a Changing Society* Jennifer Robertson
- 1132 TORRES, CARLOS ALBERTO *The Church, Society and Hegemony
A Critical Sociology of Religion in Latin America* Samuel Silva-
Gotay
- 1666 USEEM, MICHAEL *Executive Defense Shareholder Power and
Corporate Reorganization* Neil Fligstein
- 1368 VALLAS, STEVEN PETER *Power in the Workplace The Politics
of Production at AT&T* Ruth Milkman
- 1395 WAITS, WILLIAM B *The Modern Christmas in America A Cul-
tural History of Gift Giving* Michael Kearl
- 240 WALLACE, RUTH A *They Call Her Pastor A New Role for Catho-
lic Women* Edward C Lehman, Jr
- 479 WEIR, MARGARET *Politics and Jobs The Boundaries of Employ-
ment Policy in the United States* Lawrence A Wohl
- 540 WESTON, KATH *Families We Choose Lesbians, Gays, Kinship*
Beth E Schneider

- 548 WEXLER, PHILIP, with WARREN CRICHLLOW, JUNE KERN, and REBECCA MARTUSEWICZ *Becoming Somebody Toward a Social Psychology of School* Robert Fiala
- 1083 WHITE, HARRISON C *Identity and Control A Structural Theory of Social Action* Peter Abell
- 1399 WOLFE, ALAN *The Human Difference Animals, Computers, and the Necessity of Social Science* Randall Collins
- 545 WOODY, BETTY *Black Women in the Workplace Impacts of Structural Change in the Economy* Sharon M Collins
- 1138 WUNDERLICH, ROGER *Low Living and High Thinking at Modern Times, New York* E Burke Rochford, Jr
- 1109 WUNDERLIN, CLARENCE E , JR *Visions of a New Industrial Order Social Science and Labor Theory in America's Progressive Era* Gretchen Ritter
- 827 WUTHNOW, ROBERT, ed *Vocabularies of Public Life Empirical Essays in Symbolic Structure* Robin Wagner-Pacifici
- 519 WYSONG, EARL *High Risk and High Stakes Health Professionals, Politics, and Policy* Ruth Simpson
- 528 XIATONG FEI *From the Soil The Foundations of Chinese Society* Martin King Whyte
- 215 ZHOU MIN *Chinatown The Socioeconomic Potential of an Urban Enclave* Jimmy M Sanders
- 235 ZUCKERMAN, HARRIET, JONATHAN R COLE, and JOHN T BRUER, eds *The Outer Circle Women in the Scientific Community* Janice Gordon-Kelter
- 262 ZUSSMAN, ROBERT *Intensive Care Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession* James Hughes

BOOK REVIEWERS

- PETER ABELL, 1083
 PAUL S ADLER, 1366
 HENRY LEE ALLEN, 201
 DAVID W ALLISON, 1668
 GUNNAR ALMGREN, 1380
 DUANE F ALWIN, 542
 HELMUT ANHEIER, 806
 STANLEY ARONOWITZ, 490
 JEAN BACON, 1134
 HOWARD BAHR, 1128
 DAVID BAKER, 1690
 EILEEN BARKER, 794
 KRISTIN K BARKER, 1116
 SARAH BARNES, 813
 PENNY EDGELL BECKER, 1391
 HELEN A BECKSTROM, 826
 ROBERT BENFORD, 1103
 BARBARA BERGMANN, 1630
 TOM BERNARD, 211
 DIANA LYNN BETHEL, 1378
 DENISE D BIELBY, 1633
 WOLFGANG BIELEFELD, 487
 NICOLE WOOLSEY BIGGART, 481
 CHLOE E BIRD, 1663
 JUDITH BIRGEN, 791
 STEVEN BRINT, 1402
 GARRY BRODSKY, 508
 ROBERT J BURSİK, 800
 ALAN CARLING, 501
 BRUCE G CARRUTHERS, 1357
 KAREN CARVER, 831
 KATHY CHARMAS, 254
 BARRY CHISWICK, 768
 KEVIN J CHRISTIANO, 245
 RANDALL COLLINS, 1399
 SHARON M COLLINS, 545
 STEPHEN CORNELL, 788
 ANNE N COSTAIN, 1105
 PATRICIA CRAIG, 1649
 ALAN DAHL, 1093
 ALFRED DARNELL, 1350
 CAROLYN DEAN, 822
 SARA DELAMONT, 547
 WALTER DIAZ, 231
 WILLIAM DiFAZIO, 1107
 ARIF DIRLIK, 1145
 KEITH DOUBT, 819
 KEVIN DOUGHERTY, 774
 KEVIN E EARLY, 793
 GEOFF ELEY, 764
 HENRIETTE ENGELHARDT, 1405
 FREDRIK ENGELSTAD, 495
 RICK FANTASIA, 1664
 ROBERT FIALA, 548
 WILLIAM FINLAY, 474
 NEIL FLIGSTEIN, 1666
 ANN BARRY FLOOD, 804
 NILDA M FLORES-GONZALEZ, 1407
 JOHN FORAN, 786, 1679
 LEWIS A FRIEDLAND, 1397
 STEPHAN FUCHS, 843
 LAWRENCE H FUCHS, 1342
 JOHN H GAGNON, 1078
 DAVID GARTMAN, 766
 BENEDICT GIAMO, 776
 JENNIFER GLASS, 476
 KAREN GLUMM, 830
 JOANNE GOLD, 554
 JANICE GORDON-KELTER, 235
 MARGARET L GRIFFIN, 237
 THOMAS HALL, 782
 JOHN A HALL, 1697
 MAUREEN T HALLINAN, 1686
 A H HALSEY, 1684
 GARY G HAMILTON, 1372
 BARBARA GAIL HANSON, 833
 ANN HAWKINS, 223
 JAMES C HEARN, 505
 CAROL A HEIMER, 492, 1112
 KEVIN HENSON, 1099
 ALEXANDER HICKS, 205
 STEPHEN HILGARTNER, 258
 JAMES HUGHES, 262
 DAVID HULL, 839
 PATRICK JACKSON, 802
 JANET L JACOBS, 534
 BOB JESSOP, 1095
 DAVID T JOHNSON, 209
 SATOSHI KANAZAWA, 1090
 TAKEHIKO KARIYA, 1374
 PHILIP KASINITZ, 1642
 MICHAEL C KEARL, 1395
 MIKE FORREST KEEN, 1359
 ALAN C KERCKHOFF, 1691
 DAVID I KERTZER, 1674
 GARY H KIGER, 488
 FRED KNISS, 1139
 DAVID KNOKE, 485
 THOMAS KOENIG, 808
 NEIL J KRESSEL, 499
 LESTER KURTZ, 1125
 RICHARD W LACHMANN, 514
 DAVID A LATZKO, 497
 EDWARD C LEHMAN, 240

Book Reviewers

- JEFFREY LEHMAN, 778
 ZAI LIANG, 1656
 JAMES R LINCOLN, 1651
 DAVID LINDSTROM, 1661
 ALLEN E LISKA, 556
 LINDA LOBAO, 784
 JOHN ALLEN LOGAN, 477
 VICKI LUNDMARK, 841
 BRUCE LUSKE, 252
 TONY MAIER, 1688
 PETER K MANNING, 1385
 MARCO MARAFFI, 1348
 RAYMOND MARKEY, 203
 THEODORE MARMOR, 1110
 DOUGLAS S MASSEY, 1346
 MAVIS MATE, 1676
 DANIEL S MATTERN, 1355
 SUSAN MAYER, 780
 JOHN D MCCARTHY, 1658
 CRAIG MCEWEN, 1120
 GREGORY MCLAUCHLAN, 772
 JUAN DIEZ MEDRANO, 1143
 MARYGOLD S MELLI, 1635
 KATHERINE MEYER, 247, 1681
 MICHELE MICHELETTI, 233
 RUTH MILKMAN, 1368
 ALAN S MILLER, 251
 MARK S MIZRUCHI, 483
 JOHN MODELL, 1389
 ALDON D MORRIS, 1147
 CHANDRA MULLER, 1381
 JOANE P NAGEL, 796
 LAURA NASH, 249
 KATHRYN NECKERMAN, 1637
 VICTOR NEE, 1087
 MARY JO NEITZ, 536
 KEVIN NEUHOUSER, 526
 MICHAEL D NEWCOMB, 550
 YVONNE NEWSOME, 1639
 DONALD A NIELSEN, 529
 JAMES L NOLAN, 502
 GUY OAKES, 815
 ALICE O'CONNOR, 221
 PAMELA OLIVER, 1361
 J FARLEY ORDOVENSKY, 811
 FRED C PAMPPEL, 517
 ANDREW W PARKIN, 790
 RONNELLE PAULSEN, 1344
 PAOLA PÉREZ-ALEMÁN, 1393
 MICHAEL D PHILLIPS, 225
 SIDNEY PLOTKIN, 512
 ANDREA PRESS, 219
 JILL S QUADAGNO, 1352
 KATHY RAGSDALE, 1124
 LANA RAKOW, 1693
 RAKA RAY, 532
 KENT REDDING, 1130
 KIMBERLY A REED, 1628
 STEVEN REED, 1654
 STEIN RINGEN, 1092
 GRETCHEN RITTER, 1109
 GLENDA ROBERTS, 1122
 JENNIFER ROBERTSON, 1376
 E BURKE ROCHFORD, 1138
 MARY F ROGERS, 525
 DEAN G ROJEK, 521
 ÁKOS RÓNA-TAS, 770
 RICHARD ROSENFELD, 1387
 PETER H ROSSI, 1101
 MARY RUGGIE, 260
 SONYA SALAMON, 1626
 JIMY M SANDERS, 215
 LAWRENCE SCAFF, 820
 BETH E SCHNEIDER, 540
 MARK SCHNEIDER, 256
 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, 1142
 HANS SEBALD, 244
 ULLICA SEGERSTRÅLE, 844
 MARK SHANLEY, 1085
 SAWAKO SHIRAHASE, 1653
 ARTHUR B SHOSTAK, 1365
 ALAN SICA, 1404
 SAMUEL SILVA-GOTAY, 1132
 RUTH SIMPSON, 519
 VICKI SMITH, 1097
 WILLIAM S SOLOMON, 1363
 ANNEMETTE SØRENSEN, 1632
 DAPHNE SPAIN, 1383
 CAROLYN KAY STEEDMAN, 229
 JOHN D STEPHENS, 1353
 MITCHELL STEVENS, 1695
 ARTHUR L STINCHCOMBE, 1672
 WILLIAM F STINNER, 227
 GEORGE W STOCKING, JR, 816
 MERCER SULLIVAN, 1640
 GUY SWANSON, 1682
 DAVID SWARTZ, 506
 VERTA TAYLOR, 238
 ANN R TICKAMYER, 1625
 CHARLES TILLY, 1670
 ELEANOR TOWNSLEY, 522
 WALTER I TRATTNER, 207

American Journal of Sociology

J RICHARD UDRY, 1114	BARRY WELLMAN, 798	CHRISTINE L WIL-
ETIENNE VAN DE	AMY STUART WELLS,	LIAMS, 1645
WALLE, 1677	1409	JAMES G WILLIAMS,
WILLIAM VÉLEZ, 213	HARALD WENZEL, 1370	531
MERVIN VERBIT, 1136	REGINA WERUM,	LAWRENCE A WOHL,
SUZANNE VROMEN, 510	1118	479
ROBIN E WAGNER-	CATHERINE WEST-	ANNA YEATMAN, 538
PACIFICI, 827	NEWMAN, 809	RUTH ZAMBRANA, 552
JOHN P WALSH, 1647	MARTIN K WHYTE,	SANDRA L ZIMDARS-
MARY C WATERS, 217	528	SWARTZ, 242

• P R I N C E T O N •

REGULATING THE SOCIAL

The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany

George Steinmetz

Why does the welfare state develop so unevenly across countries, regions, and localities? How are elite and popular conceptions of social reality related to welfare policies? George Steinmetz approaches these issues by exploring the complex origins and development of local and national social policies in nineteenth-century Germany

"[This] book will meet the highest standards of both sociologists and historians. It will become the central text for discussions of the social policy complex in this period. . ."—Geoff Eley

Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, Editors
Cloth \$45.00 ISBN 0-691-03240-8

GAYS AND THE MILITARY

Joseph Steffan versus
the United States

**Edited by Marc Wolinsky
and Kenneth Sherrill**

Marc Wolinsky and Kenneth Sherrill have collected the affidavits filed on behalf of Joseph Steffan in his landmark lawsuit against the United States government, together with the counter-arguments of the Department of Defense and the extraordinary opinion of the U.S. District Court

This unusual and innovative work addresses fundamental questions: How is sexual orientation determined? How and why have socially prejudiced stereotypes about male and female homosexuals developed? Why have gays faced special obstacles in defending themselves against discrimination? How much political power do gays have? These remarkable documents are essential reading

All royalties from the sale of this book will be donated to the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund

Paper \$14.95 ISBN 0-691-01944-4
Cloth \$39.50 ISBN 0-691-03307-2



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

41 WILLIAM ST., PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • ORDERS 609 883-1759 • OR FROM YOUR LOCAL BOOKSTORE

Gender, Identity & Theory


Sociology Titles from St. Martin's Press

WORKING WOMEN DON'T HAVE WIVES

Professional Success in the 1990s

Terri Apter

"Subtle and sensitive A thoughtful analysis of an extraordinarily complex problem, as well as a concise summary of feminist thought over the past four decades "



—KIRKUS REVIEWS

"In this provocative book, Apter makes a plea for company

policies that would enable women to be with their children without having to sacrifice professional success "

—PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

1994 • 290 pp

ISBN 0-312-09675-5 • \$19 95

EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

Edited by **Soledad Garcia**

This book examines the complexity of the notion of European identity, stressing the differences between cultural traditions on the one hand and economic and political influence on the other

1993 • 256 pp

ISBN 1-85567-142-5 • \$49 00

A Pinter Publishers book

BACK TO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The Construction of Social Orders

Nicos P. Mouzelis

Mouzelis argues against the marked tendency in present-day sociology to conflate philosophy and sociological theory. He draws from a variety of theoretical traditions in order to construct a set of interrelated concepts useful for bridging the gulf between macro and micro sociologies

1993 • 224 pp

ISBN 0-312-10361-1 • \$18 95 pb

PUBLIC BODIES/ PRIVATE STATES

New Views on Women and Representation

Edited by **Jane Brettell** and **Sally Rice**

This book combines visual imagery from women artists and the work of leading women theorists in a multidisciplinary examination of the body, structured around themes such as health and reproduction, marriage, and religion

1994 • 156 pp • illus

ISBN 0-7190-4120-1 • \$90 00 cl

ISBN 0-7190-4121-X • \$24 95 pb

Photography Critical Views Series

A Manchester University Press book

St. Martin's Press is the exclusive North American distributor of I B Tauris, Manchester University Press and Pinter Publishers titles

Scholarly & Reference Division
257 Park Avenue South New York, NY 10010 1-800-817-2525

Roger Friedland and
Deirdre Boden, Editors

NowHere

Space, Time, and Modernity

Foreword by Anthony Giddens

"A fascinating collection of essays, led off by an introduction of shrewd, comprehensive readings of space-time problems in the thought of the leading theorists of modernity and late (post) modernity"

—George E. Marcus,

co-editor of *Writing Culture*

\$47.00 cloth, \$18.00 paper, illustrated

Nancy Foner

The Caregiving Dilemma

Work in an American
Nursing Home

Foner provides a major study of institutional care that focuses on nursing aides, who are the backbone of American nursing homes
"A first-rate ethnography"

—Louise Lamphere,

University of New Mexico

\$25.00 cloth

NEW-IN-PAPER

David Reid, Editor

Sex, Death and God in L.A.

"A provocative and involving book—the sort of book that makes you want to read more about Los Angeles, the sort of book that compels you to think about the mind-boggling disparities that exist within the boundaries of Los Angeles and so many other American cities"—*New York Times*

\$13.00 paper, illustrated

Ronald P. Dore

Shinohata

A Portrait of a Japanese
Village

With a new afterword—"The sweep of modern Japanese social history is meshed with marvelously revealing portraits of how the hamlet is structured, how it works, and what it means to live in this most elemental and formative of all Japanese social entities"

—*New York Times Book Review*

\$14.00 paper, illustrated

Suzanna Danuta Walters

Lives Together/ Worlds Apart

Mothers and Daughters in
Popular Culture

"A fascinating history of women's oppression, liberation, and feminist backlash told on the pages of *Cosmo*, in darkened theaters, and broadcast into our homes by TV"

—*LA Reader Review*

\$14.00 paper, illustrated

Mark Juergensmeyer

The New Cold War?

Religious Nationalism
Confronts the Secular State

"A sensitive survey of religious nationalism around the world, with some gentle advice for Americans bewildered by all the uproar"

—*Kirkus Reviews*

Comparative Studies in Religion and Society, \$15.00 paper

At bookstores or order toll-free 1-800-822-6657

University of California Press

Music/Culture from Wesleyan

Black Noise

*Rap Music
and Black Culture
in Contemporary America*

TRICIA ROSE

"No more loose-headed talk about rap and hip hop! From now on, all discussion starts here with *Black Noise*, a crucial book about a culture that has also become a new kind of social movement "

—Andrew Ross

\$35 00 cloth / \$14 95 paper

Upside Your Head

*Rhythm and Blues
on Central Avenue*

JOHNNY OTIS

"A fascinating collection of recollections, anecdotes, opinions, and diatribe by one of the most unique figures in mid-twentieth century United States popular culture "

—Ray Pratt

\$25 00 cloth

Dissonant Identities

*The Rock'n'Roll Scene
in Austin, Texas*

BARRY SHANK

"Shank brings contemporary theory to contemporary music [in] a richly detailed and strongly argued analysis of rock'n'roll as it is lived, created, and loved in Austin, Texas "

—Horace Newcomb

\$39 95 cloth / \$16 95 paper

Recently Published

Running with the Devil Power, Gender, and Madness in Heavy Metal Music by Robert Walser \$39 50 cloth / \$15 95 paper

New England

University Press of New England • Hanover, NH 03755-2048 • 800-421-1561



Liberal Leadership

Great Powers and Their Challengers in Peace and War

MARK R BRAWLEY

How do dominant powers arise in the world? Why do other nations challenge them? What are the effects of great-power wars on political and economic relations? Responding to such vital questions about the dynamics of the international system, Brawley advances a comprehensive model of the relationship between war and hegemonic leadership \$34 50

Adjusting to Policy Failure in African Economies

EDITED BY
DAVID E SAHN

Sixteen specialists examine the external and domestic factors that precipitated Africa's economic crisis and the nature and consequences of the process of reform designed to restore macro-economic stability and accelerate the rate of economic growth FOOD SYSTEMS AND AGRARIAN CHANGE \$49 95 cloth, \$19 95 paper

The Art of Conversation

PETER BURKE

With this pioneering work, Burke provides the first comprehensive social history of language in early modern Europe. He focuses on the dynamic roles of class distinction, ethnic and religious difference, and sexual politics to illuminate the intricate ties between language and identity formation

\$39 95 cloth, \$13 95 paper

Dismantling Apartheid

A South African Town in Transition

WALTON R JOHNSON

As a result of Pretoria's 1976 imposition of independence on the "black homeland" of Transkei, its capital city, Umtata, became one of the first communities in South Africa to experience fundamental change in apartheid. This timely book discusses those relationships that remained unchanged, as well as the important race and class realignments that accompanied apartheid's dismantling. ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

\$39 95 cloth, \$16 95 paper

The Making of American Exceptionalism

The Knights of Labor and Class Formation in the Nineteenth Century

KIM VOSS

"Voss's book makes two signal contributions. First, it provides a lucid, consistent, persuasive account of both the rise and the fall of the Knights of Labor. Second, it relates that history firmly to our more general understanding both of working-class collective action and of solidarity among different kinds of workers."

—Charles Tilly, New School for Social Research

\$39 95 cloth, \$16 95 paper

State and Society in Contemporary Korea

EDITED BY
HAGEN KOO

This book moves beyond narrow economic concerns to explore spheres of civil society that have been neglected in the literature on economic development \$32 50 cloth, \$13 95 paper

*At bookstores, or call
(607) 277-2211
(credit card orders only)*

Cornell

U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

Sage House • 512 East State Street • Ithaca NY 14850

Paper Edition Now Available

BEYOND THE LAW

Crime in Complex Organizations

Edited by Michael Tonry and Albert J. Reiss, Jr.

This newest volume in the *Crime and Justice* series focuses on the latest research and commentary on criminal misconduct occurring in U S corporations and government agencies, with special emphasis on savings and loan fraud, insider trading, nursing homes, environmental pollution, and other forms of "white collar crime "

Leading experts from a variety of disciplines investigate these antisocial and unlawful behaviors, and further explore the roles of self-regulation, administrative regulation, and civil and criminal sanctions in shaping organizational behavior

Organizational Crime, *Albert J. Reiss, Jr.*, and *Michael Tonry*

The Nursing Home Industry, *John Braithwaite*

Insider Trading, *Nancy Reichman*

Industrial Water Pollution, *Peter Cleary Yeager*

The Cartage Industry in New York, *Peter Reuter*

The Savings and Loan Industry, *Henry N. Pontell* and *Kitty Calavita*

Crime, Justice, and the Savings and Loan Crisis, *Franklin E. Zimring* and *Gordon Hawkins*

Michael Tonry is Marvin J. Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of Minnesota. **Albert J. Reiss, Jr.** is William Graham Sumner Professor of Sociology and Lecturer in Law at Yale University.

1993 320 pp Cloth \$35.00 ISBN 0-226-80821-1

Paper \$19.95 ISBN 0-226-80823-8

Beyond the Law is Volume 18 of the *Crime and Justice* series, edited by *Michael Tonry*

Order through your bookstore or directly from

The University of Chicago Press

11030 S. Langley Ave., Chicago, IL 60628

Or call (312) 568-1550

6/94

From The University of Arkansas Press

The Other Brahmins

Boston's Black Upper Class, 1750-1950

Adelaide M. Cromwell

This pioneering work explores race and the social caste system in an atypical northern environment over a period of two centuries. Based on scholarly sources, interviews, and questionnaires, the study identifies those blacks in Boston who exercised political, economic, and social leadership from the end of the 18th century to the middle of the 20th century.

\$26.00 cloth (s), 1-55728-301-X

Ambiguous Lives

Free Women of Color in Rural Georgia, 1789-1879

Adele Logan Alexander

Written as a "reclamation" of a long-ignored substratum of our society, *Ambiguous Lives* is more than the story of one family—it is a well-researched and fascinating profile of America, its race and gender relations, and its complex cultural weave.

★ 1992 Myers Center Outstanding Book on Human Rights

\$23.00 cloth (s), 1-55728-214-5 \$12.00 paper, 1-55728-215-3

Black Charlestonians

A Social History, 1822-1885

Bernard E. Powers, Jr.

Because of its large free black population, Charleston provided a case study of black social class stratification and social mobility even before the Civil War. Reconstruction only emphasized that stratification, and Powers examines in detail the aspirations and concessions that shaped the lives of the newly-freed blacks.

\$36.00 cloth (s), 1-55728-364-8 (available October 1994)

Call toll free 1-800-525-1823



ARKANSAS

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS PRESS

McIlroy House ♦ 201 Ozark Avenue ♦ Fayetteville, AR 72701

Community Review

Community
Review



Kenneth Peeples, Editor

*LaGuardia Community College of the
City University of New York*

A journal for the exchange of professional concerns and interests within the two-year community colleges. A wide range of topics is covered, including experimental programs, curriculum development, population makeup, and student counseling.

Regular features include:

Roundtable, Book Reviews, Media, and Poetry

Recent articles:

The Community College Mission

Joanne R. Reitano

Integrating Ethics in Community Colleges, Accounting Programs

Clifton Clarke

The Time is Now: An Education Course for College Instructors

Arlene C. Moriber

Advantages and Disadvantages of Hiring Part-Time Faculty in Higher Education

Ranjani H. Selvadurai

Published Semiannually

Subscription Rates:

Individuals: \$18/yr; \$33/2yrs

Institutions: \$30/yr; \$50/2yrs

Domestic first-class mail add \$12/yr

Foreign surface mail add \$12/yr

Foreign airmail add \$20/yr



TRANSACTION PERIODICALS CONSORTIUM

Department 2000, Rutgers—The State University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903

WOMEN FOUNDERS of the SOCIAL SCIENCES

Lynn McDonald



"Throw out those dated books on the white, male founders of the social sciences! McDonald documents the ideas and lives of the brilliant early women in the social sciences, while also lucidly explaining why patriarchs and many feminists stubbornly fail to acknowledge our female founders" **Mary Jo Deegan**, University of Nebraska, author of *Women in Sociology* (1991)

"[A] daring, controversial book McDonald shows why women like Florence Nightingale, Jane Addams and Beatrice Webb are known historical figures, but overlooked as founders of social science theory" **Marjorie Griffin Cohen**, Simon Fraser University, co-author of *Women's Issues in Canada* (1994)

May 1994, 373 pp, 15 illus

ISBN 0-88629-218-2 case US\$27.95/Cdn\$34.95 ISBN 0-88629-219-0 pbk. US \$19.95/Cdn\$24.95

Carleton University Press

1125 Colonel By Dr., 160 PA, Ottawa K1S 5B6 Canada Fax: 613-788-2893 Tel: 613-788-3740

Instead of just complaining about bad sociological writing, we thought it was time to do something about it. We hope you agree.

WRITING SOCIOLOGY is a quarterly newsletter immodestly aimed at changing the way sociologists write. We think that the classic promise of the discipline—to help people gain more control over their lives by giving them insight into the workings of the self and of society—can't be fulfilled unless sociologists write more clearly, forcibly, and authentically. We also want sociologists to take more seriously the need to craft their writing so that it is accessible to all who might benefit from it.

WRITING SOCIOLOGY publishes short essays on the craft and politics of academic writing, the link between writing and the self, how writing is affected by the conditions under which it is done, styles and effects of sociological writing, and about the use of writing to teach sociology.

Inquiries and submissions can be sent to Michael Schwalbe, Department of Sociology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, 27695-8107, or to Cliff Staples, Department of Sociology, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, 58202.

A four-issue subscription costs \$10. Make check payable to Writing Sociology and mail to Writing Sociology, University of North Dakota, P O Box 7136, Grand Forks, ND, 58202.

Writing

SOCIOLOGY

Escape From The Bog

ESSAY

William W. Schwalbe
Michael Schwalbe / p. 3
Cliff Staples / p. 4

Writing Theory / p. 5
Writing Theory / p. 6
Writing Theory / p. 7

Writing Theory / p. 8
Writing Theory / p. 9
Writing Theory / p. 10

Writing Theory / p. 11
Writing Theory / p. 12
Writing Theory / p. 13

Writing Theory / p. 14
Writing Theory / p. 15
Writing Theory / p. 16

Writing Theory / p. 17
Writing Theory / p. 18
Writing Theory / p. 19

Writing Theory / p. 20
Writing Theory / p. 21
Writing Theory / p. 22

Writing Theory / p. 23
Writing Theory / p. 24
Writing Theory / p. 25

Writing Theory / p. 26
Writing Theory / p. 27
Writing Theory / p. 28

Writing Theory / p. 29
Writing Theory / p. 30
Writing Theory / p. 31

Writing Theory / p. 32
Writing Theory / p. 33
Writing Theory / p. 34

Writing Theory / p. 35
Writing Theory / p. 36
Writing Theory / p. 37

Writing Theory / p. 38
Writing Theory / p. 39
Writing Theory / p. 40

Writing Theory / p. 41
Writing Theory / p. 42
Writing Theory / p. 43

Writing Theory / p. 44
Writing Theory / p. 45
Writing Theory / p. 46

Writing Theory / p. 47
Writing Theory / p. 48
Writing Theory / p. 49

Writing Theory / p. 50
Writing Theory / p. 51
Writing Theory / p. 52

Writing Theory / p. 53
Writing Theory / p. 54
Writing Theory / p. 55

Writing Theory / p. 56
Writing Theory / p. 57
Writing Theory / p. 58

Writing Theory / p. 59
Writing Theory / p. 60
Writing Theory / p. 61

Writing Theory / p. 62
Writing Theory / p. 63
Writing Theory / p. 64

Writing Theory / p. 65
Writing Theory / p. 66
Writing Theory / p. 67

Writing Theory / p. 68
Writing Theory / p. 69
Writing Theory / p. 70

Writing Theory / p. 71
Writing Theory / p. 72
Writing Theory / p. 73

Writing Theory / p. 74
Writing Theory / p. 75
Writing Theory / p. 76

Writing Theory / p. 77
Writing Theory / p. 78
Writing Theory / p. 79

Writing Theory / p. 80
Writing Theory / p. 81
Writing Theory / p. 82

Writing Theory / p. 83
Writing Theory / p. 84
Writing Theory / p. 85

Writing Theory / p. 86
Writing Theory / p. 87
Writing Theory / p. 88

Writing Theory / p. 89
Writing Theory / p. 90
Writing Theory / p. 91

Writing Theory / p. 92
Writing Theory / p. 93
Writing Theory / p. 94

Writing Theory / p. 95
Writing Theory / p. 96
Writing Theory / p. 97

Writing Theory / p. 98
Writing Theory / p. 99
Writing Theory / p. 100

CHICAGO

THE END OF THE LINE

Lost Jobs, New Lives in Postindustrial America

Kathryn Marie Dudley

The story of what the 1988 closing of the Chrysler assembly plant in Kenosha, Wisconsin meant to the people who lived in that company town

"*The End of the Line* is a major contribution to dispelling the widespread belief that in America opportunity is alive and well. This superb ethnography explores the consequences of deindustrialization in a tight economy. Opportunities may be dead but the American dream lives. This is the tragic message of Kathryn Dudley's fine book"—Stanley Aronowitz, Graduate Center, City University of New York

Cloth \$26.95 256 pages illus

Morality and Society series



CHILDERLEY

Nature and Morality in a Country Village

Michael Mayerfeld Bell

"A first-class book, thoughtful, based on solid fieldwork expertly handled, and dealing with serious issues in a serious way"

—Howard S. Becker, University of Washington

Cloth \$32.50 288 pages

Morality and Society series

THE SOCIAL THEORY OF PRACTICES

Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions

Stephen Turner

The first analysis and critique of the concept of "practices" as it has developed in the various theoretical traditions of the social sciences and the humanities. Turner argues that there is no plausible mechanism by which a practice is transmitted or reproduced, and sketches a picture of what happens when social theorists and philosophers discard this notion.

*Paper \$14.95 160 pages

DISCOURSE AND DESTRUCTION

The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE

Robin Wagner-Pacifici

Wagner-Pacifici examines how the struggle in the 1980s between the city of Philadelphia and the radical group MOVE went from memos and meetings to tear gas and bombs.

"Fascinating. This book encourages the reader to examine the discourse surrounding social violence in ways that are both more critical and more systematic"—Wendy Griswold, University of Chicago

*Paper \$12.95 192 pages

*Also available in cloth

MAX WEBER'S COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

Stephen Kalberg

Rejecting traditional notions, Kalberg argues that Weber's substantive work offers a coherent and distinctive model for comparative historical analysis

"With this work, Stephen Kalberg confirms his place in the first rank of Weber scholars today"—Randall Collins, University of California, Riverside

*Paper 240 pages \$18 95

PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD

José Casanova

In a sweeping reconsideration of the relation between religion and modernity, Casanova surveys the roles that religion may play in the public sphere of modern societies

"On the basis of this stunning book, I would put Casanova in a small handful of the best historical and comparative sociologists of his generation"—Robert N Bellah

*Paper \$17 95 352 pages

Now in paper

EMILE DURKHEIM ON INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Emile Durkheim

Edited and translated by Mark Traugott

These selections illuminate Durkheim's multiple approaches to the crucial concept of social solidarity and the study of institutions as diverse as the law, morality, and the family

"Traugott has produced a highly readable translation, taking great care to reflect the flavor and clarity of the original"—Waldia Katz Fishman, *Sociology*

\$14 95 288 pages

Heritage of Sociology series

INTENSIVE CARE

Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession

Robert Zussman

\$14 95 260 pages illus

SLIM'S TABLE

Race, Respectability, and Masculinity

Mitchell Duneier

With photographs by Ovie Carter

"I know of no other sociological work—not even Du Bois's classic *Philadelphia Negro*—which begins to provide as keenly sensitive and deeply understanding a word-portrait of poor working-class black men"—Robert K Merton, Columbia University

\$9 95 200 pages illus

THE RADIANT PAST

Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to Capitalism

Michael Burawoy and János Lukács

\$13 95 232 pages illus



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637

SPECIAL BACK ISSUE SAVINGS
American Journal of Sociology

Enhance your reference collection with significant scholarship from recent back issues
Choose single issues, volumes, or a set of all issues remaining in our inventory
But, hurry – availability is limited to current inventory at the time your order is processed

**FOCUS ON MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND
THE LIFE COURSE 96 4**

John A. Clausen, Adolescent Competence and
the Shaping of the Life Course
Judith A. Seltzer, Legal Custody Arrange-
ments and Children's Economic Welfare
Linda Waite and **Lee Lillard**, Children and
Marital Disruption
Hiroshi Ishida, **John Goldthorpe**, and **Robert
Erikson**, Intergenerational Class Mobility in
Postwar Japan

THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY

Alan Wolfe, Mind, Self, Society, and
Computer 96 5
William H. Sewell, A Theory of Structure
Duality, Agency, and Transformation 98 1
Dmitri N. Shalin, Critical Theory and the
Pragmatist Challenge 98 2

RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass
96 2
Verna M. Keith and **Cedric Herring**, Skin
Tone and Stratification in the Black Commu-
nity 97 3

MARKETS AND NETWORKS

Wayne Baker, Market Networks and Corpo-
rate Behavior 96 3
Edwina Uehara, Dual Exchange Theory,
Social Networks, and Informal Social Support
96 3
Werner Raub and **Jeroen Weesie**, Reputation
and Efficiency in Social Interactions 96 3
Joel M. Podolny, A Status-based Model of
Market Competition 98 4
Trond Petersen, Individual, Collective, and
Systems Rationality in Work Groups: Dilem-
mas and Market-Type Solutions 98 3
Neil Fligstein and **Peter Brantley**, Bank Con-
trol, Owner Control, or Organizational Dy-
namics: Who Controls the Large Modern
Corporation? 98 2

SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE, 97 2

Wayne E. Baker and **Robert R. Faulkner**, Role
as Resource in the Hollywood Film Industry
Tia DeNora, Musical Patronage and Social
Change in Beethoven's Vienna
Wesley Shrum, Critics and Publics Cultural
Mediation in Highbrow and Popular Perform-
ing Arts

Set of remaining issues* (vols 93-98) at 50% off. ☐ Individuals \$129 55 ☐ Institutions \$280 50

Individual volumes 93-99* at 35% off ☐ Individuals \$29 70 ☐ Institutions \$65 40

☐ Vol 93 ☐ 94 ☐ 95 ☐ 96 ☐ 97 ☐ 98 ☐ 99

Single issues* at 25% off ☐ Individuals \$5 65 ☐ Institutions \$12 50

List by vol / no _____

*Out of stock (not available) 93 2, 93 3, 93 4, 94 3 In limited supply 93 1

All journal rates include domestic postage Outside USA add 75¢ per issue for postage
Canadians, please add 7% GST to all back issue orders

☐ Charge my ☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard Exp date _____

Acct No _____ Signature _____

Phone(_____) _____

☐ Check enclosed (payable to journal) ☐ Purchase order enclosed

Name _____

Address _____

City/State _____ Zip _____

Please mail your order with payment to The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P O
Box 37005, Chicago, IL 60637 SF5BK

Indians in Prison

Incarcerated Native Americans in Nebraska
Elizabeth S. Grobsmith

"The subject of Indians in prison is of great importance not only because of the increasing Native American population in prisons (and the consequences for Indian life) but because that population is so disproportionately high. This first book-length study of the subject surveys the topic comparatively, incorporating detail based on firsthand ethnographic study and at the same time the hard data necessary to make it a definitive survey."

—Raymond J. DeMallie
\$37.50 cl

A Time to Die

The Attica Prison Revolt
Tom Wicker

"An excellent and gripping account of a massacre that dramatized some appalling weaknesses in the fabric of our society."

—Robert E. Walters,
Nation
\$12.95 pa

University of
Nebraska Press
Lincoln, NE 68588-0484
800-755-1105

Durkheim and Women

Jennifer M. Lehmann


"Lehmann makes the topic of Durkheim's theorizing in relation to women central to the vital question of the relationship of capitalism and of liberal social thought to patriarchy. Lehmann's work raises this issue in a clear and perspicacious way."—Roslyn W. Bologh

Durkheim and Women is the first book-length work to present a feminist analysis of the theoretical writings of Emile Durkheim. Through a close textual reading of Durkheim's widely scattered statements about women, Jennifer M. Lehmann reconstructs a coherent Durkheimian theory of women.
\$30.00 cl

Gender and the Academic Experience

Berkeley Women Sociologists
Edited by Kathryn P. Meadow-Orlans
and Ruth A. Wallace

It is difficult to imagine an intellectual world with only a few—if any—women scholars and sociologists. But that was the case, not so long ago, for women such as Arlene Kaplan Daniels, Dorothy Smith, Arlie Russell Hochschild, Jacqueline Wiseman, and Lillian Rubin. In this thought-provoking book, sixteen women describe their marginal status and how their struggles informed their studies and their later work.
\$14.95 pa, \$35.00 cl



"N"

RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES

From the 1960s to the 1990s

Second Edition

Edited by Michael Omi

and Howard Winant

Critical Social Thought

224 pp \$49.95/hb \$15.95/pb

GEORGES BATAILLE

Michael Richardson

160 pp \$59.95/hb \$16.95/pb

UNWOMANLY CONDUCT

The Challenges of Intentional
Childlessness

Carolyn M. Morell

256 pp \$55.00/hb \$16.95/pb

MOTHERING

Ideology, Experience, and Agency

Edited by Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Grace
Chang, and Linda Rennie Forcey

Perspectives on Gender


\$49.95/hb \$16.95/pb

GROWING UP BEFORE STONEWALL

Life-Stories of Some Gay Men

Peter M. Nardi, David Sanders,
and Judd Marmor

192 pp 8 illus \$55.00/hb \$16.95/pb



DISLOCATING MASCULINITY

Comparative Ethnographies

Edited by Andrea Cornwall
and Nancy Lindisfarne

Male Orders

256 pp \$62.50/hb \$18.95/pb

DANGEROUS CLASSES

The Underclass and Social Citizenship

Lydia Morris

192 pp \$62.50/hb \$17.95/pb

RETHINKING IMAGINATION

Culture and Creativity

Edited by Gillian Robinson
and John Rundell

240 pp \$62.50/hb \$17.95/pb

SPORTING FEMALES

Critical Issues in the History
and Sociology of Women's Sports

Jennifer Hargreaves

344 pp \$69.95/hb \$25.00/pb

Voice in paper

By the winner of the American Sociological
Association's Jessie Bernard Award

TEXTS, FACTS AND FEMININITY

Exploring the Relations of Ruling

Dorothy E. Smith

256 pp \$16.95/pb

Available at better bookstores

29 WEST 35TH STREET NEW YORK, NY 10001-2299 212-244-6412 or fax 800-248-4724

ROUTLEDGE



0002-9602(199405)99 6:1-00